

Somalia Stability Programme

Pilot Evaluation

Undertaken for DFID

by

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Stability Programme Pilots

Delivery of Results: Results frameworks were acceptable. More attention needed to demonstrate achievement against higher level objectives and in use of log frames. DFID's scrutiny procedures were exemplary.

Theories of Change: Partner ToCs require intervention logics that demonstrably lead to improved stability and governance.

Project/Implementing partner resilience: Good conflict analyses, risk assessments and mitigation plans in place. However need to ensure there is consistency of approach.

Barriers/Enablers of implementation: Most had both positive and negative aspects often operating simultaneously. The clan was preeminent as both as an enabler and a barrier.

Do No Harm: Somali NGOs are for the most part an extension of the clan. Thus care needs to be taken when choosing partners. All too often, doing no harm involves respecting clan sensibilities at the cost of re-inforcing divisions in Somali society.

SSP Policies and Procedures

Community Driven Development: Used by all three pilot organisations. Despite shortcomings, until other forms of intervention become possible, it is important to obtain the maximum benefit from the CDD approach.

Peace Building: The correlation between delivery-orientated peace building and increased stability needs to be proven by independent evaluation. Process-orientated peace building initiatives show indications of producing sustainable gains over time.

Theory of Change and Results Framework: There are shortcomings in the SSP ToC that need to be remedied and reflected in the log frame. Robust M&E is in place. Need for means to measure outcomes and impact to produce real time information. Randomised control trials being established to test CDD.

BOFS' Approach to Stability Programming

Stabilisation, Stability and BOFS: Integration of BOFS stabilisation approach is improving. Need to avoid divergent theorising and programming through improved communication and exploring synergies.

Geographic Focus: Focus SSP on South Central for reasons of improved monitoring, greater impact, utilisation of BOFS stabilisation capacity and because of its political significance.

Thematic Focus: Thematic guidelines are helpful rather than restrictive for applicants. Clearer guidelines are now emerging and should be further refined to include a communications component.

A Learning Organisation: Reconceive SSP as a reflexive learning structure that uses outcome and impact information to build on its project funding function.

Summary of Recommendations

- To fund an independent evaluation of delivery-orientated peace programming
- For SSP to develop a theory of change that demonstrates how the programme will contribute to social, economic and political stability. The log frame to be accordingly amended.
- Greater integration of the BOFS stabilisation team into DFID's stability work
- The SSP be re-branded to be more in tune with Somali sensibilities.
- To focus on South Central: i) to allow the collection of improved information on outcomes and impact ii) to address the needs of the area most subject to instability iii) because of its political significance.
- To clarify SSP's thematic approach and ensure it is in line with the political goals of UK stability programming.
- To generate a communications component for SSP to operate at all levels from the Secretariat to individual projects.
- To formulate a tool to allow real-time monitoring of outcome and impact
- To expand the conception of SSP to becoming a learning organisation, in so doing to add value to its funding function.

Introduction

1. The purpose of this evaluation is to inform design and programming for DFID's Somalia Stability Programme (SSP), the multi-donor Somalia Stability Fund (SSF), and the British Office for Somalia's stabilisation efforts. It is undertaken at a time when after decades of conflict, civil strife, and political turmoil there appears to be a window of opportunity that will permit the generation of more coherent government in Somalia. The move in mid-2012 from a transitional government to a more widely legitimised election of a President now forming his administration has been coupled by the acceptance of a Provisional Constitution. These circumstances provide opportunities for positive change in Somalia. Running in parallel with these events has been the removal of Al Shabaab influence from key economic centres by IGAD forces and aligned militia, AMISOM, and Somali National Forces. This congruence of factors provides grounds for guarded optimism. A foundation is emerging upon which external assistance can be extended to support a legitimated Somali government in its endeavours to bring about an independent, democratically-based, constitutionally administered, federated state that is at peace with itself and can provide security and wellbeing for its people. This then provides the context against which DFID Somalia (DFIDS) is working.

2. This process evaluation is somewhat out of the ordinary in that the SSP has barely started and there is little activity on which to comment. The reasons behind the evaluation lie in the high risk nature of the environment. DFID has taken a leading role in providing support to Somalia. It is ensuring that as far as possible risks have been considered and that the application of funds to stability programming will be successfully applied or at the very least do no harm. This exercise is also being used as an opportunity to comment on the development of the wider UK stabilisation response to Somalia so as to ensure it meets identified goals, achieves impact and produces maximum value for money.

3. In order to evaluate risk factors the first component of this exercise focuses on three community driven projects undertaken in Somalia that have been, or are currently being funded through the British Office for Somalia (BOFS)¹. The criteria against which they are being evaluated are set out in the TOR (Annex 1). The second component of the evaluation is to examine the wider BOFS stabilisation effort through locating the discussion in its strategic context and institutional frameworks so as to make recommendations on how SSP policies and procedures can be adapted to increase the feasibility and delivery of projects. The methodology used in the evaluation is to be found in Annex 2.

Evaluation Conclusions

4. There are two sets of conclusions deriving from this evaluation. The first relates to the study of the three pilot programmes. Their approach to risk and its mitigation was broadly speaking good. It was noted that DFID applied rigorous standards in the evaluation of projects. At this stage of the stabilisation process, community driven development has an important function in gaining ingress to unstable areas but as and when circumstances permit, there will be benefit in developing approaches that build upon CDD achievements such as building local government capacity, civil society development and working with the private sector. SSP needs to monitor the impact of interventions and undertake scrupulous risk analysis in respect of funding peace building initiatives.

5. The second set of conclusions relates to BOFS' Approach to stability programming: the use of stabilisation capacity and geographic and thematic focus. The evaluation offers two options on how to proceed. The first is to maintain SSP/SSF programming as it stands using third party monitoring to

¹ These were PACT, Danish Refugee Council and Transition Initiatives for Stabilisation (TIS)

ensure financial accountability. However, there are risks to the programme due to the absence of mechanisms to report on outcomes and impact and over focus. The second option is to increase integration of BOFS Stabilisation Team capacity into DFID programming, have a tighter geographic and thematic focus and redefine SSP as a learning organisation that reflexively utilises information on outcome and impact. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive.

6. Cultural sensitivity: Further to these conclusions, respondents noted that the SSP should take into account the important unifying role of Islam for Somalis, which transcends clan and regional affiliation. Care should also be taken not to undermine traditional Somali structures critical to stability. Externally driven forms of stabilisation therefore need to take sufficient account of local belief and value systems. To successfully manage SSP, care will need to be taken to support hybrid systems (as was the case with the Somaliland House of Guurti) to create structures and patterns of behaviour that lead to a more state orientated vision of society as opposed to one that is exclusively driven by clan interests.

7. Coordination and Accountability: Closely linked to these concerns is the importance of ensuring good donor coordination and that donors ensure their resources are being applied as intended. Improved mechanisms for monitoring and accountability were specifically requested by the Council of Elders delegation in Mogadishu (ref. Methodology, Annex 2). Uncoordinated aid, its diversion and consequent corruption is to the benefit of interest groups, militias and the like and the individuals that dominate them. It will likely create additional sources of opposition to government control. It will lead to continued polarisation of wealth in Somalia with consequent deepening of poverty. In addition to the humanitarian implications, this will increase the risk of further radicalisation.

Summary of Findings

8. Stability Programme Pilots

Delivery of Results: Evidence shows that results frameworks were of an acceptable standard. Still, room for improvement exists, particularly on achieving outcomes and impact, generating qualitative indicators, and in the use of log frames. There was a lack of independent evaluation. DFID's procedures for the scrutiny of applications are exemplary.

Theories of Change: Partner organisations need to produce ToCs that clearly present a theory, its application, trajectory and outcome. ToC's require an intervention logic that demonstrably leads to improved stability and governance. Stability-related ToCs need also to describe linkages to other initiatives or organisations (particularly government) and demonstrate how sustainability will be achieved. There is a need to ensure that implementing partner ToCs are clearly aligned with SSP's thematic criteria so as to allow judgements to be made on contributions to programmatic impact. To this end SSP needs to ensure its thematic criteria are made explicit.

Project and implementing partner resilience: The issue of resilience was thoughtfully addressed by all three organisations. Each sought to undertake a thorough risk analysis and have mitigation plans in place. However there were differences in approach. To ensure that issues are not missed and consistency of approach, the SSP would benefit from establishing standards for demonstrating organisational and project resilience drawing on the experience of those organisation that do it best. A check list is provided.

Barriers/Enablers of implementation: The clan is preeminent, both as a positive and negative factor, as are the diaspora. Quality and status of government is important as is security/access, staffing and

local partners. Most barriers to implementation had both positive and negative aspects often operating simultaneously, so that while there may be good clan cooperation in establishing a project, a neighbouring clan might deny access or negotiate payment of some kind to permit passage. To understand how factors can operate to the benefit or detriment of programming requires that donors ensure good quality political economy analyses and risk assessments are undertaken by implementing partners.

Do No Harm: Conflict analyses, risk assessments, and mitigation plans are essential prerequisites to avoid doing harm. Somali NGOs are no more than a reflection of Somali society and many are seen as an extension of the clan. Thus care needs to be taken when choosing partners. The avoidance of conflict by working in homogenous communities/areas has the consequence of reinforcing fragmentation and therefore grounds for possible conflict. All too often, doing no harm involves respecting clan sensibilities at the cost of re-inforcing divisions in Somali society.

9. SSP Policies and Procedures

Community Driven Development: There are mixed views on the efficacy of community driven development (CDD). Nevertheless, it is the primary instrument by which NGOs implement activities in Somalia. The three organisations of this study demonstrate use of the approach, apparently to good effect, to reach different ends. Until other forms of intervention becomes possible, it is important to obtain the maximum benefit from CDD programming.

Peace Building: There was a lack of independent evidence related to the ability of delivery-orientated 'peace' projects of resolving conflicts at the community/faction level. Such activities need independent outcome/impact assessments to examine changes in socio-political environment as well as evaluations to examine issues of perverse incentives and consequences for existing mediation structures. The correlation between delivery-orientated peace building and increased stability needs to be proven. Process-orientated peace building that allows peace initiatives to be Somali driven, although longer term, show indications of producing sustainable gains.

Theory of Change and Results Framework: There are shortcomings in the SSP ToC as outlined in its Business Case. As a consequence the log frame is not a balanced instrument. The SSP strategic vision needs to be better aligned and more clearly articulated in the ToC and reflected in an improved logframe. Robust M & E arrangements are in place to include independent evaluations and third party monitoring. However operating in circumstances of conflict and poor access, it is important to ensure stability programming does not have a negative impact. There is thus a need for an approach to monitoring outcomes and impact so as to provide information on the consequences of interventions, particularly in relation to political/power alignments. Randomised control trials are being planned to investigate the efficacy of the CDD approach. The learning derived from this exercise will have regional and global implications.

10. BOFS' Approach to Stability Programming

Stabilisation, Stability and BOFS: Approaches to stabilisation need to be organisationally and programmatically tailored to each country or region where they are applied. This is seen to be happening in BOFS where a strategic framework has been achieved. The integration of BOFS stabilisation approach is improving but the strategic framework needs to be better operationalised. The lack of clarity around the stabilisation agenda i.e. the distinction between stabilisation and stability, creates confusion and inhibits the interpretation of UK meta-policy into strategically orientated

activities. To address this and avoid divergent theorising and programming, incentives between the various BOFS components need to be increased and synergies improved.

Geographic Focus: Driven by the need to reduce risk and minimise harm, there is an argument for increased SSF geographic focus. Successful stability programming in insecure areas requires regularly collected information on outcomes and impact. This is made more complex and expensive the greater the degree programme dispersment. In defining focus there are significant political considerations for locating the SSF in South Central (SC). The region has also a serious potential for instability as a result of the large number of IDPs within its boundaries and from the possible return of refugees Kenya and Ethiopia. To focus on SC would permit greater functionality with BOFS stabilisation capacity.

Thematic Focus: Stability programming is inevitably political. There thus needs to be clear and rigorous analysis of SSP's purpose and how it should be applied. The evidence suggests that the one key feature necessary to the stability and development of Somalia is government. If this contention is accepted then consideration should be given to ensure all stabilisation activities in some way directly contribute to this. Communications is a critically important component of stabilisation and should be integrated into SSP documentation, ToC and log frame.

A Learning Organisation: There is a need to reinforce the message of accountability at all levels and with all parties of a stabilisation programme. In addition to M & E and third party monitoring, this requires measuring the impact and consequences of aid interventions. For this it is necessary to devise appropriate tools and to ensure there is suitable analytical capacity to deliver real time information to the Secretariat. The ability to gather information offers the opportunity for its analysis and dissemination in the form of bulletins or articles. Reconceiving SSF as a reflexive learning structure that builds on its project funding function, opens new possibilities.

Analysis

Stability Programme Pilots

11. **Results Frameworks:** These are a key component in risk analysis and for ensuring mitigation processes are in place. The understanding of assumptions is critical for both donor and implementer. Generally these were of an acceptable standard, certainly giving good information at the output level. However there were areas where improvement could be made. It is important to ensure that indicators are congruent with the project narrative, most particularly that they reflect the ToC at the outcome and impact levels. There can be divergences in this respect. Again generally, not enough focus is given to log frames and their use. They can be dynamic instruments that guide an intervention. There was never the feeling that this was so. These comments extend to SSP itself.

12. There was also the common problem of ensuring that indicators are carefully defined. Thus the indicator of *number of district community centres functioning* needs to be amplified by a definition of the criteria of what is meant by 'functioning' and therefore the criteria for success or achievement. The practice of providing somewhat vague indicators was not uncommon.

13. Linked to this, more thought needs to be put into generating qualitative indicators that give information about achievement and can be used to track progress against the log frame indicator at the output level. So for example, *building administration capacity* can be disaggregated into a number of scored stages each representing higher levels of achievement. It would thus be possible to measure change over time and to provide better evidence to inform outcomes.

14. The higher levels of results frameworks were less impressive. A lot of thought is given to activities (input/output) but far less on outcome and impact. TIS was distinctive in this respect because it has a clear administrative/political mandate. However, in all cases it would be helpful to see greater emphasis placed on linkages to other forms of programming once projects have been completed. Sustainability is important and was not given sufficient attention in results frameworks.

15. Monitoring systems appeared fairly comprehensive. Some were very good. However there was a lack of rigorous external evaluation. While one partner was subject to an impact assessment in 2011 there were question marks about the process. Another evaluation reviewed was undertaken by members of a participating partner organisation. It was an anodyne document that contained very little learning. From the perspective of stability-related programming, there is a need to understand more about the consequences of inputs. One organisation reported: 277 facilitators and 2,500 youth trained, 18 peace initiatives and 6 peace processes undertaken etc. It is critical to understand how such inputs are contributing to the region becoming more peaceful, or indeed, the reverse. The issue of unintended consequences is not being addressed nor are issues of attribution. Information on impact, of how activities are contributing to a more stable Somalia, is essential in understanding the value of stability programming.

16. **Theories of Change:** These are of significance because they provide the rationale for the project and describe its linkages and trajectory. They demonstrate an organisation's thinking. One ToC was predicated on three tiers: a) primary preconditions; b) assumptions; c) and then secondary preconditions. The various conditionalities that form the prerequisites for the ToC statement diminished its meaning and made it abstruse. Another was verbose and through this lacked clarity. A ToC works best is when it is clear and succinct. The differences between the DFID partners' ToCs and that of TIS were that the former had a tendency towards quantity at the expense of quality and veered towards the aspirational. The TIS approach on the other hand was more hard headed, prosaic and direct, and also more political.

17. ToC are at their most persuasive when they are straightforward (but not over-simplified), clearly expressed and meaningful in respect of their alignment with thematic criteria. There is tension between them being used as advocacy tool in lieu of providing a theory, its application, trajectory and outcome. The issue of the flexibility associated with SSP was seen more of a problem than an advantage by many NGOs who sought greater guidance as to the strategic direction favoured by the SSF in helping them develop their ToC.

18. Given the governance element in all these projects, it is surprising that more has not been made of the discussions that have been taking place between TIS, PACT, DRC and others with JPLG in respect of the phased approach to civic education and establishing a basis for formalised local government in preparation for eventual JPLG engagement. Work has been undertaken in clarifying the operation of village councils and institutional roles so as to be in line with later JPLG entry. This provides an example of an important linkage. The establishment of this type of connection is something that should be sought from all stabilisation programming.

19. **Project and implementing partner resilience:** All the partners had risk assessment and mitigation plans, although they handled these matters in rather different ways. The most impressive one had a comprehensive plan for risk analysis and mitigation which included a four point risk management strategy covering: avoidance, acceptance, transfer and control. All were experienced organisations who appeared confident and capable of handling the pressures of working in these environments, and importantly knowing when not to do so.

20. Examples were given of risks materialising and their solutions. It was evident the communities were the best arbiters in cases of misappropriation or contractual non-performance. Success in dealing with this type of risk comes through community buy-in and ensuring feedback mechanisms are in place. More serious problems are dealt with by flexibility, changing sequences, stopping the project or obtaining local government support in solving a conflict or problem.

21. In terms of SSP programmatic criteria there would be value in establishing common standards of staff safety across funded activities. Perhaps UN staff safety criteria would be appropriate. Resilience is helped by knowledge. Thus the value of a political economy analysis. These should be made obligatory across SSP programming. Resilience also needs to incorporate checks as to fiduciary capacity in target communities. A risk assessment and mitigation plan is an essential pre-requisite to any programme implementation in Somalia, its purpose to ensure activities do not create or escalate conflict². The SSP should generate a standardised approach to risk assessments to ensure that all organisations working with the Fund cover:

- a) **Project location:** Provide a description of the area's socio-political context highlighting potential tensions particularly in respect of the consequences of the project.
- b) **Beneficiaries:** To map clans and the history of inter-clan relations paying particular attention to the target group and their relationship to the less or more powerful clans.
- c) **Primary stakeholders:** Describe the key actors in the area to include government and their relation to the target group covering any possible threat to vested interests.
- d) **Winners and losers:** Establish if the project may create perceived winners and losers and how any issues of competition arising from this will be dealt with by those within the target group or between the target group and others.
- e) **Traditional power structures:** Description of how the project will affect traditional authority and decision making.
- f) **Collaboration:** Description of how the project will contribute to collaboration and serve to bring groups together.
- g) **Mitigation:** Description of how the implementers will deal with identified and/or non-identified risks related to programming. Describe mechanisms to be used to address any conflict that may arise from the project.
- h) **Staffing:** Description of how project staff are to be recruited and how representative they are of the groups affected by the project.

22. **Barriers and Enablers of Implementation:** Drawing out the commonalities from respondents, many of the issues raised could be both barriers and enablers. The Diaspora were seen as being positive in respect of the resources they brought, but negative in some of their political interventions. In Mogadishu clans were seen as a barrier. In other locations they were just a factor to be worked with. Understanding of the clan and its role in socio-political dynamics was seen as paramount. Failure to undertake an analysis that included clan structures and the histories of their interactions risked the possibility of interventions deepening inherent divisions in Somali society.

23. The quality and status of government was shown to be an enabling factor. Several success of the TIS programme have been due to the constructive cooperation provided by the Mayor of Mogadishu. ITBC report what they style as 'remarkable and inspirational aspects' to TIS programming. Both DRC and PACT have found that the quality and status of government influences how project activities proceed. They report positive relations with local government to date. That this is so is probably an indicator that the organisations are acting in an appropriate manner towards whatever government is present.

² P. Wam, P. Gajraj, S. Sardesai. 2005. Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics. World Bank, p.43.

24. Security and access were closely interlinked. Each of the three core organisations had rigid policies in respect of staff safety and appeared to have sufficient risk mitigation practices in place. None would work in an insecure environment. The presence of powerful individuals was not reported to have caused any problems but they were treated with care.

25. Staffing was a common concern, particularly being able to recruit suitably qualified individuals. Clan was always an issue. Difficulties could occur if there was not an appropriate clan balance in the implementing agency or its partner. A lack of continuity in donor funding was said to cause problems with staff retention.

26. **Do No Harm:** As has been discussed the risk analyses and mitigation practices for respondent organisations were good. Some features were particularly thoughtful. Although TIS risk analyses have not been laid out in the same way as the others, they pay due attention to risk factors and satisfy USAID guidelines. All the organisations met during this exercise were familiar with working in Somalia. Familiarity with the diverse elements of Somali culture is an important prerequisite to avoid doing harm. In this respect, one respondent noted the need to be careful when introducing new ideas, particularly if they are seen to come from foreign sources.

27. There is a need for external actors to take care with whom they are working in Somalia. There are an increasing number of NGOs but they are subject to the same intense clan politics as are other stakeholders in Somali society. It was also noted that militias are becoming involved in recently formed NGOs/CBOs as they perceive new forms of revenue generation. INGOs have responded by ensuring their own organisations have an appropriate clan balance and that they work with a balance of local partners. While such responses prevent clan-related problems occurring, they do nothing to resolve clan differences.

28. Of particular relevance to SSP programming is the way in which CDD committees are established. That there is variation in how they are selected is not so significant but it is important to make the criteria against which they are selected clear and transparent. The UN Resident Coordinator's office expressed concern as to CDD transparency and the penetration of committees by interest groups. This highlights the need ensure political risk is covered through incorporating political economy analyses into risk assessments.

29. Avoidance of doing harm was also seen to have some negative aspects. As noted, clan rivalry is addressed by working with a balance of clans. To avoid creating problems within a project, one organisation has the policy of selecting project sites where there is clan homogeneity. This allows clustering which brings economies of scale but it does little to expand inter-clan relations, rather it has the potential to reinforce clan (or sub-clan) divisions. Similarly in order to reduce tensions another organisation was compelled to split 4 large grants into 14 sub grants thus illustrating the cost of reducing conflict can foster and reinforce fragmentation.

SSP Policies and Procedures

30. **Community Driven Development:** The three organisations whose activities form the case studies all use a variation of the community driven development approach but each is working towards distinctively different ends. PACT is seeking to have effect in improving inter and intra clan relations. DCR seeks to enhance service delivery and bottom-up governance by empowering communities to exercise their rights to development goods. TIS links community selected outputs to changes in the relationships between government, business and civil society actors with the intention that the credibility of government will be increased.

31. The establishment of the DFID Core State Function Programme and the SSP have raised the issue of the efficacy of community driven development. The assumption was expressed that where a state lacks legitimacy, community based activity is essential and will bring about stability. However this is not proven. While randomised control trials to test the approach and establish how it may be improved will be useful, both for Somalia and the wider development community, it does not solve the immediate problem of the need for SSP programme monitoring and real time learning, an imperative feature noted in the recent dialogue between DFIDS and the Helmand PRT.

32. There is conflicting evidence on the value of CDD. A recent DFID report states ‘The strongest positive evidence about effective stabilisation relates to the critical importance of community involvement...’³. Yet there is an emerging body of evidence that questions whether CDD can produce the results some claim or are demanded of it⁴. That CDD does not meet expectations may well be because too much is being demanded from an approach not designed to meet the imperatives and expectations being placed upon it in politically charged circumstances⁵. Nevertheless there are few alternatives that can be used as an entry point in circumstances of weak government presence such as Somalia. However as increasing levels of stability are achieved the basis is provided to move to other mechanisms such as a greater focus on building government capacity, broader civil society development and use of the private sector. The ability to engage with these transitions is what makes SSP a creative and intriguing instrument.

33. **Peace Building:** Is peace a product or an outcome? The evaluation observed three types of approach to the notion of peace building. The first was where peace, or rather conflict resolution was being undertaken through a range of initiatives: capacity building, trainings for peace facilitators, the facilitation of community analyses and action research supported by development projects (peace dividends). Other than project reports, which understandably tend to be positive, it is hard to know whether this approach brings lasting peace. A study of UNPOS reports indicates a harsh almost Hobbesian environment in Somalia where in lieu of central government control armed groups are in a constant process of vying for power. Against such a scenario it is difficult to understand how an INGO can come in and bring about sustainable agreements. Independent verification is needed to comment on the sustainability of solutions and enforcement of agreements as set against changes in the socio-political environment. The approach raises issues of perverse incentives in linking agreements to inputs and in judging implementing partner success by numbers of conflicts mitigated. It also raises questions of undermining existing mechanisms for dispute settlement, whether they be traditional or nascent government structures.

34. The second approach is that which derives from rights-based community development such as undertaken by CARE in Somaliland in a project committed to the lengthy process of community empowerment. Much time is taken in relation building and gaining trust that leads to CSO development and community mobilisation. This approach has particular value in raising the profile of gender issues and of improving the rights of women and girls to gain greater degrees of access (particularly to education) and participation in public life. A component of this is assisting the peaceful negotiation of access to, and sharing of, natural resources and issues of gender based violence. It operates within the context of relative stability and in which there is a rule of law. This

³ S. Jones, S. Howarth. 2012. Supporting Infrastructure Development in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: Learning from Experience. (OPM) DFID, London.

⁴ M. Humphreys, R. Sanchez de la Sierra, P. van der Windt. 2012. Social and Economic Impacts of *Tuungan*. Columbia University.

⁵ See also: Report on Wilton Park Conference 1022. March 2010. Winning ‘Hearts and Minds’ in Afghanistan: Assessing the Effectiveness of Development Aid in COIN Operations. P.4. (<http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/resources/en/report-pages/2010/wp1022>)

valuable type of rights-based approach is usually more appropriately located in development contexts and funding streams rather than being associated with stability programming.

35. The third approach is the more process-orientated approach used by Interpeace, Finn Church Aid and Saferworld who are engaging with long term processes of creating dialogues, fostering linkages, providing information and generating trust in support of national actors. Working with local partners, Interpeace claims to have contributed to the Somaliland settlements of 2001. Saferworld have built platforms of civil society actors to interact with government. FCA have been supporting an initiative to bring together senior Elders from the various component parts of Somalia and work towards national reconciliation. A comment from one well-placed respondent was that peace in Somalia has to be self-driven. In respect of bringing about structural change, such INGOs seem to have the best prospect of engendering stability and more peaceful relations within Somalia. Given their long term commitment to the country and the depth of their knowledge, they may be usefully considered as having a monitoring role in ensuring that the SSP is working in an optimal manner and doing no harm. The evidence from this evaluation is that peace as an outcome is most likely to come about as a result of the application of sound development practice aligned with Somali driven peace settlements and political agreements.

36. Theory of Change and Results Framework: The ToC is an important statement. In order to analyse the SSP ToC, it is printed in its entirety:

“The SSP’s theory of change is that by resolving localised conflicts that create instability, and joining areas where peace has been established into an overarching framework for reconciling competing interests, the absence of which historically has undermined establishing a unified state, a network of stable areas abiding by an agreed set of governance principles may emerge (see paragraph 23 on how local stability has a multiplier effect on national stability). Local disputes are within and between communities. A lack of governance in these areas means that actors (clans, militias, AS, TFG, and others) endeavour to control and direct the flow of limited resources and establish informal authority. Where areas have stabilised in Somalia, it is because local processes have been able to negotiate settlements between power-brokers and affiliated security actors. The theory of change believes that reducing tensions over resources by bringing together communities to plan and get access to additional services will reduce sources of competition, that working with power-brokers to manage and negotiate settlements peacefully will bring about greater security, and that in some instances formalising some of these negotiations into governance structures will provide a framework for managing conflict and a basis for stability in local settings. Informally, this is already happening in some areas, but a national level resolution is needed that areas can engage with to assure a common basis for the rule of law.”

37. This is a difficult statement to engage with. In respect of empirical evidence, § 23 of the Business Case contains not evidence, but assumptions and assertions that local stability has a multiplier effect on national stability. Empirical evidence indicates the reverse argument can be made citing the example of Somaliland where the achievement of a strong central administration has contributed to regional stability. Conceptually, this ToC is difficult to grasp. It needs to be disentangled. In so doing, it can be interpreted as being composed of four elements:

- 1) *The proposition that by resolving local conflicts and joining areas where peace is established will produce a network of stable areas.*
- 2) *Reducing tensions over resources by bringing communities together to access services*
- 3) *Working with local power brokers to manage settlements*
- 4) *To formalise negotiations into governance structures for purposes of conflict management and to provide local stability.*

38. Examining these, the first statement is predicated on creating and joining islands of stability. This is a seductive proposition that was used as the basis of stabilisation policy in Afghanistan where it proved to be politically, militarily and culturally unfounded, that it may be relevant in the complex and fragmented circumstances of Somalia is aspirational. The case for this proposition needs to be argued within a political economy context specific to Somalia.

39. The second proposition is not without contention. There are those who would argue that increases in local resources can also create tension. It is how resources are allocated, administered and applied that is the crucial factor and to which attention needs to be addressed. Furthermore, it is not specified what these 'communities' are, but if they are circumscribed by clan identity, then it should be stated as being so. If clans they be, then the proposition has specific governance and mediation implications associated with changing the nature of power relations that needs to be theorised.

40. ToC propositions 3 and 4, are described as working with local power brokers to manage settlements and to formalise negotiations into government structures to manage conflict and provide local stability. These are questionable functions for externally funded NGOs/agents in contemporary Somalia. Who are these power brokers? Who is making judgements as to their probity? Indeed, how do you judge probity in circumstances such as these? As professed alignment with the Government perhaps? Even though external actors, or their internal proxies (i.e. Somali NGOs), might mediate disputes in the more stable regions of Somalia, the effectiveness of externally financed actors in making peace agreements at the faction level in areas of higher instability has yet to be established, particularly where there are material incentives (i.e. peace dividends). Concerns are that such approaches may be firstly creating perverse incentives, secondly they may be undermining traditional dispute settlement procedures (*xeer*) and thirdly, dependent on the course of action taken, because it might involve direct engagement in government. It needs to be made clear how negotiated agreements will be formalised into governance structures and the measures by which government will enforce these formalised agreements, if that is, government represents the means by which formalisation will take place. The distinction between governance and government is not made clear.

41. Elsewhere in the Business Case and in the letters to applicants for the rapid disbursement phase of the fund, there appears a more pragmatic statement that represents what could become a ToC: "*The SSP seeks to integrate political, security and development interventions with the intention that the integrated approach will support the establishment of legitimate local government.*" Although skeletal, it is to the point and seems more relevant than the stated Business Case ToC. It is suggested that this formulation be worked on, perhaps incorporating other ideas emerging through this evaluation, should they be seen as relevant. The aim of a ToC is to simply and clearly present theory, application, trajectory and outcome. The present ToC fails to do this.

42. The log frame has its Outcome 'Greater number of areas of stability' verified by 3 indicators. The notion of 'stability' is to be defined by the SSF Secretariat. There would be value in the log frame Impact and Outcome levels being informed by a specifically designed instrument (to be discussed in § 66). However to comment on the feasibility, design and delivery of the SSP/SSF requires looking at the outputs. These are:

- 1) *Community driven projects to meet immediate needs*
- 2) *Greater number of communities are more secure*
- 3) *Legitimate and representative local administrations established*
- 4) *Greater number of inclusive, local or regional peace settlements*

43. Output 1 is in line with the default ToC in § 41. In respect of Output 2, there is no information on the activities that will contribute to it. More specifically, information is required somewhere on who has the capacity to ensure, or bring about, security and how the SSF will engage with this function or whether it will come about as a result of other outputs. Output 3, supporting the development of local government, is in line with the default ToC, outlined in § 41. It seems an eminently relevant output in furthering stabilisation. Output 4 draws upon ToC components 1,3 and 4. These have been heavily questioned. The SSF assumptions on how outputs will be realised is not clear and needs to be made explicit, particularly in respect how Fund resources intend to be applied to improve security (ref. Business Case, § 42). Thus it is recommended that the latest log frame (29 June 2012) be revisited to ensure the outputs are in line with a clarified SSP strategy and ToC. Attention should be given to improving the indicators and their means of verification at all levels of the log frame.

44. Turning to SSP's M & E components, project design provides the basis for successful programming. DFID is commendably rigorous in its project scrutiny and ensures quality in partner approaches to M & E. Project reports provide useful indications of achievement but they need to be verified and for this DFID is putting in place a third party monitoring system. In addition it is stated there will be perception surveys and independent evaluations in Year Two and at programme end. There will be an additional annual 'process' evaluation to ensure programme design and implementation systems remain fit for purpose. The institution of randomised control trials to test CDD and understand how the approach can be improved will be of benefit to those using CDD in Somalia and to the wider development community.

45. These arrangements provide a robust set of mechanisms to deliver M & E. However stability programming, operating as it does in volatile areas with restricted access, requires information on outcomes and impact. High levels of risk are incurred without a mechanism that captures the consequence of inputs in relation to changes in the social, political and security environment. Stability programming requires higher level learning in order to ensure that where mistakes are being made, they are small ones. The way that this might be achieved is further discussed in paras 64 & 66). The need for the generation and sharing of higher level learning was recognised by both PACT and DRC.

BOFS's Approach to Stability Programming

46. **Stabilisation, Stability and DFIDS:** UK's Somalia policy is based on the need to address Islamic fundamentalism, piracy and to create stability in the Horn of Africa. Reductions in the scope of militant activity and the gains being achieved in the establishment of government provide the background to increasing support to Somalia. Part of this support has been the introduction of stabilisation capacity which is located under the aegis of the Foreign Office. The BOFS Stabilisation Team (ST) has two full time stabilisation officers with part time administrative and communications support. The stabilisation officers spend a considerable amount of time in Mogadishu and are looking forward to the relaxing of restrictions to travel more extensively. Using conflict pool funding, they are developing initiatives that will contribute to a recovery continuum that links to DFID programming through the SSP and the Core State Functions Programme (CSFP). The BOFS ST coordinate with DFID humanitarian initiatives through sharing information but have no operational interaction.

47. In recent months there have been significant improvements in how the various elements of BOFS have worked to ensure better utilisation of stabilisation capacity and resource deployment. As part of this the BOFS ST have been refining their approach. A stabilisation strategy, conceptualised and tailored to the specific circumstances of Somalia has been agreed. It links capabilities within BOFS across function, time, focus and partners. Stabilisation projects are signed off by department heads

on the basis of concept notes. There is in effect a collegiate relationship between the various BOFS actors but one that has yet to clearly realise the strategic purpose in an inter-departmental sense. Periodic joint meetings have been established between the three departments and the Somali Unit. The ST arrange bi-weekly meetings with the DFID Governance and Peace Building Team.

48. To date this has been the extent to which stabilisation capability has been formalised. To achieve greater strategy coherence requires incentives between the various component parts to promote agreement on strategy, planning and coordination. Currently the incentives for cooperation are few. This has led to divergent theorising and programming. Greater alignment between the three ministries and the stabilisation capacity in the formulation of BOFS policy and the interpretation of UK meta-policy would produce greater strategic coherence. To achieve this requires a move to cross sector and integrated programming delivering to the strategic framework that has now been established.

49. The lack of clarity over the stabilisation agenda has resulted in, or is a result of, the institutional distinction between stabilisation and stability: between what is a process and what is an outcome. However distinguishing between the two has inhibited the generation of common principles and a common methodology within BOFS. It has inhibited the integration of BOFS stabilisation capacity to produce sharper, better linked upstream stabilisation policy and practice that will bring about the strategic effect the UK seeks to achieve.

50. The semantic differentiation between the notions of stabilisation and stability, set as it is within institutional boundaries, has led to various forms of confusion both internal and external. NGOs are confused about the difference between the BOFS ST and the Stability Programme. One UN actor who said that the UK was doing a 'fabulous job' and was far more engaged than other donors stated that the uncertainty around the stability label was unfortunate.

51. This leads to a wider discussion of the use of the term 'stability' and indeed the word 'fund'. The respondent just quoted, and several others, saw the labels as being inappropriate. Stability approaches have now come to imply cooperation with the military and of pursuing a particular political line, as was the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. This inhibits some good NGOs engaging with anything labelled as stability. Furthermore, one respondent went so far as to say that using the stability label was seen as insulting to Somalis. The use of the term 'fund' was seen by others as sending the wrong signals i.e. putting the focus on money rather than programme concept(s). For all these reasons it is recommended at an early opportunity the SSP be re-branded to something that has greater resonance with the Somali people and will attract rather than deter applications from bona fide organisations.

52. **Geographic Focus:** Any critical examination of the SSF cannot avoid the issue of geographic focus. Consideration of a more tightly circumscribed SSF initially derived from seeking ways to limit risk and the consequences of inappropriate programming. Stabilisation programming inevitably takes place in circumstances where reliable information is scarce. Nevertheless this does not diminish the need to develop appropriate monitoring capacity, not just to ensure accountability, but to provide information on the outcomes and impact of interventions. It was to meet these imperatives that the UK government belatedly established the Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (HMEP). DFID played a crucial role in establishing HMEP and ensuring rigour in the instrument and its approach. The situations are not dissimilar. There are two points to be made. The first is in order to reduce risk in a hostile environment, stability programming requires a timely flow of information. The second is that gathering information becomes more difficult the larger area and the more dispersed the projects.

53. As the issue of geographic focus was examined it became evident there were a number of other reasons why there would be benefit in having a tighter fund focus and that the focus should be South Central (SC). The most significant of these is the political importance of SC. The coherence and functionality of SC is directly contingent to the notion of Somalia. Without an effectively governed South Central region, the notion of a Somali state has little meaning. Without a coherent SC, Mogadishu is diminished to being a city state set amongst a sea of competing interest groups. Somaliland, and to a lesser extent Puntland, can just let matters drift all the while increasing their administrative, regulatory and economic capacity to becoming increasingly independent states, if only in the *de facto* sense. Regional stability based on the premise of a coherent Somalia is thus contingent on a stable and dynamic SC.

54. In respect of aid delivery, increased geographic focus will produce a greater impact for the resources being applied. Furthermore it offers the prospect of achieving improved delivery through integrating BOFS's stabilisation capacity currently operating from Mogadishu. The BOFS ST have developed the knowledge and networks to provide information in respect of individuals, organisations, clan factions and security issues. They can be used to test out organisations and pilot approaches that, if successful, can be geared up to utilise SSF resources. This could lead to smarter programming and faster responses to address the needs of newly recovered areas, which given the Al Shabaab presence are likely to be in SC. It would represent an advance in stability programming.

55. A further reason for reducing the fund to one region is that if its Advisory Board were composed of representatives from the approximately three regions that compose Somalia, there are strong grounds for anticipating disagreement about how the fund should allocate resources to each region. Given the history of Somalia it is not difficult to conceive the Advisory Board becoming a focus for discord.

56. Stability in SC is threatened to a greater degree than Puntland and Somaliland by the number of IDPs present and the possible influx of refugees currently in neighbouring countries. There are 650,000 Somali refugees in Kenya. Most come from SC as do a significant proportion of the 214,000 Somali refugees in Ethiopia. SC has within its boundaries approximately 1.3 million IDPs representing about 85% of Somalia's IDP population. The humanitarian, administrative and security-related issues surrounding the IDPs and refugees have very significant implications for stability and highlight the imperative to generate government function and capacity, particularly at the local level.

57. Finally, given that a Somaliland Fund is being established for £20 million and that the Core State Functions Programme (£38 m) and SEED (£18 m) are being applied across Puntland and Somaliland as has been JPLG (£5 m), these regions are already benefitting from DFID's attention commensurate with their overall level of stability. When these various factors are taken into account, there are strong stability-related arguments for considering restricting the SSF to South Central. To do so would not necessarily inhibit funding of stability-related needs in Somaliland or Puntland which could be achieved by adjusting the balance of resources accordingly between the SSP and the SSF.

58. **Thematic Focus:** Al Shabaab has two aspects, the political and the religious. Its religious manifestation is one that represents a continuum emanating from Muslim Brotherhood perspectives and more recently the Salafis. What distinguishes Al Shabaab from these groups is that it has chosen violence as the means to which establish an Islamic State. These fundamentalist elements have received, and continue to receive, support from a range of external actors. Whether or not Al Shabaab continues as a structure or with this name, Islamic radicalism will likely persist in Somalia in one form or another since it has an audience that finds meaning in its messages. However the growth of Al Shabaab has also been fuelled by its attraction to younger males whose hopes and aspirations are stymied by their being part of a social order that gives them scant recognition until they may be

deemed 'elders' either by age and sagacity, religiosity or wealth. The ability to escape the confines of clan by joining a movement that offers the prospect of power, excitement and of opportunities not otherwise available to them, some of which pander to the most base of instincts, is understandable. Similarly, the Somali realpolitik is such that those marginalised clans unable to compete with the more powerful groupings see little choice but to join Al Shabaab as a means of maintaining and furthering their interests.

59. This issue is raised because fundamental to everything taking place in Somalia is the clan and forms of opposition to the clan. If development actors invest resources in highly politicised circumstances, they need to be aware of how those resources are being applied. Since the politics of intervention are informed and driven by the values of the interveners, stability programming needs to be seen within political contexts: those of the donors and of actors in the location where interventions are applied. To advance a proposition: it can be argued that the hope for Somalia is government. It is government that can rise above the clan and bring together a damagingly fragmented polity and culture in which the clan shrinks as other forms of identity and trust come to take precedence. At present the hopes for government are being vested in the current president who is operating under astonishingly heavy internal and external pressures. Stabilisation/stability programming has enormous potential for good. But to avoid harm, it needs to be clear about how it operates within the political arena. It thus needs to be established precisely what it is working towards, that is its political rationale. If supporting the establishment of government in Somalia is deemed its goal, it is suggested that SSF should not just have a focus on governance but include a reference to government in everything it funds.

60. This is a rather elliptical approach to the issue of SSF strategy and coherence, a subject that brought about some quite strong responses from evaluation respondents. A common view was that it would be helpful if the SSF strategy could be more clearly outlined. Saying that it is flexible fund is not helpful in orientating those applying to it. NGOs did not want to invest time and money in writing a proposal that had no hope of acceptance. Thematic guidelines were seen as being helpful rather than restrictive. Clearer guidelines are now emerging, although their interpretation might be causing some difficulty. There was also a view that a more programmatic approach could compliment the approaches of other donors.

61. Communications are a critically important component of any stabilisation programme and should be integrated into SSP documentation, ToC and log frame. An important component of stabilisation is its contribution to attitudinal change. While the physical resources applied to stabilisation initiatives are relatively small, their impact can be greatly expanded by the integration of a communications component across all aspects of stability programming. The aim being to generate a multiplier effect through demonstrating the benefits of whatever it is decided the stabilisation policy is working towards (hence the need to establish a clear rationale for such programming). TIS projects in Mogadishu for example have a sub-committee responsible for communicating project developments across the district. The BOFS ST have a vigorous approach to communications that involves funding radio stations and other initiatives that could form the foundation upon which SSF resources be applied. The benefits of a flexible funding mechanism could be used to their full in harnessing the ingenuity of a younger generation of Somalis and their capacity to develop innovative approaches to communication.

62. In examining the stated SSP strategic approach of integrating political, security and development interventions, comment has been made that its components be linked to government (para 59). If such an approach is in accord with DFID then there are arguments for a simple strategy reflected in a ToC that envisages a programme focussed on the following:

- Governance, with particular regard to government (i.e. local government) through linking the informal to the formal;
- The provision of basic services, through community driven development, with particular reference to the private sector and diaspora;
- To focus on communication: information dissemination on projects, civic education, opening up debates, bringing in new ideas and mobilising the energy and creativity of young people.

63. Such a three component construct could provide the basis for the SSP to become established and then to expand its activities and shift direction as experience dictates and confidence increases in management of the programme and associated fund.

64. **A Learning Organisation:** One of the lessons being learned about stabilisation is the need to reinforce the message of accountability at all levels and with all parties so as to give much greater focus on measuring impact and the consequences of aid⁶. Monitoring and evaluation should thus be part of any stability-related programming and should be integrated into it from the onset. This is one of the lessons from Helmand where the value of monitoring/perception survey data would have been much greater had it started with UK involvement in 2005. The evidence from Helmand indicates that what is needed is a fairly simple and but robust tool that will regularly ask a few key perception questions related to well-being and governance through relatively frequent light touch monitoring to generate real time learning⁷.

65. To a certain extent this is how the TIS Collaborative Partner Assessment measurement tool has been constructed⁸. It measures impact related to the programme's three core features: a) consensus building; b) transparency and accountability; c) responsiveness and ownership. It records and scores perceptions on these criteria at 6 month intervals. The indicator looks specifically at concrete actions within a scope that can feasibly be implemented consistently across the lifetime of the programme. It calls attention to behaviours exhibited and identifies issues with which Collaborative Partnerships are struggling and on which management must focus additional attention. To this extent it covers outcome/impact concerns as related to the programme. However, although assumptions may be made, it is not designed to look at the impact of the project on the wider environment or to integrate project findings into any political analysis of its measurement of change.

66. The learning from Afghanistan is that to provide guidance on outcome/impact in hostile environments requires wellbeing and governance data on trends over time and over diverse locations within the region being covered. In the circumstance of a programme such as SSP where there will be a diversity projects, a standardised tool, such as that designed for TIS, will likely be difficult to create. Therefore collecting data on impact needs to focus on simplicity and frequency of surveys, ideally three times a year, with the aim of providing indications of trends over time. The important information is about where and what things are getting better and where worse. By linking this data to a socio-political analysis it is possible to gain informed impact-related information.

67. If primacy is given to such forms of monitoring and evaluation, then DFID may consider conceiving the SSF as more of a learning programme, to the extent of including a research and information dissemination component. This learning element to be integrated into a geographically and thematically focused stability programme rather than a delivery vehicle for widely dispersed multi-themed stability-related projects. Indeed, it can be argued that the delivery of high quality stability programming is contingent on the reflexivity made possible by reliable information. It is

⁶ P. Fishstein and A. Wilder. 2011. *Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan*. Tufts, p.6).

⁷ D. Saltmarsh. 2012. *Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programme: Annual Review*. DFID Afghanistan, p.14.

⁸ S.M. Jay. 2012. *TIS Collaborative Partnership Data Collection Handbook*. USAID/TIS. Nairobi.

suggested that the prerequisite to transition in areas of high volatility to longer term development requires a good knowledge base to enable smart, do no harm programming.

68. The key learning point from evaluation respondents is that sustainability of stabilisation initiatives is not so much about what is done but the way it is done. To achieve delivery that minimises the risks of doing harm requires devising a tool that can provide information on changes in wellbeing and governance in the regions covered by SSP. It would also require utilising the skills of an organisation capable of understanding, analysing and translating the complexities of clan dynamics and linking this evidence with the stream of good quality reports now becoming available. Should this be achieved, it becomes possible to conceive of a responsive programme that not only does as a little harm as possible but is able to build more quickly on what proves to be positive programming⁹.

69. In addition to this resource, it is suggested to include in the secretariat an individual responsible for learning. This focal point to handle intelligence and incoming programme information with the purpose of advising the Secretariat so as to reduce the consequences of inappropriate programming, providing information on where tensions are increasing and giving feedback on where implementation is successful. This function would identify what to reinforce, what to change and where/when to draw back. It will address DFID's primary concern of taking every feasible step of reducing risk and ensuring its programming does no harm. It will contribute to creating a reflexive and adaptable fund. In addition to an individual to coordinate learning and intelligence in the secretariat, it will require commissioning of an organisation to administer the proposed measurement tool and to gather, analyse and provide the secretariat with a digest of clan-related and political data over the area being covered by the programme.

⁹ "A key theme is the critical lack of monitoring, evaluation, and empirical data available to assess the impact of aid on stability... Not only has the lack of dedicated monitoring and evaluation capacity limited the ability of actors in Afghanistan to assess the impact of their programs, it has also prevented ongoing adaptation and reform." Report on Wilton Park Conference 1022. March 2010. Winning 'Hearts and Minds' in Afghanistan: Assessing the Effectiveness of Development Aid in COIN Operations. pp.8-9. (<http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/resources/en/report-pages/2010/wp1022>)

Recommendations

70. The following are the key evaluation recommendations as related to SPP/SSF procedures, approaches and orientation:

- To fund an independent evaluation of delivery-orientated peace programming to cover issues of sustainability and enforcement of agreements, perverse incentives, impact on traditional judicial and governance structures and to identify unintended consequences (§ 33).
- The SSP ToC and log frame be redrawn. The ToC needs to be re-examined and configured to more clearly elucidate the theoretical basis for the SSP, outlining how the approach it defines will contribute to social, economic and political stability with particular emphasis on sustainability issues and the establishment of linkages with other functions, programmes and organisations. The log frame needs to be aligned in the light of a redrawn ToC (§ 36 – 43).
- There be greater integration of the various elements of BOFS stabilisation capacity so as to better capitalise on the work being undertaken by the Stabilisation Team in respect of theorisation, strategy, partner/project identification, piloting and intelligence (§ 46 -48).
- The SSP be re-branded to be more in tune with Somali sensibilities. The name for a suitable brand should be achieved through discussion with Somali actors (§ 51).
- To consider giving the SSF greater geographic focus by confining its activities to SC for reasons of its political significance, to increase impact in the most unstable region of Somalia and improve the ability to monitor and measure programme impact (§ 52 – 57).
- To clarify the political goals associated with UK stability programming in Somalia and derive a thematic approach that works towards realising those goals (§ 59 – 63).
- To generate a communications component and associated capacity as an integral part of SSP/SSF to operate at all levels from the Secretariat to individual projects. This to include a stand-alone communications component using conventional means of mass communication (§ 61).
- To formulate a tool to allow real-time monitoring of outcome and impact and to assign the analytical function to an appropriate organisation (§ 66).
- To expand the conception of SSP from being solely a mechanism to fund projects, to becoming a learning organisation. One that offers the prospect of gathering and analysing information, commissioning research and publishing bulletins and papers related to stabilisation that can feed into stability programming (§ 67 - 69).

71. There were a number of learning points that arose from study of the three pilots. The following suggestions are provided for consideration in improving SSF requirements and implementing criteria:

The Log frame:

- Ensure that indicators are congruent with the project narrative, particularly as reflected in the ToC

- Greater attention be given to recording project achievements at outcome and impact levels. Indicators at these levels need to be given more thought.

- Attention needs to be given to ensure qualitative achievements are recorded in log frames. This requires more creative use of the instrument. One way would be to disaggregate indicators to create a series of ranked stages against which progress can be marked.

General:

- There is a need for periodic independent sector evaluations, most pressingly of delivery-orientated peace projects.

- Applicants should be given instructions on what is expected from a theory of change i.e. that a ToC should be straightforward (but not over-simplified) and in alignment with thematic criteria. A ToC should clearly present theory, application, trajectory and outcome. Stability-related ToCs should also include references to linkages with other programmes/organisations and demonstrate a measure of sustainability.

- For the sake of comparability and succinctness it would be valuable for SSP/SSF and applicant organisations if SSP/SSF were to generate a check list or key points to be covered, in respect of political economy analyses, conflict analyses and risk assessments.

- SSP may consider establishing transparency standards as a criteria for project approval, particularly in respect of criteria against which councils, committees or other participative bodies are selected.

ANNEX 1

ToR for Somalia Stability Programme Pilot Evaluation

Purpose

To inform the design and programming decisions of DFID's Somalia Stability Programme (SSP), the multi-donor Somalia Stability Fund (SSF) and the British Office for Somalia's wider stabilisation effort by:

1. Assessing the feasibility, design and delivery of the approaches taken by SSF pilot projects and a range of other stabilisation activities being undertaken in Somalia against the following factors:
 - a) Delivery of results
 - b) Existence and evidence of a credible theory of change
 - c) Project and implementing partner resilience
 - d) Barriers and enablers of implementation
 - e) Adherence to 'Do No Harm' principles
2. Making recommendations on how DFID SSP and SSF policies and procedures can be adapted to increase the feasibility and delivery of the projects they support.
3. Locating the discussion in the strategic context and associated institutional frameworks.

Scope

At the core of the evaluation there are three organisations that have received UK funding in the pilot phase of the Somalia Stability Fund (SSF). However the evaluation is seeking the opportunity to incorporate the knowledge and experience of a diverse range of implementing agencies who are contributing to making Somalia more stable. Then there is a further group of actors/organisations concerned with monitoring, providing security, undertaking research and determining policy whose views will also be listened to.

Methodology

First, the evaluation will study the extensive documentation on approaches to stabilisation and stability in Somalia. Second, the evaluation will conduct a series of semi-structured interviews of personnel from organisations that are, or have been, directly engaged in implementing stability-related activity in Somalia.

The following framework will be applied to both the documentation study and the interviews:

- a) Delivery of results
 - i) Did the intervention include a baseline and expected results?
 - ii) Were these results delivered?
 - iii) Was there a system in place to monitor implementation and verify results?
 - iv) What length of time is required to deliver the intended results?
- b) Existence of a credible theory of change and evidence for it
 - i) What was the rationale for the intervention?
 - ii) What were the causal linkages that lie behind the approach taken and the actual/intended outcomes?

- iii) How did it contribute to increasing stability?
 - iv) How did the intervention improve governance?
 - v) What evidence from Somalia or elsewhere have you used to support, modify or contest the theory of change.
 - vi) How did the intervention generate evidence in favour or against its theory of change?
 - vii) How have you changed your project in light of evidence generated from it?
 - viii) How did the intervention fit in with the interventions of other development actors?
 - ix) What other factors might have contributed to any change that has taken place?
- c) Project and implementing partner resilience
- i) Did the project include a risk assessment and mitigation plan?
 - ii) Did any of the identified risks materialise and how were they addressed?
 - iii) Did any non-identified risks materialise e.g. conflict, security threat, political change, environmental incident, and how were they addressed?
- d) Barriers and enablers of implementation
- i) What effect did the following have on the intervention?
 - Clans
 - Quality and status of government
 - Powerful actors (e.g. leaders of armed groups and businessmen)
 - The local economy (access to and distribution of resources, esp. land, water and access to markets)
 - Availability of and access to social goods (e.g. health and education)
 - Security environment
 - Ability to access the project locality (e.g. security problems, remoteness) and arrangements made
 - Staffing
 - Local implementing partners
- e) Adherence to 'Do No Harm' principles
- i) How does the notion of 'do no harm' apply to this intervention?
 - ii) How have you analysed the risk of the project exacerbating tension and conflict (e.g. staffing, procurement, resource conflict)?
 - iii) Can you give an example of how you have modified your approach in order to do no harm?

Outputs

1. A final report of no more than 20 pages including recommendations for the Somalia Stabilisation Programme and Somalia Stability Fund.
2. Presentations of the findings to:
 - i) DFID Somalia and British Office for Somalia governance, peace building and stabilisation personnel.
 - ii) DFID Somalia (Monday Morning Meeting showcase)
 - iii) DFID/Stabilisation Unit in London (via VC)

DFID, September 2012

ANNEX 2

Methodology

The primary focus of the evaluation was to apply the set of questions outlined in the TOR (Annex 1) in respect of three NGO's who have received DFID and SU funds to undertake community driven projects. In addition to these organisations the evaluation sought to incorporate the experience and views of a diverse range of organisations associated with improving peace, stability and development in Somalia (Annex 3). Interviews were also undertaken in the British Office for Somalia (BOFS). Finally, views were incorporated from those concerned with monitoring, providing security and undertaking research in Somalia. Time did not permit more respondents to be interviewed, however sufficient data has been gathered to inform the findings of the evaluation.

The approach used in gathering data from implementing NGOs was to ask them to respond to a set of pre-determined questions related to the feasibility, design and delivery of their activities. Their responses were assessed against the following factors:

- a) Delivery of results
- b) Existence and evidence of a credible theory of change
- c) Project and implementing partner resilience
- d) Barriers and enablers of implementation
- e) Adherence to do no harm principles

The evaluation was given more depth by attendance at a planning workshop for one of the community driven programmes being supported by the BOFS stability capacity. This provided the opportunity to speak to a number of Somalis to include local government officials, political actors and community members, including a focus group discussion with women. Visits were made to Mogadishu. In the first discussions took place with Somali partners receiving stabilisation funds, local government actors, UN staff and an MP from the new assembly. The second was to speak with a delegation of Somali elders.

The exercise has also been informed by a study of programme documents and other material relating to Somalia. It also makes reference to the growing literatures relevant to stability-related activity in conflict and post conflict circumstances.

The primary constraint to the evaluation was the limited ability to engage with Somalis resident in country. This was a result of security restrictions. To some extent this was countered by being able to participate in the planning workshop attended by Somalis who had travelled to Kenya. The time spent in Mogadishu, restricted though movement was, nonetheless allowed a measure of interaction with those working with government and NGOs. Valuable insights were provided by UN staff and others who were able to travel more widely in South Central Somalia.

ANNEX 3

Individuals met:

Abdisaid Muse Ali – Nordic International Support Foundation
Abdulahi Ali Ahmed – MP, Somali Assembly
Abdul Aziz Osman – Azani Party, Political Advisor
Ahmed Maolin – International Organisation for Migration <mailto:amoalin.tisiom.dg@gmail.com>
Angela Yoder-Maina – USAID
Bradley David – International Organisation for Migration
Daniel Kiptugen – Saferworld
David Korpela – Finnish Church Aid
Douglas Meurs – US State Department
Emma Phillips – Saferworld
Gaelle Le Poittier – International Business and Technical Consultants
Hamish Wilson – British Office For Somalia Stabilisation Team
Hodan Hassan – USAID
Ibrahim Ghulan Adan - District Commissioner, Elwak
Issack Mohammed Abdi – International Labour Organisation
Ivanoe Frugali – Danish Refugee Council
Jabril Abdulle – Centre for Research and Development
James Stephenson – Danish Demining Group
Jerry McCann – Interpeace
Joanna Reid – DFID Somalia
Katrina Aitken Laird – Saferworld
Klaus Ljørring Pedersen – Danish Demining Group
Liz McBride – State Department
Mahde Abdile – Finnish Church Aid
Matt Baugh – H.M. Ambassador to Somalia
Mohammed Ahmed Shan – Benadir Regional Administration Planning Unit
Mohammed Hussein Omar – Qatari Charities
Nasri Hussein – USAID
Nikolai Hutchinson – PACT
Patrick Duong – Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery
Prafulla Mishra – International Rescue Committee
Simon Mills – British Council
Syed Moh’d Musai – Azani Party, Humanitarian Aid and International Cooperation
Tammy Orr – UNMAS
Tim Randall – Office of the UN Coordinator, Mogadishu
Uffe Poulsen – Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery
Vishalini Lawrence – DAI
Wouter Schaap - CARE

ANNEX 4

Acronyms

BOFS	British Office for Somalia
CDD	Community Driven Development
CDRD	Community Driven Recovery and Development
CSFP	Core State Functions Programme
DFIDS	Department for International Development Somalia
DNH	Do No Harm
HMEP	Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programme
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ITBC	International Business and Technical Consultants
JPLG	Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SC	South Central
SSF	Somalia Stability Fund
SSP	Somalia Stability Programme
ST	Stabilisation Team
TIS	Transition Initiatives for Stabilisation
ToC	Theory of Change