

# Final Report

Evaluation of Africa Democracy Strengthening Programme – Phase Two.

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SPECIALISTS IN DEVELOPING COMMUNITIES



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# Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>ADS II</b>	Africa Democracy Strengthening Programme – Phase II
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>CIDA</b>	Canada International Development Agency
<b>CMP</b>	Conflict Management Panel
<b>CNE</b>	Comissão Nacional de Eleições (National Electoral Commission)
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organisation
<b>COMESA</b>	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
<b>DEAU</b>	Department for Electoral Assistance Unit
<b>DFID</b>	Department for International Development
<b>DFID ARD</b>	Department for International Development Africa Regional Department
<b>EAC</b>	East African Community
<b>EISA</b>	Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa
<b>EMB</b>	Election Management Bodies
<b>EOM</b>	Election Observation Mission
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>HMG</b>	Her Majesty's Government
<b>IEBC</b>	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
<b>LTO</b>	Long Term Observation
<b>NDI</b>	National Democratic Institute
<b>NIMD</b>	Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>PAP</b>	Pan-African Parliament
<b>PPDT</b>	Political Parties Dispute Tribunal
<b>REC</b>	Regional Economic Communities
<b>SADC</b>	South African Development Community
<b>STO</b>	Short Term Observation
<b>TOR</b>	Terms of Reference
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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**UN** United Nations

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**UNEAD** United Nations Election Assistance Division

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# Executive Summary

## Independent evaluation of Africa Democracy Strengthening Programme II (ADS II)

- DFID commissioned Coffey to evaluate the £5.3m ADS II programme, which provided funding to the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) to strengthen election observation and management on the African continent over a four year period beginning in 2008. ADS II is due to finish in 2013 following a short extension this September.
- ADS II works with the African Union (AU) to provide training to election observers (EOs) and technical support to the delivery of election observation missions (EOMs). The programme also works with civil society organisations (CSOs), election management bodies (EMBs), legislatures and political parties in Kenya, Chad and Mozambique to support electoral management reform and build capacity and responsiveness. Through ADS II, DFID also provides funding for EISA to develop as an institution through training, conferences and symposiums.

The evaluation found that EISA is delivering ADS II effectively and that the programme represents a good return on DFID's investment of funds. The programme has performed well against logframe<sup>1</sup> targets and has made a significant contribution to improving the quality of EISA and AU EOMs, supporting electoral reform, and strengthening the capacity and responsiveness of legislatures and political parties in target countries. The evidence showed that the specifically regional dimensions of ADS II contributed to this success. With support from DFID, EISA has adapted delivery to respond to changes in context at the regional level and within ADS II target countries to ensure ADS II remains relevant. The programme has delivered impressive results that leverage the benefits of EISA's "dual role" as both a regionally respected source of technical expertise and a trusted local partner to government, CSOs and political parties in Mozambique, Chad and Kenya.

**Table 1: ADS II performance against logframe targets**

Output	Achieved?	Comment
<b>Output 1:</b> The AU, Pan-African Parliament (PAP) and EISA election observers are trained and supported and EISA election observer missions are deployed and the reports publicised	Achieved	EISA "moderately or substantially exceeded" all Output 1 milestones.
<b>Output 2:</b> The capacity of key stakeholders to play a constructive role in electoral reform and processes is strengthened in three target countries	Achieved	There is evidence that ADS II has strongly achieved its goals under Output 2, and in some cases exceeded them.
<b>Output 3:</b> The capacity of legislatures in three targeted countries to be effective and responsive enhanced	Partially achieved	ADS II was unable to meet all Output 3 targets, in part because of external influences.
<b>Output 4:</b> The capacity of political parties in 3 targeted countries to be effective and internally democratic strengthened	Achieved	EISA has significantly exceeded its targets for this output.

<sup>1</sup> Unless otherwise stated the authors refer to the 2013 Logframe provided in Annex 7 throughout the report

<b>Output 5:</b> EISA is a professional, well-managed, innovative, influential and well-focused organisation	Achieved	Performance against logframe indicators for Output 5 has generally exceeded expectations
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## Summary of key findings and recommendations

### Section 5.1: Relevance of ADS II to the problem

**Findings:** Evidence from interviews with a range of stakeholders consistently demonstrated the relevance of ADS II to increasing the credibility and quality of national elections in Africa. EISA's status as an African regional body and ability to work at national, continental and international scales is relevant to their ability to address the problem because it provides them with the ability to deploy experts across the continent and enables them to generate and disseminate evidence and learning from a range of different countries and contexts in support of the delivery of ADS II activities.

**Recommendation 5.1:** DFID should continue to use regional funding for any future iterations of ADS II to ensure partners can leverage the benefits of their regional presence and ability to work across scales (i.e. logistical capability, opportunities for comparative learning) to support regional election observation (both directly and with the AU) and national election management reform in target countries.

### Section 5.2: Complementarity of ADS II

**Findings:** Because Output 1 activities were developed in collaboration with the AU Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit (DEAU), ADSII activities respond to the expressed needs of the AU and strategically complement the work of other service providers. However, the previous memorandum of understanding (MoU) between EISA and the AU has lapsed and an updated MoU needs to be signed. Across all Outputs, EISA demonstrates a proactive approach to coordinating with other organisations working in the same space through membership of networks and on-the-ground interaction and there was no evidence of duplication of effort with the work of other organisations.

**Recommendation 5.2:** EISA should update the existing (MoU) between itself and the DEAU to reflect the changing needs of the AU and establish systematic procedures for sharing information on planned and proposed work with organisations working in the same space including but not limited to the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) and the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).

### Section 5.3: Coverage of ADS II

**Findings:** The structure of ADS II enables EISA to use success in one area of work to leverage new opportunities in others. At a strategic level, ADS II has also been effective in maximising the benefits of EISA's regional presence by encouraging learning across countries and contexts, for example by sending EMB staff from Kenya to observe elections in Ghana under Output 1 which, through real-time lesson learning, led to improved election management processes in Kenya under Output 2.

**Recommendation 5.3A:** EISA should capitalise on opportunities for maximising the benefits of its regional presence, for example by using EMB and CSO staff members as election observers where lessons can be learned across contexts.

**Recommendation 5.3B:** DFID should structure any future iterations of ADS II on a regional basis that enables partners to expose national level counterparts to relevant comparative experience in other countries across different programme Outputs.

### Section 5.4: Coordination of ADS II with other partners and programmes

**Findings:** ADS II was successful in collaborating with other organisations to provide services in cases where EISA was unable to provide the needed services independently. This contributed to the delivery of some results that could not have otherwise been achieved, notably in Kenya where collaboration with partners enabled wider roll-out of conflict mediation activities. However, there appears to be unmet demand for ADS II services by key stakeholders, due to funding and capacity constraints on the part of EISA, which could be met through additional funding or pooled resources in future.



**Recommendation 5.4:** Where there is clear evidence that coordination is amplifying the delivery of results, explore ways of providing additional funding to help EISA and other partners meet demand. This could be through a pool of funding reserved to support coordination in instances where EISA (or others) work with partners to meet emerging challenges and rapid extra funding would contribute towards programme targets.

### Section 5.5: Effectiveness of ADS II

**Findings:** The structure of ADS II and good relationship between EISA and DFID enabled the programme to respond to emerging challenges and opportunities improving the effectiveness of activities. EISA's ability to fill the dual role of a regionally respected technical expert and trusted local partner at national level was critical to the effectiveness of the programme and regional and national level work was mutually strengthening and reinforcing.

The evaluation found that the quality of EISA's staff is very high and technical expertise and access to networks in government, civil society and regional bodies was also an important contributing factor to the success of the programme. However, although staff turnover is currently stable, there is a risk that unexpected turnover of staff could reduce the effectiveness of EISA's work. Flexibility on behalf of both EISA and DFID has been crucial to the effective delivery of ADS II. EISA has effectively responded to emerging challenges and opportunities and DFID has demonstrated a willingness to respond quickly and constructively to requests to fund additional activities that contribute to the goals of the programme.

Despite regular revisions, EISA's monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system is not sufficient for a programme of the size and complexity of ADS II.

ADS II exceeded logframe targets for Outputs 1, 2, 4 and 5. EISA played a crucial role in supporting impressive improvements in the AU's ability to undertake high-quality EOMs across the continent and has successfully supported CSOs and political parties through building their capacity and responsiveness at the national level, while enabling learning to be shared across contexts. The regional structure of ADS II funding has played a clear role in supporting the achievement of these outputs.

Despite partially achieving Output 3 targets, ADS II has been effective in strengthening legislatures in Kenya and Chad and the logframe targets are not appropriate to the activities actually delivered. ADS II activities in Chad were effective and particularly significant, given the scarcity of other actors and relative weakness of national CSOs working on elections in that country.

Through the flexible funding provided under Output 5, ADS II has enabled EISA to participate in conferences and events that have built the organisation's profile on an international stage. Other activities under this Output, such as internal training and reviews, have built EISA's internal institutional capacity.

**Recommendation 5.5A:** EISA should strengthen its M&E systems to ensure that the logframe is used as an active project management tool and is updated where activities change or are unsuccessful.

**Recommendation 5.5B:** EISA should assess the feasibility of resuming activities in Chad (subject to DFID or other donor support) or an alternative country to scale-up the results achieved by existing national level work in new contexts.

**Recommendation 5.5C:** EISA should update the MoU in place with DEAU to ensure EISA's role remains relevant to AU EOM requirements as the body moves towards long-term observation (LTO) missions.

**Recommendation 5.5D:** DFID should develop a succession and handover plan for internal management of ADS II to ensure that a strong relationship with EISA and other future partners and the ability to react quickly to requests for funding is not lost.

**Recommendation 5.5E:** DFID should structure any future iterations of ADS II on a regional basis to ensure EISA and other regional partners are able to operate at both regional and national level and can continue to act as a conduit for lesson learning and a vehicle for counterparts to gain experience in comparative contexts through election observation, conferences and symposiums.

**Recommendation 5.5F:** Subject to resource availability, DFID should consider supporting further national level work through any further iterations of ADS II given the relative success of EISA's existing work in this area

and the unique opportunity offered by EISA's ability to apply regional lessons and knowledge across contexts.

### Section 5.6: Efficiency of ADS II

**Findings:** EISA has delivered ADS II in a cost-effective manner that balances quality and cost to deliver high-quality outputs at a reasonable cost, using long-standing suppliers who are reviewed every couple years. Following review and updating with the support of a specialist consultancy, financial management procedures and processes are fit-for-purpose. Flexibility in the use of ADS II funding has improved the effectiveness of ADS II by allowing EISA to respond to emerging challenges and opportunities within the overarching remit of the programme.

There is also strong evidence that EISA has used ADS II to leverage-in additional funding from other donors to scale-up successful activities.

**Recommendation 5.6:** EISA should consider reviewing long-standing agreements with suppliers for key goods and services to ensure that these still represent best value for money and ensure that EISA is securing the most cost-effective options available.

### Section 5.7: Impact of ADS II

**Findings:** The evaluation of ADS II was not an impact evaluation but the research did suggest that the programme has delivered impact in key areas. The evidence supported the conclusion that ADS II has increased the space for civil society to engage on electoral reform with political parties and parliamentarians in Mozambique and Kenya. ADS II has also made a contribution to stronger and more effective democratic institutions in the AU, Kenya, Chad and Mozambique. Bills and policies are now subject to public consultation, EOMs are operated more effectively and deliver better outputs, and electoral processes are less likely to fail as a result of the ADS II programme.

**Recommendation 5.7:** The evaluation team understand that DFID is currently commissioning separate research relating to DFID's wider work on democratic governance and elections. The findings of this and wider research should be used when updating the ADS II theory of change to ensure achievement of the Outcomes actually contributes to delivering the stated programme impact.

### Section 5.8: Sustainability of ADS II

**Findings:** Sustainability isn't the most useful way to understand some of the activities conducted under ADS II, specifically the individual-level training of election observers, but the evidence shows that as far as possible and useful ADS II activities at the national level were designed to develop sustainable skills and capacity within their partner institutions.

The evidence available suggests that EISA is applying an approach that aims to build the capacity of partners and has strengthened the capacity of individuals within DEAU to work on electoral issues in the long term but that DEAU remains logistically reliant on the resources and expertise of EISA for the time-being.

# 1 Background of ADS II

**The Africa Democracy Strengthening Programme – Phase II is a DFID-funded programme implemented by the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) to enable it to build sustainable African capacity to manage and monitor elections and involve citizens in their national democratic processes. DFID has provided £5.3m over a four year period (2009-2013). The expected outcome of the programme is stronger and more effective national, regional and pan-African democratic institutions. The expected impact of the programme is more vibrant democracy and better electoral processes in Africa.**

The implementation of ADS II involves a range of activities, including:

- (i) building regional and national capacity (in Chad, Kenya and Mozambique) in election observation, elections management, election-related conflict management and resolution;
- (ii) supporting national legislatures and civil society organisations to improve their understanding and influence of policy making;
- (iii) supporting institutional strengthening of political parties; and
- (iv) strengthening EISA's operational, governance and management systems.

## 2 Background of the Evaluation

### 2.1 Purpose of the evaluation

The evaluation was commissioned as ADS II comes to an end for the purpose of learning and accountability:

- **Accountability:** A process evaluation was conducted to determine whether ADS II achieved its objectives as set out in the original logframe<sup>2</sup>. The process evaluation focussed on whether ADS II was effective in producing the benefits anticipated, efficient in achieving results at the least possible resource cost and also identified the strengths and weaknesses of the approach;
- **Learning:** A theory-based evaluation was conducted to sets the hypotheses and assumptions in the theory of change for regional approaches to strengthening election management developed during the inception phase. The theory of change was tested in order to inform more effective, efficient and sustainable programme interventions and future decisions on DFID funding in the sector.

The **objectives** of the evaluation<sup>3</sup> were to:

- evaluate implementation of the components of the ADS II programme, and
- refine and test those specific elements of the theory of change that relate to regional approaches to strengthening election management.

### 2.2 Scope of the evaluation

The evaluation commenced in late July 2013 and provides an assessment of:

- ADS II-funded activities from project inception in October 2009 until the end of August 2013. National strengthening and support activities were focused in Chad, Kenya and Mozambique; and
- Continent-wide regional strengthening activities - in particular, support to Election Observer Missions.

A detailed consideration of activities in Burundi was not included in the scope of the evaluation because shortly after the start of ADS II it was dropped as a target country. See section 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 for a consideration of why ADS II stopped working in Burundi.

### 2.3 Use of the evaluation

#### Communications and dissemination plan

The final stage of the evaluation, listed as step 10 in Table 4, will be to communicate the conclusions and recommendations from this report to key stakeholders, including within DFID, EISA, other donors and key ADS II stakeholders. A communications and dissemination plan is included as Annex 8 to this report. A key action will be for DFID and EISA to disseminate this report to key stakeholders so that it can inform the design of future programmes, future funding decisions, and strengthen delivery of future ADS programmes and/or DFID's overall approach to working with regional bodies on elections

The primary audience for this evaluation is DFID, as the funder of ADS II, and EISA, as the implementing partner; however it is anticipated that other stakeholders will have an interest in the findings. The target audiences for the evaluation, their information requirements and the anticipated use of evaluation findings are described in Table 1.

**Table 1: Use of evaluation findings by stakeholder groups**

Target audience	Information requirements	Evaluation findings will be used to
DFID ARD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The performance of ADS II and its value</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform DFID's overall approach to working</li> </ul>

<sup>2</sup> ADS II Logframe, 2010

<sup>3</sup> As set out in DFID, Terms of Reference for the Evaluation of Africa Democracy Strengthening Programme II, June 2013.

## BACKGROUND OF THE EVALUATION

	<p>for money</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Learning on what works when engaging with regional bodies on elections</li> </ul>	<p>with regional bodies on elections</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform future funding for regional democratic governance programmes and in particular election management</li> <li>• Demonstrate accountability in spending</li> </ul>
EISA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Performance of ADS II</li> <li>• Recommendations for changes to future work</li> <li>• Learning on what works when engaging with regional bodies on elections</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improve management, monitoring and delivery of future ADS programmes</li> <li>• Improve engagement with regional bodies</li> </ul>
Regional bodies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Performance of ADS II</li> <li>• Effectiveness of their own work</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform future changes to the way election observation missions are delivered</li> <li>• Improve relationship with EISA and other bodies from which they receive support to ensure maximum benefits are received from support</li> </ul>
Other HMG actors working on elections	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The effectiveness of ADS II as an election strengthening programme</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform the design of future programmes</li> </ul>
Other donors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The effectiveness of ADS II as an election strengthening programme</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform the design of future programmes</li> </ul>

Coffey will communicate the findings of the evaluation through formal evaluation reports. In addition to the proposal which detailed Coffey's approach, Coffey has already delivered an Inception Report in September which articulated the theory of change for regional approaches to election strengthening and detailed Coffey's methodology and analytical framework for the evaluation. DFID will be responsible for sharing the final evaluation reports with other stakeholders (including EISA) as they see fit.

## 3 Approach and Methodology

### 3.1 Approach

There are two key elements to the evaluation:

- **A process evaluation** which will assess: 1) what the project is doing, 2) whether the programme is performing in terms of its capacity to deliver the quantity and quality of activities and services that were originally planned; 3) whether the activities and services delivered are being used for the optimal effect and 4) whether programme management and administration arrangements are facilitating the delivery process to this end; and
- **A theory-based evaluation** which will assess the extent to which the theory of change underpinning EISAs approach to regional strengthening activities holds true and consider the contribution that regional strengthening activities makes to improving election management and assessment processes and increasing the credibility of election systems and results.

The overarching approach to these two components is provided below and further information can be found in Annexes 2-4 which sets out a detailed approach and methodology.

#### 3.1.1 Process evaluation

The evaluation will assess the ADS II programme according to the OECD DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, complementarity, coverage, coordination, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. The evaluation questions were structured according to these criteria and are listed in section 4.2 below. Section 4.3 provides an overview of the analytical framework used to structure the research and data analysis.

Before commencing the process evaluation, an evaluability assessment was conducted to determine whether:

- It was possible to clearly define a coherent set of goals;
- The monitoring framework in place was sufficiently robust to enable an evaluation;
- It was possible to collect data to a sufficient standard; and
- The evaluation questions were relevant to the objectives of the stakeholders to the evaluation.

Overall, it was determined that the ADS II programme was *evaluable* and the detailed findings of the evaluability assessment are provided in Annex 4.

#### 3.1.2 Theory-based evaluation

In accordance with the TOR, a key part of the evaluation process was to develop a retrospective theory of change for regional approaches to improving election management. A two day workshop was held with a range of stakeholders from 5-6 August 2013 in order to develop a series of clear and testable hypotheses about how regional approaches improve election management and help to strengthen democracy.

To do this, activities were undertaken to reach a common understanding of:

- The problem that regional bodies are seeking to address and the observable symptoms of these problems;
- The higher level objectives of stakeholders;
- The activities that need to be undertaken to address the problems, as well as the symptoms; and
- How activities contribute to the higher level objectives and the changes in behaviour (individual and organisational), systems and processes that they expect as a result of activities in the short, medium and long term.

A detailed report of the workshop process and outputs is provided in Annex 5. The theory of change was refined and strengthened throughout the evaluation. Through the workshop process and further consultation with DFID, 3 key hypotheses were identified that would be tested through the evaluation. These are detailed in section 4.2.



### 3.2 Evaluation questions and assumptions to test

The TOR set out a series of evaluation questions. After the inception phase, a number of questions were added to ensure that the assessment of ADS II was comprehensive. The evaluation questions are listed in Table 2. The findings of the evaluation set out in this report (Section 5) are structured by the evaluation criteria and respond to each specific evaluation question.

**Table 2: Evaluation questions in response to the criteria**

Evaluation criteria	Overarching evaluation questions	Specific evaluation questions
Relevance	Does the initiative address the problem?	What is the relevance of a more professionally conducted EOM in advancing more credible elections on the continent? Has EISA's presence as a regional advisory body been relevant for strengthening the effectiveness of election management and election assessment at a national level?
	Is the initiative in line with beneficiary needs?	How have programme initiatives and results been relevant to increasing participation among women and the poor?
Complementarity	To what extent has this programme complemented and contributed the work of other stakeholders?	Has this programme complemented and contributed to existing programmes implemented by other stakeholders working on these issues at the regional level?
Coverage	How is the initiative structured to address the problem identified?	Do the components of ADS II inform and strengthen each other to address the problem?
Coordination	How successfully have programme interventions worked with other partners?	Has coordination with other international actors working to support EOMs under ADS II contributed to outcomes that EISA could not have achieved independently?
Effectiveness	Has the initiative achieved its objectives?	Have activities been delivered in accordance with what was originally intended?
		Have interventions contributed to improved compliance of electoral observation missions with international standards?
		Have electoral assessment interventions at the regional and national level contributed to enhancing the legitimacy and credibility of elections?
	What factors have hindered/inhibited achievement of objectives?	Were any issues identified in the implementation of the components? If so, how successfully were these addressed by the project implementers?
Is the M&E system effective?	How robust is available evidence and what are the strengths and weaknesses of EISA's monitoring and evaluation systems?	
	Has the logframe been a sufficient tool for measuring progress and results?	
Do the assumptions in the		If regional bodies have technical capacity to systematically assess elections, will this enhance their ability and

Evaluation criteria	Overarching evaluation questions	Specific evaluation questions
	program logic hold true? <sup>4</sup>	effectiveness to enforce AU / sub-regional benchmarks on the continent? Are well-resourced regional bodies with sufficient access to technical expertise more likely to engage in long-term election observation, strengthening the quality of their EOMs? If consistent and comparable data on election processes is available, will the effectiveness of election observers, including EISA will be enhanced?
Efficiency	Is the initiative cost effective?	Could the results generated by the programme have been achieved in a more cost-effective manner?
Impact	Has the initiative achieved its planned outcomes?	What interventions increased the space and capacity for national level engagement in electoral reform by civil society organisations and political parties? Are there stronger and more effective democratic institutions in Burundi, Chad, Kenya and Mozambique and at the pan-Africa level.
	Has the program resulted in any unintended consequences (positive or negative)?	Has the program resulted in any unintended consequences (positive or negative)?
Sustainability	Are the benefits that have been achieved by the programme to date likely to be sustained?	Are the benefits that have been achieved by the programme to date likely to be sustained? Have the capacity development interventions taken adequate steps to ensure sustainability of skills developed?

The theory-based evaluation was designed to test key hypotheses and assumptions underpinning EISAs approach to regional strengthening activities. These hypotheses and assumptions are detailed in Table 3 below.

**Table 3: Assumptions and hypotheses to test**

Hypothesis	Assumptions
If regional bodies have technical capacity to advise on and observe election processes, this will enhance their ability to and effectiveness in politically engaging with the election process.	Regional institutions are willing and able to adopt EISA approaches to improve electoral processes in their countries Countries invite regional bodies to provide support in the technical management of the election process. Increased technical capacity and understanding within EOMs makes them (and their final reports) less susceptible to undue political influence. Regional bodies (including EISA) use activities around technical strengthening in order to engage in conversations about political issues Long-term election observation leads to more thorough, higher quality EOMs than

<sup>4</sup> NB: These questions are directly related to the key hypotheses to be tested which are detailed in Table 3 below.

Hypothesis	Assumptions
	would be possible through a short-term mission.
If consistent and comparable data on election processes is available, then the effectiveness of election observers, including EISA will be enhanced	<p>Organisations receiving capacity-building technical assistance from EISA are willing and able to adopt and implement new ways of working/ new technologies.</p> <p>Regional, international and national electoral observer missions are willing to adopt consistent tools and approaches for their EOMs.</p> <p>Data is used by regional bodies, media, domestic and international observers and civil society to make comparisons between elections over time and between countries and this comparison informs findings and recommendations.</p>
EISA's status as a regional body with continental reach makes a positive contribution to the scale of results activities achieve.	<p>Counterparts in regional bodies trust EISA counterparts because they are from African countries.</p> <p>Being able to deploy experts at short notice and across the whole continent makes EISA more responsive to the needs of regional bodies and enables them to respond to emerging crises and situations.</p> <p>Staff drawn from across the continent have access to civil society organisations and government personnel in their country of origin / countries they have worked in, who they can access quickly when working on election observation or electoral strengthening.</p>
Do sub- regional bodies (SADC, EAC) play an important role in election observation and do they perform functions that AU or international observers cannot? <sup>5</sup>	<p>Sub-regional bodies have strong relationships with national electoral authorities in their area</p> <p>The views of sub-regional bodies are respected and taken account by regional bodies and other international actors</p>

### 3.3 Analytical framework

An evaluation matrix was developed to structure our research for both the process and theory-based components of the evaluation and to serve as framework for analysis. The evaluation matrix was designed to ensure that the evaluation was objective, systematic and transparent and that the findings provide a reliable basis for recommendations. The evaluation matrix is structured according to the OECD DAC Criteria for Evaluation and the evaluation questions provided in TOR. For each question, the matrix sets out judgement criteria, indicative indicators, data sources and research methods. Annex 2 provides further detail of how the matrix was developed and used, and the detailed evaluation matrix is included in Annex 3.

A key part of the theory-based evaluation was to consider the effect of regional approaches to election on the management of election processes and the credibility and acceptance of election results. The theory of change sets out hypotheses for how ‘regional’ activities contribute to national elections. These hypotheses were tested through the evaluation to determine the actual and likely contribution of regional activities conducted through ADS II to election management and results. The process of developing a theory of change, testing this theory to assess contribution, and using the results of contribution analysis to refine and strengthen the theory are all interlinked – as depicted in Figure 1 below.

<sup>5</sup> NB: This an exploratory research question as opposed to a hypothesis to be tested.

**Figure 1: Approaches to theory of change and contribution analysis are interlinked.**



### 3.4 Methodology

The Evaluation was conducted in two phases - the inception phase and the implementation phase – the steps involved in each stage are set out in Table 4.

**Table 4: Overview of key evaluation activities**

Phase	Steps
Inception Phase:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Assess the evaluability of ADS II</li> <li>2. Develop a theory of change with EISA and other regional actors</li> <li>3. Develop evaluation and research questions</li> <li>4. Develop an evaluation framework including indicators and data sources</li> </ol>
Implementation Phase:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. Undertake a systematic review of available documentation</li> <li>6. Finalise the survey design and sample frame</li> <li>7. Collect primary data through key informant interviews and phone interviews</li> <li>8. Collect primary data through online survey</li> <li>9. Analyse data and prepare final report</li> <li>10. Disseminate research findings to stakeholders</li> </ol>

The evaluation team used the software package Atlas TI to code and analyse qualitative data.

Annex 2 provides a detailed methodology for the evaluation, Annex 3 sets out the data sources and research methods that will be used to answer each evaluation questions and Annex 4 contains the research tools used.

### 3.5 Limitations and research problems encountered

The evaluation was largely conducted in accordance with the evaluation plan; however there were some limitations inherent in evaluation design and some research problems encountered which need to be taken into account when reviewing the findings.

#### 3.5.1 Limitations of the approach and methodology

- **Process focus:** The evaluation was commissioned and designed as a process evaluation – focusing largely on what was done and the strengths and weaknesses of ADS II implementation. While the effects of ADS II were considered (particularly in relation to regional approaches), this was not an impact evaluation.

As such, the sampling strategy was designed to be inclusive rather than representative, and a robust counterfactual was not developed.

- **Scale of research:** Both qualitative and quantitative research methods were used in the evaluation – over 200 documents were reviewed; 30 stakeholders interviewed and 25 surveys conducted. Field research took place over 4 weeks and provided a large amount of rich data. Nonetheless, the scale of the research was limited by the budget and time allocated for the evaluation. In most areas, adequate information was gathered from a range of stakeholders to enable the evaluation team to triangulate evidence and make reliable assessments. In some cases, however, it was not possible to triangulate the evidence of certain stakeholders and the report is explicit in recognising that the evidence base is weaker where this is the case.
- **Stakeholder involvement:** The limited scope and budget for the evaluation meant that research focused largely on stakeholders with direct involvement with ADS II. Indirect beneficiaries (such as citizen groups or civil society representatives who did not receive direct support) were not consulted in the evaluation, nor were stakeholders who were not directly involved in EISA activities, such as other election strengthening organisations or regional bodies who had not worked with EISA.
- **Respondent bias:** A number of the stakeholders consulted during the evaluation were susceptible to different types of respondent bias. This risk was identified at project inception and measures were taken to mitigate and manage bias. Further detail of this is provided in Annex 7.
- **Biased theory of change:** The theory of change strand of this evaluation is reliant on a theory of change that has been developed with EISA retrospectively, after project design and implementation has already (largely) been completed. Stakeholders from electoral commissions, government and NGOs participated in the theory of change workshop in order to ensure that multiple perspectives were included, but it should be noted that the theory of change was largely shaped by EISA's interpretation of the problem to be addressed, required activities to address it and the anticipated objectives.

### 3.5.2 Research problems encountered

- **Availability of interviewees:** given the seniority of some of the individuals interviewed, particularly in the AU and political parties, interviewees with some stakeholders were delayed until late in the evaluation. One interview due to take place in person was subsequently held telephonically after the evaluation team had returned to the UK.
- **Access to data:** the resources available to the evaluation also limited the data the evaluation team accessed. For example, there was not enough time to review EISA's accounts and invoices when analysing the Economy indicator.
- **Political sensitivity:** some key issues explored by the evaluation, such as whether ADS II-supported EOMs improved legitimacy and credibility, are politically sensitive issues. Collecting data on these subjects through interviews was at times difficult because the interviewees were directly involved in elections or reform processes.

### 3.5.3 Ethical concerns and data protection

- Possible ethical concerns were carefully considered prior to the commencement of research and every attempt was made to ensure the sensitivity and confidentiality of key informant interviews, interview data, and to ensure that all interviews were conducted in a sensitive and appropriate manner. Any translators used for interviews were also asked to sign non-disclosure agreements to ensure the confidentiality of interviews, interview transcripts were scrubbed of identifying names or details and key informants have been referenced in the final report in such a way as to not compromise this confidentiality.

## 4 Findings

### 4.1 Relevance

To determine the relevance of ADS II the evaluation considered the way in which it addressed the problems undermining election processes and the extent to which it met the needs of target beneficiary groups, including women, the poor and civil society groups.

#### 4.1.1 Does the initiative address the problem?

There are a number of complex issues which undermine the election process and these differ depending on the social, political and economic environment in countries. The theory of change process helped to articulate some of the key issues that EISA seeks to address across the continent. Two of the key issues that ADS II set out to address are the credibility of election processes and the effectiveness of election management and assessment.

#### What is the relevance of a more professionally conducted EOM in advancing more credible elections on the continent?

ADS II's support to EOMs is based on the rationale that if EOM's are conducted in a professional manner, then the findings of the EOM will be more credible and influential in shaping the behaviour and attitudes of key election stakeholders.<sup>6</sup>

While it is beyond the scope of this evaluation to measure the contribution of professionally conducted EOMs to the overall credibility of election process, there is clear evidence from the evaluation that ADS II activities have:

- Led to EOMs being conducted in more professional manner:** In part as a result of ADS II's support and services, AU DEAU missions have become more effectively organised over the past 4-5 years. There have been improvements in the quality of training for observers, the quality of the briefing packs, the logistical systems and processes, and the capacity of the observers who are asked to draft the mission statements<sup>7</sup>. In comparing mission statements from missions that ADS II did and did not support, ADS II's influence can be clearly seen (for example Gambia 2011<sup>8</sup> compared to Gambia 2012<sup>9</sup> or Guinea Bissau 2009<sup>10</sup> compared to 2012<sup>11</sup>). While it is recognised that there are many variables that contribute to the quality of statements, many of the changes were directly in line with the recommendations provided through ADS II. Processes within the EOM have also improved; for example, based on advice provided through ADS II, election observers have access to a more thorough briefing pack and they are briefed by political party officials, civil society groups and EMB staff as a standard operating procedure<sup>12</sup>.
- Improved credibility of EOMs and quality of EOM outputs:** The overall outcome of these changes is EOMs that are more professional and seen as more credible because they produce quality statements and reports that contain relevant, useful and insightful analysis. More detailed statements and other mission outputs increase the credibility of EOMs and provide regional bodies and other actors with more information that they can use to endorse or constructively criticise an election. For example, interviewees stated that mission statements are more comprehensive, more credible, and more transparent in terms of their methodology and reflect a more in-depth analysis and understanding of the election<sup>13</sup>.

<sup>6</sup> ToC developed in Inception Phase

<sup>7</sup> EISA 5

<sup>8</sup> Preliminary Statement of the African Union Observer Mission to the Presidential Election in the Gambia, 24 November 2011

<sup>9</sup> Preliminary Statement of the African Union Observer Mission to the 29 March, 2012 National Assembly Elections in the Republic of the Gambia

<sup>10</sup> Declaration Preliminaire de la Mission d'Observation de l'Union Africaine (UA) au Second Tour de l'Election Presidentielle Anticipee du 26 Juillet 2009 en Republique de Guinee Bissau.

<sup>11</sup> Declaration Preliminaire de la Mission d'Observation de l'Union Africaine (UA) a l'Election Presidentielle Anticipee du 18 Mars 2012 en Guinee Bissau.

<sup>12</sup> Kenya 7; EISA 5; DEAU 1

<sup>13</sup> DFID 2; DEAU 1; review of reports over time.



- **Led to changes in the knowledge and behaviour of individuals who have participated in EISA-supported EOMs.** The quality of training provided, the briefing packs and engagement with a diverse set of local stakeholders have also increased the professionalism and credibility of the observers themselves, as well as the quality of their work on mission statements and reports<sup>14</sup>.

The improved professionalism and credibility of the EOMs and observers have had positive effects both on the national election being observed and on elections in the home country of the observers who participate. For example, an EMB staff member in Kenya described how his experience participating in an EISA-led EOM significantly increased his understanding of election observation and the quality and professionalism of the mission, including the quality of the briefing pack, the use of new technology, and the engagement with local political parties and civil society made an impression on him<sup>15</sup>. As a result, he shifted his approach to election observers during the 2013 election in Kenya and made sure that the EMB was able to provide the tools and information needed for the election observers who came to observe the election in his country. He also reported a better understanding of the observers' reports and that he was better able to engage with them and answer their questions<sup>16</sup>. In addition, he reported that his experience as an observer on an EISA-led EOM also encouraged him to invite long-term observers from the EU and AU to the Kenyan election in 2013 an institutional shift in process for the EMB, which allowed the EMB to engage with the pre-election and interim reports issued by these missions and adopt new processes in response, as needed<sup>17</sup>.

There is some evidence that having a professional and credible EOM can have an important influence on how significant election issues are dealt with at the country level – this is illustrated by the case study on Mali below:

#### **Case Study: The effects of a LTO mission in the Mali elections 2013**

In Mali in 2013 the long-term observers (briefed by EISA prior to deployment) were able to gain a deep understanding of the complex electoral issues present in that country, including a critical voter registration issue. From their training and engagement with the key national stakeholders they were able to adequately brief the head of mission and short-term observers (who received training and support from EISA) when they arrived providing them with the ability to engage at a high political level on this issue and mediate engagements between the EMB and political parties to negotiate and build consensus on solutions to key challenges, including voter registration (also with support from EISA). This played a critical role in helping to ensure that the election proceeded peacefully and was seen as reasonably credible and representative in a country that was grappling with instability and suffering from a government 'legitimacy crisis' in the wake of the 2012 coup<sup>18</sup>.

#### **Has EISA's presence as a regional advisory body been relevant for strengthening the effectiveness of election management and election assessment at a national level?**

EISA is a regional organisation that works at the national level. This means ADS II can draw on knowledge and resources from a variety of contexts when delivering activities at country level in Kenya, Chad and Mozambique. Exploring the relevance of this to ADS II can help us to understand why the programme has or has not delivered as expected. The evaluation therefore explored whether EISA's regional reach (defined as logistics, personnel and African identity) makes it more or less relevant for strengthening election management and assessment at a national level.

Evidence suggests that EISA's regional reach, independent status and African identity enhance the effectiveness in the following areas:

<sup>14</sup> DEAU 1; EISA 5; DFID 2

<sup>15</sup> Kenya 7

<sup>16</sup> Kenya 7

<sup>17</sup> Kenya 7

<sup>18</sup> Briefing Mali: Politics of a Crisis, Susanna Wing, African Affairs Journal; University of Oxford.  
<http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/05/28/afraf.adt037.full>

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- **Logistics:** enables ADS II to mobilise the right people to the right place at the right time, particularly in support of AU EOMs;
- **Learning and effectiveness:** enables ADS II to acquire, retain and share knowledge and expertise between a range of countries to improve the quality of election management and assessment activities. Without this flexibility, it is unlikely that ADS II would have achieved the results that it has.
- **Stakeholder relationships:** contributes to ADS II partners' trust of EISA because of their independence and African identity.

### Logistics

From a practical perspective, EISA's continental logistical set-up enables ADS II to respond to DEAU requests for EOM support at short notice almost anywhere on the continent<sup>19</sup>. In the period that ADS II has been operational, EISA has responded to requests for EOM assistance in North Africa, West Africa, Eastern Africa, Central Africa and Southern Africa. This has built EISA's credibility as a key service provider to the DEAU and enables EISA to continue to develop a repository of experience-based learning that can be shared between contexts. It also delivers some benefits to DFID in terms of economies of scale and cost saving, discussed further in section 5.6 below.

### Learning and effectiveness

ADS II funding also enables EISA to act as a conduit for knowledge gained across countries to be transferred down to national level. For example, EISA's annual symposiums bring together stakeholders to share knowledge gained from across the region on a particular subject (recent examples include social media technology, benchmarks for political parties and managing violent election conflict<sup>20</sup>). This role also continues into EISA's day-to-day work on ADS II activities, ensuring best practice is shared across countries. For example, EISA selected several members of Kenya's EMB to act as election observers in the Ghana Elections. While in Ghana, Kenyan observers were able to witness the failure of several biometric voter identification machines. This encouraged the Kenyan EMB to put back-up paper-based voter identification processes in place which proved invaluable and were relied upon in several key areas during the 2013 election<sup>21</sup>.

### Stakeholder relationships

EISA's status as a regional, non-national body adds value to ADS II because national level stakeholders regard EISA as a non-partisan "honest broker". In Mozambique, Kenya and Chad this was cited by bureaucrats, politicians and CSOs as a factor that helped EISA to deliver ADS II activities effectively<sup>22</sup>. Interviews with Nakuru Conflict Management Panel (CMP) emphasised the value of EISA's independent status in contributing mediation in the 2013 Kenya elections<sup>23</sup>.

Additionally, EISA's staff are drawn from countries all over the continent and individuals often have access to key stakeholders at all levels of the system (civil society, central government, politicians) in their country of origin. For example in Mozambique, an interviewee credited the profile, approach and networks of EISA's Head of Office as being important to ADS II's ability to access senior leadership in all three major parties, the CNE (Mozambique's national EMB) and civil society<sup>24</sup>. Another interviewee credited the same individual's non-partisan reputation as an explanatory factor for the trust enjoyed by EISA, which is crucial to working with political parties<sup>25</sup>. This illustrates how EISA combines the benefits of being a regional organisation – logistical capability and a non-partisan reputation – with the benefits of having in-depth local expertise – access to key counterparts and sensitivity to local political economy – to deliver ADS II activities effectively.

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<sup>19</sup> EISA 1

<sup>20</sup> EISA's 4<sup>th</sup> Annual Symposium Agenda; EISA's 5<sup>th</sup> Annual Symposium Agenda; EISA's 7<sup>th</sup> Annual Symposium Agenda

<sup>21</sup> EISA 1; Kenya 7; EISA 5; EISA 3;

<sup>22</sup> EISA 1; DFID 1; Kenya 6

<sup>23</sup> Kenya 6.

<sup>24</sup> Mozambique 4

<sup>25</sup> DFID 1

#### 4.1.2 Is the initiative in line with beneficiary needs?

##### How have programme initiatives and results been relevant to increasing participation among women and the poor?

Two key ADS II beneficiary groups outlined by EISA were women and the poor because these groups are disproportionately affected by the negative consequences of poor election management.<sup>26</sup> EISA did not seek to engage directly these groups, but the evaluation considered how they were targeted in their activities and the likely effects that ADS II activities would have on them.

There is evidence to suggest that ADS II activities have increased participation among women and the poor: ADS II has actively supported civil society in Kenya<sup>27</sup>, Mozambique<sup>28</sup> and Chad<sup>29</sup> as a part of national level activities under Outputs 2, 3 and 4; it has supported election observers engagement with civil society as part of AU and EISA-led EOMs, including producing gender sensitive training materials, handbooks and checklists (that otherwise would not have been created)<sup>30</sup> under Output 1; and has invited civil society leaders to EISA workshops and symposiums to discuss gender issues under Output 5. In this way, the evidence strongly demonstrates that engagement with civil society and on gender issues have cut across EISA's work under ADS II.

##### Increasing participation among women

At the outset of ADS II, EISA aimed to incorporate gender issues throughout activities and outputs. Gender sensitive activities included pushing for the composition of EOMs to be based on the principle of gender parity; planning to ensure gender issues are included within election observation checklists; ensuring that any electoral reform processes that EISA engages with under ADS II would be encouraged to have a clear agenda on gender parity; ensuring parliamentary strengthening activities would include a component building the capacity of female MPs; and ensuring that the benchmarks for political parties being developed include principles around gender equality within political parties<sup>31</sup>.

There is evidence to suggest that ADS II has accomplished this goal. Specifically (but not exhaustively):

- EISA has produced manuals and checklists for EOMs that include criteria such as the number of women voters present, how many part agents and IEC officials present are female, whether polling stations are accessible for disabled persons, and whether the polling centre is safe and free of security forces or other intimidating groups;<sup>32</sup>
- ADS II has trained women in Chad on election processes and how to run for political office<sup>33</sup>; several of the women who received this training went on to run for office and be elected as MPs<sup>34</sup>, a rare achievement in Chad and a transformative process, as initially political parties in Chad were fairly hostile to the idea of including women on their candidate lists and supporting them to run for office;<sup>35</sup>
- In Kenya, ADS II enabled EISA to organise a parliamentary caucus which looked at how best to implement the gender quotas in the new constitution<sup>36</sup>. EISA also helped facilitate meetings between the electoral commission in Kenya and civil society and women's groups during the electoral reform process, to help ensure those groups were involved in the reform process;<sup>37</sup> and
- In several instances, civil society observers who participate in EISA-led EOMs have been able to apply learning from these missions in their own countries, even if those countries aren't supported under ADS II. For example, EISA shared comparative experience relating to gender inclusion in electoral candidatures from AU EOMs in Senegal and Burkina Faso at the national conference for CSOs in Malawi. Women's'

<sup>26</sup> "On the Links Between Violent Conflict and Chronic Poverty: How much do we really know?" Patricia Chad 20, Chronic Poverty Research Centre Working Paper, 2006.

<sup>27</sup> Kenya 3 ;

<sup>28</sup> EISA 1; Mozambique 4; DFID 1.

<sup>29</sup> Chad 1; Chad 2

<sup>30</sup> Election Day Report Form; Summary form for Elections Day Observation; Symposium Evaluation Form; Aggregation results form;

<sup>31</sup> EISA ADS II – Project Memorandum (P139); Election Day Report Form; Summary form for Elections Day Observation; Symposium Evaluation Form; Aggregation results form;

<sup>32</sup> Election Day Report Form;

<sup>33</sup> Rapport rencontre caucus femmes parlementaires

<sup>34</sup> EISA 1; EISA 6 EISA 6;

<sup>35</sup> EISA 1.

<sup>36</sup> Kenya 1;

<sup>37</sup> Kenya 3

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groups at the conference learnt from this comparative insight and were then better placed to start pushing for gender inclusion in the Malawian electoral process<sup>38</sup>. Similarly, from participating in the EISA EOM to Uganda, women observers from Zimbabwean CSOs took away aspects concerning gender inclusion such as special women seats in the Ugandan parliament<sup>39</sup>.

The increased participation observed cannot be attributed entirely to EISA activities, but the exposure that female civil society groups gained through their participation in EISA-led EOMs and learning events like the annual symposium played a role in their ability to push for reforms at home as they are now engaging their leaders from an informed position<sup>40</sup>.

### Increasing participation among the poor

ADS II indirectly created opportunities for greater citizen participation, including of the poor, through engagement and capacity building with civil society to help create space for citizens' to interact with political parties and government to influence new laws and policies and address issues such as electoral reform.

The purpose of facilitating and enhancing this engagement is to increase participation and the representativeness of elections and law-making in ADS II countries. Achievements in these areas have been clearly evidenced in Mozambique and Kenya, where ADS II built the capacity of key groups like the Electoral Observatory and facilitated engagements between civil society groups, parliamentarians and political parties<sup>41</sup>. These activities are described in more detail in section 5.5.1 under 'Output 2'. Civil society groups were composed of community leaders, including women and youth leaders<sup>42</sup>.

### Case Study: The role of the CMP in mediating conflict in Kisumu district, Kenya

Two local militias (China Squad and American Marines) that played a role in the 2007 post-election violence had reformed and were on the brink of violence, there had been some deaths already, around the elections in 2013. The EISA formed and supported CMP got their leaders in a room together and brought in Archbishop David Gitari to mediate and helped the two militias engage in dialogue, diffusing the conflict so that on election day the region was peaceful by and large.

### *Instability and violence*

In a more indirect sense, ADS II activities contributed to building social stability by reducing the risk of elections triggering violent political conflict that disproportionately affects the poor and marginalised<sup>43</sup>. One of the key activities that EISA undertook to reduce instability was the development of conflict management panels in Kenya. These panels were highly successful in mediation contentious issues between communities in Kenya, bridging ethnic and religious divides to build consensus and open dialogue<sup>44</sup>. The ADS II founded and supported panels and peace committees have been partly credited with easing tensions and diffusing potentially serious conflicts in several regions including Rift Valley Province<sup>45</sup>, Mombassa (with the Mombassa Republican Council, a separatist group that has caused significant tensions and alleged violence in Tana River and Kilifi districts)<sup>46</sup> and Nyansa Province<sup>47</sup>, preventing a repeat of the election violence Kenya experienced in 2007<sup>48</sup>. It has also been recognized that non-governmental organisations are uniquely placed to support conflict management panels, as they wouldn't necessarily be seen as legitimate if they were organised by government<sup>49</sup>. ADS II activities are also believed to have contributed to improved stability in Chad<sup>50</sup> and to bringing together opposing electoral stakeholders in

<sup>38</sup> EISA 6 EISA 6; Clarification email from EISA

<sup>39</sup> EISA 6 EISA 6; Clarification email from EISA

<sup>40</sup> EISA 6 EISA 6

<sup>41</sup> EISA 1; Kenya 3;

<sup>42</sup> Kenya 6; EISA 1;

<sup>43</sup> Aid Memoir of AGR III – Chapters Review Workshop ; EISA 6 EISA 6 (P136);

<sup>44</sup> Kenya 6; EISA 1;

<sup>45</sup> Kenya 6

<sup>46</sup> Kenya 7

<sup>47</sup> EISA 8

<sup>48</sup> Kenya 6;

<sup>49</sup> Kenya 3.

<sup>50</sup> DFID ADS II Annual Review 2012;

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Mozambique<sup>51</sup>, which is increasingly important in light of the renewed violence there around the forthcoming election. In addition to undertaking these activities, EISA has also worked to spread these best practices and learning, including focusing its' annual symposium in 2009 on preventing and managing violent election-related conflicts in Africa<sup>52</sup>. It is difficult to quantify the economic and social benefits of this work, but given the cost of the election violence in Kenya in 2007 (close to USD\$ 1 billion with more than 1,200 people killed and perhaps 600,000 displaced) it is likely significant<sup>53</sup>.

A second way in which EISA's activities under ADS II are indirectly linked to the reduction of violence and instability is through their technical work supporting AU EOMs, which frees up AU DEAU staff and the mission heads to engage in more political aspects of the mission, including facilitation between the EMB and political parties in Mali which helped prevent election violence in a highly fragile context<sup>54</sup> and previously in Senegal in 2012<sup>55</sup>. The cases in Mali and Senegal provide direct case studies for the analysis provided in a study by EISA to the FCO in 2012<sup>56</sup>.

### Conclusions relating to relevance:

- The relevance of more professionally conducted EOMs to increasing the credibility and quality of national elections in Africa has been evidenced in interviews, both in terms of the behaviour of observers when they return to their home countries and in terms of the quality of the mission on the election being observed.
- EISAs' status as an African-based regional body and ability to work at national, continental and international scales has enhanced their effectiveness through logistical capability, learning and implementing best-practice from a range of different countries and strong relationships with key stakeholders.
- EISA has succeeded at embedding gender-sensitivity and civil society engagement throughout its activities and throughout the ADS II outputs; the relationship between ADS II and reducing conflict and instability which disproportionately affect the poor is also clear.

### Recommendations relating to relevance:

#### Recommendation 5.1:

- DFID should continue to use regional funding for any future iterations of ADS II to ensure partners can leverage the benefits of their regional presence and ability to work across scales (i.e. logistical capability, opportunities for comparative learning) to support regional election observation (both directly and with the AU) and national election management reform in target countries.

## 4.2 Complementarity

In the context of this evaluation, complementarity was understood as the extent to which ADS II complimented and contributed to the work of other stakeholders and other existing programmes working at the national and regional levels.

### 4.2.1 To what extent has this programme complemented and contributed the work of other stakeholders?

#### Has this programme complemented and contributed to existing programmes implemented by other stakeholders working on these issues at the regional level?

It is an important principle of development effectiveness that donor funding be used to complement and not duplicate existing activities and work being undertaken by other stakeholders in order to maximise efficiency and achieve results that are 'greater than the sum of parts'. The evaluation looked for evidence that ADS II had sought

<sup>51</sup> DFID ADS II Annual Review 2012;

<sup>52</sup> Symposium Evaluation Form;

<sup>53</sup> DFID ADS II Annual Review 2012; IRIN news (<http://www.irinnews.org/report/97251/kenya-s-idps-fault-government-for-delayed-resettlement>)

<sup>54</sup> DEAU 1; Email from EISA 6 EISA 6; EISA 1;

<sup>55</sup> DEAU 2;

<sup>56</sup> Regional organisations' role in African elections -study



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to coordinate and collaborate with the work of other stakeholders and the effect of this collaboration on the results achieved.

Based on the evidence collected, ADS II is complementing and contributing to the work of other stakeholders. EISA coordinates with other actors working in the same space, notably IDEAS, NDI, EU and NIMD and tries to tailor support to the requirements of ADS II clients. Where there are areas of potential overlap, for example in training support provided to the DEAU, ADS II is credited as playing a differentiated role because of the coverage and exceptional quality of the services provided<sup>57</sup>. For instance, one interviewee explained how EISA coordinates some support to the DEAU with another key service provider, for example to develop modules for the DEAU to use when training observers on a regional basis, but is also the only service provider offering other support such as crucial logistical support to AU EOMs<sup>58</sup>.

A particular strength of ADS II is EISA's demand-led approach to designing and adapting the programme, which has helped to ensure complementarity with other programmes. Instead of approaching the AU with a pre-determined programme of support, EISA worked with DEAU to understand their requirements and identified needs that EISA was able to meet.<sup>59</sup> The initial agreement was formalised in an MoU and EISA's 'partnership approach' to working with DEAU has helped to ensure that services provided meet the actual needs of the unit.

EISA also tries to ensure strategic complementarity with the work of other major actors working in the political governance space. As a member of networks including the ACE network, EISA demonstrates a systematic approach to coordinating plans and programmes with organisations including NDI and NIDM<sup>60</sup>. There is also evidence of bilateral coordination with donors on specific issues to attempt to avoid duplication and maximise opportunities for building on existing and planned work<sup>61</sup>.

### Conclusions relating to complementarity:

- EISA proactively seeks to ensure that ADS II activities complement the work of other actors through membership of networks and on-the-ground coordination with counterparts in other organisations.
- Using a service provider-based approach to working with DEAU has helped EISA to ensure complementarity of work under Output 1 because activities are agreed in partnership with counterparts and based on their expressed requirements and capacity gaps. However, the previous MoU between EISA and the AU has lapsed and an updated MoU needs to be signed.

### Recommendations relating to complementarity:

#### Recommendation 5.2:

- EISA should update the existing memorandum of understanding (MoU) between itself and the DEAU to reflect the changing needs of the AU and establish systematic procedures for sharing information on planned and proposed work with organisations working in the same space including but not limited to the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) and the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).

## 4.3 Coverage

To assess the coverage of ADS II the evaluation considered the way in which the programme was structured, whether the activities informed and strengthened each other, and whether they addressed multiple dimensions of the problems articulated in the original proposal and the theory of change workshop.

### 4.3.1 How is the initiative structured to address the problem identified?

**Do the components of ADS II inform and strengthen each other to address the problem?**

<sup>57</sup> DEAU 2

<sup>58</sup> DEAU 1

<sup>59</sup> EISA 1, DEAU 2

<sup>60</sup> ACE Network newsletters

<sup>61</sup> Emails to NDI, IDEAS, other organisations, email recording collaboration with Counterpart International in Chad



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The extent to which the components of ADS II inform and strengthen each other was assessed according to two criteria: the extent to which activities were designed to strengthen each other and the extent to which ADS II activities address multiple dimensions of the problem. The evidence suggests that the components of ADS II successfully inform and strengthen each other in several ways, working together to achieve a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts and address multiple dimensions of the problems which commonly undermine election processes.

### Comparative learning

Often, EISA is able to leverage its work at the national level to engage more effectively at the regional level and vice versa. This is a critical aspect of EISA's success under ADS II, as it enables EISA to act as a conduit for learning between contexts<sup>62</sup>, bridging the international, regional and national scales and using EISA's experiences from ADS II at each level to inform the others.<sup>63</sup> This is a role which few other (or perhaps no other) organisations working on elections in Africa currently fill. For instance, EISA's presence in Kenya under ADS II has enabled it to more effectively engage not only with national political parties, civil society groups and the EMB in Kenya, but also with the East African Community (EAC) around election observation missions, conflict management, political party benchmarks and electoral laws than would have otherwise been possible<sup>64</sup>. In another case, EISA used its understanding of new technology (gathered through its work supporting and leading regional EOMs) to inform national election processes in Mozambique, training civil society groups and reporters to use smartphones to monitor elections in key hotspots around the country<sup>65</sup>.

### Links between national and regional levels

Under ADS II (Output1), EISA have targeted EMB staff and civil society groups from ADS II countries and others in their recruitment for election observer missions.<sup>66</sup> This has been done to ensure that the knowledge and understanding gained by these individuals will be applied in other contexts and the benefits of EISA training and support will be distributed across a wider range of countries<sup>67</sup>. EISA's continent-wide network, resources and connects are explicitly valued by their national partners<sup>68</sup> and are a real asset to their work in terms of increasing their effectiveness, but also their credibility and value as a partner.

Conversely, EISA's work under ADS II at the international and regional levels would be weaker without the connection to national and local electoral reforms and processes. Several sources cited the impact of having 'ears on the ground' in terms of increasing the relevance of EISA's recommendations and advice, and the quality of their knowledge and expertise<sup>69</sup>. As a service provider, the high quality of EISA's work under ADS II was cited multiple times as one of the main things that makes their work valuable, particularly for the AU DEAU<sup>70</sup>, making this structural aspect of their approach critical. In the evidence, many examples were given of work at the national scale informing regional processes, in or from ADS II countries, including the work of the Conflict Management Panels, work on gender-sensitivity, work strengthening the EMB, and experiences with LTOs<sup>71</sup>. One key example are the political party benchmarks, which were developed in close consultation with political parties in a few key countries, including Kenya, and then successfully introduced at a regional level<sup>72</sup> (as discussed in section 5.5.1). The quality and integrity of this process, beginning at the national level and then working up was cited as integral to the success of the political party benchmarks, which were circulated in Egypt during the elections, in Somalia and at the African Union<sup>73</sup>. In this sense, having this link to national processes is a critical link to ensuring the relevance, freshness and usefulness of the training and advice EISA provides at the international and regional levels, enabling it to act simultaneously as a national and a regional organisation, leveraging the strengths of working at both scales.

### Capitalising on emerging opportunities

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<sup>62</sup> EISA 6 EISA 6;

<sup>63</sup> EISA 1.

<sup>64</sup> EISA-EAC meeting report 02032013

<sup>65</sup> DFID 1;

<sup>66</sup> EISA 5

<sup>67</sup> EISA 6 EISA 6;

<sup>68</sup> Kenya 2; Kenya 1, Mozambique 4; EISA 3;

<sup>69</sup> EISA 1; DEAU 1.

<sup>70</sup> DEAU 2, DEAU 1, EISA 1.

<sup>71</sup> EISA 1, EISA 5, EISA 6 EISA 6, Kenya 7, Kenya 6,

<sup>72</sup> EISA 2, Kenya 4 .

<sup>73</sup> EISA 2

In other cases, EISA's engagement in multiple areas enabled it to identify critical areas for engagement that may not have otherwise been visible, leveraging their pre-existing work to address those gaps. For example, by working with parliament while in parallel engaging on electoral reform in Kenya, EISA was able to identify a key gap, realising that the electoral laws weren't sufficiently aligned with the new constitution and that a particular parliamentary committee would be best places to address that issue. EISA took the lead, using their relationship with parliament to work with the relevant committee to put in place the necessary election laws for the 2013 election<sup>74</sup>. In another Kenyan example, EISA has used the network it's developed through the rest of its national-level work to shepherd the Political Party Dispute Tribunal into existence, an important judicial organ mandated by the new constitution but which has had difficulty building capacity and gaining legitimacy; EISA invited it to key events, using its work on other ADS II activities in country to provide space and lend credibility the Tribunal as it gains in stature<sup>75</sup>.

#### **Value of perception of EISA as non-partisan**

Several sources also noted the value of ADS II being structured at a continental or regional level, as it provides national-level activities an additional sense of impartiality or non-partisanship, EISA and ADS II is seen as having a strong understanding of the local context while also being one step removed from national politics, able to facilitate networks and resources across the continent<sup>76</sup>. In this sense, then, the evidence suggests that the structure of ADS II also lends an additional sense of credibility and neutrality to EISA's activities under the programme. It seems clear that if ADS II was structured at the national level only, it would be less effective and EISA would have more difficulty distancing its activities from national politics.

### **Conclusions relating to coverage:**

- At the activity level, EISA use successes in one area of work to leverage new opportunities in others. This ensures the programme responds to the constantly changing contexts in which it operates.
- Strategically, ADS II has been effective in maximising the benefits EISA's regional presence provides to its work at national level and vice versa. Particularly compelling examples include using EMB and CSO staff to participate in EOM missions and benefiting from being generally received as a non-partisan organisation when engaging on sensitive issues such as conflict mediation at national level.

### **Recommendations relating to coverage:**

#### **Recommendation 5.3A**

- EISA should capitalise on opportunities for maximising the benefits of its regional presence, for example by using EMB and CSO staff members as election observers where lessons can be learned across contexts.

#### **Recommendation 5.3B**

- DFID should structure and future iterations of ADS II on a regional basis that enables partners to expose national level counterparts to relevant comparative experience in other countries across different programme Outputs.

## **4.4 Coordination**

In the context of the ADS II evaluation, coordination was interpreted as evidence that ADS II worked with other international actors working to support EOMs to contribute to outcomes that EISA could not have achieved independently.

### **4.4.1 How successfully have programme interventions worked with other partners?**

**Has coordination with other international actors working to support EOMs under ADS II contributed to outcomes that EISA could not have achieved independently?**

<sup>74</sup> EISA 1;

<sup>75</sup> Kenya 5

<sup>76</sup> DFID 1; Kenya 7; EISA 1; Mozambique 4;

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The evaluation assessed the nature and effect of ADS II coordination with other actors in delivering activities to identify if effective coordination has delivered results that ADS II could not have achieved independently, representing a value-add to DFID's investment.

There is evidence to suggest that ADS II was able to strike a good balance between collaboration and competition with other organisations working in similar areas in order to achieve outcomes that EISA could not have achieved independently. Specific examples of collaboration contributing to the delivery of results that EISA could not have achieved independently include:

- EISA and NDI worked together effectively to coordinate the delivery of training to political agents in Kenya. This enabled them to cover more ground but, as one interviewee commented, this was still not sufficient to meet demand and funding for scale-up could not be secured.<sup>77</sup> Without effective coordination, the scale of success achieved by EISA in this example would have been much lower.
- EISA also collaborated effectively with other actors including NDI, UNEAD and EP to develop a harmonised approach to working on key issues such as election violence mitigation in Kenya<sup>78</sup>.
- Work with political parties was proactively coordinated with NIDM and NDI through sharing of outputs such as EISA's political party benchmarks and exchanges of invitations to participate and talk at each other's conferences and symposiums to maximise knowledge dissemination<sup>79</sup>.

As the first of these two examples demonstrate, areas of coordination were often unexpected. By helping to meet demand that EISA could not fulfil alone, the success of collaboration may have helped to deliver stronger results against ADS II logframe Output and Outcome indicators, particularly on Outputs 2 and 3, representing a positive impact on DFID's return on investment. However, key stakeholders noted that their organisations would make greater use of EISA's services under ADS II if they were available<sup>80</sup>, demonstrating that there is unmet need which could be met through increased funding or pooled resources in future.

### Conclusions relating to coordination:

- ADS II collaborated with other actors to deliver activities in areas where demand was greater than ADSI could fulfil alone. However, there appears to be unmet demand for ADS II services by key stakeholders, due to funding and capacity constraints on the part of EISA, which could be met through additional funding or pooled resources in future.
- Collaboration was often in unexpected areas and demonstrated responsiveness to emerging challenges or opportunities.
- Because instances of coordination develop outside of funding cycles, it can be difficult for both EISA and other partners to secure funding to scale-up such work. In other instances coordination with partners is more strategic. For example, coordination with NIDM and NDI on activities delivered under Output 4 was systematically coordinated to enable partners' to leverage off each other's' conferences and symposiums.

### Recommendations relating to coordination

#### Recommendation 5.4:

- Where there is clear evidence that coordination is amplifying the delivery of results, explore ways of providing additional funding to help EISA and other partners meet demand. This could be through a pool of funding reserved to support coordination in instances where EISA (or others) work with partners to meet emerging challenges and rapid extra funding would contribute towards programme targets.

## 4.5 Effectiveness

In order to determine the effectiveness of ADS II, the evaluation considered *whether* it had achieved its objectives (both those set out in the original proposal and subsequent revisions of the logframe), and also *how* it

<sup>77</sup> Interview with Kenya Government Stakeholder

<sup>78</sup> Source: meeting agendas and invitations

<sup>79</sup> Emails between EISA and NIDM

<sup>80</sup> Interviews with Mozambique 3, Mozambique 5, Kenya 4, Kenya 5, Kenya 6, EISA 5, DFID 1.

achieved those objectives. Assessment of *how* ADS II achieved its objectives considered EISA's approach to delivering activities and how stakeholders responded to this approach; factors which inhibited the achievement of results and the management processes designed to support delivery ie M&E systems. The evaluation also considers *why* activities were or were not as effective as planned by testing key hypotheses and assumptions underpinning the approach taken by ADS II.

**A summary of ADS II progress against the output indicators set in the logframe is provided in Table 5 and details of achievements against each output are provided below.**

**Table 5: Summary of progress against outputs**

Output	Achieved?	Comment
<b>Output 1:</b> The AU, PAP and EISA election observers are trained and supported and EISA election observer missions are deployed and the reports publicised	Achieved	EISA "moderately or substantially exceeded" all Output 1 milestones.
<b>Output 2:</b> The capacity of key stakeholders to play a constructive role in electoral reform and processes is strengthened in three target countries	Achieved	There is evidence that ADS II has strongly achieved its goals under Output 2, and in some cases exceeded them.
<b>Output 3:</b> The capacity of legislatures in three targeted countries to be effective and responsive enhanced	Partially achieved	ADS II was unable to meet all Output 3 targets, in part because of external influences.
<b>Output 4:</b> The capacity of political parties in 3 targeted countries to be effective and internally democratic strengthened	Achieved	EISA has significantly exceeded its targets for this output.
<b>Output 5:</b> EISA is a professional, well-managed, innovative, influential and well-focused organisation	Achieved	Performance against logframe indicators for Output 5 has generally exceeded expectations

#### 4.5.1 Has the initiative achieved its objectives?

##### Have activities been delivered in accordance with what was originally intended?

The evaluation considered the extent to which ADS II was delivered in accordance with the original proposal and with the logframe that was revised throughout the course of implementation.

##### *Activities have been undertaken in accordance with the ADS II proposal*

While the main thrust of ADS II activities have been completed in accordance with the initial proposal, there have been key changes due to external circumstances and an internal evolution on some of the activities as EISA gained experience in certain areas, new opportunities emerged and the needs of partners changed.

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In terms of changing external circumstances, the greatest shifts have been made in response to a changing political climate in Burundi<sup>81</sup>, where political pressures made it untenable for EISA to continue work, the cessation of separate Pan-African Parliament EOMs<sup>82</sup>, which are now incorporated into AU EOMs, and a request from the AU DEAU for EISA to support all AU EOMs<sup>83</sup>, an increase from 5 per year. Some of the logframe indicators (which had been difficult to estimate before EISA started work in these areas) were significantly surpassed after the first year of ADS II<sup>84</sup>, particularly in terms of election observers being trained and the number of political parties endorsing the EISA benchmarks for political parties, so they were updated to reflect the actual numbers EISA was achieving. This overachievement was not clearly foreseeable, as EISA was not able to predict the number of elections observers that would be called by the African Union for missions, nor was it able to predict the extent to which the DEAU would call on its services for training under ADS II<sup>85</sup>. The ADS II logframe has been updated in response to these changes and they did not compromise the original aims or intent of the programme<sup>86</sup>.

At the outset, ADS II had 5 key outputs:

1. The African Union (AU), the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) and pan-African Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are more effective in monitoring elections;
2. National stakeholders (Election Management Bodies, political parties and CSOs) play a more significant and constructive role in election process in Kenya, Chad, Burundi and Mozambique;
3. Civil society and legislatures interact more effectively in Kenya, Chad and Burundi;
4. Fledgling political parties in Kenya, Chad, Burundi and Mozambique begin to develop into well governed and viable democratic parties; and
5. A stronger and more influential EISA.

These outputs have remained unchanged, although some of the activities and It was envisioned that a number of activities would takes place to achieve these goals, particularly around capacity building and support in election observation, election management, election-related conflict mediation; supporting CSOs to engage on electoral reform; supporting institutional strengthening of political parties; and strengthening EISA's internal systems<sup>87</sup>. In many areas the activities initially envisioned under ADS II have gone as planned, in some external circumstances have necessitated changes.

Before detailing the specific activities that have taken place and a detailed assessment of each against the logframe criteria, each of the key external changes which have impacted ADS II will be briefly discussed. These are the most significant external changes which impacted ADS II activities.

### Burundi

Consistent with their approach to working with political parties ADS II proposed to work with the governing party in Burundi as well as opposition parties. Initially this seemed tenable; EISA had had an office in Burundi since 2005 and had a good understanding of the context and gaps in service provision<sup>88</sup>, but an unexpected shift in the political climate in Burundi resulted in pressure being applied on EISA to only work with the party in power, which EISA declined to do<sup>89</sup> (it should be noted that this was a risk identified and rated as 'high' in EISA's initial ADS II logframe under output 4<sup>90</sup>). As a result, the government declining to renew EISA's registration to operate in the country and EISA ceased activities in 2010. Since EISA's activities in Burundi ceased, funding was reallocated to the other ADS II countries and outputs.

This resulted in a shift in the countries ADS II was active in for outputs 2, 3 and 4, but did not change the activities taking place under these outputs and did not compromise the integrity or quality of those activities.

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<sup>81</sup> EISA 1; EISA 6 EISA 6.

<sup>82</sup> PAP 1

<sup>83</sup> EISA 1;

<sup>84</sup> Logframe 2010;

<sup>85</sup> EISA 1; EISA 6.

<sup>86</sup> ADS II Inception Report;

<sup>87</sup> EISA ADS II Project Memorandum

<sup>88</sup> EISA 3;

<sup>89</sup> EISA 6 EISA 6

<sup>90</sup> EISA ADS II logframe (P103)

## Pan-African Parliament (PAP)

At the outset of ADS II, the Pan-African Parliament was leading separate EOMs, necessitating separate training and support from EISA under Output 1. However, mid-way through ADS II, the PAP election observation missions were merged with the AU missions, under an agreement where the budget for the missions would be centralised, a single harmonised statement for the mission would be produced by the AU DEAU and the PAP would provide at least 40% of the observers on each mission<sup>91</sup>, although generally AU EOMs are majority composed of observers from the PAP<sup>92</sup>.

This resulted in a shift of focus towards the African Union for Output 1, but it did not substantially affect the quality or type the activities completed as a part of ADS II for that output.

## AU DEAU

At the outset of ADS II, EISA planned to work with the AU DEAU to build their internal capacity to organize and manage EOMs, working to build the ability of the unit to train and support its own staff over the long term, write its own manuals and conduct its own missions independently<sup>93</sup>. However, as the DEAU's capacity increased and EISA's engagement with the unit continued, they realized that this goal wasn't necessarily desirable or realistic, as the number of elections per year in Africa (10-15) would require a significantly increased budget and many more permanent roles than the DEAU currently maintains or would necessarily be efficient or effective for it to have on staff<sup>94</sup>. In response, EISA shifted roles to focus on supporting the DEAU as consultant service providers, building the capacity of the DEAU to manage consultants and other partners effectively, which represents a more flexible, responsive and sustainable way for the DEAU to meet its evolving staffing needs on missions while keeping a moderate budget and group of internal staff<sup>95</sup>.

A change also occurred in terms of the number of AU EOMs EISA supports. Initially, EISA agreed to support 5 AU EOMs per year and the ADS II logframe was populated on this basis. However, mid-way through ADS II the DEAU made a request to EISA that they begin to support all AU EOMs, due to a lack of capacity of DEAU staff given the number of missions per year<sup>96</sup>. EISA made a request to increase ADS II funding by £200,000 to accommodate this increase in mission support and the logframe targets was adjusted accordingly<sup>97</sup>.

This change resulted in an enhancement of the activities being completed under ADS II output 1, increasing both the scope and quality of the output.

**Output 1: The AU, PAP and EISA election observers are trained and supported and EISA election observer missions are deployed and the reports publicised**

Output 1 has been largely delivered in accordance with the ADS II proposal. Furthermore, ADS II has delivered more than was originally intended because of the flexible way in which the programme was delivered, which enabled EISA to respond and react to the changing requirements of the AU and requirements for EOMs.

EISA "moderately or substantially exceeded" all Output 1 milestones at DFID Annual Review in 2012<sup>98</sup>. Progress against Output 1 was measured against the following indicators

Indicator	Target	Actual
Number of AU/PAP and EISA election observers trained by EISA and supported	AU=740	AU= 941
	EISA=520	EISA= 622
Number of AUC and PAP staff trained by EISA	10	19

<sup>91</sup> PAP 1

<sup>92</sup> PAP 1

<sup>93</sup> EISA 3

<sup>94</sup> EISA 3

<sup>95</sup> DEAU 2; EISA 3

<sup>96</sup> EISA 6 EISA 6

<sup>97</sup> EISA 6 EISA 6

<sup>98</sup> Source: DFID Annual Review of ADS II 2012



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Number of EISA CSO EOMs deployed	8	9
No./% EISA CSO EOMs receiving coverage in the media in the host country	8 or 100%	8 or 100%

EISA's work under Output 1 has contributed to significant improvements in the capability of the AU to undertake effective EOMs and the capacity and quality of EOMs undertaken by AU and EISA. There is also evidence to support the Theory of Change assumptions linking Output 1 to the ADS II Outcome of stronger and more effective democratic institutions in four African countries and at the pan-African level.

### **AU and EISA election observers and staff trained and supported**

#### *AU EO training*

EISA trained and supported 941 AU election observers and 622 EISA election observers by September 2012, exceeding the final logframe targets of 740 AU and 520 EISA observers trained and supported a year before the end of the programme<sup>99</sup>. EISA also trained 19 AUC staff by September 2012, exceeding the final logframe target of 10.

The evidence shows that EISA has exceeded expectations in the scale and quality of training provided to AU election observers. Interviews with DEAU revealed that EISA enables the AU to deploy EOMs that would not otherwise be possible and the evidence shows tangible improvements to DEAU systems and staff capacity to which EISA has made a contribution in the role of service provider<sup>100</sup>. The responsiveness and flexibility of ADS II has delivered important benefits in this regard by enabling EISA to rise to the challenge of a rapidly developing DEAU with increasing and changing requirements. DFID's ability to quickly approve funding for work in additional countries, for example recently in Mali, has been crucial to delivering this success (for a full description of the Mali case)<sup>101</sup>.

The handbooks and training methodologies used by EISA are robust and fit for purpose<sup>102</sup>. Feedback on the quality of training is consistently good and there is evidence that election observers apply the new skills they have learned on-the-ground when undertaking EOMs. DEAU specifically mentioned the value of EISA staff accompanying election observers on missions. This provides an additional level of support beyond pre-deployment training and allows election observers to "refresh" their knowledge and draw on EISA's expertise in a real-life setting<sup>103</sup>.

As part of DEAU's efforts to improve the organisation of EOMs, EISA supports a small drafting committee made up of volunteers with both technical understanding of elections and in-depth knowledge of local context. This committee is usually made up of 2 EISA experts and 2 AU personnel, providing an example of how EISA tries to build capacity of counterparts in its work under Output 1. DEAU, EISA and survey respondents also consistently agreed that EISA support had contributed to improvements in the quality and substance of EOM statements and reports<sup>104</sup>. This in turn has helped to improve the credibility and influence of AU EOMs and has contributed to logframe Outcome 1 indicator (O.1.)

### **EISA election observing missions EOMs deployed and reports publicised**

#### *EISA CSO EOMs*

EISA deployed 8 CSO EOMs by September 2012, already meeting the final logframe target for September 2013. Interviewees in EISA consistently referred to the positive impact of the flexibility of ADS II. This flexibility has contributed to the effectiveness of Output 1 by ensuring the programme can respond and react to emerging challenges and opportunities.

A contributing factor to the effectiveness of EISA's work supporting CSO EOMs is their ability to act as a repository of knowledge between elections. In the Theory of Change workshop participants highlighted deskilling of observers in the time between elections, when they return to day-to-day jobs and activities as a particular problem. There is some evidence from interviews with EISA staff to suggest that the consistent presence provided by ADS II has

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<sup>99</sup> ADS II Logframe

<sup>100</sup> Source: Interview with DEAU 2; DEAU 2

<sup>101</sup> EISA 1, EISA 6 EISA 6, EISA 2, EISA 7, EISA 8

<sup>102</sup> Review of training methodologies and documents provided to EISA observers on missions

<sup>103</sup> Interview with DEAU 2

<sup>104</sup> Source: DEAU 2 Karuma, OTHERS

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helped to ensure gains made through training in one election carry over to future elections because EISA staff can ensure lessons learned are applied and observers are trained / retrained or refreshed<sup>105</sup>.

### *EISA CSO EOMs media coverage*

There is also evidence that media coverage of EISA CSO EOMs increased in the lifetime of ADS II. In September 2012 7 EISA CSO EOMs had received host country media coverage, exceeding the September 2012 logframe target and placing EISA on-track to achieve the September 2013 target of 8.

The evaluation team reviewed several media clippings that drew on EISA EOM statements and reports<sup>106</sup> and EISA election assessment tools include specific references to media coverage<sup>107</sup>.

### **Output 2: Capacity of key stakeholders to play a constructive role in electoral reform and processes strengthened in 4 countries (incl. work already done in Burundi before closure).**

As initially envisioned, Output 2 aimed to provide support to the legislature of key ADS II countries around electoral reforms and strengthening, to support parliament-civil society engagement and political party development<sup>108</sup>. These activities were intended to increase the professionalism, transparency and inclusivity of elections, thereby increasing the credibility and legitimacy of electoral processes in ADS II countries<sup>109</sup>. The key output indicators were<sup>110</sup>:

Indicator	Target	Actual
2.1: Number of EMBs in 3 target countries with conflict management panels and/or party liaison committees (ex. Mozambique).	3 countries with conflict management panels; 2 countries with party liaison committees	3 countries with conflict management panels; 2 countries with party liaison committees
2.2: Number of countries where CSO networks trained by EISA and supported in voter education and election observation.	1 country network supported on voter education; 2 country networks supported on election observation	1 country network supported on voter education; 1 country networks supported on election observation
2.3: Number of trainers from political parties in Burundi, Chad and Kenya trained by EISA in poll watching.	340	416
2.4: Number of target countries where post-election reviews conducted by EISA and reports produced (excluding Mozambique)/ non-state groups submit detailed election reform proposals.	2/2	2/2

<sup>105</sup> Interviews with EISA 1, EISA 3, EISA 5

<sup>106</sup> Provided at the ToC workshop

<sup>107</sup> EISA election assessment methodology; Election results aggregation form;

<sup>108</sup> EISA Concept Note DFID 20 Nov 2008

<sup>109</sup> EISA Concept Note DFID 20 Nov 2008

<sup>110</sup> Logframe Jan 2013;

There is evidence that ADS II has achieved its goals under Output 2, and in some cases exceeded them. ADS II has met all the milestones for this output (with the exception of the number of civil society networks supported on election observation) and exceeded them for indicator 2.3. For two of the indicators (2.1 and 2.4) ADS II met not only the first milestone but the overall target by September 2011<sup>111</sup>. This suggests that the indicators for this output could have been structured or defined more strongly and set higher, so that they were relevant throughout the lifespan of ADS II.

### **Conflict Management Panels**

The milestones for indicator 2.1 were achieved by September 2011 and have remained stable since that point. EISA has supported the establishment of Conflict Management Panels in Kenya, Chad and Burundi. In Kenya, 10 CMPs were established; in Chad 111 conflict mediators were trained and in Burundi before the closure of the EISA office in 2010.

In Kenya, the impact of the CMPs is strongly evidenced. The CMPs in Kenya were composed of a range of community leaders, representing a range of religious groups and tribes, women's groups and youth groups<sup>112</sup> at the grassroots level. This grassroots-level engagement, chaired by people who have social cache within the community, successfully opened a channel for dialogue between groups and mediated conflict around the 2013 presidential election<sup>113</sup>, diffusing conflict proactively. An example from Kisumu region is given as a case study in section 5.1.2. Another example is the role of the EISA-founded peace committee in Tana River and Kilifi districts mediating between the government, local community and Mombassa Republican Council, a separatist group which has caused significant tensions in the area and alleged violence<sup>114</sup>. This mediation played a role in allowing the elections to move forward peacefully in that region, a significant achievement.

In Chad, 111 conflict mediators were trained and deployed during the January 2012 local elections. These mediators resolved certain conflicts and provided information to the electoral commission which served as a basis for early warning and response

In addition, ADS II supported party liaison committees in Kenya and Chad. Rather than setting up duplicative structures, ADS II engaged with existing structures that have roughly the same mandate as a party liaison committee<sup>115</sup>. In Chad, ADS II supported the existing Political Accord Steering Committee, and in Kenya ADS II nurtured the newly-established Political Parties Dispute Tribunal (PPDT), a quasi-judicial body. In Kenya, when the PPDT was first established, through constitutional mandate in 2010, it didn't have a set budget and wasn't clearly housed within a government department<sup>116</sup>. EISA began supporting the PPDT quickly after they were established, helping them develop a strategic plan, secure budgetary funding and a place within the Ministry of Justice, and facilitating their inclusion in key meetings and workshops so that the PPDT could increase its capacity, legitimacy and stature<sup>117</sup>.

Considering the scope and effects of these activities, indicator 2.1 does not adequately reflect the breadth and quality of activities completed under ADS II with regards to conflict management committees and party liaison committees. The evidence suggests that EISA's work under ADS II in Kenya and Chad this area has exceeded expectations in terms of effects and scope, and this could be more strongly reflected in the logframe.

### **CSO networks trained**

The milestones for this indicator was partly achieved. A CSO network in Chad in was trained and supported in voter education and election observation beginning in 2010, but no additional networks were trained on election observation in Kenya or Mozambique.

Working with civil society groups on electoral reform can be challenging, as few groups exist that focus on elections. Often groups will engage with elections during an election period, as there are resources available and issues of immediate interest, but cease work in between<sup>118</sup>. Working with civil society can be very fruitful though,

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<sup>111</sup> Logframe Jan 2013.

<sup>112</sup> Kenya 6

<sup>113</sup> FINAL: Annual Review 2012 – Africa Democracy Strengthening Programme II; Kenya 6; EISA 1; EISA 8; Kenya 7; .

<sup>114</sup> Kenya 7; EISA 8.

<sup>115</sup> EISA 5;

<sup>116</sup> Kenya 5, EISA 8.

<sup>117</sup> Kenya 5, EISA 8; Kenya 7.

<sup>118</sup> EISA 1

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and successes have been achieved under ADS II. One example is the work with civil society in Mozambique, where EISA was able to train civil society groups on the parallel vote tabulation method, something which civil society now has the capacity to deliver in large part thanks to the work under ADS II<sup>119</sup> (a strong example of sustainable skills being transferred under ADS II). In Chad, ADS II worked with civil society groups to produce the first ever citizen election observer report, which build capacity but also empowered civil society groups to engage further in their own electoral processes<sup>120</sup>.

In addition, EISA had also provided support to EMBs under ADS II, training EMB staff in Mozambique<sup>121</sup> and Kenya<sup>122</sup> to build internal capacity and strengthen the technical capacity of EMB staff around election management. Although the electoral commission in Mozambique recently changed staff, it is starting to gain credibility as an independent voice, in part thanks to its new head, a prominent civil society leader whose appointment was supported by EISA under ADS II<sup>123</sup>, and the increasing capacity and professionalism of its staff<sup>124</sup>. In Kenya, the work supporting the EMB directly translated into more effective operations at the polls; EISA's close relationship with the EMB (including funding the drafting of the bill that established the EMB and supporting its passage through parliament so that the EMB was established in time for the 2013 elections<sup>125</sup>) allowed its observers and mediators to work closely with EMB staff at the polls to mediate potential conflicts between EMB staff and voters in cases where, for example, the machines failed, there were long queues, averting agitation and potential violence<sup>126</sup>. This work is critical, given the levels of staff turnover within these commissions and the demands on these institutions at election time<sup>127</sup>, and training EMB staff has been a way for ADS II to directly support the increasing professionalism of EMBs in ADS II countries<sup>128</sup>.

### Training political parties

The milestones for this indicator were met and exceeded<sup>129</sup>.

In Mozambique, ADS II engaged with the three main political parties: Renamo, Frelimo and MDM to provide training and on internal capacity-building activities. In Mozambique, ADS II had taken a tailored approach to supporting political parties, providing training according to needs and this tailored approach has been very successful<sup>130</sup>. Both Renamo and Frelimo characterised this training and support as significant, useful and transformative in terms of the quality of internal capacity building and training their parties are able to undertake<sup>131</sup>.

In Chad, ADS II particularly worked with political parties on campaigns, communications and gender. The programme successfully brought together civil society and political parties to discuss gender parity for elected officials<sup>132</sup>, which is a topic of some contention in Chad. This work was particularly critical as few other organisations engage on these issues in Chad<sup>133</sup> and the results are clear; several women involved in the ADS II training later ran for office and were elected<sup>134</sup>.

### Post-election reviews

At milestone 1 in September 2011, the indicator of conducting 1 post-election review (out of 1 possible review) was met. The overall target of conducting 2 reviews (out of 2 possible) by September 2013 was also met. EISA conducted a post-election review in Chad after the National Assembly elections in 2011<sup>135</sup>, and a post-election review after the presidential elections in Kenya.

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<sup>119</sup> DFID 1; EISA 7; Mozambique 1; Mozambique 4;

<sup>120</sup> EISA 6 EISA 6;

<sup>121</sup> Mozambique 4

<sup>122</sup> Kenya 7

<sup>123</sup> EISA 6 EISA 6;

<sup>124</sup> DFID 1;

<sup>125</sup> EISA 8;

<sup>126</sup> EISA 8; Kenya 7.

<sup>127</sup> EISA 1; Mozambique 4;

<sup>128</sup> DFID 1;

<sup>129</sup> Logframe Jan 2013.

<sup>130</sup> DFID 1;

<sup>131</sup> Mozambique 3; Mozambique 5;

<sup>132</sup> EISA 1

<sup>133</sup> EISA 1

<sup>134</sup> EISA 1;

<sup>135</sup> FINAL: Annual Review 2012 – Africa Democracy Strengthening Programme II

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In Mozambique, EISA supported CSOs to submit electoral proposals to the Parliamentary Committee with a view to improving the management of future electoral processes<sup>136</sup>, including a proposal to enshrine the SADS Protocol on Gender and Development in electoral law<sup>137</sup>. EISA also facilitated a series of workshops and meetings between civil society and political parties on the electoral reform process, which allowed civil society groups like the Electoral Observatory to strongly input into the reform process<sup>138</sup>. This facilitation was necessary and provided valuable space for civil society and parliament to engage, as recognized by the fact that the new head of the electoral commission is a prominent figure from civil society<sup>139</sup>. EISA also inputted into the electoral reform process in Kenya, supported the development of various electoral laws and regulations and the successful establishment of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) in 2011<sup>140</sup>. In Kenya, civil society groups were also heavily involved in the electoral reform process, through meetings and workshops organised under ADS II<sup>141</sup>.

### *Output 3: The capacity of legislatures in three targeted countries to be effective and responsive enhanced*

In September 2013, ADS II had not achieved the logframe target of establishing and formalising interaction platforms between civil society and parliament in the two Output 3 (O3) target countries (Chad and Kenya). The key indicators are:

Indicator	Target	Actual
Number of the target countries in which Parliament - Non-State interaction platforms are established (E) / meet regularly (MR)/ are formalised (F).	E=2	E=0
	MR=2	MR=1
	F=2	F=0
Number/% of MPs/staff in Chad and Kenya who EISA has trained and supported to be effective in their legislative, representative and oversight roles	Chad=175 (85%)	Chad=308 (176%)
	Kenya=135 (90%)	Kenya= 0

ADS II has exceeded the logframe target for training parliamentarians in Chad but has not delivered this target in Kenya. Although ADS II did not achieve all Output 3 logframe targets, the programme was effective in delivering positive changes in both Kenya and Chad.

### **Chad**

The different contexts of Chad and Kenya affected the way EISA delivered O3 activities and the results that were achieved. In Chad, parliamentary capacity was initially very low and the evidence suggests that small changes and basic improvements were very effective in delivering visible change. Comparatively in Kenya, the Parliament was initially more robust and support focused more on assisting existing organisations.

The strongest evidence available to attest to the effectiveness of O3 is in Chad, where ADS II engaged in a country that was starting from a very low base and the evidence suggests EISA has contributed towards significant improvements in the ability of MPs to represent their constituents and strengthened the link between civil society and parliament<sup>142</sup>. EISA's training on election campaigning was particularly successful. In one case, a potential female candidate ran for office after attending an EISA training course and was subsequently elected to parliament, for which she directly credited the input of EISA<sup>143</sup>. Also, one interviewee indicated that the Chad Speaker of the House noted that the list of people wanting to ask questions has increased at the same time as ADS II training activities<sup>144</sup>.

<sup>136</sup> Mozambique 4; Mozambique 1; Mozambique 3; EISA 7;

<sup>137</sup> Proposta de alteracao da legislacao eleitoral;

<sup>138</sup> EISA 1, Mozambique 1; DFID 1

<sup>139</sup> DFID 1;

<sup>140</sup> Kenya 7; EISA 8.

<sup>141</sup> Kenya 3; EISA 8;

<sup>142</sup> The strength of evidence available on Chad is limited because the evaluation team was unable to visit the country and relied on telephone interviews with key counterparts and survey findings.

<sup>143</sup> EISA 6, EISA 1

<sup>144</sup> EISA 6

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ADS II also established training for journalists to help them understand what parliament's role is and they should expect from MP so that in turn they are more able to communicate the function of parliamentarians. The programme provided training to civil society on how to interact with parliament and parliamentary processes. While this work was successful in improving CSO awareness, effectiveness was limited by EISA's inability to establish a formal platform for interaction between CSOs and MPs because the structure and rules of the National Parliament of Chad which precluded this from happening<sup>145</sup>.

### Kenya

Activities in Kenya took place in a changing context. EISA identified a key role to play in supporting the revision of election sector laws, including through parliamentary committees and, more recently, the senate required and requested intensive support from EISA to strengthen its induction programme for MPs. These activities fit neatly into the logframe but contributed to ADS II Outcome 3 and are recognised as adding-value to the ADS II programme in DFID's Annual Reports and through the testimony of stakeholders<sup>146</sup>.

While Output 3 activities did not deliver a step-change in Kenya in the same way as in Chad, there is some evidence to suggest that ADS II has contributed to better capacity within the Senate to induct new MPs into the rules, regulations and expectations of their role, with EISA's ability to bring an external perspective to training discussions being regarded as particularly valuable<sup>147</sup>. Kenyan ADS II partners also indicated that EISA support to training for committees, particularly the Health, Labour and Social Welfare committee has been effective<sup>148</sup>.

### Failure to fully meet logframe targets

Failure to deliver targets for this output in Chad was largely a result of external factors. The legal framework in Chad prohibited the establishment of formal interaction platforms between civil society and parliament and it was therefore more appropriate for EISA to focus on training MPs / staff and build basic understanding of the roles of parliamentarians both within CSOs and amongst MPs themselves. Delayed elections also affected implementation at the beginning of the programme<sup>149</sup>. In Kenya, work under Output 3 was responsive to the changing needs of counterparts. The DFID 2012 Annual Report notes that the multi-sectoral consensus building requirement imposed by new Constitution also availed opportunities for EISA to establish mechanisms for engaging Parliament<sup>150</sup>. In response to this, the programme worked closely with parliamentary committees and EISA capitalised on the opportunity to support the newly established Senate to work with new MPs<sup>151</sup>. While targets were not fully met, the evidence clearly demonstrates that the capacity of legislatures in both Kenya and Chad did increase in areas where counterparts required support. Although the 2011 Annual Report noted that Output 3 should be reviewed in December 2012, the evaluation team did not review any documentation recording this process<sup>152</sup>. Although work under Output 3 did ultimately deliver capacity improvements and increased responsiveness, the logframe should have been updated to better reflect the work actually undertaken and the role activities played in the project theory of change (see section 5.5.3 for a consideration of how the logframe was used by EISA as a project management tool).

### *Output 4: The capacity of political parties in 3 targeted countries to be effective and internally democratic strengthened*

As defined in the logframe, Output 4 concerns the development and dissemination of EISA benchmarks for political parties. The key output indicators were<sup>153</sup>:

Indicator	Target	Actual
Number of political parties' representatives exposed to EISA benchmarks for democratic political parties.	199	251 (estimated)

<sup>145</sup> Chad1

<sup>146</sup> ADS II Annual Review 2011; ADS II Annual Review 2012; Kenya 2; EISA 8

<sup>147</sup> Kenya 1

<sup>148</sup> Kenya 1; EISA 8

<sup>149</sup> Chad 1; ADS II Annual Review 2011

<sup>150</sup> DFID ADS II Annual Review 2012

<sup>151</sup> EISA 8

<sup>152</sup> DFID ADS II Annual Review 2011; DFID ADS II Annual Review 2012

<sup>153</sup> Logframe Jan 2013.



Number of political parties targeted which endorse EISA benchmarks for democratic political parties. 12 27

EISA has significantly exceeded its targets for both indicators of this output.<sup>154</sup>

The political party benchmarks were developed through a high consultative process, involving detailed and thorough engagement with a reference group of experts and then political parties in select countries, including Kenya<sup>155</sup>. The finalised benchmarks were then introduced on a regional level; representatives of more than 30 African political parties and 16 countries attended the conference introducing the benchmarks in 2010<sup>156</sup>, which represents an impressive cross-section of African political parties, from parties which are quite mature or in power to those which are much younger. The benchmarks aim to input into the broader political framework in which political parties exist, to provide a normative (democratic) framework that guides parties towards a stronger organisational framework<sup>157</sup>. The way in which they have successfully bridged the national and the regional, where it would be impossible to develop these benchmarks at a national level and have them be adopted across the continent without the regional input<sup>158</sup>, also provides a concrete example of the value of ADS II working at multiple levels.

In ADS II countries, political parties are aware of the benchmarks<sup>159</sup> and they have had an effect in terms of providing a roadmap for how a party can build internal capacity and institutionalise itself, moving away from 'personality' driven political parties<sup>160</sup>. In Kenya, for instance, the Orange Democratic Movement was involved in the consultation process to develop the benchmarks and they have taken them on board, working to internalise the benchmarks in the way the party conducts its internal affairs and structures itself<sup>161</sup>. Recommendations from the benchmarks have also influenced the discussion that led to the establishing of an integrity commission within the ANC in South Africa<sup>162</sup>.

These benchmarks have also succeeded at engaging with political parties that other processes aren't able to, such as the Zanu PF in Zimbabwe which sent a minister to participate in the continental benchmarking process<sup>163</sup>, or groups in Somalia which are still in the process of forming into formalised political parties<sup>164</sup>.

#### **Output 5: EISA is a professional, well-managed, innovative, influential and well-focused organisation**

Performance against logframe indicators for Output 5 (O5) has generally exceeded expectations. In the logframe as updated September 2013<sup>165</sup>, ADS II has helped EISA to become a more professional and influential organisation and evidence from interviews with EISA staff consistently supports the case that EISA would not have been able to improve its regional and international standing without the support that ADS II has provided<sup>166</sup>.

Funding allocated to output 5 has enabled EISA to attend and host conferences on topics relating to election reform and EISA speakers are regularly invited to speak at high profile events in the capacity of thematic specialists<sup>167</sup>. This has contributed to the continued enhancement of EISA's reputation as a regional leader on the topic of election observation and reform, further contributing to the effectiveness of Outputs 1-4 by building credibility with key ADS II partners.

Through ADS II, EISA has become an active participant in a number of networks of organisations working in electoral reform<sup>168</sup>. This provides a platform for EISA to disseminate and absorb lessons learned and best practice

<sup>154</sup> ADS II Logframe updated Jan 23 2013

<sup>155</sup> EISA 2;

<sup>156</sup> Setting the Benchmarks for Enhanced Political Party Performance for Democratic Governance in Africa; Conference Proceedings Report 23-24 November 2010.

<sup>157</sup> EISA 2;

<sup>158</sup> EISA 2

<sup>159</sup> Mozambique 3; Kenya 4 ; CHAD EISA interview; Mozambique 1; Mozambique 5.

<sup>160</sup> Kenya 4 – ODM;

<sup>161</sup> Kenya 4 ;

<sup>162</sup> EISA 2.

<sup>163</sup> EISA 2; Setting the Benchmarks for Enhanced Political Party Performance for Democratic Governance in Africa; Conference Proceedings Report 23-24 November 2010.

<sup>164</sup> EISA 2; email

<sup>165</sup> Logframe as updated September 2013

<sup>166</sup> Interviews with EISA 3, EISA 1, EISA 2

<sup>167</sup> Letters of invitation, emails of thanks

<sup>168</sup> Newsletters, coordination emails

in electoral reform and has helped to establish EISA as a regional representative for Africa in the international setting. For example, EISA is a member of the Association of World Election Bodies and played an integral part in the formation of the organisation<sup>169</sup>. One EISA interviewee commented that ADS II funding through output 5 “gives [EISA] the space to give a voice where there wouldn’t be a voice heard.”

Activities delivered under Output 5 have met the performance expectations in the logframe; website traffic has increased, new products have been developed, and institutional capacity reviews have been conducted and this evidence supports the conclusion that ADS II O5 has been effective.

### Have interventions contributed to improved compliance of electoral observation missions with international standards?

In order to assess adherence to international best practices and standards, the evaluation considered:

- the extent to which ADS II has contributed to increased compliance of AU and EISA-led EOMs to international standards;
- evidence that EISA’s advice and recommendations are acted upon; and
- the extent to which international standards have become internalised within these missions as standard operating procedures.

Overall, there is strong evidence that ADS II has increased the quality of AU and EISA-led EOMs, including their adherence to international standards, that these improvements in capacity are being internalised as standard operating procedures and that EISA’s recommendations are acted upon.

### Contributions to increased compliance with international standards

There is evidence to suggest that the services EISA has provided to the AU DEAU have supported their internal capacity building processes in terms of the logistical aspects of organising and supporting EOMS, as well as the manuals, training, standards and procedures the mission follows<sup>170</sup>. In a survey of former election observers, a large majority (78%) indicated that EISA-led EOMs ‘always’ adhere to international standards<sup>171</sup>.

EISA performs a unique role, with regards to the services it provides to the African Union<sup>172</sup>. EISA provides training, often develops the briefing pack for observers, has inputted into the development of mission checklists and manuals, and supports the drafting of the mission statement<sup>173</sup>. As discussed in section 5.1.1, the services provided by EISA under ADS II have supported the AU DEAU becoming more professional and their capacity as the unit has grown and matured. This is evidenced in the changes to the mission statements produced<sup>174</sup>, in the development of mission checklists and training materials, the increasing use of media consultants and the long-term observer missions currently being piloted by the DEAU<sup>175</sup>. These changes, of course, are primarily attributed to the skill, leadership and growth of the DEAU, but ADS II has enabled EISA to provide training and services to the DEAU as the primary service provider that has supported improvements in these areas, particularly with regard to the processes and strength of the missions on the ground<sup>176</sup>.

### Evidence that EISA’s recommendations are acted upon

This indicator is particularly relevant to the activities under ADS II that relate to institutional capacity building of partner institutions (EMBs, political parties, civil society groups and the African Union). For these types of activities, it is not within the power of EISA to ensure that its advice is acted upon; the extent to which recommendations made under ADS II are acted upon depends on the relevance of those recommendations, the quality of them, as their role is to work as a service provider to these institutions.

<sup>169</sup> Interview with EISA 3

<sup>170</sup> DEAU 1; DEAU 2; DEAU 1; DFID 2; EISA 5;

<sup>171</sup> Coffey ADS II evaluation survey.

<sup>172</sup> DEAU 2; EISA 1.

<sup>173</sup> DEAU 2; DEAU 1; EISA 1; EISA 5.

<sup>174</sup> Preliminary Statement of the African Union Observer Mission to the Presidential Election in the Gambia, 24 November 2011; Preliminary Statement of the African Union Observer Mission to the 29 March, 2012 National Assembly Elections in the Republic of the Gambia; Declaration Preliminaire de la Mission d’Observation de l’Union Africaine (UA) au Second Tour de l’Election Presidentielle Anticipée du 26 Julillet 2009 en Republique de Guinee Bissau.

<sup>175</sup> Election Observation Entry and Exit Test; DEAU 1; DEAU 2; EISA 5;

<sup>176</sup> DEAU 2;

The high quality and value of EISA's services and support has been emphasised by all<sup>177</sup> of the key stakeholders for ADS II activities, with one exception – the MDM party in Mozambique<sup>178</sup>. The high quality of EISA's work building the internal capacity of its partners under outputs 1 – 4 of ADS II would be difficult to achieve if EISA's recommendations and advice were not acted on by its partners<sup>179</sup>. For example the DEAU approached EISA under ADS II for support writing the statements for their EOMs<sup>180</sup>. In response to that request, EISA has provided significant recommendations and support to the DEAU to strengthen the statements produced by AU EOMs, recommendations which have now been incorporated as standard operating procedures within the unit<sup>181</sup>. Other examples come from the numbers, quality and participants who attend workshops and meetings facilitated by EISA under ADS II, bringing together stakeholders in a way that would be difficult if EISA wasn't held in high regard<sup>182</sup>; and the credibility and stature of EISA were mentioned unprompted many times in discussions with key stakeholders<sup>183</sup>, which stems not only from the quality of their work but also their political neutrality, their cross-continental networks and resources, the permanency of their partnerships and ability to move between national, regional and international scales<sup>184</sup>.

### **Regional bodies adopting international guidelines as part of standard operating procedures**

The AU DEAU is now at the point where they capably handle the logistics and organisational aspects of EOMs themselves, carrying out these tasks at a high level<sup>185</sup>. EISA has played a strong supporting role in this process, for instance helping the DEAU build internal capacity to produce more professional and transparent mission statements, a sea change which has become part of their standard operating procedures<sup>186</sup>. The DEAU have increased their ability to strategically manage their partners, including EISA. AU DEAU materials and procedures are being adopted by REC missions, and are increasing seen as standard themselves<sup>187</sup>.

### **Have electoral assessment interventions at the regional and national level contributed to enhancing the legitimacy and credibility of elections?**

The Inception Report highlighted the difficulties of defining legitimacy and credibility. After discussion with EISA and an additional democratic governance expert, and acknowledging the resource constraints of the evaluation, the research team used the following criteria to assess the effectiveness of ADS II in this regard:

- The extent to which electoral processes in countries receiving EISA support adhere to national rule and institutions.
- The extent to which participants view election outcomes as valid.

There is limited evidence available against which to make a judgement on ADS II performance against these criteria because of the lack of a robust counterfactual and the sensitive nature of the subject, which constrained the research. However the evidence generated does reveal specific examples that support the conclusion that ADS II has been effective in supporting election assessment that has contributed to enhancing the legitimacy and credibility of elections by making participants more accountable and creating space for, often unseen, high-level political engagement to pre-empt and mitigate disagreements. There is also a clear link between parts of ADS II not directly working on EOMs and the extent to which participants view election outcomes as valid.

### **Improving accountability**

ADS II has contributed to making election participants more accountable to the voting population in countries where EISA has supported EOMs. By providing training and support ADS II has helped to improve the organisation and outputs produced on EOM missions (see sections 5.7 and 5.5). Election observers supported by EISA arrive in-country with an understanding of the national context and election laws and the knowledge required to accurately

<sup>177</sup> DEAU 2, DEAU 1, Kenya 7, Nuengenyne; Kenya 3; Kenya 4 ; Kenya 5; Kenya 6; Mozambique 5; Mozambique 3; Mozambique 1; Mozambique 4.

<sup>178</sup> The MDM party critiqued EISA for not providing direct financial support to help the party in addition to the training and capacity-building activities being provided.

<sup>179</sup> Section 7.5.1;

<sup>180</sup> DEAU 2;

<sup>181</sup> DEAU 2; EISA 1; EISA 5.

<sup>182</sup> Kenya 1; Kenya 2; Kenya 4 ; Mozambique 3; EISA 1; Kenya 7;

<sup>183</sup> DEAU 2; Kenya 3; Kenya 6;

<sup>184</sup> EISA 2; EISA 1; Kenya 2; Kenya 1, Mozambique 4; EISA 3; Kenya 7; DEAU 1.

<sup>185</sup> DEAU 1; DEAU 2.

<sup>186</sup> DEAU 1; DFID 2;

<sup>187</sup> DEAU 1; DEAU 2.

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assess voting and democratic processes<sup>188</sup>. This means that election observers are able to do their job better, producing higher quality reports and statements that are reported on by the media to help publicly hold participants to account for their actions during elections.

### High-level political engagement

The evaluation found that engagement with politicians and bureaucrats has helped to improve the legitimacy and credibility of elections by influencing the behaviour of participants. During an EISA-supported AU EOM in Senegal, high-level engagement led by the AU helped to avert a potential crisis<sup>189</sup>.

In an indirect way long-term ADS II engagement with senior politicians and bureaucrats has helped to improve legitimacy and credibility by improving systems and processes which are potential triggers for accusations of fraud. For example, ADS II facilitated a visit to Ghana by Kenyan representatives during an election who witnessed the failure of electronic voting systems and as a result of this developed back-ups for Kenyan electronic voting systems in the 2013 elections.

### Links to other ADS II components

The research also clearly illustrated important links to other components of ADS II that are relevant to the judgement criteria provided for this question. Notably, in Kenya, EISA assisted CMPs to mediate conflict that would otherwise likely have become violent in the 2011 elections<sup>190</sup>. While CMPs would probably have operated anyway, EISA certainly played a role in building their technical capacity through training and on-the-ground support<sup>191</sup> and individuals directly involved in the mediation process speak very highly of the importance of EISA's role<sup>192</sup>. This contributed to ensuring that participants viewed the outcome of the election as valid.

#### 4.5.2 What factors have hindered/inhibited achievement of objectives?

##### Were any issues identified in the implementation of the components? If so, how successfully were these addressed by the project implementers?

This question seeks to address whether there were any factors, either external or internal, that hindered or inhibited the achievement of the objectives of ADS II. EISA assessed the risks and assumptions present in ADS II at the outset of the project and updated those risks and assumptions on an annual basis along with the logframe<sup>193</sup>. EISA also has a clear risk management policy<sup>194</sup>. Primarily, the factors that hindered the achievement of ADS II were external factors, including the changing political context in Burundi<sup>195</sup>. A few internal factors emerged from the evidence, including limited staff capacity due to funding limitations, which constrained the impact of ADS II at the national level to a certain extent<sup>196</sup>, although it's unclear exactly how significant this was.

Significant external factors that negatively affected ADS II included the forced office closure in Burundi as mentioned in section 5.5.1, security concerns in Mombasa due to a series of terror attacks postponed to launch of the Conflict Management Panels in that area until the security situation normalised<sup>197</sup>, an increase in illiberal democracies in Africa that made it difficult for ADS II to achieve two of its' goal indicators<sup>198</sup>, in Chad post-election political tension had a negative impact on the ADS II post-election review<sup>199</sup>, and in Mozambique the unpredictability of requests from political parties made programme and financial planning challenging<sup>200</sup>. A final significant external factor affecting ADS II was the decision for the Pan-African Parliament to cease fielding separate EOMs, and to harmonise their missions with the AU EOM<sup>201</sup>. Some of these issues would have been difficult to foresee, specifically the office closure in Burundi and the terror attacks in Mombasa. However, the

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<sup>188</sup> Interview with EISA 8

<sup>189</sup> Clarification email from EISA

<sup>190</sup> Interview with CMPs, EISA 8

<sup>191</sup> EISA 8, CMPs

<sup>192</sup> CMPs

<sup>193</sup> Logframes 2010-2013; EISA 6 EISA 6; Risk Management Matrix 2010;

<sup>194</sup> Risk Management Policy 2009;

<sup>195</sup> EISA 2; EISA 3; EISA 6 EISA 6;

<sup>196</sup> DFID 1; EISA 3;

<sup>197</sup> EISA 8;

<sup>198</sup> FINAL Annual Review 2012 – ADS II

<sup>199</sup> FINAL Annual Review 2012- ADS II

<sup>200</sup> FINAL Annual Review 2012 – ADS II

<sup>201</sup> PAP 1;

tensions in Chad and unpredictability of requests from political parties in Mozambique could perhaps have been expected, given the political context in Chad and low-capacity of political parties in Mozambique.

By and large, ADS II responded to these issues flexibly and responsively when they appeared, preserving the integrity of ADS II activities limitedly affecting the achievement of objectives (with the exception of the office closure in Burundi). While the work in Burundi was forced to stop, the funding from Burundi was reallocated, with the approval of DFID, to the 3 other ADS II country offices<sup>202</sup>. The Conflict Management Panels in Mombasa was slightly delayed, but were successfully established and played a significant role mediating tensions in that area<sup>203</sup>. While ADS II ceased to separately support PAP EOMS, they continued to train PAP election observers as part of the main AU missions and provide support to the PAP as far as possible<sup>204</sup>.

Less significant external factors, in terms of their impact in ADS II included a coup d'état in Guinea Bissau that set back the AU EOM there<sup>205</sup>, and the coup d'état in Mali in 2012 that similarly delayed the planned AU EOM there to July 2013<sup>206</sup>.

It is important to note that some external factors had a positive effect on the implementation of ADS II. One key external factor that had a positive effect was the continued growth of the AU DEAU, which added additional staff during ADS II greatly increasing its' capacity. The leadership of the DEAU also had a significant positive impact on ADS II, as they were already working to strengthen and professionalise the work of the unit at the AU missions<sup>207</sup>, making them more receptive to the services being provided by EISA under ADS II and their strategic understanding of what EISA could provide meant that they were able to effectively make use of EISA's services and support<sup>208</sup>. The ratification of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance in early 2012 also had a significant positive impact on national ADS II activities, as it provided an authoritative set of standards for democratic governance on the continent<sup>209</sup>. The new constitution in Kenya along with the electoral reform process also provided a critical opening for ADS II to engage on significant electoral processes and institutions, although this opportunity had been anticipated by EISA to some extent<sup>210</sup>. These positive external

### 4.5.3 Is the M&E system effective?

#### How robust is available evidence and what are the strengths and weaknesses of EISA's monitoring and evaluation systems?

To assess the effectiveness of EISA's M&E system the evaluation explored whether there is a robust system in place for collecting, collating and analysing evidence. The evidence shows that EISA has a suitable M&E system in place and is taking steps to strengthen this further.

#### Strengths of EISA's M&E system

Interviews with EISA staff demonstrated a good understanding of roles and responsibilities for data collection and reporting both in Johannesburg and field offices in ADS II countries<sup>211</sup>. Interviewees indicated that they understood how and why to provide monitoring data in line with logframe requirements. Data is collected using appropriate tools appropriate for the reporting requirements in the logframe, which provides clearly defined indicators<sup>212</sup>. EISA demonstrated a commitment to ensuring their training tools and methodologies are relevant and appropriate and commissioned an independent follow-up study of their training courses during the lifetime of ADS II<sup>213</sup>.

<sup>202</sup> EISA 1;

<sup>203</sup> Kenya 6; EISA 8; Kenya 7;

<sup>204</sup> PAP 1;

<sup>205</sup> EISA 6 EISA 6;

<sup>206</sup> FINAL Annual Review 2012 – ADS II

<sup>207</sup> DEAU 2; DEAU 1; EISA 1; EISA 5;

<sup>208</sup> DEAU 2; DEAU 1; EISA 1; EISA 5.

<sup>209</sup> FINAL Annual Review 2012 – ADS II ; EISA 6 EISA 6;

<sup>210</sup> EISA 8.

<sup>211</sup> Interviews with EISA 7; EISA 8; Chad1; Chad 2

<sup>212</sup> EMB monitoring tool; Evaluation of REC EOM coordinators form; Conference satisfaction form; Learning event feedback form; Symposium feedback form; Technical assistance evaluation form; Technical assistance Inception form; Technical assistance progress form

<sup>213</sup> Terms of reference for follow-up study of EISA training courses



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EISA has invested in developing their M&E system and commissioned an independent consultant to review and update their processes and procedures at the start of 2013<sup>214</sup>. EISA has also recently hired an M&E specialist responsible for implementing their M&E system across all projects and programmes, including ADS II.

### Weaknesses of EISA's M&E system

There are no M&E specialists at the level of individual project offices and until recently there had been no M&E specialist at headquarters level. However, EISA did recognise and respond to this potential weakness by taking advice from external consultants to develop and periodically update their logframe and recently recruited an M&E Adviser who will be responsible for strengthening the M&E system for future work and programmes.

### Has the logframe been a sufficient tool for measuring progress and results?

The adequacy of the ADS II logframe for measuring progress results was assessed according to several key criteria:

- whether the outputs and indicators comprehensively reflect ADS II activities and effects;
- whether targets were realistic; and
- whether the logframe was used as a performance management tool.

ADS II was a challenging programme to set a logframe for; however, the impact – level indicators were not relevant to the higher-level goals of ADS II<sup>215</sup> and several of the output indicators were set too low at the outset and were quickly surpassed (specifically 1.1, 1.2, 4.1, 4.2. and 5.1)<sup>216</sup>. Also, certain indicators were externally dependent (for instance the number of observers trained, relevant to indicators 1.1 and 1.2) and the numbers achieved reflect the number of elections and size of the missions as much as ADS II work<sup>217</sup>. The logframe was regularly updated and used as a performance management tool, but it could have been designed in a way that was more reflective of the activities and effects of ADS II.

ADS II activities are intended to be flexible and responsive to the needs of EISA's partners, like the African Union<sup>218</sup>. At the time the first logframe for ADS II was devised, many of the activities were new and it was difficult to anticipate demand for them<sup>219</sup>. In addition, one of the key strengths of ADS II has been the flexibility of the funding, expanding to cover all AU EOMs, or to cover elections like Mali<sup>220</sup>. These factors combine to make it difficult to set logframe targets for ADS II, as was difficult at the start of the programme to anticipate what level of services were going to be needed several years in the future in all ADS II areas. Finally, there are few independent sources assessing the quality of democracy or of elections, which constrains EISA in their selection of goal/impact level indicators<sup>221</sup>. The logframe targets have been periodically updated though, to reflect the closure of the Burundi office and the increase in support to AU EOMs<sup>222</sup>. However targets for Output 3 in the final version of logframe were still not fully appropriate to the activities ADS II actually delivered.

EISA has also worked to strengthen the logframe indicators in 2010 and 2011, particularly the impact level indicators<sup>223</sup>. At the outset of ADS II, a theory of change underpinning the programme was not defined, which added to the difficulty of setting relevant impact indicators<sup>224</sup>. In order to make the goal/impact level indicators more relevant to ADS II activities, in 2010 EISA developed three indexes to assess progress: an election observation mission scorecard, an electoral integrity index and the benchmark for political parties<sup>225</sup>. These tools, particularly the election observation mission scorecard and the electoral integrity index are positive steps forward in terms of developing impact indicators that are more relevant ADS II activities and effects.

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<sup>214</sup> Towards development of a standardised institutional monitoring, evaluation and reporting system across EISA programmes and field offices, Steve Jones (2013)

<sup>215</sup> EISA 1; ADS II Logframe Revision;

<sup>216</sup> Logframe updated Jan 2013; FINAL Annual Review 2012;

<sup>217</sup> EISA 6 EISA 6;

<sup>218</sup> EISA 1

<sup>219</sup> EISA 1; EISA 6 EISA 6;

<sup>220</sup> EISA 3;

<sup>221</sup> EISA 1;

<sup>222</sup> EISA 6 EISA 6; Logframes;

<sup>223</sup> EISA 1;

<sup>224</sup> FINAL Annual Review 2012

<sup>225</sup> 10-02-19 Logframe workshop report



#### 4.5.4 Do the assumptions in the programme logic hold true?

##### If regional bodies have technical capacity to systematically assess elections, will this enhance their ability and effectiveness to enforce AU/sub-regional benchmarks on the continent?

Based on participant contributions in the TOC workshop and further consultation and research, the evaluation tested the hypothesis that technically robust EOMs are an avenue for regional bodies to influence electoral processes more effectively. Specifically, the team researched whether more professional EOMs improve the AUs ability to promote and enforce international norms and standards and explored reasons why / why not.

To test the key causal links underpinning this theory, the evaluation asked the following sub-questions:

- Do regional bodies adopt norms and standards and promote them through their EOMs?
- Does technical capacity building actually make EOMs more professional?
- If it does, do more professional EOMs actually enable regional bodies to influence electoral processes more effectively?
- Is there a link between technical capacity building and political engagement and does one approach contribute more or less to the goal of influencing electoral processes?

The final question was added to help build understanding on the contribution made by technical support because pre-evaluation research suggested that other factors, loosely falling under the description of “political”, could also make a significant contribution to improving the effectiveness of influencing.

The research showed that improved technical capacity does make regional EOMs more effective at promoting democratic electoral practices. The evaluation also found examples of political engagement contributing to better democratic processes and outcomes around elections. The evidence gathered suggested that a dichotomous view of either “technical” or “political” approaches being superior in achieving better democratic outcomes around elections was inappropriate. Rather, technically strong EOMs work hand-in-hand with, and in some cases are a part of, astute political engagement to promote better democratic practices around elections<sup>226</sup>.

#### **Do regional bodies adopt norms and standards and promote them through their EOMs?**

##### ***Setting benchmarks based on norms and standards***

There are a variety of norms and standards used to inform the methodology of election observation and there is no consistent application of a single standard across African regional bodies<sup>227</sup>. However, regional bodies all subscribe to norms and standards including the African Charter, and training received from service providers such as EISA is also based on this and other generally accepted international standards<sup>228</sup>. The methodology of AU EOMs described by interviewees, and the content of training manuals and handbooks provided by EISA, indicates that the standards adopted by EOMs are aligned to international standards and therefore that the AU (and other regional bodies) are consistently trying to promote democratic electoral processes through their work.

#### **Does technical capacity building actually make EOMs more professional?**

##### ***Building regional EOM capacity***

DEAU has internalised capacity improvements gained from better trained, higher quality observers and more professional mission statements as standard operating procedures<sup>229</sup> and apply these in the delivery of EOMs. It therefore appears that regional institutions like DEAU are not just willing to adopt higher standards but actively seek to build their own internal capacity on election observation, demonstrating a long-term commitment to developing their capacity through support from service providers and their own experience. The standards adopted

<sup>226</sup> Note that most of the research conducted as part of the evaluation focused on the AU and the analysis presented is therefore limited in regards to the role of sub-regional bodies (RECs).

<sup>227</sup> PEMMO, African Charter, EU etc.

<sup>228</sup> AU methodology; EISA training material; EISA handbook; PEMMO

<sup>229</sup> DEAU 1

by the AU also appear to have a knock-on effect in terms of being adopted or setting the standard for sub-regional observer missions<sup>230</sup>.

### ***Better statements and outputs***

EISA operates on the assumption that technical support increases the internal capacity of EOMs and observers, enabling them to have a better technical grasp of the mechanics of election observation and preparation of mission statements. With this increased understanding of the process, observers will be more empowered to push for the technical integrity of mission statements, resisting political interference<sup>231</sup>. This has borne out in practice: the recent mission in Zimbabwe provides a good example where a strengthened, more professional EOM was able to push for the integrity of the mission statement and publish a highly credible, professional output<sup>232</sup>. Generally, the organisation and management of missions also appears to have improved, supporting the conclusion that building capacity through training, resourcing and support does make EOMs more professional<sup>233</sup>.

### **Do more professional EOMs actually enable regional bodies to influence electoral processes more effectively?**

#### ***Contributing to a platform for change***

The evidence considered did not demonstrate any direct link between more professional EOMs and change in electoral processes attributable to the influence of regional bodies. However, as one interviewee pointed out: the point of more professional EOM outputs is “to make AU reports, reports you can actually refer to, reports that can form the basis of policies, [and] calls for reform.”<sup>234</sup> In this sense, the quality of reports has increased and the quality of content related to recommendations for changes to election processes is strong. Recognising that it is beyond the scope of an EOM to directly change the policies and procedures of sovereign states, this represents an important, if indirect, contribution to influencing electoral processes if the content of such reports is used by local and international organisations – including EISA – to form the basis of advocacy and reform work at country level.

#### ***Limitations to influence***

The research also found that there are limits to the degree to which regional bodies can enforce benchmarks and standards. First, change happens at the national level and there is a limit to what regional bodies can achieve, technically and politically, when dealing with sovereign nation states. Second, the degree of pressure regional bodies can exert on poor performing states through statements and reports, regardless of technical capacity, is limited because they cannot risk destabilising their region by appearing to be too hard on a member state. Returning to the example of Zimbabwe, both of these constraints are visible when comparing the content of the report to the limited follow-up action that has followed.

### **Is there a link between technical capacity building and political engagement and does one approach contribute more or less to the goal of influencing electoral processes?**

#### ***Political pressure contributes to influencing electoral processes***

A positive or negative EOM statement can contribute to legitimising or de-legitimising the outcome of an election but evidence from recent cases such as Zimbabwe demonstrate that this is not sufficient to directly influence electoral processes. However, EOMs continue to be relevant and international political pressure is such that most countries in Africa invite international observers and significant stigma is attached to countries that reject observers<sup>235</sup>. This makes the political and technical engagement that occurs during missions increasingly important as they seem to be a lasting institution in Africa and while the political pressure of a negative EOM report is unlikely to directly influence political processes, evidence from EISA’s work through ADS II suggested that

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<sup>230</sup> DEAU 1; DEAU 2;

<sup>231</sup> EISA 1; EISA 5; DEAU 1;

<sup>232</sup> EISA 1;

<sup>233</sup> EISA 5; DEAU 2

<sup>234</sup> EISA 5

<sup>235</sup> DEAU 1;

providing technical support can strengthen the credibility and quality of EOMs and by extension the political discussions that accompany them, which make a contribution to this objective<sup>236</sup>.

### ***Improved technical capacity is linked to political factors***

The relationship between technical strengthening and engagement around political issues is complex. While regional EOMs always have a political aspect and issue statements which have political implications<sup>237</sup>, technical support must be a non-partisan, non-political activity, as the goal is to increase the professionalism and quality of missions<sup>238</sup>. However, a relationship between the technical and political aspects of missions can be observed. For example, technical support from service providers like EISA frees up capacity for DEAU staff to focus on the mediation or political activities that may take place during a mission<sup>239</sup>. Also, increased technical capacity and understanding on the part of observers may empower them to some extent, enabling them to resist political interference to change the content of the mission statement<sup>240</sup>.

The evidence supports the conclusion that EOMs contribute to regional bodies' ability to enforce benchmarks by generating political pressure around electoral processes. There is also evidence to suggest that technical and political engagement strategies are linked and mutually reinforcing. Technically better regional EOMs can make more constructive recommendations in statements, increasing political pressure and providing a platform for other actors to engage on long-term reform at the national level, but are limited in what they can realistically achieve because of the status of regional bodies as political organisations that cannot interfere directly in the affairs of their member states. This demonstrates how regional, national, political and technical dimensions of ADS II all contribute in mutually reinforcing ways to the goal of strengthening electoral processes and improving democracy.

### **If consistent and comparable data on election processes is available, will the effectiveness of election observers be enhanced?**

Work with regional bodies generates a great deal of data across and within national and sub-regional contexts. This research question investigated whether, if actors working on electoral processes are able to make comparisons within the same country, between regions, EOMs, constituencies or years, this will make their analysis more detailed and useful to their practical work.

We asked the following questions:

- Are organisations receiving capacity building technical assistance from EISA willing and able to adopt and implement new ways of working (including adoption of consistent tools and approaches for EOMs)?
- Is data used by different actors to make comparisons between elections over time and between countries?
- If so, does this comparison inform recommendations and findings?

The research found that regional bodies are already committed to adopting systematic ways of working but that a single uniform EOM methodology for collecting data is not realistic and is probably undesirable. Likewise, EMBs do not usually look outwards for lessons learned to inform their work<sup>241</sup>. EISA therefore adds unique value by being able to bring comparable data to both regional EOMs and EMBs at the national level through the organisation's status as a trusted regional expert.

### **Are organisations receiving capacity building technical assistance from EISA willing and able to adopt and implement new ways of working (including adoption of consistent tools and approaches for EOMs)?**

The DEAU has demonstrated an appetite for improvement and incorporates the benefits of training provided by EISA into EOM operations<sup>242</sup>. The training provided by EISA is driven by the needs and requirements of the DEAU which has a clear strategy for growth and development. Interviews with DEAU suggest that harmonisation of approaches with other regional or international observation missions is not a key priority because, as discussed above, regional bodies generally subscribe to the same set of normative values and standards based on regional legislation.<sup>243</sup> There is therefore some evidence that organisations are willing to implement new ways of working in

<sup>236</sup> EISA 1;

<sup>237</sup> EISA 1; DEAU 1.

<sup>238</sup> EISA 5.

<sup>239</sup> DEAU 1; DEAU 2.

<sup>240</sup> EISA 1;

<sup>241</sup> EISA 1

<sup>242</sup> DEAU 1; DEAU 2; EISA 5

<sup>243</sup> DEAU 1

line with their expressed requirements and strategic goals but that consistent tools and approaches for EOMs is not a priority, nor necessarily a desirable, objective.

Organisations are also exposed to data from other contexts through EISA's work under Output 5. For example, annual symposiums bring together a diverse range of actors from across the region to discuss a particular topic, providing an opportunity for lessons from one context to be applied in another<sup>244</sup>.

### **Is data used by different actors to make comparisons between elections over time and between countries?**

There is evidence that EISA uses experience gained within and between contexts to identify key lessons learned for comparable contexts and cases. Examples provided by interviews demonstrated that these lessons are applied practically on a case-by-case basis. EISA has also collected a range of more academic data on elections and electoral processes and there is some evidence that this is being used by academics and researchers. However, systematic analysis of comparative data is not currently used to inform the work of EISA or ADS II.

### **If so, does this comparison inform recommendations and findings?**

There is evidence that practical experience learned is applied in recommendations across contexts. One EISA interviewee gave the example of discussion in Malawi regarding the representation of women in Parliament. While attending a conference in Malawi, an EISA staff member was able to refer to comparative experience in Senegal where a "zebra list" approach to candidate lists was employed, demonstrating how experience drawn from across the continent can be applied in national contexts<sup>245</sup>. However the evaluation did not find evidence that data from previous EOMs is used in a systematic way to inform the content of statements and reports.

### **Does EISA's status as a regional body with continental reach make a positive contribution to the scale of results activities achieve?**<sup>246</sup>

This question was designed to help DFID understand if EISA's profile as an African, regionally-based organisation added specific value to the delivery of ADS II. The evaluation identified three factors that might improve EISA's effectiveness related to its regional nature and identity and researched them through the following sub-questions:

- Does EISA's African identity help build trust with counterparts?
- Does EISA's ability to deploy experts at short-notice across the continent make them a more effective organisation?
- Does the multi-national nature of EISA's staff add value to the delivery of ADS II?

The evaluation found significant evidence to support the conclusion that EISA's regional reach, in terms of logistics, ability to act as a "conduit" for knowledge sharing, and the quality and networks of its staff, makes a positive contribution to the scale of results achieved. There was, however, only limited evidence to suggest that EISA is more effective because of the organisation's African identity and this was largely a secondary consideration for counterparts when considered against EISA's technical quality, professionalism and ability to quickly provide quality technical assistance in support of activities.

### **Does EISA's African identity help build trust with counterparts?**

The evaluation found some evidence that counterparts in regional bodies were more receptive to support from EISA compared to non-African organisations, however, interviewees in regional bodies were careful not to over-emphasise this<sup>247</sup>. At national level, EISA interviewees referred to common language and cultural references as beneficial when building relationships but also felt that other factors were more important when explaining why they are capable of delivering effectively<sup>248</sup>.

<sup>244</sup> Symposium Agendas and reports

<sup>245</sup> EISA 6

<sup>246</sup> Note that this research question overlapped with findings provided under Relevance question 1.3: "Has EISA's presence as a regional advisory body been relevant for strengthening the effectiveness of election management and assessment at a national level?"

<sup>247</sup> DEAU 2

<sup>248</sup> EISA 1

### Does EISA's ability to deploy experts at short-notice across the continent make them a more effective organisation?

Within the lifetime of ADS II EISA has been able to respond to requests for assistance in a range of countries across the continent. This serves to improve EISA's credibility as a professional organisation with deep experience working in election observation and reform and contributes to the organisation's ability to respond quickly and effectively to the needs of regional clients. The AU has specifically referred to EISA as a key service provider that meets important capacity gaps to help them work effectively and the organisation's ability to deploy at short-notice makes an important contribution to this strength<sup>249</sup>.

Linked to evaluation question 12, above, the experience gained by being able to deploy in a variety of countries is also beneficial to the wider work of ADS II and EISA. As EISA deploys and supports EOM missions in a range of contexts, it is able to develop a deeper base of evidence on which to base training, recommendations and other aspects of its work.

### Does the multi-national nature of EISA's staff add value to the delivery of ADS II?

When discussing both regional and national level work, interviewees consistently referred to the value of individual EISA members of staff when talking about the strengths of ADS II<sup>250</sup>. Specifically, EISA counterparts appear to appreciate the value added by EISA staff because they are technical experts in relevant subject areas and both from the countries in which they work yet perceived as non-partisan because of EISA's status as a regional body<sup>251</sup>. This places EISA staff in a strong position of having access to key counterparts at different levels of national systems, both within government and civil society, adding value to their ability to deliver the objectives of ADS II.

## Conclusions relating to Effectiveness:

### General conclusions:

- Flexibility on behalf of both EISA and DFID has been crucial to the effective delivery of ADS II. EISA has effectively responded to emerging challenges and opportunities and DFID has demonstrated a willingness to respond quickly and constructively to requests to fund additional activities that contribute to the goals of the programme.
- EISA's status as a regional organisation with strong networks and staff at national level adds unique value to ADS II and contributes to the effectiveness of all areas of activity. Work with regional bodies is strengthened by EISA's ability to quickly mobilise anywhere on the African continent and provide experts with in-depth local knowledge and high-quality technical expertise. Work at the national level is strengthened by EISA's ability to act as a conduit for lessons learned in comparative contexts and the organisation's profile as a non-partisan body that often has the trust of key counterparts.
- EISA's M&E system is not sufficient for a programme of the size and complexity of ADS II. However, EISA appears to recognise this and is taking steps to improve M&E in future work through the recent hiring of a dedicated M&E adviser.
- High quality experts with strong technical expertise and knowledge of the countries in which they work are essential to EISA's ability to deliver ADS II effectively. While staff turnover is currently low and, there is a risk that the loss of key staff would damage the effectiveness of programmes supported by DFID for which EISA is the main implementing partner.

### Output-specific conclusions:

- ADS II has been effective in supporting the DEAU to undertake EOM missions and in conducting EISA EOM CSO missions. EISA exceeded the logframe targets for Output 1 and the organisation's collaborative approach to working with DEAU, responding to their needs and requirements, has been an important contributing factor to the effectiveness of this part of ADS II.

<sup>249</sup> DEAU 1; DEAU 2

<sup>250</sup> DFID 1; Mozambique 1; DEAU 1; Kenya 6

<sup>251</sup> Mozambique 3; Mozambique 5; DFID 1; Kenya 6

- Output 2 was intended to increase the professionalism, transparency and inclusivity of elections, thereby increasing the credibility and legitimacy of electoral processes in ADS II countries. These logframe targets have been achieved and, with respect to training election observers, exceeded.
- Despite not meeting Output 3 logframe targets ADS II has been successful in building the basic capacity of MPs and establishing a link between civil society and parliament in Chad and has made important contributions to the drafting and operationalization of new electoral legislation in Kenya that brings lawmakers closer to CSOs and political parties. ADS II activities in Chad were effective and particularly significant, given the scarcity of other actors working on elections in that country
- ADS II successfully developed and disseminated the political party benchmarks and there is evidence that these benchmarks have been used by political parties as an internal capacity-building tool. This indicator also provides a concrete example of the value of ADS II working at multiple levels.
- Through funding provided under Output 5, ADS II has enabled EISA to participate in conferences and events that have built the organisation's profile on an international stage. Other activities under this Output, such as internal training and reviews, have built EISA's internal institutional capacity.

## Recommendations relating to effectiveness:

### Recommendation 5.5A:

- EISA should strengthen its M&E systems to ensure that the logframe is used as an active project management tool and is updated where activities change or are unsuccessful.

### Recommendation 5.5B:

- EISA should assess the feasibility of resuming activities in Chad (subject to DFID or other donor support) or an alternative country to scale-up the results achieved by existing national level work in new contexts.

### Recommendation 5.5C:

- EISA should update the MoU in place with DEAU to ensure EISA's role remains relevant to AU EOM requirements as the body moves towards LTO missions.

### Recommendation 5.5D:

- DFID should develop a succession and handover plan for internal management of ADS II to ensure a strong relationship with EISA and other future partners and the ability to react quickly to requests for funding is not lost.

### Recommendation 5.5E:

- DFID should structure any future iterations of ADS II on a regional basis to ensure EISA and other regional partners are able to operate at both regional and national level and can continue to act as a conduit for lesson learning and a vehicle for counterparts to gain experience in comparative contexts through election observation, conferences and symposiums.

### Recommendation 5.5F:

- Subject to resource availability, DFID should consider supporting further national level work through any further iterations of ADS II given the relative success of EISA's existing work in this area and the unique opportunity offered by EISA's ability to apply regional lessons and knowledge across contexts.

## 4.6 Efficiency

To determine the efficiency of ADS II the evaluation considered at the policies, processes and procedures EISA have used in the delivery of ADS II and considered the extent to which they are able to deliver economy, efficiency and effectiveness.

**Could the results generated by the programme have been achieved in a more cost-effective manner?**



## FINDINGS

To assess whether results could have been achieved in a more cost-effective manner the evaluation examined the policies, processes and procedures used by EISA to deliver ADS II activities and assessed the extent to which they deliver value for money against the following criteria:

- Economy – is ADS II delivering at the right price?
- Efficiency – has ADS II done things in the right ways?
- Effectiveness – has ADS II done the right things?

In order to assess the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of ADS at an appropriate level for the purposes of this evaluation, this evaluation reviewed the financial management procedures in place, interviewed key stakeholders who have knowledge of these processes, and considered all cases where EISA was able to leverage additional funding from other sources. It was beyond the scope of this evaluation to directly compare costs to results or analyse specific expenditures under ADS II.

Based on these criteria the evidence shows that some aspects of ADS II are high-cost and that this enables EISA to attract high quality people who are the crux of the programme's effectiveness, which is considerable. EISA has robust policies and procedures in place to deliver VfM and that these are understood and adhered to by staff.

### **Economy**

To assess whether ADS II has secured inputs at the right price the evaluation reviewed financial management procedures and processes. The evaluation team looked for evidence that all travel from ADS II is supported by a sound business case and that flights and hotels are procured at the minimum necessary cost. Processes for agreeing staff salaries and consultant fees were also examined to assess whether EISA is able to secure rates in line with market rates.

EISA recently updated their financial management procedures with guidance from PwC<sup>252</sup>. Based on this new document, the processes used for ADS II are assessed to be robust and fit for purpose<sup>253</sup>. Procurement guidelines stipulate reasonable procedures, for example requiring 3 quotes before the purchase of goods over 10,000 R in value, and there is evidence that these have been applied in the delivery of ADS II when purchasing goods with ADS II funds such as a new generator<sup>254</sup>.

EISA have clear policies in place to secure the cheapest possible flights and book in advance to secure the cheapest available fare. This policy changes slightly for the deployment of VIPs who usually alter their flight dates before making a trip to provide more flexibility<sup>255</sup>. For hotels, EISA standardise their daily rates and benchmark these using the US Department of State published per diem rates<sup>256</sup>. Before deploying EOM missions, EISA organises and advance scoping visit to identify suitable hotels and amenities for observers to use<sup>257</sup>.

While the evaluation researchers did not directly review salary rates for staff and consultants, we did discuss EISA's approach to agreeing salaries with interviewees. EISA acknowledge that they pay relatively competitive market salaries for the staff (even though these remain lower than those paid by international organisations working in the same field) but point to the quality of work produced by staff as justification for this<sup>258</sup> and as a consistent finding throughout the evaluation has been that the quality of EISA staff has been an important contributing factor to the positive results ADS II has achieved, the evidence suggests that the benefits of paying above market rates outweigh the increased cost.

### **Efficiency**

To assess whether ADS II did things in the right way the evaluation considered the procedures and processes EISA applies to manage finances and deliver activities, particularly related to the comparative cost of EOM deployments, training workshops and publications.

#### *Processes and procedures*

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<sup>252</sup> Source: Project Memorandum Annex D: Institutional Assessment, Financial Manual, Field Financial Manual

<sup>253</sup> EISA Field Financial Manual

<sup>254</sup> EISA 3

<sup>255</sup> EISA 3

<sup>256</sup> EISA 3

<sup>257</sup> EISA 3

<sup>258</sup> EISA 3

## FINDINGS

While the cost of EOM missions understandably varies between contexts EISA is able to provide accurate financial proposal that outline costs in advance of deployment. Costs are kept on-budget through close management of project offices and pre-set (but variable) criteria for deployment requirements. For example, a “standard” mission will consist of 14 observers but if there is a need for more support this might be scaled-up<sup>259</sup>.

Overall management of the ADS II budget is led from EISA HQ in Johannesburg. Project managers are required to report on their budgets and review them with the EISA Director of Operations to ensure projects are delivering in-line with expected costs.

### *Flexibility*

A particular strength related to effectiveness has been EISA’s ability to deliver ADS II in a flexible and responsive way<sup>260</sup>. Flexibility in budgeting and financing trainings and missions has been important to enabling ADS II to adapt quickly and effectively to the changing requirements for EOMs and opportunities at national level. For example, with agreement from DFID and using unspent funding under Output 1, EISA was able to successfully support an EOM in Mali at the beginning of 2013 that was not planned in the ADS II budget<sup>261</sup>. Similarly, the ability to be flexible in adapting to opportunities to attend and present at international conferences has been important to enabling EISA to deliver Output 5.

### **Effectiveness**

To assess whether EISA has done the right things the evaluation considered the extent to which ADS II has achieved desired outcomes and specifically looked for evidence that the programme has levered in additional resources and evidence attesting to the effect and scale of effect of the programme.

### *Levering in resources*

EISA has successfully levered in additional resources as a result of DFID’s investment through ADS II. Within HMG, FCO funded EISA work on the Political Parties Act in Kenya based on the strength of their work with committees in the senate<sup>262</sup>. In Chad, EISA leveraged additional funding from SDC and Counterpart International to support work on civic and voter education<sup>263</sup>.

There is also evidence that activities funded by ADS II raised EISA’s profile sufficiently to secure funding from other partners, including in Kenya where SIDA funded additional work based on EISA’s reputation through ADS II worth approximately 100m Shillings<sup>264</sup> and EISA are also currently in negotiations with DANIDA over the possibility of receiving funding for work.

### *Scale and effect of ADS II*

For a full discussion of the effectiveness of ADS II please see the previous section of this report.

## **Conclusions relating to efficiency:**

- EISA has delivered ADS II in a cost-effective manner that balances quality and cost to deliver high-quality outputs at a reasonable cost.
- EISA has recently updated its financial management procedures and processes with external support from a specialist consultancy and these are fit-for-purpose.
- Flexibility in the use of ADS II funding has improved the effectiveness of ADS II by allowing EISA to respond to emerging challenges and opportunities within the overarching remit of the programme.
- There is strong evidence that EISA has used ADS II to leverage-in additional funding from other donors to scale-up successful activities.

## **Recommendations relating to efficiency:**

<sup>259</sup> EISA 3

<sup>260</sup> See Effectiveness and Impact sections of this report for a discussion of how flexibility has helped ADS II to deliver results and impact.

<sup>261</sup> EISA 6; EISA 3

<sup>262</sup> Source: EISA 8

<sup>263</sup> Source: EISA 3

<sup>264</sup> Source: EISA 3

**Recommendation 5.6:**

- EISA should consider reviewing long-standing agreements with suppliers for key goods and services to ensure that these still represent best value for money and ensure that EISA is securing the most cost-effective options available.

## 4.7 Impact

The evaluation assesses impact by unpacking the qualitative changes in institutional capacity, behaviours and systems that underpin the quantitative Outcome level indicators in the logframe. Where possible we try to assess the contribution ADS II has made to changes.

We note that assessing the impact of any governance programmes is difficult because of the challenges involved in establishing a counterfactual against which to assess progress. This problem was compounded in the evaluation of ADS II because no formal baseline was established at the beginning of the project. Furthermore, this evaluation was not designed to be an impact evaluation and is not able to rigorously capture the impacts of ADS II.

### What interventions increased the space and capacity for national level engagement in electoral reform by civil society organisations and political parties?

The evaluation considered whether ADS II interventions increased the engagement of civil society in electoral reform and electoral observation to assess the extent to which ADS II increased the space and capacity for national level engagement in electoral reform by civil society organisations and political parties.

ADS II has contributed to a significant increase in the role of civil society and political party engagement in electoral reform in Kenya. The programme has also contributed to creating space for CSOs to engage on reform issues in Mozambique and has empowered MPs in Chad to discharge their parliamentary duties more effectively, but contribution to impact has been lower than in Kenya. The evidence suggests that the success of ADS II, particularly in creating space for CSOs, is made possible by the ability of EISA staff to access and make well-timed and high quality contributions to technical and political debates and technical processes (such as drafting legislation or providing training) at a national level in all three countries.

#### Mozambique

ADS II activities created space for civil society groups, political parties and/or parliamentarians to engage on electoral reforms and processes in several ways. In Mozambique, ADS II convened public meetings and workshops where civil society groups could input into electoral reforms being discussed between the major political parties in 2012- 2013<sup>265</sup>. Civil society groups, particularly the Electoral Observatory, engaged in discussions around electoral reforms in 2007<sup>266</sup>, but without ADS II it isn't clear that civil society groups would have been able to engage with the process to the same extent in 2012 -2013 and the engagement of civil society has increased, particularly in terms of being able to submit their own proposals for reforms to the parliament<sup>267</sup>. Civil society groups have historically been fairly weak in Mozambique, so the facilitation role that ADS II played was critical<sup>268</sup> and it was effective, since parliament was open to hearing from civil society, in making their contributions particularly valuable<sup>269</sup>. Under ADS II, EISA also supported a civil society leader being appointed at the head of the electoral commission, which represents a new level of representation for civil society groups in the electoral commission<sup>270</sup>.

#### Kenya

In Kenya, ADS II also facilitated key workshops and meetings between civil society groups and political parties, including opening critical dialogue around the development of the Political Parties Act, the act that established the

<sup>265</sup> Mozambique 1; EISA 7; Mozambique 4; Mozambique 3.

<sup>266</sup> Mozambique 4

<sup>267</sup> DFID 1

<sup>268</sup> DFID 1

<sup>269</sup> DFID 1; Mozambique 1.

<sup>270</sup> Rebert EISA 6; Mozambique 4; Lei da CNE;

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electoral commission (IEBC)<sup>271</sup>. The new Kenyan constitution also requires public consultation on all new bills being debated in parliament, a new process which ADS II engagement with Parliament is helping support by training parliamentarians and using EISA's network to engage civil society, so that the appropriate groups are able to participate in the public debates on bills<sup>272</sup>. For example, the Kenyan CSO Law Society of Kenya described how they and others had constructively input into new legislation. During the electoral reform process in Kenya, ADS II also facilitated regular meetings between civil society groups, including women's groups, and the electoral commission<sup>273</sup>.

### Chad

Some work with civil society groups was completed under ADS II in Chad. Civil society groups were trained on election observation and the first ever citizen election observer report was produced<sup>274</sup>, which is an important milestone in the engagement of civil society groups in electoral processes. ADS II symposiums and learning events have also specifically engaged and included civil society groups, providing them with the opportunity to engage on a regional level which might not otherwise have been possible.

In addition, ADS II support to AU EOMs, specifically the training and briefing of observers at the start of the mission has increased the dialogue between observers, civil society groups and political parties, as these groups are invited to brief observers as part of EISA's standard operating procedures under ADS II<sup>275</sup>. Given the limited staff capacity of the AU DEAU, if ADS II wasn't providing this training and these briefing sessions, it's unlikely they would happen at all<sup>276</sup>.

### Are there stronger and more effective democratic institutions in Burundi, Chad, Kenya and Mozambique and at the Pan-African level?

#### National level

At the national level ADS II measured changes in the strength and effectiveness of democratic institutions by monitoring the number of electoral processes that are largely or fully compliant with international standards and the extent to which target countries' parliamentary bills and policies are subject to public consultation. To assess the national level impact of ADS II we consider how capacity, behaviours and systems have changed to deliver (or not deliver) improvements against these indicators that in turn lead to stronger and more effective democratic institutions.

Based on these criteria the evaluation found that ADS II has contributed to stronger and more effective democratic institutions in Chad, Kenya and Mozambique. Logframe targets have largely been met and, while challenges remain, there are specific examples of improvements in areas that ADS II has been working in. It has not been possible to determine the exact contribution ADS II has had to these improvements but a range of interviewees (EISA staff, ADS II partners and third parties) credited the role of EISA supporting the conclusion that ADS II has had a positive impact on making democratic institutions stronger and more effective at the national level.

In Kenya, ADS II supported the development of a new constitution that makes it a legal requirement for parliament to subject new bills and policies to public consultation. Since the new constitution came into force there is strong evidence that this requirement is being adhered to and that lawmakers are seeking and reacting to public consultation on new bills. When asked, interviewees from civil society pointed to two examples where this has happened and indicated that there are several others that could be mentioned).

ADS II also made a positive contribution to peaceful elections in Kenya in 2013 through support to conflict management panels. Set-up in high-risk parts of the country, CMPs provided mediation services to belligerent parties who might otherwise use violence as a means to resolve differences. Members of the CMPs and third parties credit the role of EISA in training CMPs before election day and providing on-the-ground support to CMPs during voting.

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<sup>271</sup> EISA 8;

<sup>272</sup> Kenya 2;

<sup>273</sup> Kenya 3;

<sup>274</sup> EISA 6 EISA 6;

<sup>275</sup> DEAU 1; EISA 5

<sup>276</sup> DEAU 1; EISA 5

**Example: Kenya-Ghana knowledge sharing**

ADS II has delivered discrete achievements in unexpected ways. Before the 2013 Kenya elections, ADS II facilitated a visit by a senior Kenyan election official to observe elections Ghana in which electronic voting equipment failed. Based on this observation the Kenyan EMB devised a back-up plan in case of failure of their own electronic equipment. During Kenyan elections the electronic equipment did fail and the back-up plan ensured affected citizens could still cast their vote and removed a potential trigger for violence.

In Chad less evidence is available because the evaluation team could not travel to Chad to conduct interviews and survey response rates were low. However there are specific examples of ADS II contributing to the development of basic parliamentary functions and capacity. Particular successes in Chad include providing training potential MPs to empower them campaign effectively and establishing a link between media and parliament.

In Mozambique EISA support has improved the capacity of RENAMO, FRELIMO and to some extent MDM to operate in more democratic ways. There is also evidence that ADS II workshops with parliamentary committees have informed the content of the new electoral law.

**Pan-Africa level**

At the pan-African level strengthening of democratic institutions is measured by the number of AU / PAP EOMs that are largely or fully compliant with international standards. To understand the impact that this has the evaluation considers how the AU DEAU has improved as an institution, changes in the operations and outputs of AU EOMs and the extent to which ADS II has contributed to improvements.

ADS II performance against indicator O.1 was rated “partially or moderately achieved” at last DFID Annual Review, having contributed to the delivery of 17.6% fully compliant (FC) and 58.8% largely compliant (LC) AU EOMs . However, as the Annual Review notes, achievement of these logframe targets is dependent on the effectiveness of the AU in areas outside of EISA’s control and, based on the criteria above, evidence generated through the evaluation shows improvement in the capacity and operations of the DEAU and significant improvements in the quality of EOM outputs. Because this change process has been driven by DEAU it is again difficult to determine the exact contribution ADS II has made to improvements, however interviewees from DEAU acknowledged that EISA has played an important role, particularly in contributing to better organised missions and higher quality mission statements and reports. This supports the conclusion that EISA has also contributed to a positive impact on the strength and effectiveness of democratic institutions at the pan-African level.

The ability of the DEAU to organise EOM missions has improved since the unit became operational in 2008, the same year ADS II began implementation . Compared to 2008, the DEAU are now more able to identify areas of weakness and source external assistance from different partners, including EISA, to fill capacity gaps . This change process has been driven by the DEAU and, while difficult to specify exactly, EISA is consistently regarded to have played an important role in supporting improvements . EISA has provided trainings, workshops and direct logistical support to missions to contribute towards improvements in the logistics of AU EOMs . Examples of changes in the way missions are organised include formalising AU EOM financial management procedures and a more systematic approach to selecting observers for specialist sub-groups (such as the EOM drafting committee) while deployed on a mission to ensure appropriately skilled individuals are performing these tasks .

Better organisation and resourcing has helped to improve the quality of EOMs both in terms of operations and outputs. EISA has provided training to AU observers before they deploy on EOMs and, because EISA staff accompany AU observers on deployments, they have been able to provide on-the-job advice to refresh and embed learning, helping to strengthen observer capacity within DEAU .

EISA has also supported DEAU to change the way they draft statements and reports . Statements are now more detailed and written by specialist drafting teams usually made up of a combination of EISA and AU experts. More detailed and better quality statements have enabled AU to comment more thoroughly on election processes and this is helping to build the credibility and influence of their EOMs . Strengthened statements and reports also provide benefits within EOM missions through, for example, providing detailed preliminary statements to the Mission Leader to build his or her situational awareness and understanding.



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By design, these improvements have been driven by the DEAU and while DEAU still relies on EISA to deliver technically robust EOMs at scale it has sustainably developed internal capacity during the lifetime of ADS II. An important initiative being led by DEAU is the move to focus on LTO rather than STO. A key priority for EISA going forward should be the identification and formalisation of the role it can play supporting DEAU in this regard.

### Has the programme resulted in any unintended consequences (positive or negative)?

No significant negative unintended consequences of ADS II emerged from the evidence. However, several significant positive unintended consequences were described, significantly strengthening or expanding the impact of ADS II. For instance, partly as a result of the establishment of an office in Kenya under ADS II, as well as due to the support provided to AU EOMs, there has been unexpected engagement with the East African Community, leading to a MoU between EISA and the EAC<sup>277</sup>. Similar engagements have also begun to take place between EISA and the Common Market for Easter and Southern Africa (COMESA).

The flexibility of funding under ADS II also enabled new activities to be included, responding to current events, which were not initially planned at the inception of the programme. These include the EISA-led mission to observe the elections in Mali and Egypt, and AU-led EOMs to Libya and Tunisia supported by EISA<sup>278</sup>. EISA's presence in Egypt under ADS II was particularly significant as international election observers, including the EU and UN, were not permitted to observe, making EISA one of the few international organisations present<sup>279</sup>. In Libya, ADS II funding enabled EISA to support the AU EOM, through which some of the recommendations captured in the AU EOM report informed the current constitution making process<sup>280</sup>.

An unintended consequence of Output 5 has been increased scope for EISA to interact with international networks of organisations working on electoral issues, including ACE, and take part in international conferences<sup>281</sup>. EISA has worked to increase the African representation on these networks and in these conferences, and the flexibility of ADS II has enabled them to act as a 'bridge', incorporation African viewpoints more strongly in these platforms<sup>282</sup>.

Similarly, the flexibility of ADS II funding has also allowed EISA to pilot the use of new technology within its electoral observation missions, allowing them to collate and analyse evidence much more effectively and issue statements more quickly, learning which EISA has been able to apply under Outputs 1 and 2<sup>283</sup>. These activities were unanticipated at the inception of ADS II, but have proven valuable effects of the programme.

In several areas, ADS II activities also leveraged funding from new sources, unexpectedly expanding the scope or impact of ADS II activities. This is described in more detail in section 7.6.

## Conclusions relating to impact:

- The evidence shows that ADS II has significantly increased the space for civil society to engage on electoral reform with political parties and parliamentarians in Mozambique and Kenya.
- No significant negative unintended consequences of ADS II emerged from the evidence. However, several significant positive unintended consequences were described, significantly strengthening or expanding the impact of ADS II.
- ADS II has made a contribution to stronger and more effective democratic institutions in the AU, Kenya, Chad and Mozambique. Bills and policies are now subject to public consultation, EOMs are operated more effectively and deliver better outputs, and electoral processes are less likely to fail as a result of the ADS II programme.

## Recommendations relating to impact:

### Recommendation 5.7:

- The evaluation team understand that DFID is currently commissioning separate research relating to DFID's wider work on democratic governance and elections. The findings of this and wider research should be

<sup>277</sup> EISA 6 EISA 6; Letter from EAC;

<sup>278</sup> EISA 1;

<sup>279</sup> EISA 1; EISA 6 EISA 6;

<sup>280</sup> EISA 6 EISA 6; Clarification email from EISA

<sup>281</sup> EISA 3; EISA 1;

<sup>282</sup> EISA 1;

<sup>283</sup> EISA 1; Kenya 7; DEAU 1; EISA 5;



used when updating the ADS II theory of change to ensure achievement of the Outcomes actually contributes to delivering the stated programme impact.

## 4.8 Sustainability

In order to determine the sustainability of ADS II, the evaluation considered the extent to which the benefits delivered would be sustainable, and assessed the ways in which activities were designed and delivered in order to ensure the sustainable transfer of skills and knowledge.

### Are the benefits that have been achieved by the programme to-date likely to be sustained?

To assess the sustainability of ADS II the evaluation considered whether beneficiaries are applying skills they have learned. Specifically, the research team considered whether beneficiaries apply new capacities and skills independently and whether beneficiaries will be able to apply skills and capacities in future activity related to the election process. The evidence available to answer this question is mixed and ADS II benefits are likely to be sustained to some extent only and some benefits remain dependent on continuing support from EISA. However, in some areas it became clear that sustainability isn't the most useful way to understand some of the activities conducted under ADS II, particularly at the regional level.

#### Sustainability of regional level work

ADS II has supported the rapid development of the AU DEAU<sup>284</sup> and partners within the AU acknowledge that they would not be able to operate at current levels without EISA support<sup>285</sup>. One DEAU interviewee gave the example of including communication expertise on AU EOMs and indicated that it was very difficult to quickly secure internal AU resources for missions and that DEAU therefore turned to EISA for this expertise<sup>286</sup>. Further, DEAU staff note that they plan to continue to strategically make use of services provided by partners and consultants, rather than trying to act entirely independently and provide all services in-house<sup>287</sup>. In this sense, sustainability refers to increased ability to strategically make use of service providers, rather than ceasing to use them altogether. Through training and capacity building ADS II has contributed to improved skills of staff within DEAU and on the EOMs they operate. The evidence available suggests that EISA is applying an approach that aims to build the capacity of partners and has strengthened the capacity of individuals within DEAU to work on electoral issues in the long term but that DEAU remains logistically reliant on the resources and expertise of EISA for the time-being<sup>288</sup>.

#### Sustainability of national level work

In Kenya, Chad and Mozambique the evidence shows EISA apply a similar approach that emphasises the transfer of knowledge through training, handbook, conferences and symposiums wherever possible<sup>289</sup>. For example, evidence from Chad suggests that ADS II work on gender has changed behaviours from a point where, at the start of the programme, gender was a contentious issue to a point at the end of the programme where beneficiaries point to the success of their efforts to recruit female MPs<sup>290</sup>.

Importantly, there are areas where EISA's status as a regional, non-partisan third-party organisation delivers unique value that could not be fulfilled directly by beneficiaries. For example, in Kenya the success of CMPs has at times been credited directly to EISA because belligerents see them as an independent mediator<sup>291</sup>. EISA also acts as a conduit for knowledge and experience gained at and across the regional level to be transferred to national level beneficiaries and it would be very difficult for the AU or a similar regional organisation to fill this role.

### Have the capacity development interventions taken adequate steps to ensure sustainability of skills developed?

<sup>284</sup> See Section X above on Output 1

<sup>285</sup> DEAU 2, DEAU 1, Olufunto

<sup>286</sup> DEAU 2

<sup>287</sup> DEAU 2, DEAU 1.

<sup>288</sup> Interview with DEAU 2, EISA 5, DEAU 1

<sup>289</sup> Handbooks; Symposium reports

<sup>290</sup> EISA 1

<sup>291</sup> Kenya 6

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This question was assessed by gathering evidence on whether ADS II activities have been designed to ensure sustainable skills are developed. Sustainability isn't the most useful way to understand some of the activities conducted under ADS II, specifically the individual-level training of election observers, but the evidence shows that as far as possible and useful ADS II activities were designed to develop sustainable skills and capacity within their partner institutions.

Building sustainable skills in terms of the training provided under ADS II to election observers, civil society groups, EMB and political parties can be a mixed undertaking, as the staff and participants can have high turnover rates<sup>292</sup> making it necessary to run trainings on a regular basis, and refresher trainings at the outset of each EOM. At the individual level, then, sustainability is perhaps less useful as a way to understand the purpose of the training activities carried out under ADS II. It should be noted, though, that ADS II trainings of electoral observers explicitly try and train relevant individuals, including electoral commission staff and leaders of civil society groups who will be able to apply the skills learned observing future elections or working on election-related issues in their home country<sup>293</sup>. In this sense, sustainability can be achieved in some sense at the individual level, and ADS II activities are designed to build sustainable skills in this way<sup>294</sup>.

However, the internal capacity of these organisations, particularly civil society organisations, political parties, EMBs and the AU DEAU can be strengthened as a whole in a way that's more sustainable over the long term in terms of maintaining learning and improved processes, and in many cases ADS II activities succeeded in building capacity at the organisational level in this way.

In Mozambique, EISA's work supporting the Electoral Observatory, the main civil society organisation working on elections has built significant internal capacity, including the skills needed to conduct Parallel Vote Tabulation without support<sup>295</sup>. The increased internal capacity of the Electoral Observatory has also enabled the organisation to successfully weather a key leadership transition, when their head left to take up a position leading the electoral commission (IEBC)<sup>296</sup>.

In Kenya, EISA has heavily supported the Political Parties Dispute Tribunal, enabling the Tribunal to secure a yearly budget, develop a organisational strategy and build its stature as an institution, key steps towards becoming an independent quasi-judicial institution<sup>297</sup>. ADS II activities have also supported key political parties in Kenya to build their strength as institutions, as they move away from being 'personality-driven' parties which quickly dissolve after an election<sup>298</sup>. The political party benchmarks have played a key role in the ADS II support and were explicitly cited as critical by partners in terms of the sustainability of ADS II support<sup>299</sup>. Additionally, there is evidence that the conflict management panels established under ADS II were also designed in a sustainable way, with members drawn from local community leaders who continue to have a stake in mediating conflicts in their communities, to the point that the CMPs continue to operate post-election, even without direct continuing support from EISA<sup>300</sup>.

With the AU DEAU, the types of support provided through ADS II have shifted slightly over the course of the programme, with the explicit intention of becoming more sustainable<sup>301</sup>. Initially, the services being provided to the DEAU under ADS II were focused on capacity building within the unit, so that the eventually the unit would be able to manage EOMS without external service providers or support<sup>302</sup>. As the capacity and staff of the DEAU grew and through consultations with the unit, it was realised that this model wasn't viable and that a more sustainable approach would be to support the DEAU as a long-term service provider or consultant, providing services which the DEAU can make use of strategically and flexibly, according to their needs at the time<sup>303</sup>. The focus continues to be towards capacity building, though, in terms of the training provided to AU election observers under ADS II as well as support provided to the DEAU and PAP themselves under the MoU's signed with those partners<sup>304</sup>. The DEAU

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<sup>292</sup> EISA 1

<sup>293</sup> EISA 5; Mozambique 4; Kenya 7; Kenya 3;

<sup>294</sup> Rapport de l'atelier- Obs elect 21 & 22 sept 2012.; EISA 5; Mozambique 4;

<sup>295</sup> DFID 1; Mozambique 4;

<sup>296</sup> DFID 1.

<sup>297</sup> Kenya 5; EISA 8; Kenya 7.

<sup>298</sup> ODM exec director; Kenya 1.

<sup>299</sup> ODM exec director; Kenya 1

<sup>300</sup> EISA 8; Kenya 6.

<sup>301</sup> EISA 3

<sup>302</sup> EISA 3; EISA ADII inception report\_P1;

<sup>303</sup> EISA 3; DEAU 2; DEAU 1

<sup>304</sup> PAP 1; DEAU 1;

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has significantly improved the quality of EOMs and mission statements and incorporating best practices as part of their standard operating procedures, in part attributable to the services provided by EISA under ADS II<sup>305</sup>.

Finally, in terms of sustainable learning and best practices, EISA also produces reports and handbooks as part of their activities under Output 5, ensuring that key learning's from ADS II are formalised and disseminated to key stakeholders and partners<sup>306</sup>.

### Conclusions relating to sustainability:

- Sustainability isn't the most useful way to understand some of the activities conducted under ADS II, specifically the individual-level training of election observers, but the evidence shows that as far as possible and useful ADS II activities at the national level were designed to develop sustainable skills and capacity within their partner institutions.
- The evidence available suggests that EISA is applying an approach that aims to build the capacity of partners and has strengthened the capacity of individuals within DEAU to work on electoral issues in the long term but that DEAU remains logistically reliant on the resources and expertise of EISA for the time-being

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<sup>305</sup> DFID 2; DEAU 2; DEAU 1; EISA 1.

<sup>306</sup> Electoral Assistance Programme Handbooks

## 5 Conclusions

### 5.1 Relevance

There is evidence to suggest that the degree to which an EOM is conducted ‘professionally’ does play a role in influencing the credibility and quality of the EOM, its findings, and by extension, the election management and assessment processes. Benefits of training and support for observers extend beyond any single EOM they are part of, because evidence suggests that they use the knowledge and experience gained to advocate for better practices in other African nations. EISA’s status as an African-based regional body also makes them uniquely placed and resourced to support the increased professionalism, transparency and quality of EOMs, in part due to their institutional ability to learn and implement best-practice from a range of different countries, their continent-spanning offices and staff, and their strong relationships with key stakeholders. In terms of the wider relevance of ADS II, the evidence suggests that the programme has indirectly enhanced the participation of women and poor people in the election process by embedding gender sensitivity and civil society engagement throughout its activities.

### 5.2 Complementarity, Coverage and Coordination

Very few instances were described in the evidence of ADS II activities overlapping or duplicating existing projects or programmes. Rather the evidence suggests that EISA proactively seeks to ensure that ADS II activities complement the work of other actors through membership of networks and on-the-ground coordination with counterparts in other organisations. Several examples were given in the evidence of EISA collaborating with other actors as a part of ADS II, to deliver a greater scope of activities or effects than would have otherwise occurred.

The design of ADS II has also played a role in the success of programme activities. Using a service provider-based approach to working with DEAU has also helped EISA to ensure complementarity of work under Output 1 because activities are agreed in partnership with counterparts and based on their expressed requirements and capacity gaps. In addition, the evidence suggests that the components of ADS II successfully inform and strengthen each other in several ways, working together synergistically to achieve a whole that is clearly greater than the sum of its parts.

### 5.3 Effectiveness

Measured against the logframe outputs, ADS II activities and effects have met or exceeded expectations. ADS II has been effective in supporting the DEAU to undertake EOM missions, providing key technical support which frees up DEAU staff to focus on other aspects of the mission, including political engagement. EISA’s long-term commitment to working with the DEAU, their national and regional experience enables them to provide high quality and relevant services that few other organisations could provide. Additionally, in providing these services to AU EOMs on the ground, ADS II fills a critical gap which the DEAU doesn’t currently have the capacity to fill itself.

ADS II has also met and exceeded expectations in terms of the activities under outputs 2 and 4, working to increase the professionalism, transparency and inclusivity of elections as well as develop and disseminate EISA’s political party benchmarks. The quality of the effects of both of these activities was enhanced by the flexibility of ADS II funding, enabling ADS II activities to respond quickly to changing partner needs as well as emerging opportunities, and the programme design where ADS II (and EISA) activities take place at both the national and regional levels.

The effects of the activities completed under output, which intended to build the basic capacity of MPs and establishing a link between civil society and parliament in Chad and Kenya, have been more variably visible. Comparatively, parliamentary capacity was lower in Chad and fewer external organisations work to support them, so that small changes and basic improvements were very effective in delivering visible change. Comparatively in Kenya, the Parliament was initially more robust and so ADS II support focused more on assisting existing organisations, with less immediately visible effects.

The flexibility of ADS II funding has also been critical to the success of output 5, which enabled EISA to participate in conferences and events that have built the organisation’s profile on an international stage, while also building EISA’s internal institutional capacity through training and internal reviews.

### 5.4 Efficiency

EISA has delivered ADS II in a cost-effective manner that balances quality and cost to deliver high-quality outputs at a reasonable cost. ADS II has processes in place to secure resources and goods at a reasonable cost and has a suitable financial management system in place.

### 5.5 Impact

The evidence shows that ADS II has significantly increased the space for civil society to engage on electoral reform with political parties and parliamentarians in Mozambique and Kenya. No significant negative unintended consequences of ADS II emerged from the evidence. In addition, the evidence suggests that ADS II activities have made a contribution to stronger and more effective democratic institutions in the AU, Kenya, Chad and Mozambique. Bills and policies are now subject to public consultation, EOMs are operated more effectively and deliver better outputs, and electoral processes are less likely to fail as a result of the ADS II programme.

### 5.6 Sustainability

Sustainability isn't the most useful way to understand some of the activities conducted under ADS II, for example the individual-level training of election observers, which must be repeated for each mission, but the evidence shows that as far as possible and useful, national level ADS II activities were designed to develop sustainable skills and capacity within their partner institutions. For activities that must be repeated, like observer training, EISA also acts as a conduit for knowledge and experience gained at and across the regional level to be transferred to national level beneficiaries and it would be very difficult for the AU or a similar regional organisation to fill this role. At the regional level, the evidence available suggests that EISA is applying an approach that aims to build the capacity of partners and has strengthened the capacity of individuals within DEAU to work on electoral issues in the long term but that DEAU remains logistically reliant on the resources and expertise of EISA for the time-being.

## 6 Recommendations and lessons learned

### 6.1 Recommendations for DFID

ADS II is a well-functioning programme that is generally delivering agreed Outputs. This is in large part due to key strengths and practices DFID should ensure continue in future programming:

- **Maintain a flexible approach.** EISA is able to respond to emerging challenges and opportunities to ensure ADS II remains relevant to the problems it aims to address and delivers effectively. DFID plays an important role in enabling this flexibility through a strong working relationship with EISA and a willingness to quickly fund new activities that contribute to programme goals. The evaluation team recommends that DFID retain this flexibility in future iterations of ADS and develop strategies to ensure that a flexible approach to implementation is not lost due to internal staff changes.
- **Continue to structure programmes to capitalise on partners' strengths.** EISA occupies a unique position as a respected regional body with in-depth knowledge of a variety of national contexts and access to key counterparts at all levels of the system. ADS II demonstrated the value of this position to both regional and national level work and the evaluation team recommends that future programming ensures EISA is able to continue to operate at both regional and national levels in a coherent and complementary way.

### Lessons learned

- **Leveraging learning, resources and increasing credibility by working across scales.** The ability to apply knowledge and learning across contexts and scales has added significant value to ADS II, increasing the credibility and quality of individual project interventions as well as the overall effectiveness of the programme. This effectiveness can be attributed, in part, to the way in which ADS funding was structured; regional funding of the programme, allowed EISA greater flexibility to work across scales than would otherwise be present.
- **Value-added of working with an Africa-based organisation.** EISA's status as an African-based regional body has several key benefits, inasmuch as it enhances the high technical quality and professionalism of EISA's work. This includes their institutional ability to learn and implement best-practice from a range of different countries, their continent -spanning offices and staff, their deep understanding of local contexts and their strong relationships with key stakeholders.
- **Reconceptualising sustainability.** For the purposes of this evaluation, it has been more useful to understand sustainability in term of the quality and longevity of relationships and institutional structures being created, rather than the decreased reliance of key stakeholders on services. For instance, for activities that must be repeated, like observer training, it is not desirable that the AU works towards providing these services in-house, rather sustainability is better understood as the increased capacity of the DEAU to strategically make use of services provided by partners like EISA, who can act as a conduit for knowledge and experience gained at and across the regional level to be transferred to national level beneficiaries.

### 6.2 Recommendations for EISA

EISA is delivering both the regional and national level components of ADS II effectively across all outputs. For the most part, EISA should maintain its working practices and approaches that are successful in delivering the mandate of ADS II. However the evaluation team proposes a number of specific recommendations:

- **Use the logframe as a project management tool.** Where activities under outputs change, update the logframe and targets in coordination with DFID to ensure that the benefits of activities actually delivered are captured and recorded.



## CONCLUSIONS

- **Strengthen M&E systems.** Improving M&E systems will help EISA to collect evidence of their effectiveness. For example, EISA could systematically record instances where potential overlap of activities is avoided and / or complementarity with the work of other organisations is maximised for use in future evaluations and reports
- **Update the MoU between EISA and DEAU.** As the AU moves to supporting long-term observation, EISA should agree on the role the organisation will play in supporting DEAU and formalise this agreement in an updated MoU to help ensure future work remains relevant to the problem, complementary to existing work, and coordinated with the work of other partners on an on-going basis.

## Lessons learned

- **Importance of responding flexibly to emerging needs.** Part of EISA's success in meeting and exceeding Outputs 1,2,4 and 5 can be attributed to its organisational flexibility and high level of responsiveness, tailoring interventions to national context and the needs of key stakeholders, updating the logframe as new understandings emerge about what works and what doesn't, as well as identifying emerging opportunities. This flexibility and iterative improvement has been key to the success of ADS II and is a key lesson to take forward in terms of what works when delivering complex elections programmes.
- **Complexity of gathering evidence on effectiveness.** Elections programmes like ADS, which have diverse stakeholders and diffuse, long-term impacts require systematic and methodical internal M&E systems in place. Strengthened internal M&E systems will enable EISA to more rigorously evidence the impact of ADS projects.

# Annex 1

## Terms of Reference

## **TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION OF AFRICA DEMOCRACY STRENGTHENING PROGRAMME II**

### **1. Background**

Sub-Saharan Africa is characterised, on the whole, by rising economic growth. Initially, in many countries, growth was accompanied by improvements in political systems and democratic governance. Recent data though suggests a situation of stagnant political and civil liberties, diminishing political participation and state-dominated governance processes with only superficial citizen participation. In many countries, citizens continue to lack the power to demand greater accountability from their governments, driving not only sub-optimal development outcomes but also social unrest and the risk of political implosion.

Since the late 1980s, multi-party democracy has continued gradually to supplant authoritarianism, but this transformation has not proved entirely durable. Based on Freedom House annual lists, the number of democracies in Africa has declined slightly from 21 in 2000 to 20 in 2012. Moreover, taking population into account, the number of people living in electoral democracies actually fell by more than half during the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

In this context, through the Africa Democracy Strengthening Programme II (ADSII), DFID is providing up to £5.3m over a four year period (2009-2013) to the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) to enable it to build sustainable African capacity to manage and monitor elections and involve citizens in their national democratic processes. The expected outcome of the programme is stronger and more effective national, regional and pan-African democratic institutions. The expected impact of the programme is more vibrant democracy and better electoral processes in Africa. Although a logical framework was developed for monitoring ADSII, no overarching theory of change was developed for this intervention at the design stage. (See *Annex 1: Programme Memorandum, and Annex 2: Logical Framework*).

EISA project implementation involves a range of activities, including (i) building regional and national capacity (in Chad, Kenya and Mozambique) in election observation, elections management, election-related conflict management and resolution, (ii) supporting national legislatures and civil society organisations to improve their understanding and influence of policy making, (iii) supporting institutional strengthening of political parties, and (iv) strengthening EISA's operational, governance and management systems.

The ADSII project design is based on assumptions that a continental approach to strengthening democratic governance, working to improve election observation and the capacity of a continental NGO, will add value to democratic governance reforms and outcomes at a national level. This is consistent with the approach of DFID's Africa Regional Department (ARD) in seeking to strengthen regional organisational and institutional capacity in DFID's priority areas. For this reason, the evaluation will focus on the regional dimensions of the ADSII project, to help improve understanding of the role regional institutions (African Union, Pan-African Parliament and EISA) have in strengthening democratic governance. The ADSII approach does contribute though to DFID's overarching democratic governance objective of supporting freer and fairer elections at national level.

ADSII project design took into account lessons learned from a previous phase of support. As reflected in the project memorandum, these lessons included:

- the need to partner with international agencies that provide electoral assistance to ensure common approaches and better coordination of support to regional institutions such as the AU; and
- the need for continuous capacity building for continental parliamentarians in democracy, and election observation and other relevant activities and processes, as they provide their services as election observers to regional institutions such as the PAP.

The original project design envisaged that the national level project outputs would be implemented in five countries. Five focus countries were identified during the inception period, but owing to emerging operating environments, activities were ceased in relation to two of those countries during the project implementation period.

## **2. Purpose, Objectives and Scope**

The main objectives of this assignment will be (i) to evaluate implementation of the components of the ADSII programme, and (ii) refine and test those specific elements of the theory of change that relate to regional approaches to strengthening election management.

The purpose of the evaluation will be both accountability and learning across all activities and outputs, with a specific emphasis on learning in relation to the regional dimensions of the ADSII programme approach.

Accountability: The evaluation will seek to show the extent to which the programme has been *effective*, i.e. producing the benefits anticipated, and *efficient*, i.e. using the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the benefits.

Learning: The evaluation will identify programme and non-programme related explanations for success and failure that could be 'translated' into more effective, efficient and sustainable programme interventions. This learning should be presented in ways that will help to inform future EISA programme design and EISA/donor partner funding decisions. ADSII is scheduled to conclude in September 2013 and the timing of the evaluation is designed to inform any future decisions on DFID funding in this sector.

Although the project has been subject to ongoing monitoring, no overarching theory of change was developed for the intervention either at the design phase or during implementation. In order to test intervention hypotheses and assumptions as these relate to the relevance and effectiveness of regional approaches to improved election management, specific elements of a theory of change will need to be articulated as part of the inception phase of this evaluation (as captured in these terms of reference).

The key challenges that will need to be addressed during the evaluation will be (i) those related to the development of a partial theory of change near the end of project implementation, taking into account any weakness in the logframe and its amendment during project implementation, and (ii) access to and availability of key stakeholders.

### **3. Theory of Change and Evaluation Questions**

The evaluation will include (i) a process evaluation that will seek to ascertain whether objectives have been achieved and identify any strengths and weaknesses in the approach, and (ii) a theory-based evaluation which will test hypotheses and assumptions within the partial theory of change developed during the inception phase. This partial theory of change will focus explicitly on assumed change processes related to the regional dimensions of the programme approach (i.e. the hypotheses and assumptions underpinning the programme's approach of working through regional institutions (African Union and Pan-African Parliament) and establishing EISA itself as an institution with a regional presence and reach).

Since the evaluation will focus on these regional dimensions, it is not proposed that a full theory of change is developed for the ADSII project intervention. It is acknowledged though that development of a partial theory of change poses challenges, particularly as the project nears completion and given the difficulties of separating the regional dimensions of the approach from the overall assumptions and changes expected through ADSII. These challenges, for example risks relating to bias, and potential responses should be identified in proposals.

This partial theory of change should:

- respond to analysis of the context, the problem and the changes needed in regional approach as identified in the underlying documentation;
- articulate the assumed change processes by which the regional dimensions of programme activities deliver the outputs, how these contribute to achieving the outcome, and how this is expected to contribute to achievement of longer term impact(s) including democracy, empowerment and accountability;
- make explicit assumptions about causal links, implementation, context and external factors;
- provide the basis for specific hypotheses to be tested during evaluation; and
- assess the evidence for the assumptions and hypotheses.

The evaluation questions will be developed by the evaluation team during the inception phase. Those questions developed to test the partial theory of change should respond to and reflect hypotheses in the theory of change identified in collaboration with stakeholders. It is expected that the questions will draw on the DAC evaluation criteria; issues of coverage, coherence and co-ordination should also be considered in developing evaluation questions. In doing so, the questions should meet the high-level objectives of this evaluation in exploring ADSII's contribution to (i) regional organisation capacity, (ii) the capacity of EISA itself, and (iii) these continental bodies' approaches in delivering democratic governance reform at a national level.

The section below outlines some indicative questions. This is not a fixed list and should be refined by the evaluation team, informed by the work on the theory of change, and additional consultation during the inception period.

### Implementation:

Have activities been delivered in accordance with what was originally intended?

Were any issues identified in the implementation of the components? If so, how successfully were these addressed by the project implementers?

How successfully have programme interventions worked with other partners?

Whether the logframe has been a sufficient tool for measuring progress and results? How robust is available evidence and what are the strengths and weaknesses of EISA's monitoring and evaluation systems?

### Relevance



What has been learnt about the relevance of the African Union and Pan-African Parliament, and in particular their election observation work, for strengthening participatory democracy?

To what extent has EISA's presence as a regional advisory body been relevant for strengthening the effectiveness of election management at a national level?

How have programme initiatives and results been relevant to increasing participation among women and the poor?

*Effectiveness and Impact:*

Have interventions contributed to improved compliance of electoral observation missions with international standards?

Have electoral management interventions at the regional and national level contributed to enhancing the legitimacy and credibility of elections?

What interventions increased the space and capacity for national level engagement in electoral reform by civil society organisations and political parties?

*Efficiency:*

Could the results generated by the programme have been achieved in a more cost-effective manner?

*Sustainability:*

Are the benefits that have been achieved by the programme to date likely to be sustained?

Have the capacity development interventions taken adequate steps to ensure sustainability of skills developed?

#### **4. Information Sources**

The programme has generated a range of data which the evaluator(s) will be able to draw on. It is expected that the evaluation consultant(s) will draw largely on this and other secondary data and small-scale additional primary data collection through interviews and/or questionnaires of a focussed selection of individual stakeholders, in order to triangulate results.

Data sources will include EISA's annual reporting, election observation mission reports, national election management body reporting, and EISA's collation of media reporting. Expected data sources should be outlined in proposals and can be explored in more detail with EISA during the inception phase.

## **5. Methodology**

An inception phase will (i) articulate the specifically regional hypotheses and assumptions forming part of the overall programme theory of change, and (ii) develop an evaluation framework for ADSII. This framework will set out an approach which combines a process evaluation and specific elements of a theory-based evaluation. The inception phase should also identify which key assumptions for the causal chains of the theory of change will be tested through the evaluation. The expectation is that there will be more scope to examine the assumptions, in the specific elements of the theory of change that are being explored, from activity to output, and from output to outcome, than at the outcome to impact level.

### Evaluation Proposals

Evaluation proposals should, as a minimum, including the following information:

- the choice and balance of evaluation approaches proposed to address the identified evaluation requirements set out in these terms of reference;
- a clear outline of the relevant skills and experience of the proposed evaluation team members in using these types of approaches;
- expected data sources, and sampling methods, including the extent to which the team propose to engage in new data collection;
- a proposed approach and workplan for the inception phase;
- how they would quality assure the inception design and evaluation reports;
- identify relevant risks, challenges and proposed responses; and
- be explicit about costings for the evaluation methods proposed, including any limited primary data collection expected to be necessary.

By way of guidance, to ensure sufficient contextual analysis it is proposed that the evaluations will require:

- a field visit to EISA headquarters and Pan-African Parliament Headquarters in Johannesburg;
- field visits to each of Mozambique and Kenya where EISA is actively engaged with national election management institutions through this project. For logistical reasons it is proposed that evidence is gathered from Chad by way of questionnaires/telephone interviews;

- a field visit to the African Union in Addis Ababa; and
- questionnaires/telephone interviews with other stakeholders, including those in the remaining countries in which the ADSII has been active, for example through its support for AU election monitoring.

DAC Quality Standards for Development Evaluation, and DFID's Ethical Guidance for Research and Evaluation, should be adhered to when undertaking the evaluation.

### Inception Phase

During the inception phase the consultant(s) will be expected to:

- develop a theory of change for the specific regional aspects of the programme approach that are to be tested (as outlined above);
- further develop and agree a full analytical framework for the evaluation working closely with EISA to ensure consistency with underlying analysis and the logical framework;
- determine what evaluation questions will be used to test the theory of change;
- elaborate the overarching design and methodology, including details of the analytical basis on which evaluative judgments will be made and how they will address the issue of bias;
- detail (a) the data (quantitative and qualitative) required to address evaluation questions and assumptions, (b) the data sources that will be used, identifying where they expect to use existing data and where new data will be collected, (c) the methods for collecting new data, and (d) how country visits will be used;
- set out the overall process map, work plan, timeline and responsibilities for the evaluation; and
- design a communications and dissemination plan for the evaluation.

The evaluation consultant(s) will be responsible for identifying the full set of relevant stakeholders who should be consulted and informed as part of this evaluation, building on the list of suggested stakeholders (*See Annex 4: Indicative List of Stakeholders*). The team should include consultation with stakeholders during the inception phase.

## **6. Outputs**

These terms of reference require the consultant(s) to produce the following four outputs:

- i) Theory of Change: addressing the specific hypotheses and assumptions underlying the regional approach adopted through the ADSII intervention. This should address the criteria set out in

section 3 above and be submitted within 2 weeks of the contract start date;

- ii) Evaluation Inception Report: This should also be submitted within 1 month of the contract start date, presenting the evaluation framework and methodology (e.g. how each question will be answered), including setting out a process map, work plan, timeline and responsibilities;
- iii) Evaluation Draft Report: This should be submitted within 2 months of the approval of the Inception Report; and
- iv) Evaluation Final Report: Within 2 week of receipt of comments on the Draft Evaluation Report.

All outputs must be 12 point Arial font using non-technical, accessible English.

## **7. Audience**

The primary audience for this evaluation will be EISA and DFID as the funder of ADSII. In addition, the evaluation is anticipated to be of interest to other funding agencies (in particular as the evaluation informs future EISA programming choices) and bodies active in the field of democratic governance. The final evaluation will be published alongside a Management Response by DFID.

Evaluation proposals should identify how key evaluation findings will be presented for dissemination to relevant stakeholders. The methodology should detail a clear strategy for evaluation uptake that will amplify the influence and use of evaluation findings, with a wide range of stakeholders – both within DFID, and amongst external networks. Proposals should detail the types of communications products expected, and approaches for engaging with a variety of stakeholders.

## **8. Skills and Qualifications**

The consultant(s) should have the following expertise and/or experience:

- experience of designing and managing multi-country research or evaluation studies, that test across contexts and are concerned with external validity;
- proven experience of evaluation of complex political governance/democratic governance programmes in sub-Saharan Africa;

- good understanding of the interaction between political governance challenges and state-society dynamics in difference contexts;
- knowledge and experience of developing and using theories of change;
- in depth knowledge of different approaches to impact evaluation, particularly theory based evaluation;
- proven expertise in use and analysis of qualitative and quantitative data and statistical sampling;
- sound evaluation record, including knowledge of international evaluation standards, and research ethics; and
- a strong communications record.

Experience or electoral observation interventions would also be desirable.

The supplier shall be responsible for the safety and well-being of their Personnel (as defined in Section 2 of the Contract) and Third Parties affected by their activities under this contract, including appropriate security arrangements. They will also be responsible for the provision of suitable security arrangements for their domestic and business property.

DFID will share available information with the Supplier on security status and developments in-country where appropriate and may be able to offer in-country briefings at the request of the supplier. All personnel must register with their respective Embassies to ensure that they are included in emergency procedures.

The Supplier is responsible for ensuring appropriate safety and security briefings for all of their Personnel working under this contract and ensuring that their Personnel register and receive briefing as outlined above. Travel advice is also available on the FCO website and the Supplier must ensure they (and their Personnel) are up to date with the latest position.

The Supplier is responsible for ensuring that appropriate arrangements, processes and procedures are in place for their Personnel, taking into account the environment they will be working in and the level of risk involved in delivery of the Contract (such as working in dangerous, fragile and hostile environments etc.). The Supplier must ensure their Personnel receive the required level of training and safety in the field training prior to deployment.

Tenderers must develop their Tender on the basis of being fully responsible for Duty of Care in line with the details provided above and the initial risk assessment matrix developed by DFID (see *Annex 5: Risk Assessment Matrix*). They must confirm in their Tender that:

- They fully accept responsibility for Security and Duty of Care.
- They understand the potential risks and have the knowledge and experience to develop an effective risk plan.
- They have the capability to manage their Duty of Care responsibilities throughout the life of the contract.

If you are unwilling or unable to accept responsibility for Security and Duty of Care as detailed above, your Tender will be viewed as non-compliant and excluded from further evaluation.

Acceptance of responsibility must be supported with evidence of capability and DFID reserves the right to clarify any aspect of this evidence. In providing evidence Tenderers should consider the following questions:

- a) Have you completed an initial assessment of potential risks that demonstrates your knowledge and understanding, and are you satisfied that you understand the risk management implications (not solely relying on information provided by DFID)?
- b) Have you prepared an outline plan that you consider appropriate to manage these risks at this stage (or will you do so if you are awarded the contract) and are you confident/comfortable that you can implement this effectively?
- c) Have you ensured or will you ensure that your staff are appropriately trained (including specialist training where required) before they are deployed and will you ensure that on-going training is provided where necessary?
- d) Have you an appropriate mechanism in place to monitor risk on a live / on-going basis (or will you put one in place if you are awarded the contract)?
- e) Have you ensured or will you ensure that your staff are provided with and have access to suitable equipment and will you ensure that this is reviewed and provided on an on-going basis?
- f) Have you appropriate systems in place to manage an emergency / incident if one arises?

## **9. Logistics and Procedures**

The consultant(s) will be introduced by DFID's Africa Regional Department (ARD) to DFID Country Office contacts and EISA's nominated lead contact. The latter will provide requested documentation, introduce the consultant(s) to regional body contacts and national government/parliament/civil society partners, and provide support for arranging timetables for field visits. .

ARD will be responsible for compiling initial documentation although the consultant(s) will request more detailed implementation reporting direct from EISA, copied to ARD or the relevant DFID country office.



The inception report and draft evaluation report will be subject to review by DFID's programme team and by DFID's External Quality Assurance Panel. At least 12 working days should be allowed between submission of each report to ARD and receipt of comments.

It is envisaged that the contract start date will be mid June 2013, meaning that the inception report would be due in early July 2013, with final draft report due in mid-September 2013 and final report in mid-October, allowing time for quality assurance processes.

Proposals should be submitted by 5 June 2013.

## **10. Governance, Reporting and Contracting Arrangements**

An Evaluation Steering Group will be established whose role will be to assure future utility of the evaluation, and to ensure that international quality standards are met. Membership of the Evaluation Steering Committee is intended to include: a representative of DFID's Politics, State and Society Team in policy division, a member of DFID's evaluation cadre, DFID's Africa Regional Department Governance Adviser, DFID's African Union representative, a DFID country office representative, and a donor/organisation active in democracy strengthening in Africa.

The first point of contact for the consultant(s) regarding the content and process for the evaluation will be DFID ARD's Governance Adviser. Matters regarding the contract for evaluation work will be handled by ARD's Governance and Extractive Industries Team Deputy Programme Manager.

The inception report and draft evaluation reports will be subject to review by the Evaluation Steering Committee, informed by a technical assessment by DFID's External Quality. Up to three weeks should be allowed between submission of each report to ARD and receipt of comments.

## **11. Budget**

The fees and expenses budget for this work should be within a range of around £ 60,000 to £75,000 (inclusive of 20% value added tax ).

## **Annexes**

1. Project Memorandum
2. Logical Framework
3. Details of Country Coverage
4. List of suggested stakeholders
5. Risk assessment matrix

# Annex 2

## Detailed Methodology

## Annex 2 - Detailed evaluation methodology

The research methods and data sources for each evaluation question asked are set out in the Evaluation Matrix provided in Annex 3. This is summarised into a list of stakeholders to be interviewed (Annex 3.3) and the documents that will be reviewed (Annex 3.2). This section provides an overview of how the research instruments will be developed and how the data will be collated for analysis.

### 2.1 Developing research instruments

#### 2.1.1 Data quality assessment

The evaluation will rely on secondary data sources – both programme documentation from EISA and data from other stakeholders collected through interviews. To ensure that the evaluation findings are as robust as possible, it is important that they be based on high quality data. All data sources were reviewed against the dimensions of data quality listed in Table 1. Where there were serious concerns about the quality of the data source, data was either discounted completely or acknowledged as comparatively weak in the main body of the report.

**Table 1: Definitions of data quality dimensions**

Dimension of Data Quality	Operational Definition
<b>Accuracy</b>	Also known as validity. Accurate data are considered correct: the data measure what they are intended to measure. Accurate data minimize errors (e.g., recording or interviewer bias, transcription error, sampling error) to a point of being negligible.
<b>Reliability</b>	The data generated by a programme's information system are based on protocols and procedures that do not change according to who is using them and when or how often they are used. The data are reliable because they are measured and collected consistently.
<b>Precision</b>	This means that the data have sufficient detail. An information system lacks precision if it is not designed to capture the required characteristics defined in the description of the indicator.
<b>Completeness</b>	Completeness means that an information system from which the results are derived is appropriately inclusive: it represents the <i>complete</i> list of eligible persons or units and not just a fraction of the list.
<b>Timeliness</b>	Data are timely when they are up-to-date (current), and when the information is available on time. Timeliness is affected by: (1) the rate at which the programme's information system is updated; (2) the rate of change of actual programme activities; and (3) when the information is actually used or required.
<b>Integrity</b>	Data have integrity when the system used to generate them is protected from deliberate bias or manipulation for political or personal reasons.
<b>Confidentiality</b>	Confidentiality means that clients are assured that their data will be maintained according to national and/or international standards for data. This means that personal data are not disclosed inappropriately, and that data in hard copy and electronic form are treated with appropriate levels of security (e.g. kept in locked cabinets and in password protected files).

#### 2.1.2 Interviews

The evaluation matrix clearly sets out the information sought from each stakeholder in the form of 'indicators'. The interview plan (Annex 3.4) is structured by stakeholder, and for each one sets out the indicators against which the evaluation team sought evidence. The evaluation team developed detailed topic guides for each respondent prior to interviews to guide conversations. Examples of these are provided in Section 3, below.

### 2.1.3 Online survey and telephone survey

An online survey was conducted using Survey Monkey targeting an inclusive, rather than representative, sample of respondents. The evaluation team received drew on the evaluation matrix to develop survey questions. The survey was piloted before formal roll-out and the findings were used as part of the team’s analysis.

## 2.2 Data collection

### 2.2.1 Secondary data

Secondary data was both provided directly by EISA and through the team’s independent research. Documents reviewed are logged in the document register in Annex 3.2. Additional data sources were added throughout the evaluation providing the team with a rich base of contextual and theoretical knowledge.

### 2.2.2 Interview Transcripts

After each interview or meeting, a detailed transcript was prepared by a professional transcription service to record the contents of the interview. Interviewees are not referenced by name in the main report and not quoted directly.

### 2.2.3 Survey Data

The Evaluation conducted an online survey to collect data. The team used Survey Monkey to collect data because this was easily accessible for all respondents. Data was then exported to excel spread sheets for further analysis.

## 2.3 Data collation and analysis

The Evaluation team used qualitative data analysis software (Atlas TI) to collate data according to the relevant evaluation questions and specific judgement criteria. The team developed a detailed coding framework and trialled this before roll-out to ensure that 1) the framework is comprehensive and 2) that all team members are coding in a consistent manner. The coding framework is provided in Section 4, below.

All data from secondary documents, interviews and surveys was collated using Atlas TI. The coding framework be developed was based on the evaluation matrix and the team coded against key themes and judgement criteria. This enabled the evaluation team to systematically map the available evidence against the evaluation matrix, so that the resulting analysis is as comprehensive and detailed as possible. This also helped ensure that the analytical framework drives the analysis of the evidence, upholding the integrity of the theory-based evaluation. The evaluation matrix provides the analytical framework that was used to answer the evaluation questions.

# Evaluation process

Although the analytical framework distinguishes between the process and theory-based components, Coffey conducted an integrated evaluation. Table 2 summarises the work plan used by the team.

## 2.4 Summary of work plan

**Table 2: Summary of our work plan**

Phase	Steps	Timeline
<b>Inception Phase:</b>	11. Assess the evaluability of ADS II	Complete
	12. Develop a theory of change with EISA and other regional actors	Complete
	13. Develop evaluation and research questions	Complete
	14. Develop an evaluation framework including indicators and data sources	Complete
<b>Implementation</b>	15. Undertake a systematic review of available documentation	Complete

<b>Phase:</b>	16. Finalise the survey design and sample frame	Complete
	17. Collect primary data through key informant interviews and phone interviews	Complete
	18. Collect primary data through online survey	Complete
	19. Analyse data and prepare final report	Complete

## 2.5 Example Topic Guides

### 2.5.1 [Interviewee 1]

- Are all of the ADSII funded activities captured in the logframe? (Mali, etc)
- Does the prioritisation of outputs in the logframe reflect the importance of each of these outputs in terms of achieving outcomes"
- Were the most significant intended effects of the activities all captured in the indicators?
- Was there any significant over or underachievement against milestones? (Given that some of the overall milestones were achieved after year 1). Why or why not?
- In terms of significant over or underachievement against milestones, what factors caused this and what was or was not in EISA's control?
- Were variations to the scope or scale of work were reflected in the logframe?
- How did EISA re-assess programme objectives and activities, in light the progress being made against the logframe milestones?
- How has EISA levered in additional resources (financial or in-kind) to help undertake ADS II?
- From your perspective, what is the strongest evidence that attests to the effect (and scale of effect) of the programme?
- Looking back at the assumptions made by ADS II, do you think they were credible and realistic?
- From your perspective, how did EISA work to effectively mitigate risks associated with ADS II activities?

### 2.5.2 [Interviewee 2]

- Can you please go over the roles and responsibility for data collection and reporting? How are these procedures disseminated internally and what kind of internal checking is done to ensure they are being followed?
- How are the people responsible for data collection, collation or analysis trained?
- Where data is required from partner institutions, how are these requests processed and what kind of documents/data is provided?
- Can you please show us how you define monitoring indicators, and how you gather data and measure against these indicators?
- Can you please go over your data storage procedures (data confidentiality etc)
- Can you please go over your data verification procedures, particularly for data that comes from partners?
- Are most of the significant intended effects of the activites are all captured in the logframe indicators?
- Was there any over or underachievement against logframe milestones? Why/why not?
- In terms of significant over or underachievement against milestones, what factors caused this and what was or was not in EISA's control?

### 2.5.3 [Interviewee 3]

- Are all of the ADSII funded activities captured in the logframe? (Mali, etc)

- Does the prioritisation of outputs in the logframe reflect the importance of each of these outputs in terms of achieving outcomes?
- Were the most significant intended effects of the activities are all captured in the indicators?
- Was there any over or underachievement against logframe milestones? Why/why not?
- In terms of significant over or underachievement against milestones, what factors caused this and what was or was not in EISA's control?
- Were variations to the scope or scale of work were reflected in the logframe?
- How did EISA re-assess programme objectives and activities, in light the progress being made against the logframe milestones?
- How has EISA levered in additional resources (financial or in-kind) to help undertake ADS II?
- From your perspective, what is the strongest evidence that attests to the effect (and scale of effect) of the programme?
- Looking back at the assumptions made by ADS II, do you think they were credible and realistic?
- From your perspective, how did EISA work to effectively mitigate risks associated with ADS II activities?

#### 2.5.4 [Interviewee 4]

- Are all of the ADSII funded activities captured in the logframe? (Mali, etc)
- Does the prioritisation of outputs in the logframe reflect the importance of each of these outputs in terms of achieving outcomes?
- Were the most significant intended effects of the activities are all captured in the indicators?
- Was there any over or underachievement against logframe milestones? Why/why not?
- In terms of significant over or underachievement against milestones, what factors caused this and what was or was not in EISA's control?
- Were variations to the scope or scale of work were reflected in the logframe?
- How did EISA re-assess programme objectives and activities, in light of the progress being made against the logframe milestones? [Particularly in relation to Output 4, given your role]
- How has EISA levered in additional resources (financial or in-kind) to help undertake ADS II?
- From your perspective, what is the strongest evidence that attests to the effect (and scale of effect) of the programme?
- Looking back at the assumptions made by ADS II, do you think they were credible and realistic?
- From your perspective, how did EISA work to effectively mitigate risks associated with ADS II activities?
- Something on legitimacy and credibility? Has the way participants view election outcomes changed over time due to EISA's involvement? For example are losing parties more likely to accept results. Are processes improved? Has adherence to rules and procedures improved? Have partners identified weaknesses in their electoral processes?
- In your opinion, does technical work to improve elections enhance regional bodies' effectiveness in engaging politically with the election process?
- What effect, if any, does comparable data on election processes have on improving the effectiveness of election observers?
- How, if at all, has EISA's stature as an African organisation improved their ability to engage with regional bodies on election issues?

#### 2.5.5 [Interviewee 5]

- Are all of the ADSII funded activities captured in the logframe? (Mali, etc)
- Does the prioritisation of outputs in the logframe reflect the importance of each of these outputs in terms of achieving outcomes?

- Were the most significant intended effects of the activities all captured in the indicators?
- Was there any over or underachievement against logframe milestones? Why/why not?
- In terms of significant over or underachievement against milestones, what factors caused this and what was or was not in EISA's control?
- Were variations to the scope or scale of work reflected in the logframe?
- How did EISA re-assess programme objectives and activities, in light of the progress being made against the logframe milestones?
- How has EISA levered in additional resources (financial or in-kind) to help undertake ADS II?
- From your perspective, what is the strongest evidence that attests to the effect (and scale of effect) of the programme?
- Looking back at the assumptions made by ADS II, do you think they were credible and realistic?
- From your perspective, how did EISA work to effectively mitigate risks associated with ADS II activities?
- In your opinion, does technical work to improve elections enhance regional bodies effectiveness in engaging politically with the election process?
- What effect, if any, does comparable data on election processes have on improving the effectiveness of election observers?
- How, if at all, has EISA's stature as an African organisation improved their ability to engage with regional bodies on election issues?

#### 2.5.6 [Interviewee 6]

- Are all of the ADSII funded activities captured in the logframe? (Mali, etc)
- Does the prioritisation of outputs in the logframe reflect the importance of each of these outputs in terms of achieving outcomes?
- Were the most significant intended effects of the activities all captured in the indicators?
- Was there any over or underachievement against logframe milestones? Why/why not?
- In terms of significant over or underachievement against milestones, what factors caused this and what was or was not in EISA's control?
- Were variations to the scope or scale of work reflected in the logframe?
- How did EISA re-assess programme objectives and activities, in light of the progress being made against the logframe milestones?
- How has EISA levered in additional resources (financial or in-kind) to help undertake ADS II?
- From your perspective, what is the strongest evidence that attests to the effect (and scale of effect) of the programme?
- Looking back at the assumptions made by ADS II, do you think they were credible and realistic?
- From your perspective, how did EISA work to effectively mitigate risks associated with ADS II activities?
- In your opinion, does technical work to improve elections enhance regional bodies effectiveness in engaging politically with the election process?
- What effect, if any, does comparable data on election processes have on improving the effectiveness of election observers?
- How, if at all, has EISA's stature as an African organisation improved their ability to engage with regional bodies on election issues?

#### 2.5.7 [Interviewee 7]

- Are all of the ADSII funded activities captured in the logframe? (Mali, etc)



- Does the prioritisation of outputs in the logframe reflect the importance of each of these outputs in terms of achieving outcomes?
- Were the most significant intended effects of the activities are all captured in the indicators?
- Was there any over or underachievement against logframe milestones? Why/why not?
- In terms of significant over or underachievement against milestones, what factors caused this and what was or was not in EISA's control?
- Were variations to the scope or scale of work were reflected in the logframe?
- How did EISA re-assess programme objectives and activities, in light the progress being made against the logframe milestones?
- How has EISA levered in additional resources (financial or in-kind) to help undertake ADS II?
- From your perspective, what is the strongest evidence that attests to the effect (and scale of effect) of the programme?
- Looking back at the assumptions made by ADS II, do you think they were credible and realistic?
- From your perspective, how did EISA work to effectively mitigate risks associated with ADS II activities?
- What procedures to EISA use when procuring goods and services under ADS II?

#### 2.5.8 [Interviewee 8]

- Are all of the ADSII funded activities captured in the logframe? (Mali, etc)
- Does the prioritisation of outputs in the logframe reflect the importance of each of these outputs in terms of achieving outcomes?
- Were the most significant intended effects of the activities are all captured in the indicators?
- Was there any over or underachievement against logframe milestones? Why/why not?
- In terms of significant over or underachievement against milestones, what factors caused this and what was or was not in EISA's control?
- Were variations to the scope or scale of work were reflected in the logframe?
- How did EISA re-assess programme objectives and activities, in light of the progress being made against the logframe milestones?
- How has EISA levered in additional resources (financial or in-kind) to help undertake ADS II?
- From your perspective, what is the strongest evidence that attests to the effect (and scale of effect) of the programme?
- Looking back at the assumptions made by ADS II, do you think they were credible and realistic?
- From your perspective, how did EISA work to effectively mitigate risks associated with ADS II activities?
- In your opinion, does technical work to improve elections enhance regional bodies effectiveness in engaging politically with the election process?
- What effect, if any, does comparable data on election processes have on improving the effectiveness of election observers?
- How, if at all, has EISA's stature as an African organisation improved their ability to engage with regional bodies on election issues?

## ADS II Coding Framework

### 2.6 Protocols for selecting quotes:

- Test should be quotes that are several sentences or a paragraph in length, to provide sufficient context to whatever evidence is being captured.

- Each piece of evidence should only be quoted once per source--- if a particular piece of evidence is mentioned multiple times in the same source, it should only be coded one time.
- Quotes can be assigned multiple codes.

## 2.7 Codes:

### 2.7.1 Evaluation questions

- **1.1** Evidence of a differentiated role for regional bodies in election observation
- **1.2** Evidence that election observation contributes to more technically sound election processes
- **1.3** Evidence that EISA's stature as a regional body adds value to its work strengthening key national election institutions and support EOMs.
- **2.1** Evidence that activities are designed to increase participation of the poor.
- **2.2** Evidence that EISA initiatives aim to reduce disputes and resultant instability.
- **2.3** Evidence that activities are designed in a gender-sensitive way.
- **3.1** Evidence of ADS contributing to existing programs
- **3.2** Evidence that ADS does not duplicate existing work.
- **4.1** Evidence that ADS II activities have been designed to inform and strengthen each other.
- **4.2** Evidence that ADS II activities have been designed to address multiple dimensions of the problem.
- **5.1** Evidence that partnerships under ADS II have contributed to outcomes that EISA could not have achieved independently.
- **6.1** Activities have been undertaken in accordance with the ADS II proposal.
- **6.2** Output 1: AU, PAP and EISA election observers trained and supported, and EISA EOMs deployed and reports publicised.
- **6.3** Output 2: EMBs, political parties, CSOs have the capacity to play a constructive role in electoral reform, and processes strengthened in Burundi, Chad, Kenya and Mozambique.
- **6.4** Output 3: Capacity of legislatures in Chad and Kenya are effective and responsiveness is enhanced.
- **6.5** Output 4: Capacity of target political parties in selected countries to be effective.
- **6.6** Output 5: EISA is a professional, well-managed, innovative, influential and well focused organisation.
- **7.1** Evidence that feedback and advice provided by EISA are acted upon.
- **7.2** Evidence that EISA participation on missions has led to increased compliance with stated standards
- **7.3** Evidence that regional bodies have adopted regional and international standards as part of their SOPs for EOMs.
- **8.1** Electoral processes in countries receiving EISA support adhere to national rules and institutions
- **8.2** The extent to which participants view election outcomes as valid.
- **8.3** Evidence that EISA's work in Kenya, Mozambique and Chad has increased participation in elections and electoral reform.
- **9.1** Evidence that EISA identified and addressed issues within their control.
- **9.2** Evidence of external issues hindering ADS II project delivery.
- **10.1** There is a robust system in place for collecting, collating and analysing evidence.
- **11.1** Logframe outputs and indicators comprehensively reflect ADS II activities
- **11.2** Logframe outcomes and indicators comprehensively reflect the effects of ADS II activities.
- **11.3** Targets were realistic and set at an appropriate level.

- **11.4** The logframe was used as a performance management tool.
- **15.1** Economy: Inputs being secured at the minimum necessary cost
- **15.2** Efficiency: Outputs are produced efficiently (ratio of inputs to outputs)
- **15.3** Effectiveness: Outputs achieve desired outcomes
- **15.4** Equity: Benefits are distributed fairly
- **16.1** Evidence that ADS II interventions increased the engagement of civil society in electoral reform and election observation
- **17.1** AU/PAP EOMs that work in ways that are fully or largely compliant with international standards.
- **17.2** Electoral processes including national referenda in target countries where electoral processes are fully or largely compliant with internationally accepted standards.
- **17.3** Countries' Parliamentary bills and policies are subject to public consultation.
- **17.4** Requests/feedback recognizing EISA as a key institution contributing to elections and democracy in Africa.
- **18.1** Has the program resulted in any unintended consequences (positive or negative)?
- **19.1** Evidence that ADS II beneficiaries are applying skills they have learned.
- **20.1** Evidence that ADS II activities are designed to ensure sustainable skills are developed.

#### **2.7.2 Research questions:**

- **12.1** Regional institutions are willing and able to adopt regional and international standards to improve electoral processes in their countries.
- **12.2** Countries invite regional bodies to provide support in the technical assessment of the election process.
- **12.3** Increased technical capacity and understanding within EOMs makes them (and their final reports) more professional.
- **12.4** (remove?)
- **13.1** Insufficient resources are a significant barrier to increased numbers of long-term election observation.
- **13.2** Difficulty recruiting long-term election observers with sufficient technical capacity and expertise is a barrier to increased long-term election observation.
- **13.3** Long-term election observation leads to more thorough, higher quality EOMs than would be possible through a short-term mission.
- **14.1** Organisations receiving capacity-building technical assistance from EISA are willing and able to adopt and implement new ways of working / new technologies.
- **14.2** Regional, international and national electoral observer missions are willing to adopt consistent tools and approaches for their EOMs.
- **14.3** (remove?)
- **1X** Evidence relating to the relative strengths of sub-regional election observation, compared to AU election observation.

#### **2.7.3 Codes for evidence quality or source (particularly for coding in-depth interviews):**

- **A** Anecdote or testimonial furnished by EISA
- **B** Anecdote or testimonial furnished by non-EISA source
- **C** First-hand knowledge, direct source
- **D** Second hand, indirect knowledge
- **E** Corroborated by another source

## ANNEX 2 – DETAILED METHODOLOGY

- **F** Official report or document

# Annex 3

## Evaluation Matrix

## Annex 3.1 – Evaluation Matrix

Criteria	Overarching evaluation questions	Specific evaluation question	Judgement criteria		Indicators	Research methodology	Data sources
Relevance	Does the initiative address the problem?	1 What has been learnt about the relevance of the African Union and Pan-African Parliament, and in particular their election observation work, for strengthening participatory democracy?	1.1	Evidence of a differentiated role for regional bodies in election observation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evidence of a technical role for regional bodies in election observation</li> <li>- Evidence of a political role for regional bodies in election observation</li> <li>- Regional election observers perform different functions to domestic observers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Key informant interviews</li> <li>- Document review</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Interviews with CSO partners in Kenya</li> <li>- Interviews with CSO partners in Mozambique</li> <li>- Interviews with CSO partners in Chad</li> <li>- Interviews with AU DEAU staff</li> <li>- Interviews with participants in AU EOMs</li> <li>- Media clippings/coverage from EISA-supported AU missions</li> <li>- Review of academic journals</li> <li>- Interviews with governance and elections experts from academic institutions</li> </ul>
			1.2	Evidence that election observation contribute to more technically sound election processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Regional body-supported election processes more compliant with international standards</li> <li>- Regional body-supported election processes more compliant with national laws</li> <li>- Countries with a substantial regional EOM presence are more likely to meet international standards</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Document review</li> <li>- Key informant interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Reports from AU/PAP-supported EOM missions</li> <li>- Reporting on the quality of election processes</li> <li>- International standards on elections</li> <li>- Interview with DFID AU representative</li> </ul>
		1.3	Has EISA's presence as a regional advisory body been relevant for strengthening the effectiveness of election management at a national level?	Evidence that EISA's stature as a regional body adds value to its work strengthening key national election institutions and support EOMs.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Relevance of EISA's regional reach and structure to it's ability to work with national election institutions</li> <li>- Relevance of EISA's regional reach and structure on it's ability to lead and support EOMs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Key informant interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Interviews with national organisations that liaise with the EMB in Kenya</li> <li>- Interviews with national organisations that liaise with the EMB in Mozambique</li> <li>- Interviews with national organisations that liaise with the EMB in Chad</li> <li>- Interviews with EMB staff in Kenya,</li> <li>- Interviews with EMB staff in Mozambique</li> <li>- Interviews with EMB staff in Chad</li> <li>- Interviews with AU DEAU staff</li> <li>- Interviews with DFID governance adviser in Kenya</li> <li>- Interviews with DFID governance adviser in Mozambique.</li> <li>- Needs assessments and capacity building plans developed by EISA</li> </ul>
	Is the initiative in line with beneficiary needs?	2 How have programme initiatives and results been relevant to increasing participation among women and the poor?	2.1	Evidence that activities are designed to increase participation of the poor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Initiatives working with CSOs are designed to improve voter registration</li> <li>- Initiatives working with EMBs are designed to improve voter registration</li> <li>- Proposed electoral reform supported by EISA will increase participation of the poor</li> <li>- Initiatives are designed to improve voter education</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Document review</li> <li>- Key informant interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Documentation on EISA's engagements with national CSOs in Kenya, Mozambique and Chad</li> <li>- Documentation on EISA's work in electoral reform in Mozambique</li> <li>- Documentation on EISA's work in electoral reform in Kenya</li> <li>- Interviews with EISA staff in Kenya</li> <li>- Interviews with EISA staff in Mozambique</li> <li>- Phone interviews with EISA staff in Chad</li> <li>- Interviews with national partner (CSOs) staff in Kenya</li> <li>- Interviews with national partner (CSOs) staff in Mozambique</li> <li>- Phone interviews with national partner (CSOs) staff in Chad</li> </ul>

				2.2	Evidence that EISA initiatives aim to reduce disputes and resultant instability	- EISA initiatives are designed to reduce electoral disputes	- Document review	- Documentation on the work of EISA's conflict mediation bodies in Kenya
				2.3	Evidence that activities are designed in a gender-sensitive way	- Gender sensitivity of training modules - Gender balance of training participants - Inclusion of Gender-related issues in EOM checklists and toolkits	- Document review	- Manuals and training materials prepared by EISA - Participant lists for EISA training workshops and emails sent by EISA soliciting female training participants - EOM checklists and toolkits that have been developed with the support of EISA - EOM checklists and toolkits that were not developed with the support of EISA - Emails sent by EISA soliciting female election observers for EISA-led EOMs; participant lists for EISA-led EOMs.
Complementarity	To what extent has this programme complemented and contributed the work of other stakeholders?	3	Has this programme complemented and contributed to existing programmes implemented by other stakeholders working on these issues at the regional level?	3.1	Evidence of ADS contributing to existing programs	- Provide support to Electoral Commission Forum (part of SADC) - Information shared with EU - Information shared with IDEA - Information shared with UN - Information shared with Gates Foundation - Information shared with Carter Center - Support provided to staff on secondment to AU DEAU or EOMs from partners - Evidence of EISA acting on support received / lessons learned from partners - Coordination with regional bodies (AU, PAP, EU, UN)	- Document review - Key informant interviews - Survey	- Emails provided by EISA - Interviews with AU DEAU - Interviews with Carter Centre - Interviews with IDEA - Interviews with DFID liaison to AU - Survey of AU / PAP and other partners
				3.2	Evidence that ADS does not duplicate existing work	- Stakeholder mapping undertaken and responded to in design of ADS activities - Evidence of differentiation of work of EISA with AU and the work of other stakeholders - No evidence of duplication of work	- Key informant interviews - Survey	- National stakeholders in Kenya - National stakeholders in Mozambique - National stakeholders in Chad - Interviews with AU DEAU staff - Interviews with IDEAS - Interviews with Carter Centre - Survey of AU / PAP and other partners that interact with EISA under ADS II
Coverage	How is the initiative structured to address the problem identified?	4	Do the components of ADS II inform and strengthen each other to address the problem	4.1	Evidence that ADS II activities have been designed to inform and strengthen each other	- Learning from ADS II pre-election missions informs the design of ADS II EOMs - Existing reports from previous ADS II EOMs informs the approach to new ADS II EOMs - Reports from previous and existing national activities with CSOs / PPs / EMBs in Kenya, Mozambique and Chad (and Burundi) inform the design of new activities in these countries - Evidence that trust and social capital generated through one activity is used to strengthen / improve others	- Key informant interviews - Document review	- Internal EISA reports and emails - Interviews with EISA staff - EISA annual reports and progress reports - Reports on work with CSOs - Reports on work with political parties - Reports on work with EMBs
				4.2	Evidence that ADS II activities have been designed to address multiple of dimensions of the problem	- Problem is clearly and consistently defined in activity designs - Activity design and implementation addresses behaviour barriers - Activity design and implementation addresses capacity barriers - Activity design and implementation addresses resource barriers - Activity design and implementation addresses cultural barriers - Activity design and implementation addresses systems barriers	- Key informant interviews - Document review	- Internal EISA reports and emails - Interviews with EISA staff - EISA annual reports and progress reports - Review of original proposals for activities which set out the rationale for the activities and what they aim to achieve



<p><b>Coordination</b></p>	<p>How successfully have programme interventions worked with other partners?</p>	<p>5</p>	<p>Has coordination with other international actors working to support EOMs under ADS II contributed to outcomes that EISA could not have achieved independently?</p>	<p>5.1</p>	<p>Evidence that partnerships under ADS II have contributed to outcomes that EISA could not have achieved independently</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evidence that EISA has engaged the comparative strengths of their partners under ADS II to achieve outcomes in more collaborative, efficient and effective ways</li> <li>- Further collaboration/ relationships in other areas as a result of ADS II activities</li> <li>- Scope of partnership/work has increased as a result of ADS II activities</li> <li>- Increased engagement of EISA at international level as a result of ADS II activities</li> </ul>	<p>- Key informant interviews</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Interviews with IDEAS</li> <li>- Interviews with Carter Center</li> <li>- Interviews with CSOs in Kenya</li> <li>- Interviews with CSOs in Mozambique</li> <li>- Interviews with CSOs in Chad</li> <li>- Interviews with political parties in Kenya</li> <li>- Interviews with political parties in Mozambique</li> <li>- Interviews with political parties in Chad</li> <li>- Interviews with AU DEAU</li> <li>- Interviews with EISA staff</li> </ul>
<p><b>Effectiveness</b></p>	<p>Has the initiative achieved its objectives?</p>	<p>6</p>	<p>Have activities been delivered in accordance with what was originally intended?</p>	<p>6.1</p>	<p>Activities have been undertaken in accordance with the ADS II proposal</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Activities are delivered in accordance with the descriptions provided in the ADS II proposal</li> <li>- Where activities are not delivered in accordance with the proposal, a clear rationale for changes is provided</li> </ul>	<p>- Document review</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ADS II proposal</li> <li>- Email exchanges relating to programme changes</li> <li>- Annual Reports</li> <li>- Progress Reports</li> <li>- EOM reports</li> </ul>
				<p>6.2</p>	<p><b>Output 1:</b> AU, PAP and EISA election observers trained and supported and EISA election observing missions (EOMs) deployed and reports publicised.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 740 AU observers observers have been trained and support</li> <li>- 520 EISA observers observers have been trained and support</li> <li>- 10 AUC and PAP staff have been trained by EISA</li> <li>- 8 EISA CSO EOM's (supported by DFID) have been deployed</li> <li>- 8 or 100% of EISA CSO EOMs received coverage in the media in the host country</li> </ul>	<p>- Document review</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Accreditation cards from EMBs and EOM statements and reports</li> <li>- Attendance lists, report of training and photos</li> <li>- EOM reports</li> <li>- Media clippings</li> <li>- Annual reports</li> <li>- Progress reports</li> </ul>
				<p>6.3</p>	<p><b>Output 2:</b> Election Management Bodies; political parties, CSOs have the capacity to play a constructive role in electoral reform and processes strengthened in Burundi, Chad, Kenya and Mozambique</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 3 EMBs in target countries with conflict management panels (CMPs) <b>AND/OR</b> 2 EMBs in Burundi, Chad and Kenya with party liaison committees (PLCs)</li> <li>- CSO networks trained by EISA and supported in voter education (VE) in 1 country</li> <li>- CSO networks trained by EISA and supported in election observation (EO) in 2 countries</li> <li>- 340 trainers from political parties in Burundi, Chad and Kenya trained by EISA in poll watching.</li> <li>- Post-election reviews conducted by EISA and reports produced in 2/2 target countries (excluding Mozambique) /non-state groups submit detailed election reform proposals</li> </ul>	<p>- Document review</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Progress reports and EOM reports where relevant</li> <li>- Workshop reports, testimonies from the beneficiaries and other EOM reports where relevant</li> <li>- Workshop reports</li> <li>- Pre-existing trainer / workshop evaluation</li> <li>- Workshop reports and electoral reform submissions where relevant</li> <li>- Annual reports</li> <li>- Progress reports</li> </ul>
				<p>6.4</p>	<p><b>Output 3:</b> Capacity of legislatures in Chad and Kenya are effective and responsiveness is enhanced</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Non-state interaction platforms are established, formalised and meet regularly in Chad and Kenya</li> <li>- EISA has trained and supported 175 (85%) MPs/staff in Chad to be effective in their legislative, representative and oversight roles</li> <li>- EISA has trained and supported 135 (90%) MPs/staff in Chad to be effective in their legislative, representative and oversight roles</li> </ul>	<p>- Document review</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Minutes of meetings with legislators and parliamentary groups</li> <li>- Annual reports</li> <li>- EISA progress reports</li> <li>- Media clippings where available (* MPs and parliamentary staff).</li> </ul>
				<p>6.5</p>	<p><b>Output 4:</b> capacity of target political parties in selected countries to be effective</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 199 political parties' representatives exposed to EISA benchmarks for democratic political parties</li> <li>- 12 political parties targeted endorse EISA benchmarks for democratic political parties</li> </ul>	<p>- Document review</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Minutes of meetings with political parties</li> <li>- EISA progress reports</li> <li>- Media clippings where available</li> <li>- Annual reports</li> <li>- Progress reports</li> </ul>

			6.6	<p><b>Output 5:</b> EISA is a professional, well-managed, innovative, influential and well-focused organisation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 80% partners/ beneficiaries satisfied with EISA programmes and performance</li> <li>- 8 new and innovative products developed</li> <li>- 8 new and innovative products disseminated</li> <li>- 4 unqualified annual audits and 8 key recommendations of IAR report aimed at enhancing EISA's institutional capacity are fully implemented</li> <li>- 500K hits on EISA website</li> <li>- 20 invitations to speak at high-level meetings</li> <li>- 30 partnerships established/sustained with democracy deepening actors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Document review</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Pre-existing participants' evaluation forms</li> <li>- Testimonies from partners</li> <li>- EISA website and EISA Annual Reports</li> <li>- EISA Annual Reports based on Annual Audited Accounts</li> <li>- EISA Annual Reports</li> <li>- Invitation letters to speak at high-level meetings</li> <li>- Copies of MOUs signed and copy of joint activity reports</li> <li>- Records on website traffic</li> </ul>
	7	Have interventions contributed to improved compliance of electoral observation missions with international standards?	7.1	Evidence that feedback and advice provided by EISA are acted upon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Recommendations made by EISA are reflected in policies, reports or tools</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Survey</li> <li>- Document review</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Survey of AU, PAP and other partner staff</li> </ul>
7.2			Evidence that EISA participation on missions has led to increased compliance with stated standards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Country in question sets standards to aspire to (i.e. PEMMO / IFES / other)</li> <li>- EISA-supported missions demonstrate adherence to stated standards</li> <li>- Evidence methodology changed because of EISA inputs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Key informant interviews</li> <li>- Document review</li> <li>- Survey</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EOM reports</li> <li>- Interviews with former election observers</li> <li>- Survey of AU, PAP and other regional body staff</li> </ul>	
7.3			Evidence that regional bodies have adopted EISA methodology and guidelines are part of their SOPs for EOMs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Regional bodies' SOPs changed because of EISA inputs</li> <li>- Regional bodies' methodology changed because of EISA inputs</li> <li>- Regional bodies' tools and checklists changed because of EISA inputs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Key informant interviews</li> <li>- Document review</li> <li>- Survey</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Interviews with AU DEAU staff</li> <li>- AU EOM reports</li> <li>- Survey of AU, PAP and other regional body staff</li> </ul>	
	8	Have electoral management interventions at the regional and national level contributed to enhancing the legitimacy and credibility of elections?	8.1	Electoral processes in countries receiving EISA support adhere to national rules and institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Elections meet national standards</li> <li>- Elections demonstrably followed national procedures</li> <li>- Third parties view elections as adhering to national rules and institutions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Key informant interviews</li> <li>- Document review</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Media clippings</li> <li>- Interviews with EISA staff</li> <li>- Interviews with AU DEAU</li> <li>- Interviews with PAP</li> <li>- Interviews with local organisations</li> <li>- National polling information</li> </ul>
			8.2	The extent to which participants view election outcomes as valid	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Opposition believes election was free and fair</li> <li>- Same procedures were followed by all participants, both government and opposition</li> <li>- Opposition is willing to accept the outcome of the election</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Key informant interviews</li> <li>- Document review</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Election management guidelines and manuals</li> <li>- Third party literature on the subject of election management processes</li> <li>- Media clippings</li> <li>- Progress reports</li> <li>- Annual reports</li> <li>- Interviews with CSOs in Kenya</li> <li>- Interviews with CSOs in Mozambique</li> <li>- Interviews with CSOs in Chad</li> <li>- Interviews with EMB in Kenya</li> <li>- Interviews with EMB in Mozambique</li> <li>- Interviews with EMB in Chad</li> <li>- National polling information</li> </ul>

					Evidence that EISA's work in Kenya, Mozambique and Chad has increased participation in elections and electoral reform	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Weaknesses in electoral reform process have been identified</li> <li>- EISA has engaged partners to address Weaknesses in electoral reform</li> <li>- Change to electoral processes has taken place</li> <li>- Improved laws around voter registration, participation and civil society</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Key informant interviews</li> <li>- Document review</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Third party literature on the subject of election management processes</li> <li>- Media clippings</li> <li>- Progress reports</li> <li>- Annual reports</li> <li>- Interviews with CSOs in Kenya working on electoral reform</li> <li>- Interviews with CSOs in Mozambique working on electoral reform</li> <li>- Interviews with CSOs in Chad working on electoral reform</li> </ul>
What factors have hindered/inhibited achievement of objectives?	9	Were any issues identified in the implementation of the components? If so, how successfully were these addressed by the project implementers?	9.1	Evidence that EISA identified and addressed issues within their control	N/A			
			9.2	Evidence of external issues hindering ADS II project delivery	<i>n/a - this question will be responded through by exploratory research.</i>			
Is the M&E system effective?	10	How robust is available evidence and what are the strengths and weaknesses of EISA's monitoring and evaluation systems?	10.1	There is a robust system in place for collecting, collating and analysing evidence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Roles and responsibility for data collection and reporting are clearly set out and understood by staff members</li> <li>- Individuals who have responsibility for data collection, collation or analysis are appropriately trained</li> <li>- Where data is required from partner institutions, this is clearly communicated and data sharing mechanisms are in place</li> <li>- Indicators are clearly defined and monitoring and measurement against indicators is consistent and detailed</li> <li>- Data is stored confidentially and measures are in place to ensure that it cannot be tampered with</li> <li>- There are clearly defined and followed procedures to verify source data from partners</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Key informant interviews</li> <li>- Document review</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Interview with EISA M&amp;E coordinator and project staff</li> <li>- Review of EISA M&amp;E manuals, procedures and systems</li> <li>- Review of EISA reporting forms</li> <li>- Review of EISA workshop reports, conference reports, EOM reports</li> <li>- Review of any primary data collected by EISA</li> <li>- Review of EISA database systems</li> </ul>	
			11	Has the logframe been a sufficient tool for measuring progress and results?	11.1	Log frame outputs and indicators comprehensively reflect ADS II activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- All ADSII funded activities are captured in the logframe</li> <li>- Prioritisation of outputs reflects the importance of outputs in achieving outcomes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Key informant interviews</li> <li>- Document review</li> </ul>
	11.2	Log frame outcomes and indicators comprehensively reflect the effects of the ADSII activities			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Most significant intended effects of the activities are all captured in the indicators</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Key informant interviews</li> <li>- Document review</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EISA logframe</li> <li>- EISA annual reports and progress reports</li> <li>- Interviews with EISA staff</li> <li>- Minutes from theory of change meeting minutes</li> </ul>	
	11.3	Targets were realistic and set at an appropriate level			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- There was no significant over or underachievement against milestones</li> <li>- Where there was significant over or underachievement against milestones this was caused by factors beyond the control of EISA and justification has been given</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Key informant interviews</li> <li>- Document review</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EISA logframe</li> <li>- EISA annual reports</li> <li>- Progress reports</li> <li>- Interviews with EISA staff</li> </ul>	
	11.4	The logframe was used as a performance management tool			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Variations to the scope or scale of work were reflected in the logframe</li> <li>- Progress reporting against milestones prompted re-assessment of programme objectives and activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Document review</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Minutes from meetings between DFID and EISA</li> <li>- Older drafts of the logframe</li> <li>- Email exchanges regarding changes to the log frame</li> </ul>	

Do the assumptions in the program logic hold true?	12	If regional bodies have technical capacity to advise on and observe election processes, will this enhance their ability to and effectiveness in politically engaging with the election process?	12.1	Regional institutions are willing and able to adopt EISA approaches to improve electoral processes in their countries	N/A		
			12.2	Countries invite regional bodies to provide support in the technical management of the election process.	N/A		
			12.3	Increased technical capacity and understanding within EOMs makes them (and their final reports) less susceptible to undue political influence.	N/A		
			12.4	Regional bodies (including EISA) use activities around technical strengthening in order to engage in conversations about political issues	N/A		
	13	Are well-resourced regional bodies with sufficient access to technical expertise more likely to engage in long-term election observation, strengthening the quality of their EOMs?	13.1	Insufficient resources are a significant barrier to increased numbers of long-term election observation.	N/A		
			13.2	Difficulty recruiting long-term election observers with sufficient technical capacity and expertise is a barrier to increased long-term election observation.	N/A		
			13.3	Long-term election observation leads to more thorough, higher quality EOMs than would be possible through a short-term mission.	N/A		
	14	If consistent and comparable data on election processes is available, will the effectiveness of election observers, including EISA will be enhanced?	14.1	Organisations receiving capacity-building technical assistance from EISA are willing and able to adopt and implement new ways of working/ new technologies.	N/A		
			14.2	Regional, international and national electoral observer missions are willing to adopt consistent tools and approaches for their EOMs.	N/A		

				14.3	Data is used by regional bodies, media, domestic and international observers and civil society to make comparisons between elections over time and between countries and this comparison informs findings and recommendations.	N/A		
Efficiency	Is the initiative cost effective?	15	Could the results generated by the programme have been achieved in a more cost-effective manner?	15.1	Economy: Inputs being secured at the minimum necessary cost	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- All travel is supported by a sound business case</li> <li>- Flights are procured at the minimum necessary cost</li> <li>- Hotels are procured at the minimum necessary cost</li> <li>- Staff salaries are in line with market rates</li> <li>- Consultant fees are in line with market rates</li> </ul>	- Document review	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Expense reports</li> <li>- Receipts</li> <li>- Average salary information</li> <li>- Historical consultant fee rate data</li> </ul>
				15.2	Efficiency: Outputs are produced efficiently (ratio of inputs to outputs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Comparison of cost per training workshop</li> <li>- Comparison of cost per EOM deployment</li> <li>- Cost per publication</li> </ul>	- Document review	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Training costs reports</li> <li>- EOM costs reports</li> <li>- Publication costs reports</li> </ul>
				15.3	Effectiveness: Outputs achieve desired outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evidence is that the programme has levered in additional resources (financial or in-kind)</li> <li>- Evidence of the effect (and scale of effect) of the programme</li> <li>- Assumptions underpinning interventions are credible and realistic</li> <li>- Risks associated with activities are effectively mitigated</li> </ul>	- Key informant interviews - Document review	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Log Frame - Annual reports</li> <li>- Programme risk register</li> <li>- Interviews with EISA project management staff</li> <li>- Interviews with AU - Interviews with CSOs in Kenya</li> <li>- Interviews with CSOs in Mozambique</li> <li>- Interviews with CSOs in Chad</li> <li>- Interviews with political parties in Kenya</li> <li>- Interviews with political parties in Mozambique</li> <li>- Interviews with political parties in Chad</li> </ul>
				15.4	Equity: benefits are distributed fairly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Number of men and women beneficiaries reached through EISA-led activities</li> </ul>	- Document review	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Lists of participants in EISA workshops, trainings, EISA-led EOMs, EISA organised conferences.</li> </ul>
Impact	Has the initiative achieved its planned outcomes?	16	What interventions increased the space and capacity for national level engagement in electoral reform by civil society organisations and political parties?	16.1	Evidence that ADS II interventions increased the engagement of civil society in electoral reform and election observation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Interventions include CS in national forums and workshops</li> <li>- Interventions include CS in regional conferences</li> <li>- CS engagement in electoral reform processes</li> <li>- CS society peer learning through partnership and EOMs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Key informant interviews</li> <li>- Document review</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Documentation on EISA's engagements with national CSOS in Kenya</li> <li>- Documentation on EISA's engagements with national CSOS in Mozambique</li> <li>- Documentation on EISA's engagements with national CSOS in Chad</li> <li>- Documentation on EISA's work in electoral reform in Mozambique</li> <li>- Media clippings</li> <li>- Interviews with EISA staff in Kenya,</li> <li>- Interviews with EISA staff in Mozambique</li> <li>- Interview with EISA staff in Chad</li> <li>- EISA annual reports and progress reports</li> <li>- Participant lists for national forums, workshops and regional conferences</li> <li>- Interviews with national CSOs staff in Kenya</li> <li>- Interviews with national CSOs staff in Mozambique</li> <li>- Interviews with national CSOs staff in Chad</li> <li>- Survey of CSOs and national actors</li> </ul>

		17	Are there stronger and more effective democratic institutions in Burundi, Chad, Kenya and Mozambique and at the pan-Africa level.	17.1	AU/PAP election observer missions (EOM) that work in ways that are fully or largely compliant (FC or LC) with international standards.	- 25% of AU/PAP EOMs are fully compliant	- Document review	- EISA EOM Scorecard - Log frame - Annual reports
				17.2	Electoral processes incl. national referenda in target countries where electoral processes fully or largely compliant (FC or LC) with internationally accepted standards.	- 1 fully compliant country that includes a national referenda - 3 largely compliant countries that include a national referenda	- Document review	- EISA EOM Scorecard - Log frame - Annual reports
				17.3	Countries' Parliamentary bills and policies are subject to public consultation	- 2 target countries parliamentary bills and policies are subject to public consultation	- Document review	- Media clippings
				17.4	Requests/feedback recognising EISA as a key institution contributing to elections and democracy in Africa	- 100 requests/ feedback received	- Document review	- Participant / partner testimonials from previous exchanges - Media clippings - Invitation letters
	Has the program resulted in any unintended consequences (positive or negative)?	18	Has the program resulted in any unintended consequences (positive or negative)?	18.1	Has the program resulted in any unintended consequences (positive or negative)?	- n/a: this question will be responded to through exploratory research		
Sustainability	Are the benefits that have been achieved by the programme to date likely to be sustained?	19	Are the benefits that have been achieved by the programme to date likely to be sustained?	19.1	Evidence that ADS II beneficiaries are applying skills they have learned	- Beneficiaries apply new capacities and skills independently - Beneficiaries will be able to apply skills and capacities in future activity related to the election process	- Key informant interviews - Document review	- Internal EISA reports and emails - Interviews with EISA staff - EISA annual reports and progress reports - Interviews with AU DEAU staff - Interviews with CSOs in Kenya - Interviews with CSOs in Mozambique - Interviews with CSOs in Chad - Interviews with EISA-led EOM observers - Training reports
		20	Have the capacity development interventions taken adequate steps to ensure sustainability of skills developed?	20.1	Evidence that ADS II activities are designed to ensure sustainable skills are developed	- EISA processes for selection of trainees targets individuals with a long term role in the election process - Training is relevant to individuals roles in the election process and targets identified capacity gaps	- Key informant interviews - Document review	- Internal EISA reports and emails - Interviews with EISA staff - EISA annual reports and progress reports - Interviews with AU DEAU staff - Interviews with CSOs in Kenya - Interviews with CSOs in Chad - Interviews with CSOs in Mozambique - Interviews with EISA-led EOM observers

## Annex 3.2 – Document Register

	Document	Author	Publication date	Status	Date expected	Action required	Contact person	Description
1	ADS II Inception Report	EISA	Mar-10	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
2	ADS II Annual Review (2010)	DFID	Mar-10	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
3	ADS II Annual Review (2011)	DFID	Sep-11	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
4	ADS II Annual Review (2012)	DFID	Sep-12	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
5	ADS II Annual Report	EISA	Sep-12	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
6	Building Stability Overseas Strategy	HMG	2011	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	Relevant theoretical framework
7	Capability, Accountability and Responsiveness Framework	Mick Moore; Graham Teskey	2006	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	Relevant theoretical framework
8	EISA Conflict Management Handbook	EISA	-	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
9	Egypt ROM Report	EISA	2012	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
10	International Election Observation Missions, Technical Assessment Missions, and Mission Support	EISA	-	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
11	Organising Social Dialogue: A Guide	EISA	2011	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
12	Rapport de la mission D'observation de l'EISA Guinee	EISA	2010	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
13	EISA Election Observer Mission Report - Lesotho	EISA	2012	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
14	EISA Election Observer Mission Report - Liberia	EISA	2011	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
15	EISA Election Observer Mission Report - Mozambique	EISA	2009	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
16	EISA Election Observer Mission Report - Zanzibar	EISA	2010	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
17	Non-Partisan Citizen Observation Handbook	EISA	-	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
18	Setting Benchmarks for Enhanced Political Party Performance for Democratic Governance in Africa	EISA	2013	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
19	Lignes Directrices Pour Rehausser la Performance des Partis Politiques en Matiere de Gouvernance Demoratique en Afrique	EISA	2013	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
20	Estabelecer Padrões para um Melhor Desempenho dos Partidos Políticos para uma Governação Democrática em África	EISA	2013	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
21	EISA Legislative Component Progress Report	EISA	2008	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
22	EISA ADS II Project Proposal	EISA	2009	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
23	Project Memorandum	DFID	2009	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
24	Concept Note for New Proposal	EISA	2008	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
25	Interim Report - Capacity Building Component	DFID	-	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
26	Interim Report - Elections Component	DFID	-	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
27	Interim Report - Legislative Component	DFID	-	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
28	When Elections Become a Curse: Redressing Electoral Violence in Africa	EISA	2010	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
29	Media clippings from EISA-supported AU EOMs	EISA	-	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
30	Reports from workshops with CSOs in Chad	EISA	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
31	Reports from workshops with CSOs in Kenya	EISA	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
32	Reports from workshops with CSOs in Mozambique	EISA	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
33	Emails between EISA and partners on the subject of partnership and coordination with external organisations	Various	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
34	Emails within EISA on the subject of coordinating activities that cut across ADS II outputs	Various	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
35	Emails within EISA on the subject of designing ADS II activities	Various	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	



36	Invitation letters/ Accreditation cards from EMBs and EOM statements and reports	Various	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
37	Attendance lists, report of training and photos	EISA	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
38	Training feedback sheets from workshops / trainings with CSOs	EISA	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
39	Training feedback sheets from workshops / trainings with EMBs	EISA	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
40	Training feedback sheets from workshops / trainings with regional bodies	EISA	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
41	Workshop reports from trainings with EMBs	EISA	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
42	Electoral reform submissions - Chad	Various	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
43	Electoral reform submissions - Kenya	Various	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
44	Electoral reform submissions - Mozambique	Various	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
45	Minutes of meetings with legislatures demonstrating improved capacity and responsiveness	EISA	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
46	Invitations for EISA staff to speak at high level events	Various	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
47	Report on website traffic	EISA	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
48	Legislation governing election management in Chad	Government of Chad	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
49	Legislation governing election management in Kenya	Government of Kenya	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
50	Legislation governing election management in Mozambique	Government of Mozambique	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
51	EISA internal organogram	EISA	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
52	EISA working practices guidelines (quality assurance process etc)	EISA	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
53	EISA M&E manual and / or guidelines	EISA	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
54	EISA reporting forms and / or templates	EISA	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
55	Conference reports	EISA	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
56	EISA Log Frame	EISA	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
57	Emails between EISA and DFID on the subject of changing / updating the log frame	EISA / DFID	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
58	Emails between EISA and external partners on the subject of their role in conflict mediation	Various	-	Requested from EISA	-	-	-	
59	Book Review: Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa	Roger Southall	2005	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
60	Citizens' Perceptions of Government Responsiveness in Africa: Do Electoral Systems and Ethnic Diversity Matter?□	Wonbin Cho	2010	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
61	Do International Election Monitors Increase or Decrease Opposition Boycotts?	Judith Kelley	2011	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
62	Does the Quality of Democracy Matter for Women's Rights? Just Debate and Democratic Transition in Chile and South Africa	Denise M. Walsh	2012	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
63	Electoral Gender Quotas: A Conceptual Analysis	Mona Lena Krook	2013	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
64	Electoral Governance Matters: Explaining the Quality of Elections in Contemporary Latin America	Jonathan Hartlyn et al	2007	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
65	Electoral Protests and Democratization Beyond the Color Revolutions	Katya Kalandadze	2009	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
66	Electoral regimes and party-switching: Floor-crossing in South Africa's local legislatures	Eric McLaughlin	2011	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
67	In the Shadow of Democracy Promotion: Strategic Manipulation, International Observers, and Election Boycotts	Emily Beaulieu and Susan D. Hyde	2008	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
68	Measuring Democracy through Election Outcomes: A Critique with African Data	Matthijs Bogaards	2007	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
69	Multiparty Elections and Party Support in Tanzania	Edwin Babeiya	2011	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
70	New Datasets on Political Institutions and Elections, 1972–2005	Patrick M. Regan et al	2009	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
71	Newspaper coverage of post political election violence in Africa: an assessment of the Kenyan example	Uche Onyebadi and Tayo Oyediji	2011	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
72	Party systems and democratic consolidation in Africa's electoral regimes	Michelle Kuenzi and Gina Lambright	2005	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
73	Patterns of Electoral Governance in Africa's Emerging Democracies	Shaheem Mozaffar	2002	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
74	Power sharing, peace and democracy: Any obvious relationships?	Helga Malmin Binningsbø	2013	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
75	Rushing to the Polls: The Causes of Premature Postconflict Elections	Dawn Brancati and Jack L. Snyder	2011	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
76	The Comparative Study of Electoral Governance—Introduction	Shaheem Mozaffar and Andreas Schedler	2002	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
77	The cost of exposing cheating: International election monitoring, fraud, and post-election violence in Africa	Ursula E Daxecker	2012	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
78	The Politics of Media Accountability in Africa: An Examination of Mechanisms and Institutions	Wisdom J. Tetey	2006	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	
79	The Will of the Parties Versus the People? Defections, Elections and Alliances in South Africa	Susan Booysen	2006	Softcopy in Dropbox	-	-	-	

# Annex 4

## Evaluability Assessment

## Annex 4 – Detailed evaluability assessment

The evaluability assessment considered the activities under the 5 programme objectives to determine whether there were clear objectives for carrying out activities and whether the M&E systems in place collected adequately robust data to support an evaluation. It should be noted that the inherently political and rapidly changing in which ADSII operates requires the programme to be flexible and opportunistic and that it is not always possible or appropriate to set objectives for their activities or monitor their effects through systematic data collection, for example conducting informal lunch time meetings in order to influence decision making. For these sorts of activities it may not be possible to evaluate these activities against what they set out to achieve, but as far as possible, the effects of these activities will be captured through qualitative research.

The evaluability assessment also considered the evaluation questions to determine their relevance and assess the feasibility of collecting reliable data in order to respond to the questions. For each question, the relevance to stakeholders is rated as *'highly relevant'*, *'relevant'*, *'somewhat relevant'*, and the possibility of collecting a sufficient standard of data is rated as *'possible to a high standard'*, *'possible to a sufficient standard'*, *'not possible to a sufficient standard'*. It should be noted that not all evaluation questions or components of the programme can be considered 'high priority'. Where something is considered as a lower priority, this does not mean that it is not important, just that it is not necessarily a focus area for this particular evaluation.

Programme component/ activity	Coherent set of goals?	M&E system in place for collecting robust data?
<b>Output 1: AU, PAP and EISA election observers trained and supported and EISA election observing missions (EOMs) deployed and reports publicised.</b> <b>Weight: 25%</b>		
AU EOMs (DEAU, PAP)	Conduct EOM's in line with international standards and best-practice methodologies	EOM reports available;
EISA EOMs (Mozambique, S. Sudan, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Tanzania, Cameroun, Zambia, Chad, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Uganda, Kenya, Senegal, Tunisia, Mali?)		EOM reports available for EISA-led EOMs and M&E data collection on deployment, operations and procurement for missions.
<b>Output 2: Capacity of key stakeholders (Election Management Bodies, political parties, CSOs) to play a constructive role in electoral reform and processes strengthened in 4 countries (incl. work already done in Burundi before closure).</b> <b>Weight: 35%</b>		
CMPs (Conflict Mediation Programmes) (Chad, Kenya)	Building capacity of CSOs, EMBs and political parties in election observation, elections management, vote	EISA collects data on each training, workshop and conference they hold, including capacity-building training for CSOs, EMBs and political parties. EISA also records information about the results of this

MPLCs (Multiparty Liaison Committees) (Kenya)	tabulation, voters register audit, election-related conflict management and resolution, to ensure effective, accessible and sustainable democratic processes.	training in their progress reports and Annual reports.  EISA documents their interactions with CMPs and MPLCs in Chad and Kenya.
Voter education (Chad)		
Domestic observation (Chad)		
Poll watching (Kenya, Chad)		
Post-election reviews (Chad)		
Electoral reforms (Mozambique, Kenya)		

**Output 3: Capacity of legislatures in 2 target countries to be effective and responsive enhanced (Chad & Kenya)**

**Weight: 15%**

Parliament- non state interactions (Chad, Kenya)	Providing support to national legislatures and CSOs to improve CSOs understanding and influencing of policy making, promoting effective citizen participation in democratic processes to strengthen institutional accountability and responsiveness.	EISA documents their interactions with parliamentarians and CSOs in Chad and Kenya
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**Output 4: Capacity of political parties in selected countries to effective enhanced**

**Weight: 15%**

Political parties' benchmarks exposure/ endorsement/ party training (Mozambique, Chad, Kenya)	Institutional strengthening of political parties to ensure effective, accessible and sustainable democratic processes.	EISA collects data on the number of political parties introduced to the benchmarks, the number of parties who have endorsed or adopted these benchmarks, and on any training sessions conducted with political parties in these 3 countries.
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**Output 5: EISA is a professional, well-managed, innovative, influential and well-focused organisation.**

**Weight: 10%**

Strengthen internal operational, governance and management systems.	Strengthening EISA's operational, governance and management systems, creating a culture of excellence within EISA that leads to consistently high quality products and services	EISA has its' internal policies and procedures manuals stored and has M&E data collection systems and databases in place.
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Evaluation question	Relevance to stakeholders?	Possible to collect data to a sufficient standard?
<b>Relevance</b>		
What has been learnt about the relevance of the African Union and Pan-African Parliament, and in particular their election observation work, for strengthening participatory democracy?	<b>Highly relevant:</b> For both DFID and EISA, evidence on the relevance of regional bodies and their observation work to strengthening participatory democracy is extremely important because a significant amount of funding and project activity is conducted in this area. Evidence in this area could be used to shape future funding and activity.	<b>Possible to a high standard:</b> Data will be gathered through key informant interviews with a range of stakeholders and through review of the literature published in this area.
Has EISA's presence as a regional advisory body been relevant for strengthening the effectiveness of election management at a national level?	<b>Highly relevant:</b> The relevance of EISA as a regional body is critical in assessing the value that they offer and the impact of their activities. This question will assess whether the problems or needs that exists can best be addressed by EISA in their capacity.	<b>Possible to a sufficient standard:</b> The relevance of EISA's activities will largely be determined through interviews with members of Election Management Bodies in Kenya, Mozambique and Chad and there is a risk of self-serving bias influencing the data. In order to address this, third parties who have also worked with EMBs will be interviewed. Where available, the evaluation will also consider evidence of the capacity of EMBs prior to EISA's interventions ie needs assessment reports.
How have programme initiatives and results been relevant to increasing participation among women and the poor?	<b>Relevant:</b> this question will focus on how EISA's activities have been conducted in a way that promotes gender equality. Both DFID and EISA are committed to gender equality and it is important to explore how these commitments translate into activities.	<b>Possible to a high standard:</b> EISA maintains detailed records of their activities and the makeup of participants. It is also understood that EISA's communication with stakeholders explicitly states requirements for equal participation.
<b>Complementarity</b>		

<p>Has this programme complemented and contributed to existing programmes implemented by other stakeholders working on these issues at the regional level?</p>	<p><b>Somewhat relevant:</b> A key principle of development effectiveness is coordination between actors to ensure that activities complement and do not duplicate each other. The extent to which EISA's activities complement those of other actors will be considered, but it is noted that the nature and extent of cooperation are often driven by strategic and political factors, and that there may be pertinent reasons for overlap of activities.</p>	<p><b>Possible to a sufficient standard:</b> Some primary research will be undertaken with other actors and the evaluation will review documentation relating to cooperation or information sharing. The evaluation will not focus significant resources in this area because complementarity is not considered to be a high-priority area for stakeholders.</p>
<p><b>Coverage</b></p>		
<p>Do the components of ADS II inform and strengthen each other to address the problem?</p>	<p><b>Relevant:</b> In evaluating a programme it is important to consider how comprehensively it addresses the problem identified.</p>	<p><b>Possible to a sufficient standard:</b> Review of programme documentation and interviews with key stakeholders within EISA will provide strong evidence into the rationale for activities and how they fit together to address the problem. There is a small risk of exposure bias, because the conceptualization of the problem as well as the means of addressing it are both provided by EISA. This will be managed through review of secondary data and by drawing on the expertise of team members.</p>
<p><b>Coordination</b></p>		
<p>Has coordination with other international actors working to support EOMs under ADS II contributed to outcomes that EISA could not have achieved independently?</p>	<p><b>Somewhat relevant:</b> Cooperation with partners to achieve something that is 'greater than the sum of parts' is a key indicator of effectiveness. The extent to which ADSII has done this successfully will be considered in the evaluation but is not considered to be a high priority area.</p>	<p><b>Possible to a sufficient standard:</b> Assessment of the effectiveness of cooperation will largely be assessed through interviews with EISA's partners. There is a risk of bias affecting the data produced for two main reasons 1) organisations might be keen to protect their relationship with EISA and reluctant to say anything negative or identify areas for improvement or 2) organisations might be unwilling to reveal their own weaknesses or the extent to which they rely on EISA, instead choosing to depict a situation where EISA they are providing more support to EISA than is necessarily the case. These risks will be managed through careful structuring of the questionnaires / topic guides to encourage interviewees to focus on the nature of the cooperation that takes place.</p>
<p><b>Effectiveness</b></p>		
<p>Have activities been delivered in</p>	<p><b>Highly relevant:</b> Delivering activities according to what is planned is an</p>	<p><b>Possible to a high standard:</b> The evaluation will combine a review of programme documentation</p>

accordance with what was originally intended?	important element of accountability and a high priority for the evaluation.	with interviews with programme beneficiaries and a range of other stakeholders with varying levels of involvement in EISA activities. A data quality assessment will also be undertaken to assess the quality of evidence produced by EISA. The table above provides more detail on the 'evaluability' of individual activities.
Have interventions contributed to improved compliance of electoral observation missions with international standards?	<b>Highly relevant:</b> Improving compliance with international standards is one of the key objectives of EISAs work in deploying EOMs and support the technical capacity of the AU to deploy missions. As such, evidence of the effect of EISAs efforts to improve compliance is highly relevant in evaluating the programme.	<b>Possible to a sufficient standard:</b> By reviewing EOM reports and interviewing members of EOMs it will be possible to collect very strong evidence of whether or not EOMs followed international standards. It may, however, be difficult to reliably prove the extent to which EISA's interventions have contributed to the EOM's adhering to international standards and assess (even qualitatively) what might have happened anyway.
Have electoral management interventions at the regional and national level contributed to enhancing the legitimacy and credibility of elections?	<b>Highly relevant:</b> Enhancing the legitimacy and credibility of elections is one of the main objectives of EISAs activities and so this is an extremely relevant question to assess the value of the programme.	<b>Possible to a sufficient standard:</b> The theory linking EISAs election management activities to enhanced legitimacy and credibility of elections contains many assumptions and the success of activities is vulnerable to a number of powerful external forces such as political will which are beyond the control or influence of EISA or any one actor. In addition to this, assessments of the legitimacy and credibility of elections can be subject to personal perspective bias and it is likely that the variety of stakeholders consulted will have slightly different views on the extent to which election processes that EISA contributed to were considered legitimate and fair.  This evaluation was commissioned to focus on the process of ADSII implementation and was not designed to rigorously test its impact. Within the scope and resource limitations of the evaluation, it will be possible to provide evidence of the <i>contribution</i> of EISAs electoral management interventions to enhancing legitimacy and credibility.
What factors have driven/enabled achievement of objectives?	<b>Highly relevant:</b> In addition to assessing whether EISA has achieved its objectives, it is important to consider how and why this is the case in order to strengthen future programme design	<b>Possible to a sufficient standard:</b> The research conducted will involve a wide range of stakeholders with different perspectives on election processes and EISAs role in supporting them. These perspectives and the drivers and enablers reported will be captured in the report; however it is beyond the scope of the evaluation to rigorously assess the impact of these external factors.



<p>Were any issues identified in the implementation of the components? If so, how successfully were these addressed by the project implementers?</p>	<p><b>Relevant:</b> In assessing ADSII, it is important to consider EISA's effectiveness as a program implementer and the way in which they managed the barriers that they faced.</p>	<p><b>Possible to a sufficient standard:</b> Assessment of the issues faced will largely rely on testimonies from EISA staff who were responsible for implementing activities as they are able to comment</p>
<p>How robust is available evidence and what are the strengths and weaknesses of EISA's monitoring and evaluation systems?</p>	<p><b>Highly relevant:</b> Our assessment of ADS II will reply to a significant extent on pre-existing data collected by EISA, so the strengths and weaknesses of EISA's monitoring systems are relevant not just to Output 5, but to the quality of the ADS II evaluation as a whole.</p>	<p><b>Possible to a sufficient standard:</b> The Evaluation Team will conduct a data quality assessment which will include a review of EISA's internal M&amp;E systems, procedures and database. This data will be triangulated to the extent possible with data collected through in-depth interviews with key stakeholders and partners, but it is beyond the scope of this evaluation to independently verify data by repeating surveys or systematically cross-checking information with beneficiaries.</p>
<p>Has the logframe been a sufficient tool for measuring progress and results?</p>	<p><b>Highly relevant:</b> A lot of time and effort has been invested in developing a logframe. It is important to assess its effectiveness as a performance management tool, and also to determine the extent to which it captures the results being achieved.</p>	<p><b>Possible to a high standard:</b> As well as assessing EISA's achievements against the milestones set out in the logframe, the evaluation seeks to capture un-reported and un-intended effects of ADSII. The evaluation will also include discussions with a range of stakeholders on their perceptions of the usefulness and adequacy of the logframe.</p>
<p>How is gender equality addressed?</p>	<p><b>Relevant:</b> ADS II was designed to address gender through its training and work with partners, but gender equality is not a central focus of ADS II programme design.</p>	<p><b>Possible to a sufficient standard:</b> EISA maintains detailed records of their activities and the makeup of participants. It is also understood that EISA's communication with stakeholders explicitly states requirements for equal participation.</p>
<p><b>Efficiency</b></p>		
<p>Could the results generated by the programme have been achieved in a more cost-effective manner?</p>	<p><b>Highly relevant:</b> Cost-effectiveness is a central aspect of Output 5, as it relates to the effectiveness of EISA's internal organizational processes and it is something that is critical to consider when evaluating EISA's work under ADS II.</p>	<p><b>Possible to a sufficient standard:</b> Assessment of the issues faced will largely rely on a review of EISA's internal data collection systems and while these systems are believed to be sound, the level of detail captured and the ease which resource use can be analysed by activity is not currently clear.</p>
<p><b>Impact</b></p>		
<p>What interventions</p>	<p><b>Highly relevant:</b> Creating space for</p>	<p><b>Possible to a sufficient standard:</b> Assessment</p>

<p>increased the space and capacity for national level engagement in electoral reform by civil society organisations and political parties?</p>	<p>civil society is a central strategic objective of EISA as a whole, and is relevant to Output 2 of ADS II.</p>	<p>of the extent to which ADS II has increased space for civil society will be assessed through interviews with key programme partners, including civil society organizations, EMBs, political parties and legislators. This will triangulate EISA programme documentation and testimonials. However, there is a risk of bias, both social acceptability bias and self-importance bias as respondents may seek to overemphasise the importance of their own role creating space for civil society, or they may feel that it's more socially acceptable to affirm that space for civil society has been created, rather than saying that it hasn't. This will be managed through interviewer selection, ensuring that a range of perspectives are included and through review of secondary data and by drawing on the expertise of team members.</p> <p>This evaluation is process and theory focused and was not designed to rigorously test the impact of ADS II activities. Within the scope and resource limitations of the evaluation, it will be possible to provide evidence of the <i>contribution</i> of EISAs activities under ADS II to increasing the space and capacity for civil society engagement on elections.</p>
<p>Has ADSII achieved the outcomes set out in logframe?</p>	<p><b>See table above</b></p>	
<p>Has the program resulted in any unintended consequences (positive or negative)?</p>	<p><b>Relevant:</b> Unintended consequences are an inevitable aspect of project implementation and are important to assess as they can help clarify the project theory of change and inform future project design.</p>	<p><b>Possible to a sufficient standard:</b> The evaluation will combine a review of programme documentation with interviews with programme beneficiaries and a range of other stakeholders with varying levels of involvement in EISA activities. There is a risk of exposure bias with this type of exploratory research, as the information on this is by nature unintended and cannot be assessed systematically.</p>
<p><b>Sustainability</b></p>		
<p>Are the benefits that have been achieved by the programme to date likely to be sustained?</p>	<p><b>Highly relevant:</b> Capacity-building of key partners is central to the ADS II programme design, and relates centrally to partner's ability to sustain the benefits of this programme.</p>	<p><b>Possible to a sufficient standard:</b> The sustainability of the benefits achieved by EISA will be assessed through interviews with a range of trainers and trainees of the programme. Training reports and feedback forms will also be reviewed where available.. It will not be possible to track a large numbers of beneficiaries of training programmes over a long period of time, and there is a risk of selection bias in interviewing those who are still involved with EISA or election</p>

		management bodies.
<p>Have the capacity development interventions taken adequate steps to ensure sustainability of skills developed?</p>	<p><b>Highly relevant:</b> Capacity-building of key partners is central to the ADS II programme design, making the design and implementation of these aspects of ADS II of high interest for the evaluation.</p>	<p><b>Possible to a high standard:</b> A review of the steps taken to ensure sustainability will be based on programme documentation and interviews with key stakeholders involved with the training process.</p>

# Annex 5

## Theory of Change Summary

# Annex 5 –Theory of Change Workshop Report

## 1 Introduction and overview

Coffey facilitated a Theory of Change with EISA and some of their national and regional partners August 5-6, 2013 in Johannesburg. This initial theory of change workshop report is intended to provide a brief summary of the purpose and outputs of the theory of change workshop. It does not provide detailed workshop outputs and a comprehensive version will be included as an annex to the Inception Report.

### 1.1 Purpose of the workshop

#### 1.1.1 Building the basis for a theory-based evaluation

Workshop participants developed a theory of change for EISA's regional approaches to strengthening election management and election observation missions. The primary aim of the workshop was to develop a deeper contextual understanding of the root problems EISA and other regional bodies face in terms of observing elections and supporting improved election processes, the activities being implemented to address these problems, and the changes we expect to see in the short, medium and long term as a result of the activities of EISA and the other regional bodies it supports— concentrating on causal linkages.

Using a common understanding of the root problems developed through workshop activities, participants identified several hypotheses for how change happens. The evaluation team will refine these hypotheses during the inception phase and, in the inception report, will propose a selection of hypotheses to test during implementation to meet DFID's requirement for a theory-based evaluation that provides learning insights about what works when supporting regional bodies in the democratic governance sector.


#### 1.1.2 Improving participants' understanding of their work

A secondary purpose of the workshop was to provide participants with the opportunity to consider the appropriateness of their own activities which address these issues. The theory of change process maps the changes we expect to see in the short, medium and long-term, focusing on the causal linkages between inputs, outputs, outcomes and impact. By considering their own work in more detail, the theory of change workshop provided an opportunity for participants to improve the work of their own organisations.

## 2 Summary of the theory of change

Figure 1 provides a simplistic overview of the different levels of EISA's theory of change illustrating the high-level causal linkages between EISA's activities and more vibrant democracy and increasingly representative government.

**Figure 1 – Overview of the components of the theory of change**



The reality of the theory of change is much more complex and difficult to capture in a single, digestible diagram. Annex 1.1 provides a complete, high level illustration of the intricate linkages between activities, outcomes and impacts that demonstrates the complexity of EISA's work with regional bodies. The evaluation team also produced detailed illustrations for individual activities. Annex 1.2 provides the granular-level illustration of the intermediary steps building up to outcome and impact for each key activity of regional bodies identified and discussed during the workshop. These granular-level illustrations are more suited to consider the causal logic underpinning an individual activity. When these illustrations are considered together with the problem statement produced by workshop participants, it is possible to see the outline of a theory of change from which hypotheses can be drawn.

### 3 Workshop activities

The theory of change workshop focused around a series of linked activities designed to build the components of a comprehensive theory of change. Each activity delivered a specific output that fulfilled a specific component of the theory of change. When considered together, the activity outputs form a cohesive theory of change that articulates:

- what the underlying root problems are;
- how activities address these problems, overcome barriers and are assumed to bring about change (anticipated outcomes and impacts);
- assumptions underpinning the linkages between intermediary steps and anticipated outcomes.

Table 1 briefly explains the purpose of each key activity undertaken during the workshop:

**Table 1: Activity summaries**

Activity	Purpose
Defining what success looks like	Set higher level goal for what regional bodies are trying to achieve (both in terms of role of regional bodies and outcome of election processes) and what success might look like from the perspectives of multiple stakeholders.  This then represents our overarching goals and indicators of success. From here we can also have a framework to

	assess current activities and establish what needs to be done to achieve goals
Articulating strategies to achieve our vision	<p>Discuss the problems EISA is trying to address with its activities to support regional bodies and ask if these issues are the root problem or just symptoms (using 'but why?' questions).</p> <p>Map pathways to change by asking why activities aimed at addressing problems are undertaken, helping to identify intermediary outcomes and high level impacts (using 'so what?' questions).</p> <p>We can then look at the extent to which these activities are in line with the overall vision for the regional bodies, and whether the activities under ADS II appear to be intervening at the most appropriate junctions in the causal chain.</p>
Identifying challenges and barriers to implementing activities	Map barriers to implementation of activities to understand what barriers and challenges EISA activities are designed to overcome
Identifying key hypotheses	Articulate plausible theories on how activities address the underlying problem to overcome barriers and deliver change in line with the vision of success

## 4 Detailed workshop outputs

### 4.1 Problem statement

Participants identified the problem that regional bodies are seeking to address and the observable symptoms of these problems. Below is a summary of the key themes identified during the workshop:

**Lack of political will** – There is often a lack of genuine political will around elections issues. Parliaments need to be genuinely involved and not just “rubber stamping”.

**Lack of skills on “supply side” (observers and capacity building organisations)** – Regional institutions lack capacity to build capacity and strengthen local institutions. Some skills required are very technical and there is a shortage of availability within regional institutions. Also observers lack the skills to effectively carry-out their role because they are not technicians.

**Lack of resources and low capacity in key organisations** – Organisations working in the elections sector lack the resource (money, people, time) to effectively deliver their mandates. Key organisations lack capacity because there is a risk that political staff appointments can negatively affect democratic process.

**Poor knowledge/ understanding of electoral frameworks** – Election observers and voters are not always aware of the laws governing elections or voters’ rights. Laws and rights (and citizens’ level of knowledge of them) differ across countries and can change within countries in the time between elections.

**Biased media reporting** – The media do not have access to accurate data and generate inaccurate data. Reporting, by both public and private media outlets, is often biased and the media can be used instrumentally by political parties. Access to media is often tightly controlled by ruling parties.

**Challenges to accurate reporting** – Regional bodies prepare reports for internal use only and fear the implications of publishing reports publicly. Regional bodies need to balance making an honest report of a situation and maintaining political stability.

**Difficulty obtaining contextual information** – It is difficult for regional organisations to access localised knowledge on important issues such as election legislation and information on key stakeholders. Context also varies greatly between states and nuance has to be accounted for in individual missions.

**Lack of common policy and methodologies** – The African Union Charter is not signed, ratified and domesticated uniformly by all states. There is also limited consensus on standards and norms and no common methodology for undertaking election observation and reporting on findings.

**Weak government institutions** – Some government institutions (mainly political parties with significant power) are able to act with impunity and power is distributed unequally. Electoral commissions and other EMBs are sometimes hamstrung because they don't have the funding and / or mandate to do what they need to.

**Violence and intimidations** – Violence and intimidation is used at election time to pressure people and take away their free will.

**“Sovereignty vs. Interference”** – Regional bodies must respect the sovereignty of nation states. Therefore the role and influence of regional bodies and independent observers can be limited.

**Absence of democratic values** – Some actors involved in elections do not value democratic principles, norms and processes. They intend to “steal” elections. There are also political parties and movements who, if in power, would seriously compromise the wellbeing of citizens (i.e. through human rights violations).

## 4.2 Causal maps

Based on the problem described above, participants identified the activities that need to be undertaken to address the problems, as well as the symptoms and articulated how activities contribute to the higher level objectives and the changes in behaviour (individual and organisational), systems and processes that they expect as a result of activities in the short, medium and long term.

See Annex 1.2 for detailed causal maps that breakdown the intermediary steps from activity to outcomes and impact for each of the activities that workshop participants identified.

## 4.3 Hypotheses and research questions for the evaluation to test and explore

Using the causal maps developed during the workshop, participants were invited to suggest hypotheses for the evaluation team to test that would be helpful in improving their understanding of what works when engaging with regional bodies on elections issues. Although exploring all suggested question is beyond the scope of this evaluation, the evaluation team used these suggestions to inform the hypotheses and research questions proposed in the evaluation framework. Participants' suggested hypotheses are provided below:

- If most African countries' elections are free and fair is there a need for EOMs?
- The relationship between EMBs and key stakeholders (EMBs, parliament) will lead to acceptable results. How will people accept results? Will improved relationships lead to people accepting results?
- If the AU is technically supported in election observation will they improve their assessment of elections in Africa?
- If free and fair election assessment missions are conducted will subsequent EOMs be better prepared to conduct EOM missions?
- In the context of EISA's training undertaken in this programme, what percentage or proportion of knowledge is transferred from a programme in a training workshop? To what extent is knowledge absorbed?
- What are the most effective ways of transferring knowledge in a training-based approach?
- What positive impact does a gender-balanced / sensitive / equitable approach deliver?
- What percentage of EOM reports have beneficiaries read and how have they been useful to their assessment of elections?
- What impact has EISA media strategy had on shaping or guiding conversations about elections?
- Does the presence of EISA experts in AU missions lead to better quality outputs from the AU mission?



- How much peer-learning is taken back and implemented by organisations?

## 5 List of workshop participants

Name	Organisation
Denis Kadima	EISA
Grant Masterson	EISA
Olufunto Akinduro	EISA
Josiane Wawa Dahab	Pan-African Parliament
Sophia Gallina-Haitsma	GIZ-SADC Peace, Security and Good Governance, Botswana
Rindai Chipfunde-Vava	Zimbabwe Election Support Network
Miguel de Brito	EISA
Ilona Tip	EISA
Hama Munyikwa	EISA
Mr. T.G.G.G Seeletso	Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), Botswana
Ebrahim Fakir	EISA
Vincent Tohbi	EISA
Kerryn Kotler	EISA
Robert Gerenge	EISA
Adv. Lekhetho Rakuoane	Parliament / Popular Front for Democracy
Rinke Magagula	Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), South Africa
Mbali Ntuli	Democratic Alliance youth leader, South Africa

# Annex 6

## Approach to dealing with bias

## Annex 6 – Plan for addressing stakeholder bias

This table summarises the most pertinent bias risks and key mitigation strategies for stakeholder groups.

Stakeholder	Risks of bias	Strategies to mitigate bias
Members of regional bodies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Stakeholders may have an inflated perception of the importance of regional interventions (in particular observation missions) in national election processes</li> <li>Stakeholders may be reluctant to admit weaknesses in their capacity or a reliance on EISA to meet requirements</li> </ul>	<p><b>Triangulation:</b> Testimonies from representatives from regional bodies will be considered alongside: 1) testimonies from CSOs and other groups who are not directly involved with regional bodies 2) testimonies from governance and elections experts 3) academic papers on the role of international observer missions</p> <p><b>Structuring interview questionnaires:</b> Interview topic guides will seek to elicit information about how regional bodies and EISA work together rather than focussing on the capacity gaps that necessitate EISA's engagement</p>
Members of EISA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Extensive research with EISA staff could create a level of exposure bias because the evaluators will give more weight to EISA's perception of the problem and the most effective way of addressing the problem</li> <li>There may be a natural tendency for staff to see EISA's activities as more important/ influential in achieving outcomes than they actually are</li> <li>There is a risk of self-serving bias affecting staff's presentation of events and a tendency to attribute success to EISA interventions and any issues to contextual factors</li> <li>Staff may want to downplay important issues and suggest that they were all handled as well as possible</li> </ul>	<p><b>Verification:</b> The Evaluation will seek to verify claims made by EISA staff through review of documentation such as emails and other records.</p> <p><b>Triangulation:</b> While testimonies from EISA staff members and associates will provide an extremely important source of information, extensive research will be carried out with other stakeholders – both those who EISA has worked directly with and those who have not. Secondary data will also be reviewed.</p> <p><b>Application of expertise:</b> While the evaluation will largely focus on EISA's conceptualization of the problem, Team members with governance and elections expertise will contribute their technical knowledge to the research process and analysis of findings</p>
Members of Election Observer Missions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Individuals who have received training and support from EISA may be reluctant to disclose that the intervention did not necessarily achieve its intended impact</li> <li>Individuals may be reluctant to reveal that they had gaps in their capacity to conduct missions or their knowledge of</li> </ul>	<p><b>Interview process</b> – care will be taken to explain to all interviewees that the information they provide is confidential and will not be attributed back to them in evaluation reporting</p> <p><b>Indirect questioning</b> – As far as possible, interview topic guides will seek to de-personalise the conversation and focus on what is 'typical' of observers</p>

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	<p>the process prior to EISA’s interventions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The range of individuals who take part in EOM's enhances the risk of personal perspective bias – individuals interviewed may have very different views on the support received by EISA, and the conduct and effect of the mission depending on their own personal perspective and the role they took in the mission</li> </ul>	<p>and EOMs in terms of where they require support and the ways they can be most effective</p> <p><b>Selection on interviewees:</b> By talking to individuals who have completed a number of EOMs without EISA involvement, it might be possible to make some comparison</p>
<p>Election Management Bodies</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There may be a risk of self-serving bias within election management bodies where stakeholders believe that when all goes well it was due to their interventions, but that any issues are caused by contextual factors</li> <li>• There may be a reluctance on the part of EMBs to admit to any weaknesses or capacity gaps that they could not have addressed without EISA support</li> </ul>	<p><b>Triangulation</b> – In addition to in-depth interviews with stakeholders, other sources of documentation will be reviewed including needs assessments carried out by EISA. Research will also include discussions with stakeholders who have been involved with EMBs but are not necessarily part of EISA's activities (ie CSOs who have worked with EMBs)</p> <p><b>Structuring interview questionnaires</b> – The interview topic guides will be structured to focus on the systems and processes in place and how they contributed to election management rather than seeking to address any organisational strengths to EISA’s interventions</p>
<p>Other election strengthening bodies</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Other organisations working to strengthen electoral process in Africa may have a different view of the problems that need to be addressed and the most effective way of addressing them depending on their own personal perspectives; i.e. whether they are an international body, focused on particular region, or from an academic background. This bias is not something that necessarily needs to be ‘addressed’ but it is important to note</li> <li>• It is recognised that while other bodies engaged in election strengthening are considered EISA’s partners and peers, there is also a level of competition between organisations playing similar roles</li> </ul>	<p><b>Structuring interview questionnaires:</b> All interviews will be conducted according to topic guides which set out the topics and questions that are of interest and will provide data relevant to the evaluation. As far as possible, these topic guides will be adhered to in order to ensure some structure to the interview and to minimise the likelihood that interviewees will focus on areas that are not directly relevant to the evaluation, i.e. on the things they do that EISA does not</p>

# Annex 7

## ADS II Log Frames

ADS II - Logical Framework

EISA: AFRICA DEMOCRACY STRENGTHENING PROGRAMME II

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

23/01/2013

Note: Cumulative numbers unless otherwise stated

PROJECT TITLE	EISA African Democracy Strengthening Programme II						
IMPACT	Impact Indicator 1		Baseline Sep 2009	Milestone 1 Sep 2011	Milestone 2	Target Sep 2013	Not required.
More progress towards credible electoral and political processes in Africa	I.1 No./% elections deemed FC/LC *	Planned	FC=3/17 or 17.6%	FC=6/54 or 11.1%	-	FC=8/122 or 6.5%	
			LC=3/17 or 17.6%	LC=18/54 or 33.3%	-	LC=48/122 or 39.0%	
		Achieved		FC=13/54 or 24%	-		
				LC=16/54 or 29.63% #####	-		
		<b>Source</b> EISA Election Credibility Assessment. Baseline data taken from 2008 elections Election Credibility Assessment : Fully credible (FC) = 76 -100, largely credible (LC)= 51-75; partly credible = 26-50, not credible =1-25 (developed by EISA, based on international election standards)					
	Impact Indicator 2		Baseline Sep 2009	Milestone 1 Sep 2011	Milestone 2	Target Sep 2013	
	I.2 No. countries ranked free and partly free	Planned	F=10/53 PF=23/53	F=09/54 PF=23/54		F=10/54 PF=23/54	
			Achieved		F=09/54 PF=23/54 #####		
		<b>Source</b> Freedom House "Freedom in the World" Survey. Baseline data taken from 2008 edition.					

##### Based on the total number of national elections and referenda held from October 2009 to September 2011  
 ##### Some countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Libya or Egypt have improved their ratings (political rights and civil liberties) but not changed their status (Not Free) based on the 2011 Freedom House Index.

OUTCOME	Outcome Indicator 1		Baseline Sep 2009	Milestone 1 Sep 2011	Milestone 2 Sept 2012	Target Sep 2013	Assumptions	
<p>Stronger and more effective democratic institutions in four African countries* and at the pan-Africa level.</p> <p>Target countries: Burundi, Chad, Kenya and Mozambique.</p>	<p><b>O.1</b> % AU/PAP election observer missions (EOM) that work in ways that are fully or largely compliant (FC or LC) with international standards.</p>	Planned	FC= 0	FC= 6%	FC= 21.4%	FC= 25%	<p>No widespread deterioration in political stability or new curbs on political freedoms in Africa</p> <p>Shortcomings in national constitutions do not constrain democratic progress.</p>	
			LC= 0	LC= 10%	LC= 42.8%	LC= 25%		
		Achieved		FC= 0	17.6%			
				LC=28.6%	58,8%			
		<b>Source</b>						
	EISA EOM Scorecard. Data taken from 2008 elections Election Credibility Assessment : Fully credible (FC) = 76 -100, largely credible (LC)= 51-75; partly credible = 26-50, not credible =1-25 (developed by EISA, based on international election standards)							
	<b>Outcome Indicator 2</b>			<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>	<p>Elections held as planned in majority of countries</p>
	<p><b>O.2</b> No. of electoral processes incl. national referenda in target countries where electoral processes fully or largely compliant (FC or LC) with internationally accepted standards.</p>	Planned	FC=0	FC=0	FC=0	FC=1		
			LC=0	LC=2	LC=1	LC=3		
		Achieved		No elections held in target countries				
<b>Source</b>								
EISA EOM Scorecard. Data taken from 2008 elections Election Credibility Assessment : Fully credible (FC) = 76 -100, largely credible (LC)= 51-75; partly credible = 26-50, not credible =1-25 (developed by EISA, based on international election standards)								
<b>Outcome Indicator 3</b>			<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>	<p>Basic level of political will in Africa to move</p>	
<p><b>O.3</b> No. of countries where parliamentary</p>	Planned	0	0	2	2			
	Achieved			1	2	2		

	bills and policies are subject to public consultation in target countries.	<b>Source</b>					towards vibrant democracies.  Public support for democracy maintained.
		Media clippings					
	<b>Outcome Indicator 4</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>	
	No. of requests/feedback recognising EISA as a key institution contributing to elections and democracy in Africa	<b>Planned</b>	0	30	65	100	
		<b>Achieved</b>		0	69	69	
<b>Source</b>							
EISA testimonials, media coverage and invitation letters							
<b>INPUTS (£)</b>	<b>DFID (£)</b>		<b>Govt (£)</b>	<b>Other (£)</b>	<b>Total (£)</b>	<b>DFID SHARE (%)</b>	
	<b>£5,000,000</b>		<b>Nil</b>	<b>Nil</b>	<b>£5,000,000</b>	<b>100%</b>	
<b>INPUTS (HR)</b>	<b>DFID (FTEs)</b>						
	<b>Project Officer</b>						<b>0.05</b>
	<b>Lead Adviser</b>						<b>0.075</b>

\* % is used as numbers are dependent on the number of EOMs by the AU/PAP

<b>OUTPUT 1</b>	<b>Output Indicator 1.1</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>
AU, PAP and EISA election observers trained and supported and EISA election observing missions (EOMs) deployed and reports publicised.	1.1 No. AU/PAP and EISA election observers trained by EISA and supported	<b>Planned</b>	AU=0	AU=120	AU=500	AU=740	AU/PAP willing and able to deploy trained observers and Mission Leaders on EOMs.
			EISA=120	EISA=320	EISA=420	EISA=520	
		<b>Achieved</b>		AU=340	AU=824	941	AU willing and able to deploy trained staff on Missions
				EISA=204	EISA= 597	622	
		<b>Source</b>					
Invitation letters/ Accreditation cards from EMBs and EOM statements and reports							



IMPACT WEIGHTING (%) 25%	<b>Output Indicator 1.2</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>	No political interference by AU/PAP with the assessment of its EOMs.  Countries having elections accept the presence of election observers, give adequate notification and provide necessary access.  Elections go ahead, as planned.  Media in host and other countries willing and able to publicise EISA EOM findings.	
	1.2 No. of AUC and PAP staff trained by EISA	<b>Planned</b>	0	0	10	10		
		<b>Achieved</b>		0	19	19		
	<b>Source</b>							
	Attendance lists, report of training and photos							
	<b>Output Indicator 1.3</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>		
	1.3 No. EISA CSO EOMs deployed (supported by DFID)	<b>Planned</b>	0	4	6	8		
		<b>Achieved</b>		4	8	9		
	<b>Source</b>							
	EOM reports and media clippings							
	<b>Output Indicator 1.4</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>		
	1.4 No./% EISA CSO EOMs receiving coverage in the media in the host country	<b>Planned</b>	0	4 or 100%	6 or 100%	8 or 100%		
<b>Achieved</b>			75%	7 or 116%	8 or 100%			
<b>Source</b>								
Media clippings								
<b>RISK RATING</b>								
Low								
<b>INPUTS (£)</b>	<b>DFID (£)</b>		<b>Govt (£)</b>	<b>Other (£)</b>	<b>Total (£)</b>	<b>DFID SHARE (%)</b>		
	£ 549,891.39		0	0	£549,891.39	100%		
<b>INPUTS (HR)</b>	<b>DFID (FTEs)</b>							
	Project Officer	0.010						
	Lead Adviser	0.015						

OUTPUT 2	Output Indicator 2.1		Baseline Sep 2009	Milestone 1 Sep 2011	Milestone 2 Sep 2012	Target Sep 2013	Assumptions	
Capacity of key stakeholders* to play a constructive role in electoral reform and processes strengthened in 4 countries (incl. work already done in Burundi before closure). *Election Management Bodies; political parties, CSOs.	2.1 No. of EMBs in 3 target countries with conflict management panels (CMPs) and/or party liaison committees (PLCs) (ex. Moz.)	Planned	CMP=0	CMP=3	CMP=3	CMP=3	Governments/parliaments willing to allow EMBs and other stakeholders to play a wider and more constructive role in electoral processes.  EMBs, CSOs and political parties have adequate basic will to engage constructively in electoral processes.  EMBs willing to work with others on election processes.  CSOs willing to work together and in networks and communicate concerns of all citizens	
			PLC=0	PLC=2	PLC=2	PLC=2		
		Achieved		CMP=3	CMP=3	CMP=3		
				PLC=2	PLC=2	PLC=2		
		<b>Source</b>			Testimonies from the beneficiaries, Progress reports and EOM reports where relevant			
	Output Indicator 2.2		Baseline Sep 2009	Milestone 1 Sep 2011	Milestone 2 Sep 2012	Target Sep 2013		
	2.2 No. countries where CSO networks trained by EISA and supported in voter education (VE) and election observation (EO).	Planned	VE=0	VE=1	VE=1	VE=1		
			EO=0	EO=2	EO=1	EO=2		
		Achieved		VE=1	VE=1	VE=1		
				EO=1	EO=1	EO=1		
		<b>Source</b>			Workshop reports, testimonies from the beneficiaries and other EOM reports where relevant			
	Output Indicator 2.3		Baseline Sep 2009	Milestone 1 Sep 2011	Milestone 2 Sep 2012	Target Sep 2013		
	2.3 No. Trainers from political parties in Burundi, Chad and Kenya trained by EISA in poll watching.	Planned	0	280	0	340		
		Achieved		291	416	416		
		<b>Source</b>			Workshop reports and trainers' evaluation			
Output Indicator 2.4		Baseline Sep 2009	Milestone 1 Sep 2011	Milestone 2 Sep 2012	Target Sep 2013			
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)								
35%								

	2.4 No. Target countries where post-election reviews conducted by EISA and reports produced (excluding Mozambique) /non-state groups submit detailed election reform proposals.	<b>Planned</b>	0	1/1	0	2/2	
		<b>Achieved</b>		1/1	0	2/2	
		<b>Source</b>					
Workshop reports and electoral reform submissions where relevant						Medium	
<b>INPUTS (£)</b>	<b>DFID (£)</b>		<b>Govt (£)</b>	<b>Other (£)</b>	<b>Total (£)</b>	<b>DFID SHARE (%)</b>	
	<b>£1,750,000</b>		<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>£1,750,000</b>	<b>100%</b>	
<b>INPUTS (HR)</b>	<b>DFID (FTEs)</b>						
	<b>Project Officer</b>	<b>0.010</b>					
	<b>Lead Adviser</b>	<b>0.015</b>					

<b>OUTPUT 3</b>	<b>Output Indicator 3.1</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	
Capacity of legislatures in 2 target countries to be effective and responsive enhanced (Chad & Kenya)	3.1 No. of the target countries in which Parliament - Non-State interaction platforms are established (E) / meet regularly (MR)/ are formalised (F).	<b>Planned</b>	E=0	E=2	0	E=2	Governments in the 2 countries willing to allow legislatures to operate more effectively and responsively.	
			MR=0	MR=1	MR=1	MR=2		
			F=0	F=0	F=0	F=2		
		<b>Achieved</b>		E=1	E=0	E=0		Sustained separation of powers in the 2 countries.
				MR=1	MR=1	MR=1		
				F=0	F=0	F=0		
		<b>Source</b>						
EISA progress reports and minutes of meetings								
IMPACTING WEIGHTING (%) 15%	<b>Output Indicator 3.2</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>		
	3.2 No./% of	<b>Planned</b>	0	Chad=155* (75%)	Chad=165 (80%)	Chad=175 (85%)		

	MPs/staff in Chad and Kenya who EISA has trained and supported to be effective in their legislative, representative and oversight roles		0		0	Kenya=135 (90%)	of dialogue.  Legislatures and CSOs have basic will to work together.
		<b>Achieved</b>		0%	Chad=308 (176%)	Chad=308 (176%) Kenya= 0	
		<b>Source</b>					
		EISA progress reports and media clippings where available (* MPs and parliamentary staff).					
<b>RISK RATING</b>							
Medium							
<b>INPUTS (£)</b>	<b>DFID (£)</b>		<b>Govt (£)</b>	<b>Other (£)</b>	<b>Total (£)</b>	<b>DFID SHARE (%)</b>	
	<b>£750,000</b>		<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>£750,000</b>	<b>100%</b>	
<b>INPUTS (HR)</b>	<b>DFID (FTEs)</b>						
	<b>Project Officer</b>	<b>0.010</b>					
	<b>Lead Adviser</b>	<b>0.015</b>					

<b>OUTPUT 4</b>	<b>Output Indicator 4.1</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>
political parties in selected countries to be effective. Capacity of target	4.1 No. of political parties' representatives exposed to EISA benchmarks for democratic political parties.	Planned	0	179	185	199	Democratic order maintained in the 3 countries.  Party leaders have basic will to reform and modernise their parties and to allow women a greater role  Political parties willing to engage in constructive dialogue.
		Achieved		230	231	251	
		<b>Source</b>					
	EISA progress reports and media clippings where available						
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%) 15%	4.2 No. of political parties targeted which endorse EISA benchmarks for	Planned	0	8	2	12	
		Achieved		26	27	27	
		<b>Source</b>					
	EISA progress reports and media clippings where available						

	democratic political parties	EISA progress reports and media clippings where available				RISK RATING Low
<b>INPUTS (£)</b>	<b>DFID (£)</b>		<b>Govt (£)</b>	<b>Other (£)</b>	<b>Total (£)</b>	<b>DFID SHARE (%)</b>
	£750,000		0	0	£750,000	100%
<b>INPUTS (HR)</b>	<b>DFID (FTEs)</b>					
	<b>Project Officer</b>	0.010				
	<b>Lead Adviser</b>	0.015				

<b>OUTPUT 5</b>	<b>Output Indicator 5.1</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	
EISA is a professional, well-managed, innovative, influential and well-focused organisation.	5.1 % partners/beneficiaries satisfied with EISA programmes and performance	<b>Planned</b>	60 % ***** (estimate)	70%	75%	80%	EISA able to recruit and retain trained and experienced staff.	
		<b>Achieved</b>		90%+	98.3%	98.3%		
		<b>Source</b>						
		Participants' evaluation forms and testimonies from partners where available						
	5.2 No. of new and innovative products* developed (DEV) and disseminated (DIS).	Planned		DEV=0	DEV=4	DEV=6	DEV=8	EISA able to secure funding to enable it to continue/extend its operations.  EISA and other organisations promoting democracy in Africa work cooperatively together.
				DIS=0	DIS=4	DIS=6	DIS=8	
		Achieved			DEV=5	DEV -9	new data not submitted, target already reached,	
					DIS=2	DIS-4	new data not submitted, target not reached	
		<b>Source</b>						
		EISA website and EISA Annual Reports						

\*\*\*\*\* Percentage (%) has been inserted to explain the numbers in the baseline, milestone & target.

IMPACT WEIGHTING (%) 10%	<b>Output Indicator 5.3</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>		
	5.3 No. of unqualified annual audits(A)/ No. key recommendations (R) of IAR report aimed at enhancing EISA's institutional capacity are fully implemented (see work plan)	<b>Planned</b>	A=0	A=2	A=3	A=4		
			R=0	R=8	R=8	R=8		
		<b>Achieved</b>		A=2	A=3	Target not reached, new data not submitted		
				R=6	R=9	new data not submitted, target not reached		
	<b>Source</b>							
	EISA Annual Reports based on Annual Audited Accounts and External evaluation report							
	<b>Output Indicator 5.4</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>		
	5.4 No. hits (H) on EISA website / No. invitations (I) to speak at high-level meetings	<b>Planned</b>	H=224/K/yr	H=350K/yr	H=450K/yr	H=500K/yr		
			I=0	I=10	I=5	I=20		
		<b>Achieved</b>		H=3,595,278	H=4,072,102	New data not submitted, target exceeded		
				I=17	I=11	I=19		
	<b>Source</b>							
	EISA Annual Reports and Invitation letters							
	<b>Output Indicator 5.5</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>		
5.5 Number of partnerships established/sustained with democracy deepening actors	<b>Planned</b>	20	25	30	30			
	<b>Achieved</b>		26	42	New data not submitted, target exceeded			
	<b>Source</b>							
Copies of MOUs signed and copy of joint activity reports								
							<b>RISK RATING</b>	
							Low	

<b>INPUTS (£)</b>	<b>DFID (£)</b>		<b>Govt (£)</b>	<b>Other (£)</b>	<b>Total (£)</b>	<b>DFID SHARE (%)</b>
	<b>£500,000</b>		<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>£500,000</b>	<b>100%</b>
	<b>DFID (FTEs)</b>					
	<b>Project Officer</b>	<b>0.010</b>				
	<b>Lead Advisor</b>	<b>0.015</b>				

\* (1) Election Credibility Assessment, (2) Democratic Party Benchmarks, (3) E-voting tools, (4) Conflict management Panel Handbook, (5) Parallel Vote Tabulation Manual, (6) EOM Handbook (for domestic observation), (7) Social Dialogue Handbook, (8) IEOM Scorecard (for international observers).

**ADS II Logical Framework**

**Attachment 1**

**Outputs 2 to 4: Baselines, Milestones and Targets by Country**

	Indicator	Baseline		Milestone		Milestone		Target	
		Sept 2009		Sept 2011		Sept 2012		Sept 2013	

2.1	No. of EMBs in 3 target countries with conflict management panels and/or party liaison committees	CM	PL	CM	PL	CM	PL	CM	PL
	Burundi	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Chad	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Kenya	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Mozambique	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>

2.2	No. countries where CSO networks trained and supported in voter education and election observation.	VE	EO	VE	EO	VE	EO	VE	EO
	Burundi	0	X*	0	X	0	X	0	X
	Chad	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Kenya	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
	Mozambique	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>

\* EO Being done under another project. VE to be decided

2.3	No. Trainers from political parties in Burundi, Chad and Kenya trained in poll watching.	No.	No.	No.	No.
	Burundi	0	50	50	50
	Chad	0	200	200	200
	Kenya	0	30	30	90



	Mozambique	X	X	X	X
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>280</b>	<b>280</b>	<b>340</b>

2.4 (a)	<b>No. post-election reviews conducted and reports produced in 2 countries.</b>	No.	No.		No.
	Burundi	0	0	0	0
	Chad	0	1	1	0
	Kenya	0	0	0	1
	Mozambique	X	X	X	X
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>

2.4 (b)	<b>No. of target countries in which civil society/non-state groups submit detailed election reform proposals.</b>	No.	No.	No.	No.
	Burundi	X	X	X	X
	Chad	0	1	1	1
	Kenya	X	X	X	X
	Mozambique	0	1	1	1
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>

3.1	<b>No. of the 3 target countries in which Parliament - Non-State platforms are established/ meet regularly/formalised.</b>	E	M	F	E	M	F	E	M	F	E	M	F
	Burundi	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	Chad	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1
	Kenya*	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1
	Mozambique	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>

\* There is a platform in Kenya currently. Efforts will be made to strengthen it. If this is not possible a separate platform

*will be established.*

3.2	No./% of MPs and staff in Chad, Kenya and Burundi who have been trained by EISA in how to be effective in their roles.	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
	Burundi	X	X	X	X			X	X
	Chad	0	0	155	75%	165	80%	175	85%
	Kenya	X	X	0	X	0	X	135	90%
	Mozambique	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>155</b>		<b>165</b>		<b>310</b>	

4.1	No. of political parties representatives EISA benchmarks for democratic political parties.	No.	No.	No.	No.
	Chad, Kenya, Mozambique and other African states	0	179	185	199
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>199</b>

*Those who have done or indicate that they will participate in national elections*

4.2	Number of political parties which endorse the EISA benchmarks for democratic political parties.	No.	No.	No.	No.
	Burundi	X	X	X	X
	Chad	0	2	1	3
	Kenya	0	4	0	6
	Mozambique	0	2	1	3
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>12</b>

## Attachment 2 - LOGIC TABLE

Goal	
More vibrant democracy and better electoral processes in Africa.	Not needed
Purpose	Purpose to Goal Assumptions
Stronger and more effective democratic institutions in four African countries* and at the	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No widespread political instability or curbs on political freedoms in Africa</li> <li>Shortcomings in national constitutions do not constrain progress.</li> </ul>

<p>pan-Africa level. <i>Target countries:</i> <i>Burundi, Chad, Kenya and Mozambique.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Elections held as planned in majority of countries</li> <li>• Sustained political will in Africa to move towards vibrant democracies.</li> <li>• Public support for democracy maintained.</li> </ul>
<b>Outputs</b>	<b>Output to Purpose Assumptions</b>
<p><b>1.</b> AU, PAP and EISA election observers trained and supported and EISA election observing missions (EOMs) deployed and reports publicised.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AU/PAP willing and able to deploy trained observers and Mission Leaders on EOMs.</li> <li>• No political interference by AU/PAP with the assessment of its EOMs.</li> <li>• Countries having elections accept the presence of election observers, give adequate notification and provide necessary access.</li> <li>• Elections go ahead, as planned.</li> <li>• Media in host and other countries willing and able to publicise EISA EOM findings.</li> </ul>
<p><b>2.</b> Capacity of key stakeholders* to play a constructive role in electoral reform and processes strengthened in four countries (incl. work already done in Burundi before closure) <i>*Election Management Bodies; political parties, CSOs.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Governments/parliaments willing to allow EMBs and other stakeholders to play a wider and constructive role in electoral processes.</li> <li>• EMBs, CSOs and political parties have adequate capacity to engage constructively in electoral processes.</li> <li>• EMBs willing to work with others on election processes.</li> <li>• CSOs willing to work together and in networks and communicate concerns of all citizens</li> </ul>
<p><b>3.</b> Capacity of legislatures in 2 target countries to be effective and responsive enhanced <i>Target Countries: Chad, Kenya</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Governments in the 2 countries willing to allow legislatures to operate more effectively and responsively.</li> <li>• Sustained separation of powers in the 2 countries.</li> <li>• Political will in the 2 countries to formalise processes of dialogue.</li> <li>• Legislatures and CSOS are willing and able to work together.</li> </ul>
<p><b>4.</b> Capacity of target political parties in selected countries to be effective and internally democratic strengthened. <i>Target Countries: Chad, Kenya, Mozambique and others</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Democratic order maintained in the 3 countries.</li> <li>• Party leaders have the will to transform their parties into modern political parties and to allow women a greater role</li> <li>• Political parties willing and able to engage in constructive dialogue.</li> </ul>
<p><b>5.</b> EISA is professional, well-managed, innovative, influential and well-focused organisation.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EISA able to recruit and retain trained and experienced staff.</li> <li>• EISA able to secure funding to enable to continue/extend its operations.</li> <li>• EISA and other organisations promoting democracy in Africa work cooperatively together.</li> </ul>

ADS II - Logical Framework

EISA: AFRICA DEMOCRACY STRENGTHENING PROGRAMME II

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

05/01/2012

Note: Cumulative numbers unless otherwise stated

PROJECT TITLE							
EISA African Democracy Strengthening Programme II							
IMPACT	Impact Indicator 1		Baseline Sep 2009	Milestone 1 Sep 2011	Milestone 2	Target Sep 2013	Not required.
More progress towards credible electoral and political processes in Africa	I.1 No./% elections deemed FC/LC *	Planned	FC=3/17 or 17.6%	FC=6/54 or 11.1%		FC=8/122 or 6.5%	
			LC=3/17 or 17.6%	LC=18/54 or 33.3%		LC=48/122 or 39.0%	
		Achieved		FC=13/54 or 24%			
				LC=16/54 or 29.63% ++++++			
		<b>Source</b>					
		EISA Election Credibility Assessment. Baseline data taken from 2008 elections Election Credibility Assessment : Fully credible (FC) = 76 -100, largely credible (LC)= 51-75; partly credible = 26-50, not credible =1-25 (developed by EISA, based on international election standards)					
	Impact Indicator 2		Baseline Sep 2009	Milestone 1 Sep 2011	Milestone 2	Target Sep 2013	
	I.2 No. countries ranked free and partly free	Planned	F=10/53 PF=23/53	F=09/54 PF=23/54		F=10/54 PF=23/54	
			Achieved		F=09/54 PF=23/54 ++++++		
		<b>Source</b>					
Freedom House "Freedom in the World" Survey. Baseline data taken from 2008							

+++++ Based on the total number of national elections and referenda held from October 2009 to September 2011

+++++ Some countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Libya or Egypt have improved their ratings (political rights and civil liberties) but not changed their status (Not Free) based on the 2011 Freedom House Index.

			edition.	
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OUTCOME	Outcome Indicator 1		Baseline Sep 2009	Milestone 1 Sep 2011	Milestone 2 Sept 2012	Target Sep 2013	Assumptions		
<p>Stronger and more effective democratic institutions in four African countries* and at the pan-Africa level.</p> <p><u>Target countries:</u> Burundi, Chad, Kenya and Mozambique.</p>	<p><b>O.1</b> % AU/PAP election observer missions (EOM) that work in ways that are fully or largely compliant (FC or LC) with international standards.</p>	<p><b>Planned</b></p>	FC= 0	FC= 6%	FC= 21.4%	FC= 25%	<p>No widespread deterioration in political stability or new curbs on political freedoms in Africa</p> <p>Shortcomings in national constitutions do not constrain democratic progress.</p>		
			LC= 0	LC= 10%	LC= 42.8%	LC= 25%			
		<p><b>Achieved</b></p>		FC= 0	17.6%				
				LC=28.6%	58,8%				
		<b>Source</b>							
		<p>EISA EOM Scorecard. Data taken from 2008 elections</p> <p>Election Credibility Assessment : Fully credible (FC) = 76 -100, largely credible (LC)= 51-75; partly credible = 26-50, not credible =1-25 (developed by EISA, based on international election standards)</p>							
		<b>Outcome Indicator 2</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>	<p>Elections held as planned in majority of countries</p>	
	<p><b>O.2</b> No. of electoral processes incl. national referenda in target countries where electoral processes fully or largely compliant (FC or LC) with internationally accepted standards.</p>	<p><b>Planned</b></p>	FC=0	FC=0	FC=0	FC=1			
			LC=0	LC=2	LC=1	LC=3			
		<p><b>Achieved</b></p>		No elections held in target countries					
<b>Source</b>									
<p>EISA EOM Scorecard. Data taken from 2008 elections</p> <p>Election Credibility Assessment : Fully credible (FC) = 76 -100, largely credible (LC)= 51-75; partly credible = 26-50, not credible =1-25 (developed by EISA, based on international election standards)</p>									
	<b>Outcome Indicator 3</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>	<p>Basic level of political</p>		
	<b>O.3</b> No. of countries	<b>Planned</b>	0	0	2	2			

	where parliamentary bills and policies are subject to public consultation in target countries.	<b>Achieved</b>		1	0		will in Africa to move towards vibrant democracies.  Public support for democracy maintained.
		<b>Source</b>					
		Media clippings					
	<b>Outcome Indicator 4</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>	
No. of requests/feedback recognising EISA as a key institution contributing to elections and democracy in Africa	<b>Planned</b>	0	30	65	100		
	<b>Achieved</b>		0	69			
	<b>Source</b>						
	EISA testimonials, media coverage and invitation letters						
<b>INPUTS (£)</b>	<b>DFID (£)</b>		<b>Govt (£)</b>	<b>Other (£)</b>	<b>Total (£)</b>	<b>DFID SHARE (%)</b>	
	£5,000,000		Nil	Nil	£5,000,000	100%	
<b>INPUTS (HR)</b>	<b>DFID (FTEs)</b>						
	<b>Project Officer</b>	0.05					
	<b>Lead Adviser</b>	0.075					

\* % is used as numbers are dependent on the number of EOMs by the AU/PAP

<b>OUTPUT 1</b>	<b>Output Indicator 1.1</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>
AU, PAP and EISA election observers trained and supported and EISA election observing missions (EOMs) deployed and reports publicised.	1.1 No. AU/PAP and EISA election observers trained by EISA and supported	<b>Planned</b>	AU=0	AU=120	AU=500	AU=740	AU/PAP willing and able to deploy trained observers and Mission Leaders on EOMs.
			EISA=120	EISA=320	EISA=420	EISA=520	
		<b>Achieved</b>		AU=340	AU=824		AU willing and able to deploy trained staff on Missions
				EISA=204	576		
<b>Source</b>							
Invitation letters/ Accreditation cards from EMBs and EOM statements and reports							

IMPACT WEIGHTING (%) 25%	<b>Output Indicator 1.2</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>	No political interference by AU/PAP with the assessment of its EOMs.  Countries having elections accept the presence of election observers, give adequate notification and provide necessary access.  Elections go ahead, as planned.  Media in host and other countries willing and able to publicise EISA EOM findings.	
	1.2 No. of AUC and PAP staff trained by EISA	<b>Planned</b>	0	0	10	10		
		<b>Achieved</b>		0	26			
	<b>Source</b>							
	Attendance lists, report of training and photos							
	<b>Output Indicator 1.3</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>		
	1.3 No. EISA CSO EOMs deployed (supported by DFID)	<b>Planned</b>	0	4	6	8		
		<b>Achieved</b>		4	8			
	<b>Source</b>							
	EOM reports and media clippings							
<b>Output Indicator 1.4</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>			
1.4 No./% EISA CSO EOMs receiving coverage in the media in the host country	<b>Planned</b>	0	4 or 100%	6 or 100%	8 or 100%			
	<b>Achieved</b>		75%	7 or 116%				
<b>Source</b>								
Media clippings								
<b>RISK RATING</b>								
Low								
<b>INPUTS (£)</b>	<b>DFID (£)</b>		<b>Govt (£)</b>	<b>Other (£)</b>	<b>Total (£)</b>	<b>DFID SHARE (%)</b>		
	£ 549,891.39		0	0	£549,891.39	100%		
<b>INPUTS (HR)</b>	<b>DFID (FTEs)</b>							
	<b>Project Officer</b>	0.010						
	<b>Lead Adviser</b>	0.015						

OUTPUT 2	Output Indicator 2.1		Baseline Sep 2009	Milestone 1 Sep 2011	Milestone 2 Sep 2012	Target Sep 2013	Assumptions		
Capacity of key stakeholders* to play a constructive role in electoral reform and processes strengthened in 4 countries (incl. work already done in Burundi before closure). *Election Management Bodies; political parties, CSOs.	2.1 No. of EMBs in 3 target countries with conflict management panels (CMPs) and/or party liaison committees (PLCs) (ex. Moz.)	Planned	CMP=0	CMP=3	CMP=3	CMP=3	Governments/parliaments willing to allow EMBs and other stakeholders to play a wider and more constructive role in electoral processes.  EMBs, CSOs and political parties have adequate basic will to engage constructively in electoral processes.  EMBs willing to work with others on election processes.  CSOs willing to work together and in networks and communicate concerns of all citizens		
			PLC=0	PLC=2	PLC=2	PLC=2			
		Achieved		CMP=3	CMP=3				
				PLC=2	PLC=2				
		<b>Source</b>							
	Testimonies from the beneficiaries, Progress reports and EOM reports where relevant								
	<b>Output Indicator 2.2</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>			
	2.2 No. countries where CSO networks trained by EISA and supported in voter education (VE) and election observation (EO).	Planned	VE=0	VE=1	VE=1	VE=1		EMBs willing to work with others on election processes.  CSOs willing to work together and in networks and communicate concerns of all citizens	
			EO=0	EO=2	EO=1	EO=2			
		Achieved		VE=1	VE=1				
				EO=1	EO=1				
		<b>Source</b>							
	Workshop reports, testimonies from the beneficiaries and other EOM reports where relevant								
	<b>Output Indicator 2.3</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>			
	2.3 No. Trainers from political parties in Burundi, Chad and Kenya trained by EISA in poll watching.	Planned	0	280	0	340			IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)  35%
Achieved			291	301					
<b>Source</b>									
Workshop reports and trainers' evaluation									
<b>Output Indicator 2.4</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>				



	2.4 No. Target countries where post-election reviews conducted by EISA and reports produced (excluding Mozambique) /non-state groups submit detailed election reform proposals.	<b>Planned</b>	0	1/1	0	2/2	
		<b>Achieved</b>		1/1	0		
		<b>Source</b>					
Workshop reports and electoral reform submissions where relevant						Medium	
<b>INPUTS (£)</b>	<b>DFID (£)</b>		<b>Govt (£)</b>	<b>Other (£)</b>	<b>Total (£)</b>	<b>DFID SHARE (%)</b>	
	<b>£1,750,000</b>		<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>£1,750,000</b>	<b>100%</b>	
<b>INPUTS (HR)</b>	<b>DFID (FTEs)</b>						
	<b>Project Officer</b>	<b>0.010</b>					
	<b>Lead Adviser</b>	<b>0.015</b>					

<b>OUTPUT 3</b>	<b>Output Indicator 3.1</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>
Capacity of legislatures in 2 target countries to be effective and responsive enhanced (Chad & Kenya)	3.1 No. of the target countries in which Parliament - Non-State interaction platforms are established (E) / meet regularly (MR)/ are formalised (F).	<b>Planned</b>	E=0	E=2	0	E=2	Governments in the 2 countries willing to allow legislatures to operate more effectively and responsively.  Sustained separation of powers in the 2 countries.
			MR=0	MR=1	MR=1	MR=2	
			F=0	F=0	F=0	F=2	
		<b>Achieved</b>		E=1	E=0		
				MR=1	MR=1		
				F=0	F=0		
<b>Source</b>							
EISA progress reports and minutes of meetings							
IMPACTING WEIGHTING (%)	<b>Output Indicator 3.2</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>	Political will in the 2 countries to

15%	3.2 No./% of MPs/staff in Chad and Kenya who EISA has trained and supported to be effective in their legislative, representative and oversight roles	<b>Planned</b>	0	Chad=155* (75%)	Chad=165 (80%)	Chad=175 (85%)	formalise processes of dialogue.  Legislatures and CSOs have basic will to work together.	
			0		0	Kenya=135 (90%)		
		<b>Achieved</b>		0%	Chad=308 (176%)			
		<b>Source</b>						
EISA progress reports and media clippings where available (* MPs and parliamentary staff).								
<b>RISK RATING</b>								
Medium								
<b>INPUTS (£)</b>	<b>DFID (£)</b>		<b>Govt (£)</b>	<b>Other (£)</b>	<b>Total (£)</b>	<b>DFID SHARE (%)</b>		
	£750,000		0	0	£750,000	100%		
<b>INPUTS (HR)</b>	<b>DFID (FTEs)</b>							
	<b>Project Officer</b>	0.010						
	<b>Lead Adviser</b>	0.015						

<b>OUTPUT 4</b>	<b>Output Indicator 4.1</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>
political parties in selected countries to be effective. Capacity of target	4.1 No. of political parties' representatives exposed to EISA benchmarks for democratic political parties.	Planned	0	179	185	199	Democratic order maintained in the 3 countries.  Party leaders have basic will to reform and modernise their parties and to allow women a greater role
		Achieved		230	231		
		<b>Source</b>					
EISA progress reports and media clippings where available							
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%) 15%	<b>Output Indicator 4.2</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>	Political parties willing to engage in constructive
	4.2 No. of political parties targeted which	Planned	0	8	2	12	
		Achieved		26	27		

	endorse EISA benchmarks for democratic political parties	<b>Source</b>					dialogue.
		EISA progress reports and media clippings where available					RISK RATING Low
<b>INPUTS (£)</b>	<b>DFID (£)</b>		<b>Govt (£)</b>	<b>Other (£)</b>	<b>Total (£)</b>	<b>DFID SHARE (%)</b>	
	£750,000		0	0	£750,000	100%	
<b>INPUTS (HR)</b>	<b>DFID (FTEs)</b>						
	<b>Project Officer</b>	0.010					
	<b>Lead Adviser</b>	0.015					

<b>OUTPUT 5</b>	<b>Output Indicator 5.1</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>
EISA is a professional, well-managed, innovative, influential and well-focused organisation.	5.1 % partners/ beneficiaries satisfied with EISA programmes and performance	<b>Planned</b>	60 % %%%%%%%%%%(estimate)	70%	75%	80%	EISA able to recruit and retain trained and experienced staff.
		<b>Achieved</b>		90%+	96.4%		
		<b>Source</b> Participants' evaluation forms and testimonies from partners where available					
	<b>Output Indicator 5.2</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>	EISA able to secure funding to enable it to continue/extend its operations.  EISA and other organisations promoting democracy in Africa work cooperatively together.
	5.2 No. of new and innovative products* developed (DEV) and disseminated (DIS).	<b>Planned</b>	DEV=0	DEV=4	DEV=6	DEV=8	
			DIS=0	DIS=4	DIS=6	DIS=8	
		<b>Achieved</b>		DEV=5	DEV -9		
				DIS=2	DIS=4		
	<b>Source</b> EISA website and EISA Annual Reports						
	<b>Output Indicator 5.3</b>		<b>Baseline</b>	<b>Milestone 1</b>	<b>Milestone 2</b>	<b>Target</b>	

Percentage (%) has been inserted to explain the numbers in the baseline, milestone & target.

IMPACT WEIGHTING (%) 10%			<b>Sep 2009</b>	<b>Sep 2011</b>	<b>Sep 2012</b>	<b>Sep 2013</b>	
	<b>5.3</b> No. of unqualified annual audits(A)/ No. key recommendations (R) of IAR report aimed at enhancing EISA's institutional capacity are fully implemented (see work plan)	<b>Planned</b>	A=0	A=2	A=3	A=4	
			R=0	R=8	R=8	R=8	
		<b>Achieved</b>		A=2	A=3		
				R=6	R=9		
	<b>Source</b>						
	EISA Annual Reports based on Annual Audited Accounts and External evaluation report						
	<b>Output Indicator 5.4</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>	
	<b>5.4</b> No. hits (H) on EISA website / No. invitations (I) to speak at high-level meetings	<b>Planned</b>	H=224/K/yr	H=350K/yr	H=450K/yr	H=500K/yr	
			I=0	I=10	I=5	I=20	
		<b>Achieved</b>		H=3,595,278	H=4,072,102		
				I=17	I=11		
	<b>Source</b>						
	EISA Annual Reports and Invitation letters						
	<b>Output Indicator 5.5</b>		<b>Baseline Sep 2009</b>	<b>Milestone 1 Sep 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2 Sep 2012</b>	<b>Target Sep 2013</b>	
<b>5.5</b> Number of partnerships established/sustained with democracy deepening actors	<b>Planned</b>	20	25	30	30		
		<b>Achieved</b>		26	42		
<b>Source</b>							
Copies of MOUs signed and copy of joint activity reports							
<b>RISK RATING</b>							
Low							
<b>INPUTS (£)</b>	<b>DFID (£)</b>		<b>Govt (£)</b>	<b>Other (£)</b>	<b>Total (£)</b>	<b>DFID SHARE (%)</b>	
	<b>£500,000</b>		<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>£500,000</b>	<b>100%</b>	
	<b>DFID (FTEs)</b>						
	<b>Project Officer</b>	<b>0.010</b>					
	<b>Lead Advisor</b>	<b>0.015</b>					

\* (1) Election Credibility Assessment, (2) Democratic Party Benchmarks, (3) E-voting tools, (4) Conflict management Panel Handbook, (5) Parallel Vote Tabulation Manual, (6) EOM Handbook (for domestic observation), (7) Social Dialogue Handbook, (8) IEOM Scorecard (for international observers).

**ADS II Logical Framework**

**Attachment 1**

**Outputs 2 to 4: Baselines, Milestones and Targets by Country**

	Indicator	Baseline		Milestone		Milestone		Target	
		Sept 2009		Sept 2011		Sept 2012		Sept 2013	

2.1	No. of EMBs in 3 target countries with conflict management panels and/or party liaison committees	CM	PL	CM	PL	CM	PL	CM	PL
	Burundi	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Chad	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Kenya	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Mozambique	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>

2.2	No. countries where CSO networks trained and supported in voter education and election observation.	VE	EO	VE	EO	VE	EO	VE	EO
	Burundi	0	X*	0	X	0	X	0	X
	Chad	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Kenya	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
	Mozambique	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>

\* EO Being done under another project. VE to be decided

2.3	No. Trainers from political parties in Burundi, Chad and Kenya trained in poll watching.	No.	No.	No.	No.
	Burundi	0	50	50	50
	Chad	0	200	200	200
	Kenya	0	30	30	90

	Mozambique	X	X	X	X
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>280</b>	<b>280</b>	<b>340</b>

2.4 (a)	<b>No. post-election reviews conducted and reports produced in 2 countries.</b>	No.	No.		No.
	Burundi	0	0	0	0
	Chad	0	1	1	0
	Kenya	0	0	0	1
	Mozambique	X	X	X	X
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>

2.4 (b)	<b>No. of target countries in which civil society/non-state groups submit detailed election reform proposals.</b>	No.	No.	No.	No.
	Burundi	X	X	X	X
	Chad	0	1	1	1
	Kenya	X	X	X	X
	Mozambique	0	1	1	1
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>

3.1	<b>No. of the 3 target countries in which Parliament - Non-State platforms are established/ meet regularly/formalised.</b>	E	M	F	E	M	F	E	M	F	E	M	F
	Burundi	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	Chad	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1
	Kenya*	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1
	Mozambique	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>

\* There is a platform in Kenya currently. Efforts will be made to strengthen it. If this is not possible a separate platform

*will be established.*

3.2	No./% of MPs and staff in Chad, Kenya and Burundi who have been trained by EISA in how to be effective in their roles.	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
	Burundi	X	X	X	X			X	X
	Chad	0	0	155	75%	165	80%	175	85%
	Kenya	X	X	0	X	0	X	135	90%
	Mozambique	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>155</b>		<b>165</b>		<b>310</b>	

4.1	No. of political parties representatives EISA benchmarks for democratic political parties.	No.	No.	No.	No.
	Chad, Kenya, Mozambique and other African states	0	179	185	199
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>199</b>

*Those who have done or indicate that they will participate in national elections*

4.2	Number of political parties which endorse the EISA benchmarks for democratic political parties.	No.	No.	No.	No.
	Burundi	X	X	X	X
	Chad	0	2	1	3
	Kenya	0	4	0	6
	Mozambique	0	2	1	3
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>12</b>

## Attachment 2 - LOGIC TABLE

Goal	
More vibrant democracy and better electoral processes in Africa.	Not needed
Purpose	Purpose to Goal Assumptions
Stronger and more effective democratic institutions in four African countries* and at the	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No widespread political instability or curbs on political freedoms in Africa</li> <li>Shortcomings in national constitutions do not constrain progress.</li> </ul>



<p>pan-Africa level. <i>Target countries:</i> <i>Burundi, Chad, Kenya and Mozambique.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Elections held as planned in majority of countries</li> <li>• Sustained political will in Africa to move towards vibrant democracies.</li> <li>• Public support for democracy maintained.</li> </ul>
<b>Outputs</b>	<b>Output to Purpose Assumptions</b>
<p><b>1.</b> AU, PAP and EISA election observers trained and supported and EISA election observing missions (EOMs) deployed and reports publicised.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AU/PAP willing and able to deploy trained observers and Mission Leaders on EOMs.</li> <li>• No political interference by AU/PAP with the assessment of its EOMs.</li> <li>• Countries having elections accept the presence of election observers, give adequate notification and provide necessary access.</li> <li>• Elections go ahead, as planned.</li> <li>• Media in host and other countries willing and able to publicise EISA EOM findings.</li> </ul>
<p><b>2.</b> Capacity of key stakeholders* to play a constructive role in electoral reform and processes strengthened in four countries (incl. work already done in Burundi before closure) <i>*Election Management Bodies; political parties, CSOs.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Governments/parliaments willing to allow EMBs and other stakeholders to play a wider and constructive role in electoral processes.</li> <li>• EMBs, CSOs and political parties have adequate capacity to engage constructively in electoral processes.</li> <li>• EMBs willing to work with others on election processes.</li> <li>• CSOs willing to work together and in networks and communicate concerns of all citizens</li> </ul>
<p><b>3.</b> Capacity of legislatures in 2 target countries to be effective and responsive enhanced <i>Target Countries: Chad, Kenya</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Governments in the 2 countries willing to allow legislatures to operate more effectively and responsively.</li> <li>• Sustained separation of powers in the 2 countries.</li> <li>• Political will in the 2 countries to formalise processes of dialogue.</li> <li>• Legislatures and CSOS are willing and able to work together.</li> </ul>
<p><b>4.</b> Capacity of target political parties in selected countries to be effective and internally democratic strengthened. <i>Target Countries: Chad, Kenya, Mozambique and others</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Democratic order maintained in the 3 countries.</li> <li>• Party leaders have the will to transform their parties into modern political parties and to allow women a greater role</li> <li>• Political parties willing and able to engage in constructive dialogue.</li> </ul>
<p><b>5.</b> EISA is professional, well-managed, innovative, influential and well-focused organisation.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EISA able to recruit and retain trained and experienced staff.</li> <li>• EISA able to secure funding to enable to continue/extend its operations.</li> <li>• EISA and other organisations promoting democracy in Africa work cooperatively together.</li> </ul>