

# Tax reforms from a Latin American perspective

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

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# Taxation and growth

## Tax Instruments and its effects on economic growth

Negative effect  
on GDP per  
capita



Arnold (2008)  
Johansson (2008)

•The usual suggestion for developing countries is to promote tax reforms to increase the weight of property and consumption taxes into the tax structures.

•However, there are other “growth reasons” that explain why these tax reforms cannot be carried out **in some Latin American countries.**

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
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
# Deep macroeconomic fluctuations

**Real GDP Growth Volatility  
(S.D 1950-2008, in %)**



Maddison Tables (2007),  
OECD & IFS


**Cycle  
Average depth (in %)**



Maddison Tables (2007)


**1950- 1973 Average Latin America: 3.1%**  
**1974-2008 Average Latin America: 4.6%**

# Exogenous shocks, weak institutions and volatility of growth




**Exogenous shocks are poorly managed because of weak institutions, which are not able to time-distribute negative effects, thus amplifying shocks and contributing further to growth volatility.**

# Terms of trade shock



**Evidence shows positive correlation between the volatility of terms of trade and growth volatility**

**Terms of trade growth Volatility & Real GDP growth volatility S.D. 1980-2008**



# Weak institutions

The Global Competitiveness Report 2009-2010  
World Economic Forum

(2)

*Pillar 1: Institutions*

Country	Ranking
Singapore	1
Sweden	2
Denmark	3
Chile	35
Uruguay	40
Costa Rica	47
Ecuador	125
Argentina	126
Paraguay	130
Bolivia	132

**From a global perspective, Latin American countries show weaker institutions than developed countries**



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# How should fiscal policy be set over the business cycle?

- **Standard Keynesian models** imply that fiscal policy should be **countercyclical**: when bad times hit, the government should increase government spending and lower taxes to help the economy “spend” its way out of the recession.
- **Tax-smoothing models** (Barro, 1979) imply that fiscal policy should remain essentially **neutral** over the business cycle (and respond only to unanticipated changes that affect the government’s budget constraint).

# procyclical fiscal policy in Latin America

- $\beta$ : Wald Test (coefficient restriction)

- Null Hypothesis:  $\beta$  below restriction

- Rejection of Null Hypothesis: stronger evidence of procyclical fiscal policy



- Less (\*) low positive relationship between real gov. consumption growth and real GDP growth

$\beta$	Real Gov. Consumption growth vs. Real GDP growth			
	Weak 0,85	0,9	0,95	Strong 1
Bolivia	***	***	***	***
Chile				
Costa Rica	*			
Paraguay	***	***	***	***
Uruguay	***	***	**	*
EU15	**	*		
G7	*			

(\*\*\*): Indicates confidence at the 99% level

(\*\*): Indicates confidence at the 95% level

(\*): Indicates confidence at the 90% level

1961-2008

$\beta$  restrictions: ad hoc characterization

# Why do developing countries have a procyclical fiscal policy?

- Imperfections in international credit markets that prevent developing countries from borrowing in recessions (Gavin & Perotti - 1997-)
- Corrupt governments (Alesina & Tabellini, 2005)
- “Voracity effect” (Tornell & Lane, 1999)
- Social polarization (Woo, 2005)

# Why is tax collection procyclical in Latin America?

1. The volatility of tax revenue is partly explained by **Latin America's greater reliance on volatile non-tax and indirect tax revenue**, which are more volatile than income taxes and social security contributions. Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti & Talvi (1996) (1)
2. **Consumption is usually more volatile than income** due to incomplete financial markets. (2)

# Tax collection is relies heavily on consumption taxes


Taxes on goods & services/Total Tax Revenue  
Average (%)

(1)



# Consumption is more volatile than income

## Growth Volatility S.D. 1961-2008



OECD,  
CEPAL

	EU15	Bolivia	Paraguay	Costa Rica	Uruguay	Chile
<b>Private Consumption</b>	1,57%	3,00%	4,59%	4,94%	6,52%	6,77%
<b>Real GDP</b>	1,62%	2,85%	3,53%	3,20%	4,43%	5,08%

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# Should LATAM countries rely more on indirect taxes?

- A tax structure levying consumption excessively, may end up promoting volatility of growth rate, hence further affecting long term growth in some Latin American economies.
- So, why should Latin-American countries -which have strong problems to stabilize their economies- introduce reforms to increase the weight of consumption taxes while:
  - a. these economies already rely heavily on indirect taxes?;
  - b. further increase on consumption based taxes may exacerbate already procyclical behavior of fiscal policies?

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