

G20 International Migration and Displacement Trends Report 2018



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Executive summary

Key trends

- The population of G20 countries, which has now reached 4.7 billion, increased by more than 66 million between 2015 and 2017, with 7 million attributing to net migration.
- In 2017, 65% of the 258 million international migrants worldwide resided in the G20, accounting for 3.5% of the G20 population. About 40% of international migrants in the G20 came from 10 countries.
- The main single G20 destination country of new migrants in 2017 was the United States (2.5 million new permanent and temporary migrants). In the European Union, the total number of first permits granted to third-country nationals reached 3.4 million in 2016, up 28% compared to 2015.
- During 2017, there were an estimated 1.7 million claims for asylum lodged with States or UNHCR in ‘first instance’ procedures, of which some 1.3 million were in G20 countries. By the end of 2017, about a third of all refugees under UNHCR’s mandate were living in G20 countries.
- In 2015, about 3.6 million international students were enrolled in tertiary education in the G20. More than half come from another G20 country. They account for 3% of the G20 tertiary-level student population.
- Most migrants in G20 countries are of working age and are in employment. Across the G20, foreign-born individuals are more likely to be in employment than the native-born, with 68% of the foreign-born in employment, compared to 64% of the native-born. Foreign-born workers account for 10% of the employed population in G20 countries.
- Migrants and refugees are not able to fully utilize their skills. One third of migrants in G20 countries, for which data are available, are overqualified for their jobs. Furthermore, migrant workers are more likely to be in non-standard employment.

Policy Implications for the G20 on Maximizing Benefits from Skills of Migrants and Refugees

- The assessment and formal recognition of qualifications and competencies acquired abroad is critical to capitalize on migrants' and refugees' skills and enable their successful inclusion in society. This is particularly important for regulated and highly-skilled occupations; however, recognition of foreign qualifications and prior learning is equally important for low and middle-skilled migrant workers, although often left unaddressed.
- The labour market integration of refugees takes time. Data from Europe suggest that only after 15 years in their host country do refugees reach an employment rate that, at 70%, is comparable with that of the native-born.
- Evidence on policy practice suggests that governments, in collaboration with worker and employer organizations, should design and implement employment policies that support labour market inclusion and job creation for both national and migrant workers at all skill and competency levels.
- *G20 Policy Practices for the Fair and Effective Labour Market Integration of Regular Migrants and Recognised Refugees*, provides a useful framework for improving integration outcomes.

- More generally, it is important to improve the management of regular migration pathways for both migrants moving primarily for work, study or family reasons and those in need of international protection. The G20 has an important role to play in addressing these challenges and making the most out of migration.
- Some traditional settlement countries, notably Australia and Canada in the G20, have developed sophisticated merit-based migration systems. Countries which manage labour migration mostly through temporary migration schemes have usually adopted systems where a job offer is necessary for migrant workers. Newly emerging poles of attraction for migrants and refugees – such as Saudi Arabia, Russia, Turkey – can benefit from the experience of other G20 member states in this regard.
- In all cases, the skill dimension of migration governance becomes critical in maximizing benefits for migrants, as well as for sending or host communities. Efficient matching of demand for skills in destination countries with the potential supply abroad through migration remains quite challenging.
- Skills Mobility Partnerships (SMPs) in particular have recently emerged as an innovative way to associate migration and skills development for the mutual benefit of origin and destination countries.
- Diasporas can act as important agents of change, as they possess substantial human and financial capabilities that can contribute to the socio-economic development of both countries of origin and destination. In 2015/16, overall, close to 30% of migrants in the G20 held a tertiary degree. One in five highly educated migrants in G20 countries comes from India, China or the Philippines.
- A structured policy of engaging, enabling and empowering diaspora, in order to harness their skills and, more generally, enhance economic and social contributions, would be an important policy area for the G20 to address. Yet, to accomplish that, there is a need for better data to understand diaspora size, characteristics and willingness to engage, as well as identify societal and sectoral needs for socio-economic development which could be supported through partnerships with diaspora.

Introduction

Migration has always been present, rising and falling in scale, and will continue to contribute to shape our societies and economies in the future, but as emphasised in the 2017 G20 Leaders' Declaration (Hamburg, 2017) *“the world is experiencing historic levels of migration and forced displacement”*. G20 Leaders called for *“improving the governance of migration and providing comprehensive responses to displacement and recognise the need to develop tools and institutional structures accordingly”*. They also emphasised the need to monitor global displacement and migration, as well as its economic consequences. The OECD, in cooperation with ILO, IOM and UNHCR, was asked to provide an annual update on trends and policy challenges.

The 2018 edition of the joint OECD, ILO, IOM & UNHCR, *G20 International Migration Trends Report* aims to respond to this call, with a special focus on the skills of migrants and refugees. It is composed of two parts. The first part of the report presents the latest figures on migration flows and stocks in G20 countries, including student migration and forced displacement. It also analyses the latest trends regarding labour market integration of migrants and refugees in G20 countries. The second part looks at the main policy challenges for making migration a true enabler of socio-economic development which contributes to building the domestic talent pool and allowing migrants and refugees to make the most out of their skills and competencies. The last section provides some concluding remarks.

A1. Recent trends in migration


Net migration rates in G20 countries

The population of G20 countries, which has now reached 4.7 billion, increased by more than 7 million between 2015 and 2017 due to net migration. This represents almost 11% (+66 million) of the overall population increase in the G20 (including EU28) over that past two years. The United States was the main net destination country with 2.7 million more immigrants than emigrants over this time period (Figure 1), followed by Germany (+2.1 million), Turkey (+900 000) and the United Kingdom (+800 000).

Relative to the countries' population, Germany had the highest annual net migration rate with 8.6 per thousand over 2015-17, twice the level observed between 2010 and 2014. Australia had the second highest net migration rate (6.9 per thousand), followed by Canada (6.0), the United Kingdom (4.1), Turkey (3.8), and Saudi Arabia (3.6) where the net migration rate has been divided by three compared to 2010-2014. In Italy, the net migration also fell very sharply, from 6.5 to 1.0 per thousand as a result of declining inflows and increasing exits.

Only four G20 countries showed negative emigration rates on average over the period 2015-17: Indonesia (-0.6 per thousand), Mexico (-0.5), India (-0.4) and China (-0.2). However, in all these countries, the net migration rate was smaller in recent years than between 2010 and 2014.

Figure 1. Net migration rates in G20 countries, 2010-2017




Source: EU countries: Eurostat. Other G20 countries: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017). World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, DVD Edition. 2010-2014: estimates, 2015-17: medium variant.

Migration flows in G20 countries

Available data on gross migration inflows are not available for all G20 countries and are not systematically comparable. The data presented here are compiled from many different sources, notably based on OECD regional monitoring systems. They include both long-term movements and settlement migration and short-term movements, including students but excluding visitors.

Overall total migration to G20 countries declined in 2017 compared to previous years, but the trend varies considerably across countries (Figure 2 and Table 1). The main single G20 destination country of new migrants in 2017 was the United States with just under 2.5 million new permanent and temporary migrants, despite the first decrease of migration flows since 2010 (-3% compared to 2016). In the European Union, the total number of first permits granted to third-country nationals reached 3.4 million in 2016, up 28% from 2.6 million in 2015. Taking into account only permits with at least one-year duration, there was a 32% increase from 1.5 million to 2 million.

Figure 2. Recent changes in migration flows to selected G20 countries, 2015-2017



Source: see Table 1 below

Inflows to Germany (including intra-EU) amounted to 1.4 million people in 2017, down from 2 million in 2015 and 1.7 million in 2016, but still higher than in any year prior to 2015. Saudi Arabia received around 1.4 million labour migrants from Asia every year since 2015. The number of new temporary and permanent migrants moving to Australia each year was fairly stable since 2013 and stood at 770 000 in 2017.

Total migration flows accounted for just over half a million people in 2017 in Canada (530 000), as well as in the United Kingdom (505 000) despite a steady decline since 2014. In 2017, migration flows increased in France (+5% compared to 2016), in Japan (+11%), Korea (+13%), Italy (+15%), and particularly in Spain (+30%) where the number of new migrants almost doubled between 2013 and 2017. Immigration to the Russian Federation, Argentina and Mexico was stable in 2017 but remained at significantly lower levels than in 2014/15.

Table 1. Migration flows to selected G20 countries, 2010-2017, thousands

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Permanent	Temporary	Students	Source	Comment
Argentina	178	259	292	279	206	269	223	221	1	1	1	Ministry of Interior	
Australia	580	608	698	768	773	765	752	767	1	1	1	DIBP	
Brazil	96	117	133	148	133	137	108		1	1	1	Ministry of Justice	
Canada	482	458	488	494	487	490	549		1	1	1	IRCC	
China													
France	197	193	193	205	211	218	230	243	1	1	1	Ministry of Interior	Non-EU citizens only
Germany	684	842	966	1 108	1 343	2 016	1 720	1 412	1	1	1	Destatis	Intended stay ≥ one week
India													
Indonesia	65	77	72	69	69					1		ILO	Registered migrant worker
Italy	424	354	321	279	248	250	263	301	1		1	Istat	
Japan	287	267	304	307	337	391	428	475	1	1	1	Ministry of Justice	
Mexico	92	91	79	118	109	103	101	102	1	1	1	SEGOB	
Korea	293	307	300	360	407	373	402	453	1	1	1	Ministry of Justice	Long-term ≥ 90 days
Russian Federation	192	206	283	346	439	421	384	391	1			Federal Migration Service	
Saudi Arabia	1 128	1 116	1 277	1 245	1 272	1 397	1 382			1		Sending countries	Worker deployments from Asia
South Africa		118	145	111	83	75			1	1	1	Department of Home Affairs	
Spain	330	336	272	248	264	290	352	454	1			National Institute of Statistics	
Turkey	50	74	96	95	199	164	177		1	1	1		
United Kingdom	498	488	418	449	551	548	515	551	1		1	Office for National Statistics	Long-term Int. Migration
United States	2 000	2 077	2 092	2 162	2 320	2 470	2 534	2 454	1	1	1	DHS/ DOS	
European Union	2 473	2 177	2 097	2 356	2 326	2 622	3 361					Eurostat - first permits to TCN	

Sources: National sources; OECD International Migration Database, OAS, OECD (2017) International migration in the Americas - SICREMI, ADBI, ILO, OECD (2018) Increasing the Development Impact of Migration through Finance and Technology.

Note: Sources, definitions and coverage of data used vary significantly across countries. This does not allow for aggregations and direct comparisons, but order of magnitude and trends can be described. Data are generally based on national sources, and most often include temporary workers and students. N/A means that information is not available. Inflows to Turkey are estimates based on Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Labour reports.

Enrolment of international students in G20 countries

In 2015, about 3.6 million international students were enrolled in tertiary education in the G20 (Table 2). This is 240 000 more than the previous year or a 7% increase in one year. More than two in five students were enrolled in the European Union and one in four in the United States. Overall, the top five G20 destination countries host nearly 60% of international students. Main European destinations are the United Kingdom (431 000), France (239 000) and Germany (229 000). Australia (294 000), Canada (172 000), the Russian Federation (226 000) and Japan (132 000) are other important destination countries for international students.

More than half of international students in the G20 come from another G20 country. This share is particularly high in English-speaking countries, as well as in some Asian G20 countries. Asian students dominate in Australia, Korea and Japan where they make up more than 80% of all foreign students. In Argentina, the large majority of international students are coming from the Americas while in South Africa, and to a lesser extent in France, they are coming mostly from Africa. In the European Union, on average, 57% of international students come from G20 countries, one third from another EU country, 28% from Asia and 12% from Africa.

The share of female international students tends to be higher in the European Union than in non-European G20 countries. There are more women than men among international students enrolled in Italy (59%), in France and the United Kingdom (52%) but also in Korea (54%). Conversely, this share is the lowest in Turkey (31%) and in South Africa (43%).

International students account for an average of 3% of the G20 tertiary-level student population and 8% in the European Union. This proportion reaches 18% in the United Kingdom and 15% in Australia. Conversely, the share of international students in the total student population tends to be low in Asian countries as well as in the Russian Federation and in Turkey.

The proportion of international students increases as they reach higher education levels. On average in the G20, international students account for 7% of students enrolled in Master's programmes, and 19% of PhD programmes. In the United Kingdom and France, more than two in five PhD students are international students.

Most G20 countries have active policies to attract (and retain) international students through specialised agencies (e.g. British council, Campus France, DAAD in Germany, Australian Agency for Education and Training, EducationUSA network) and/or national plans. Japan, for example, has announced its intention to host up to 300 000 international students by 2020. Similarly Canada's international education strategy aims at increasing sharply the number of international students to reach 450 000 in 2022 (see also the National Strategy for International Education 2025 in Australia).

Table 2. International students enrolled in G20 countries, 2015

Destination countries	Number of international or foreign students (in thousands)	G20 countries (%)	Of which from:						Women (%)	Share of international or foreign students by level of tertiary education (%)		
			Americas (%)	Europe (%)	Africa (%)	Oceania (%)	Asia (%)	Not allocated by region		Total tertiary education	Master's or equivalent level	Doctorate or equivalent level
Argentina	3	8	80	20
Australia	294	58	4	4	2	1	86	2	46	15	43	34
Brazil	20	30	49	14	26	-	10	-	46	8	12	22
Canada	172	66	9	12	9	-	51	18	45	11	14	30
China	96	45
France	239	38	7	20	39	-	21	14	52	10	13	40
Germany	229	56	7	37	8	-	32	15	49	8	13	9
India	4	1	25	-	68	1
Indonesia	7	11
Italy	90	45	10	47	13	-	30	1	59	5	5	..
Japan	132	68	1	3	1	-	83	12	47	3	7	18
Korea	55	75	5	2	3	-	88	2	54	2	6	9
Mexico	10	0	1	3
Russian Federation	226	8	-	22	3	-	67	8	..	3	11	5
Saudi Arabia	73	8	2	4	30	-	62	1
South Africa	43	7	3	6	81	-	3	7	43
Spain	75	53	33	40	8	-	8	10	52	3	7	..
Turkey	72	12	1	13	13	-	70	4	31	1	4	6
United Kingdom	431	64	4	30	8	1	48	10	52	18	37	43
United States	907	68	11	7	5	1	74	2	44	5	9	38
European Union	1 522	57	7	40	12	-	28	13	52	8	12	22
G20 total	3 577	56	7	22	9	-	52	9	47	3	7	19
G20 average	..	37	14	10	15	-	52	8	45	6	13 #	20

Note: Data for Argentina, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Saudi Arabia and Turkey refer to foreign students instead of international students. 2014 for Argentina, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia; 2013 for South Africa.

Source: Education at a Glance database, OECD.

Migrant stocks in G20 countries


The share of international migrants in the total population of the G20 remains small, at 3.5% (Figure 3). About 167 million people were born abroad and lived in G20 countries in 2017 with more than half of them being women.

In 2017, 65% of the 258 million international migrants worldwide resided in the G20. Half of them resided in four countries only: the United States, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and the Russian Federation. The United States and the EU28 hosted respectively 30% and 33% of the migrant population living in the G20.

Despite the recent global economic crisis, migrant stocks have continued to increase over the past decades. Since 1990, the number of international migrants in the G20 increased by around 77 million (+86%), more rapidly than in the rest of the world where it grew by 45%. The size of the international migrant stock declined only in India, Indonesia and Brazil. In ten countries and in the EU28, the migrant population more than doubled in the period 1990-2017. Since 2000, the number of foreign-born increased fourfold in Korea, South Africa and Turkey and almost threefold in Italy.

There are significant differences across countries regarding the share of migrants among the population, with very low share of migrants in the largest G20 countries and much higher percentages notably in OECD G20 countries. Foreign-born make up 0.1% and 0.4% of the total population in China and India, while in the EU28 and the United States they account for 11% and 15% of their total population, respectively. The highest shares are observed for Saudi Arabia followed by Australia and Canada.

Figure 3. International migrant stocks in 1990 and 2017 and share in the total population in 2017



Note: The figures for the G20 total include EU28 countries. The figures for China refer to mainland China only.

Source: Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2017 Revision, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2017; OECD (2018a) *International Migration Outlook*.

The top ten origin countries represented 38% of migrants in the G20. Mexico was the top origin country, with close to 12 million emigrants in 2015/16 according to the last round of population censuses data. This corresponds to an increase of 6% from 2010/11. The growth of the stock of migrants from India and China has been remarkable since 2010/11, with increases of 42% and 13% respectively. These two countries, with 4.9 and 4.2 million emigrants respectively in 2015/16, now have the second and third largest diasporas living in the G20. European countries with traditionally large emigrant populations, such as the United Kingdom and Germany, have moved down the list of the top countries of origin, although the Italian diaspora is growing.

A2. Recent trends in asylum applications, resettlement and refugee stocks

Asylum-seekers

*During 2017, there were an estimated 1.7 million claims for asylum lodged with States or UNHCR in ‘first instance’ procedures, of which some 1.3 million were in G20 countries.*¹ The United States was the largest recipient of new asylum applications, with 331 700 lodged in 2017 (Figure 4).² This represents a 27% increase from 2016 (262 000) and nearly double the number in 2015 (172 700). Similar to last year, applicants from the North of Central America³ made up 43% of all claims in the United States. Salvadorans made up the largest nationality of applicants with 49 500 claims, almost half as much as the 33 600 submitted in 2016. Guatemalans and Hondurans were the next largest groups with 35 300 and 28 800 claims in 2017, respectively. Claims from Venezuelans increased by 63% to 29 900, reflecting the challenging conditions in the country (see Box 3).

Germany witnessed a sharp decline in asylum applications. In 2017, 198 300 new applications were registered, a 73% decline from the 722 400 claims in 2016 and less than half the number in 2015 (441 900). As in previous years, the largest number of asylum claims were from Syrians with 49 000 applications, less than one-fifth of the 266 300 claims received in 2016. In contrast to 2016, more Iraqis (21 900) applied for asylum in 2017 than Afghans (16 400) but applications from both declined.

Italy remained the third-largest recipient of asylum claims in 2017 with 126 500 new applications, a small increase compared with 123 000 in 2016. Nigerians were the most common nationality applying for asylum with 25 100 applications. The second most common country of origin was Bangladesh with 12 200 applications. Altogether, applicants from countries in West Africa accounted for over 61% of all applications to Italy.

In Turkey, Syrians receive protection under the country’s Temporary Protection Regulation, with 681 000 new registrations in 2017. In contrast, people of other nationalities seeking protection in Turkey must undergo an individual refugee status determination procedure with the Turkish Government. As per UNHCR registration data, these applications amounted to 126 100 claims, making Turkey the fourth-largest recipient of new asylum applications. Afghans remained the most common nationality to submit asylum applications with 67 400, followed by Iraqis (44 500) and Iranians (9 200).


During 2017, there were 93 000 new individual asylum applications registered in France which remained the fifth-largest recipient of claims, a 19% increase from the previous year (78 400). As in 2016, Albania was the most common country of origin with 11 400 claims. The next most common nationality was Afghans (6 600), followed by Syrians (5 800), and Haitians (5 600).

¹ The data for some countries may include a significant number of repeat claims, i.e. the applicant has submitted at least one previous application in the same or another country.

² Estimated number of individuals based on the number of new cases (138 800) and multiplied by 1.501 to reflect the average number of individuals per case (Source: US DHS); and number of new ‘defensive’ asylum requests lodged with the Executive Office of Immigration Review (123 400, reported by individuals).

³ El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras.

Figure 4. Top G20 recipients of new asylum claims, 2008-2017



Source: UNHCR

There were 3.1 million asylum-seekers with pending claims at the end of 2017, a substantial increase on the 2.8 million individuals awaiting decisions the previous year and a continuation of an increasing trend over recent years. The largest asylum-seeker population towards the end of 2017 was in the United States, where pending claims have continued to increase with 642 700 people, 44% more than in 2016. In Germany, the asylum-seeker population declined by 27%, from 587 300 at the end of 2016 to 429 300 at the end of 2017, thanks to the processing of the backlog of applications. As in 2016, Germany processed by far the highest total number of applications with 749 600 decisions in 2017. Other G20 countries with more than 50 000 asylum claims pending at the end of 2017 included Turkey (308 900), South Africa (191 300), Italy (186 600), Brazil (85 700), France (63 100), Austria (56 300), Canada (51 900), and Sweden (51 600).

Box 3. Recent emigration from Venezuela and demands for international protection

In the past few years, the complex socioeconomic, human rights and political situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has caused more than 2 million Venezuelans to move to neighbouring countries and beyond. The number of Venezuelan migrants and refugees living abroad increased significantly, by over 300% between 2015 and 2018 (IOM and UNHCR 2018). Their primary destinations were Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, Spain, and the United States of America. According to figures provided by host governments, more than 285 000 Venezuelans lodged new asylum claims since the beginning of 2015, with an exponential increase experienced during 2017 and 2018. By early 2018, over 500 000 Venezuelans had accessed other legal forms of stay under national or regional frameworks, including in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay.* However, the majority find themselves in irregular situations. Without access to a legal status, they are at a higher risk of violence, exploitation, sexual abuse, trafficking, and discrimination. While the responses of States were generous, host communities receiving Venezuelans were also under increasing strain as they sought to extend assistance and services to those arriving.

* This figure is based on operational data and includes the beginning of 2018. Countries in the region reported 345 600 Venezuelans in the 'others of concern' category

Refugees

At the end of 2017, the global refugee population, including 5.4 million Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate, was 25.4 million – the highest known total to date and an increase of 2.9 million from the end of 2016. The number of refugees under UNHCR's mandate increased for the sixth year in a row, to a total population of just under 20 million by the end of the year. G20 countries⁴ hosted 7.0 million refugees at the end of 2017,

⁴ 19 G20 countries plus remaining EU-28

representing approximately one-third of all refugees under UNHCR’s mandate. More than half of these refugees were residing in Turkey.

Turkey continued to be the country hosting the world’s largest number of refugees, with a 21% increase in its refugee population, from 2.9 million at the beginning of the year to 3.5 million at the end (Figure 5). The total refugee population hosted in Turkey comprised Syrians (3.4 million), along with Iraqis (37 300), Iranians (8 300), and Afghans (5 600).

The sixth-largest refugee-hosting country in the world and the second among G20 countries was Germany. The refugee population increased by 45% to 970 400, mainly due to positive decisions on asylum claims of individuals already present in the country but also including resettlement arrivals. The majority of refugees hosted by Germany came from Syria (496 700), followed by Iraq (130 600), Afghanistan (104 400), Eritrea (49 300), and the Islamic Republic of Iran (38 300).

Figure 5. Major host countries of refugees among G20 countries, million





Figure 6. Number of refugees per 1 000 inhabitants, top G20 countries, end-2017



Source: UNHCR

*The number of refugees hosted by each country can be compared with reference to the national population size.*⁵ Using this criterion, the impact of the Syrian crisis can clearly be seen in Turkey, with 43 refugees per 1 000 inhabitants, the highest among all OECD member countries (Figure 6). Sweden also has a relatively high proportion of refugees with 24 per 1 000, followed by Malta, Austria, Germany and Denmark.

Resettlement

Altogether, 102 800 refugees were resettled to third countries, the majority of which were to G20 countries (98 100), with numbers dropping significantly compared to 2016. At the same time, UNHCR estimated that 1.2 million refugees were in need of resettlement in 2017.

During the 2017 calendar year, 33 400 people were resettled to the United States, a 65% drop compared with 2016 (96 900).⁶ Other G20 countries that admitted large numbers of resettled refugees during the year included Canada (26 600), Australia (15 100), the United Kingdom (6 200), and Sweden (3 400).

⁵ National population data are from United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, ‘World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision’, New York, 2017. For the purpose of this analysis, the 2017 medium fertility variant population projections have been used. See more <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/>.

⁶ During the US fiscal year 2017, 53 716 people were resettled to the United States


In addition to resettlement, a large number of people in need of protection used complementary pathways in G20 countries. In OECD countries alone, it is estimated that up to 120 000 Syrians, Eritreans, Iraqis, Afghans and Somalis were granted a family, study or work permit in 2016 (Box 4).

Box 4. Monitoring of the use of complementary pathways for refugees in OECD countries.

OECD and UNHCR jointly monitor the use of non-humanitarian, regular entry and visa pathways of admission used by refugees in search of protection and solutions. A first survey focused on specific nationalities, namely Syrians, Eritreans, Iraqis, Afghans and Somalis. These nationalities were selected based on several indicators and factors, including the fact that they comprise more than half of the world’s refugees under UNHCR’s mandate and that these five groups have relatively high recognition rates, ranging from over 55% to 100%. Data are collected from OECD member countries based on first permits issued during the period 2010 to 2016 for family reunification, work or study purposes.

Results presented in Figure 7 are largely driven by permits granted to Syrian nationals who account for between 45 and 60% of all permits granted in 2016. The figure shows the relative importance of family migration and its sharp uptick since 2014/15. Study permits are more volatile while labour migration permits remain at a very low level due to the many obstacles that prevail in terms of international matching and transferability of skills.

Figure 7. First Permits granted by OECD countries (32) to Syrians, Eritreans, Iraqis, Afghans and Somalis by permit type, 2010 and 2016



Source: OECD-UNHCR (2018 forthcoming)

Available evidence regarding refugee skills in selected G20 countries


Labour market integration prospects for refugees depend, as for other migrant groups, on educational attainment. On average, better-educated individuals have much better employment prospects than those with only a basic education. This can be explained by a better fit with labour demand in host countries, better ability to acquire language skills, or other unobservable factors correlated with formal education.

Information on the educational attainment of recent refugees is, however, relatively limited and arises from various sources, at different stages of the asylum process. As a result, there is no comprehensive and comparable data across G20 countries. In some countries, surveys have provided assessment of educational attainment for asylum seekers, while in others, this information is available only for people admitted as refugees. Figure 8 depicts the distribution of education among refugees from two of the main origin countries of recent humanitarian migration, Syria and Afghanistan, in selected OECD countries.

Overall, the educational attainment of these recent refugees appears relatively low compared to natives even if a non-negligible share of refugees hold tertiary degrees. Comparing Syrian and Afghan refugees, it appears that the share of post-secondary educated is markedly higher among the former. There are also stark differences in educational attainment across migration stages and refugee categories. For example, the share of tertiary-educated

is much lower among Syrian refugees in Turkey than among Syrians in Sweden or in Austria. In Canada, where Syrian refugees have been resettled both under government and private sponsorship, those who benefited from private sponsorship were much more likely to have post-secondary education.

Figure 8. Educational attainment among Syrians and Afghans in origin countries, selected G20 countries



Source: Panel A: UNHCR (2016); Panel B: Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Agency (AFAD) (2013); Panel C: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada; Panel D: Statistics Sweden; Panel E: Displaced Persons in Austria Survey (DiPAS); Panel F: German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) (2018).

A3. Labour market integration


Recent trends in labour market outcomes of migrants and refugees in G20 countries

In the G20 countries with available data, 68% of foreign-born individuals are in employment, against 64% of the native-born, with the foreign-born accounting for 10% of the employed population. These averages, however, mask quite some variation across countries.

Countries in which migration is primarily labour-driven, such as Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Canada, and Australia as well as the United Kingdom and the United States have seen employment rates exceeding 70% among their foreign-born populations. Indeed, in the United States, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Korea, South Africa and in South American G20 countries, employment rates among the foreign-born exceed those among their native-born peers (Figure 9).

In contrast, in the majority of G20 countries in the EU, as well as in Indonesia and Mexico (and to a lesser extent in Japan, Canada and Australia), native-born individuals are more likely to be in employment than migrants. In France, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey, the employment rate of the foreign-born falls below 60% and lags substantially behind that of the native-born population.

Figure 9. Employment rates among the native- and foreign-born Percentages of 15- to 64-year-olds, 2017




Source: OECD, EU (2018 forthcoming), Settling In, Indicators of Immigrant Integration

Migrants holding a higher level of education tend to achieve better labour market outcomes than those without. That said, the benefits conferred by a higher education level appear to be dampened among the foreign-born when compared to the education premium among the native-born. This is partially driven by the number of migrants holding foreign qualifications, which tend to be discounted on host country labour markets.

In 2015/16, approximately one-third of immigrants in those G20 countries for which data are available had completed some form of tertiary education (OECD, EU 2018 forthcoming). However, as Figure 10 illustrates, it is precisely among the highly educated that the immigrant-native employment gap is negative virtually everywhere in the G20. In France, Italy, Germany and Spain, employment rates among highly-educated migrants fall more than 10 percentage points below those of their native-born peers. The gap is, however, narrower in the United Kingdom, as well as in Mexico, South Africa, Russia and non-European settlement countries including Canada, the United States, and Australia.

For immigrants who are employed, over-qualification is widespread, and this is mostly driven by immigrants with foreign qualifications which is the case for the vast majority of migrants (OECD, EU 2014). On average in the G20 for which data are available 35% of employed tertiary-educated migrants are overqualified in their job.

Figure 10. Employment gap between foreign-born and native-born aged 15-64 not in education, by educational level, Percentage points, 2015-16




Note: Canadian data include people still in education. Australian data include people aged over 24 who are still in education. The United States includes people over 55 who are still in education and calculates employment rates for the 16-64 age group.

Source: OECD, EU (2018 forthcoming), Settling In, Indicators of Immigrant Integration.

In many G20 countries, migrant women face particular difficulties to integrate into the labour market. In the majority of G20 countries participation rates among foreign-born women lag, not only behind those of their male counterparts, but also lag substantially behind those of native-born women. South Africa, Spain, Argentina, Italy and Saudi Arabia provide notable exceptions to this trend. Yet in France, Germany and Indonesia, participation among foreign-born women fall over 10 percentage points behind those of native-born women (Figure 11).

Figure 11. Participation rate among the native- and foreign-born women, Percentage of the 15-64, 2017



Source: OECD, EU (2018 forthcoming), Settling In, Indicators of Immigrant Integration

More than those who migrate for labour, for study, or to reunite with family, refugees and other recipients of international protection face considerable barriers to labour market integration. Those migrating for international protection are largely driven by push rather than pull factors; they have had little to no time to prepare for migration – to collect proof of qualifications or to learn the language – and they are likely to experience health and educational consequences as a result of their long journey. Lastly, in contrast to migrant workers, who already have an employer upon arrival, refugees arrive without a job in hand. This unique set of integration challenges is often reflected in unemployment rates.

On average, in the European Union in 2014 only 56% of refugees were employed, with the unemployment rate among refugees reaching 19% (OECD/EU 2016). However, outcomes vary substantially across countries. While refugees fare slightly better than other non EU-born migrants in France and Italy, in Germany and the United Kingdom the employment rate of refugees is at least 7 percentage points lower than that of other non EU-born migrants. These employment disparities are driven, in part, by the greater distance between refugees and their host country labour markets, a distance which can take several years to bridge. Proactive approaches that involve all stakeholders are required to improve the labour market inclusion of this group of particularly vulnerable migrants (see Boxes 5&6).

The labour market integration of refugees also takes time. Data from Europe suggest that, only after 15 years in their host country do refugees reach an employment rate that, at 70%, is comparable with that of their native-born counterparts. In Canada, Bevelander and Pendakur (2012) have found evidence that refugee employment rates close the gap with those of natives after 12 to 15 years, and Evans and Fitzgerald (2017) have found evidence that, in the United States, refugees close the gap after 6 years.

Box 5. ILO's global guidelines on access of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons to the labour market

Since the 2016 London Syrian Conference, the issue of refugee employment has become a central pillar of the global intervention framework, highlighting the critical role and responsibilities of the ILO. As a result, the ILO embarked on a path to addressing refugee movements through a strengthened policy framework.

In November 2016, ILO's Governing Body adopted Guiding Principles on the Access of Refugees and other Forcibly Displaced Persons to the Labour Market.⁷ They provide practical guidance on the application of policy measures to facilitate refugee and displaced persons' access to the labour market in a manner that yields positive outcomes for concerned people as well as the host country's working populations. The ILO's effort has been on providing an integrated and comprehensive approach that embraces and reinforces all labour market systems and structures in countries experiencing a large influx of refugees, with an important focus on host communities and their social cohesion.

Further, in June 2017, the International Labour Conference adopted Recommendation N° 205 on Employment and Decent Work for Peace and Resilience⁸, revising the Employment (Transition from War to Peace) Recommendation, 1944 (N° 71). It includes a section on refugees and access to labour markets, and reflects the need for a more comprehensive and updated normative basis for crisis response. It calls for strengthened partnerships and for prevention, resilience and recovery.

Box 6 UNHCR-OECD Action Plan for "Engaging with Employers in the Hiring of Refugees"⁹

Through a series of regional dialogues on "Employing Refugees", the OECD and UNHCR have brought together employers and employer organisations to share lessons learned on how to promote refugee employment. On the basis of these consultations, the two international organisations have drawn up an action plan for employers, refugees, civil society and governments on Engaging with Employers in the Hiring of Refugees.

The plan has been further informed by subsequent consultations with refugees, governments, and civil society to validate the outcomes of the dialogues with employers and employer organisations. Released in April 2018, it is composed of 10 "action areas" which are illustrative of the process and issues faced by employers concerning the hiring of refugees. The Action Plan is structured as follows:

As a starting point, employers must be in a position to navigate the administrative framework regarding work rights (Action 1) and have sufficient legal certainty on the length of stay of refugee workers (Action 2). Once these preconditions are met, the necessary first step in the labour market integration process is the initial assessment of refugees' skills (Action 3). Some skills gaps may be identified in this process, and measures for re- and upskilling may be needed to increase refugee employability (Action 4). With this base, a proper matching can be done with employers' skill needs (Action 5). For a fair recruitment process, equal opportunities are a precondition (Action 6), and the working environment must be prepared (Action 7). Enabling long-term employability requires specific attention (Action 8). To ensure that scalable models for refugee employment are sustained and championed by employers, building a real business case for employment is essential (Action 9). Finally, different stakeholders need to work effectively and efficiently together throughout the process (Action 10). The Action Plan intends to inspire focused policy action and structural coordination among different stakeholders with the aim of facilitating the process of refugee employment for employers, governments, civil society actors and refugees, and thereby getting the most out of refugees' skills to the benefit of all stakeholders.

Non-standard employment among migrant workers¹⁰

According to ILO research, migrant workers are more likely to be in non-standard employment. Migrant workers may lack sufficient language skills, and often have limited or no social and professional networks to rely on. This situation restricts their possibilities of having full labour market information, including about their rights, and also significantly limits their bargaining power. Migrant workers are also under strong pressure to find quick employment in order to pay back migration costs and send remittances. As a consequence, they may find themselves more often in nonstandard employment¹¹ than their native counterparts. Another issue is the lack of

⁷ http://ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_protect/@protrav/@migrant/documents/genericdocument/wcms_536440.pdf

⁸ See more http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:R205

⁹ See more <http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/UNHCR-OECD-Engaging-with-employers-in-the-hiring-of-refugees.pdf>

¹⁰ This section is based on ILO (2016)

¹¹ This specific ILO research addresses four types of non-standard employment: (1) temporary employment; (2) part-time work; (3) temporary agency work and other forms of employment involving multiple parties; and (4) disguised employment relationships and dependent self-employment. The analysis is mainly focused on employees and therefore excludes

recognition of their formal qualifications and skills, including prior learning. Employers with an imperfect understanding of what foreign credentials mean or of the migrant worker’s overall skill level have incentives to systematically use temporary contracts as a screening device for migrant workers.

The incidence of non-standard employment among migrant workers is highly depended on gender, intended duration of stay and return plans, as well as their country of origin. For example, in Europe, migrant women have a higher likelihood of holding temporary and part-time jobs compared to both migrant men and native-born women. The gap is most significant for the temporary employment status of migrant women from non-European countries (Table 3).

Table 3. Type of employment by migration status and gender (aged 15–59) in EU-27, by origin, 2009

	Permanent	Temporary	Full-time	Part-time
Women				
Native-born	89.5	10.5	70.5	29.5
Migrants from other EU-27 countries	85.2	14.8	61.3	38.7
Third-country migrants	78.8	21.2	61.9	38.1
Men				
Native-born	91.4	8.6	94.9	5.1
Migrants from other EU-27 countries	87.5	12.5	93.6	6.4
Third-country migrants	79.2	20.8	89.0	11.0

Source: Eurostat, 2010, *European Labour Force Survey, tabulations by Kontos, 2011* in Non-standard employment around the world: Understanding challenges, shaping prospects International Labour Office – Geneva: ILO. 2016 (p. 148).

The legal status of migrants has important consequences for their capacity to obtain formal working relationships. This also holds true for employment in temporary employment agencies. New migrants are more likely to face the above challenges, compared to established ones.

Another reason for greater propensity of migrants to hold non-standard jobs is their concentration in specific sectors, traditionally known for a high prevalence of non-standard work. While important differences exist among countries, migrant workers can often be found working in construction, seasonal agriculture, domestic care, hotel and restaurant services, and the cleaning sector. For example, globally, it is estimated that in 2013, migrant domestic workers accounted for 7.7% of all international migrant workers. 17.2% of all domestic workers were international migrant workers (ILO, 2015).

Box 7. Addressing recruitment costs and integrity of the global supply chain

The United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development marks a milestone by mainstreaming migration as an integral component of development policy. It is the first time that a migration-related indicator is incorporated in such an agenda. Target 10.7 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) calls for facilitating orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies. This target includes the indicator 10.7.1: “Recruitment cost borne by employee as a proportion of yearly income earned in country of destination”¹².

Under the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD), the World Bank and the ILO have been working on a methodology to measure recruitment costs since 2014. Several pilot surveys have been conducted in collaboration with local research institutions in selected origin and destination countries to shed light on the magnitude as well as the key factors that influence recruitment costs for low-skilled jobs paid by migrant workers¹³. Based on the experience gained, the ILO and the World Bank are developing guidelines for National Statistical Offices to measure SDG indicator 10.7.1 on recruitment costs borne by employee as a proportion of yearly income earned in destination

independent, self-employed workers. The classification of non-standard employment considered in this research follows the conclusions of the February 2015 ILO Meeting of Experts on Non-standard Forms of Employment.

¹² See more https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/Global%20Indicator%20Framework%20after%20refinement_Eng.pdf

¹³ Data resulting from these pilot surveys, including where the survey was conducted and information on sample size, can be found online at: <https://www.knomad.org/data/recruitment-costs>

countries. These guidelines will include a developed methodology, concepts and definitions in order to measure the cost born by all migrant workers.

In response to the recruitment cost challenges, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has also launched a global “Fair Recruitment Initiative” (ILO-FAIR)¹⁴ to: i) help prevent human trafficking; ii) protect the rights of workers, including migrant workers; and iii) reduce the cost of labour migration and enhance development gains. This multi-stakeholder initiative puts social dialogue at the centre, and is implemented in close collaboration with governments, representative employers’ and workers’ organizations, the private sector and other key partners. The ILO is currently organizing a tripartite meeting of experts to be held on 14-16 November 2018¹⁵ on defining recruitment fees and related costs and recommending ways to disseminate and use the adopted definition to provide guidance and policy advice on eliminating abusive and fraudulent recruitment practices.

Given the prevalence of migrant worker rights abuses along global supply chains, governments, private sector, international organizations and civil society initiated the development of an international social compliance scheme that helps differentiate ethical labour recruiters from those whose business model is to charge high fees to migrant workers. Facilitated by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Recruitment Integrity System (IRIS) works by setting a benchmark for ethical recruitment (the IRIS Standard) and establishing a voluntary certification scheme together with a compliance and a monitoring mechanism¹⁶. In June 2018, the Philippines and two provinces in Canada signed a memorandum of understanding to start IRIS piloting along this migration corridor.

B1. Policy practices for making the most of migrants and refugees’ skills

Contributing to the talent pool through migration policies

Migrants make up an important and growing contribution to the skills base in many G20 countries. Labour migration is the migration channel primarily focused on contributing to the skills base. Policy settings in this area in G20 countries vary widely, but all countries have some channel for admitting foreign workers to address skill shortages. The past few years have seen rapid policy evolution in this area, in terms of improving the efficiency of targeted legislative arrangements and programmes for skilled foreign workers and ensuring protection of the local labour market¹⁷. These include new types of skilled settlement programmes, new forms of skills mobility partnerships with origin countries as well as new programmes to attract entrepreneurs and innovators (Box 8).

Some traditional settlement countries, notably Australia and Canada in the G20, have developed sophisticated merit-based migration systems to select skilled migrants in their permanent migration programmes. Candidates for migration are pre-screened based on multiple criteria to enter a pool from which people are then picked by national authorities or various authorised sponsors (including employers in some cases). Having a job offer may increase the chances to be preselected and/or picked but is not a precondition, as the key objective of these programmes is typically to use migration to increase the stock of human capital according to long-term needs.

Countries which manage labour migration mostly through temporary migration schemes have usually adopted demand-driven systems where a job offer is necessary for economic migrants. These programmes are common in G20 countries, including in some cases for lesser skilled migration. Countries with demand-driven labour migration systems have a number of tools to secure skills through migration while protecting domestic employment (OECD 2014). Methods include numerical limits (at national, sectoral or employer levels), levies to discourage use of foreign workers, or labour-market tests to certify that the employer is unable to find anyone

¹⁴ For more information on the Fair Recruitment Initiative, please see more http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/fair-recruitment/WCMS_320405/lang--en/index.htm

¹⁵ For more information on the ILO tripartite meeting of experts on defining recruitment fees and related costs. See more: https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/events-training/WCMS_632651/lang--en/index.htm

¹⁶ See more <https://iris.iom.int/>

¹⁷ To be effective, labour migration policies should be grounded in strong evidence. The ILO is at an advanced stage of developing guidelines on labour migrations statistics in order to improve the availability, accuracy, quality and comparability of labour migration data around the world, which will be discussed at the 20th International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) in October 2018.


locally, or train local workers in a reasonable timeframe, at the profile sought. The latter approach is usually coupled with labour market analyses to identify occupations and sectors where international recruitment is facilitated (shortage lists) or, more rarely, forbidden (with non-eligible lists).

Newly emerging poles of attraction for migrants and refugees – such as Saudi Arabia, Russia, Turkey – can benefit from the experience of other G20 member states in terms of management of skilled migration.

In all cases, matching demand for skills in destination countries with the potential supply abroad through migration remains quite challenging. Even setting aside the need for recruits to speak the language of the host country, there is still the issue of verifying that workers abroad possess the right kinds of skills to meet the demand in the destination country. Another issue relates the potential impact of skilled migration programmes on the availability of skills in countries or regions of origin (brain drain). One means to bridge these obstacles is to better integrate skills development, assessment and recognition into the migration process (Figure 12).

Figure 12. Skills development, assessment and recognition in migration

Flowchart of interventions at different points in the migration process.



Source: OECD.

Skills Mobility Partnerships (SMPs) in particular have recently emerged as an innovative way to associate migration and skills development for the mutual benefit of origin and destination countries, as well as migrants themselves. They factor-in the possibility for potential migrants to acquire new professional skills and they are based on alternative ways to share the costs of training between all parties involved as well as to improve matching. Building skills with an explicit focus on emigration could indeed, under certain conditions, actually increase the total supply of skills in origin countries (brain gain), through increasing the total pool of skills at origin¹⁸.

This concept is not new and builds on a variety of bilateral skills mobility partnerships already piloted and tested by many G20 countries (OECD 2018). However, these programmes have generally remained limited in scope and are the exception rather than the rule. The skills mobility processes could be greatly enhanced by involving

¹⁸ As one example, with IOM's technical and EU's financial support, several vocational and educational training (VET) courses and certification standards were designed, piloted and introduced in Kyrgyzstan offering training on skills for occupations on demand in the main destination country for Kyrgyz migrants – the Russian Federation. Similarly, VET programmes in several countries in North Africa were aligned to start preparing migrants going towards the European Union. See more <https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/country/docs/RO-Vienna-LHD-Showcase-projects-2015.pdf>

employers in both programme design and validation of migrants' skills; by acknowledging the diversity of approaches and situations across countries and sectors in how skills development and migration are combined; and by creating one-stop-shops for promoting skills mobility partnerships, supporting their implementation and conducting evaluation. In addition, of paramount importance for the success of such partnership is close collaboration and coordination of a whole range of governmental stakeholders from countries of origin and destination along a specific migration corridor, such as ministries of foreign affairs, interior but also labour and education.

Box 8. Migrants as entrepreneurs, investors and innovators


The global competition for talent is not limited to recruitment by companies. One important driver of growth is new and innovative businesses. Diversity, including cultural, is increasingly viewed as not only a social responsibility matter but also as a strategy to improve business performance. Further, migrants are overall more entrepreneurial than natives (OECD 2011), and attracting immigrant entrepreneurs, business founders and investors has become strategic to increase productivity.

Major investors with a management role in companies have long been able to receive work permits in G20 countries. Recent years, however, have seen the expansion of migration possibilities for smaller-scale entrepreneurs, with capital requirements lowered in many countries. Even these provisions, however, have been shown to be ill-suited for the start-up founders many countries are trying to attract, and who may have only ideas and a business plan instead of capital and long experience.

At least 14 OECD countries now have specific start up visa programmes. They have adopted a range of approaches in order to ensure that their start-up programmes are targeting innovative, scalable and viable business ideas. Some countries have chosen to impose requirements on the business itself (maturity, sector). Alternatively requirements may focus on the characteristics of the entrepreneur. Finally, some countries have chosen to require start-ups to demonstrate their viability by providing or securing funding. One of the main developments in recent years is to match start-up creators with incubators; this is logic behind Brazil's Start-Up visa, for example, or the start-up visa offered in certain Japanese National Strategic Special Zones (currently six cities).

Similarly, inventors and key scientific personnel are also of interest. Innovators in particular are mobile, and contribute to a large share of patents (Figure 1). In 2018, for example, China introduced a new visa category, the R Visa, for foreign talents such as scientists, technology experts, international entrepreneurs, who are in line with the direction of introducing high-level, specialized or urgently needed talents, and meeting market demands for China's socio-economic development.

Figure 13. Immigrant patentees and their share in the total number of patentees, by destination country, 1993-2011



Note Patentees refer to patent holders

Source: OECD analysis of data from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in Miguelez and Fink (2013)

Policies to make the most of migrants and refugees' skills

Migrant and refugee workers, if properly integrated in the host country, can contribute to economic development by bringing human and social capital, as well as entrepreneurial motivation. Designing and implementing sound labour market information systems, including accurate labour market needs assessments, and putting in place processes for skills recognition are key to foster a rapid integration.

The assessment and formal recognition of qualifications and competencies acquired abroad is a critical step in addressing the difficulties faced by immigrants and refugees in the labour market of destination countries. This is particularly important in the case of regulated occupations, which immigrants and refugees cannot access without going through a formal assessment and recognition of their qualifications. Lessons learnt from G20 countries with longstanding experience in trying to address this issue can be particularly beneficial to others (Box 9).

Recognition of foreign qualifications is also important for low- and middle-skilled migrant workers, although often limited. ILO research, in collaboration with the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), has examined the labour-market integration trajectories of newly arrived immigrants into middle-skilled jobs of new immigrants in Europe. These findings point to the significant role of local labour market structures - labour market institutions (e.g., wage setting institutions, mandatory social benefits, the unemployment insurance system, etc.) – and economic conditions in determining the success of integration policies (Benton et al., 2014).

The challenge of skills recognition is also present in origin countries. Migrants frequently encounter difficulties in leveraging their experiences from the destination countries into better human resources development opportunities on their return, thus hindering their possibilities for finding employment back home. Similarly important for countries of origin is addressing integration challenges at a pre-departure stage for migrants and refugees – either while migrant workers are awaiting decision on their work permit, or during resettlement case processing¹⁹.

Box 9. Assessing and recognising migrants' skills: lessons learnt from OECD countries²⁰

The issue of recognition of foreign qualifications has received considerable attention in recent years. Much has been done to facilitate the transferability of foreign qualifications and skills including, most recently, for skilled refugees. However, in many countries the process can be long, involve many actors, and be confusing and discouraging. Recent policy development in the field of qualification recognition has therefore focused on speeding up the process, streamlining the recognition system and raising awareness of recognition procedures. Nevertheless, a range of barriers to existing recognition mechanisms remain, explaining why still only relatively few immigrants use assessment offers.

Building on the experience of OECD countries, OECD (2017b) identifies these barriers and presents ten lessons about effective tools and components of recognition policy that policy makers can use to raise the benefits of recognition for immigrants, employers and origin countries.

The first point is about **establishing a right to the assessment of foreign qualifications** (lesson 1) but it is also important to make sure that **recognition procedures are quick and provide opportunities to assess foreign qualifications prior to arrival** (lesson 2) and that **information is easily available** (lesson 3). There is also a need to ensure that **regulatory bodies treat immigrants fairly** (lesson 6) and that **costs do not represent a barrier** (lesson 10)

The **validation of skills** – acquired both formally and informally – through Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL) facilitates the transferability of skills (lesson 4). These tools have the advantage of validating skills which are acquired through work experience instead of formal education. This is particularly relevant for migrants working in the skilled trades, for which there is high demand in many G20 countries

¹⁹ See a large repository of practices documented in IOM 2015.

²⁰ See more <http://www.oecd.org/publications/making-integration-work-assessment-and-recognition-of-foreign-qualifications-9789264278271-en.htm>

In some cases, only partial recognition of qualifications is granted. Immigrants should then be systematically offered the possibility to **bridge the gap between foreign qualifications and the requirements in the country of destination** (lesson 5).

Policies facilitating the recognition and the validation of immigrant skills are only efficient if employers accept the outcome. Employers have been shown to be reluctant to hire migrants with foreign credentials and little labour market experience in the destination country. **Making information on foreign qualifications accessible to employers, involving them in the recognition and validation of skills, as well as facilitating migrants' access to vocational language training are key measures to ensure migrants can put their skills to use** (lesson 7).

Multilateral agreements on the assessment and recognition of foreign qualifications are an efficient way to bypass lengthy and costly procedures in the destination country but are still rare (lesson 9). Finally, it seems important to **establish partnerships and networks for the transnational exchange of expertise and good practice in the area of recognition** (lesson 8).

Evidence on policy practice suggests that governments, in collaboration with worker and employer organizations, as well as other partners, should design and implement employment policies that support job creation for both national and migrant workers. These efforts should cover capacity building measures for public employment services and private employment agencies to facilitate access of these groups to the labour market. Steps should also be taken to ensure the coordination of work-related entitlements, such as social security benefits, including pensions, and skills recognition and certification (ILO& OECD 2018, IMO 2013). More generally, migrant workers are best protected where the fundamental principles and rights at work are effectively enforced and relevant international labour standards are applied (OECD, ILO, IMF, WB 2017). As such, national integration strategies should include measures to address all forms of discrimination in law and in practice, promoting the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining.²¹

Specific approaches need to be developed to make the most of refugee skills (see boxes 10, 11 & 12). Lessons learned from specific programmes to help refugees (ILO, 2018b) suggest that improving skills development and recognition, including recognition of prior learning, have been of key importance in facilitating labour market access. Further, language is a common barrier to labour market entry of refugees, coupled with occupation-specific and entrepreneurship training, in order to foster social cohesion. Given that refugee women experience greater difficulties in entering the labour market, the ILO and other UN partners, in particular UNHCR and IOM have specifically designed activities to assist them, e.g. promoting child care services, home-based enterprise opportunities, etc.

Box 10. Vocational, skills, and language training opportunities to increase the employability of refugee and host communities in Turkey²²

The ILO, in partnership with the Sanliurfa Union of Chamber of Craftsmen and Artisans (ŞESOB), Gaziantep Union of Chamber of Craftsmen and Artisans (GESOB) and South-Eastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration (GAP-RDA), have been implementing vocational training in 11 occupation-related subjects, coupled with entrepreneurship and Turkish language instruction, targeting Syrian refugees and their host communities. Approximately 1 450 Syrians (out of them 838 women) and host community members participated in these activities. The training certificates issued are formally recognised by the Ministry of National Education (MONE), ILO and Unions of Chamber of Artisans and Craftsmen in order to promote formal employment.

To evaluate the impact, strengthen the quality and labour market relevance of the vocational training delivered, the ILO is planning to carry out in the near future tracer surveys to track the job retention rate among participants. Greater attention will also be placed on vocational training programmes not emphasizing traditional gender roles.

²¹ See also G20 Policy Practices for the Fair and Effective Labour Market Integration of Regular Migrants and Recognised Refugees http://www.w20-germany.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/Arbeitsministererk1%C3%A4rung_und_Annex.pdf

²² See more http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/genericdocument/wcms_613633.pdf

Box 11. UNHCR approach for making the most of refugees' skills

Traditionally, initiatives supporting refugee livelihoods have not taken a short-term, humanitarian approach with limited regard for local economic development and market forces. They focused on developing skills and capacities of refugees through vocational training, entrepreneurship training and financial education, with the idea to enable refugees to start micro-enterprises or small income-generating activities. While these approaches can succeed in promoting short-term income generating opportunities for refugees, they are unlikely to reach scale.

The new approach is market oriented, it takes into account the impact of refugees on hosting communities and economies and works closely with development actors, including relevant line ministries such as ministries of labour, agriculture, commerce etc. This entails *inter alia*:

- Understanding the socio-economic situation of refugees and market demands, through assessments and research, to be able to design and match appropriate interventions that would facilitate access of refugees to concrete economic opportunities
- Investing not only in skills development but equally on market development measures that will create employment opportunities for refugees
- Facilitating financial inclusion of refugees
- Advocating for the right to work of refugees, e.g. development of policy and advocacy guidance and instruments

Bringing about economic development that leads to sustainable job creation for refugees and host communities requires a multitude of actors to work together on holistic approaches. While development organizations should continue to support governments and public institutions in providing conducive framework conditions as well as necessary support services, development projects should also seek to leverage expertise and initiatives of private sector players. Particularly in developing countries, the private sector has a role to play in generating much-needed investment for job creation, but also as a potential buyer of goods and services produced by smaller enterprises and small-holder farmers. Engaging the private sector, particularly to better connect forcibly displaced persons and host communities to off taker markets and to encourage knowledge transfers and technological spill-over effects, has the potential to strengthen livelihoods for forcibly displaced persons and their host communities and lift people out of poverty.

Box 12. Promoting Multi-stakeholder Collaboration and Building the Capacity of Municipalities for the Socio-Economic Inclusion of Vulnerable Migrants and Refugees in Europe

Addressing the skills dimension while designing effective integration and socio-economic inclusion solutions to forcibly displaced groups of population is an important policy area which is growing in recognition. The Skills2Work is a platform developed in the European Union with the purpose to promote labour market integration of beneficiaries of international protection by promoting the early validation of formal and informal skills and competences. The platform is the result of a multi-stakeholder initiative among a number of different stakeholders – international organizations, civil society, governments and private sector, in particular IOM, the African Young Professional Network, Odnos, Fondazione Leone Moressa, Menedék, the Ministry of Employment and Social Security in Spain, the Ministry of Interior in Slovakia, Integrazione Migranti, Pontis Foundation, the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA), Radboud University Nijmegen and the Foundation for Refugee Students UAF. By uniting efforts and expertise of these various institutions and organizations, the initiative resulted in identifying common approaches for improving the reception framework and capacities of relevant authorities, intermediaries and employers, and enhancing access to information and services regarding the recognition of skills and qualifications of beneficiaries of international protection – see more at <http://www.fromskills2work.eu/>

It has been recognized that integration is a policy area which can be effectively addressed primarily at the local level or sub-national level. This highlights the importance of ensuring peer-to-peer experience sharing and the development of networks of practitioners who offer integration support to migrants and refugees residing in their communities and cities. ADMI4ALL is a capacity-building programme targeting municipal administrations and other service providers at the local level, with particular attention to their front-line staff. Implemented by IOM with financial support from the EU, the programme helps develop capacities of its beneficiaries in dealing with multiple dimensions of long-term socio-economic inclusion of migrants and refugees at local level. It relies on peer-peer mentoring and on a partnership approach to migrant integration at the local level among various public, private and non-profit stakeholders in 12 municipalities across four EU member states: Italy (Bari, Florence, Naples and Milan), Austria (Bruck an der Leitha, Tulln, Korneuburg), Poland (Poznań, Warsaw and Wrocław), and Romania (Bucharest and Cluj) – see more at <https://admin4all.eu/>

B2. Harnessing the skills of diasporas and facilitating reintegration

Diasporas (or also referred to as transnational communities) are important agents of change in both countries of destination and origin forming a reservoir of human capital at all skill levels. Their contributions are varied, ranging from remittances, labour market participation, business, investment, innovation, trade and philanthropy to skills transfer and crisis-based interventions.

Diasporas may divide their working or personal lives across several countries and identify with, and hold citizenship of, several countries, making the size of the global diaspora population difficult to quantify. While migrant stocks can act as a proxy for diaspora populations, the actual number of people who feel and act as members of the specific transnational communities are potentially much larger and include population groups such as second and third generations of migrants; persons with common ethnic identity.²³

Migrants possess substantial resources that can contribute to support the economic development of their countries of origin, both in financial terms, as illustrated by the level of official transfers to developing countries, which the World Bank has estimated at USD 457 billion in 2017, and in terms of human capital. In addition, migrants are sometimes key players in trade links between their home and destination countries, with some of them initiating projects that can expand employment and infrastructure, at the local level in particular.

Highly-skilled members of the diaspora can be an important source of research and innovation, technology transfer, and skills development. Diaspora skills transfer in origin countries' economies can take multiple forms including temporary or virtual return (e.g. extended visits, virtual connectivity, return to permanent employment in the country of origin), technology licensing agreements, direct investment in local firms, knowledge spillovers etc. IOM and MPI (2012) mapped policies and practices of 60 plus countries, including those in G20.

While countries often look for the most highly skilled migrants, economic research also points to the important contributions of low- and medium-skilled workers. Low skilled migrants contribute economically and in terms of knowledge or skills they have acquired to the societies they live in and those that they originate from.²⁴

Nevertheless, the contribution of diasporas to their home countries' economic and social development critically depends on many factors, such as the size, skill level, duration of stay in the host country and the degree of organisation of the communities involved. It also hinges crucially on the economic, social and political conditions prevailing in their home countries, as well as the support provided to expatriate communities. Hence the importance of developing effective policies and collaboration initiatives for their engagement (IOM and MPI 2012).

Diaspora and highly skilled emigration to the G20

The number of tertiary educated migrants in G20 countries has increased by more than 60% between 2000/01 and 2010/11 (OECD 2017a) and continues to increase at a very rapid pace. In 2015/16, overall, close to 30% of migrants in the G20 had a high level of education (tertiary), an increase of three percentage points since 2010/11. Three countries –the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom—host more than two thirds of all highly educated migrants living in G20 countries, for a total of 23 million.

²³ IOM (2018) describes diaspora as “migrants or descendants of migrants, whose identity and sense of belonging have been shaped by their migration experience and background. IOM also refers to diaspora as transnational communities, because in a world of unprecedented global mobility, they comprise people who are connected to more than one country and include foreign-born children of these individuals, as long as they maintain some link to their parent’s home country. The OECD (2012) report, defines diasporas as foreign-born persons aged 15 or older by country of birth, and their children born in destination countries.

²⁴See more http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EDUCATION/Resources/278200-1126210664195/1636971-1126210694253/Work_Globally_Develop_Locally.pdf

According to recent OECD estimates, one in five highly educated migrants in G20 countries comes from India, China or the Philippines. India had by far the largest community of highly educated emigrants in G20 countries in 2015/16, with close to 3 million, a 36% increase in the last five years. China and the Philippines, with 1.8 million and 1.7 million respectively, had the second and third largest diasporas of highly educated emigrants.

Among the top origin countries of highly educated migrants in the G20, the emigration rate²⁵ of the highly educated in 2015/16 was particularly large for Romania (21%), Poland (11%) and the United Kingdom (9%). For the more populous Asian countries (India and China), the risk of brain drain remains low (3% or less).

Brain drain is a serious concern particularly for countries with small populations, such as island states in the Pacific and the Caribbean. In the long run, a rise in educational attainment levels can contribute to mitigating the negative effects of increasing numbers of high-skilled emigrants. The issue of brain drain or depletion of human capital can to some extent be relieved by harnessing the contribution of high skilled migrants to specific sectors of need and education institutions in their countries of origin.

Policies to harness the skills of the diaspora

Underlying all the areas of diaspora economic contribution is the education, knowledge base and skill sets that diasporas possess. The international community and governments at both ends of the migration cycle increasingly recognize the value that diaspora populations bring to development efforts and are seeking ways to magnify their human capital and financial resources to development in their countries of origin.²⁶

A structured approach is required for harnessing diaspora skills. One such approach is IOM's 3Es for action: engage, enable and empower. Engage diaspora by knowing who and where they are as well as how they can contribute. Enable transnational communities so that they can serve as architects of economic and social progress. Finally, Empower diaspora to mobilise skills and expertise. The 3 E strategy is built on a whole of society approach. The inclusion of the diaspora itself in the design and management of initiatives to harness diaspora skills will lead to ownership and long-term support for activities.

There is a need for better data and identification of diaspora as well as societal and sectoral needs to enable skills matching for the purposes of temporary, virtual and permanent initiatives. Capturing information on diaspora networks and engaging networks willing to contribute to the development of their origin countries, are other mechanisms to engage professionals. Further sharing of information on diaspora programmes and best practices is important. In this context the G20 already provides for remittance reporting plans, it may be useful to consider how similar diaspora data and policy plans can be developed.

Dual (or multiple) citizenship can improve both diaspora's connection with its origin country and integration, as citizenship is an important determinant of a diaspora's participation in trade, investment, and technology transfer with its origin country.

Return and Reintegration

There is also a need to develop policies to help foster their reintegration, including by ensuring the portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits through the conclusion of social security agreements using the

²⁵ The emigration rate of highly educated is defined as the number of highly educated migrants from one country as a share of the all highly educated persons living in that specific country, including emigrants from the country.

²⁶ Paragraph 3.6 of the New York Declaration recognizes the contributions that migrants and diaspora communities can make to sustainable development. 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development though less explicit, emphasizes the need for multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilize knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources to achieve the SDGs. See Target 17.16.

model agreement in the Annex of the ILO Maintenance of Social Security Rights Recommendation, 1983 (No. 167).²⁷

The return and reintegration of migrants unwilling or unable to remain in host or transit countries have gained renewed political importance in the agenda of national and international policy makers. IOM has been implementing assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) programmes since 1979 and has assisted over 1.6 million people to safely return back home. In 2017 alone, IOM offices in 124 countries assisted 72 176 migrants to return to 165 countries. Reintegration assistance in countries of origin is essential to enhance migrant well-being upon return and is therefore a crucial component of AVRR programmes.

Reintegration assistance is equally relevant for those migrants who are forcibly returned and in vulnerable situations due to extended periods of time spent abroad, lack of preparedness before return, stigmatization linked to deportation. These migrants and the communities to which they return to, are in need of post-arrival support through comprehensive reintegration assistance.

Increasingly the sustainability of reintegration and its link to development are at the top of global political agenda (Box 13). IOM calls for the adoption of an Integrated Approach to Reintegration, which advocates for the implementation of reintegration measures across economic, social, and psychosocial dimensions at the individual, community and structural levels. This approach also calls for coordinated policies and practices between stakeholders responsible for migration management and development at the international, national and local levels. As a specific support to policy making and implementation, IOM has developed new tools to measure sustainability of reintegration, encompassing a set of indicators and a scoring system, which can be used for monitoring and evaluation purposes (IOM 2017)²⁸.

Box 13. Promoting Innovation, Knowledge-based Economies and Skills Transfer through Diaspora Engagement

Since the late 1990s, governments encouraged circular migration, co-development and reintegration of temporary workers in their home countries by supporting skill transfer programmes that utilize expertise and knowledge available among diaspora communities. IOM and UNDP have undertaken several such skills transfer projects e.g. UNDPs Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN). IOM's Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) and Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (TRQN) programmes enabled mainly highly skilled diaspora members to invest skills and resources into their home countries, often in the sectors of health and education and also in post conflict countries. The latest initiatives, such as Connecting Diaspora for Development (CD4D) supported by the Government of the Netherlands²⁹ and MIDWEB supported by the EU and Germany³⁰, move away from the idea of a permanent return as was the case in return of highly qualified nationals (RQNs) towards more of a temporary and virtual return that assist in transferring professional knowledge and soft skills. Specifically, diaspora from the Netherlands helps support the following economic sectors for its countries of origin: healthcare, rural and urban development in Afghanistan; agriculture, education and healthcare in Ethiopia and Sierra Leone; agriculture and infrastructure in the Federal Republic of Somalia.

²⁷ The inclusion of social security provisions in bilateral labour agreements using the Annex of the Migration for Employment Recommendation, 1949 (No. 86) as a model agreement could also be considered.

²⁸ See more <https://www.iom.int/news/new-iom-report-recommends-steps-strengthen-reintegration-programmes-returnees>

²⁹ See more <https://www.iom-nederland.nl/en/migratie-en-ontwikkeling/connecting-diaspora-for-development>

³⁰ See more http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Sonstige/projektinformationsblatt-iom-midweb-englisch.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

B3. Reinforcing international cooperation to maximise the benefits from migration and mobility

On 19 September 2016, Heads of State and Government from the 193 UN Member States came together at the UN General Assembly to discuss topics related to migration and refugees at the global level. The subsequent adoption of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants recognized the need for a comprehensive approach to migration and launched two processes to elaborate a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), and a Global Compact on Refugees (GCR).

Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM)

The GCM is expected to be adopted in an intergovernmental conference on international migration on 10-11 December 2018 in Morocco. The first intergovernmental negotiated agreement to cover all dimensions of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner, the GCM is framed to be consistent with targets 10.7 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDGs), in which States committed to cooperate internationally to facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration and SDG target 8.8 to protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments of all workers, including migrant workers. The states-led process to develop a global compact for migration began in April 2017 with a period of multi-stakeholder consultations.

The GCM includes a shared vision of participating countries and guiding principles, as well as a cooperative framework comprising 23 non-binding objectives, their implementation, follow-up and review. Each objective contains a commitment, followed by a range of actions considered to be relevant policy instruments and best practices to realize the commitment. Implementation of the global compact will be initiated by states. It will require efforts at the global, regional, national and local levels, and will be supported by the UN system. The establishment of a capacity-building mechanism within the United Nations, building upon existing initiatives, that supports the efforts of the Member States, is foreseen in the compact.

As the GCM is expected to cover all dimensions of international migration, Member States agree that its implementation should be done in cooperation and partnership with migrants, civil society, migrant and diaspora organizations, as well as the private sector, and other relevant stakeholders. Member States also welcomed the Secretary-General's decision to establish a UN Migration Network. The Network will be coordinated by IOM and be structured around a core and extended membership (with a limited number of working groups chaired by a UN entity with IOM as the secretariat). The Network is expected to ensure effective and coherent system-wide support to the implementation of the GCM, as well as to its follow-up and review, and to coordinate the capacity-building mechanism called for by Member States in the GCM.

Included in the GCM proposition for follow-up and review is the creation of the International Migration Review Forum, which shall serve as the primary intergovernmental global platform for Member States to share progress on all aspects of the GCM. It is expected to take place every four years, beginning in 2022. Relevant sub-regional, regional and cross-regional processes are also invited to review regional-level implementation of the GCM. Moreover, the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) is invited to provide a space for annual informal exchange on the implementation of the Global Compact, and report the findings, best practices and innovative approaches to the International Migration Review Forum.

The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR): Improving international responses and sharing responsibility for large refugee situations

The vast majority of refugees worldwide (approximately 85 per cent) are hosted in low and middle-income countries close to the countries wracked by conflicts from which they fled. Despite the large and growing contributions of donors, the burdens of hosting and protecting the world's refugees fall disproportionately on the countries least resourced to shoulder them.

Motivated by a desire to share burdens and responsibilities more equitably and predictably, the General Assembly resolved in 2016's New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants to work towards the adoption of 'a global compact on refugees'. UNHCR was asked to engage with Member States and other stakeholders with a view of

proposing a text in 2018, building upon the practical application of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, which was also adopted as part of the New York Declaration.

Over the course of discussions and consultations, this joint effort to forge a robust and more equitable global response to refugees has benefitted from active and constructive engagement from States and a wide range of other stakeholders, including civil society, refugees, and international organizations. The final text proposed by UNHCR will be considered for adoption by the General Assembly towards the end of 2018.

While not legally binding, the compact will represent the ambition of the international community to strengthen the international response to large refugee situations in concrete ways, with a blueprint for action to ensure refugees and the communities hosting them can count on timely and robust support, from a broader base of partners benefitting both refugees and the hosting communities.

Conclusion

Migration – a phenomenon that has been with us since the beginning of the mankind - has risen up to the top of the agenda of governments and partners in G20 countries, as well as elsewhere in the world. Migration flows, involving both migrants and refugees, have been rising over the past decades and will most likely remain high, given the large demographic and economic imbalances as well as the instability in several parts of the world. In 2017, about 258 million people were living outside their country of birth globally, with two-thirds living in G20 countries.

Well-managed migration has the potential to make positive demographic, economic and social contributions to both countries of origin and destination. Between 2005 and 2015, migrants accounted for 65% of the increase in the workforce in the United States and 92% in the EU. Migrants bring skills, including entrepreneurial skills, and their dedication to fulfil their aspiration for a better future. However, for a positive impact of regular migration to materialise, it is a prerequisite that migrants and their children are well integrated.

A number of global, regional and national policy tools and guidelines have been developed by the international community and countries themselves to ensure good migration governance. G20 Policy Practices for the Fair and Effective Labour Market Integration of Regular Migrants and Recognised Refugees, which was annexed to the G20 Employment Ministerial Declaration in 2017, provide a useful framework for improving outcomes around four areas of action: (i) providing labour market access, (ii) improving employability, (iii) promoting decent work conditions and (iv) promoting economic and social acceptance. Monitoring the progresses in these four dimensions and creating the space for exchanging on good practices remains a priority.

More generally, it is important to improve the management of regular migration pathways for both migrants moving primarily for work, study or family reasons and those in need of international protection. The G20 has an important role to play in addressing these challenges and making the most out of migration. This requires, however, having access to sound, up-to-date international comparable data.

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