FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

Evaluation of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD)

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Acknowledgements

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List of Acronyms

ACDP	African Christian Democratic Party (South Africa)
ALN	African Liberal Network (ALN)
AWN	Arab Women's Network (Labour Party)
BAPC	Budget and Appropriation Committee
BiH	Bosnia-Herzegovina
BiRD	Bureau for Institutional Reform and Democracy GmbH
BMD	Botswana Movement for Democratic Change
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CLARION	Centre for Law and Research International (Kenya)
CPA	Commonwealth Parliamentary Association
CPST	Centre for Parliamentary Studies and Training (Kenya)
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DA	Democratic Alliance (South Africa)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAYLP	Democratic Alliance Young Leadership Programme (South Africa)
DFID	Department for International Development
DUA	The Democratic Union of Africa
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
EALA	East Africa Legislative Assembly
EET	External Evaluation Team
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign & Commonwealth Office
FDC	Forum for Democratic Change (Uganda)
FNS	Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (Germany)
HMG	Her Majesty's Government (United Kingdom)
HO	Head Office
ICAI	Independent Commission for Aid Impact
IDC	International Development Committee of the House of Commons
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IPE	IPE Global Private Limited (Infrastructure Professional Enterprise)
IPU	Inter-Parliamentary Union
IRI	International Republican Institute
Lab	Labour Party
LibDem	Liberal Democratic Party
MENA	The Middle East and North Africa Region
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MP	Member of Parliament
MTE	Mid-term Evaluation
NDI	National Democratic Institute for International Relations
NGOs	Non-government organisations
NPC	Network of Parliamentary Committees (Western Balkans)
NPP	New Patriotic Party (Ghana)
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement (Kenya)
PEA	Political Economy Analysis
PFM	Public Financial Management
PDP	Party of Democratic Progress (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
SDA	Party of Democratic Action (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
ToR	Terms of Reference

TR	Triennial Review
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
URP	United Republican Party (Kenya)
USFP	Union Socialiste des Forces Populaire (Morocco)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VFM	Value for Money
VVD	Dutch People's Party for Freedom & Democracy
WAFA	The Women's Academy for Africa
WB	Western Balkans
WFD	Westminster Foundation for Democracy

Executive Summary

The Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) is a Non-Departmental Public Body that provides technical advice to support developing parliaments, political party structures and civil society organisations – key institutions that make up a functioning democracy. WFD provides such assistance through staff employed in London and in the field, through the three main UK political Parties – the Conservative Party, Labour Party and Liberal Democrats – and a group of smaller parties represented in the House of Commons.

WFD has provided support to democracy and improved governance in countries emerging from authoritarian regimes and in post-conflict and fragile states for more than twenty years. It combines political party expertise and links to Westminster with technical expertise to provide support to emerging democracies. This is achieved by providing support to parliaments in addressing their core functions, assistance to political parties and by working with civil society in the countries in which WFD operates.

A. DFID and FCO Support to the Westminster Foundation for Democracy

The UK provided the Westminster Foundation for Democracy £16.5 million[1] over three years, starting 2012, to support the Foundation to contribute to the strengthening of democratic governance, through building capable, accountable and responsive institutions in at least four post-conflict/fragile states and five emerging/transitional democracies.

The grant was intended to lead to improved effectiveness of WFD to deliver these outcomes and to be a leader in the field of democracy assistance. The revised 2012-15 logframe to the Business Case states that, with DFID and Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) funding, WFD committed to the following output targets:

Output 1: Parliamentarians, including female parliamentarians, in ten legislatures, undertake their key legislative, oversight, financial scrutiny and representative roles.

Output 2: Ten political parties, in countries selected by WFD, have strengthened internal structures and external networks, enabling them to formulate, communicate and campaign on policy-based messages that offer a genuine choice to citizens.

Output 3: Civil society organisations in five countries, including women's groups have better access to and are trained to engage effectively with parliaments, parties and other stakeholders.

Output 4: Enhanced strategic focus and strengthened coordination, including party-to-party, parliamentary and cross-party work; deepened technical expertise and professionalism; reformed structure and governance arrangements as set out in WFD's Change Agenda.

In 2012, WFD developed its strategic parliamentary programmes for 2012-15. These included seven country programmes and four regional programmes. While the political parties do not limit their activities to a set number of countries or projects, they have identified several longer-term programmes as well. WFD also focused on reforming the organisation to support improved delivery, which included plans for more strategic, coordinated, multi-year programming, supported by more rigorous monitoring and evaluation.

B. Evaluation of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy

In June 2013, DFID commissioned IPE Global Private Limited to undertake an evaluation of its multi-year support to WFD, co-financed by the FCO. The main objective of this evaluation is to assess 'WFD's effectiveness in contributing towards its intended outcome of making the parliaments and political parties it works with more effective, accountable and representative'. The expected impact is to 'strengthen democracy, stability and good governance and improve citizen engagement, in the emerging/developing democracies and post-conflict countries and fragile states in which WFD works'.

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[1] £3.5 million per annum from FCO and £6 million from DFID over the life of the three-year programme

The overall evaluation of WFD was divided into six phases, each of which consists of reviews and analyses of different aspects of WFD's functioning. These different phases culminate into a final evaluation and the project completion report, scheduled in the first and second quarters of 2015.

| Annuel review 1 | Inception phase | **Mid-term assessment** | Annual Review 2 | Final Evaluation | Project Completion Report |

This Final Evaluation looks to assess the implementation of various programmes, selected based on discussions with WFD and DFID, and aims to:

- Evaluate the three-year programme of the Foundation in achieving the results and outcomes envisaged in the Business Case submitted and approved in 2012;
- Determine the impact of the work of WFD on beneficiaries and political governance institutions that have received support through the programme;
- Set out lessons learned; and
- Provide recommendations for WFD's future implementation.

The focus of the final evaluation is on relevance, delivery, results and sustainability. This evaluation differs slightly from previous ones, particularly the mid-term evaluation. It not only reflects the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria but also criteria applied by the UK Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI).

The Final Evaluation was carried out between December 2014 and April 2015. It began in December with a desk review followed by field visits by the External Evaluation Team (EET) members to Jordan (Jan 11-16), Bosnia-Herzegovina (Jan 18-22), Serbia (Jan 22-23), South Africa (Jan 26-30), Kenya (Feb 9-18), and Albania (Feb 20-21).

C. Methodological Framework

The evaluation team assessed various programmes being undertaken in 5 of WFD's target countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kenya, South Africa, and Jordan) against key goals and outputs set out by WFD in their corporate plan. This assessment included programmes at both the regional and country levels and looked at WFD's work through networks and bilateral engagement of beneficiaries.

The evaluation team started with an extensive and statistical desk study and document review of select WFD programmes. Desk research concentrated on analysis of documentation on programme proposals, context and need assessments, geographic diversity and diversity of targeted beneficiaries compared to resources available to WFD, modalities of interventions and the applied WFD policy framework (i.e. corporate plan 2011-2015, annual business plans, WFD change agenda).

Following the data inventory collection, a sample of 12 WFD programmes[2] in 5 countries was selected. Data collection was undertaken through a combination of desk research and fieldwork, following a participatory approach in which key actors were engaged, including implementers, beneficiaries, technical advisers, national partners, FCO and DFID. While the desk research concentrated mainly on the analysis of documentation on programmes and context assessment, which was provided by WFD and political party representatives, fieldwork focused on conducting semi-structured interviews, focus groups and teleconference discussions, including with: WFD staff at Head Office and at political party offices in London, WFD beneficiaries, WFD field programme managers, stakeholders, technical experts, WFD implementing partners and external organisations working in political governance at various locations in the field where WFD operates.

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[2] MENA Women's Programme; Conservative support to SDA (BiH); Conservative support to PDP (BiH); Labour programme (BiH); LibDems African Liberal Network; Smaller Parties Group support to ACDP (South Africa); Jordan Parliament Programme; BiH Integrated Programme; Kenya Parliament Programme; Western Balkan Network of Parliamentary Committees; Labour WAFA; Labour Arab Women's Network

D. Key Findings

Relevance

WFD has achieved strategic relevance, ensuring its work is very much aligned with the strategic priorities of DFID and FCO. However, the detailed results framework upon which this programme was based was more of an accommodation than a well-crafted and detailed plan for the implementation of an articulated theory of change. As a result, in many cases and particularly related to its work with parliaments, WFD was more focused on the delivery of outputs than the achievement of the greater outcome.

The focus on outputs has resulted in a corporate mindset that is more concerned with capacity development and the provision of assistance to address the capacity gaps of national beneficiaries and less on the broader objective of enhanced political governance. The exception to this approach is found in some political party assistance programmes where the UK parties have inherently worked at the outcome level and seem to be addressing the problems of their sister parties as they arise.

The capacity to conduct context analysis is improving within WFD. Since the Mid-term Evaluation, training has been provided to staff for conducting such analyses and recent analyses – including for the integrated programme in Bosnia – have been of a higher quality. However, such analysis is still primarily used during the formulation stage of the programme cycle. Where WFD has achieved results, it can be linked to continuous context and political analysis by staff during the implementation of programming.

Delivery

WFD has improved the means by which it has delivered its assistance to its partners and beneficiaries. Its work is better coordinated with HMG in the countries in which it is operating and, to some extent, with other political governance assistance implementers. However, some of the challenges noted in earlier reviews are still present, including the impact of HMG funding on how WFD relates to FCO staff in the country.

Capacity development is still the primary means by which WFD delivers assistance. Where in the past the predominant model was static knowledge events (workshops) and study tours, there are signs that the Foundation is moving towards the use of mentoring and coaching and the building of medium and long-term relationships between technical experts and those receiving assistance.

Where WFD has been seen to be having a greater impact is where it has moved towards a relational approach to development – engaging key actors on an ongoing basis and addressing their needs through this continuous interaction. This is most evident in the work of the UK parties, but there are examples of how this shift has occurred in support to parliaments where the field staff assigned to a programme have the political acumen and capacity to manage multiple, complex political relations.

The M&E system has benefited from an increase in committed staff, including at the senior level. The systems for an effective M&E strategy are now being put in place. However, it is still observed that the culture of a learning organisation is still not in place in WFD. Reports are being written but there is less indication that the lessons being reported are being shared throughout WFD and resulting in adjustments to all programmes. For example, when the Western Balkan Network of Parliamentary Committees wanted to support the Serbian National Assembly in the development of the Parliamentary Budget Office, it was done without any reference to lessons learnt from parliamentary research centres supported by WFD in other countries and regions.

Evaluating Value for Money (VFM) was a challenge for this report. WFD also acknowledges that it has not moved beyond financial indicators of VFM. This has led the EET to note that certain costs are benchmarked and, where feasible, WFD is partnering with national and international organisations in the delivery of activities. The networks established allow for more efficient delivery of outputs and have provided support to multiple national partners in a cost-effective manner. However, WFD has not, as yet, developed the measurements that would allow them to determine the means by which it can deliver effectiveness, moving from output-driven inputs to outcome-driven inputs.

Results

Achievement Rating

Outcome: More effective accountable and representative parliaments and political parties in the countries in which WFD works.	**Achieved**
Output 1: Parliamentarians, including female parliamentarians, in 10 legislatures undertake their key legislative, oversight, financial scrutiny and representative roles.	**Achieved**
Output 2: Minimum of 20 political parties, in countries selected by WFD, have strengthened internal structures and external networks, enabling them to formulate, communicate and campaign on policy-based messages that offer a genuine choice to citizens.	**Achieved**
Output 3: Civil society organisations in 5 countries, and women's groups in 3 countries engage effectively with parliaments, parties and other stakeholders.	**Achieved**
Output 4: Enhanced WFD's strategic focus and strengthened coordination, including party-to-party, parliamentary and cross-party work; deepened WFD's technical expertise and professionalism (drawing on best practice, learning and development, improved programme management, communication tools etc.); reformed WFD structure and governance arrangements, as set out in WFD's Change Agenda (December 2011).	**Partially Achieved**

From the sample of programmes reviewed as part of the Final Evaluation there is evidence of WFD having contributed to the development of more effective, accountable and representative parliaments and political parties in the countries in which it is engaged with partners and beneficiaries. Key examples of results include:

- New legislation has been adopted in Morocco and Bosnia-Herzegovina as a result, at least in part, of the interventions of WFD.
- Space has been created for citizens to participate in the budgeting process by the Constitution and legislation is being utilised and enforced at the local level in Kenya with budgets having been adjusted to reflect local concerns and interests.
- A government coalition has been formed in Bosnia-Herzegovina more quickly, resulting in less political dysfunction, as a result of the efforts of WFD.
- The Botswana political system is the most competitive it has ever been through the support provided to political parties.
- The Jordanian Parliament has the capacity to produce evidence-based legislative analysis for the first time.
- Parliamentary committees in the Western Balkans are using their authority to monitor their respective governments and to press for allocation of funding.

These results occurred where WFD has used newer tools and methods of engagement that have enabled the Foundation to build trusted relationships with partners and beneficiaries and where it has played the role of a broker of disparate interests in building a coalition for change on a specific issue.

There may also be some societal impact from the work of WFD through the corporate programme. There are indicators suggesting women have more political empowerment, states are doing more to fight corruption, issues related to gender-based violence are being addressed and there is less political violence in some countries. In particular, the following are some of the methods that have produced the results noted:

- Using regional networks (whether they are of political parties or parliamentarians) as an entry point for bilateral engagement that has resulted in concrete results
- Peer-to-peer knowledge exchanges in which WFD acts as a facilitator but allows more experienced partners in regional networks to mentor or coach other actors

- Applying ongoing context analysis as part of the day-to-day work on implementing a programme, thus allowing for constant adjustments to the programme based on the ever-changing political context in which WFD is operating in any given country

Sustainability

Beyond the achievement of results, it can be seen that WFD has, in some cases, provided lasting results that will most likely be sustainable beyond the life of the current programme. Where this has been achieved it is primarily the result of the following:

- **Ownership:** Where the beneficiaries have not only embraced the ideas and advice of WFD but have taken ownership of the process by which such advice is provided, there is evidence that the results are longer lasting;
- **Long-term Relationships:** Success in sustainability has predominantly been observed where WFD has built a long-term relationship with the local organisations with which it provides assistance. In previous reviews these relationships were almost exclusively managed by the UK parties, but there are now a number of parliamentary programmes that have also been able to build trusted relationships and the results can be seen from this effort;
- **Empowered Field Staff:** Relationships are built between WFD and its partners where WFD has field staff that have the capacity and political acumen, and are empowered to build such relationships;
- **Focus on Outcomes:** Where WFD has focused on the delivery of the corporate outcome and not on implementing activities in order to address output, the results have been longer lasting.

E. Recommendations

Based on the evidence gathered and the analysis conducted by the EET, the following are the recommendations for WFD:

Recommendation[3]	Previous or New Finding?
Be more ambitious: WFD needs to aspire to become a political governance development agency that is seen to be more of a 'Thought Leader' in its chosen field.	Previous Finding
Revisit the organisational and intervention level theories of change: WFD needs to do some reimagining, conflating capacity development models predicated on building accountability with the more relational problem-driven models premised on fostering collaboration.	New Finding
Focus country teams on outcomes not just outputs: WFD needs to craft socio-political analytical tools that aim to create rich descriptions about institutional change in their specific intervention contexts, focused primarily on political priorities.	Previous Finding
Develop a relationship tracking tool: Consider developing a formal but simple tool to administer a 'relationship tracker' that enables staff to map interests around specific performance bottlenecks and identify potential coalitions and strategies for change.	New Finding
Start a conversation about the merits of a more structured approach to micro-political analysis, focusing on the specific politics of institutional reform.	Previous Finding

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[3] As of March 31, 2015

Become better at telling 'stories of change': Develop M&E tools that promote 'learning for change' not just 'reporting for results'.	Previous Finding
Start to put in place the building blocks of a VFM system: WFD should develop a VFM strategy and build this into a comprehensive system for monitoring VFM.	New Finding
Develop a clearer focus on articulating exit strategies from the outset. WFD should introduce more concrete mechanisms into project documents and funding proposals that demonstrate it has clear mechanisms in place for managing the exit.	New Finding
Produce a small set of policy learning papers on standard intervention typologies: WFD should produce a series of short policy and learning papers to help teams understand how interventions sit within its wider theory of change, what specific outcomes they are contributing to and in what ways they contribute to them.	New Finding

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Section 1: Introduction

1.1 Evaluation purpose

This report presents an evaluation of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) corporate programme performance during the past three years (2012-2015). The evaluation builds on previous assessments, including the Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE)[4] and the Triennial Review (TR)[5] (See Box 1 for details). The evaluation looks at ensuring accountability and learning from DFID political governance portfolio interventions. In addition to undertaking an assessment of Value for Money (VFM) and impact, the study is intended to be forward-looking and seeks to learn lessons to support future WFD programming and political governance programming by DFID and other bilateral and multilateral organisations more broadly.

1.2 WFD vision and mission

Since its establishment in 1992, WFD has sought to promote democratic principles and practices around the world. As an organisation created at the end of the Cold War, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, WFD's principal aim has been to share experience and lessons learnt from British political institutions with partners from political institutions in developing and transitional states, with a focus on emerging democracies in Eastern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa.

The Foundation is structured around two 'wings' – parliamentary assistance and political party assistance. There is a Chief Executive Officer responsible for all activities in WFD and a Board of Governors made up of both political and independent appointees. However, the implementation of the work of WFD is split, with UK political parties responsible for delivery of political party assistance and WFD Head Office (HO) responsible for implementing parliamentary assistance and integrated programmes (which includes civil society support).[6]

Partnerships are important to WFD and include global, regional and national actors. Globally, WFD is engaged with the House of Commons and the devolved assemblies of Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland, political party ideologically based networks (i.e. Socialist International; Liberal International; International Democratic Union) and UK based implementers in the field of political governance (e.g. National Audit Office; Commonwealth Parliamentary Association; Adam Smith Institute). Regionally it has partnered with, among others, the Arab Parliamentary Union (APU) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). At the national level, the Foundation has engaged local think tanks, academic institutions and civil society organisations to support its work.

In addition to the division of work within WFD described above, in 2012, as part of the DFID funding, WFD established the Capacity Building and Innovation Fund. It was provided as an incentive for WFD to build its capacity to deliver programming and to pilot integrated work between WFD HO and the UK political parties. The fund was scheduled to last for the length of the current funding agreement (2012-15).

WFD's broad strategic ambition: 'to assist, support and encourage the peaceful establishment and development of pluralistic democratic practice and political institutions' has remained unchanged since the organisation was created.

For Her Majesty's Government (HMG), international efforts to improve institutions of political governance can help tackle corruption, contribute to stability or eliminate extreme poverty. In a submission by DFID to the International Development Committee of the UK House of Commons, working with parliaments is one important mechanism for supporting the development of open, inclusive and accountable democratic systems, part of a 'Golden Thread' of institutions that underpin stable, inclusive and prosperous societies. Women's political participation is considered to be an important factor in shaping more accountable institutions.

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[4] https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/350860/Evaluation-Westminster-Foundation-Democracy.pdf
[5] Tesoriere, A and Robinson, W (2014) Triennial Review: Westminster Foundation for Democracy, undated draft version
[6] See Annex 4 for an Organogram of WFD

As the January 2015 International Development Committee (IDC) inquiry on parliamentary strengthening noted, the relationships with political institutions in developing and transitional states have always been an important aspect of 'soft power' believed to be good for Britain.[7]

1.3 WFD strategic focus

WFD's strategic focus has continued to evolve during the past three years. From an organisation that was operated as two distinct units three years ago, it is now primarily focused on three main areas: parliamentary assistance, political party strengthening and, with the adoption of its new strategy in January 2015, support for the work of parties in parliaments.[8]

WFD partnerships increasingly recognise and account for the dynamic nature of the wider institutional landscape that includes formal institutions (executive and judiciary, civil society, media, private sector, donors) at international, regional, national and sub-national levels. They are also concerned with less formal structures as demonstrated in the new WFD strategy paper which pays closer attention to the informal rules and norms that inform political governance relationships (e.g. the influence of history, culture and religious traditions).[9]

Box 1: WFD: Recent Evaluations

This Final Evaluation is the fifth in a series of six reviews that have taken place to date with regard to the multi-year corporate funding provided by DFID and FCO in 2012. The first review was the *2013 Annual Review*, which acknowledged the efforts of WFD to have met milestones for the first year of the corporate programme, mainly because the milestones were limited given it being a new programme.

In 2014, two reviews were conducted. The *2014 Annual Review* observed that the work of the Foundation with regard to support to political parties and civil society was meeting the identified milestones for that year, while the support to parliaments did not meet the milestones. The Mid-term Evaluation was also undertaken in 2014. It noted, among other things, the following key findings:

- A lack of unified management structure prevented WFD from maximising the impact of its work;
- The work of WFD with regard to political party assistance was showing results because of the trusted relationships developed between the parties and their sister parties;
- The overall intervention logic was incoherent and lacking a corporate strategy that would allow for a clear understanding of how WFD would operate and implement its programmes;
- There was limited diagnostic and information gathering, resulting in programmes that were being designed, particularly with parliaments, that did not always fit within the context in which they were being implemented;
- Knowledge was not being shared amongst staff to ensure all programmes were learning lessons from each other; and
- WFD lacked a culture of M&E. Even though reports were being produced, there was a lack of learning from lessons that were being gathered from the reports.

In March of 2015, the FCO *Triennial Review* was released. The report noted the following key findings:

- WFD needs a clearer strategic vision at the corporate level;
- WFD priorities need to be better aligned with HMG strategic priorities with regard to partners, beneficiaries and countries;
- WFD needs to be more integrated in its work, moving from a duality to a more cohesive organisation;
- WFD is over-stretched with regard to the countries in which it operates;
- WFD's ability to have an impact with regard to political governance is limited by the capacity of HO staff; and
- The Board of Governors needs to be more focused on strategic issues and less on operational ones.

This report builds on the work done to date. The findings and evidence gathered through the previous four reviews has been considered and measured against the efforts of WFD to address their recommendations.

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[7] Triennial Review (2015)
[8] WFD (2015) Draft strategy paper
[9] Ibid

1.4 WFD Strategic Results Framework

WFD's intention to foster the development of nascent political institutions was central to the strategic priorities outlined in the corporate plan (2011-2015) and included in the corporate results framework.[10] According to the corporate logic model 'more effective accountable and representative parliaments and political parties in the countries where WFD works' will contribute to 'strengthening democracy, stability and good governance' more broadly in post-conflict countries and fragile states'.[11] The hierarchy of results included in the corporate results framework posits that the creation of 'more effective, accountable and representative' political institutions' is contingent on delivery of four tangible outputs (Box 2).

Box 2: WFD Strategic Objectives

Impact: Strengthened democracy, stability and good governance and improved citizen engagement, focused particularly on emerging/developing democracies and post-conflict countries and fragile states.

Outcome: More effective accountable and representative parliaments and political parties in the countries in which WFD works.

Outputs:

1. Parliamentarians, including female parliamentarians, in 10 legislatures undertake their key legislative, oversight, financial scrutiny and representative roles.
2. Minimum of 20 political parties, in countries selected by WFD, have strengthened internal structures and external networks, enabling them to formulate, communicate and campaign on policy-based messages that offer a genuine choice to citizens.
3. Civil society organisations in 5 countries and women's groups in 3 countries engage effectively with parliaments, parties and other stakeholders.
4. Enhanced WFD strategic focus and strengthened coordination, including party-to-party, parliamentary, and cross-party work; deepened WFD technical expertise and professionalism (drawing on best practice, learning and development, improved programme management, communications tools, etc.); reformed WFD structure and governance arrangements, as set out in WFD's change agenda 2011.

1.5 WFD's Theory of Change

According to WFD's theory of change, the strengthening of political institutions, whether parliamentary, political party, or even civil society, requires provision of 'knowledge, technical expertise, and political insights to enhance institutional competencies'.[12] Such competencies are a means to a number of democratic institutional ends: to fulfil legislative and oversight functions, to develop, debate and advance public policies, to engage citizens in the policy process.[13] This theory has not changed since the inception of this corporate programme in 2012; what has changed are the tools used by WFD to deliver the change.

WFD interventions need to be technically sound but also context specific and politically savvy. This is particularly important if they are to foster enduring development of political institutions, to help enhance party structures and generate improvements in internal and external party communication systems, enable political parties to develop effective electoral strategies and to compete peacefully in periodic elections. To this end WFD has started, since the MTE, to more effectively use context and political economy analysis to inform institutional development strategies, particularly to understand the interests and incentives that influence the behaviour of different stakeholders.[14] This is not yet universal, but in most political party programmes and in certain parliament programmes the effective use of such analysis was evident through the delivery of the programmes.

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[10] Logical framework version dated December 2014
[11] Ibid: see impact and outcome statements
[12] WFD (2015) Draft Theory of Change
[13] Ibid
[14] Robinson, R (2014) Policy Development and Policy Capacity: Democracy, Parliaments and Political Parties, November 2014

1.6 Activity typology

WFD draws on a mix of intervention models to foster institutional change within political parties and parliaments (boxes 3 and 4 respectively). Some activities can be considered as part of a traditional technocratic 'capacity gap' model. Such approaches to institutional development are often expert-driven with a strong focus on training and mentoring. WFD also engages partners through longer-term relationships in which assistance is part of the process of engagement. These tend to be problem-driven rather than solution-focused and seek to address specific systemic issues, often tackling blockages or constraints to institutional performance. These approaches draw on WFD convening and facilitation roles and emphasise partner negotiating and brokering skills. They can entail frequent and iterative analysis, design adaption and learning.

Box 3: WFD's Political Party Activity Typology

- UK political parties build long-term relationships with sister parties, allowing for a regular dialogue on political and institutional needs and how the UK parties can assist their sister parties in addressing such needs.
- UK MPs, political party staffers and trusted advisors deliver regional or bilateral training seminars and workshops on communications, electoral campaign techniques, policy development processes (e.g. economic policy) or party reform processes.
- UK technical specialists help produce knowledge products, including guidelines and toolkits, often available as online downloads.
- Sister party staff is attached to UK political parties during UK electoral campaigns, attend UK party conferences and visit UK political party offices to study UK democracy in action.
- UK political party staff seconded to sister parties to support electoral campaigns and voter targeting techniques.
- Sister party staff visit sister parties in other countries to share experience and enhance peer-based learning.
- UK parties and sister parties use their network relationship to broker deals and solve constraints to achieving strategic goals.

Box 4: WFD's Regional Desk Parliamentary Activity Typology

- WFD staff, UK MPs and UK parliamentary staff provide technical advice to parliamentary staff and MPs at regional network meetings or in partner countries, often working to strengthen core parliamentary committees (e.g. budget and appropriations).
- WFD regional staff convenes regional thematic conferences and seminars in order to foster mutual understanding and commitment to a plan of action (e.g. violence against women).
- WFD contracts international or national parliamentary experts to produce knowledge products, including legislative analysis, technical guides and handbooks to explain oversight functions.
- WFD contracts international and national parliamentary experts to train and mentor new MPs, and members of the parliamentary committee and supporting services (e.g. parliamentary research offices).
- WFD contracts national experts to develop in-service curriculum and learning materials for parliamentary service training institutes.
- WFD supports nascent parliamentary structures (e.g. budget offices, research services, women MP caucus) and process (e.g. legislation).
- WFD supports parliamentary partners to undertake stakeholder engagement processes, including budget consultations/hearings.
- WFD contracts trusted former parliamentarians to help solve emergent institutional relations problems.
- WFD staff facilitates partnerships with a view to understanding constraints to performance and brokering solutions.

Activities are coordinated by UK-based political party staff, WFD staff from regional desks or those working in countries. Interventions either target sister party members and staff or focus more on parliamentary members and staff. In this respect, WFD is often described as having two distinct 'wings'. In response to recent MTE and TR recommendations, WFD has undertaken efforts to foster cooperation between these two programmatic entities. Such co-operation has resulted in the piloting of integrated programming in some countries.

WFD donor support

As a Non-Departmental Public Body, WFD has been supported financially by HMG since it was established, with the FCO being its principal funder. WFD has also received ad hoc project funding from DFID, the EU and

Box 5: FCO and DFID funding 2012-15

Donor/Fiscal	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	Total
FCO	3.5m	3.5m	3.5m	£10.5m
DFID	2.0m	2.0m	2.0m	£ 6.0m

1.7 Scope of the final evaluation

As specified in the Final Evaluation TOR (see annex 1) the final evaluation is concerned with assessing the performance of WFD with regard to the corporate programme. Other programmes, externally funded, are not part of this review, but will likely gain from the lessons learnt from this review.

The research has involved visits to six countries in Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Serbia), the Middle East (Jordan) and Sub-Saharan Africa (South Africa, Kenya). The sample is similar to the MTE sample so as to enable a degree of comparison. The sample allows for an assessment of three strands of programming (parliamentary, political party, and joined-up interventions) as well as the two main intervention delivery models (networks and bi-lateral country relations).

1.8 Analytical framework and key evaluation questions

The evaluation draws on both OECD-DAC and ICAI evaluative framework criteria. It is the evaluator's view that a combination of OECD-DAC and ICAI criteria will enrich the analysis (i.e. by including 'Efficiency' within a wider section on 'Delivery'). A focus on Delivery may broaden the analytical scope ensuring important partnership dynamics (i.e. coordination, cooperation and competition), ways of providing technical assistance (i.e. training, mentoring, negotiating and brokering models) as well as progress against WFD's own organisational development priorities (i.e. M&E and VFM systems improvements) are not overlooked.

The broad analytical questions are depicted in Box 6.[15] The analytical framework also provides scope to assess progress against the recommendation made in the MTE and TR. These earlier recommendations are particularly relevant to analysis of Delivery, for instance the extent to which expert-driven training still dominates the capacity-development model, the progress in consolidation of the global country portfolio or the extent to which operational decision-making powers have been transferred to country offices.

Box 6: Evaluation Criteria and Key Evaluative Questions

Criteria	Broad analytical questions
Relevance	Are WFD strategic objectives and the intervention design relevant to the stakeholder and beneficiary context? How are beneficiaries involved in the programme design?
Delivery (efficiency)	Have WFD delivery modalities been designed and managed to be fit for purpose? How has WFD ensured VFM, managed results and mitigated reputational and fiduciary risks?
Effectiveness	In what ways have parliaments and political parties become more effective, accountable and representative as a result of WFD partnership interventions? How have CSOs been able to exert influence on parliament and political parties?
Impact	In what ways has democracy, good governance and stability improved in the sample countries? How have citizen's relations with political institutions improved?
Sustainability	Are changes to political institutions and to political relationships likely to endure?
Lessons	What lessons has WFD learnt from its interventions?
Recommendations	What are the implications of these findings for future programming? What does WFD need to do differently?

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[15] The detailed analytical framework is contained in Annex 5

1.9 Methodology

The evaluation was conducted between December 2014 and April 2015. The methodology was outlined in the Terms of Reference[16] and agreed by WFD and DFID. A mixed approach was used involving the collection, collation and analysis of a wide range of qualitative and quantitative data. The approach utilised a variety of qualitative data collection methods including key informant interviews, focus group discussions and network surveys. Quantitative data, both primary and secondary, was collected from programme documentation and national and a variety of international governance data sets (e.g. integrity index, gender watch index).

To ensure multiple perspectives the team spoke to key informants from different levels of the WFD intervention delivery chain. These included DFID, WFD and Political Party staff in Whitehall and Westminster, WFD regional and country programme staff, FCO Political Advisors and DFID Governance Advisors in Post. Particular emphasis was placed on interviewing a wide range of international and national political party and parliamentary technical experts, national parliamentary partners, members of sister parties, CSO and youth group representatives.[17] In total the team conducted more than 150 key informant interviews.

The team used a semi-structured interview approach to collect data from key informants. The semi-structured approach was intended to encourage reflection and learning.

An interview guide was produced. The team paid particular attention to ethical issues, clearly explaining the purpose of the evaluation and intended use of the data to interviewees. Given the sensitive nature of some of the findings, interviewees were assured anonymity, and no quotes were to be attributed to named individuals.

All interviews drew loosely on a common set of relatively open interview questions and these were linked to the wider analytical framework of the evaluation. However, the interview approach was intended to be flexible, and subsequent questions were adapted, ensuring responsiveness to emergent findings and issues.

Interview transcripts were produced following each interview and then triangulated in order to identify common themes, categories and issues as well as to validate findings using a variety of different interview sources. In this way, the evaluation team sought to arrive at a common truth (a view shared by a wide range of informants as a result of disaggregating data from different groups with an interest in the intervention).

In addition to conducting interviews with individuals, the team also facilitated a wide range of focus group discussions (e.g. a group of youth in Jordan and a group of national parliamentary consultants in Kenya). The approach offered an efficient method for ensuring multiple stakeholder participation and consultation, useful for identifying case studies and for exploring a small number of common but important themes (e.g. many parliamentary consultants compared details of their negotiating brokering role with county assemblies).

Broad stakeholder participation was also ensured through the use of simple surveys targeted at all the registered participants of specific regional networks, both parliamentary (Western Balkans and Middle East) and political parties (predominantly African and Middle Eastern Networks). With a view to ensuring wider reach, four political party network surveys were designed and implemented with support from the UK Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democratic Party offices. These 'purposive surveys' were distributed throughout the UK political parties.[18] Each survey included a set of ten questions. For instance, respondents were asked to rate particular results on a scale of 1-5 (i.e. the extent they had been able to influence the role of women in their party) and asked to provide a concrete example to support their scale rating (i.e. how party involvement in the network led to the empowerment of women in the party). Survey respondents were guaranteed anonymity.[19] Responses were collated by the UK parties but analysed by the evaluation team.

An extensive review of internal programme documentation was undertaken, referencing DFID and WFD strategies, government policy papers, intervention results frameworks, operational plans and reports and a

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[16] See Annex 1 for the Terms of Reference for this Evaluation, which includes an Evaluation Work Plan
[17] See a full list of key informants in Annex 2
[18] Purposive surveys are sent to named individuals from a target group. They are not random sampled which are selected randomly from a larger population group.
[19] See Annex 6 for the full results of the surveys

wide range of project financial data. Where available, hard financial and administrative data was also sourced from parliamentary, political party and CSO partners as well as national political governance data sets.

The report was produced by independent evaluators who were not presented with any conflicts of interest during the production of the report. In addition, the report was produced with no interference or undue influence on the evaluators in the making of conclusions and recommendations.

Prior to the finalisation of the report, WFD and the UK political parties were given the opportunity to review an early draft and provided feedback and comments that resulted in revisions where the evaluators agreed with the points raised.

1.10 Target audiences for evaluation

This evaluation is, first and foremost, directed at WFD, and provides specific lessons that can be learned from the past three years of funding. It also provides some direction to WFD based on where it has achieved results and made an impact.

Equally, this report will be of interest to DFID and FCO. As the primary funders of WFD, these two departments will see the value in the evaluation of the performance of WFD, which may influence their decision(s) with regard to future funding of the Foundation. There are likely broader lessons about political governance assistance (i.e. – parliaments; political parties) that DFID and FCO can apply for its funding of UK-based organisations, international NGOs and multilateral organisations.

The political governance assistance community – those that implement projects related to parliamentary assistance and political party assistance – will gain from reading this evaluation. In a field that has traditionally had limited evidence-based evaluations and an aggregation of lessons learnt, this report will provide a snapshot of how one such organisation (i.e. – WFD) is achieving its results.

Finally, the broader development community, including bilateral and multilateral organisations (e.g. UNDP; USAID), parliamentary networks (e.g. CPA; IPU) that fund or work with parliaments and/or political parties may find the report informative as to how to best achieve an impact with state political actors.

1.11 Challenges and limitations

The evaluation process was constrained by a number of methodological challenges and limitations concerning the theory of change, the sampling methodology, the data collection methods and the analysis.

Both WFD and DFID have acknowledged that the corporate results framework constitutes more of a funding agreement than a coherent logic model. While the output, outcome and impact statements provide an analytical steer they do not in themselves offer a viable theory of change on which to structure an evaluation.

The ability to robustly assess the validity of the underlying theory of change has to some extent also been challenged by the country sampling approach. The Final Evaluation followed the same approach as the MTE. While the approach ensured consistency and comparison in terms of progress over time, it did not enable comparative analysis around specific intervention level theories of change, for example, comparing the factors contributing to results of support to parliamentary research services in different country settings.

The country sample sought to ensure a wide mix of WFD programming funded through the DFID/FCO grant. The selection was made to strike a balance between political party programming and parliamentary programming across different regions. A focus on regional parliamentary and party networks was added later in the evaluation inception stage and not part of the original sampling exercise. The conclusions are drawn mainly from country visit findings. There are limited references to other programmes outside the visit sample. For this reason, they are highly context-specific and difficult to generalise.

The primary method of data collection has been key informant interviews. While the interview findings have been thoroughly triangulated and were constantly tested with WFD staff at country and head office at different points in the evaluation process they are not entirely bias-free, and may reflect evaluator, WFD and DFID preferences, particularly in terms of the underlying argument in favour of specific programming approaches.

While survey responses have been high (often more than 80% of distributed questionnaires), the findings are drawn from small samples (e.g. only 8 members of the Arab Women's network). As the political party surveys were conducted during the period UK political parties were preparing for the 2015 elections not all surveys questionnaires were returned. For instance, the Democratic Union of Africa (DUA), a regional network coordinated by the UK Conservative Party, were not able to return any responses from their network members.

Surveys suffered to some extent from social desirability bias (e.g. respondents over-rated the benefits of network participation in the desire to provide good news and to assure future funding). In order to address this inherent bias, the team conducted deeper interviews with a random selection of survey respondents during country visits. This was possible in South Africa, Kenya, and Jordan and helped improve validity.

A broader impact assessment has been a challenge for this evaluation. Many of the WFD interventions funded by the corporate grant are still relatively recent. New grant partnerships take time to operationalise and to produce results. Some interventions have only been operational for 12-18 months. While there is evidence of progress, it is often hard to find evidence of institutional change in such a short timeframe. Institutional development is recognised to be a long term, even historic process. The evaluation has been able to arrive at qualitative judgements regarding the contribution WFD has made to fostering political institution development in many settings, but given the multiple internal and external drivers of such change attribution is unreliable. Where possible, however, the evaluation has attempted to highlight evidence of emerging impact.

The report does not directly address issues related to the Paris Declaration, such as domestic accountability, and building the capacity of national institutions. However, the report is meant to evaluate the objective of the work of WFD is to build their capacity, in part, to ensure domestic accountability. Therefore, the overarching theme of the report is to determine if such accountability has been achieved. By engaging local and national beneficiaries during the collection of data and evidence, the report is very much based on their perspectives.

1.12 Report structure

The report consists of six sections of which this is the first. The second section considers the relevance of the programme, attention is paid to WFD's strategic coherence, its design, planning and policy making processes, particularly the extent to which context and political economy analysis are embedded in interventions.

The third section considers WFD's approach to programme delivery, analysing the benefits and costs of the network and bilateral delivery models. The section discusses coordination mechanisms and assesses the different approaches WFD takes to fostering institutional development, from training and mentoring led capacity building for engaging on institutional constraints and bottlenecks. Key components of delivery such as monitoring and evaluation, financial management assurance and risk management are also analysed.

The fourth section assesses results generated by interventions, from multiple participant perspectives, the extent they have improved participant knowledge and skills, enabled new institutional systems and structures and improved institutional functionality and fostered behavioural change, particularly in terms of societal impacts, for instance the election of women, the protection of human rights, social stability, and economic integration. Section five assesses the sustainability of these skills, systems and structures. Lessons, conclusions and recommendations are presented in the sixth and final section.

Section 2: Relevance

WFD's interventions are strategically aligned with those of its donors, partners and beneficiaries. The focus, to date, has been on the delivery of outputs and activities, with less attention paid to achieve the institutional change that would come with an outcome-oriented approach to the work. The effective use of political and context analysis to inform programming is limited, but increasing.

Evaluation Questions	Conclusions	Evidence
To what extent have WFD's strategic objectives and theory of change remained relevant given the changing context of political governance in each of the five sample country programmes?		
What did WFD set out to achieve? To what extent was this relevant given the institutional context of political development in each country?	▪ WFD wanted to create political governance institutions (parliaments; political parties) that are inclusive and participatory ▪ Original context analyses for parliament programming were limited in quality and in identifying key entry points ▪ More recent programmes that have been redesigned or developed have had better context analyses ▪ Party analysis was of better quality but often not fully articulated or recorded	▪ Jordan & Kenya Parliamentary programmes lacked original context analysis that provided specific understanding of each country's history and dynamics. ▪ Serbia PBO & BiH Blogging Programmes are more recent, and analysis is better ▪ Labour support in BiH was based on good context analysis, although not always in written form
Does the programme have a valid theory of change and results chain?	▪ Theory of Change was based on a political compromise to allow for equal allocation of funding ▪ Original TOC has changed as new methods and tools have been applied by WFD ▪ Somewhat of a disconnect between activities and overall objective/outcome of WFD programme	▪ Kenya Parliament programme has adopted newer methods of support ▪ BiH Blogger programme has gap between activities and eventual outcome
To what extent were local stakeholders consulted in the programme design	▪ UK parties were very good at local consultation prior to programme development ▪ Parliamentary assistance work improved on local consultations as programme progressed ▪ Programmes were more impactful where robust local consultations happened	▪ Labour support in BiH based specific local requests ▪ Serbia PBO based on parliament's inputs ▪ Jordan parliament programme newer outputs related to RC were based on consultations with Speaker

The section examines the relevance of WFD's high-level strategic objectives (as noted in Box 2 in the previous section). The discussion considers the alignment of WFD's intended results at impact and outcome level to the strategic priorities of sponsors, donors and partners in the regions and pre-selected sample of states in which WFD works.

The section assesses the extent of internal coherence and alignment between WFD regional and country interventions with the overarching strategic ambitions set out in the WFD results framework. In so doing the section considers the relevance of the underlying theory of change and ways in which strategic policy, context and political economy analysis have influenced strategy design and adaptation.

2.1 Strategic alignment with HMG priorities[20]

WFD has been described as a 'standard bearer', as an official promoter of the 'Westminster model'. The organisation is legitimised by HMG to work in sensitive political arenas. As a coordinator of regional parliamentary and political networks and as a bilateral partner WFD has often accrued high levels of trust and established strong partnership ties, enabling 'soft power', considered good for Britain.[21]

The 'Westminster model' is a well-received model and WFD is the main source for providing partners with the lessons gained from centuries of implementing this model, thus allowing countries to achieve 'more effective, accountable, and representative parliaments and political parties'. This approach is in line with DFID's strategic interest in 'open, inclusive and accountable democratic systems'[22]. As a result, WFD's strategy contributes to the 'Golden Thread'.[23]

WFD's intended outcome reflects the importance of fostering political governance institutions that serve the many not the few, the accountability of power-holders to citizens and the ability of citizens to demand their rights and participate in the decisions that affect their lives. It is such strategic partnerships that can help foster representative, legitimate and capable political systems.[24] These institutional outcomes can help create wider societal goods: deeper democracy, less corruption and better governance, stability and even poverty reduction.[25]

While WFD's impact and outcome statements are broadly aligned with the strategic priorities of HMG, according to the WFD management team, one of WFD's ongoing operational challenges is to find ways to reconcile the differing strategic interests that at times can exist between DFID and FCO. The difference was less important when WFD sourced from bespoke challenge funds (such as the Arab Partnership Fund) but has become something of a dilemma since WFD entered into the multi-year partnership agreement with DFID. As the TR recommended, 'WFD needs better alignment with funding Department's priorities'.[26]

2.2 Strategic results alignment to partner priorities

Similarly, UK political party relations with their sister parties are often predicated on less ambiguous outcomes such as winning elections, as compared to parliamentary assistance, which is based on more complex issues, such as accountability. According to party staff, a shared interest in winning elections builds trust with sister parties and, in turn, provides the political space to negotiate other less tangible results such as embedding human rights principles into party policy.

WFD parliamentary wing priorities are equally aligned to the strategic interests of state government partners. In Jordan, Royal Court officials provided a copy of the policy framework informing the establishment of the Integrity Committee (as part of a broader commitment to fighting corruption) and the parliamentary legislative research service.[27] In Kenya, Transitional Authority staff believed that the WFD partnership fitted well within their Devolution Capacity Development Framework and the objectives of the Kenyan government.[28] In both cases, WFD's support to the relevant assemblies is focused on the priorities as outlined by the respective governments.

Members of the Western Balkans Network of Parliamentary Committees (NPC) recognised a strong shared interest with WFD in terms of the strategic desire to improve national parliamentary oversight capacities within a wider framework of EU integration priorities, including funding instruments, energy policy and investment strategy.

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[20] It should be noted that the priorities of HMG, as defined in this report, are based on a desk review of relevant and public documents and not from interviews with HO staff of DFID or FCO
[21] Triennial review (2015)
[22] WFD Corporate Programme Logframe (2012-15)
[23] The Prime Minister has defined, the 'Golden Thread' in a number of different ways, but emphasises the presence of good governance, rule of law and strong civil institutions
[24] DFID report to IDC inquiry on parliamentary strengthening
[25] HMG (2011) Building Stability Overseas Strategy, DFID, FCO and MOD. Post 2015 Sustainable development goals
[26] HMG (2015) Triennial Review: Westminster Foundation for Democracy
[27] Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2013) National Integrity System, Charter and Executive Plan
[28] Transitional Authority (2012) Devolution capacity development framework

Some differences in the strategic priorities of WFD and national partner governments were noted. In Jordan, while the intention of WFD to improve the functionality of parliamentary research and legislative oversight structure was legitimised by the Royal Court, there appeared to be less commitment to accord any meaningful powers to the new committees, given the need for domestic stability at a time of heightened regional crisis.

Similarly in Kenya, County Assembly officials believed legislation to build their institutional capacity was being systematically undermined by the interests of national technocrats and political elites keen to use national institutions responsible for devolution to retain political and financial power. The report elaborates on these contradictions in the results section (see section four).

Strategic contradictions in terms of state commitment to building civil society oversight capacity were also noted. For example, in Jordan and Kenya promulgations and legislation exist to enable voice and accountability initiatives, through budget advocacy and financial policy recommendations, among others. Yet when visited by the consultants, increasing evidence of a shift in thinking and new legislative efforts to control civil society, to restrict their role to service delivery and discourage their policy research and advocacy was noted. In Jordan, according to the January 2015 report of the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL)[29], the anticipated reform of the legal framework for civil society organisations has been further delayed within the Ministry of Social Development. In Kenya, the amendments to the Public Benefits Organizations Act (2013) proposed further stifling of civic action.

2.3 WFD internal strategic coherence

DFID provision of multi-year funding in 2012 went some way to incentivise WFD to more clearly articulate its strategic ambitions to HMG and to use more conventional governance and development planning frameworks to do so.

According to some members of the new WFD senior management team, this necessitated a shift in WFD operating culture as WFD experience in organisational strategies and logical corporate frameworks before 2012 was limited.

The strategic planning process was not without challenges. Most of the corporate stakeholders recognised that while 'strengthened democracy, stability and good governance as well as improved citizen engagement' were suitably framed results, the indicators proposed for measuring them were far too ambiguous.

Moreover, the reality of the logical framework design meant that strategic outputs were negotiated primarily to ensure an equal division of resources between the different wings. The hierarchy of results was less a well thought through representation of how WFD envisaged institutional change to happen, 'more an accommodation of interests'[30]. WFD acknowledges that the four original outputs existed in distinct silos, represented as institutional entities – parliamentary, political parties, civil society, and WFD's own organisational development strategy.

At the outset of the funding agreement, it had been easier to compartmentalise and think in terms of meeting the interests of constituent parts than frame a robust logic model.

WFD partially attributes this lack of strategic coherence to weaknesses in the organisational coherence that existed at the outset of the strategy period. WFD is not organised as a traditional bureaucratic hierarchy or as a networked coalition with a common interest but shaped by a central office with headquarters in Westminster and four separate offices each representing UK political party strategic international interests. In such an organisational construct, institutional norms and values are as fragmented as the differing interests and incentives for action between the competing groups.

The strategy is considered pragmatic and appropriate given the context. The TR recommendation to be 'more joined-up' - to become an integrated organisation that adds value rather than is little more than the sum of its constituent parts - was unsurprising given this context. WFD has since made concrete efforts to integrate parliamentary and political party programming (in Bosnia and Tunisia). There is an ongoing commitment to

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[29] http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/jordan.html
[30] Interview Transcripts

'link and lever' the contribution of political parties to the wider organisation goals of integrated democracy assistance.

The new draft WFD strategy supports further integration of the two 'wings', particularly by working with 'Parties in Parliament'. UK political party officials consulted with tacitly endorsed the 'three-pronged approach'. The approach enables the parliamentary and political party wings to retain their respective intervention models.

While the 'parties in parliament' model creates a useful third strand of programming as WFD goes forward, this strand of programming must be implemented in a manner that ensures it is not output-driven. In some ways 'parties in parliament' has just replaced 'civil society' as a third output. The 'three-pronged approach' does not address the absence of robust intervention level theories of change. For instance, both parliamentary and political party wings have strong regional strategic interests in the political empowerment of women, but there is no overarching intervention level theory of change that holds these two initiatives together and hence strategic coherence will continue to remain weak.

2.4   Strategic Gaps

While there is a high degree of strategic alignment between corporate framework outputs and regional and country interventions on paper, some country teams acknowledged gaps as a result of implementation experience. The report offers three strategic examples where these gaps exist: a) women's political empowerment, b) civil society influence on parliamentary legislation and, c) political party electability.

Women's political empowerment

The benefit to state and societal actors from WFD's engagement on women's political empowerment is highly relevant in terms of both UK aid priorities and international sustainable development goals, yet it is difficult to discern from any WFD strategic policy documentation what women's political empowerment actually looks like.

The corporate and intervention level logical frameworks are silent on the intended institutional change outcomes for women. The overarching narrative remains weak. It is unclear whether the ambition is that more women candidates be elected, chair committees, occupy senior party leadership roles or to achieve legislative changes that empower women, such as inheritance, employment or family protection laws.

Civil society and youth engagement with legislatures

A slightly different results gap has emerged around the strategic objective to improve civil society engagement with parliaments in order to influence legislation.

WFD's initial intention to focus on civil society and youth engagement with legislative bodies has not materialised to the extent that was envisaged during the design stage (see results section four). Initial interventions had been designed, logical frameworks developed and even baseline studies conducted. But teams in Jordan and Kenya informed the consultants that they had opted to change their strategic direction after the first year of implementation. WFD's regional management and Kenya and Jordan country teams acknowledged that their programmes had gone from being civil society and youth focused towards being more parliamentary-focused in a relatively short period of time.

In both cases, the shift was in response to the changing political context mentioned above and to the belief that results would be stronger if WFD concentrated more on its core business of parliamentary and political party strengthening, a recommendation that was made after the midterm evaluation. However, these strategic shifts were not suitably captured in corporate results frameworks.

Political party strengthening

Finally, there is a result gap around the strengthening of political parties. The outcome is currently focused on strengthening policy and electoral communication capacities of political parties. This is not inaccurate but it does tend to overlook some important intentions of this relationship. There could be undefined outcomes which result from the WFD intervention such as sister parties with more women candidates (e.g. Labour's

support to sister parties in Africa), electoral success or even helping sister parties become the main opposition groups (e.g. Liberal Democrats' support to Botswana Movement for Democratic Change in Botswana). Such results often contribute to societal change, including a reduction in electoral violence, better governance and growth.

2.5   Theories of change

Perhaps one main reason for these gaps is that WFD's interventions tend to be structured around a series of capacity development outputs, focused predominantly on two main programming pillars, parliamentary and political party strengthening. The pillars reflect the interests of WFD's two 'wings' and form part of the accommodation that underpinned the corporate funding agreement. (The two outputs are even allocated equal impact weighting (35%) further supporting the need for equal distribution of financial resources between 'wings').

While the 'parties in parliament' pillar included in the new strategy goes some way to embedding the TR recommendations for greater organisational integration, the strategy still remains largely output-driven.[31] Such a strong focus on only one part of the results chain undermines the robustness of the underlying theories of change. The output-driven framing has implications for regional and country interventions.

The strategic framing encourages teams to only think about the requisite activities and processes needed to 'build capacity' and overcome the defined 'capacity gaps'. The team is only focused on the causal relationship between activities and outputs. The relationship between outputs and outcomes – which will lead to institutional change – is weak.

For example in three of the countries visited (Bosnia, Kenya and Jordan), the country teams talked about the importance of knowledge and skills transfer, whether from international or national experts. Increased importance was accorded to mentoring and coaching, as some noted, responding to previous MTE and TR recommendations to broaden delivery and move away from standalone expert-led events. Similarly, resources were allocated to the production of training curriculum, to technical guidelines and tools.

In theory, WFD activities are to be adapted to the political context (a 'tailored' rather than 'blue-print' approach). However in limiting their methods of support to conventional capacity-building interventions some teams are delivering ready-made solutions to the institutional context. Some have acknowledged that they may be less well placed to engage with the specific institutional problems that are known to impede institutional reform initiatives and hence to drive institutional change outcomes.

Country teams are concerned that their relationships are usually predicated on organising capacity development activities rather than solving institutional problems. For example, in Kenya the team came to realise that its principal focus on building the capacity of the county assembly budget and appropriation committees had often led it to overlook some of the emerging institutional problems the committees were facing. The country team is however politically savvy and understands that many of these institutional problems are emergent (i.e. they cannot always be predicted or defined).

In some cases, the solution was the cause of the problem. For instance in Kenya a problem for one county assembly budget and appropriations committee concerned its role in ensuring the Executive kept its promise to allocate funds towards bee-keeping not just fish-farming, an important pro-poor initiative in a county where marginalized groups depended on honey sales.

Yet the teams often found it hard to swim against the 'capacity-development' tide. Particularly since the capacity development model was so embedded in the results management systems of the Kenyan Government, WFD and even in DFID systems.

The focus of strategic capacity development plans, partner agreements, etc. often made it difficult for country teams to carve out the required time and space to innovate and experiment, particularly for support building around emergent collective action problems and to become more outcome-focused.

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[31] WFD (2015) Draft Corporate Strategy

For example, in Kenya the team, with encouragement from HO, was beginning to question the relevance of reporting systems that sought to measure the numbers of activities completed, or surveys that sought to assess 'capacities in budget-making', when they knew some of the real challenges were relational, concerning the 'capacity to solve problems'.

2.6   Policy analysis

WFD has benefitted from its relationship with DFID on levels other than financing and results management. In the third year of the corporate programme, there is evidence of a much greater leadership commitment to policy development. Initial policy development papers have been commissioned and organisational changes negotiated to ensure that regional management teams are more focused on policy analysis and strategic direction rather than becoming too involved in the micro-management of the country and regional interventions.

Hitherto strategic programming interventions had often been underpinned by financial incentives and organisational imperatives as much as thematic policies. For example, the West Balkans regional network strategy was a response to a request to reduce the country portfolio without compromising the quality of state-based partnerships. And the selection of Tunisia for 'joined-up' programming was in part a means of closing funding gaps following the end of the Arab Partnership Fund Grant.

Our sample of country programme visits points to the emergence of a narrow typology of parliamentary strengthening preferences, for instance the provision of support to parliamentary structures such as research services, budget and appropriations committees and parliamentary budget offices. It was informed that the typology was popular within regions as well as across regions. Yet country teams acknowledge that the menu of institutional structures is often based on tacit knowledge about what is likely to get funded and produce tangible results than a product of any formal policy learning or knowledge base about what works and why it works.

2.7   Political analysis

WFD has clearly improved organisational capacity to ensure context and political economy analysis (PEA) that underpins programme relationships. DFID has equally played a role in enhancing management team knowledge and skills in this area. Analysis of WFD project design documents developed in the third year of the programme[32] offers clear evidence of this enhanced capacity. This analysis has been used to develop concise, strategic interventions that have, in some cases, achieved results in a short period of time.

Our country visits provided sound evidence that regional and country teams have the skills to think politically. There is evidence that intervention designs are being adapted as a result of this knowledge, for instance by refocusing or withdrawing early. This was evident among the youth work in Jordan and Kenya. An evaluative mindset in Bosnia had also triggered early learning around new interventions to strengthen campaigning capacities of female political party candidates.

Yet since such analysis is still underpinned by a 'capacity-gap model', many country teams considered the analysis to be largely superficial. In some cases, PEA was positioned as a pre-implementation activity either similar to a macro-level governance assessment or constituting some form of stakeholder mapping. Such initiatives are often part of an effort to identify openings, to assess the level of political commitment or to determine the nature and level of risk. As yet WFD does not currently use such analytical tools to identify and surface institutional problems. PEA and other relational tools are not used as part of the partnership approach, intended to focus on solving collective action problems for institutional outcomes.

Many WFD regional and country teams acknowledge that they have a tacit ability to unpack the interests and behavioural incentives of different actors that populate the institutional environment they are engaged on but do not have a structured approach to analysing the institutional relations that can drive or impede outcomes.

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[32] Bosnia Integrated Programme; Serbian Parliamentary Budget Office; Jordan Research Centre

There is perhaps more evidence of such 'relational models' in the political party work. As politically competitive entities, such problem-driven adaptive approaches are consistently in their DNA. The key challenge for WFD is whether its parliamentary wing can consistently integrate such relational approaches and focus on the kind of strategic outcomes that at times cohere with the interests of political parties, for instance around the political empowerment of women. This may mean finding common ground on a related set of emergent institutional problems and enable joint experimentation.

2.8   Interim conclusions

WFD has ensured a high degree of strategic relevance. The strategic objectives are clearly aligned to those of its sponsor, donors, partners and the different parts of the organisation itself. The strategy draws on WFD role as 'standard bearer' of the 'Westminster Model' and promoter of a strong UK brand of democracy assistance that ensures soft power and returns for Britain as much as results for partners.

At the outset of its first multi-year partnership agreement with HMG, WFD's strategic results framework came to be interpreted more as an accommodation between interest groups than a theory of how institutional change happens. The logic model is focused strongly on the delivery of individual parliamentary, political party and civil society strengthening outputs. But less attention was paid to the specific type of institutional outcomes that these direct deliverables contribute to.

The output-driven framework encouraged teams to think about requisite activities and processes needed to 'build capacity' and overcome 'capacity gaps' but a focus on the relationship between activities and outputs ensured insufficient attention was given to the relationship between outputs and outcomes. As a result, outcomes remain unspecified and teams less well placed to the surface and find ways to tackle the kind of institutional problems and constraints that can undermine outcomes.

While the policy, context and political analytic capacities are clearly improving across WFD, they are still only partially embedded in partnership relations. Some country teams are questioning the continued relevance of the capacity development model and are starting to see that more relational models might enable them to tell themselves (and others) real stories of institutional change.

Key Lessons Learnt
o The 'equal allocation principle' within WFD limits the ability to implement a comprehensive Theory of Change
o The means by which institutional change occurs has evolved within WFD and its Theory of Change has to evolve with it
o Where WFD has applied more effective context analysis, it has resulted in programming that is more relational and, therefore, impactful

Section 3: Delivery

WFD's use of regional networks and bilateral national partnerships has resulted in a cost-effective means of delivering support that is further enhanced by the effective use of consultants. For the work with political parties, WFD's support is outcome-oriented and is able to achieve greater institutional change as a result. For the work with parliaments, there are indications that more results-oriented methods are being used to build capacity and maintain relationships. It has improved its use of M&E though further work is required. VFM has, to date, been focused on financial aspects of its work and has not been adopted with regard to programming.

Evaluation Questions	Conclusions	Evidence
To what extent is the WFD delivery chain designed and managed to be fit for purpose, to deliver the intended results? How has WFD ensured delivery efficiencies, including management of results of VFM assurance?		
Has the choice of delivery modalities been appropriate to the institutional and political contexts and adapted over time?	▪ WFD links to parties are very strong ▪ WFD links to parliament partners are strengthening ▪ UK parties use of relational modality has been highly effective ▪ Parliamentary assistance has shown results where less use of training and more use of brokering, mentoring and convening.	▪ LibDems support to DA and ALN based on strong partnerships ▪ Serbia PBO is example of stronger parliament links ▪ Western Balkans NPC now uses more advanced tools such as mentoring and convening ▪ Conservative's support to PDP & SDA (BiH) based on relational model
To what extent has the delivery of regional and country level programmes been aligned to maximise results?	▪ All party programmes – regional and national – are well aligned, allowing a two-track approach to capacity building ▪ Some parliament programmes at regional level are aligned with national support ▪ Use of regional networks, overall, is a good tool for cost-effective delivery of support	▪ ALN, WAFA and AWN have formed basis for some bilateral support while providing support at one level to many parties ▪ WB NPC is well aligned with national support in 6 Balkan countries
To what extent has WFD organisational structures at different levels, resource allocation and work planning enabled the delivery of planned outputs?	▪ Progress being made towards a more impactful and results-oriented structure within WFD ▪ Limited financial data and VFM indicators related to programming ▪ Limited use of monitoring reports and lessons learnt to improve programme results ▪ Change in role of Board of Governors to be more strategic and less operational ▪ WFD has become more effective at use of field staff	▪ New senior management have made strides in making WFD results-oriented ▪ Still examples of programmes being developed, like Serbia PBO, without gaining from lessons learnt ▪ Increased role and autonomy of field staff in Kenya, Jordan and Western Balkans
To what extent has WFD improved internal and external coordination and collaboration	▪ First cross-party work started in BiH ▪ No integrated work between parliaments and parties ▪ Communication between two wings is improving, but not fully functional ▪ HMG coordination in-country is hampered by funding coming from London ▪ Donor and implementer coordination in-country is limited	▪ BiH Blogger programme is cross-party work ▪ Limited opportunities for collaboration between AWN and MENA Women Programme ▪ Limited communication with HMG post in Jordan ▪ No formal donor and implementer coordination was observed
To what extent has WFD developed the technical	▪ UK Parties have technical capacities to deliver results, including high-quality	▪ Labour support in BiH was based on work of consultants who have long

Evaluation Questions	Conclusions	Evidence
To what extent is the WFD delivery chain designed and managed to be fit for purpose, to deliver the intended results? How has WFD ensured delivery efficiencies, including management of results of VFM assurance?		
capacities to deliver its strategy?	consultants • Parliamentary assistance is improving its technical capacity, but still work to do • Where field staff are capable and empowered, relational approach has developed to solving beneficiaries' problems	relationships in country • Western Balkans NPC has field staff who have built good relations with national partners • MENA Women's programme relies heavily on workshops and conferences
To what extent has WFD been able to ensure VFM in terms of delivery of planned results?	• Financial reports meet standards • VFM limited to financial controls and not developed into programmatic approach • No VFM strategy • Based on limited data, WFD is achieving VFM	• HO Finance staff acknowledge no VFM strategy • VFM focused on procurement and costs but is effective to that extent
To what extent has WFD been able to efficiently track progress, to monitor and report results?	• Corporate logframe indicators were of limited value • M&E has improved as programme progressed, including quarterly and annual reports • Some UK parties have limited, recorded M&E, but programmes are based on regular feedback from beneficiaries and technical experts • Limited evidence of parliamentary assistance using M&E to improve programmes	• Parliament indicators are geographic-centric • Quarterly and annual reports are now standard • Labour M&E is detailed and implemented well • Serbia PBO was developed with no indication of learning from lessons within WFD
To what extent has WFD been able to develop an evidence base to support wider learning?	• UK parties use feedback and evidence to adjust programmes • Less evidence that parliamentary assistance is making adjustments to programmes based on evidence and feedback • Political analysis capacity is increasing • No clear KM strategy	• LibDems work with ALN has increased policy monitoring • BiH Blogger programme showed limited adjustments after first round of support • Limited sharing of lessons learned from regional programmes

The section assesses the quality of the WFD strategy delivery system. It examines the financing and the operationalisation of regional network and bilateral partnership modalities. The section seeks to assess the efficacy of the technical activities and processes WFD deploys to deliver outputs and to influence institutional change outcomes. The section then presents an analysis of the arrangements for coordination and cooperation within WFD and between WFD, FCO and DFID as well as other political governance actors, primarily at the country level. Finally, the report examines progress against WFD's organisational output; focusing primarily on M&E and VFM systems then closes the section with a set of interim conclusions.

3.1 Strategy resource allocation

WFD strategy delivery faces two key dilemmas that relate to different agendas of the donors. On the one hand, DFID has been concerned with grant absorption, the ability of WFD to scale-up operations in order to deliver on a more ambitious and complex strategy. And on the other hand, WFD has been concerned with ensuring it has sufficient funding to sustain a wide portfolio of partner relationships, ensuring programmatic transition and continuity between funded projects.

As an organisation annual grant expenditure has remained relatively consistent over each of the three years of the strategy period recording a moderate annual increase in grant expenditure (2012/13 = £3.56m, 2013/14= £3.89m, 2014/15= £4.24m); political parties have received marginally more than funding (55.6%

compared to 44.4%), largely because they have directed funds to existing bilateral partnership relationships (Box 7). The allocation supports the principle of equal division (e.g. impact weightings at 35% for both outputs 1 & 2). As the allocation principle reinforces an output-based strategy – as indicated in section two – continuation of the principle undermine efforts to improve strategic cohesion and incentivises against a focus on outcomes and related institutional impediments.

For WFD's parliamentary programming, there were challenges in implementing in the first year that are common amongst development agencies that are expanding their footprint, both thematically and geographically. The first year (2012/13) was understood as an inception period involving participatory analysis and partner design work. Though WFD concedes that the former management team may have been overly optimistic in estimating the time it takes to put partnership Memoranda of Understandings and new office registration in place in many country contexts. It is also important to note that in the first year of the programme funding from DFID and FCO was delayed several months, impacting implementation.

Box 7: WFD Expenditure by Output

The establishment of CSO partnerships was protracted (given the need for their active participation in intervention design processes). The operationalisation of a Capacity Development and Innovation Fund also took longer than anticipated. WFD was 'fully-stretched' with the implementation of the new strategy.[33] The delay was also partially attributed to the absence of a clear plan to support the fund.

Box 8: WFD output expenditure by year (2012-15)

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
[33] WFD (2012) Capacity Building and Innovation Fund: 1

3.2 Regional networks

A proportion of FCO/DFID grant was used to coordinate or engage with seven regional parliamentary and political party networks in the Western Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. Both parliamentary and political party programmes have invested in network models, with parliamentary programming at a higher percentage than political parties (30% v 21% - Box 9).

Box 9: Percent of WFD expenditure by regional/national activities

	Parliamentary Assistance			Political Party Assistance		
	Network	**Country**	**Total**	**Network**	**Country**	**Total**
Expenditure	1,487,416	3,458,446	4,945,862	1,098,748	4,165,398	5,264,146
%	30.1%	69.9%	100%	20.9%	79.1%	100%

Some networks are pre-existing and funded and supported by WFD (e.g. NPC) while others were formed and are solely sustained by WFD (e.g. Women's Academy for Africa (WAFA)). Box 10 shows the specific regional networks that have been funded.

Box 10: WFD Regional Networks

Network	WFD coordinating body	No. of Countries
1. West Balkans Network of Parliamentary Committees (NPC)	Europe and Asia Desk	6
2. Arab women MP coalition against violence	MENA Desk	10
3. Arab Policy Network	MENA Desk	8
4. Democratic Union of Africa (DUA)	UK Conservative Party	11
5. Arab Women's Network (AWN)	UK Labour Party	4
6. Women's Academy of Africa (WAFA)	UK Labour Party	9
7. African Liberal Network (ALN)	UK Lib-Dem Party	44

While WFD has invested in regional networks in South Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, the parliamentary and political party networks often reflect different geostrategic interests. Parliamentary programmes have invested in Europe and the Middle East while political parties have used their grant funds to support new or nascent networks in the Middle East and Africa (Box 10).

A reason for this difference is that there was little incentive for UK political parties to use their grant to establish regional networks in Eastern Europe given that the Conservative and Labour Parties already had close bilateral ties in most of the Balkan states (with the exception of Croatia which has closer links with German sister parties).

That said the network model used in the Middle East and Africa was to some extent predicated on the lessons learnt in building sister party relationships in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin wall. The Labour Party developed its Arab Women's Network (AWN) based on and with the support of the Central and Eastern Europe Network established in the 1990s (Box 11).

Box 11: UK political parties' expenditure by network and country

Programme	Conservatives		Labour		Liberal Democrats		Smaller Parties	
	Network	**Country**	**Network**	**Country**	**Network**	**Country**	**Network**	**Country**
Expenditure(£)	512,574	1,688,142	231,793	1,968,924	354,381	316,714	0	191,618
% Total	23.3%	76.7%	10.5%	89.5%	52.8%	47.2%	0%	100%

Conversely a strong commitment by the Conservatives to sustaining their bilateral relations in Eastern Europe (sister relations in nine countries, including Turkey) may be one reason for them deciding to invest less on building an African network.

The Labour party's African network demonstrates political acumen betting on longer-term returns as women move into stronger leadership positions, noting that 'the Women's Academy for Africa is currently a network of eleven Labour, Socialist, and Social Democratic parties from nine countries that seek to promote gender equality, empowerment and political advancement of women in Africa'.

3.3   WFD regional network benefits and challenges

While WFD wings and its member political parties compete to protect their respective financial and political interests, at the same time they seek common benefits from network models. They exhibit common aims, whether in the empowerment of women or regional economic liberalisation which are reflected in their network names, the 'Western Balkans Network of Parliamentary Committees for Economy, Finance and European Integration', the 'Arab Women MP Coalition Against Violence' or the 'Women's Academy of Africa'. However, there are few signs that this commonality has been recognised and resulted in joined up work.

Where party networks differ is in terms of their desire to strengthen their 'family', to embed in these sister relationships a common set of values that reflects a shared political ideology (the quest for economic freedom, fairness and solidarity or human rights) and serves to also enhance electoral capability to eventually win elections.

This approach is important in the Middle East where political volatility and repression can make bilateral relations unpredictable. Regional coalitions have enabled continued dialogue with partners in Egypt or Libya at times when bilateral relations were just not feasible. Similarly for political parties a network approach enables relations to be formed with parties from countries where governments have discouraged any external support to opposition parties. Parliamentary networks have also ensured responsiveness to national opening, e.g. the creation of a new parliamentary budget office in Serbia through the NPC.

Regional networks have helped to facilitate dialogue between different political interest groups often between countries where trust has been historically low, helping participants find common ground around a range of issues. This has certainly been the case in the Balkans and is now playing out in Arab and African settings.

Without a doubt, such convening power is often enhanced as a result of pre-existing geopolitical factors, for instance, close proximity clearly enables easier links in the Western Balkans than some other regions. WFD considers the Balkans network model to be a well-established as a negotiating platform for EU integration.

In the Middle East and North Africa, the common Arab language lends itself well to network dialogue. Moreover, the spread of social media has enabled issue-based networks to transcend national boundaries while finding expression in different national contexts (e.g. 'Arab Spring', sexual violence against women).

Regional network models have afforded WFD the opportunity to build a community of practice, to bring peers together, whether parliamentary research officials at a 2014 workshop in Morocco or party communications officials in order through workshops hosted by the ALN or DUA to impart good practice and to share learning.

Relations formed through networks have served to lessen the emphasis on north-south knowledge transfers and instead help embed learning in the regional and national cultural contexts. For instance, more mature members of WAFA (e.g. Frelimo in Mozambique, or the ANC in South Africa) have supported members of young parties in other African counties to develop policy positions and refine campaign strategies. The same south-south approach has been used by DUA member party leaders from Ghana to support their sister party leaders in Uganda.

Regional network models have made coordination easier, providing a cost-efficient platform for delivery of a range of capacity development interventions to a dispersed yet core target group. For instance, WFD was able to use the approach to provide expert training by international and regional specialists on parliamentary monitoring to youth groups from Bahrain, Yemen, Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt. For the Liberal Democrat Party, the ALN is a cost-effective platform on which to build member commitment to human rights through the

Marrakesh Declaration - a commitment to prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, enabling the expression of identity for all, and enforcing human rights for all, regardless of race, colour, nationality, ethnic origin, religion, age, gender, sexual orientation or disability. These declarations were achieved and endorsed by more than 40 political parties in Africa with an investment of approximately £100,000 per year.

Regional networks provide a means of bringing MPs and parties together in order to build a coalition of support and plan bilateral action on sensitive political issues that might be initially lost by a bilateral approach, e.g. ensuring that violence against women is high on the legislative agenda, as done by the Arab Women's Network supported by the Labour Party, in Morocco.

The regional network model tends to have a centralising effect as coordination usually resides in London. Some within WFD believe that the networks will 'fall apart' without such central oversight, but others have decentralised coordination to regional hubs, for instance, the ALN secretariat in South Africa, embedded in the offices of the Democratic Alliance (DA). The challenge in these contexts is to ensure the values and interests of those running the hubs suitably reflect those of the wider network. WFD have also noted that regional hubs can add another layer of bureaucracy if decision-making power is retained in London. There can also be tensions between the national interests of the secretariat or regional office teams and the London offices of WFD. The gravitational pull of the hub has a similarly centralising effect and staff can overlook their membership empowerment role becoming inward, looking at their own country interests and not enabling others.

WFD is clearly conscious of the risks that regional networks do not become self-serving entities that have weak links to national contexts and generate few returns other than non-binding proclamations and overly ambitious and under-resourced plans. The risk can be high when network theories of change are not well articulated with a clear link drawn between inputs, activities, outputs and outcomes. A focus on a tangible set of national problem-driven institutional outcomes can be beneficial.

3.4   Bilateral partner relations

WFD's grant to the UK parties has mainly been used to fund bilateral relations (70-80% total party expenditure), used for meeting the technical assistance costs of parliamentary, political party or CSO work in twelve core regional and country-based programmes, part of a wider WFD portfolio of 30 countries across four continents (Box 12).[34] Our visits to Bosnia, Jordan and Kenya, were premised on examining these types of relationships.

Box 12: WFD bilateral partnerships by region

WFD	Europe	Middle East	Africa	Asia	Total
Regional Desks	3	5[35]	4[36]	3[37]	15
Conservative Party	7	4	4	2	17
Labour Party	9	5	8	3	25
Liberal-Democrats	4	2	5	2	13
Smaller Parties	2	0	4	0	6

It was noted that WFD's bilateral relations vary between parliamentary and political party interests. Of the six countries visited, WFD's parliamentary wing had a country office in three (Bosnia, Jordan, and Kenya). While WFD political parties do not operate a country office model, one or more UK parties maintained sister party relations in five of the countries visited. In the case of Bosnia and Serbia, all three main parties had long-standing relations. While party relations are established, they are loosely coupled. Parliamentary relations tend to be more recent but more tightly coupled (involving deeper and more frequent partner engagement).

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[34] Figures do not include Caribbean, Latin America and Pacific
[35] Includes Iraq and Kurdistan Assemblies
[36] Includes East African Regional Assembly
[37] Include Pakistan National Assembly and Punjab Assembly

WFD parliamentary interventions are often bound by annual timelines informed by logical frameworks with clear sets of planned activities. Milestones and targets are used to ensure a strong focus on progress toward delivery of intended outputs. Emphasis is placed on the use of training, mentoring and coaching with a view to building technical capacities, including the development of knowledge products and processes. Sharing good practice and embedding the type of knowledge and skills considered critical by some for institutional development. Increasingly WFD technical advisors and staff are also playing more of a negotiating and brokering role to tackle the blockages and constraints to institutional performance and change.

While there are distinct commonalities (political parties also use all the same approaches as regional teams), the sister party partner engagement model appears to be more focused on outcomes rather than outputs (e.g. their engagement starts off with the outcome clearly sighted rather than the output).[38] Their support is predicated more on solving the kind of institutional problems that are often undermining the electoral performance of sister parties. Party dialogue is more tactical and outcome-focused. The emphasis is not just placed on supplying technical solutions but also on helping to solve political problems. This means that parties tend to deploy more negotiating and brokering skills. These approaches are emergent in parliamentary work but they are less evident and the results section explores this distinction further.

3.5   Consultant recruitment, training and sharing best practice

WFD places a high level of importance of utilising expertise from a trusted group of parliamentary and political party insiders in order to develop partner knowledge and skills. They are usually experienced practitioners, working in parliamentary research services, or budget analysis offices, from Westminster, the Scottish Parliament or the Northern Ireland Assembly. Their technical expertise helps partners strengthen nascent structures and processes intended to improve oversight or legislative capacities.

Similarly UK parties draw on their 'family members' from within their own ranks variously deploying campaign strategists, party activists and in some cases current or former MPs to help improve sister party policy development capability or campaigning knowledge and skills.

Clearly there is no single approach to the selection of these UK-based experts, nor should there be, allowing expertise to be identified based on the context in which it is required. Some parts of WFD approach consultants directly or recruit from a small trusted pool of regulars. Others issue open calls inviting applications from their party staff even using competency assessment frameworks and ensuring recruitment becomes more merit-based and less ad hoc across WFD.

Such technical specialists represent good value for money, based on a cost analysis. The EET noted that WFD consultants and experts engaged during this evaluation had different payment agreements, including work at below-market rates, for honorariums or even on a pro-bono basis. As tried and tested experts they have a proven capability to impart 'good practice' in sometimes difficult and unpredictable partnership settings.

Financial rewards are not always their primary motivation. One activist noted that he was just happy to be asked to 'work for the party'. Another thought international parliamentary work brought a new perspective to his work in the UK. This view was echoed by a number of political party workers consulted during the preparation of this report.

Regional and national parliamentary and political experts are increasingly used to deliver training. In Jordan, Kenya and Bosnia, senior staff from partner CSOs delivered training to specific target groups including youth group representatives, representatives from community-based organisations and female candidates and officials from different political parties. In some cases, a beneficiary on one WFD project might deliver training to beneficiaries from another WFD project. For instance in Jordan a woman MP, part of the women's caucus and the coalition against violence, was contracted to train a large group of youths on policy development that was part of a project initiative to improve youth engagement with parliamentarians; this is evidence of a programme being more 'joined-up'.

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[38] This approach permeates the work of the UK parties but is not always so evident in their formal documentation.

3.6 Coaching and mentoring

In response to shortcomings highlighted in the MTE and TR WFD has made a conscious effort to move away from an event-based training model considered insufficient to enhance partner organisational capacities and drive institutional development (but clearly still favoured by partners in many of the countries visited). WFD's parliamentary work now emphasises more regularised and closer contact with partners rather than facilitating workshops in large hotels.

The evaluators saw greater evidence of coaching and mentoring of parliamentary officials and serving MPs in Serbia, Jordan and Kenya. UK experts provided their technical experience in organising legislative research functions or managing budget oversight committees but were also skilled at motivating and influencing partners to try out new approaches. This more tailored approach demonstrates a shift away from the event-based training model.

For example, influenced by the 'House of Commons Library Model', Northern Ireland Assembly officials have helped the Speaker of the Jordan Parliament develop a nascent parliamentary research function, spending time coaching and mentoring a small team of Jordanian economic, political and social researchers to develop operational plans, agree on job descriptions and terms of reference and produce legislative research papers and policy briefs for parliamentarians.

UK political parties often deploy similarly trusted UK specialists to work side by side with their sister party's counterparts, helping, for instance, to improve communication strategies. The inputs are usually more tactical rather than general capacity development. For instance, Liberal Democrat campaign strategists helped the BMD in Botswana develop their 2014 general election strategy. In Bosnia, UK Conservative Party communication strategists provided weekend training to Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and Party of Democratic Progress (PDP) party activists on voter database management, targeting, contact, and local application of party messages in the months just prior to the 2014 election.

WFD also recognises the value of regional and national experts, considered well respected, accessible and attuned to the prevailing cultural and institutional rules and norms. For instance, in Jordan, WFD contracted a respected former member of the National Human Rights Commission and a well-known Senator to offer advice to members of the new Integrity Committee and the Women's Caucus. They were known to be reformists but also trusted by the Royal Court and easily accessible. Coaching can also pose a challenge for the UK recruited parliamentary specialists when they need to rely on translators to explain concepts or procedures. They are also often less sensitive to the prevailing political changes (in the case of Jordan a slowdown in the reform agenda). That said, while national consultants may be well aware of the political context impending institutional change(s) they may prefer to keep the knowledge tacit out of fear of jeopardising the aid relationship and undermining their contract status.

In Kenya, the WFD country office created a nine-member technical group comprised of former National Assembly members and senior civil servants who had high-level experience in budget and appropriations work. The team came highly recommended by the Parliamentary Budget Office and Speaker of the Senate; a person accorded some central oversight responsibility for the devolution reforms. WFD contracted the team to coach newly elected members and recruited officials from the recently formed County Assemblies and help them understand their budget cycle role. The support supplemented more formal training offered by the wide range of Nairobi-based institutions supporting Kenya's devolution act. The team delivered formal training but also adopted a mentoring role working closely alongside committees helping them apply new knowledge and skills.

Increasingly UK parties are also using regional experts to help develop learning in sister parties. The model is equally dependent on the use of respected individuals, often leaders from more mature sister parties. For example, a Conservative sister party leader from Ghana has provided support to a sister party leader and his officials in Uganda by providing campaign strategists and political advice to party staff.

3.7 Negotiating and brokering

While there are distinct commonalities (political parties also use all the same approaches as regional teams), the sister party partner engagement model appears to be more focused on outcomes rather than outputs (e.g. their engagement starts off with the outcome clearly sighted rather than the output).[39] Their support is predicated more on solving the kind of institutional problems that are often undermining the electoral performance of sister parties. Party dialogue is more tactical and outcome-focused. The emphasis is not just placed on supplying technical solutions but also on helping to solve political problems. This means that parties tend to deploy more negotiating and brokering skills. These approaches are emergent in parliamentary work but they are less evident and the results section explores this distinction further.

The evaluators noted that many of the UK party consultants who had provided multiple inputs over long periods had developed close relationships of trust with sister party leaders and officials. This was particularly true in contexts where individuals had some history and shared a common language making it easier for them to have 'frank discussions'. Familial relations were often more conducive to sensitive talks or even heated debates.

At times, MPs had been better than technocrats at surfacing the hitherto tacit issues and facilitating the necessary debates, bringing people together. For instance, a Liberal Democrat MP played a critical role in generating consensus on a human rights declaration for the ALN, challenging sister party members to discuss the real constraints to reforming discriminatory African policies concerning sexual identity.

While pushing for more of an open door, Scottish Parliamentary officials played a similarly catalytic role motivating some officials from the West Balkans Network of Parliamentary Committees, particularly members of the Serbian Parliament, helping them make the case to leverage more national resources to operate a budget office.

Certainly in Kenya the group of Ten County Assembly trainers told the EET how they had 'debated passionately' with other groups to help resolve some of the emerging budget-related problems that had emerged in the different County Assemblies they were supporting. Proximity to practice had forced them to go beyond their remit of Public Financial Management (PFM) training and coaching of County Assembly officials (in Fiscal Policy Strategy papers and other technical aspects of the budget cycle). In one case, a 'PFM Trainer' was able to build a coalition of support by enlisting the help of a group of local elders to ensure that the County Governor and his County Cabinet demonstrated tangible commitments to the agreed budget revisions (case study 7, annex 3) and the required cash backing and eventual transfers. Other 'incidences' of this type of 'outcome brokering' are highlighted as case studies in the next section.

3.8 Parliamentary and political party coordination and cooperation

The MTE and TR highlighted an apparent lack of operational cooperation within WFD. Parliamentary and political party interventions were considered to be in parallel to each other, lacking strategic coherence. The reviews suggested that efficiency and effectiveness might be improved if WFD interventions were better integrated and the different wings more aligned to common strategic outcomes.

In response to these reviews, WFD has used corporate funds to pilot interventions in Bosnia and Tunisia. WFD has taken a measured approach as 'programme staff and parties are fully stretched with implementation of their new strategic programmes'.[40]

With a view to assessing progress in this area, the evaluation team undertook a visit to Bosnia to examine one of the two integrated models. WFD only began implementation in late 2014 so it is premature to evaluate results. But the visit did allow an early assessment of delivery with a view to drawing early lessons (Box 13), and there are already some observations that may be of value. First, the provision of a programme manager based in Sarajevo is already having an impact on the capacity of the project, as the manager builds relations with local political parties and CSOs. Secondly, the UK parties are hesitant to allow full interaction between

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[39] This approach permeates the work of the UK parties but is not always so evident in their formal documentation.
[40] WFD (2012) Capacity Building and Innovation Fund: Priorities and Outline Budget for 2012-13

the programme manager and the parties, often times requiring the manager to communicate through London, which is limiting the potential impact of the project. It also resulted in some participants in the first training not being committed candidates in the next local elections in 2016, despite that being the primary audience for the training. Finally, the project is perceived by local actors (CSOs; political parties) as having been designed in London. In the rush to have a joined up programme much was assumed and delivered without a detailed and reflective context analysis on which to base the design of the project.

Box 13: Integrating Programming in Bosnia

The idea to develop an integrated programme in Bosnia came from the political parties. The strategic focus, to strengthen women's political agency, appealed to all parties and the parliamentary wing. The design does not at this point include parliamentary engagement and instead focuses on training and mentoring of female candidates from across the political spectrum. As a result, there are potential societal returns in bringing interest groups together and in building a wider institutional commitment to women's political empowerment.

The design and implementation process has required negotiation between the WFD Europe desk and the three UK party offices and the smaller parties group. The design reflects UK party interests in ensuring a clear link to a tangible specified outcome: in this by preparing female candidates for the 2016 Bosnian elections. The tight strategic focus of party interventions contrasts with the broader approach to framing strategic results usually taken by WFD parliamentary wing.

The theory of change is premised on a mix of technical capacity and political commitment. The design includes three components, a) building blogging skills among candidates, b) building wider campaigning and communications skills, and c) ensuring leadership commitment. The project is still at an early stage of implementation and had only recently completed its first blogger training for 23 female participants from four political parties.

According to the national WFD team, 'we were under pressure to get something done before the end of the financial year'. Integrated programming often presents coordination challenges and activities require long lead times to plan and implement. This can be difficult if there is pressure to show quick results.

Competition between parties also means that parties are often reluctant to provide training to participants from other parties, particularly in areas such as electoral communications knowledge and skills; these are considered 'party secrets'. While this can result in parallel interventions, parties tend to avoid a cross-party approach as the returns in terms of building trust are lower.

Given the teething challenges of convening different interest groups around a single 'blogger training' the event was reported to be a success by many of the implementing parties, the external trainers were described as 'top-notch'. However, it is in understanding these challenges that lessons can be drawn.

In the first instance the pressure to 'get something done quickly' meant that many of the training participants were not party candidates but instead party staff. In Bosnia, selection of political candidates is a sensitive process and the expectation that candidate selection would have been completed in time for the training was, with the benefit of hindsight, perhaps overly optimistic.

Bosnian trainers commented on the variation in skill and motivation among some of the participants; selected by their local party bosses, who had received requests to put forward participants from their party headquarters. Evidently few of the central or local party leaders had much knowledge of the wider process, 'they were just dealing with yet another invitation that had landed on their desks' one noted.

On reflection WFD national staff posit that had they been more involved in the planning process they would have been able to negotiate with party leaders and ensure a higher quality of participation, particularly when brokering such results in their own language, with a deeper knowledge of some of the sensitive issues. As a result, the process was considered 'protracted' and 'inefficient'.

Local trainers and political party leaders consulted thought the intervention had been mainly 'designed in London'. WFD national staff commented that if the party leadership component had been used as an entry point for the training, the selected participants would have been more appropriate and motivated.

Some UK political parties 'desire to retain control of coordination' (and similar interest by sister parties to engage them) meant that invitations ended up being rushed out at the last minute. As a result, members of the breakaway Croat party, HDZ1990 were unable to attend. The evaluators are unclear if this was the real reason for their non-attendance but the closed nature of participation meant that many important political parties were excluded, for instance, SNSD and SDS. Trainers thought it was 'extremely limiting' for the project that not all parties had the opportunity to be represented, particularly in the political context of Bosnia. According to UK party staff the nature of political competition and the need to

build trust with sister parties was the main reason. A similar situation was noticed in other country settings, where some sister parties had refused to attend training attended by their political competitors.

The requirement to 'post a blog' was a key condition of participation. At the time of our visit, only seven of the 23 participants had posted such blogs on the designated area of the Bukka website. According to Bukka staff and our own translator the quality of the content suggests that some participants were merely fulfilling an obligation. Our discussion with participants suggests that many were more interested in the campaigning element of the project and not the blogger training. As one female party candidate said, people in my area do not use such online sites. I am more interested in developing my public presentation skills'.

Some local partners felt the intervention was too driven by numbers, '20 people and 20 blogs' and the quest for short-term output targets. The intervention was thought to be less focused on tackling the institutional problem or why people do not vote for women.

WFD assumed what female candidates should do. The theory of change implied that blogging improves electoral profile and chances of electoral success, but also drives website traffic and contributes to democratic politics more broadly.

But the design overlooked the political economy of the intervention. One journalist argued that had the invitation been open to other parties as well as to real political bloggers the event could have potentially made a stronger contribution to strengthening the quality of online political debate about women in politics.

The observation highlights a fundamental flaw in the intervention level theory of change and points to a key strategic dilemma for such integrated programming. Party work is primarily focused on achieving very tangible short-term party outcomes, often concerned with improving electability of parties, even though they may express a wider hope for the institutional development of parties.

Conversely, WFD's parliamentary work is often in pursuit of a wider hope for the institutional development of parliament or improvements in the democratic environment per se. But to do this WFD parliamentary wing relies on quantitative outputs (X candidates trained; X blogs produced) that are often in a weak causal relationship with institutional outcomes.

The integrated interventions enabled WFD to try something out. They are unsure where it will lead but acknowledge the coordination has brought them closer and allowed for collaboration.

3.9   WFD country level coordination and co-operation

Previous evaluations have argued that WFD country-level engagement with FCO and DFID country offices and international political governance partners could be more active, allowing for a more routine dialogue. This evaluation found that WFD coordination and cooperation varies according to country context. Good WFD coordination and cooperation was noted in contexts where bilateral donors had a strong interest in the sector and multiple service providers existed. For instance in Kenya, WFD is an active member of a Parliamentary Working Group (currently chaired by DFID) and regularly attends monthly meetings, updates the other members on WFD plans and activities, and generally works to ensure efficiency and add value to the sector capacity development strategy (see Box 14).

Box 14: Donor Coordination in Kenya

In Kenya, WFD has coordinated and collaborated with the PWG members on capacity development initiatives around the implementation of Constitutional Devolution a key focus of the WFD country intervention. In this case WFD was able to carve out a clear niche supporting the Centre for Parliamentary Service Training (CPST) to develop a Public Financial Management (PFM) training module part of a the new professional in-service training curriculum intended to strengthen the budget oversight capacities of county assembly officials. The forum ensured clarity on decisions regarding the criteria for partner selection reducing duplication with other PWG members.

WFD acknowledges the difficulty in moving the PWG beyond an information-sharing forum. There is competition for funds and few agencies will collaborate if it means a reduction in their funding. Concerns have been raised regarding low meeting turnout. Larger agencies often delegate participation to junior staff. Participation costs in more than one working group can be high for WFD. There is a need for a trade-off between the requirement to attend coordination meetings and the need to engage more with county partners.

WFD is increasingly concerned with the sole focus on capacity development. There is little conversation as to how the members can work together to address some of the emerging problems associated with the implementation of the Devolution related Acts and Public Finance Management Act (e.g. the reductions in locally generated revenues, the lack of civic participation in expenditure oversight, lack of actual expenditure on development investments). The sheer number

of national devolution interests is said to be having more of a centralising effect. There is a tacit understanding among the WFD team that devolution assistance solutions may be creating more relational problems with centralists than solving them.

In countries where FCO strategic interest is strong, inter-organisational coordination mechanisms tend to be less structured. Moreover, in countries where WFD is not a recipient of embassy grants or has no direct project relations the coordination incentives can be weaker. The absence of international staff in the WFD country offices can also be a factor as there may be fewer informal relations. Jordan is a case in point and a country where coordination has been a challenge (Box 15).

Box 15: Development partner coordination in Jordan

In Jordan WFD country staff tend to maintain strong ties with their Amman government partners, from the Royal Court and the Parliament. Although WFD regional management has always sought to brief the FCO during periodic country visits, the irregular nature of their engagement has meant that ties are weaker. This can be a cause of FCO frustration if there are reputational risks associated with WFD interventions, particularly associated with parliamentary interventions.

Some democracy assistance providers believed that a more structured parliamentary sector working group would help improve trust and transparency not just coordination efficiencies between donors and partners working in the sector.

There is a belief that better coordination might lead to a more unified message to the Jordanian Parliament. Different western democracy assistance providers were all supporting committees, caucuses and women MPs but offering different advice, often sending mixed policy messages to partners. A coordination forum would provide space to discuss the efficacy of different policies and delivery models in the particular Jordanian context. Some believed that poor information flows had enhanced competition between the different agencies and better coordination would foster more collaborative approaches.

The more established providers noticed the increased government effort to coordinate their different interventions, for instance by encouraging different providers to support different parliamentary committees (WFD had been allocated the Integrity Committee and the Parliamentary Research Office). In principle, they supported such coordination by government partners (given the increase in democracy assistance actors supporting the Jordanian Parliament).

Development partners believed that partners should coordinate more openly, not just negotiate bilaterally. Such an approach might foster trust rather than suspicion. Importantly a forum might lead to a more explicit discussion on how to tackle institutional performance problems not just how to close capacity gaps.

In Bosnia, the evaluators noted that WFD national staff ties with democracy assistance actors had become stronger as a result of personal relations developed through engagement in strategy mapping and scoping exercises. The desire to adopt a more evaluative stance had led the team to be more outward facing and engage informally with other actors, often among other professional women. Although the lack of formal ties with the FCO had meant that the team was unaware of embassy grants being provided to WFD's media partner, albeit for different strategic purposes.

MPs and staff from some UK political parties expressed less interest in coordinating with democracy assistance providers. They argued, for example, that such engagement might compromise the trust they had built up with their Bosnian sister parties. Whilst acknowledging that sister parties were often indirectly supported by National Democratic Institute for International Relations (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI) they considered these 'aid relationships' to be quite different from the family-like ties they had built with their Bosnian sister parties.

MPs and staff from UK political parties did, however, meet with FCO personnel, usually with the Ambassador as part of a standard visit protocol. The evaluators heard from some UK party staff that these meetings could also provide opportunities to ensure they were supporting HMG strategic interests. For instance, in Bosnia this had entailed working together to address EU integration bottlenecks and to enhance bilateral trade ties (see results section four). In this respect party engagement with the embassy was often political, intended to use the relationships to tackle particular institutional problems with a view to driving quite tangible outcomes.

3.10 Monitoring, evaluation and learning

WFD has since 2012 attempted to improve its corporate management systems. In its 2012-2015 corporate plan, WFD committed itself 'to be a results and learning organisation'.[41] 10% of the FCO/DFID grant was allocated to a 'Capacity-Building and Innovation Fund' intended to enable WFD to deliver against its fourth output: 'strengthen M&E and VFM systems' including learning tools.[42]

Progress during the first two years has been reported as slow.[43] The MTE recommended WFD pay greater attention to the management of results.[44] The 2014 Annual Review recommended WFD 'establish an integrated approach to monitoring of support to parties and parliaments' adding that 'monitoring and evaluation must result in the adoption of programmes based on lessons learnt'.[45] More broadly these perceived corporate deficits were reflected in recommendations made by the TR team that WFD need to concentrate on 're-tooling management systems'.[46]

At HO level, the evaluators noticed that a high priority had been accorded to generating a step change in the way that WFD thought about measuring change and monitoring and reporting of progress. The revised organisational structure has established a Senior M&E Advisor with line management reporting directly to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) supported by a dedicated M&E officer. WFD now has an M&E strategy and a clearer plan of action to support it.

As a result of more effective central direction (informed by a closer adherence to results-based management principles) WFD HO teams have now largely moved away from high frequency activity monitoring (often involving weekly field reports) towards more strategic quarterly reporting involving activity to output analysis.

Adaptation of results-based M&E systems by WFD political parties has been less comprehensive. Some parties have invested more in fostering change than others. Most continue to report to WFD against individual consultant inputs largely seeing the process as one of accounting for funds received. That said UK parties do have more robust internal analytical processes with evidence of interventions being adapted as a result of activity evaluations and debriefs from consultants and staff.

Country teams all commented on the noticeably higher quality of M&E support offered by HO in the past year and it was clear that many field staff were beginning to see M&E more as a benefit than a burden. For some there is still a pressure to demonstrate that output milestones and targets have been achieved (this pressure was high at the time of our visit during the last quarter of the financial year) but there is also an emerging view that M&E can help drive results and learning.

That said some field staff are beginning to experiment with ways of using their partners' voices in order to report on progress and success, as well as problems. Although the problems often related to WFD's own strategic interests (asking them to reflect on WFD shortcomings or recommend ways to ensure replication of the model) rather than reflect on the impediments affecting their own reform efforts. In Kenya and Bosnia, some are beginning to think through the type of political analytical tools they need to bring these to light in the partner relationships. There is a demand for processes and tools to help them diagnose the binding constraints of specific collective action problems and enable them to tell stories of real change.

3.11 Value for Money

WFD recognises that it has made less progress in terms of developing its VFM assurance capabilities. In the absence of a VFM strategy and without any clear VFM guidelines or indicators VFM is still largely confined to finance-focused mainly on economy concerned to achieve best prices when procuring goods and services.

Economy

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[41] WFD (2012) Corporate Plan (2012-2015)
[42] WFD (2012) Capacity Building and Innovation Fund
[43] WFD Annual Review (2014)
[44] MTE:59
[45] DFID (2014) WFD Annual Review Report
[46] HMG (2015) WFD Triennial Review Report

The evaluation team noted sound evidence that country teams had generally worked to ensure best prices when renting office accommodation, negotiating workshop facilities and hiring vehicles. In Kenya, WFD sub-lets offices from the British Council and, in Bosnia, WFD operates out of a small, low-cost central apartment block. WFD keeps capital expenditure down by generally not operating its own vehicles.

In all countries visited as part of this evaluation, it was noted that WFD shares training costs with many of its partners, for instance, budget cycle training in Kenya, parliamentary public consultations in Bosnia and recurrent costs of a resource centre in Jordan. Such cost-sharing and in-kind contributions (such as salaries and rents) produce economies but also contribute to more sustainable arrangements (see sustainability section).

Efficiency

WFD also benchmarks consultant fees (which as a whole constitute very good VFM). However in some sectors, such as PFM, WFD recognises inflationary pressure on national consultant rates reflecting the high demand and limited supply and it can be hard to keep prices down if there is a risk of losing the right people. Pressure to try and recruit national staff for lower than market rates is also something of a false economy if they do not last long and the churn unsettles partner relations.

Costing activities rather than inputs has been more problematic as there are often so many variables whether parliamentary policy papers, participant costs of PFM workshops or delegate costs of regional conferences. [47] Recent analysis by WFD for this evaluation suggests that policy papers can be produced for no additional costs by a UK party staffer, for a marginal cost by a national intern and respectively higher costs by regional or international consultants. The costs also say very little about the actual quality of the paper or its legislative influencing value.

It will be harder still to arrive at benchmark costs for public hearings and participatory budget processes and WFD has yet to attempt to cost the causal link between activities and outputs (e.g. budget training and budget knowledge).

The evaluators note that the network model appears to provide a relatively cost-efficient model to deliver outputs though this evaluation is not able to back up this claim with tangible costs. Regional networks appear to have helped WFD parliamentary programmes reduce their recurrent country costs enabling portfolio consolidation while broadening capacity to respond to strategically relevant opportunities as they arise.

Our evidence also suggests that these networks do not exist in a programmatic vacuum but are instead intrinsically linked to bi-lateral relationships each serving to reinforce the other and to ensure efficient programmatic value as a result.

Effectiveness

WFD has yet to think through the mix of effectiveness measures that might usefully help it improve its focus on outcomes. To date, WFD has not had the internal debate necessary to identify the measurement and indeed contributory cost of the relationship between inputs, outputs and outcomes. For example how policy papers produced lead to coalitions of support for legislation and eventual legislation passed or electoral techniques applied and electoral success achieved. There is a clearly an urgent need for WFD to find ways to take forward the VFM conversation and to begin the gradual process of moving VFM out of finance and into results management more broadly.

3.12 Interim conclusions

WFD has developed relatively robust delivery mechanisms for achieving its strategic outputs efficiently, utilising the higher levels of grant funding to operationalize a larger programme using a mix of network and bilateral relationship modalities.

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[47] EET VFM table comparing ten indicators across regions and parties

There is clear evidence of improved coordination with FCO, DFID and international democracy assistance actors in the countries visited. This can be particularly challenging when WFD only has grant relations at head office level rather than country level and coordination costs for the small numbers of field staff are high.

WFD has benefitted from implementing a more coherent M&E strategy and plan and is seeing tangible returns to reporting and learning as a result of stronger output monitoring. The move from weekly activity reporting to quarterly output reporting has reduced field staff transaction costs and improved management efficiencies.

Despite efforts to introduce a more strategic approach to management, there is evidence that WFD is too 'stretched' not just at HO level but also at the country level. The determination to achieve a set of output milestones and targets is sometimes causing WFD to spend less time thinking about whether all the capacity development interventions are making any difference. As was seen in the corporate logframe revisions proposed by WFD in 2014, DFID's hesitancy to revisit outcome statements may also inadvertently reduce the incentives to specify what institutional change looks like and to unpack the binding constraints the limit reform.

Political parties appear clearly sighted on outcomes often as a result of established relations of trust and closer dialogue around electoral problems. Parliamentary relationships would equally benefit from articulating institutional outcomes and surfacing and engaging on the related institutional impediments in the knowledge that capacity development solutions can sometimes contribute to the problem.

Key Lessons Learnt
o Results and institutional change occur where WFD focuses on a more relational approach to its work – identifying the problems being faced by beneficiaries and supporting them in resolving those problems
o Context and political analysis must be ongoing and integrated into the programming of WFD and not seen as a 'one off' at the start of a programme cycle
o Regional networks provide an opportunity for WFD to provide cost-effective support while being used to build bilateral relationships with partners that are committed to institutional reforms

Section 4: Result

WFD has contributed to the development of more effective, accountable and representative parliaments and political parties in the countries in which it has a physical presence and in some cases in contexts where it does not. In some cases, there has been a societal impact as a result of the work of WFD, including new legislation, institutional reform to political parties to be more inclusive and a reduction in political conflict.

Achievement Rating

Outcome: More effective accountable and representative parliaments and political parties in the countries in which WFD works.	**Achieved**
Output 1: Parliamentarians, including female parliamentarians, in 10 legislatures undertake their key legislative, oversight, financial scrutiny and representative roles.	**Achieved**
Output 2: Minimum of 20 political parties, in countries selected by WFD, have strengthened internal structures and external networks, enabling them to formulate, communicate and campaign on policy-based messages that offer a genuine choice to citizens.	**Achieved**
Output 3: Civil society organisations in 5 countries and women's groups in 3 countries engage effectively with parliaments, parties and other stakeholders.	**Achieved**
Output 4: Enhanced WFD's strategic focus and strengthened coordination, including party-to-party, parliamentary and cross-party work; deepened WFD's technical expertise and professionalism (drawing on best practice, learning and development, improved programme management, communication tools etc.); reformed WFD structure and governance arrangements, as set out in WFD's Change Agenda (December 2011).	**Partially Achieved**

The section assesses the outcomes and impacts of WFD partnerships with different parliaments, political parties and civil society organisations (CSOs), primarily within the regions and countries visited by the evaluation team.

The section is organised in five parts. The first three parts assess the ways in which WFD partnerships have contributed to 'more effective, accountable and representative parliaments and political parties'. [48] The analysis draws on nine case studies (annex 3). As different 'stories of change' they each offer rich descriptions of partnership relations and shed light on the drivers of change.

The outcome analysis is sequenced according to three outcome statements that constituted WFD's theory of change at the start of the strategic period (Box 16). [49]

Box 16: WFD Strategic Outcomes (2012-15)
1. Parliaments function effectively and produce quality legislation that responds to citizens' needs.
2. Civil society organisations are able to influence parliaments and parties to represent citizens' needs.
3. Political parties more representative, better informed, with consultative policy development processes.

The outcome statements loosely correspond to the three outcome indicators included in the 2012 corporate logical framework design for 'transforming political parties and democratic institutions'. Broadly, they seek to measure a) the quality of 'parliamentary policy, legislation and its implementation', b) CSO influence on legislation, through advocacy and policy recommendations and c) political party policy development, communication and campaign capabilities'.

The fourth part of this section briefly analyses the contribution these outcomes have made to wider societal change. Following WFD's strategic impact statement presented in the 2012 logical framework this report considers the potential ways in which 'democracy, stability and good governance has been strengthened'. [50]

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[48] WFD (2012) Logical Framework
[49] WFD (2012) Theory of Change Diagram
[50] Ibid

The report pays specific attention to the political impact in the context of Bosnia, Jordan, and Kenya. Finally – in the fifth part – the report offers some interim conclusions and related recommendations.

4.1 Outcome 1: Parliaments function effectively and produce quality legislation that responds to citizens' needs

Evaluation Questions	Findings	Evidence
To what extent have parliaments and political parties in countries which WFD works become more effective, accountable and representative?		
To what extent have parliaments developed the technical and institutional capacities to produce quality legislation that responds to citizen's needs?	▪ Evidence of increased capacity in Jordan ▪ Focus on legislative analysis has developed niche for WFD ▪ Women MPs receiving specific and effective support to promote new laws	▪ Jordan RC is now providing evidence-based analysis to MPs ▪ Research and analysis centres have become WFD niche ▪ Jordan Women's Caucus is effective at promoting new laws ▪ Conference in Jordan with women MPs, government and CSOs on Family Protection Law
To what extent have parliaments developed technical and institutional capacity to conduct oversight of government and to scrutinise legislation?	▪ Evidence of an increase in oversight capacity ▪ Women MPs capacity specifically addressed ▪ Parliamentary committees conducting public oversight hearings ▪ Increased capacity for budget analysis	▪ Serbia PBO is based on demand for greater financial oversight ▪ WB NPC - Macedonian public hearing run by woman MP who is chair ▪ WB NPC – public oversight hearings in 3 parliaments
To what extent have MPs, including women MPs, developed the technical and institutional capacity to work across party lines?	▪ Multi-party women's caucus established and supported ▪ Women MPs working across party lines to conduct oversight ▪ Effective budget analysis based on cross-party support	▪ Jordan Women's Caucus is active and has built cross-party cooperation ▪ Serbia PBO – woman MP on committee presses for public oversight hearing ▪ WB NPC – Macedonian and BiH women committee chairs conducting committee hearings
To what extent have parliaments and MPs utilised resource centres supported by WFD to enhance the quality of their work?	▪ Evidence that RCs used ▪ Committees have benefited from evidence-based analysis ▪ Use of analysis in plenary debates	▪ Jordan RC being used by some MPs and committees on regular basis ▪ Jordan Integrity Committee has accessed RC for analysis ▪ Serbia PBO – budget analysis has been used in plenary debate on budget
To what extent have parliaments and MPs assumed the political will to endorse and implement reforms to their legislative and oversight functions?	▪ Evidence of some parliaments endorsing reforms ▪ Integration of WFD supported RCs into Secretariat ▪ MPs building on what they have learned from WFD support to increase oversight of executive	▪ Albanian-Montenegro bilateral committee advocacy to encourage completion of highway ▪ King of Jordan speech reference to Parliament's RC ▪ Jordan Speaker's endorsement of RC ▪ Jordan RC and Serbia PBO to be integrated into parliaments ▪ Kenya county assemblies change procedures to adapt to citizen demands for transparency

Broadly our analysis suggests that WFD's bilateral and regional relationships have contributed to strengthening the 'structures, systems and procedures that allow for effective legislation, oversight and representative processes'.[51]

Analysis of results from our country sample suggests that WFD interventions contributed to strengthening the structures that have ensured parliamentarians are better placed to engage with their Executive's legislative agenda. Evidence from a range of interviewees believed that as a result legislative scrutiny has become more evidence-based, particularly in terms of contributing to social and economic policy legislation. Our evidence from specific countries is presented below (further detail is provided in annex 3).

Legal research support and better legislation on social issues in Jordan

In Jordan the Chair of the Integrity Committee informed the EET that he believed the quality of information included in the briefing paper prepared by the Parliamentary Research Centre (PRC) – which is supported through the WFD intervention – had helped him comment on the Illicit Drugs Bill.

Similarly a member of the Committee for Public Freedom and Rights of Citizens stated that without the new PRC research capacity their input to the Human Rights Trafficking Bill, the Crime Bill and to revisions to the law governing contractual debt would have been less effective.

Members of the Women and Family Affairs Committee considered the PRC's comparative study on sexual harassment laws to have helped them influence the proposed Executive revisions to 2008 Family Law. They stated that as a result the PRC had directly contributed towards improving the legal framework needed to protect women from domestic violence in the country.

Arab regional coalitions and national action on social issues in Morocco

Participation in the Family Law revision process has clearly motivated Jordanian women MPs, some whom are now involved in efforts to build a regional coalition of support and propose to use the Jordanian Family Law as an 'Arab Model', a culturally relevant precedent, to influence legislative revisions in other Arab countries with a view to protecting women and girls from violence.[52]

Women MPs from Morocco told the EET how engagement with their peers from the region, members of the Labour-sponsored AWN (aka - Tha'era) had helped 'raise their consciousness'. Participation in the regional forum had motivated them towards taking public action in their own country. In this case experience shared by East European feminist groups with long Labour, party relations helped others unpack the problems and contributed to building solidarity around a set of legislative issues relating to women's rights.

A Tha'era meeting in Morocco was considered serendipitous, convened by Labour at a time when the national public mood was changing; people were challenging cultural norms and implicitly the Sharia laws that had historically condoned violence against women. The shift in social values helped the formation of a cross-party coalition of support in Morocco that contributed to legal protection of girls from violence, particularly rape (case study 1, annex 3).

Trusted party relations drive legislation to tackle corruption in Bosnia

Citizen protest, this time in the form of outrage over endemic corruption in the Western Balkans also acted as a catalyst for change in Bosnia. The Director of a Sarajevo Think Tank mentioned that public pressure has contributed to putting anti-corruption on the political agenda. The Labour Party helped source trusted external technical support for its partner to develop a clear policy position on anti-corruption that ultimately led to the adoption of new legislation.

Politicians interviewed believed that the new anti-corruption law will go some way towards restraining bad behaviour in the public and private sector and they hoped that it might also contribute towards paving the way towards EU ascension and future economic prosperity.

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[51] WFD (2012) Logical framework outcome indicator statement
[52] WFD is supporting a nascent coalition of Arab MPs to advocate for legislative changes that serve to better protect women from violence across the region

West Balkans parliamentary committee networks members collaborate to solve transport infrastructure problems between Albania and Montenegro

A trusted relationship established as a result of participation in a WFD supported regional parliamentary network has had a similar catalytic effect in the Western Balkans (case study 3, annex 3). Coordinated pressure exerted on government transport ministry officials and cabinet ministers by parliamentary finance and budget committee members in Montenegro and Albania resulted in a negotiated budget agreement that helped to resolve a long-standing inter-country road-financing problem. The members of the two committees interviewed were confident that the subsequent completion of the 'highway' would contribute to improved trade flows between the two countries, long isolated from one another.

Road transport links between the adjoining border areas of Albania and Montenegro had been historically poor. Accordingly few national infrastructure investments had benefitted local communities, particularly impoverished farmers. The MPs argued that regional transport links might not only help local farmers to access markets but such regional transport integration might also contribute to improving the EU ascension chances of both countries.

Trusted advisors broker a 'budget accommodation' in Kenya

In contexts where trust between parliamentary and executive authorities has been weak and relationships are strained, respected external technical advisors have often been able to play a mediating role, helping to resolve budget problems. In Kenya, trusted national PFM advisors, recruited by WFD to build budget oversight capacity of County Assembly Budget and Appropriations Committee members soon found themselves in a mediating role to reconcile different political interests and find common ground on the budget.

One Kenyan mentor commented that he thought he had been contracted to 'train, coach and mentor' elected members and newly recruited officials (as budget devolution in Kenya was part of the new local governance arrangement informed by the Constitutional reforms of 2010, introduced to address societal grievances that underpinned political violence in 2008) but he soon had to put on a 'different hat' as it became apparent that relations between the Executive and County Assembly authorities were poor and there was little teamwork.

Another noted how he had no choice but to 'write a memo' to the Executive outlining the problem. 'I had to bring the two teams together, sometimes even having to force them apart, to stop them from physically fighting each other'. She added 'it took eight days' to reach an agreement on budget allocations.

In another instance, a mentor had paid a visit to the tribal elders, working hard to convince them why the Governor must share financial information with the County Assembly. His approach highlighted the importance of working with informal institutions. As culturally embedded decision-making institutions, tribal elders were often thought to have more legitimacy than the new county governance arrangements even though they had less formal power.

At the root of some of the problem was the proportion of the budget allocated to the Governor's office. The mentors had helped broker an arrangement that ensured the County Assembly interests were not overlooked. 'They created a Ward Development Plan', to ensure the funds were equitably distributed, she noted. The mediation helped institutionalise a more consultative budget-making process and ensured the Governor became more responsive to local needs (Case study 2, annex 3).

Form and functionality

In all the above cases, legislative advocacy by parliamentarians and civic activists has often been underpinned by 'political will'. The initiatives have 'followed the grain'. Coalitions of support have even included influential government figures. The social or economic problems mattered to political leaders; some who perceived an electoral dividend while others foresaw serious reputational risks.

There were also cases where 'political will' appeared to be strong on paper but much less evident in terms of real action for change. In some cases, Executive authorities had promulgated political support for legislative initiatives while simultaneously withholding the requisite powers needed to effectively implement the

legislation. As a result, the creation of new institutional structures to implement legislation gave an impression of intent but without suitable powers such new structures had good form but limited real functionality.[53]

In some of the cases, the creation of new oversight structures was said to be little more than 'theatre' (case study 4, annex 3). In Jordan, for instance, the establishment of a new Parliamentary Integrity Committee, with the tacit support from the Royal Court, signalled Executive intent to vest greater oversight powers in Parliament.[54] (According to some journalists the expansion of Parliamentary oversight architecture was a direct consequence of the 'Arab Spring' and the promise of new democratic reforms made by the King). However, the onset of an 'Arab Winter' meant little oversight power had actually been vested in the new committees; they were still somewhat hollow institutional structures.

Limited mainly to a fact-finding role, MPs involved in the Integrity Committee expressed their frustration at being unable to undertake parliamentary enquiries. Trusted advisors argued that a fact-finding role was probably more appropriate given the lack of resources, noting that the committee should concentrate on providing information to the Royal Integrity Commission.

Parliamentary insiders believed the MPs' frustration was down to an inability to use their committee positions to boost their own public image, considered important in the context of Jordan's highly individualistic political culture, particularly for first time MPs who were keen to make a public mark. Parliamentary elections are frequent in Jordan and MP turnover is very high.

4.2 Outcome 2: CSO influence Parliament and parties to represent citizen's needs

Evaluation Questions	Findings	Evidence
To what extent have CSOs developed the capacities to influence parliament to better represent citizens needs	- CSOs developed coalitions to address budget concerns - CSOs engaged in public hearings on oversight	- Kenya programme – CSOs and citizen's groups build coalitions to advocate for change in county budgets - Serbia & Macedonia public hearings (WB NPC) included CSO inputs
To what extent have CSOs developed the capacities to engage with political parties to better represent citizen needs	- CSOs engaged parties to develop successful joint issue campaign - CSOs engaged in party youth development	- AWN – Moroccan CSO worked with Moroccan party to build issue campaign to repeal Moroccan Penal Code section - Labour - DA Young Leaders Programme – LibDems – CSOs developed and partnered with as part of programme

At the outset of the strategy period, WFD had envisaged direct partnerships with CSOs, principally with a view to influencing national and sub-national legislative processes.[55] WFD had hoped CSOs would be enabled 'to advocate, form effective coalitions, develop evidence-based policy recommendations, represent constituency interests and effectively contribute to policy-making processes'.[56]

Our country visits to Kenya and Jordan allowed the EET to assess a small range of results that might come under the rubric of such 'voice and accountability' partnerships. While the sample was limited, results were also mixed. In Jordan Al Quds, WFD's CSO partner told the EET that the partnership had not materialised as envisaged, coming to an end earlier than expected. In Kenya, CLARION, WFD's CSO partner, said early results were good but were unclear about the future.

There are more fundamental reasons for the mixed results. Evidently country strategic focus in both Jordan and Kenya underwent a shift during the three years programme, away from direct support to CSO-youth-led legislative initiatives towards fostering closer relations between parliamentarians and their citizens. This shift

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[53] Andrews, M. (2013), The Limits to Institutional Reform, Cambridge University Press
[54] The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2013) National Integrity System: 'Charter' and 'Executive Plan'
[55] WFD logical framework outcome indicator: number of WFD supported civil society, including women's groups having a demonstrable influence on legislation, through advocacy and policy recommendations
[56] WFD theory of change document, 6th February 2012

<cn_seg>was due in part to the redesign of the programme (Kenya) or was influenced by the MTE recommendations (Jordan).[57] This quick shift, however, left some CSO partners confused about WFD's strategic direction.

Jordan parliamentary monitoring by CSOs and youth

In the case of Jordan, initial plans to support parliamentary oversight by CSOs and youth had not been taken forward. WFD's CSO partner was invited to the UK to meet CSOs with a parliamentary monitoring remit but plans to support oversight of the Jordanian Parliament did not materialise, in part due to other democracy assistance actors already supporting CSO monitoring of Parliament, the shifting political climate, and to lessons from early stages of engagement.[58]

An eventual 'youth-led advocacy project' yielded limited results.[59] Some of the trained youths had used WFD seed money to take forward small projects with a view to engaging in legislation that supported their interests, such as electoral law revisions. Quality proposals had however not been as forthcoming as expected as many youths had little concept of what they wanted to do. Even the CSO expected to be told what to do; 'we saw it as a contract' they conceded.

As a result, only a small number of projects received WFD funding. In one case funds were provided to publish an electronic 'youth newsletter' and in another case a youth leader undertook public consultations on the planned electoral law. Neither initiative appears to have had any real influence on electoral law revisions or other legislation.

The CSO argued that Parliament is less responsive and seldom provides them with appropriate information despite a Freedom of Information Act. They were not sure if the reason was down to a lack of willingness or a lack of ability.

According to some Jordanian parliamentary committee members, the interest in 'this kind of CSO influencing' is waning. One noted that CSO advocacy had gone too far and had resulted in something of a backlash. Another committee member believed Parliamentarians were only accountable to the Executive and the Royal Court. If they were unaccountable to themselves (having rejected legislation proposed by the Code of Conduct Committee) there was even less likelihood of being accountable to private CSO businesses with weak public legitimacy.

One political observer noted that state appetite for CSO and youth monitoring of Parliament had lessened in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Moreover, the absence of pressure on the Executive for reform and regional instability had created incentives to legislate for strong controls of CSOs and other associations.

Parliamentary constituent visits

WFD has shown itself to be adaptive to shifting political incentives. Provision of support for Jordanian Parliamentarians to undertake 'constituency visits' has been more aligned with the prevailing institutional incentives, often framed as activities to 'build capacities of women MPs to listen to the needs of citizens'.[60]

The Senate Advisor to the Jordan Women's Caucus agreed that such 'constituency visits' were also very important to MPs in Jordan. Particularly as individual MP popularity matters far more than party popularity.

TV cameras and journalists are usually invited, particularly to poor rural areas. In one respect, such visits can provide an opportunity for citizens to 'question their MPs'. But it is difficult to compare these visits to town hall meetings. As Jordanian citizens told us, the Amman MPs expect to visit their villages and hand out prizes. They are treated more like dignitaries than political representatives.

CSOs 'naming and shaming' local public authorities in Kenya

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[57] MTE (2014)
[58] Al Quds Centre and NDI (2009) Jordanian Parliament Monitor, Third Parliamentary Monitoring Report, August 10th 2009
[59] WDF Jordan - 2014 weekly activity reports and CSO reports
[60] Report of the Jordanian Parliamentarians meetings in Northern Shouneh and Rusaufeh cities, Nissan Centre for Political and Parliamentary Development, September 2014

While civic space for influencing parliamentary legislation may be limited in some country contexts space may expand in others. Changes in the Kenyan constitution served to increase space for CSOs oversight of local authorities.

Following the implementation of the 2010 Constitution and 2012 Devolution related Acts, groups of local civic activists, trained and mentored by national Apex CSOs and PFM advisors have sought to improve budget accountability and transparency by county authorities.

Citizen groups have taken different approaches to engaging with their local authorities. In some cases, they have used their advocacy skills to frame the issues and to take direct action. In one case a 'leaflet drop' intended to generate public outrage at alleged increases in corrupt behaviour by some of the County Executive Committee officials and members of the County Assembly.[61] Evidently the change in governance arrangements had not led to a change in public behaviour, and authorities were still controlled by the same group of elite families. Many citizens believed that the new system had just 'devolved corruption'.

In one case, citizens from the 'Kitui County Devolution Support Network' wrote to the Controller of Budget to complain about the quality of public consultation for the county budget.[62] The group argued that the correct procedure had not been followed and that public forums were limited. The group complained that the public had not been admitted to the public gallery to hear the reading of the budget. In other counties, citizens have taken Speakers and Governors to court for bad budget behaviour and for some, devolution has just led to more litigation.

It has however been difficult to ascertain the actual effects of such civic action. As one activist noted, in Kenya written complaints often fall on deaf ears. With no responsibility to answer to such complaints, it is often the case that little action ends up being taken. While there is some evidence of such answerability at the national level with former ministers being taken to court for corruption, there is little evidence of commitment to such action at the county level.[63] It is easy for public officials to dismiss such actions as little more than sponsored performances.

CSOs collaborating with public authorities in Kenya

It was observed that efforts to improve budget accountability in Kenya are not always quite so confrontational. In some counties, citizen's groups have taken a more collaborative approach and in so doing gone some way to ensuring budget decisions take account of the interests of poorer communities in the district.

In one case, a group of ten citizens, many affiliated with different community-based organisations (CBO), had submitted a memo to the Chair of the County Budget Committee complaining about the lack of public involvement in the development of the County Development Plan (case study 4, annex 3).

Evidently few had ever seen a 'Budget Review and Outlook Paper' or a 'Fiscal Strategy Paper'. They argued that only the Governor's cronies had access to vital documents and the authorities seemed reluctant to share any budget documents with civil society who were deemed to be on the 'wrong side of the road'.

Some of the group believed that the Trusted Advisors, recruited by WFD had not just helped them understand the budget cycle process but also gone some way to 'opening the Assembly doors', reminding the Speaker of the constitutional rights of citizens to sit in the public gallery, requesting that the Clerk give the group sufficient notice prior to budget deliberations. Knowledge of the meeting data and access to the meeting hall was no guarantee that a meeting would take place. Such budget advocacy requires 'persistence', a quality that can be hard to maintain when participation costs are high (e.g. transport or childcare unavailable, phones call unanswered, colleagues absent).

Negotiated access, first to the meetings and then to the documents, primarily to the Fiscal Strategy Paper, led the group to advocate for a reprioritization of the agricultural development budget. A written request submitted to the Executive and the Assembly questioned the policy issue, arguing bee-keeping would produce better

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[61] CLARION (2014) Activity Report
[62] Kitui county citizen group letter to controller of budget, 18th July 2014
[63] Economist, March 27th, 2015, 'Corruption in Kenya: At long last, a prosecution'

returns than fish-farming in a drought prone district. Investment in bee-keeping might stimulate honey sales and benefit poorer communities.

These incidences are still only emerging, often seen as an exception rather than the norm, behaviour yet to be institutionalised: as the citizens were keen to point out, the county governance arrangement is still very new and many local members still find it hard to look beyond their own Ward interests.

4.3   Outcome 3: Political parties more representative, better informed with consultative policy development processes

Evaluation Questions	Findings	Evidence
To what extent have political parties supported by WFD developed the technical and institutional capacity to produce policy-based campaign messages?	▪ Evidence of policy-oriented campaigning by sister parties ▪ WFD supported policy dialogues result in groundbreaking policies ▪ WFD supported sister parties use new campaign techniques	▪ Botswana BDM – LibDems supported manifesto and communication strategies ▪ Labour support in BiH on policy development ▪ LibDems – ALN Policy Declarations – Human Rights & Free Trade ▪ Conservatives support to sister parties in BiH included new campaign techniques
To what extent have political parties expressed a change in political will to reforms of party structures or party external relations and communications?	▪ Evidence of sister parties adjusting legal framework to promote greater role for women ▪ Youth members have been given greater opportunities for party engagement ▪ Sister parties have more effective and focused message for external communication	▪ WAFA – Labour - survey showed a number of parties amended constitution to allow greater role for women ▪ DA Youth Leaders Programme – LibDems – youth now assuming leaderships roles in party ▪ ACDP communication strategy – DUP – more focused and effective communication important to electoral success
To what extent have those political parties supported by WFD benefited from exchanges with other like-minded parties through networks?	▪ Parties in networks have increased role of women members ▪ Parties have developed effective issue campaigns from network support ▪ Parties have adopted strong policies based on network dialogue	▪ WAFA & AWN – networks allowed for peer-to-peer dialogue and party reforms ▪ AWN – Morocco Penal Law Repeal – issue campaign ▪ ALN survey results – new policies being developed in sister parties based on network policy declarations

WFD envisaged that UK party partnerships, either by engaging network members collectively or by collaborating with sister parties bilaterally, would lead their sister parties to become more 'representative', with 'consultative policy development processes' in place. As a result, parties would have 'strengthened their policy development, communications and campaigning capabilities' and have adopted a more policy-based electoral stance.[64]

Party policy development capacity

Sister party members who responded to the UK party network surveys were generally of the opinion that their relationships with the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrats had caused them to think more about their policy stance on a range of issues, from free trade to human rights, including gender rights.[65] For example 75% of ALN respondents said their parties had promoted new policy initiatives as a result of being part of the Liberal Democrat family in Africa.

The ALN 'Zanzibar Declaration' on African Free Trade and the ALN 'Marrakesh Declaration' on Human Rights was mentioned by several ALN survey respondents as a contributory factor in shaping their policy stance.

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[64] WFD logical Framework (2012-15)
[65] 9 out of 34 ALN members responded to the survey

In Kenya, the ODM had placed a strong emphasis in the 2013 elections on making promises to tackle unemployment through the stronger implementation of the African Free Trade Agreement. In South Africa, the DA sought to promote Liberal values in their efforts to attract black voters. The ALN members from Botswana stated that their Manifesto focus on human rights and equality had gone some way to making them a more electable party.

Bosnian parties interviewed made similar claims about the effect of their bilateral sister party relationships in their policy development capacities. They argued that the capacities had developed slowly, as a result of long-standing relationships and mutual trust built up over a ten-year period between members of the party leadership.

Members of the SDA and PDP in Bosnia stated that the Conservative relationship had been instrumental in helping the parties develop their manifestos and to find common ground on four core principles that would underpin the post-electoral co-operation. Labour's technical support on an anti-corruption policy put Bosnia in a good position to steer through related legislation.

Some ALN members believed there existed few incentives for parties to develop policies while the broader polity was personality rather than policy-based and parties were seen as just vehicles for individuals to get into power. Orange Democratic Movement (OMD) members from Kenya cited the United Republican Party (URP) as an example, formed just before the 2013 elections and now part of the ruling coalition in the country. MPs in Jordan informed the EET that individual blocks of MPs mattered more than parties; alliances that ensured continued legislative support for the executive policy, not party policy.

More representative political parties

MPs, party officials and CSO activists interviewed during the evaluation all expressed the view that political parties in their countries were becoming more representative of the population. Their notion of representation was understood largely in terms of gender equity and the role of women in the respective parties.

Members of the WAFA and Tha'era networks (100% and 87%) had the most positive outlook regarding the role of women in parties (Boxes 17& 18) – an opinion that carries some weight given that the two networks are composed of women in politics. Even views expressed by ALN network members were positive, perhaps reflecting the network's proportion of male party members.

Box 17: Percent of respondents who believe the role of women party members changed as a result of party engagement with ALN

Network members pointed to evidence of gender equality, often a result of a more robust gender policy framework, integrating a gender perspective in their by-laws and candidate recruitment policies and creating 'gender focal points'.

An ALN affiliated party stated that gender policies had led to an increase in the number of women on the National Executive from two to six and the number of women on the party's Central Committee from 10 to 22. Another noted that women now make up at 30% of positions in all his party decision-making bodies and for the first time a woman held the post of Deputy Secretary-General.

Tha'era affiliated parties noted the positive effect of the introduction of quotas for leadership posts. Women now occupied 35% of the posts in one party's political bureau and 38% of the posts on their National Council. Another party similarly stated that more leadership positions were now occupied by women; including the National Executive Vice-President, Director of International Relations and the Party Treasurer. A CSO leader from Lebanon mentioned how their newly acquired 'campaigning skills' had contributed to putting a woman in charge of a large trade union for the first time. A Moroccan MP claimed her party had fielded more female candidates in the last election than previously. Respondents believed network participation to have contributed to change.

Box 18: Number of WAFA respondents who thought the network had influenced women's leadership in their party

Members of the Jordanian women's caucus supported the view that women were becoming more prominent in politics, citing the names of the different female MPs who chaired committees in the Jordanian Parliament. Such views were also expressed by women MPs interviewed in Bosnia who clearly believed that more women were finding a way to party leadership positions and being nominated as party candidates. They argued that better representation of women in political parties would benefit women in society more broadly.

There was less evidence of parties becoming more inclusive. In South Africa the DA appeared to have made the strongest efforts to diversify its profile, noting that over the last decade they have made more of an effort to include black people and youth in party leadership roles. Evidently they had 'turned maybes into supporters, supporters into members, members into activists, and activists into candidates'. A Smaller Parties Group evaluation recently noted a similar ability of trained sister party officials from the Scottish Nationalist Party to convert a large number of supporters into members in Zambia prior to the 2015 elections.[66]

In the case of South Africa the DA had strong political incentives to become more inclusive, keen to dispel the image of being a party led by white, middle-aged people, and had positively discriminated in favour of black candidates and youth. WFD contributed to this change through the development and support to the Young Leaders Programme (DAYLP) to allow for younger DA members to assume leadership roles.

In Kenya, the ODM had sought to broaden its appeal to other ethnic groups, attempting to challenge the institutional norms that had led Kenya parties to become polarised around ethnic vote banks and tribal, territorial interests.

A similar nationalistic strategy was adopted by Nasa Stranka, a multi-ethnic party in Bosnia. In both cases party officials believed that that their UK sister party relations had contributed towards improving their strategic capacities and motivated them to tackle some of the cultural impediments to development of Bosnian political institutions arguing that such relations often catalysed change.

Political party electoral capability

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[66] Smaller Parties Group (2014) Zambia Project Evaluation

In many cases observed by the EET, political party efforts to improve policy development capacities or to ensure better representation of women, youth or even different ethnic groups was viewed as a means to improve electoral capability and win elections.

MPs and officials expressed the strongest interest in translating their new campaigning knowledge and skills into votes and winning elections. As a result, a high proportion of ALN member respondents had adopted their campaigning techniques as a result of their participation in the ALN (Box 19).

Box 19: Percent of ALN respondents who stated their party had adjusted or revised its methods of campaigning as a result of engagement with the ALN

As a result of adopting messaging and targeting techniques learnt from the UK Liberal Democrats and other sister parties the DA in South Africa increased its membership among black communities.

In Botswana, the BMD believed campaigning efforts had been more effective as a result of earlier support in leadership, voter research, polling processes as well as close mentoring from DA and the UK Lib-Dems campaign strategists in the period immediately preceding the 2014 elections. As a result, the BMD had succeeded in becoming the main opposition party (case study 5, annex 3).

In Ghana, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) accredited its electoral capacity to DUA support in campaign techniques and post-campaign reviews, arguing that the relationship had enabled it to become more effective at voter contact techniques. Regional conferences were considered to be useful networking and learning events but only by embedding a Tory party strategist into NPP campaign offices had they become more effective, benefitting from real-time advice and inputs. The BMD in Botswana similarly attributed their success to such active tactical engagement.

SDA party activists in Bosnia noted that as a result of applying campaigning techniques learnt from the Conservatives they had increased their party membership in key local branches. This had contributed in 2014 to maintaining the SDA in power.

Bosnian party staff and candidates had been able to adopt lessons learnt shadowing UK Conservative party activists during the 2011 elections. The influence, however, is not just in one direction. The UK Liberal Democrats have drawn on DA strategists to support their 2015 Campaign and most parties acknowledge a high level of mutual interest in the relationship.

Electoral success and capacity development will vary from sister party to sister party. In South Africa, the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), a small political party based on Christian values, received ongoing support from Northern Ireland's Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) from 2012-14, in the lead up to the national and provincial elections. MPs from ACDP and party officials all noted that there had been a paradigm shift in the party as a result of its engagement with the DUP They now understood that the party could be true to its values while seeking electoral success. The party was able to maintain its three seats in the Parliament of South Africa after the 2014 election, allowing it to continue its reforms.

4.4 Societal Impacts

Evaluation Questions	Findings	Evidence
To what extent has democracy, good governance and stability improved in the sample countries over time		
To what extent has the strength of democratic institutions improved during the past three years	- Evidence of overall political system reform is minimal - Evidence of some parliaments being more active and effective at oversight - Some parliaments have increased capacity for evidence-based analysis for laws and budgets	- Results in sample countries limited to institutional reforms (at best) - Serbia PBO – capacity for financial oversight has increased - Jordan RC – increased capacity to analyse laws - Albania-Montenegro committee bilateral oversight of highway project - Macedonia & Serbia public hearings on financial oversight
To what extent has public participation in political institutions improved during the past three years	- Evidence of women MPs and party members increasing capacity and positions in parliament/party - Citizens engaging local assemblies to change budget allocations - Public hearings held and citizens engaged	- Jordan Women's Caucus – increased capacity and prominence of women MPs - AWN – women party members increase capacity to lead within parties - Macedonia MP/Committee Chair conducting oversight hearings - Serbia public hearings with citizen inputs - Kenya county assemblies accepting petitions from citizens

The above outcome analysis suggests that WFD regional and bi-lateral relations between parliaments and among parties may have contributed to the societal change in a number of different and often unexpected ways. It is, however, difficult to discern a direct causal link between the outcomes and intended impacts, including democracy, governance and stability.

There are four key reasons. WFD impact indicators are neither relevant nor robust enough; they are insufficiently distinct from the outcome indicators. There is very little reliable longitudinal data available, timeframes between interventions and results have been too short (eighteen months to two years is just too brief a period in which to assess societal impacts), and there are just far too many other potential causal variables, both internal and external, to factor in.

That said, our analysis suggests that WFD outcomes 'may' have contributed to a range of societal impacts some of which were less clearly articulated in their corporate strategy, these include, among others: a) the political empowerment of women, b) improvements in state integrity and a reduction in corruption, c) the protection of women from violence, and d) reductions in political violence. Below the report explores some of these types of societal change in Bosnia, Jordan and Kenya.

Political empowerment of women

There are now more women MPs in the Jordanian Parliament than there were four years ago. The number is however still small, women hold 18 out of 150 seats.[67] Only three of these seats are non-quota seats. Most of the Women MPs interviewed admitted that they only needed to attract 500 votes, mainly from their own tribe (to whom in the absence of electoral reform they remain accountable).

Women remain only moderately better represented in the Bosnian and Kenyan Parliaments and depend on quotas in order to access Parliament.[68] Political party candidates from all three countries believed that men and even women did not vote for women candidates, cultural norms that promoted women's primary domestic roles was considered to be one of the main impediment to change.

Integrity and anti-corruption

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[67] Inter-Parliamentary Union (2014) – PARLINE Data base – Jordan 2014
[68] IPU – Bosnia (9 women out of 42 MPs or 21%), Kenya @ 19%

Despite low numbers in Parliament there is clear evidence that women MPs have been accorded more of a leadership role, often as Chairs or Deputy-Chairs of committees that seek to improve state accountability to citizens, in Jordan these included a Social Development Committee, a Code of Conduct Committee, Human Rights Committee an anti-corruption focused Integrity Committee.

It seems women are no longer limited to just welfare and social protection legislation and have moved beyond these traditionally ascribed gendered parliamentary roles. Although such gender stereotyping is still evident (e.g. women MPs were at times described by others as having 'clean hands', and considered 'better-suited' to integrity work). Such generalisations were often internalised and expressed by Women MPs and female CSO leaders.

As Jordan's formal accountability structures are still relatively new (and as the report notes above, often lack substantive powers) it is difficult to determine to what extent such roles constitute the 'political empowerment of women' and given the context of empowerment whether these particular roles have contributed to having an impact on levels of 'corruption' or 'social protection' in society.

According to Transparency International Jordan, is less corrupt than it was five years ago.[69] Global Integrity's score, though somewhat dated (2011), considers the Anti-Corruption legal framework to be strong, though oversight and controls are reported as weak, there remains a yawning implementation gap.[70] Citizens consider private and public sector corruption levels to be a growing problem. Lack of civic oversight mechanisms is reported to be a contributory factor.[71]

Similar characteristics were noted in Kenya, ranked 145 out of 175 by Transparency International in 2014.[72] Kenya is considered by Integrity to have a strong anti-corruption legal framework but low implementation scores.[73] The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) can undertake investigations but prosecutorial authority resides in the Office of the Attorney General. The World Bank believes that corruption has increased since the introduction of the 2010 Constitutional Devolution. 'Weak institutional capacity' is said to have undermined attempts to increase transparency in the budget-making process and procurement process, budget oversight remains weak with little input from civil society.[74]

Growing dependence on national budget transfers following devolution and a commensurate reduction in locally generated revenues is likely to lead county Governors to be more upwardly accountable to Nairobi than to local citizens.

Despite similarly strong anti-corruption legislation in Bosnia, and according to the World Bank, a 'positive trend in its control of corruption indicator' (up from 42.2 in 2007 to 52.2 in 2013), Bosnia still suffers from a distinct lack of strong and independent anti-corruption enforcement mechanisms.[75] The findings were supported by Global Integrity Index scoring Bosnia at 100 for its Anti-Corruption legal framework and only 42 for the functionality of enforcement mechanism.[76] According to Freedom House, the country's 'complex institutional framework provides many avenues for corrupt behaviour among politicians'.[77]

The protection of women from violence and sexual abuse

It is perhaps too early to draw any conclusions regarding the impact of the legislative efforts to protect women from violence and abuse in Jordan and Morocco and the Arab World more broadly. Both countries had improved their 'gender equality ranking' during the last four years, a trend that was also noted during visits to Bosnia and Kenya.[78] But the ranking is too broad a measure to have much utility in terms of assessing the extent that legislation has served to better protect women and girls from violence in society.

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[69] Transparency International – Corruption Perception Index (CPI) www.transparency.org
[70] Global Integrity Report/Index/Jordan: http://report.globalintegrity.org
[71] Civicus Civil Society Index (CSI): www.civicus.org/csi
[72] Transparency International – Corruption Perception Index (CPI) www.transparency.org
[73] Global Integrity Report/Index/Jordan: http://report.globalintegrity.org
[74] World Bank Governance Indicators (2014) Kenya longitudinal data (1996-2013)
[75] Ibid
[76] Global Integrity Report/Index/Bosnia: http://report.globalintegrity.org
[77] Freedom House – www.freedomhouse.org
[78] Social watch gender index

Moreover, it is becoming clear that changes in the laws have empowered some Arab women more than others. While women no longer need their husband's permission to apply for a driving license or passport and are often free to drive or travel alone legislative change has still done too little to reduce the number of 'under-aged wives who are de facto slaves in their husband's homes'.[79]

The gap between social protection legislation and the social reality of women is less well reported by international governance data sets. The evidence that public authorities act on crimes against women is better gleaned from police records, court reports, newspaper articles and interview with rape victims. Such records provide better insights as to the extent that women's rights are upheld.

Risk of Political Violence

WFD has sought to improve democratic institutions, capable of mediating collective action problems, an indicator of which being a reduction in electoral violence as society is able to negotiate its grievances peacefully.

Political relations in Bosnia, Jordan and Kenya have been less marred by political violence during the WFD strategy period. Despite pointing to a generally negative political violence trend in Kenya since 1998, World Bank governance indicators point to a moderate improvement in the country (from 9.5 in 2009 to 13.7). Constitutional changes introduced in 2010 may have gone some way to mitigating the risk of violence around the 2013 election but it is too early to say whether more accountable and responsive budgeting by County Authorities has improved political relations and lessened the risk of future electoral violence.

In Jordan, traditional factional tensions between East Bank Bedouin tribes (the backbone of the Hashemite Monarchy) and Palestinians have escalated in recent years due to a growing division between secularists and fundamentalists. The electoral victory of Hamas in Palestine and warfare in Syria and Iraq has served to lessen the pace of democratic reform and it is difficult to argue that WFD support for parliamentary reforms has lessened the risk of political violence during elections. The Islamic Action Front remains aggrieved at the absence of electoral reform and risk of electoral violence remains high.

4.5 Interim Conclusions

WFD has contributed to the development of more effective, accountable and representative parliaments and political parties in the countries in which it has a physical presence and in some cases in contexts where it does not.

Its network and bilateral relations have been characterised by the use of an interchangeable mix of training, mentoring, negotiating and brokering roles, used often by trusted insiders but also by international experts, to strengthen legislative structures and political party processes, at times leading to results that have the potential to transform state-societal relations for the better.

Results have inevitably been mixed and unexpected. In some cases WFD has backed the 'wrong horse', sometimes put down to an insufficient understanding of the shifting political interests and incentives among important stakeholders but at other times it has contributed to positive change enabling the right mix of people in the right place at the right time, all focused on resolving an institutional or societal problem in which there is a strong collective interest.

Key Lessons Learnt
o Results are more prevalent where WFD is working with beneficiaries' political incentives for reform
o Investing in one champion is not sufficient, and WFD must be a broker of temporary coalitions that resolve problems that result in reforms
o Societal impact of the work of WFD is not always planned but flows from building trusted relationships with partners

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[79] Economist, March 20th, 2015:'Morroco the slow pace of change'

Section 5: Sustainability

Sustainability of results for WFD is more likely to be achieved where it has capable staff in the field that are building lasting relationships with beneficiaries and where those same beneficiaries have a strong sense of ownership of reforms.

Evaluation Questions	Findings	Evidence
Sustainability: To what extent will the changes to political institutions endure after WFD support has ceased		
To what extent has the WFD approached ensured sustainability of processes and outcomes as a result of its support to parliaments?	▪ Some parliaments are integrating WFD projects into Secretariats ▪ Where ownership by beneficiaries is strong, WFD supported groups/committees have permanently increased capacity	▪ Jordan RC ▪ Serbia PBO ▪ WB NPC – Montenegro Budget Committee
To what extent has WFD approach ensured sustainability of processes and outcomes as a result of its support to political parties	▪ Some sister parties have amended constitutions to create greater leadership role for women ▪ Sister party youth have assumed leadership roles in some parties	▪ WAFA Survey results – Labour ▪ AWN Survey results – Labour ▪ DA Youth Leaders Programme - LibDems
To what extent has WFD approach ensured sustainability of processes and outcomes as a result of its support to civil society organisations	▪ CSO support not well integrated to work with parliaments and parties ▪ Support to CSOs showed little indication of sustainability	▪ Jordan youth programme ▪ Kenya county assembly support

This section of the report will focus on whether or not the work of WFD and the results achieved by that work will have a lasting effect on the partners and countries in which WFD is operating. As was identified in the previous section, there are results that have been achieved through the work of WFD, some planned and others less so, but the key is to understand if WFD has established a long-term change(s) in the operations of their beneficiaries or established societal change in those countries and, if so, how was this achieved?

This section will follow the same structure as the previous one, as the report attempts to determine if the results achieved can be maintained. By way of reflecting upon a number of the case studies outlined in annex 3, it is hoped to provide some analysis of how WFD was able to achieve sustainable results.

5.1 Parliaments function effectively and produce quality legislation that responds to citizens' needs

Based on the sample of national and regional programmes evaluated for this report, there is some evidence of the efforts of WFD resulting in a lasting change in its beneficiaries. Where WFD has moved from stand-alone knowledge events to the use of mentoring, brokering and longer-term engagement it has had some success in establishing institutions within the parliament. In addition, where WFD has strong knowledge of the context in which it is operating and is responding to the needs of its partners and beneficiaries it has been able to accomplish cultural and behavioural changes.

By highlighting one case study – the establishment of the Jordanian Parliament's Research Centre – it is hoped to provide some anecdotal evidence of how WFD's work can be result in lasting change.

The Research Centre in the Jordanian Parliament was established in 2014 after WFD received direction from the Speaker of the Parliament that the current research capacity was not well used by MPs. In just one year, WFD has created a viable unit of the Parliament that has the capacity to produce research and legislative analysis for deputies and committees.

There is a concrete plan for the transfer of the Research Centre to the Secretariat of the Parliament. The Director-General of the Office of the Speaker sees the Research Centre as a cornerstone of a more effective parliament. He acknowledges that the Parliament will eventually have to assume full financial and administrative control of the Centre, but by sharing the costs in the coming years, he is hopeful this will allow a transition that will ensure the Centre has time to build its capacity while finding the right 'fit' in the Secretariat of the Parliament.

The means by which the Centre was established should also have an important role in ensuring the facility has a long-term future. The Director of Research for the Northern Ireland Assembly has worked closely with the Director of the Centre and a bilateral relationship has been developed between the two units. He was able to convince one of his researchers to come to Jordan in 2014 to mentor the researchers in the centre. He intends to stay engaged in the hopes of continuing to provide advice and support as needed.

The Research Centre has already produced at least 17 analytical documents that have been well received by deputies and committees. The Director of the centre sees the quick delivery of analysis to key actors in the Parliament as critical to its institutionalisation. By producing papers for the Speaker, the Legal Committee and women MPs, the Director thinks the Centre has found champions that recognise its value and this will lead to a good reputation and desire for the Parliament to maintain its capacity.

But not everyone is so confident in the Research Centre's long-term viability. The Al-Quds Centre noted that MPs seek advice and legislative analysis from a number of sources, including civil society organisations (such as the Al-Quds Centre). Each MP appears to have their favourite think tank or analytical expert. The Research Centre is just one of many sources of analysis for MPs and committees and there is no guarantee it will emerge as the primary source of such work.

The rules of the Jordanian Parliament state that the Speaker is elected for a one-year term. The current Speaker, the patron of the Research Centre, was re-elected in November 2014 for a second term. However, if he is not re-elected again in 2015, it is conceivable that the Research Centre will not survive in the long-term. Without a 'champion' at the highest level of the Parliament, the Centre may not be able to have enough time to be institutionalised within the Parliament.

Currently, the funding of the Centre is almost fully provided by WFD and is physically and administratively located outside the Parliament's structure. The Director-General of the Office of Speaker wants to transition the Research Centre into the Secretariat quickly, likely by 2016. WFD's MENA Head of Programme acknowledges that there are risks to such a rapid transition, including the possibility that forces for the status quo in the Parliament will isolate the Centre before it has had time to build a reputation for delivering evidence-based analysis for MPs and committees.

Analysis

The Research Centre has benefited from the patronage of the Speaker of the Jordanian Parliament and has been recognised by the King as a key aspect of a more effective institution. Having such senior level endorsement will be critical in the coming years as the Centre is integrated into the Parliament's secretariat. The Royal Court has acknowledged that, for them, the priority in the development of the Parliament is the establishment of the Centre.

Moving from the 'Arab Spring' to the 'Arab Winter' has changed the political landscape and priorities of the Government. Parliamentary reforms, including the need for a research centre, were identified in 2011-12. But now the Centre must move from a centre in form to one in function during a time in which the political will for such facilities has changed. As noted by the Director of the Office of the Speaker, there is still a commitment to the Research Centre, but there is a need for WFD to ensure the Centre is not perceived as a WFD project and that it can deliver a significant number of reports and analyses in the coming years. In order to accomplish this, WFD must continue to play the role of broker between the Centre and the MPs that need support and between the Centre and the Northern Ireland Assembly, to ensure the Centre continues to have access to timely advice and expertise as it continues to develop.

5.2 CSOs influence parliament and parties to better represent citizen's needs

Sustainable results have been achieved in WFD's work with CSOs where the Foundation has identified highly qualified technical experts that understand the context in which they are working. This has enabled the experts to go beyond the simple implementation of programme activities and the delivery of outputs to considering how they can use their relationships and authority to broker procedural changes and budgetary allocations that reflect citizen interests.

From the sample of five countries in which this evaluation was based, WFD was supporting civil society in just two – Jordan and Kenya. Kenya's support to CSOs is indicative of the long-term viability of such support.

In Bomet County in Kenya, the SMART citizens have been provided with support in their efforts to advocate for changes to the county annual budget. The members of the group are 'development entrepreneurs', working with a variety of NGOs that work locally and are nationally affiliated. The skills they have received from the technical experts of WFD have been critical to their engagement with the county assembly and the executive. By going beyond training seminars to conduct mentoring and coaching, the experts have used real life experiences to pilot the CSO interventions into the budget approval process.

However, the evidence is less clear as to whether or not the coalition is built to address a specific budget change (i.e. – fish-farming to bee-keeping) is sustainable. In development terms, are the SMART Citizens using bridging capital or bonding capital[80]? If the former, it is likely a heterogeneous coalition that will need to be congregated for each budget and if it is the latter, there is a real chance that the homogeneity in the coalition will result in a sustainable group that will continue to advocate and be engaged in the annual budget approval process.

Analysis

Can the results from Bomet County in Kenya be replicated? The success in that county can be attributed to the selection of consultants who had the political acumen to not only address the specific aspects of their work (training; mentoring) but also saw their role as one in which they were brokers and mediators between civil society and the local government. A WFD consultant in that county noted that there was a problem that needed resolving and attempted to do so.

In order for this approach to work consistently WFD must ensure the experts selected for support to CSOs fully understand the local context in which they are working, are able to build relationships with various actors and then use their political skills, as well as their technical ones, to address the underlying problems that may be beyond the specific activity for which they have been hired. This will require WFD to empower national staff and consultants to be problem-solvers and not only implementers of activities.

5.3 Political parties more representative, better informed with consultative policy development processes

As was noted in the MTE of WFD, the work of the UK political parties has shown results, some of which are of a lasting nature. Where the UK parties have instilled a sense of ownership of the sister party work it has resulted in established party networks and reformed internal party structures. Also, by using a system of peer-to-peer knowledge exchanges, the sister parties are learning from their colleagues, something that is likely to build long-term relationships amongst them. But there are still challenges, including funding, that will limit sustainability if not addressed.

A look at the ALN will present evidence of how sustainability can be achieved and the challenges that still remain.

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[80] For a definitive description of these terms, see: Putnam RD. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster; 2000. Also see: http://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/bonding-and-bridging

The ALN has been able to achieve results at the network level and at the national level, as was identified in the previous section. But whether or not it is sustainable is still an open question.

On the one hand, there are clear signs that the network has transitioned from a UK-based network to one in which there is clear ownership by the member parties from Africa. The Vice-President of the ALN for Southern Africa noted that the Executive Committee is leading the direction of the network. He sees this in the follow-up to the policies adopted at the annual conferences. These policies are not a final statement but a beginning of further work. He noted that the Executive Committee has established a system for monitoring and facilitating the adoption of the Zanzibar and Marrakesh Declarations by the member parties. He also acknowledged that there are annual work plans and quarterly meetings of the committee to monitor the implementation of the plans.

The ALN has also recognised the benefit of capable and empowered staff located in the field to coordinate the work of the network. Since 2012, the LibDems have transferred the management of the network to Africa. It has partnered with the DA in South Africa to house the ALN Coordinator in the DA office in Cape Town. The Coordinator noted that she had the authority to manage the network on a day-to-day basis. She sees herself as working for the Executive Committee of the ALN but works closely with the LibDems as the primary funder.

The use of South-South and peer-to-peer interventions is also a crucial step towards a sustainable network. The Director of the LibDems International Office noted that the network does not rely wholly on technical expertise from the UK. A technical expert from the DA had been engaged in the support provided to the BMD in Botswana. That expert stated that the knowledge of the DA with regard to the Southern African context and the use of scientific campaign techniques allowed him to provide context-specific advice to the BMD in a timely manner.

The ALN is not a stand-alone network but is a part of the broader Liberal International network of liberal political parties. This is a key factor in its long-term viability. As noted by the LibDems International Office Director, the established European liberal parties have an informal agreement to support regional branches of the global network, with the LibDems taking responsibility for the ALN. He stated that this ensures the network and its members have access to advice and expertise from a broader group of experts. For example, he acknowledged the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FNS), the foundation affiliated with the Free Democratic Party in Germany, has also provided 40% of the funding in support of the ALN. In addition, the Dutch People's Party for Freedom & Democracy (VVD) has also provided funding to the ALN to enable it to hold its annual conference.

The survey of ALN members noted that 75% of respondents stated that they had adjusted their party policies based on ALN policy adoption[81]. However, the adoption of national policies by parties is not in itself a concrete change in a national legal framework. Given that the Marrakesh and Zanzibar Declarations are less than two years old this may be too much to as at this stage, but is a key measure of long-term impact that has not yet been achieved by the ALN.

Funding of the ALN is, in part, tied to the LibDems' funding from WFD and funds from FNS. The network does have a policy of membership fees but, according to the Coordinator of the ALN, collection of these fees has been a challenge. The Executive Committee acknowledges this, but the Coordinator states that the ALN is not currently sustainable without WFD and FNS funds.

The Director of the LibDems International Office acknowledges that the current formula used to fund the LibDems and the smaller parties through WFD is based only on the previous election results[82]. He stated that the German model of funding the party foundations, in which the funding is based on a basket of election results, would be fairer. If the LibDems funding is reduced after the 2015 election, it will no doubt have a considerable impact on the activities and results of the ALN.

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[81] ALN Questionnaire for Final Evaluation (2015)

[82] The formula applied by WFD for the allocation of funds is a based on the Short Money formula used to fund opposition benches in the House of Commons (See: http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN01663/short-money) but is different in that funding is provided to the governing party(s) as well and the WFD formula is designed to ensure that the governing party and the official opposition receive an equal share of the funding each year; ; the other parties (LibDemsand the smaller parties) have their funding adjusted also based on election results.

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Analysis

The ownership of the ALN by the member parties is a critical factor in its success. The policies being adopted are not just being accepted *pro forma* but the Executive Committee has shown real commitment to the policies being implemented by each of the members of the network. The Vice-President of the ALN stated that the establishment of the monitoring system within the ALN is indicative of member parties who want to have policy-oriented political parties that are competitive in national elections.

The ALN has also used peer-to-peer engagement to build the electoral campaign capacity of member parties. To date, this has only been used in one bilateral relationship (South Africa's DA and Botswana's BMD). The LibDems' Director of the International Office stated that other more mature member parties must assume a similar role to that of the DA in order for this method of learning to be entrenched.

But, in the end, funding and the activities it produces and the staff it employs are still dependent on external sources of funding, including WFD, FNS and VVD. In the short-term, having more than one foreign source of funding is effective, but if the ALN is to become truly sustainable, the network must be self-sufficient and the member parties must be willing to show their commitment to the goals of the network by funding its activities themselves.

5.4   Societal Impacts

In addition to the question of whether or not the beneficiaries of WFD support are able to be viable in the long-term, there is the question as to whether or not the work of WFD has achieved results at the state level? In other terms, has there been a change at the societal level – a change in a law, cultural change – that will be lasting in nature?

Noting the limitations identified in section 4.4, it can be a challenge to link the work of WFD with long-term and sustainable impacts at the societal level. But by way of the example from Morocco, there is some evidence upon which the work of WFD can be analysed.

As was noted by a woman party activist in the Moroccan USFP political party, with the support of the Labour party and its AWN network, the repeal of section 475 of the Penal Law has had a long-term benefit for women and girls. It has also confirmed a cultural shift in a country in which women are no longer willing to allow the law to ignore sexual violence.

In Bosnia, there are clear signs that the work of WFD is impacting the legal framework and the political landscape of the country. The Vice-President of the SDA noted that the support of the Conservative Party was critical in the early stages of the development of an ideologically based coalition in which five core principles reflecting the party's values are the basis of the government coalition.

Labour through its WFD work has achieved legislative change in the Western Balkans. Based on long-standing relationships at least six laws have been approved or amended in the region on anti-corruption. As was noted by political observers, the laws were a necessary step in changing the capacity of the entity to fight corruption.

Analysis

The societal changes achieved by WFD were primarily ones that were not foreseen when the programme was designed, but that should not be unexpected. What can be seen is that where WFD was focused on outcomes, rather than outputs, societal changes were possible. Where WFD built trusted relationships, saw itself as a broker of varied interests, and provided high quality technical expertise, it was able to create the conditions by which its partners and beneficiaries used the space created by WFD to go beyond the remit of one activity or output to see the possibility of a political solution and formed a coalition to achieve a critical result – a new law passed, a government coalition established.

This may be best exemplified in the Western Balkan NPC. As was noted by the Chairperson of the Budget, Economy & Finance Committee of the Parliament of Montenegro, the opportunity to engage his counterparts in neighbouring countries had not existed prior to WFD's support to the Balkan NPC network. He saw this as an opportunity to achieve mutually beneficial political goals (i.e. a highway between Albania and Montenegro).

He acknowledged that his capacity to advocate and to conduct oversight of the government and the confidence to do so came from his engagement in the network, but the end result was his recognition of a political issue that required a resolution. Thenetwork helped to facilitate the dialogue between himself and his counterpart in Albania to achieve the goal.

5.5 Interim Conclusions

Based on the analysis of the results that have been achieved by WFD and the sustainability of those results, it is possible to observe the following as key factors in sustainability:

- Where the support has been provided by means of a **long-term relationship,** it is more likely the advice provided will be accepted by the partner and will lead to structural change and even societal change. These relationships create a trusted link. As many beneficiaries have noted, their relationship is akin to a family relationship and they are likely to listen to advice from a family member.

- Where WFD has been able to establish **'ownership'** of its work by its partners and beneficiaries, it is more much more likely that the results will be sustainable. Such ownership will be more likely when there are long-term relationships, but not always. As was seen in Jordan, the Research Centre is relatively young but has 'champions' that are ensuring it is well placed to be a functioning part of the Parliament in the years to come.

- The focus on **outcomes instead of outputs** and activities also is more likely to lead to sustainable results. Many of the results achieved by WFD, as noted in this report, were not originally foreseen, but where WFD has relied less on implementing an activity or a workplan and has, instead, tried to respond to problems as articulated by their partners and beneficiaries, it has had the greatest results. The Director-General of the Office of the Speaker of Jordan noted that the Speaker observed the lack of in-house legislative analysis and WFD responded to this concern. In Western Balkans, Labour responded quickly to requests from sister parties who were struggling to implement their manifesto pledges, providing technical support to solve their problem. .

- WFD must consider an **exit strategy** for all its work. Results may be achieved while the funding is provided for networks and activities by WFD, but consideration must be given to how the structures supported by WFD will be institutionalised and funded by partners in case WFD is no longer financing such work. The funding of the ALN will quickly become an issue in the coming year. Ensuring the operation and funding of Jordan Research Centre is transferred to the Parliament's secretariat will be necessary if it is to succeed in the long-term.

- WFD needs capable, **empowered field-based staff** in constant communication with national partners and beneficiaries. This will enable staff to adjust programming to reflect the dynamic nature of political governance and the ability to create space for partners and beneficiaries to address political problems. As was noted by the Programme Manager of the Western Balkans NPC, bilateral meetings were not originally a part of the activities offered to network members, but based on his communication with the members and their articulation of the need for such meetings, he adjusted the programme to address their needs and results followed.

Key Lessons Learnt
o Use of national technical expertise can allow for a longer-term and more sustainable relationship with a beneficiary
o Technical knowledge transferred to a beneficiary is not sufficient to achieve reforms but must be combined with ensuring a political commitment to reform

Section 6: Lessons, Conclusions and Recommendation

The section consists of three parts. The first part discusses some of the lessons WFD has learnt about the underlying theory of change and the delivery modalities put in place in order to achieve intended results, including some the factors that may have contributed to results and to ensuring institutional changes endure and serve to societal interests more broadly. The second part synthesises the concluding remarks from each of the four previous sections and these conclusions then form the third part, which is the basis from which to present a small set of nine recommendations for WFD to consider.

6.1 Lessons Learnt

Evaluation Questions	Findings
Lessons: What are the key strategic and operational lessons that WFD can draw from the analysis?	
What has WFD learnt about the original theory of change and what are the implications of this approach for future programming?	▪ The TOC was not developed based on political governance best practices and relied too heavily on static knowledge events (trainings; seminars) ▪ Where WFD applied more active methods of capacity support (coaching; mentoring) the results were greater ▪ Where WFD has built trusted relationships with partners and beneficiaries results are the best and, in some cases, societal impact can be observed
What has WFD learnt about strategy delivery mechanisms, coordination, technical, institutional engagement and engagement with results, VFM and evidence agendas?	▪ Use of cross-party and integrated work is too limited as yet to draw any lessons ▪ Multi-year programming has allowed WFD to build trusted relationships that have produced results ▪ Use of regional networks and national partnerships has been an effective way of using resources and identifying partners that are ready for reforms ▪ Lack of VFM strategy has limited ability to know what models have been most cost-effective in delivering results
What has WFD learnt about the outcomes and impacts of its interventions?	▪ Effective and ongoing context and political analysis is critical to designing a programme that responds to the needs of beneficiaries ▪ Trusted relationships with beneficiaries result in a problem-oriented approach to the support and, in turn, greater results
What has WFD learnt about the drivers of sustainable institutional and organisational change?	▪ Capable and empowered field staff are vital to building lasting relationships with partners and beneficiaries and, in turn, a greater possibility of results ▪ Beneficiaries must have political commitment to reforms if technical interventions are to become sustainable

Relevance

It is clear from the analysis presented in the 'Relevance' section that there can be a risk that WFD's logical framework will be interpreted narrowly, as a tool with which to negotiate an internal accommodation around resource allocation, rather than serve as a process that enables a discussion as to how WFD thinks about institutional change, what it looks like and the ways in which it sometimes happens. For example, the support to the Serbian National Assembly in the development of a Parliamentary Budget Office shows WFD moving from a regional network that was providing workshops and study tours to one in which local staff with good political intelligence build a relationship with key actors in the Assembly to build a solution to a problem identified by the Assembly leadership.

The historic 'equal allocation principle' that underpins financial relations within WFD ensures that any theory of change will always be partial, a compartmentalised and overly strong focus on outputs that will continue to undermine strategic coherence and ensure WFD finds it hard to tell itself and others interesting stories of change.

Given that the corporate logical framework is likely to remain a political compromise, WFD is learning to place a priority on ensuring the quality of its intervention level theories of institutional change. These are becoming

less of a cascaded version of the corporate framework and more of a locally grown and politically savvy representation of how change might be negotiated in different institutional settings.

Inevitably at the corporate level there will be outcome gaps and the relevance section highlighted some (e.g. the political empowerment of women and the electability of political parties). But achieving clarity on what this actually looks like at intervention level and the specific strategic outcomes associated with it does matter. Such clarity will help WFD teams frame a tight set of qualitative and perhaps even quantitative outcome measures which suitably reflect the focus on a small set of institutional problems in their respective institutional settings.

WFD management knows that it needs to be suitably broad and ambiguous in terms of framing outcome measures for the purposes of the corporate logical framework. However, senior management must remain constantly engaged in encouraging country teams to keep developing the storyline that supports their own outcome narrative, enriching it through embedded institutional analysis and ongoing partner dialogue around emergent problems.

Findings clearly show that ideas as to how institutional change happens have evolved over time as a result of experience with institutional reform processes and WFD management increasingly knows that their theories of change also need to evolve.

The investment in M&E and political analysis suggests that lessons have been learnt regarding the need to ensure learning feeds regularly back into programme design, and that delivery and reports are not just used to track output milestones and targets.

Delivery

Parts of WFD realise these problem-driven approaches are more focused on partner relations and are political, not just technical. Tackling collective action problems requires a more nuanced understanding of prevailing interests and incentives. The relationship is no longer just predicated on closing 'capacity gaps'. The realisation has implications for the way teams work and for partnership relations more broadly.

WFD teams in some of the countries visited have already learnt that they need to adopt a mix of 'craftwork' that helps them understand their relational roles and the roles of others in their networked relations (Box 20). They are understandably apprehensive about the implications of working in such a way (an anxiety to be expected when taking a calculated risk and trying to experiment and learn).

Box 20: Evolving WFD Craftwork
• Clarifying the specific institutional problem or constraint
• Thinking politically
• Using the voice of others to influence
• Quietly challenging partners
• Being persistent
• Building wider coalitions of support around a problem, not just relying on individual reformists or single champions to deliver an output
• Experimenting with different approaches and adapting designs

WFD political parties adhere to similar relational constructs as they are often less encumbered by more prescriptive approaches to capacity development that have taken root in many traditional political governance development agencies.

Greater collaboration within WFD is a good thing but WFD is acutely aware that integrated programming presents stiff coordination challenges as activities usually require long lead times to plan and implement. Even if both parts of WFD are doing the same thing with the same results in mind, there are no guarantees the results will be greater than the sum of the parts. This will continue to be the case while the two parts plan and implement with little consultation. Collaboration generally happens when people plan together but also share a common interest in the same outcomes.

Partner coordination of political governance development providers tends to focus on minimising overlaps, geographic or within the sector (e.g. the Research Centre in Jordan or PFM capacities in Kenya). But many of

the problems cut across sectors and have more to do with relationship problems than technical capacity deficits. Yet partnerships can be inward looking, concerned to protect their immediate interests. There is a clear need to think politically if partnerships are recalibrated towards a focus on some of the emergent and more tractable collective action problems that impede institutional change. Particularly if it means engaging across policy networks, participation costs can be more than monetary and sometimes best not incurred.

For some in WFD, this means challenging the entrenched practices and ways of thinking about aid relationships. The results section highlighted areas where technical insiders had been able to build coalitions of support to tackle institutional problems, a product of thinking laterally and understanding prevailing interests and incentives.

This has implications for the kind of institutional diagnostic tools in use. A key lesson concerns the need to move beyond using context and political economy analysis at the design stage but instead weaving them into partner relations, using tools to surface and discuss collective action problems and map institutional outcomes. Our evidence suggests that political parties have done this tacitly for some time. M&E tools can be used programmatically to drive institutional change not just report on it.

Results

As a result of practice some WFD national teams realise that a systematic approach to close 'capacity gaps' (through training, coaching and mentoring) will likely help to surface institutional problems but not always result in a commitment to tackle them. In some unfortunate cases, capacity deficit inputs even contribute to the problem.

Often WFD's own organisational arrangements can inadvertently work against adopting this kind of problem-driven focus. The results management architecture, logical frameworks, report templates, quantitative indicators can all work together to create the 'perfect storm' making it hard to swim against the organisational tide. Donors are also learning lessons about the effect of their own systems in this area.

Partners tend to prefer 'capacity development' particularly given the lack of professional development budgets in their legislatures. In Kenya national capacity development frameworks have served to funnel support into a narrow and prescriptive set of technical solutions inadvertently incentivising against engagement on the emergent institutional problems associated with devolution.

Some WFD country teams have learnt not to invest too much faith in a single champion. Patrons are certainly useful at the outset and sometimes to help resolve downstream delivery problems. However, as problems and impediments to real institutional change begin to surface engagement on these institutional problems often requires WFD to broker the creation of a coalition of support that extends beyond the office of the patron and involves a distributed range of change agents. WFD teams know they have the political acumen to do this but have yet to apply it in a structured way; some are hesitant to move out of their own comfort zone.

WFD knows that change tends to happen when there are political incentives to resolve a particular institutional problem. It has learnt the importance of going with the grain and not pushing its own agenda in the absence of such incentives.

But our analysis also pointed out that whilst the concept of 'political will' is useful shorthand for the assumptions and risks section of logical frameworks in the UK, it is just too broad and ambiguous a term to be useful in country relationships.

Instead, teams are learning to constantly unpack the political interests and incentives on particular institutional reforms throughout the course of their relations as these have not always been clearly surfaced and understood and do change over time.

Sustainability

WFD support is predicated on leadership, ownership and commitment to the particular capacity development intervention. It recognises the need to institutionalise operational costs in legislative or party budgets with a view to ensuring capacities do not dissolve once support is withdrawn. Peer processes that draw on local

learning resources and serve to empower partners are increasingly used instead of external experts with a view to producing similarly enduring ends.

Where WFD has empowered politically savvy local staff to implement programmes, it has seen an increase in results that are of lasting nature. Such staff are key to building relationships with national partners and to allow for continuous institutional analysis that has an impact on society.

WFD has learnt that a combination of political commitment and technical knowledge and skills is insufficient to foster real institutional change. WFD's evolving theory of change recognises that institutional behaviour (and hence performance) is influenced by historic social and cultural norms as much as interests and incentives. A focus on such relational outcomes might just produce more enduring results.

6.2 Conclusions

Overall, WFD has been able to deliver what it committed to in its 2012 Business Case, including meeting almost all the milestones set out in the Logframe. The one area for which the Foundation was unable to meet its expected outputs is with regard to its corporate restructuring (i.e. – Output 4), where significant progress has been made, but where, perhaps, the expected milestones were over ambitious.

With regard to the outcome expected to be met for this corporate programme - more effective, accountable and representative parliaments and political parties in the countries in which WFD works – it is a challenge to state such a broad outcome can be achieved in just three years. What can be said is that WFD has supported the progression of its national partners – parliaments and political parties – towards this important objective and that there is clear evidence of such progression.

WFD has ensured a high degree of strategic relevance. The strategic objectives are clearly aligned with the interests of its sponsors, donors, partners and the different parts of the organisation itself. The strategy draws on WFD's perceived role as a promoter of the 'Westminster Model' and the UK brand of political governance that ensures soft power and important returns for Britain as much as results for partners.

WFD has developed relatively robust delivery mechanisms for achieving its strategic outputs efficiently, utilising the higher levels of grant funding to operationalise a larger programme using a mix of network and bilateral relationship modalities.

There is clear evidence of improved coordination with FCO, DFID and other political governance development actors in the countries visited. This can be particularly challenging when WFD only has grant relations at head office level rather than country level and coordination costs for the small numbers of field staff are high.

WFD has benefitted from implementing a more coherent M&E strategy and plan and is seeing tangible returns to reporting and learning as a result of stronger output monitoring. The move from weekly activity reporting to quarterly output reporting has reduced field staff transaction costs and improved management efficiencies.

The evaluators consider VFM to be good despite the lack of a clear VFM strategy and plan. From the documents reviewed and interviews with key actors, both within WFD and partner organisations, there is no evidence that the delivery of activities and the provision of technical expertise was done in manner that suggested the cost of the inputs was unusually high for this field. Indeed, if anything, WFD is making efforts to not compete with the larger, better funded, political governance implementers who are able to pay higher salaries and consulting fees.

Broadly WFD has contributed to the development of more effective, accountable and representative parliaments and political parties in the countries in which it has a physical presence and in some cases in contexts where it does not. Results have inevitably been mixed and unexpected. In some cases WFD has backed the wrong horse, often misreading the political interests and incentives among important stakeholders, but at other times it has contributed to positive change enabling the right mix of people in the right place at the right time, all focused on resolving an institutional or societal problem in which there is a strong collective interest.

WFD network and bilateral relations have also evolved over the past three years now characterised by the use of an interchangeable mix of training, mentoring, negotiating and brokering roles used not just by trusted

insiders but also by international experts to strengthen legislative structures and political party processes at times leading to sustainable results that have the potential to transform state-societal relations for the better.

WFD is clearly focused on trying to ensure the sustainability of its capacity development interventions, negotiating with partners to ensure interventions are institutionally embedded and nationally resourced often as part of a replication plan or tacit exit strategy. At times such approaches have led teams to become less preoccupied with organising capacity development interventions and meeting annual output milestones and targets and more interested in surfacing some of the real problems that are impeding institutional performance in their particular context.

Certainly the national staff interviewed during country visits showed a high level of political acumen. Their default position was to think in terms of the incentives and interests of different stakeholders even though they often lacked the practice and tools to undertake it in a more structured way with their partners.

However, there was less evidence of engagement on challenges of institutional effectiveness or institutional performance and functionality. In some cases, this was legitimate as many interventions were relatively new and had not been in place long. But this did not apply in other cases. Teams often worked with the political grain but overlooked the real institutional bottlenecks that inhibited potential outcomes.

These findings relate to our concern about the theory of change regarding the country team capacity to engage on the important cognitive, cultural and institutional impediments to reform (of parliamentary institutions) as much as capitalise on the political priorities that are likely to win through, particularly the ability to use micro-socio-political analysis to study the interests and incentives in a proposed reform and unpack the 'political will' as much as catalyse new conversations about change.

Output-focused frameworks create incentives to think only about the requisite activities and processes needed to 'build capacity' and overcome 'capacity deficits' and importantly to deliver against planned output milestones and targets. Donor results agendas often serve to reinforce a focus on deliverables. The tight relationship between activities and outputs has ensured insufficient attention is given to the loose relationship between outputs and outcomes. As a result outcomes remain underspecified and teams less well placed to the surface and find ways to tackle the kind of institutional problems and constraints that can undermine outcomes.

Political parties are more clearly focused on outcomes, often as a result of established relations of trust and closer dialogue around electoral problems. But parliamentary relationships would benefit from enriching outcome narratives and surfacing and engaging on the related institutional impediments in the knowledge that a narrow set of capacity development solutions can sometimes contribute to the problem.

6.3 Recommendations

The nine recommendations are made as of March 31, 2015, and at a time when WFD has submitted plans to FCO and DFID for financial support during the next strategic period. A business case has also been submitted by DFID to support the funding proposal.

It is important to note that the argument made by this report for placing more of an organisational emphasis on outcome-focused, problem-driven approaches does not mean that it recommends that WFD pull back from promoting 'good practice' capacity development models. There is room for both and the latter will probably provide the requisite legitimacy to engage on the former.

WFD needs to start some new conversations within the management team at country level and across Westminster. These will likely need to be supported by the adaptation of existing tools and processes as much as the introduction of some new ones. Either way the process should be gradual and incremental and will need to be integrated into existing plans.

All the following recommendations are directed at WFD and, more specifically, the CEO and senior management team of the Foundation. The expectation is that the recommendations will be implemented in the medium to long-term (i.e. - six months to two years) as WFD continues to implement programmes.

1. **Be more ambitious – being seen as a 'thought leader' in political governance:** As a promoter of the lessons gained from the 'Westminster Model', which is highly valued and adopted around the world, WFD needs to aspire to becoming a political governance development agency that is seen to be more of a 'thought leader' in its chosen field. This means that it needs to become much better at policy and learning to ensure that its planning, monitoring and evaluation systems are used for programmatic not just administrative purposes, premised on driving outcomes and learning rather than just reporting outputs and valuing them.

2. **Revisit the organisational and intervention level theories of change:** WFD needs to revisit its overarching and intervention level theories of change in order to ensure they are less partial and more credible. In so doing, WFD needs to do some reimagining, conflating capacity development models predicated on building accountability with the more relational problem-driven models premised on fostering collaboration. This would help to demonstrate how WFD not only works to overcome capacity deficits but also effectively facilitates and negotiates engagement in the kind of collective action problems that often impede institutional change.

3. **Focus country teams on outcomes not just outputs**: WFD needs to craft socio-political analytical tools that enable country teams to enrich their specific outcome narratives. The tools should generate reflection and aim to create rich descriptions about institutional change in their specific intervention contexts, focused primarily on political priorities in different sets. This is likely to require ethnographic analysis of organisational relations and diagnostics of institutional procedures in order to understand the specific range of institutional problems that partners are trying to resolve or not. Pre-existing analytical tools such as Outcome Mapping and Sense-Maker may have a value. This needs to be a collaborative field-based process and cannot be undertaken behind a UK desk.

4. **Develop a relationship tracking tool**: Consider developing a formal but simple to administer 'relationship tracker' that can be used by different country teams around a particular institutional problem, one that enables them to map interests around specific performance bottlenecks and identifies potential coalitions and strategies for change. These problems may not be related to WFD outputs but leadership priorities and require teams to think beyond a process champion or a project patron.

5. **Start a conversation about the merits of a more structured approach to micro-political analysis**, focusing on the specific politics of institutional reform: This is probably already being done tacitly to some degree but the focus and quality need to be gradually improved. Do not try and adopt a comprehensive WFD wide approach to this kind of analysis but instead pilot in one or two settings where there is a likelihood of some success. In the first instance, engage with the mindsets of programme staff, UK and field-based staff will have strong opinions and consensus on the way forward needs to be generated for it to have traction and become embedded. Country teams have strong tacit knowledge on the micro-political economy of institutional reforms. Regular consultants also have strong views. Some may even see such a conversation as a threat to their careers as there is vested interest in the capacity deficit model.

6. **Become better at telling 'stories of change'**: develop M&E tools that promote 'learning for change' not just 'reporting for results', slowly introduce the 'stories of change' methodologies to the M&E toolkit, helping the country teams embed the stories of change in the theories of change and ensuring that slowly the different narratives become embedded in the conversations that WFD has among itself as well as the conversations it has with others. Ensure the 'stories of change' methodology becomes part of a recalibrated WFD eco-system that provides rich information about the change, identifying the different characters in the story and how they worked together to make change happen. Some of these have already been outlined in the case studies included in this evaluation, but WFD needs to tell them drawing on insider perspectives and following an ethnographic analytic approach.

7. **Start to put in place the building blocks of a VFM system:** As an organisation dependent on taxpayer funding, WFD must get better at demonstrating that its partnerships represent good VFM. WFD needs to start putting in place the foundation of a VFM system. In the first instance, WFD should develop a VFM

strategy. The strategy should engage with DFID's approach to VFM and NAO guidelines.[83] The strategy should include a small basket of VFM indicators that enable assessment of the 3E framework (economy, efficiency and effectiveness). The strategy should aim to bring the dimensions of value and money together, thus economy concerns the cost and value of inputs.[84] Efficiency concerns the aggregate cost of inputs that are transformed by a set of activities into outputs. Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness are the achievements of outcomes and impact in relation to the underlying costs associated with outputs. Some of the challenges are set out in the delivery section of this report. It is advised that WFD builds the system incrementally starting out with a small basket of economy and efficiency measures and then slowly introducing effectiveness measures as the variables become clearer, and data collection systems are put in place. A draft set of VFM measures were provided to WFD as part of this evaluation and the evaluation team also fed into the VFM section of the most recent DFID business case.

8. **Develop a clearer focus on articulating exit strategies from the outset**: The continuation of grant funding either from other Departments or via the Parliamentary short formula has inherent risks attached to it. Sustainability of network and bilateral investments are highly sensitive to electoral results, and WFD needs to manage partner expectations accordingly. WFD should introduce more concrete mechanisms into project documents and funding proposals that demonstrate it has clear mechanisms in place for managing exit. A strong focus on outcomes will go some way towards ensuring longer-term sustainability and should be emphasised as part of such an exit strategy.

9. **Produce a small set of policy learning papers on standard intervention typologies:** WFD currently adheres to a relatively narrow typology of capacity development interventions designed to strengthen political institutions (budget office, resource centres, legislative committees, MP induction, electoral campaigns, *etc.*). WFD should produce a series of short policy and learning papers to help teams understand how these interventions sit within its wider theory of change, what specific outcomes they are contributing to and in what ways they contribute to them. The papers should also enable teams to understand the binding constraints that work against the intended institutional outcomes. It is these constraints that interventions should also focus on.

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[83] DFID (2011) DFID's Approach to Value for Money (VfM) July 2011, Quest reference 3116186
[84] Barr, J and Christie, C (2014) Better Value for Money: An Organising framework for management and measurement of VFM indicators, Itad.

Annexes

Annex 1: Terms of Reference for Final Evaluation

Background

FCO has been providing annual grants to WFD since the 1990s. Following one of its evaluations of WFD, conducted in 2009, there was a push to have the organisation become more structured in its support to political institutions with which it works. In 2011, WFD developed a long-term strategy that included core objectives outlined in the Corporate Plan for the years 2011 to 2015, and a Business Case that was subsequently submitted to FCO and DFID in 2012.

The development of these documents and core objectives for the structural development of WFD resulted in the agreement to provide, for the first time, multi-year funding to WFD to support its transition based on its Corporate Plan. In particular, DFID and FCO are providing support to WFD to make parliaments and political parties more effective, accountable and representative in at least 4 post-conflict / fragile states and 5 emerging/transitional democracies. WFD has used the funding to:

- Provide technical expertise in support of parliamentarians and parliamentary institutions;
- Facilitate civil society and citizen access to parties and parliamentary procedures, to support greater empowerment and accountability;
- Provide political expertise to parties in parliamentary systems, drawing on Westminster parties;
- Build strong networks between UK and sister parties; and
- Enhance WFD's own internal coherence, learning and development and programme effectiveness.

To support harmonisation and to avoid WFD managing multiple results frameworks, DFID support (this programme) is measured through the WFD corporate logframe, which includes the following specific results:

Impact: Strengthened democracy, stability and good governance and improved citizen engagement, in the emerging/developing democracies and post-conflict countries and fragile states in which WFD works.

Outcome: *More effective, accountable and representative parliaments and political parties in the countries in which WFD works.*

This outcome is to be achieved through four **outputs**:

1. Parliamentarians, including female parliamentarians, in 10 legislatures undertaking their key legislative, oversight, financial scrutiny and representative roles.

2. Minimum of 10 political parties, in countries selected by WFD, having strengthened internal structures and external networks, enabling them to formulate, communicate and campaign on policy-based messages that offer a genuine choice to citizens.

3. Civil society organisations in 5 countries, and women's groups in 3 countries engaging effectively with parliaments, parties and other stakeholders.

4. Enhanced WFD's strategic focus and strengthened coordination, including party-to-party, parliamentary and cross-party work; deepening WFD's technical expertise and professionalism (drawing on best practice, learning and development, improved programme management, communication tools, etc.); reforming WFD structure and governance arrangements, as set out in WFD's Change Agenda (December 2011).

Since 2013 an External Evaluation Team (EET) has been contracted by DFID to evaluate the programme. To date, two assessments (i.e. 2013 Annual Review; 2014 Annual Review;) in line with the original logframe approved in 2012 and one mid-term evaluation (MTE) have been conducted. The MTE was conducted from December 2013 to March 2014 and included findings and recommendations related to results of WFD's work at the mid-point in the programme and lessons that could be learned and applied during the second half of the programme.

Objectives of the Final Evaluation

1. To evaluate the three-year programme of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) in achieving the results and outcomes envisaged in the Business Case submitted and approved in 2012;

2. To determine the impact of the work of WFD on beneficiaries and political governance institutions that have received support through the programme;

3. Set out lessons to be learned; and

4. Provide recommendations for WFD's future implementation.

Scope of Work

As the programme is scheduled to end on March 31, 2015, the EET will conduct a Final Evaluation (FE) between December 2014 and March 2015 of the HMG funding to the Westminster Foundation for Democracy. The scope of work of which includes:

1. Assessing the impact of the work of WFD on the beneficiaries and the political governance institutions that have received support in countries in which WFD has provided programming.
2. Determining the various achievements and results of the work of WFD and which approaches used by WFD have been the most effective
3. Providing robust evidence as to whether or not the work of WFD has delivered Value for Money (VFM)
4. Identifying lessons from this programme that can inform WFD, DFID, FCO and the broader international community on assistance to parliaments and political parties.

The evaluation will look to provide a clear understanding of whether WFD is helping the countries concerned to move in the right direction and in assessing which have been the most effective approaches and in which circumstances. It shall provide clear and comparable evidence of results and value for money of WFD's work as a whole (including the programme teams and the political party projects) and highlight what has worked well and what has been less effective.

The evaluation is only looking at WFD's work over a three-year period so it will not be able to make a strong judgement on the broader impact of WFD on strengthening democracy in its countries of operation. Realistically though, it is expected to draw solid and specific conclusions on which elements of WFD´s work have proven to be effective in strengthening effectiveness and accountability of parliaments and political parties in the countries where WFD is active (the intended outcome of the intervention).

Based on the documentation provided by WFD and the evidence gathered by the EET during the desk review and field mission components of the FE, it is anticipated that there will sufficient evidence to determine if WFD has delivered Value for Money in its programming. If VFM has not been achieved, the EET will provide specific and detailed recommendations as to how it can be achieved in future programming.

The evidence gathered will also form the basis for concrete and specific lessons that can be identified for WFD's future work in parliamentary and political party assistance. WFD's experience in these fields may be extrapolated for the benefit of DFID and the FCO's broader engagement in parliamentary and party assistance. Finally, where applicable, there may be lessons that can be of value and can be shared with the international community working in support of political institutions.

The FE will include quantitative, and qualitative analysis of WFD's programme activities implemented over three years to assess the Foundation's strategy and priorities including business areas and geographic focus against funding received. The FE will also include a detailed quantitative and qualitative analysis of WFD's regional and country programme portfolios (preferably the same regions and countries as in the MTE) to assess the progresses and impact at the end of the three-year period.

Output

At the end of this process the evaluators will produce a Final Evaluation report that will include:
o Executive Summary of up to 5 pages
o Achievement rating scale
o Introduction / Background
o Project outline and management

o Objectives
o Methodology
o Analysis
o Findings
o A summary of recommendations
o A summary of lessons indicating with whom and how lessons should be shared
o Relevant annexes
o List of acronyms
o Evaluation work plan and TOR
o Key reference documents

Process of action plan and Timeframe for the Final Evaluation

Process action plan	Activities	Timeframe
Evaluative Process FE		
FE	Elaboration of the Draft Methodology to be applied	22 October – 17 November
FE	First Draft of the Methodology to be presented to DFID and WFD	20 November
FE	Presentation of the Methodology in London	24 November
FE	Refinement of the methodology and incorporating feedback	28 November
FE	Methodology approved and agreed by all parties	01 December
FE	Research and field visits (project countries and London visits)	01 December – 15 February
FE	Triangulation, analysis, report writing	15 February – 13 March
FE	Feedback and report finalisation	14 – 31 March

Annex 2: WFD stakeholders interviewed

Kenya

Title
WFD Head of Africa Programme
WFD PM
WFD PO
WFD FO
Senior Deputy Director Parliamentary Budget Office and Head of Macroeconomic analysis division
Vice Chair Transitional Authority
Member, Transitional Authority
Director County Coordination and Liaison, National Audit Office
Senior Deputy Director, Administration and Corporate Affairs, Centre for Parliamentary Studies and Training
Senior Deputy Director, Curriculum Development, Training and Research, Centre for Parliamentary Studies and Research
Acting Executive Director, Clarion
Speaker of the Senate
Senate public affairs and communications officer
Chair, Bungoma County Budget and Appropriations Committee
Chair, Laikipia County Budget and Appropriations Committee
Clerk, Laikipia County Budget Committee
Laikipia County Budget and Appropriations Committee
Laikipia County Budget and Appropriations Committee
Laikipia County Budget and Appropriations Committee
Laikipia citizen group
Laikipia citizen group
Laikipia citizen group
West Pokot Speaker
Clerk
Chair Budget and Appropriations Committee
HR and assistant to Speaker
Finance assistant, budget and appropriations
CSO coordinator
CSO member
Member of women's self-help group
Chief of Party, SUNY Kenya
Chief of Party, IRI
Program Officer, IRI
Assistant Program Officer, IRI
Director of Communications, ODM
DFID Kenya Governance Advisor, Chair Parliamentary Working Group
WFD TT
WFD TT
WFD TT
WFD TT
UN Women Democratic Governance Team Leader

Bosnia

Title
WFD Programme Manager
NDI Political Advisor
NDI Regional Political Programme Director
Blogger Training Participant (SDA)
Blogger Training Participant

Blogger Training Participant (NS)
International Relations Officer, University of Sarajevo
PDP Executive
PDP Executive and MP in RS Parliament
PDP Political Activist
PDP Political Activist
PDP Political Activist
PDP Political Activist
Buka Director and Blogger Trainer
Vice-President of SDA
SDA Political Activist
SDA Political Activist
SDA Political Activist
SDA Political Activist
UN Women
Conservative Party Technical Expert
Labour Party Technical Expert

Western Balkans

Title
Programme Manager
Deputy Speaker of Serbian National Assembly
Deputy Speaker & Budget & Finance Committee Chairperson
Clerk to Budget & Finance Committee
MP and member of European Affairs Committee
Secretary-General of the Serbian National Assembly
Former MP and Technical Adviser
Secretary to European Integration Committee (Serbia)
Technical Expert, Scottish Parliament Committee Clerk
Macedonian MP
Macedonian MP
MP for Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina
MP from Montenegro
Kosovo Central Assembly Secretary to Budget Committee
Montenegro Parliament Secretary to Budget Committee
MP from Albania

Jordan

Title
Secretary General, House of Parliament, Jordan
Head of Legal Committee and Head of Islamist Coalition in House of Parliament, Jordan
Senator and Advisor to Jordan Women's Caucus
Director Research and Information Department, House of Parliament, Jordan
Director General, Office of the Speaker, House of Parliament, Jordan
Head of Integrity Committee, House of Parliament, Jordan
Coordinator of Jordan Women's Caucus
Former coordinator of Jordan Women's Caucus
Deputy Chair of Integrity Committee and Chair
Former Coordinator of Jordan Women's Caucus and chair of women's MP regional coalition against violence
Research Centre Director, House of Parliament, Jordan

Research Officer, House of Parliament Research Centre
Research Officer, House of Parliament Research Centre
Deputy Chief of Party NDI
Senior Country Director, Middle East and North Africa NDI
Senior Political Officer, British Embassy
Member of the Women's Coalition on Gender-based Violence
Member of the Women's Coalition on Gender-based Violence
Member of the Women's Coalition on Gender-based Violence
Member of the Women's Coalition on Gender-based Violence
1st Secretary Political and Economic, British Embassy
Executive Director, Al-Quds Centre
General Manager Cader and Advisor to Parliamentary Integrity Committee
Prime Ministers Trade Envoy to Iraq
Gender, Human Rights and Cultural Advisor, UNFPA
Head of Research and Information Service, Northern Ireland Assembly and Technical Advisor to Jordan Parliamentary Research and Information Centre
UK Labour Party
Royal Court Political Adviser
Youth Programme Participant
Youth Programme Participant
Youth Programme Participant
Jordan Programme Coordinator, WFD
Regional Finance Officer, WFD

South Africa

Title
ACDP MPL and Provincial Leader
Cape Town City Councillor & ACDP Chair of National Executive
FCO – Cape Town Consulate
ACDP MP & National Executive Member
ACDP MP
ACDP Party Organiser & National Executive Member
ALN Coordinator
DA MP and ALN Executive VP (Southern Africa)
DA Adviser and Technical Expert for ALN
Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD) Leader and MP
DA YLP Coordinator
YLP Graduate (Beneficiary)
YLP Graduate (Beneficiary)
YLP Graduate (Beneficiary)

United Kingdom

Title
WFD CEO
WFD M&E Adviser
WFD Director of Finance
WFD Manager of Communications
WFD HR Manager
Smaller Parties Group
LibDems International Office
LibDem Campaign Strategist
Labour Party International Office
Conservative Party International Office
Conservative Party International Office

MP & LibDems WFD Governor
WFD MENA Head of Programme
WFD Europe Head of Programme
WFD M&E Officer
WFD MENA Desk Officer
WFD Europe Desk Officer

Regional Networks (DUA; AWN; WAFA)

Title
Former Chairperson of DUA (Ghana)
Leader of FDC Party and Chairperson of DUA (Uganda)
Chairperson of AWN (Tha'era) (Lebanon)
Member of AWN (Morocco)
Former Chairperson of WAFA (Mozambique)

Annex 3: Case Studies

Case study 1 - Moroccan Parliamentarians and CSO activists negotiate with government officials to ensure better legal protection for girls from sexual violence, particularly rape.

This is the case of a regional network established to build the capacity of like-minded women political activists in the Arab Region that provided the women with the necessary skills and the opportunity to collaborate. That collaboration allowed one of the activists, and the party she is a member of, to develop and implement an advocacy campaign that led to the repeal of a controversial section of the Moroccan Penal Law.

The main character is a member of the *Union Socialiste des Forces Populaire* (USFP) who joined other women from socialist parties and affiliated CSOs from four countries (Morocco; Tunisia; Lebanon; Egypt) to form Tha'era – the Arab Women's Network. The network was supported and convened by the UK Labour Party with funding from WFD.

After the Arab Spring of 2011 a small group of women political activists wanted to build on the momentum of women's role in the various revolutions to create political parties and national political systems that allowed women to assume leadership roles. By convening the network, creating space for relationships to be built amongst the women and providing technical expertise, the Labour Party created the conditions for one of the activists and her party to effect change in the Moroccan legal framework.

A woman member of the USFP saw the Arab Spring as an opportunity for political change in Morocco that would allow women to build a nation that was less oppressive and more equal in the treatment of women. She learned from the UK Labour Party that a new network of like-minded women from four countries was being established to give women in her party the campaign skills to reform her party and to promote change in Morocco.

She attended workshops in 2012 and 2013 to increase her personal campaign skills and to develop a training course that could be used to train women in her party at the national and branch levels. This would allow women in her party to have the skills to assume leadership roles at all levels of the USFP.

At one of the workshops for Tha'era, held in Morocco in 2013, she was already working on an important advocacy campaign for her party and other activists. USFP was trying to have section 475 of the Moroccan Penal Law repealed. Section 475 allowed a rapist to avoid prosecution if he married his victim. In 2012, a young girl had committed suicide as a result of being married to her rapist under this section of the Law. There were outrage and protests over this incident. USFP saw a political opportunity to take credit for the law's repeal and to also move forward a more egalitarian justice system in Morocco.

At the Morocco workshop of Tha'era, the women party activist for USFP saw an opportunity to seek advice from her colleagues and the technical experts on how to convince her fellow Moroccans that the law should be repealed. The advice provided by the network formed the basis for the advocacy campaign developed by USFP and its affiliated groups.

The skills gained by her and her fellow USFP members were applied in the implementation of the campaign to repeal section 475, including a campaign at the local level in rural areas, which were more traditional and less likely to support such a provision.

In January 2014, the National Assembly repealed section 475 of the Moroccan Penal Law. Media accounts confirm that the work of USFP, an opposition group in the Assembly, was a critical factor in the eventual acceptance of the need for the repeal by the governing coalition and its adoption in the Assembly.

There are significant implications for the repeal of this section of the Penal Law. It is a change in the legal framework of Morocco, expressing a national desire to protect women and girls from violence. It advances gender equality in the country and it has been held up as an example for the other Arab States that such a traditional law can and should be repealed throughout the region.

Case study 2: The Isiolo accommodation

The case examines the causal relationship between efforts to build the capacities of County Budget and Appropriation Committee members from 10 of Kenya' s 47 new county assemblies, improved accountability of the County Executive, and budget allocation and expenditure that benefits poorer Kenyan communities.

There is a long list of key characters in this particular story of change including the Speaker of the Senate at the national level, WFD Kenya staff and its technical PFM mentors, the Speakers and Chairs of committees from county assemblies, members of County Assembly Budget and Appropriations Committees, Governors and members of the County Executive. There is also an emerging part played by activists from community-based organisations.

The central characters in this story are the 'magnificent nine'. A group of nine (a majority of the members have their roots and homes in rural constituencies that had elected them and city homes in Nairobi as well therefore they consider themselves rural) public sector professionals, some whom were former MPs of the 9th and 10th National Parliament, others who were semi-retired civil servants keen to remain engaged in public life and supplementing their income with PFM consultancy work.

On one level, it is a story about their efforts to build the knowledge and skills of members of the budget appropriations committees from 10 of Kenya's 47 counties. The team started life as a 'groups of trainers'. They were constituted as a 'technical team' contracted by WFD to support the 'capacity development' of members of budget and appropriations committees in ten of the new counties.

Drawing on lessons from the early stages of implementation the team soon realized that the provision of one-off training at the CPST outside Nairobi or in the meeting rooms of high-quality Rift Valley and coastal hotels was insufficient to ensure committees were applying what they had learnt. The WFD training and mentoring approach offered them an opportunity to ensure application of training by Counties. County officials usually preferred to attend training outside of their workplace, but were more responsive to coaching and mentoring around specific budget processes.

As the Speaker noted, the demand for knowledge and skills is huge. Some County Assembly staff had experience with the former District Council model, but none had experience of the new county assembly model of governance. For many the idea of negotiating a budget with the Governor and Executive is alien.

As a man accorded central responsibility for ensuring the implementation of Kenya's new devolution system, particularly the provision of support to the new county assemblies, the Speaker of the Senate has played a key role in efforts to defend, protect and promote the financial oversight capacity of County Assemblies.

Technical team members provided training and mentoring on seven stages of the budget cycle, the county development plan, budget review and outlook paper, county fiscal strategy papers policy papers, emphasising importance of assessing the cash backing of budgets and provision for development, and the importance of keeping budgeting cycle deadlines.

For many committees, the FY 2013/2014 was the assembly's first budget. It was also the first time that the executive had to provide timely budget documentation to the assembly which majority did not comply with unlike in FY 2014/15.

Raising the question of where the money is coming from for all these priorities, some county officials argued that their levels of internally generated revenue as the Constitution and devolution related acts had reduced the incentives to collect taxes, in the expectation that more funds would be transferred from the centre.

Case Study 3: The Albania-Montenegro Highway

This is a case of the causal relationship between support to a regional parliamentary network, national executive accountability to parliament and economic transformation, EU integration and regional cooperation.

The main characters in this case are the long-time Chairperson of the Budget, Economy & Finance Committee of the Parliament of Montenegro, a member of the Finance & Budget Committee of the Albanian Parliament, members of their respective committees, WFD staff located in the field to support the regional network and the leaders in the two countries respective Ministries of Transport.

It is the story of an opposition MP in Montenegro who saw the opportunity for political gain married with greater economic opportunity for his country. By building a network that served the needs of MPs, he was able to build the relationships he desired to achieve both goals.

Montenegro is one of the world's youngest countries, having only achieved independence from Serbia in 2008. Since that time the Chairperson of the Budget, Economy & Finance Committee has been designated as an opposition MP and one man has held the seat of Chair of that Committee. In the first few years as Chair he was regularly invited to regional events organised by international, regional and national institutions and organisations, but he started to note that there was no venue for parliamentarians to discuss the topics that were relevant to them.

The IFC had established a network of committee chairpersons, to which he was a member, in 2009, in order to discuss European integration and other economic matters. He found that the conferences organised by the network were not always as practical as parliamentarians would perceive as relevant.

In 2012, WFD assumed funding and support to the network from the IFC. WFD had been encouraged to step back from its bilateral support to parliaments in the Western Balkans and was looking for a regional network to enable it to continue to work in the area, but at a regional level. This enabled WFD to reduce its direct investment with national parliaments while, at the same time, maintaining relations with eight parliaments in the region.

The Montenegrin MP and other members of the network noted that in the first year of the new network – the Network of Parliamentary Committees (NPC) – the content was still quite academic and not at all what the MPs wanted. In early 2013 there was a convergence of factors that resulted in the MPs reorganising the network to suit their interests.

It started with the MPs insisting that future activities of the network be defined by the MPs and be topics and content that reflected their needs.

At the same time, WFD appointed a new programme manager, based in Macedonia, to support the network. The new programme manager has worked with different political governance implementers and inherently understands the political needs of the MPs. Upon his arrival, he quickly saw observed that the previous work of the NPC was highly academic and established a Board of Directors composed of MPs to enable the MPs to drive the agenda of the Network. It was through this Board that the programme manager and the MPs were able to refocus the work of the NPC.

Finally, based on the new management structure, WFD redesigned the programme in June 2013 to include a greater array of activities that allowed for a more nuanced approach to the support that was being provided to the network. The network focuses on strategic economic issues that all parliaments have in common – EU integration, state aid/FDI, state budget oversight and energy. For each of the four topics, the network provides workshops for MPs to learn about the topics in detail, training to committee staff, online and written materials on the topics. It also included support to bilateral meetings between the various national committees that were receiving support from the NPC where they could discuss mutual priorities for action.

The Montenegrin MP and committee chairperson attended all the events organised by the NPC and encouraged his committee staff to do the same. Through the network, he saw an opportunity to engage the Albanian Budget & Finance Committee. He had known that there was a planned highway between the two

countries, but it had not been constructed, and he saw a political opportunity to take political credit for the construction of the highway.

Two bilateral meetings between the Budget, Economy & Finance Committees of Montenegro and Finance & Budget Committee of Albania were organised by the NPC in 2014. The two committees used these meetings to press their respective Ministries of Transport for construction of the highway. Based on the discussions at the bilateral meeting the two committees returned to their respective countries and used the powers afforded to them under their respective constitutions and parliamentary procedures to call the Ministers of Transport to account for why the highway had not been built to date.

Within six months of the first bilateral meeting the highway was nearing completion, as the funds were released for the project in 2014 and construction was commenced.

Through the NPC WFD has created space for parliamentary committees in the Western Balkans to engage directly and on their terms. In a region that twenty years ago saw the disintegration of the Federation of Yugoslavia and where Albania traditionally had no contact with its neighbours, the network has built inter-committee and inter-state relations. This, in turn, has enabled the committees and MPs to find common interests, both political and economic. For example, as of 2012, only 1.73% of Montenegro imports came from Albania while more than 65% came from Serbia. In the same year Albania exported only 7.65% of its goods to Montenegro (as compared to more than 62% to Kosovo) and imported only 2.63% of its goods from its neighbour, as compared to 45.4% from Serbia. According to a 2013 study, the percentage of Albanian tourists coming from Montenegro between 2007 and 2010 dropped from 9.4 to 5.1% of the total visitors to the country.

Case Study 4: CSO oversight of the County Executive in Kenya

This case is set in Kenya and examines the causal relationship between the efforts to build the capacities of local citizen groups to engage with the County Executive and County Legislative Assembly during the annual budget allocation process with a view to improving state accountability to the interests of the poor.

The main characters in the case are a group of ten citizens, from Bomet county, The coordinator of CLARION (a Nairobi-based CSO specialising in legal research and civic education), WFD Kenya staff and trainers, Speaker and members of the County Budget and Appropriations Committee, and members of the County Executive, including the representative from the Ministry of Agriculture in the County Government.

The story concerns the efforts of the 'SMART citizens of Bomet County' to influence the 2014/2015 county budget allocation process. It concerns their efforts to pressure the Executive and the Assembly to re-allocate development funds away from fish farming to beekeeping and chicken rearing. In Kenya subsistence farmers in arid and semi-arid lands often scratch out a living from the sale of honey and eggs within their localities.

The 'SMART citizens of Bomet County' cannot be considered as an established budget advocacy group. They are more of a loose alliance of individuals, each with their own interests. Although many of the ten members have been involved in some form of development work or another over the years, the group coordinator has enjoyed a long-standing relationship with CLARION. Some work at the community level for other national CSOs such as Caritas, while others often earn a living acting as volunteer mobilisers and civic educators.

As 2013 was the first year that county governments had the authority to plan and approve their own budgets, most Kenyan citizens had very little knowledge about the county budget process. In the second year i.e. FY 2014/15, mentoring and training by one of the nine WFD trainers went some way to help them develop their knowledge about the budget cycle and the role of the legislative assembly in approval of the document.

As far as the group knew there had been little real civic involvement in the development of the County Integrated Development Plan. Few had ever seen a Budget Review and Outlook Paper or a Fiscal Strategy Paper. They had reported to CLARION bemoaning the fact that 'only the Governor's cronies had access to vital documents', and he seemed reluctant to share any documents with civil society.

The group also found it hard to even get through the gate to the County Assembly in FY2013/14. The idea of citizens participating in budget setting deliberations was alien to the Executive and the Assembly, although some believed that WFD capacity development support to the Budget and Appropriations Committee and other members of the Assembly had gone some way to easing open the doors in FY 2014/15.

According to one of the BAPC members, the WFD trainer had worked behind the scenes to help broker access for the group, reminding the Speaker of the Assembly of the constitutional rights of citizens to sit in the public gallery and requesting that the Clerk to the Assembly ensure that the group was given ample notice of when the budget hearings would next take place in the Assembly.

According to the group coordinator, this required persistence including 'door-stepping' members of the BAPC to find out the meeting date. A BAPC member had complained to the WFD trainer that the Executive Committee seldom respected budget document deadlines and was reluctant to share information with them, but he found it hard to see why they were exhibiting the same behaviour.

In exerting their right to information and their right to sit in the public gallery during budget deliberations the citizens group learnt more about the budget priorities. They were concerned about the lack of money being allocated to development.

Their concerns reflected a wider national worry that the majority of transferred funds were being allocated to recurrent costs, even the development budget was being expected to cover the costs of all the new staff that had been recruited or transferred from the previous district administration following devolution.

The group used their local contacts and the WFD trainer's experience to find out the best channel through which to submit a petition to the Chairman of the BAPC. As part of their official input to the Fiscal Strategy Paper the group expressed concern at the plan to roll our fisheries development in all wards, arguing that

such a plan was impractical in many poorer wards prone to drought. They argued and petitioned that funds were allocated to beekeeping projects in these drier areas.

It is too early to tell whether they have made much progress in resolving this particular budget problem. The BAPC has not assessed the availability of cash to support the budget. They are concerned with a reduction in locally generated revenues and the lack of incentives to collect local taxes now that more funds are supposed to be transferred from the centre. The Governor has a reputation for promising to fund such 'flagship' projects, but the money never materialises.

The question of whether to allocate funds to fish farming or beekeeping or to rely on central transfer or locally generated revenues to fund the budget concerns many different people. The citizens of Bomet know that they cannot resolve such problems on their own. Evidently the BAPC is beginning to channel information requests to the Department of Agriculture and Lands in order to better understand the first problem but there is as yet little collaboration among these groups to understand why agricultural productivity among poorer communities is so low, whether it is related to lack of irrigation or other institutional factors such as lack of land registration and lack of support for alternatives to crop management e.g. livestock farming is also a factor.

According to some parliamentarians the problem of depressed local revenues is an emergent one and still not being widely acknowledged by Governors although there is a growing risk that counties with a strong dependence on internal transfers are likely to be less accountable to their own citizens in the future.

The national framework for capacity building intended to develop the budget management capacities of county stakeholders is focused more on building the technical skills of County Executive Committees and County Assembly members; it is not particularly focused on finding ways to resolve some of the emergent problems.

In Kenya, Parliamentarians noted that recent security legislation proposed by their own government is likely to have an adverse effect on CSO oversight activities unless resisted.

Case Study 5: Electoral Success in Botswana

This is a case of how support to a regional network of ideologically similar political parties in Africa resulted in the development of a bilateral partnership between a UK political party and one of those parties and the delivery of strategic advice in the lead-up to a general election that resulted in a professional campaign that created a large opposition contingent and the most competitive election in Botswana's history.

The main characters in this case are two men who consecutively became leaders of a new political party in Botswana, a sister party based in neighbouring South Africa, a UK political party and technical experts who provided campaign advice in a timely manner.

The story concerns a branch of the governing political party that split and started a new party, the Botswana Movement for Democratic Change (BMD), and the desire of its leader to build a professional party structure and campaign that could effectively compete for seats in the 2014 general election. It is a story of frustrated leadership ambitions that were not fulfilled in the governing party and a desire to seek other means of achieving such ambition.

The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has been in power since the country achieved independence in 1966. With no other party even achieving 15 seats in the parliament, the country has become a *de facto* one-party state.

A senior member of the BDP was unhappy with the transition to power of the current President and, in 2010, had a falling out and decided to establish his own political party – the BMD. Having been very active at senior levels of the BDP, he was aware of the support that party was receiving from the Conservative Party of the United Kingdom. Seeking similar support, in 2011 the BMD joined the Africa Liberal Network (ALN) – a network of liberal political parties in Africa that has received support from the Liberal Democrats (LibDems) in the UK.

Through the activities and conferences organised by the ALN, the BMD and its leader showed interest in bilateral support. This coincided with the general election planned for 2014 in Botswana. As a result of their positive engagement at annual conferences and a workshop on political communication held in 2013 and as a result of the timing of the election in Botswana, the LibDems decided to provide direct support to the BMD.

In addition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), the primary opposition party in South Africa and a member of the ALN, decided to support the BMD through the ALN. DA is aware that it is perceived in South Africa as a 'white party'. Its engagement in the ALN has allowed it to build allies from other African countries, thus helping to change the perception of the party at home. There are political benefits for the DA in supporting a party in, Botswana when there are Botswanan diaspora living in South Africa.

The LibDems and DA have worked closely in building the capacity of the ALN and its member parties. When the LibDems wanted to establish a field office and network coordinator for the ALN, the DA provided office space in Cape Town and the coordinator chosen, after a competitive process, was a DA activist.

The support from the LibDems and the DA followed the needs of the BMD in the lead up to a professionally-run election campaign. In 2013, the DA sent a senior party organiser to Botswana to support the BMD in defining the skills and experience it wanted in its candidates for the election. This was followed in the same year with political research to determine how voters perceived the party and to develop its core message. This was done by working side-by-side with the staff and activists in BMD, allowing them to me mentored as polling was conducted, focus groups were organised and the messaging was developed.

This support was invaluable to the young party and its leader. In a by-election in 2013, with the support of the LibDems and the DA, BMD won its first parliamentary seat, giving it credibility and political momentum going into an election year.

In 2014, the leader continued to work with the LibDems and the DA on a schedule of support that coincided with the electoral calendar. The BMD and its leader requested and received technical advice on the development of its campaign manifesto and messaging. In June, the leader's constituency was starting to build its election campaign team, and the LibDems were asked to send one of its party organisers to assist

with the establishment of the team. The staff and activists benefited from professional coaching and mentoring to enable them to deliver a professionally run campaign in the constituency so as to increase the chances of victory in the constituency in the October poll.

Sadly, in August, the leader of the BMD was killed in a car accident. The party, after a period of mourning, was forced to reassess its relationship with the ALN for the coming election. A new leader was elected, a close ally of the deceased leader in leaving the BDP in 2010 and establishing the BMD. By continuing the relationship with ALN, the relationship was institutionalised, and the efforts of the party were able to continue, despite the unfortunate death of the leader.

The party eventually decided that it would continue to receive support from the DA and LibDems and that this would include the LibDems sending the same party organiser to work in the new leader's constituency during the final week of the campaign. Party staff was able to sustain the ALN relationship and ensure mentoring support was available in the leaders constituency during the final week of the campaign.

On October 24, 2014, the BMD, as part of an electoral coalition, won the most seats ever achieved by a party other than the BDP in the history of Botswana. The governing BDP, for the first time, did not attain 50% of the vote. The new leader continues to work closely with his colleagues in the DA and LibDems. The BMD continues to be a member of the ALN.

Botswana now has the most competitive political system in its history. The leader of the BMD believes the citizens of Botswana now have a newfound hope. For the first time, the combined opposition has reached 20 seats (35% of the elected seats). In its 2014 report, Freedom House noted that the establishment of BMD as a breakaway party from BDP would impact the governing party including the loss of key leaders. Botswana's ranking in The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index (2006-12) has remained a 'flawed democracy' but is ranked the highest ranked country in Africa and its score has remained consistent over the past ten years.

Annex 4: Organogram of WFD

WFD BOARD OF GOVERNORS

(1) Chief Executive

(2) Board Secretary / PA

(3) Director of Finance / Company Secretary

(4) HR Manager

(5) Management Accountant

(6) Programme Accountant

(7) Finance Assistant / IT Officer

(20) Director of Programmes

(19) Communications Manager

(16) Director of Research and Evaluation

(8) Head of Programmes - MENA

(9) Programme Officer

(10) Programme Officer

(12) Head of Programmes – Africa

(13) Programme Manager

(14) Programme Officer

(15) Programme Officer

(17) Head of Europe Programmes and Business Development

(18) Programme Officer

(11) M&E Officer

Conservatives Director, International Office

Labour International Programme Manager

Liberal Democratic Head, International Office

Smaller Parties Programme Manager

International Prog Manager (p/t)

International Programme Officer

International Programme Admin Assistant

Senior International Prog Officer

WFD Assistant

International Programme Officer

WFD FIELD OFFICES

IRAQ PM (21)	**KENYA** PM (29), PC (30) PAFA (31)	**KYRGYZSTAN** PM (39) & PAFA (40)	**GEORGIA** PM (45) & PAFA (46)
JORDAN RPM (22), PC (23) & RFA (24)	**DRC** PM (32)	**WESTERN BALKANS** PM (41), PAFA (42) & PAA (43)	**UGANDA** PM (47) & PAFA (48)
MOROCCO PM (25) & PAFA (26)	**PAKISTAN Islamabad** Senior		
LEBANON PC (27)	**PAKISTAN** –Lahore PM (34) & PAFA (35) PAA (36)	**BOSNIA & HERCEGOVINA** PM (44)	
TUNISIA PM (28)	**EALA-Tanzania** PM (37) & PAFA (38)		

RPM – Regional Programme
PM – Programme Manager
PC – Programme Coordinator
RFA – Regional Finance Assistant
PAFA - Programme Administrator & Finance Assistant
PAA– Programme Admin Assistant

Annex 5: WFD Final Evaluation – Detailed Analytical Framework

Evaluation Questions	Criteria for Assessment	Sources of Evidence
Relevance: to what extent have WFD's strategic objectives and theory of change remained relevant given the changing context of political governance in each of the five sample country programmes?		
What did WFD set out to achieve? To what extent was this relevant given the institutional context of political development in each country?	▪ Quality of original WFD political context analyses for each programme ▪ WFD strategic clarity on a set of reform outcomes and arrangement to track progress against key parliamentary, political party institutional reforms ▪ Quality of macro and micro political economy analysis of political, institutional reforms, institutional landscape mapping, analysis of different political actors and relationships in different settings	▪ Strategic business case and positioning papers, theory of change report, inception report ▪ Country governance assessments, political economy analysis paper, gap and deficit analysis ▪ Baseline studies ▪ WFD strategy and programmatic approach papers, corporate and country logical frameworks, project plans, reports and reviews ▪ Country democracy indicator data sets (Freedom House, Polity IV, Bertelsmann, Ibrahim, Civicus, etc.)
Does the programme have a valid theory of change and results chain?	▪ Quality of WFD overarching and intervention level theories of change ▪ Clarity of risks and assumptions in logical framework ▪ Clarity of outcome and impact narratives ▪ Overall programme coherence, including strategic and policy links between different thematic areas (legislatures, political parties, CSOs) ▪ Appropriateness of impact and risk weightings	
To what extent were local stakeholders consulted in the programme design	▪ Consultations with political party representatives, legislative committees, civil society groups, executive and judiciary ▪ Consultation with other intervening organisations and communities of practice ▪ Quality of institutional assessments	▪ Parliamentary partner MOU and operational agreements, UK political party grant agreements ▪ Interviews with country parliamentary and political party officials, politicians, civil society representatives
To what extent has the theory of change remained relevant given any change in theoretical, strategic and operational context?	▪ The quality of theoretical and conceptual design thinking in terms of capacity development, behavioural change, organisational change and institutional reform. ▪ Quality of political economy analytic approach ▪ The relevance of underlying theoretical models about political development (best practice/good fit/problem-driven approaches). ▪ Relevance of model in context of conflict and fragility in each country ▪ Ability to feedback programmatic lessons and results into programme design and ensure continued relevance. ▪ Responsiveness to strategic review recommendations. ▪ Organisational addictiveness to changing country contexts	▪ Interviews with WFD personnel, UK political parties, DFID ▪ Partner (Legislature, political parties, civil society, media and development partner interviews) ▪ Revised country and regional programme logical frameworks ▪ Quarterly reports ▪ Activity reports
Delivery: to what extent is the WFD delivery chain designed and managed in order to be fit for purpose, to deliver the intended results? How has WFD ensured delivery efficiencies, including management of results of VFM assurance?		
Has the choice of delivery modalities been appropriate to the institutional and political contexts and adapted over time?	▪ Nature and quality of delivery chain (efficiency of links from WFD to country partners) ▪ Quality of partnership agreements between WFD and UK-based organisations (political parties) and country-based organisations (research and training organisations, etc.) ▪ Quality of partner selection and review process and mechanisms ▪ Quality of process for assessing partnership commitment and interest ▪ Capacity arrangements for technical delivery and political engagement, including advocacy	▪ HO MOU and UK and country agreements, country partnership reviews and reports ▪ Country partner meeting minutes and action points ▪ Monthly, Quarterly and annual country reports ▪ WFD and partner interviews
To what extent has the delivery of regional and country level programmes been	▪ Consideration of regional activities reflective of country level outputs ▪ Coordination of activities and participants between regional and country level	▪ MOUs with regional organisations ▪ MOUs with national partners that include regional

Evaluation Questions	Criteria for Assessment	Sources of Evidence
aligned to maximise results?	▪ Extent to which allocation of resources between regional and country programmes was appropriate ▪ Extent to which knowledge developed at the regional level is applied at the country level ▪ Coordination and communication between regional and country level WFD staff ▪ Capacity of regional and country level programmes to adapt and build upon the work of each other ▪ Extent of country level partners commitment to regional engagement	components ▪ Quarterly reports ▪ Activity reports ▪ Annual reports ▪ Knowledge materials developed ▪ Interviews with national beneficiaries ▪ Interviews with national partners ▪ Country staff interviews ▪ Regional staff interviews
To what extent have WFD organisational structures at different levels, resource allocation and work planning enabled the delivery of planned outputs?	▪ Alignment of operational structures to programme strategy ▪ Allocation of resources by outputs and country programme ▪ Self-assessment processes and partner work planning procedures ▪ Capacities and resources expended by country field offices ▪ Recruitment and management of technical experts by UK political parties and WFD country offices ▪ Balance of resource allocation across country and regional programmes ▪ Ratio of direct to indirect costs/programme to admin costs ▪ Balance of process, tools, frameworks, guidelines across programmes ▪ Extent of external expert and consultant use across programmes ▪ Output delivery tracking and trends ▪ Expenditure on output over period ▪ Output progress ratings	▪ Organograms, establishment levels, job descriptions ▪ Self-assessment reports ▪ Financial management reports ▪ Country staff interviews ▪ Six monthly and annual reports ▪ Annual reviews ▪ Activity reports ▪ ToRs for expert consultants ▪ Partner interviews
To what extent has WFD improved internal and external coordination and collaboration?	▪ Extent to which WFD programme interventions are joined-up ▪ Mechanisms to link parliamentary and political party interventions ▪ Mechanisms to link different political party interventions and deliver cross party component ▪ The quality of in-country engagement with development partners, including DFID and FCO and other intervening organisations UNDP, NDI, IRI, etc. ▪ Support to developing parliamentary and political party donor coordination structures and capacities	▪ WFD and UK political party interviews ▪ Strategy and organisational reviews ▪ Country staff and partner interviews ▪ Development partner interviews ▪ HMG in-country interviews
To what extent has WFD developed the technical capacities to deliver its strategy?	▪ WFD country capacity to think and engage politically ▪ WFD country capacity to focus on surface institutional problems ▪ WFD county approach to 'relationship management' and 'craftwork.' ▪ WFD cadre thematic experience (political governance) ▪ Level and frequency of access to key political actors ▪ Quality of DFID political support and engagement	▪ WFD country staff interviews ▪ UK political party interviews ▪ Country partner interviews ▪ Focus group/survey instrument ▪ Theory of change ▪ Country and Regional Log frames
To what extent has WFD been able to ensure VFM in terms of delivery of planned results?	▪ Quality and utility of VFM framework, including use of VFM indicators for economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity ▪ Use of partner grant KPIs, etc. ▪ Existence of anti-corruption policy and strategy ▪ Quality of risk management ▪ Quality of financial reporting	▪ VFM strategy ▪ Annual reports ▪ WFD country interviews ▪ Risk register and reports ▪ Anti-corruption policy
To what extent has WFD been able to efficiently track progress, to monitor and report results?	▪ Quality of M&E system, including output and outcome indicator monitoring and reporting arrangements, including use of stories of change, relationship tracking and political economy analytic process to understand change	▪ M&E guidelines, strategy and plans, logical frameworks, M&E tools ▪ M&E officers ▪ WFD staff and partners

Evaluation Questions	Criteria for Assessment	Sources of Evidence
	▪ Balance of qualitative and quantitative indicators and data collection tools ▪ Ability to balance external reporting requirements with results delivery.	▪ Progress reports ▪ Annual reviews ▪ Activity Reports ▪ Quarterly Reports
To what extent has WFD been able to develop an evidence base to support wider learning?	▪ The quality of KM or learning strategy, the extent of capacity and resource allocation, the institutionalisation of learning systems and processes. ▪ Quality of stakeholders communications and feedback loops to partners ▪ Quality of policy analysis and political assessments	▪ KM and learning strategy ▪ Internet content and profile ▪ Social media and knowledge platforms ▪ Partner interviews ▪ Development partner interviews

Evaluation Questions	Criteria for Assessment	Sources of Evidence
Results Section: to what extent have more capable, accountable and responsive political institutions contributed to strengthening democracy and good governance, particularly in terms of improved citizen engagement in developing democracies?		
Outcomes: to what extent have parliaments and political parties in countries which WFD works become more effective, accountable and representative?		
<u>**Parliament outcomes:**</u> **To what extent have parliaments developed the technical and institutional capacities to produce quality legislation that responds to citizen's needs?**	▪ Evidence of improved parliamentary skills, knowledge, attitudes and behaviour regarding public engagement ▪ Evidence of parliamentary committee commitment to citizen engagement (expressed through institutionalisation of consultation processes, legislation, resources, mechanisms) ▪ Evidence that public engagement by committees is routine and self-initiated ▪ Evidence of tangible social interaction between parliamentary committees and citizens groups, including CSO entities ▪ Evidence that citizen engagement by committee has resulted in a # of committees that have conducted public consultations based on WFD interventions ▪ Committees have used evidence-based research to support its work ▪ Extent to which regional programmes have resulted in public engagement by parliaments at the national level	▪ Country governance assessments and analysis of political institutional behaviours and actions ▪ WFD baseline studies and case studies ▪ Stories of change ▪ Interviews with parliamentary officials and parliamentary committee chairs, interview with women's caucuses ▪ Annual reports, quarterly reports, activity reports ▪ WFD Review documents ▪ Transparency international, HRW, IPU, Hansard reports ▪ WFD parliamentary regional teams ▪ Government and parliamentary websites ▪ Development partners interviews ▪ Committee reports
To what extent have parliaments developed technical and institutional capacity to conduct oversight of government and to scrutinise legislation?	▪ Evidence of improved knowledge and skills among parliamentary oversight committees ▪ Evidence of improved and routine legislative scrutiny by committees ▪ Evidence of budget process engagement ▪ Evidence of legislative amendments and inquiries as a result of WFD interventions ▪ Evidence of routine questions & interpellations towards government ▪ Evidence of evidence-based committee reports ▪ Extent to which regional programmes have resulted in national action (public consultations; public hearings; evidence-based issues raised)	▪ Interviews with WFD project beneficiaries ▪ Interviews with other parliamentary officials ▪ Interviews with members of anti-corruption committees, appropriations committees, etc. ▪ Parliamentary reports ▪ State budgets ▪ WFD reports ▪ Government and parliamentary websites
To what extent have MPs, including women MPs, developed the technical and institutional capacity to work across party lines?	▪ Women MPs have expressed a commitment to engaging at the national level in cross-party activities ▪ # of cross-party activities amongst women MPs organised by WFD at the national level ▪ # of fora established by WFD to encourage women MPs to share their knowledge ▪ Evidence of effect of cross-party engagement of women MPs has	▪ Interviews with party representatives ▪ Women MPs ▪ Women's caucuses ▪ WFD and party reports ▪ Expert interviews ▪ WFD case studies and stories of change

Evaluation Questions	Criteria for Assessment	Sources of Evidence
	created a result (law amended; bill introduced; investigation initiated) ▪ Extent to which regional programmes have resulted in national action by women MPs	
To what extent have parliaments and MPs utilised resource centres supported by WFD to enhance the quality of their work?	▪ Extent and ways in which parliamentary committees have utilised research services (Evidence that resource centres have produced materials that add value to the work of MPs) ▪ Extent to which partner resource centres have provided quality and unbiased information to MPs and parliaments ▪ Evidence of parliamentary reports and initiatives based on resource centre work	▪ Research outputs (Policy papers, and reports) ▪ Interviews with resource centre staff ▪ Interviews with MPs and committee chairs/members ▪ Expert interviews ▪ WFD case studies and stories of change
To what extent have parliaments and MPs assumed the political will to endorse and implement reforms to their legislative and oversight functions?	▪ Expression of political ownerships by MPs of suggested reforms ▪ Perception of a change in political will by external actors ▪ Public expression of commitment to reforms ▪ Extent to which change in political will can be attributed to WFD	▪ Changes to legal framework of parliament ▪ Media reports ▪ Development partner interviews ▪ WFD Reports ▪ Interviews with MPs and parliamentary staff
Political parties: **To what extent have political parties supported by WFD developed the technical and institutional capacity to produce policy-based campaign messages?**	▪ Extent to which partner parties have expressed a commitment to reform ▪ Evidence of partner parties institutionalising a policy development process that is inclusive ▪ Extent to which political parties have developed and promoted policy papers and/or manifestos ▪ Partner parties have adjusted messaging techniques based on WFD interventions	▪ Party communications literature and material ▪ Party officials and communications officers ▪ WFD case studies and stories of change ▪ Development partners interviews ▪
To what extent have political parties expressed a change in political will to reforms of party structures or party external relations and communications?	▪ Evidence of a commitment to party structural reforms ▪ Evidence of a commitment to reform in external relations ▪ Expression of political commitment to reforms by party leadership ▪ Perception of party commitment to reforms by external actors	▪ Review of PPA reports ▪ Media reports ▪ External actor interviews (national CSOs; international implementers) ▪ Interviews with party leaders ▪ Party documents (communication strategy; constitution) ▪ UK political party interviews
To what extent have those political parties supported by WFD benefited from exchanges with other like-minded parties through networks?	▪ Extent of change in party member knowledge and attitudes as a result of WFD partnership ▪ Extent of change in party organisational processes, structures and legislation ▪ Extent to which parties are public-facing initiative (public good agenda v private interest) ▪ Perceptions and actions supporting changes in party organisational practice and behaviour (manifesto published, issue-based policy, gender and inclusion policy, membership profile, including youth and women)	▪ Review of PPA reports and regional network documentation ▪ UK political party interviews ▪ Interviews with workshop facilitators and network facilitators ▪ Interviews with key political party interlocutors ▪ Focus group discussions/survey instrument? ▪ Interviews with female party candidates ▪ WFD case studies and stories of change ▪ Development partner interviews ▪ National expert interviews

Evaluation Questions	Criteria for Assessment	Sources of Evidence
	▪ Perceptions and actions regarding party public engagement, including engagement with youth and women ▪ Party member perceptions and actions towards coalition-building and cross-party engagement	
CSO and Media: **To what extent have CSOs developed the capacities to influence parliament to better represent citizens' needs?**	▪ Quality of CSO parliamentary advocacy, participation in committees and forums, engagement in parliamentary processes, including budget oversight ▪ Quality and extent of CSO interaction access to parliamentarians (invited space, formal/informal) ▪ Evidence that CSO advocacy has resulted in political institution action (law amended, questions asked in parliament, committee agenda changed, etc.) ▪ Perception of citizens, CSOs and media of committees commitment to consultation ▪ Media and citizen access to parliamentary resource centres	▪ CSO and media reports ▪ WFD Project reports ▪ Civicus, IREX, Integrity index ▪ CSO forums, advocacy networks focal points interviews ▪ Media interviews/political journalist interviews ▪ UNDP, NDI, EU development partners ▪ Ombudsmen offices ▪ Youth groups and women's groups ▪ WFD case studies and stories of change ▪ CSO produced IEC material
CSO and Media: **To what extent have CSOs developed the capacities to engage with political parties to better represent citizen needs?**	▪ Evidence that CSO advocacy has resulted in changes in political party behaviour (manifestos, gender policies developed, female candidates, issue-based coalitions, public good, etc.) ▪ Quality of CSO access to political party leaders at central and branch levels – extent of interaction between interest groups ▪ Citizen perception of party reforms (related to communication, policy, public engagement, etc.)	▪ CSO and Media reports ▪ UK political party and regional network reports ▪ Civicus, IREX, Integrity Index ▪ CSO forums, advocacy network focal points interviews ▪ Youth groups and women's groups ▪ WFD Baseline studies and case studies ▪ UNDP, NDI, EU development partners
Sub-section 2: Impact: to what extent has democracy, good governance and stability improved in the sample countries over time		
Impact **To what extent has the strength of democratic institutions improved during the past three years?**	▪ Quality of Democracy ratings ▪ Budget transparency scores ▪ Quality of elections	▪ International governance data-sets ▪ Independent electoral reports ▪ Open Budget Index, Transparency International ▪ Bertelsmann, Ibrham index, polity iv, freedom house and WB governance data-sets
To what extent has public participation in political institutions improved during the past three years?	▪ Level of public participation in elections, local councils, and other democratic institutions ▪ Civil society legitimacy ▪ Women in parliament	▪ Civicus and Integrity ratings ▪ Country governance data-sets, UNDP/HDI, IREX, ▪ National surveys ▪ Donor macro analysis ▪ Citizen perception surveys
Sub-section 3: Sustainability: to what extent will the changes to political institutions endure after WFD support has ceased?		
Sustainability: **To what extent has the WFD approached ensured sustainability of processes and**	▪ Extent of transition planning by WFD and delivery partners ▪ Parliamentary and executive leadership commitment ▪ Institutional knowledge retention strategies	▪ WFD transition and sustainability approaches ▪ Interviews with parliamentarians/officials ▪ Legislative and budget documentation ▪ Parliamentary reports ▪ Political, institutional analysis

Evaluation Questions	Criteria for Assessment	Sources of Evidence
outcomes as a result of its support to parliaments?	▪ Extent of institutionalisation of change (legal frameworks, resources, capacities, etc.)	
To what extent has WFD approach ensured sustainability of processes and outcomes as a result of its support to political parties?	▪ Extent of transition planning by WFD and delivery partners ▪ Extent of institutionalised changes, including new strategies, legislation, resources, structures and mechanisms in place ▪ Change in party political narrative and relations between parties and constituencies and society more broadly	▪ WFD transition and sustainability approaches ▪ Interviews with party officials ▪ Legislative and budget documentation ▪ Party reports ▪ Political, institutional analysis
To what extent has WFD approach ensured sustainability of processes and outcomes as a result of its support to civil society organisations?	▪ Extent of transition planning ▪ Extent of institutionalisation changes, including new strategies, legislation, resources, structures and mechanisms in place ▪ Change in social narrative regarding relations between society and political institutions	▪ WFD transition and sustainability approaches ▪ Interviews with CSO officials ▪ Legislative and budget documentation ▪ CSO reports ▪ Political institutional analysis
Lessons: What are the key strategic and operational lessons that WFD can draw from the analysis?		
What has WFD learnt about the original theory of change and what are the implications of this approach for future programming?	▪ Overarching theory of change and WFD specific intervention level theory of change ▪ Extent to which assumptions - that technical support (workshops/training) leads to uptake of 'good practice' knowledge or institutional change or 'peer to peer' and regional networking leads to institutional change. ▪ Lessons about the balance between a) technical knowledge, b) thinking politically and c) doing things differently.	
What has WFD learnt about strategy delivery mechanisms, coordination, technical, institutional engagement and engagement with results, VFM and evidence agendas?	▪ What aspects of cross-party working and working together has been effective and why ▪ What have been the benefit/costs of a) multi-year programming compared, b) different partnership modalities, c) increased internal management and technical capacities and resources, d) greater focus on results management and VFM	
What has WFD learnt about the outcomes and impacts of its interventions?	▪ What has worked well and why? ▪ What has been less effective and why?	
What has WFD learnt about the drivers of sustainable institutional and organisational change?	▪ What are the factors that seem to contribute to the political capacity development and institutional behaviour change in the different countries, what similarities and differences, what mix between endogenous and exogenous variables?	
Conclusions and Recommendations		

- **What general conclusions can we draw out about relevance, delivery, results and sustainability of the WFD interventions?**

- **What practical recommendations can we make to help WFD improve the quality of its programming in the short-term and over the long-term?**

Annex 6: WFD Network Questionnaire Replies

African Liberal Network Questionnaire Replies – 12/36 replies

1. In what year did your party become a member of the Africa Liberal Network?					
2003 - 3	2005 - 1				
2009 - 3	2010 - 2	2012 - 1	2013 - 1	2014 - 1	

2. List the activities of the network for which your party has participated in the last 3 years. (Mark all those that are relevant)					
Network Annual Conference xxxxx xxxxx x 11	Thematic Seminars (related to party organising or campaigning) xxxxx xxx 8	Thematic Seminars (related to policy development) xxxxx xxxx 9	Bilateral exchanges Xxxx 4	UK Party Conference attendance Xxxxx 5	Accessed online resources Xxxxx x 6
Training Workshops xxxxx xxxx 9	Facilitated training of other parties Xx 2	Other X (Election Observation Training) X (EU Meetings) 2			

3. Ranking each option from 1-5 (1 = highest importance, 5 = lowest importance), please identify the value you place on each aspect of the work of the network (Average score)					
Peer-to-peer knowledge exchange 2.1	Access to political expertise 2.0	New ideas/policies to differentiate your party from other parties 2.9	Political encouragement from like-minded parties 3.2	Opportunity to discuss political challenges in your country 3.0	
2	1	3	5	4	Rank

4. What support have you received from the UK Liberal Democrats in the last 3 years as a result of your membership in the network? (Mark as many as are relevant)					
Access to political strategists xxxxx xxxx 9	Campaign strategy development xxxxx xxx 8	Support in development of a campaign manifesto xxxxx 5	Advice on election campaign techniques xxxxx x 6	Communications advice xxxxx xxxx 9	Access to written material Xxxxx 5
Advice on structural reforms xxx 3	Candidate development xxxx 4	Other X - Regional cooperation with other liberal parties X - Advocacy and ALN statements on Guinea 2			

5. (a) On a scale of 1-5, what value would you place on the benefit derived by you in attending network conferences organised by the party network (1 = no benefit & 5 = very significant benefit)?					
1. x - 1	2.	3.	4. xxx 3	5. xxxxxxxx 8	

(b) **Provide one example of how (a) you benefited as an individual and (b) how your party benefited from an ALN conference.**

- Developing policies and manifesto for a liberal party using DA of South Africa example; Using those

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lessons in developing the current Manifesto
- I was elected VP of ALN; Party has benefited from the intra-trade policy
- I really grasped many liberal ideas and received important documents from the ALN. The policies and political strategies are very significant to our party
- I benefited from the training on political communication and the manually prepared, and we provided this training for our party and allies, with huge impact on the development of our political communication
- For example, the ALN last General assembly helped us to hear about experiences of the other members and it also helps us to make relationship between our party and some of the ALN members
- As an individual, I gave been able to learn a lot from the training I attended in Zanzibar and also the ALN AGM in Morocco late last year. The two were informative and educative; as a party, we have been able to benefit directly from the expertise training and workshops that have been attended by my colleagues on various occasions. Dr Joseph Misoi, a member of the party's elections board, has attended several pieces of training and conferences that have helped in shaping how we carry out our internal elections and nomination of candidates. Philip Etale, the Director of Communications, has attended several pieces of training/seminars/workshops in South Africa, Germany, UK and Belgium on political parties' communications and strategy. Our party Leader, the Rt. Hon. Raila Odinga has on several occasions been invited to Liberal Dem International Conferences and just last year (2013), he was privileged to be the keynote speaker at the Lib Dem/ALN Conference in Cape Town, South Africa. Generally, ODM has benefited a lot from ALN and the Lib Dem International as a whole
- Capacity building in the field of leadership; Political communication and campaign strategy
- My party co-held alongside the 2015 conference, a forum on issues of democratic governance Africa. This forum was a real democratic framework for sharing experience in and our party truly benefited
- Understanding how other parties function; Through training and other activities
- An ALN Conference provides several benefits:
  - an opportunity for networking with other like-minded member parties;
  - ALN acts as a vocal advocate for the Party in times of political crises or Human Rights violations (such as ALN statements in March 2013, February 2014)
- Some of these ideas gained from peers were replicated in the party in the area of party programmes

(c) To what extent has your party's prospects of electoral success increased as a result of your party's participation in the ALN (1=no increase, 3= little increase, 5= big increase)?					
1.	2.	3. xxxxxxx 7	4. x 1	5. xx 2	

6. (a) Has your party changed its legal framework or internal structure as a direct result of engaging in the ALN?					
	Yes xxx 3	No xxxxxxxxx 9			

(b) If you answered "Yes", please provide details of such changes.

(c) If you answered "No" to (a), why has there been no structural or legal change?

- We have made changes as a result of our own evaluation of our Party structure and Strategic Planning exercise. Strengthening of the Youth and Women wings of our Party was partly influenced by exchanges with our colleagues in ALN
- Our party is already structured and well organised
- Our party structure is build according to the Sudanese Political Parties law of 2007, and it is difficult to change it without change in the actual law and procedures
- No need for this change
- The party has been able to adopt the model of other Liberal Democratic parties across the globe in terms of management and the running of its affairs. We have a strong National Executive Committee (NEC) as well as a well-organized and structured secretariat which is headed by the Secretary-General and run by the Executive Director who has other Directors under him i.e. Director of Finance and Administration, Director of Membership and Recruitment, Director of Operations, Director of Political Affairs and Strategy and Director of Communications. Under the Directorates are other officers whom they work hand in hand to deliver for the party.
- Because our party was founded on liberal values and principles of internal democracy
- There are no changes in this context was because the structures are not in phase with the legal regime ALN
- Mainly because the propositions were already part of our structure
- The structural or legal changes may be made during the Party's conference, which will take place this

year			

- The issue of Gender parity is what the party is working on now to be a policy at all levels. There is now a 50/50 campaign that is on-going in the party

7. (a) Has your party adjusted or revised its methods of campaigning as a result of engagement with the ALN?

	Yes xxxxx Xxx - 8	**No xxxx - 4**			

(b) If you answered "Yes", please provide details of the changes

- We have attempted to get more press coverage by engaging the press and creating news events
- The DA adjusted its target market to grow in black constituencies. This is all due to collaboration within ALN
- The points that we got from ALN conference support us to develop election campaign strategy
- Party demonstrated the benefit of liberal market and equality of citizens; Party promoted women's role in political positions and increased in executive and central committee
- According to the training on political communication, our party is doing more direct marketing and door to door campaigns
- The Party has been able to adopt new ways of campaigning and employed new tactics in its bid to win state power. The party now engages volunteers in canvassing for votes, holding town-hall meetings and engaging professionals. This is a campaign strategy practised by liberals world over
- Communication is much more oriented towards citizens without political affiliation and to executives
- The Party found the ALN Best Practice in Political Communication very useful. We have adapted our communication strategies to incorporate new technics and strategies of political communication
- The answered is NO due to the fact that the party has not benefitted from such training or workshop since it became a member of the ALN

8. (a) Has your party established and promoted new policy initiatives as a result of engagement in the ALN?

	Yes xxxxx Xxxx - 9	**No xxx - 3**			

(b) If you answered "Yes", please provide details of the new initiatives.

- Taking the example of DA we are preparing a 10 percent growth with employment strategy for our country
- Revamping our communications strategy to capture the target market
- African trading mechanisms and Human right principles are incorporated into our programme and election manifesto
- According to the training on political communication, our party is doing more direct marketing and door to door campaigns; We provided campaigns in favour of LGBT communities
- The Party believes in Liberalism. Liberalism is the way to go in the new world order, and we embrace it to achieve our goal of equitable, just and fairer society
- Communication is much more oriented towards citizens without political affiliation and to executives
- The party is in the process of reviewing its policy on free trade to reflect the network's recommendations
- The party at the moment is working on the policy of free market economy and that of women inclusivity at all levels

9. (a) Has the role of women party members changed as a result of your party's engagement in the ALN?

	Yes xxxxxxx - 7	**No xxxxx - 5**			

(b) If you answered "Yes", please provide details of the new leadership roles assumed by women party members

- At least 30 percent of the member in all decision-making bodies must be women. For the first time, our Deputy Secretary General of the Party is a Woman
- We have more women representatives in our structure and in all councils and legislatures
- Our party initiated women to be a member and participate on leadership status. In this case, women elected as a leader, and we do have one woman participated as executive committee and two been as central committee member
- The number of women in executive increased from two to six; the number of women in central committee from ten to twenty-two
- The Party's Women League has really improved, and the participation of women in party affairs is enormous and encouraging. In fact, I encourage the ALN to organise capacity building workshops for the women and invite our party women members to attend and learn from their counterparts from other

countries.

- Legal affairs & communications
- Women are now encouraged to contest for all position within the party. The next conference early next year will see more women vying for the leadership of the party and more women as parliamentary candidates.

10. Overall, how would you measure the value to your party of membership and engagement in the ALN? (1 = no value & 5 = very significant value)					
1.	2.	3.	4. xxx - 3	5. xxxxx xxx - 8	

Arab Women's Network (Tha'era) Questionnaire Replies – 8/8 replies

1. (a) **In what year did you become a member of the Network?**					
3 NGOs	5 Parties		2012 - 7	2013 - 1	

2. (a) On a scale of 1-5, what value would you place on the benefit derived by you in being a member of the network (1 = no benefit & 5 = very significant benefit)?

1.	2.	3.	4.	5. xxxxx xxx-8	

(b) Provide one example of how you have benefited from the network.

- The TOT training provided to women activists from our organisation enabled us to train 28 women from our NGO on messaging, public speaking, and advocacy. This has affected the way we conduct our support campaigns to promoting women participation in public life.
- Our NGO supports social democrat parties in our country. Our membership gave us news skills and exposed our members to the importance of the role of women in political structures
- Through the programme Empowering Arab Women, the Women section of our party has now 22 women activists that can train on political messaging, campaigning, and public speech. The ripple effect of these training to the regional level is having a positive effect on how women present themselves to the party as viable candidates in addition to planning their campaigns in a professional manner. Our trainers formed the core group of a campaign that resulted in a woman candidate from our party winning the presidency of a very important association/trade union. It is a first time a woman heads this Association.
- I have attended a TOT, and I benefited from the training, which has improved my presentation skills, I also benefited from the interaction with the other participants from different Arab countries. In fact, listening to the various experiences and sharing problem-solving ideas was very useful.
- Exchanging experiences of political parties and how they address gender issues in the four countries was very useful reconnaissance by the leadership. They hear us more and cooperate plus.
- Invaluable cross-fertilization of ideas and solidarity among and between members & sponsor. More specifically, a series of training of trainers regional, national, and subnational workshops targeting Social Democratic politically active women (parliamentary candidates and electoral campaign leaders)

3. Please rate the following potential benefits of the network (5 = high 3= average, 1= low)

Peer-to-peer knowledge exchange	Access to political expertise	New ideas/policies to differentiate your party from other parties	Political encouragement from like-minded parties	Opportunity to discuss political challenges in your country	
4.0	4.0	3.9	4.0	3.6	Tha'era

4. What support have you received from the UK Labour Party in the last 3 years as a result of your membership in the network? (Mark as many as are relevant)

Access to political strategists Xxxxx xxx - 8	Support in development of party policies Xxxxx xxx - 8	Advice on election campaign techniques Xxxxx xxx - 8	Communications advice Xxxxx xxx - 8	Access to written material Xxxxx xx - 7	
Advice on structural reforms Xxxxx xxx - 8	Advice on becoming a candidate Xxxxx xxx - 8	**Other** X-Access to experiences from similar countries that help designing appropriate strategies X-Attendance at a Labour Party Conference & Study tour to Slough, UK, on local governance (three-year programme)			

5. (a) On a scale of 1-5, to what extent have you been able to influence a change in the role of women in your party as a result of your participation in the networks (1 = unable to influence, 3= some influence, 5= a lot of influence)

1.	2.	3.	4.	5. xxxxx x - 6	

(b) Please provide one example of how you have influenced your party culture towards women as a result of your network participation.

- We are women NGO, so the question is not relevant. But we can say that it affected positively the

effectiveness of our intervention as to actions promoting women participation in political life and women rights.

- Our members were able to strongly support the promotion of women in parties to leadership position through a network grouping women in all parties in our country
- Our participation in the network exposed to our leadership practically and without the possibility of denial a comparative with women role in other social democrat parties in the region. With it came a realisation that our party was lagging behind in the promotion of women to leadership roles in elected bodies. As irrelevant as this seems, yet it generated lots of discussion within the leadership. Let's not forget that our party prides itself to be one of the first in the region and that it had an advanced policy for women role in the party since the mid-twentieth century. The synergy created resulted in a decision within the leadership to increase dramatically the number of women candidates in local elections as well as Unions and Associations.
- Following the TOT we were able to prepare women candidates, which increased their visibility, and hence drew the attention of the party leadership to them. We were also able to demand a women quota in the decision-making party structures, which we succeeded in getting. Around 35 per cent in the political Bureau and 38% in the National Council.
- The number of women members in the party increased
- More liberty for the women's section of the Party
- Party women have obtained a formal 30%participation quota written in the recently revised party bylaws. This was not an easy gain that needed active participation in the drafting of the bylaws, and a voting strategy agreed in advance among party women members of our party executive committee. Ground preparations also included early lobbying, note writing, ready responses and pressure tactics inspired by the network.

6. (a) **As a result of your engagement in the network has your party adjusted or revised its methods of candidate selection to encourage more women?**					
	Yes **xxxxx - 5**	**No**			

(b) If you answered "Yes", please provide details of such changes.

- The change happened in practice as stated above but not in the form of legal reform or amendment
- The party has seeked Tha'era's representatives' advice in selecting women candidates.
  As a result, all the candidates (but one) in the past Legislative election were members who had received Tha'era TOT. Yet because the electoral law called for horizontal parity, there were no changes in the number of female candidates.
- The party engaged in knowing more about women members of the party who can be candidates
- More support for women who wish to present
- See above on 30% women quota. In addition, in preparation for forthcoming parliamentary elections, we recently arranged an interactive meeting between our Party leader and 10 women parliamentary candidates who came from the provinces (These women had also earlier participated in Tha'era national TOT.) Each candidate had a chance to present herself and update him on her profile, feeding him with points on her electoral campaign programme and ambition. These points and knowledge would support further negotiations with other coalition parties in support of women candidates. We also discussed real challenges all parties are facing under the new electoral law to gain ground (2/3 independent candidates and 1/3 closed non-party based electoral lists, electoral zones, funding and other constraints)

7. **When comparing the last two elections in your country, to what extent was there an increase in the number of female candidates 1= no increase, 3= moderate increase, 5= big increase)**					
1.	2.	3.	4.	5. x - 1	

8. **To what extent has your participation in the network had an effect on women's leadership role in your party? (1= no effect, 3= some effect, 5= a big effect)**					
1.	2.	3.	4.	5. xxxxx x- 6	

9. **Please provide an example of any change in women's leadership role in your party**

- We are women NGO, so the question is not relevant. Yet the way the training affected our work has helped us to participate effectively in a network promoting women in leadership in parties and trade unions.
- The leadership realised the need to reform increasing women in leadership roles in the party; the discussion is under way. The leadership committed to increasing the number of women candidates to a local government position; nominations are taking place. The leadership committed to increasing the number of women candidates to Union and Association position. A woman was nominated and won the leadership of a very important association.
- Because of the increase in the number of well-trained women in the decision-making party structure,

Women can make their voices heard, and can, therefore, influence the decision-making in favour of other women. The treasurer of the party is one of the Tha'era's national trainers as well as the vice president of the National Council and the head of the department of International relations.
• More women were able to join the central committee of the party
• More women in regional leadership
• Women participation on the Party Executive Committee reached 33% in the last party elections. Our Women Secretariat is widely recognised as one of the most active organs in the party. Our close participation with the bylaws drafting committee got us involved in tough negotiations on women's participation rate and leadership role (structural reform).

10. **(a) Has your party changed its legal framework or internal structure with regard to promoting women as leaders as a direct result of engaging in the network?**					
Yes - xx - 2	**No - xxx - 3**			
(b) **If you answered "Yes", please provide details of such changes.**					
• During the party, Congress that took place in July 2013 Tha'era representatives pushed for the adoption of parity measures in the constitution. The women structure was officially adopted after long negotiations with the party leadership and Congress delegates. It is thanks to Tha'era members' hard work and patience that they were able to push women forward in all the party structures.					

Women's Academy for Africa Network Questionnaire Replies – 9/9 replies

1. **In what year did you become a member of the Network?**					
2009 - 6		2011 - 3		9 Parties	

2. (a) **On a scale of 1-5, what value would you place on the benefit derived by you in being a member of the network (1 = no benefit & 5 = very significant benefit)?**					
1.	2.	3.	4. xx – 2	5. xxxxx xx - 7	

(b) Provide one example of how you have benefited from the network.

- The women who attended the workshop in Ghana had the opportunity to broaden their perspective on decision-making
- I have been completely changed by workshops and women who attended
- I have benefited from network contacts, training and exposure
- We train women to change the status quo and not to change themselves to fit into the current status quo
- Exchange of knowledge and experiences; leadership & communications skills
- The exposure and education I have received is awesome
- I was a woman leader in Party before, but now a Vice-Chairperson
- Received training in getting women elected in politics and exchanged experiences with other women

3. **Please rate the following potential benefits of the network (5 = high 3= average, 1= low)**

Peer-to-peer knowledge exchange	Access to political expertise	New ideas/policies to differentiate your party from other parties	Political encouragement from like-minded parties	Opportunity to discuss political challenges in your country	
4.0	3.8	4.2	3.8	3.7	WAFA

4. **What support have you received from the UK Labour Party in the last 3 years as a result of your membership in the network? (Mark as many as are relevant)**

| Access to political strategists

Xxxxx xxxx- 9 | Support in development of party policies

Xxxxx xx - 7 | Advice on election campaign techniques

Xxxxx xxxx - 9 | Communications advice

Xxxxx xxx - 8 | Access to written material

Xxxxx x - 6 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Advice on structural reforms

Xxxxx xx - 7 | Advice on becoming a candidate

Xxxxx xxx - 8 | Other

**X – Not all parties require same level of support from LP
X- Advice on assertiveness & transformational leadership
X-Stress management
X-Confidence building** | | | |

5. (a) **On a scale of 1-5, to what extent have you been able to influence a change in the role of women in your party as a result of your participation in the networks (1 = unable to influence, 3= some influence, 5= a lot of influence)**

1. x - 1	2.	3. xx - 2	4. xx - 2	5. xxxx - 4	

(b) Please provide one example of how you have influenced your party culture towards women as a result of your network participation.

- Party already has strong structure promoting women
- The number of women in the executive at all levels has increased to 40%
- I have advised my Party to put the women's league on top
- We were able to influence the Party to come up with an affirmative action policy that favours women as election candidates

- Party now sees women as integral part of organisation
- Created a women's movement in the Party to support women members
- Through my efforts, three women are now in the leadership of the Party (including myself)
- Now women in branch organisations have voting rights
- Women received skills to empower them and build their capacity.

6. (a) As a result of your engagement in the network has your party adjusted or revised its methods of candidate selection to encourage more women?

Yes xxxxx xx - 7	No, x - 1			

(b) If you answered "Yes", please provide details of such changes.

- In next election 40% of candidates will be women; internal party election fees for candidates have been reduced by half for women
- Ever since joining women have received a special place in our Party
- There is now an affirmative action policy in place
- Party introduced affirmative action
- Use the quota system for more women in the National Assembly
- Party is now ensuring that in any 5 members in the structure three are women
- Increased voting rights for women members and two vice-chairpersons are women

7. When comparing the last two elections in your country, to what extent was there an increase in the number of female candidates 1= no increase, 3= moderate increase, 5= big increase)

1. xxx - 1	2.	3. xxxx - 4	4. xx –2	5. xx - 2	

8. To what extent has your participation in the network had an effect on women's leadership role in your party? (1= no effect, 3= some effect, 5= a big effect)

1.	2.	3. xx - 2	4.	5. xxxxx - 4	

9. Please provide an example of any change in women's leadership role in your party

- Party is committed to supporting like-minded parties and adherence to SADC and UN gender protocols
- Four of nine leaders in Party are women; women are very active in media
- Every woman leader has a say in my Party
- Able to get first woman chairperson of Party & first opposition woman MP
- For the first time, Party elected woman as Party Chairperson
- More women are on the National Executive Committee; women members more likely to fight against poor treatment from hierarchy
- The confidence of out women leaders has increased reality, and we are now making informed decisions

10. (a) Has your party changed its legal framework or internal structure with regard to promoting women as leaders as a direct result of engaging in the network?

Yes xxxxx xxx - 8	No, x - 1			

(b) If you answered "Yes", please provide details of such changes.

- At branch level at least two women are to be on executive in addition to women's representative
- Party legal advisor is a woman
- Party constitution amended to ensure quota for women in all leadership roles
- Affirmative action
- More women elected at levels of Party structure, but women still not happy because their perspectives are ignored
- In accordance with the national constitution, Party is changing its rules to ensure 50/50 rule for women/men representation
- Party constitution amended
- For every position in Party elected by members, there must be at least women candidate