



Empowered lives.
Resilient nations.

ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS **LIBERIA**

EVALUATION OF UNDP CONTRIBUTION



HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP
efficiency COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP relevance MANAGING FOR RESULTS
sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP effectiveness COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP
efficiency COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP relevance MANAGING FOR RESULTS
sustainability MANAGING FOR RESULTS responsiveness
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT effectiveness COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP



*Empowered lives.
Resilient nations.*

ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS LIBERIA

EVALUATION OF UNDP CONTRIBUTION

REPORTS PUBLISHED UNDER THE ADR SERIES

Afghanistan	Republic of the Congo	Malawi	Somalia
Argentina	Ecuador	Maldives	Sudan
Bangladesh	Egypt	Mongolia	Syrian Arab Republic
Barbados and OECS	El Salvador	Montenegro	Tajikistan
Benin	Ethiopia	Mozambique	Thailand
Bhutan	Georgia	Nicaragua	Turkey
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Ghana	Nigeria	Uganda
Botswana	Guatemala	Papua New Guinea	Ukraine
Brazil	Guyana	Paraguay	United Arab Emirates
Bulgaria	Honduras	Peru	Uzbekistan
Burkina Faso	India	The Philippines	Vietnam
Cambodia	Indonesia	Rwanda	Yemen
Chile	Jamaica	Senegal	Zambia
China	Jordan	Serbia	
Colombia	Lao PDR	Seychelles	

ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS: EVALUATION OF UNDP CONTRIBUTION – LIBERIA

Copyright © UNDP 2012, all rights reserved.
Manufactured in the United States of America. Printed on recycled paper.

The analysis and recommendations of this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Development Programme, its Executive Board or the United Nations Member States. This is an independent publication by the UNDP Evaluation Office.

Editor: Jeffrey Stern, Suazion, Inc. (NY, suazion.com)
Design: Suazion, Inc. (NY, suazion.com)
Production: Consolidated Graphics Inc.
Cover images: UN Photo, UNDP and Vijayalakshmi Vadivelu

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This evaluation was conducted by the Evaluation Office of UNDP, with Vijayalakshmi Vadivelu as the evaluation manager. The office drew on the following persons to conduct the evaluation: Team Leader Rajeev Pillay and team members Richard Langan and Hope Kabuchu, who took specific responsibilities for the rule of law and gender equality programme areas, respectively. At the Evaluation Office, Anna Perini provided research support.

Our thanks are extended to stakeholders and partners of UNDP Liberia, including members of the government, civil society, international development community, the United Nations family and members of the communities that the ADR team consulted during the course of the evaluation.

We extend our sincere thanks to Amara Konneh, Minister of Finance, Government of Liberia.

The cooperation of Moustapha Soumare the UN Resident Coordinator, UNDP Resident Representative and Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, and Dominic Sam, UNDP Country Director, is acknowledged with thanks. We also appreciate the cooperation received from Fernando Abaga Edjang, Deputy Resident Representative, and the other staff of UNDP Liberia. We would also like to thank the UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa, in particular Tegegnetwork Gettu, Director, Babacar Cissé, Deputy Director and Suppiramian Nanthikesan, Evaluation Advisor, for their valuable support and contributions to the process.

FOREWORD

As a core area of the work of the Evaluation Office, an Assessment of Development Results (ADR) seeks to independently and systematically assess progress around key United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) initiatives in countries that receive UNDP support. The ADR in Liberia is the 73 evaluation, and the 16th conducted within the Regional Bureau for Africa. This is the first ADR conducted in Liberia, taking place towards the end of the current 2008–2012 programming cycle.

The ADR covers the period of 2003–2011, a particularly important time for Liberia, where the UNDP programme has operated in the context of one of the pioneering integrated United Nations peacekeeping missions. UNDP has provided support through multiple phases of the post-conflict period, from urgent assistance during the initial humanitarian response period to progressively more development oriented assistance as reconciliation and rebuilding progressed. The UNDP programme has been of significant importance in each of the thematic areas key to Liberia's transition from a protracted period of armed conflict and civil war to sustainable peace and development. This evaluation highlights the successes of UNDP support, but it also identifies ways in which the organization could have improved its performance. The lessons drawn are not only of value to Liberia, but also to future UNDP assistance provided in other integrated peacekeeping missions.


The evaluation found that UNDP has contributed to all of the most significant priorities of Liberia's transition, as these were defined by the government, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), and leading analyses of the underlying causes of the conflict. UNDP has successfully secured a niche for itself during each stage of a phased approach to the transition from conflict to development and has sought to address each among the most intractable structural causes of conflict. Such work remains key to long-term stability and development, as most such causes involve

inequitable power distribution and entrenched vested interests.

The UNDP programme has played a central role in supporting UNMIL and has consistently addressed top priority areas in the UNMIL mandate throughout the period covered by this review. This alliance has also showcased the innate partnership that forms between agencies with complementary mandates, with complementarity between peacekeeping operations and UNDP mandates in governance and capacity development. In Liberia, UNDP work has spanned the areas of democratic governance; social, political and economic inclusion; rule of law; security sector reform and decentralization; and the creation of economic opportunities that are of priority in a transition.

Despite notable achievements, this evaluation finds that there is an urgent need for a coherent, strategic and comprehensive programmatic approach—as opposed to the prevailing project-based approach—in each UNDP focus area. The current lack of strategic focus causes fragmented interventions that run in isolation. UNDP Liberia should seek to capture synergies and mutually reinforcing benefits, with a view towards enhancing results at the outcome level. The evaluation also cautions that UNDP success depends on the extent to which Liberia's contextual impediments are addressed and recommends that UNDP transition away from short-term projects to longer-term, broader-scope development activities that increasingly place national institutions at the helm of management and implementation.

It is our hope that this evaluation will help UNDP further leverage its strategic partnership with the Government of Liberia.



Indran A. Naidoo
Director, UNDP Evaluation Office

CONTENTS

Acronyms and Abbreviations	vii
Executive Summary	ix
Chapter 1. Introduction	1
1.1 Objective and Scope of the Evaluation	1
1.2 Methodology	1
Chapter 2. National Context	9
2.1. Political, Economic and Developmental Trends	9
2.2 Security Council Mandate and Milestones	16
2.3 Immediate Future	18
Chapter 3. UNDP Response	19
3.1 Overall Structure of the UNDP Programme in Liberia	19
3.2 Relevance to Government Plans and Priorities	21
3.3 Relevance to the United Nations Mission in Liberia’s Mandate	27
3.4 Relevance to the Underlying Causes of Conflict	28
3.5. Support to Aid Coordination and Positioning as a Service Provider	28
3.6 Factors To Be Taken Into Account in Future Positioning/Repositioning	31
Chapter 4. UNDP Contributions to Development Results	35
4.1 Democratic Governance and Conflict Prevention	35
4.2 Crisis Prevention and Recovery: Security Sector Reform and Rule of Law	56
4.3 Millennium Development Goals and Poverty Reduction	84
4.4 Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment	93
4.5 HIV and AIDS	102
4.6 Energy and the Environment	104
4.7 Sustainability	107
4.8 Overall Efficiency	112
Chapter 5. Conclusions and Recommendations	115
5.1 Conclusions	115
5.2 Recommendations	119

Annexes

Annex I. Terms of Reference	125
Annex II. Persons Consulted	135
Annex III. Select References	139
Annex IV. Terms of Reference of UNMIL	141
Annex V. List of Projects, Budgets and Expenditures	143

Boxes

Box 1. The Jurisdiction of the Liberian Anti-corruption Commission	47
Box 2. The Justice and Security Trust Fund	64
Box 3. The Working Relationship between the Police and Community Leaders in Bong County	65
Box 4. The Peacebuilding Fund	69
Box 5. Environment Conventions Ratified by Liberia	105

Figures

Figure 1. Inflation in Liberia – IMF Estimates	12
Figure 2. Current Account Balance and Foreign Direct Investment	13
Figure 3. Breakdown of Approved Budgets, UNDP Country Programmes	20
Figure 4. Evolving Development Perspectives and Timelines	22
Figure 5. A Phased Approach to Post-Conflict Recovery in Liberia	23
Figure 6. Relationship Among the Poverty Reduction Strategy, United Nations Development Assistance Framework and the UNDP Country Programme	25
Figure 7. Addressing the Sources of Conflict – UNDP and Peacebuilding	27
Figure 8. Coordination Mechanisms in Liberia	30
Figure 9. Poverty Reduction Strategy Projects: Completion Rates	85
Figure 10. Liberia: Progress on Gender Equality in Different Positions	94

Tables

Table 1. Short List of Flagship Projects/Programmes for In-depth Review	3
Table 2. Interview Formats and Coverage by Criteria	5
Table 3. Location of Field Trips, Thematic Coverage and Rationale for Selection	7
Table 4. Percent Real Annual GDP growth: Liberia	11
Table 5. Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals	14
Table 6. Significant UNDP Responses to National Priorities	26
Table 7. Mapping UNDP Liberia's Progress on Security Council Resolution 1325 Commitments	95
Table 8. UNDP Responsiveness to Gender Equality and Women's Economic Empowerment	99

ACRONYMS

ADR	Assessment Development Results
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CPAP	Country programme action plan
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Recovery
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
GDP	Gross domestic product
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
LISGIS	Liberian Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services
LNP	Liberia National Police
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
SMSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
TRAC	Target for Resources Assignment from the Core
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2011, the Evaluation Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conducted an independent country-level evaluation in Liberia. The Assessment of Development Results (ADR) analysed the UNDP role and contributions to development results in the Republic of Liberia between 2004 and mid-2011. This period includes the previous (2004–2007) and the ongoing (2008–2012) UNDP country programmes. This was the first ADR conducted in Liberia, taking place towards the end of the current 2008–2012 UNDP programme cycle.

The ADR covered a particularly important time period for Liberia as it began the transition from a protracted period of armed conflict and civil war—which caused the breakdown of virtually all of the nation’s institutions and society as a whole—to sustained peace and sustainable development. Between 2003 and 2011, the two UNDP country programmes implemented a wide range of activities in each of the priority thematic areas, following an overall strategy for peacebuilding that reflects the priorities of both the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the country’s elected government.

The United Nations Country Team (UNCT) and UNMIL had volunteered to develop ‘At Work Together’, and subsequently ‘Delivering as One’, in order to raise the overall coordination, profile and effectiveness of the United Nations in a complex emergency situation. In this respect, the UNDP programme has supported the two principal UNMIL pillars, supplying technical assistance—or providing reconstruction and facilitation services where UNMIL itself addressed technical assistance needs.

The ADR assessed the effectiveness of the UNDP strategy to achieve development results by facilitating and leveraging national efforts

in the areas of sustainable peace, transition and state-building. This assessment involved extensive analysis of programme documentation, semi-structured and structured stakeholder interviews and focus groups, and field visits to areas with a high concentration and representative sample of UNDP activities. Based on the findings of this process, the ADR formulated forward-looking recommendations for the next cycle of the country programme.

KEY FINDINGS

UNDP has clearly attempted to support national efforts spearheaded by the government to address the underlying structural causes of conflict. Working with the Governance Commission, relevant ministries and subsequently established targeted commissions, UNDP has sought to address issues such as the exclusion of large population segments from decision-making and political power; legislation that institutionalizes ethnic, tribal and religious discrimination; inequitable land distribution; corruption; and human rights violations. UNDP has also addressed key institutional aspects of the rule of law, with the appropriate exception of the reform of the armed forces.

UNDP has positioned itself as a service provider to all donors in the procurement of equipment for the early rehabilitation of essential institutions; managing contracts for rehabilitation and reconstruction; procuring essential supplies for a number institutions; sponsoring key positions in various branches of Government; managing quick implementation projects on behalf of donors; and the administrator of large multi-donor trust funds to deliver funding for themes or sectors of priority for the transition. This approach has enabled UNDP to fill a gap during the immediate post-conflict period but has also

had a tendency to carry on too long, influencing the content of UNDP's programmes (at least until very recently), reducing their sustainability and adversely affecting the effectiveness of national capacity building. This situation has persisted in part because of the continued lack of confidence on the part of other international partners in the capacity of Liberia's national institutions.

UNDP's achievements during the period under review are extensive and are both catalogued and reviewed in this report. It argues that, in many instances, UNDP's contribution has taken the form of administrative and operational support that laid the foundation for effective technical or substantive support by other partners. In the interest of urgently needed humanitarian action, UNDP has been called upon to adopt a number of modalities that are detrimental to long-term sustainability and could even undermine national ownership. Most of such decisions have been justified, because in the immediate post-conflict period, Liberia did not possess sufficient capacity to satisfactorily manage donor resources. At the same time, maximum use has been made of national experts and consultants—both in Monrovia and in the field—ensuring that products are in line with national institutions, legislation, culture and social practices, thereby raising the efficiency and effectiveness of programme implementation. Still, the continued absence of sufficient local technical capacity is causing significant errors to be made in areas such as microfinance (regarding, for example, the terms and administration of credit) and needs to be urgently addressed.

Low population density and large distances between communities had a negative affect on the sustainability of community-based rural development projects, making it more difficult to introduce effective cost-recovery mechanisms for services and the purchase of inputs that can expect to ensure sustainability over the long term. Most such schemes are likely to remain dependent on external support or subsidies for a long time, unless a mechanism is found to ensure economies of scale.

UNDP's approach has remained highly project-based and could have benefited from a more coherent strategic approach that capitalized on synergies between country-office and UNCT programmes and more effectively coordinated at the local community level, which is seeing a number of largely parallel interventions. In addition, the efficiency and timeliness of UNDP's procurement were repeatedly criticised by virtually all government counterparts. While it is clear that delivering on UNDP's fiduciary commitments while meeting programming deadlines poses a challenge in the difficult institutional environment of post-conflict Liberia, cumbersome UNDP procedures have often resulted in goods or services being delivered late, sometimes even beyond their date of usefulness. The relative lack of monitoring and evaluation activities in the country office during 2004–2011 and the unavailability of data (including the data sources originally set forth in UNDP project documents that were to be used as measurement of stated indicators) continue to hinder efforts to assess the efficiency of UNDP programming—especially from a cost-benefit perspective.

CONCLUSIONS

Conclusion 1: UNDP has contributed to all of the most significant priorities of the transition in Liberia as defined by the government, UNMIL and leading analyses of the structural causes of Liberia's conflict. It has successfully secured a niche for itself during each stage of a phased approach to the transition from conflict to development.

By responding to the wishes of the government and attempting to address as many priorities as possible, UNDP has thinly spread its capacity, thereby lacking technical depth and compromising programmes' sustainability and effectiveness. This is exacerbated by the government's wish to have a neutral agency such as UNDP in a leadership role and the President's direct and successful efforts to mobilize resources by ensuring UNDP involvement.

Conclusion 2: The service role has strengthened UNDP capacity to support aid coordination by the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the Resident Coordinator and the Humanitarian Coordinator, particularly by virtue of the UNDP role in the administration of donor funds.

Conclusion 3: The United Nations integration strategy has been vague. Perhaps as a result, some potential benefits of United Nations integration have not been sufficiently exploited. For example, while UNDP has supported government-led efforts to define necessary structural changes, there is relatively little evidence of UNDP using the UNMIL Security Council mandate as leverage with the National Assembly—for example, to exert pressure for change in the areas of land reform or anti-corruption and human rights measures.

Conclusion 4: UNDP has had relatively little in-house technical advisory capacity in areas of security sector reform, rule of law, elections, policing and microfinance. Where such capacities exist, they are stretched thin.

Conclusion 5: To its credit and that of the government, UNDP has sought to address each of the most intractable structural causes of conflict. These areas of work remain key to long-term stability and development, and in most such cases the work involves addressing power relationships and entrenched vested interests. To date, the approach has been to establish special commissions for each issue. These commissions have begun work to analyse the issues, develop policies and seek redress. However, they are mostly ineffectual—in that they have insufficient enforcement capacity and have been blocked by vested interests that persist and, for the most part, now reside in congress.

Conclusion 6: There remains a significant capacity deficit at the level of middle management and below in all government agencies. Education levels are low, and it is currently difficult to recruit and retain well-qualified Liberians. The problem is severe in Monrovia and is considerably more so

at subnational government levels. If the decentralization plans currently championed by UNDP and the Governance Commission are to succeed, sufficient incentives need to be put in place to attract well-qualified and experienced civil servants to local government posts for extended periods of time.

Conclusion 7: As other UNDP programmes in Liberia, rural and community development programmes are fragmented and largely consist of projects implemented quickly, in a semi-humanitarian assistance mode. The development experience gained by UNDP in other post-conflict settings worldwide has not been sufficiently utilized, and as a result, the programmes are insufficiently sustainable.

Conclusion 8: Cost efficiency is difficult to assess. However, there has been extensive use of Liberian nationals as professional project and programme staff, which improves national ownership and reduces implementation costs.

Conclusion 9: While activities and outputs are monitored and reported on a project-by-project basis to fulfil donor requirements, there appears to be no systematic framework for monitoring development results at the outcome/impact or the local/national levels.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: UNDP should not assume that a drawdown of UNMIL signifies a definitive transition to peace, growth or human development. The gains made are fragile, and the structural causes of conflict still need to be addressed. Therefore, UNDP should not spread itself thin by taking on the full range of activities that normally fall within its mandate. UNDP focus should involve more geographically and thematically targeted projects and programmes.

Recommendation 2: There is an urgent need for a coherent, strategic and comprehensive programme approach (as opposed

to a project-based approach) for each area of UNDP focus. This is currently lacking, causing UNDP interventions to be fragmented and run in isolation. Synergies and mutual reinforcement need to be captured with a view towards enhancing overall results at the outcome level. The success of the UNDP programme depends on the extent to which broader structural impediments of progress are addressed.

Recommendation 3: UNDP needs to transition away from quickly implemented projects to longer-term development project activities that increasingly place national institutions in the lead of programme management and implementation. These activities should also shift their emphasis from infrastructure rehabilitation and the procurement of equipment to long-term capacity building by developing relevant systems and providing cutting-edge advisory services.

Recommendation 4: With respect to building capacities in a sustainable manner, every UNDP project should have an explicit exit strategy. For such a strategy to be practical, it is essential that it be developed in conjunction with Liberia's Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs and the counterpart government agency, so that resulting recurrent costs can be earmarked in the national budget (in a phased manner, if necessary).

Recommendation 5: Furthering government efforts to promote gender equality, improve women's access to economic resources and address gender-based violence should be a key dimension of the UNDP programme. It is critical for UNDP programming to recognize that addressing gender equality-related issues impacts both programme effectiveness and progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Gender-related interventions alone are not a substitute for the necessary broader programmatic inclusion.

Recommendation 6: The importance of the UNDP mandate in integrated peacekeeping missions has been recognized. Member States should consider allocating an assessed budget for governance and essential development aspects of the work of peacekeeping missions.

Recommendation 7: UNDP and UNMIL will need to initiate a systematic handover process at least six months before the Mission's departure.

Recommendation 8: 'Delivering as One' is an important initiative that, if properly designed and implemented, should greatly enhance the effectiveness of UN-supported programmes by harnessing the technical capacity of the entire United Nations system for joint implementation of programmes and activities.

Recommendation 9: UNDP should seek to create in-house technical advisory capacity in each of the priority thematic areas at a relatively senior level. Such an advisory team would provide technical guidance in the management of UNDP projects and provide advisory services to relevant government agencies, the Resident Coordinator, UNCT and UNDP Liberia senior management. Such capacity may need to be funded from TRAC resources in the form of a project and could be integrated into the current Policy and Planning Unit.

Recommendation 10: Cost-efficiency should not necessarily be associated with low costs alone. Cost considerations need to be balanced with those of quality and professional standards. UNDP needs to deploy additional capacity at the county level to ensure that physical monitoring and oversight of implementation is more systematic and effective. This should be accompanied by a properly funded effort to collect baseline data for planning, setting priorities and monitoring results.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

In 2011, the Evaluation Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conducted an independent country-level evaluation in Liberia. The Assessment of Development Results (ADR) analysed the UNDP role and contributions to development results in Liberia between 2004 and mid-2011. This period includes the previous (2004–2007) and the ongoing (2008–2012) UNDP country programmes. This was the first ADR conducted in Liberia, taking place towards the end of the current 2008–2012 UNDP programme cycle.

The ADR assessed the effectiveness of the UNDP strategy to achieve development results by facilitating and leveraging national efforts in the areas of sustainable peace, transition and state-building. Based on this assessment, the ADR makes forward-looking recommendations for the next country programme cycle.

The objectives of the ADR were to:

- Support the UNDP Administrator's accountability function in reporting to the UNDP Executive Board. The ADR will be made available to Executive Board members when the new Liberia country programme is presented in June 2012;
- Support greater UNDP accountability to national stakeholders and partners in the programme country; and
- Serve as a means of quality assurance for UNDP interventions at the country level and contribute to learning at the corporate, regional and country levels. The evaluation is intended to provide inputs to the 2013 UNDP country programme and its role in other United Nations programmes scheduled for the same year.

1.2 METHODOLOGY

The ADR assessed UNDP contributions to national efforts to address development and humanitarian challenges in the social, economic and political spheres, and the UNDP roles and strategic positioning within the framework of Liberia's transition from peace building to development. This includes analysis of key anticipated and unanticipated results at the output and outcome levels of UNDP cooperation funded from both core and non-core resources. The ADR evaluates all UNDP activities in the country, including non-project activities such as support to coordination, management services, management of funds and integration within broader United Nations operations. (See Annex I for Terms of Reference of the ADR)

This evaluation provides insights and makes recommendations for the future:

- **Positioning and strategic relevance** of the UNDP programme, particularly in the event of a drawdown of the United Nations Mission in Liberia;
- **Management** of the programme with a view to raising effectiveness and efficiency; and
- **Strategy for enhancing the sustainability** of institutions and programme outcomes.

The ADR applied both meta- and direct evaluation techniques. The main elements of the methodology include:

Semi-structured 'insider' stakeholder individual interviews: Individual interviews with relevant government agency officials that are beneficiaries of UNDP programmes, the United Nations Mission in Liberia and other UN system agencies (e.g. UNDP, United Nations Capital Development Fund, United Nations Department

for Peacekeeping Operations and United Nations Office for Project Services staff), officials of donors and donor agencies to the country programmes and UN agency personnel involved with joint programmes with UNDP as part of the ‘Delivering as One’ initiative.

Semi-structured ‘outsider’ stakeholder group and individual interviews: With donor agencies, project personnel and staff of relevant projects or programmes undertaken by other agencies or academic institutions, religious institutions and national media organizations, professional associations, community-based organizations, national non-governmental organizations and other local-level implementation entities.

Field visits. The evaluation team visited a sample of UNDP projects in Bomi and Bong Counties. Bomi and Bong were selected because of the wide cross-section of projects—both from the current and previous country programmes.

Review of documentation: The documents reviewed for the evaluation included: national plans and budgets, sectoral reports pertaining to the sectors covered by the UNDP programme, programme monitoring documents (including progress reports and reports of review meetings), documents produced as project outputs (including any manuals, systems design work and concept papers prepared), strategic documents that established the overall direction of development for Liberia and UN and UNDP contributions, a range of political and development reports, economic sector reports, thematic sector reports, relevant legislation and national plans, strategy papers prepared by the UNDP office or its projects, select articles in the media, relevant reports of the Secretary-General to the UN Security Council and resolutions pertaining to the role and function of United Nations Mission in Liberia, relevant programme and project evaluations, sectoral and thematic evaluations, UNDP Bulletins and other relevant data collected by the country office.

SAMPLING METHODS AND FIELD VISITS

The evaluation focused on flagship projects in each area of focus/theme; projects that either received the largest portion of UNDP funds or are of greater significance to international effort in Liberia (see Table 1; for a complete list of UNDP projects, see Annex V).

The evaluation team reviewed the results of UNDP contributions to resource management under the various basket trust funds established by the international community.

Table 2 provides the range of stakeholders interviewed to answer key evaluative questions and the format of such interviews (individual or group interviews). For a full list of persons met, see Annex II.

In addition to its work in Monrovia, the evaluation team conducted on-site visits in two counties where a cross-section of UNDP programmes were readily accessible (Table 3).

METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS

The principal limitations on the evaluation were:

Time available: The team spent three weeks in Liberia, including field visits, data analysis and preparations for the presentation/debriefing. Because of the numerous persons that needed to be interviewed, most meetings were restricted to one hour. Field visits were relatively short, limiting the number of project sites that could be visited at any one location and the time that could be spent evaluating outputs and assessing local-level outcomes.

Lack of access: Although plans were made to visit relatively remote counties such as Maryland and Grand Cru, this was not possible as the UNDP country office was not able to secure air transportation in time.

The unreliability of macro statistics: Though considerably improved through UNDP support to the Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-information Services, the absence of reliable or

Table 1. Short List of Flagship Projects/Programmes for In-depth Review

Area of Focus/Theme	Sub-Theme/ Programme	Flagship Projects
Conflict Prevention and Recovery	Security Sector Reform	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Recovery-Liberia
		Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Recovery
		Norwegian Contribution—UNDP Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Recovery
		Demobilization of the Liberia National Police
		Restructuring and Training of the Liberia National Police
		Support to the Police Academy with European Union funding
		Enhancing Police Reform
		Capacity Building Liberia National Police
		Enhancing Community Security and Social Cohesion
		Enhancing Relationship Between Police and Civilians
		Enhancing Security Sector Reform
	Transitional Justice	Support to Truth and Reconciliation Commission with Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency Funds
		Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Reconciliation
Democratic Governance	Governance Reform	Governance
		Building National Integrity
		Supporting Liberian Anti-corruption
	Decentralization	Liberia Decentralization
		Poverty and Social Impact Analysis Decentralization Project
		Strengthening the Capacity of Sub-national Administration
		Capacity Building of the Country Support Team
		Support to Strengthening National Institutional Capacity (direct and national execution modalities)
		United Nations Capital Development Fund Local Development Fund
	Rule of Law	Improving Public Prosecutors
		Strengthening Public Defence
		Rule of Law and Administration
	Elections	Support to the 2010–2012 Liberian Electoral Cycle
	Capacity Building	Liberia Emergency Capacity Building
		National Capacity Development
		Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals
		Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals, United States Agency for International Development Grant
		Senior Executive Service

Table 1. (cont)

Area of Focus/Theme	Sub-Theme/ Programme	Flagship Projects
Democratic Governance (cont.)	Macroeconomic Management and Aid Coordination	Economic Policy and Management
		Economist Programme
		Inclusive Globalization
		Support to Ministry of Finance Resource Unit
		Coordination for Results
		Coordination Capacity of UN country team
Poverty Reduction and the Millennium Development Goals	Rebuilding Communities	Community Reintegration
		Human Security Fund—Rebuilding Communities
		Community-Based Recovery
	Essential Infrastructure	Liberia Transitional Support
		Emergency Infrastructure
	Youth Empowerment/ Livelihoods	Youth Empowerment
		Creating Livelihoods for Workers in Guthrie
		UNDP Microfinance Project
	Food Security/ Forestry Development	Liberia Development Forestry Management Project
		Improve Food Security
Women's Empowerment	Economic and Political Empowerment	Strengthening Gender Mainstreaming
		Economic Empowerment of Women
		Gender Equality and Economic Empowerment
		Women and Leadership
		European Community Support to International Women's Colloquium
		Finnish Support to International Women's Colloquium
		Norwegian Support to International Women's Colloquium
Combating HIV/AIDS	Control and Prevention	Emergency Preparedness and Post Emergency Recovery Fund
		Strengthening HIV/AIDS
		Strengthening HIV/AIDS and Prevention
		Malaria Control and Prevention
		Tuberculosis Control and Management
		Environment and Natural Disasters
		Disasters and Climate Risk
Energy and the Environment	Climate Change	

Table 2. Interview Formats and Coverage by Criteria

Criterion	Key Evaluative Question	Individual Interviews	Group Interviews
Relevance	Has UNDP played a meaningful and important role in Liberia's transition from conflict to stability and development, what comparative strengths has it applied and how responsive has it been in realigning its programme to address changing development perspectives and needs?	Special Representative of the Secretary-General; Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General; UNDP Country Director and Deputy Country Director; President; Office of the President; Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs; Ministry of Finance.	UN country team; Bilateral Donors; Parliamentary Commissions; political parties; national NGOs; media organizations; university representatives; international NGOs.
Effectiveness	What outcomes have been achieved in each thematic area with UNDP assistance, and how did UNDP contribute to their achievement?	Special Representative of the Secretary-General; Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General; Each of the ministries/agencies receiving UNDP assistance; United Nations Capital Development Fund.	Bilateral Donors; The World Bank; national NGOs; parliamentary commissions; political parties; media organizations; university representatives; international NGOs.
Efficiency	How timely and cost-effective has UNDP assistance been in delivering inputs and activities and the achievement of outputs and outcomes?	The World Bank; each of the ministries/agencies receiving UNDP assistance; institutions of sub-national government; United Nations Capital Development Fund.	Bilateral donors;
Sustainability	Are the institutions strengthened with UNDP assistance able to continue to perform their functions to acceptable standards beyond the period of assistance, and are physical outputs such as essential infrastructure constructed of sufficient quality and durability and have maintenance requirements been addressed adequately?	Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs; ministries/agencies receiving UNDP assistance; The World Bank; International Monetary Fund; United Nations Capital Development Fund.	Donors; media organizations; university representatives; international NGOs.
Positioning	How has UNDP positioned itself vis-à-vis the rest of the UN system, the international community, the government and Liberian society as a whole in supporting Liberia's transition, particularly in the context of an integrated mission, and how effectively has it performed? What comparative strengths has it sought to apply and how have these strengths been perceived?	Special Representative of the Secretary-General; Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General; UNDP Country Director and Deputy Country Director; The President; Office of the President; Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs; Ministry of Finance.	UN country team; donors; media organizations; university representatives; international NGOs.
Strategies	What overall conceptual frameworks has UNDP applied to peacebuilding and long-term development and how has its strategies varied and changed in response to shifting needs and changing national frameworks and planning time-frames?	Special Representative of the Secretary-General; Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-Generals; UNDP Country Director and Deputy Country Director; President; Office of the President; Ministry of Planning & Economic Affairs; Ministry of Finance; United Nations Capital Development Fund.	UN country team; donors; media organizations; university representatives; international NGOs.

Table 2. (cont)			
Criterion	Key Evaluative Question	Individual Interviews	Group Interviews
Processes and Instruments	What processes and instruments have been applied by the international community and the government in supporting the transition from conflict to long-term stability and development, how has UNDP participated, and how effective has UNDP been in influencing their substantive content?	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General; UNDP Country Director and Deputy Country Director; The World Bank; Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs; Ministry of Finance.	UN country team; donors; university representatives; international NGOs.
Positioning	How has UNDP positioned itself vis-à-vis the rest of the UN system, the international community, the government and Liberian society as a whole in supporting Liberia's transition, particularly in the context of an integrated mission, and how effectively has it performed? What comparative strengths has it sought to apply and how have these strengths been perceived?	Special Representative of the Secretary-General; Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General; UNDP Country Director and Deputy Country Director; The President; Office of the President; Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs; Ministry of Finance.	UN country team; donors; media organizations; university representatives; international NGOs.
Strategies	What overall conceptual frameworks has UNDP applied to peacebuilding and long-term development and how has its strategies varied and changed in response to shifting needs and changing national frameworks and planning time-frames?	Special Representative of the Secretary-General; Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-Generals; UNDP Country Director and Deputy Country Director; President; Office of the President; Ministry of Planning & Economic Affairs; Ministry of Finance; United Nations Capital Development Fund.	UN country team; donors; media organizations; university representatives; international NGOs.
Processes and Instruments	What processes and instruments have been applied by the international community and the government in supporting the transition from conflict to long-term stability and development, how has UNDP participated, and how effective has UNDP been in influencing their substantive content?	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General; UNDP Country Director and Deputy Country Director; The World Bank; Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs; Ministry of Finance.	UN country team; donors; university representatives; international NGOs.

disaggregated statistics prevented a thorough analysis of developmental trends and the provision of clear answers to development questions.

The absence of baseline data: None of the projects appeared to have systematically collected baseline data, although monitoring data (particularly with respect to activities) is being collected and reported on regularly.

The absence of outcome data: Although activities and outputs are recorded and tracked,

very few of the indicators collected by projects and the country office were geared toward tracking outcomes.

The availability of government officials and stakeholders: In several cases, key interlocutors were unavailable or out of the country (substitutes were interviewed).

The Evaluation Team sought to offset the limitations of access, time and relevant and reliable data through:

Table 3. Location of Field Trips, Thematic Coverage and Rationale for Selection

County	Thematic Areas	Conditions
Bomi County	Democratic Governance, Poverty Reduction and the Millennium Development Goals, Women's Empowerment.	Proximity to Monrovia.
Bong County	Democratic Governance, Poverty Reduction and the Millennium Development Goals, Crisis Prevention and Recovery, Women's Empowerment, Energy and Environment.	Better infrastructure; more advanced programmes with outcomes; difficult access to villages off the main roads; and high original concentration of combatants and internally displaced persons.

- **Meta-analysis of evaluations:** Use of prior evaluations, reviews and studies as a means of covering counties and issues that could not be directly assessed by the evaluation team;
- **Sampling:** Careful sampling of programmes and counties/districts to ensure that different conditions and situations are sufficiently covered to provide a range if not a cross-section of the conditions and issues faced during implementation; and
- **Triangulation:** Asking similar questions of parties on different sides of the development partnerships and comparing them with monitoring data with a view to verifying reported results.

The following chapter discusses the peacebuilding, state-building and development context of Liberia to which the UNDP programme responded.

Chapter 2

NATIONAL CONTEXT

Since 2004, key political and economic indicators have suggested positive trends in Liberia. However, despite this trend and concerted government and international community efforts, fundamental structural dichotomies persist that must be addressed if current gains are to be consolidated and a return to conflict averted. These dichotomies exist between economic development and progress in the Monrovia hinterlands, between a concessions-driven economy and a subsistence economy, and between a US dollar economy that provides goods and services to the expatriate community (private companies, bilateral and international agencies and NGOs) and the Liberian dollar economy that applies to the majority of the local population.

These divides have remained largely unchanged despite remarkable and systematic government, bilateral and multilateral development partner efforts; addressing these challenges is vital to achieving long-term peace. The institutional and structural factors that need to be addressed are deeply ingrained; change will be incremental and will need to be addressed over an extended period of years and decades. While the elected government has sought to address the structural factors—particularly through the establishment of commissions to address key bottlenecks (e.g. political impasses in congress and the pernicious effects of vested interests) have mitigated the results of these efforts.

Liberia has a population of approximately 4 million people, with a growth rate of 4.2 percent.¹ Rural Liberia remains sparsely populated; villages

consist of 100 to 200 inhabitants on average and are separated by difficult terrain with rudimentary roads that are impassable during much of the rainy season. Essential utilities have never been provided to most of rural Liberia or have been destroyed by years of conflict. Even in Monrovia, power is often unavailable and electrification was not available for streetlights on Monrovia's main streets until 2005. Economies of scale are difficult to achieve and providing services is uneconomical in many contexts. However, despite these constraints (and limitations on the quality of national statistics), a number of important successes have been recorded.

2.1. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENTAL TRENDS

POLITICAL TRENDS

Liberia has held orderly presidential, congressional and congressional by-elections since 2003. It has also seen the growth of a relatively vibrant press and some growth of civil society organizations. While perpetrators of human rights violations during the years of conflict remain a force in domestic politics, they appear to have abandoned armed conflict in favour of the newly reinstated institutions of democratic governance. Indeed, many of these former leaders have been elected to congress and form elements of a disparate and somewhat disorganized opposition. The arrest and trial of Charles Taylor, former President of Liberia, in connection with war crimes in Sierra Leone has also contributed to the peace.

1 Estimated at 3,995,000 in 2009 according to The World Bank, World Development Indicators.

Despite the political formulations, the process of decision-making has remained relatively stable and considerable progress has been made in returning the country to a degree of normalcy. Since the demobilization and disarmament process, organized armed conflict has been largely eliminated from the political landscape. The existence of weapons, a large population of ex-combatants with minimal education and limited long-term prospects of employment and the conflict's psychosocial effects on communities and individuals have contributed to persistently high crime rates, including armed robbery, rape and violent protests over lay-offs and land disputes. However, as a testament to the effectiveness of the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and recovery (DDRR) process—together with the difficulty of maintaining small arms that have been hidden in hot and humid conditions and former combatants' conflict-weariness—the incidence of organized armed conflict has been virtually eliminated in the past two years.

Government systems

The 1986 Constitution provides for three co-equal branches of government: executive, legislative, and judicial. Liberia's bicameral legislature consists of 64 representatives and 30 senators. Each county in Liberia is entitled to elect two senators for a nine-year term.² The Liberian House of Representatives is elected through a system of proportional representation from constituencies that under Article 80(d) of the Constitution³ are comprised of at least 20,000 persons (the total number of electoral constituencies is limited to 100).

Since the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2003 and the establishment of the elected government in 2006, Liberia has remained relatively stable

and has shown substantial progress in developing its political institutions. Nevertheless, democracy and democratic institutions are evolving. An unwieldy number of parties exist, and some 21 to 23 are likely to vie for office in the forthcoming presidential and congressional elections. Party structures remain weak and largely personality-based. The 2005 elections placed a spectrum of political personalities in the legislature, most for six-year terms. Although the official campaign season has not yet started, political dialogue and rallies have begun. While vigorous, the content of the political debate reflects the heavy emphasis on personalities. The constitutional architecture exists in Liberia for a legislature that should arguably be stronger than most in Africa. Yet, corruption within the legislature and a lack of legislative independence and capacity to fulfil its constitutional mandate has existed throughout much of Liberian history.

The lack of legislative oversight has often been cited as one of the root causes of the conflict.⁴ The legislature suffers from lack of staff and budgetary resources to fund its standing committees and concepts of public hearings and a 'watch dog' function of civil society upon the legislature and executive are not well developed.

While the first round of presidential and congressional elections in 2004 were conducted under the aegis of the United Nations, the recent elections was administered and overseen by the National Election Commission, an independent body established under a chairman nominated by the President and ratified by the House and Senate.

2 Liberian Constitution, July 3, 1984, Art. 46.

3 Liberian Constitution, July 3, 1984, Art. 80(d).

4 Modernization Plan 2009-2013: Making the Liberian Legislature 21st Century Compliant: A blueprint for effective Representation, Law-making and Oversight (The Legislature of the Republic of Liberia 2010).

Table 4. Percent real annual GDP growth: Liberia

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011 (Est)
Real GDP Growth	3.7	-31.3	2.6	5.3	7.8	9.4	7.1	4.6	5.1	5.9

Sources: OECD and IMF

Sub-national governance and decentralization

At the local level, traditional leaders—such as Paramount Chiefs, Clan Chiefs, Town Chiefs and Quarter Chiefs⁵— have played an important role. Officially recognized and appointed leaders include a County Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent, District Superintendent, District Commissioner, Township Commissioner, City Mayor and Tribal Governor. Under the current system, locally elected traditional leaders are accountable to officials appointed by the President.⁶

The current Ministry of Internal Affairs originated in the 1860s as the principal central government authority for administration of the Hinterland Laws. The revised version of the rules for ‘Governing the Hinterland’, approved in 1949, set up the structure of local administration that largely prevails today. These rules recognize the coexistence of a dual legal system—modern and traditional—with an institutional counterpart in terms of the structure of local officials and representatives. The 1986 Constitution still acknowledges customary law as an important factor in dealings among indigenous people.

Constraints on the advancement of local governance include (1) limited to no authority to collect revenue and manage budgets locally; (2) absence of local elections (key positions are appointed by the President); (3) lack of clarity in asset ownership (land in particular), limited authority

of local officials and institutions to manage resources; (4) overlap in responsibilities and lack of clarity in functions between local units and systems; (5) persistence of customary laws and practices that remain un-codified, rationalized or brought into a structured relationship with official legislation; and (6) current tendency to decentralize responsibilities to local authorities without providing them with the requisite means or resources.

ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT TRENDS

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has declared that Liberia’s post-conflict economic stabilization “is now essentially complete, although substantial vulnerabilities and challenges remain.”⁷ Two years after qualifying for support from the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, \$4.7 billion in total debt was written off in June 2010. Nominal public sector external debt now amounts to just 9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Inflation remains relatively high, but has eased since 2008, partly due to the international financial crisis and the decline in aggregate demand for primary products from Liberia (see Table 4 and Figure 1).


A key element of the Liberian programme leading to the HIPC completion include the government’s programme to restore macroeconomic stability by maintaining a balanced budget on a cash basis, freeing the central bank to focus

5 Liberia Governance Commission, *The Roles of Traditional Chiefs in a Decentralized Governance in Liberia* (Consultancy Report), With Support From The Liberia Decentralization and Local Development Programme (UNDP, United Nations Capital Development Fund, European Commission), Monrovia, 2010.

6 Ibid, p.22.

7 International Monetary Fund, *Liberia: Staff Report for the Article IV Consultation and Fifth Review Under the Three ear Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility*, Country Report No. 10/373, November 22, 2010.

Figure 1. Inflation in Liberia – IMF Estimates



Sources: Liberian authorities, and IMF staff estimates

on exchange rate stability. This resulted in output growth, modest inflation and the central bank building up its foreign reserves from minimal levels (by attracting foreign investors, particularly from China and India in the iron ore sector and from Malaysia in commercial agriculture).


A second key element was the presidentially led economic reforms. The reforms included initiating changes in governance and economic management, putting in place policies and systems to manage debt; implementing new laws on financial management, procurement and audit; stepping up spending on health care centres nationwide; and seeking to provide qualified and properly paid teachers for public schools. The anti-corruption commission was also established to address graft.

Based largely on these measures, Liberia advanced to HIPC completion in a little over two years. As a result, The World Bank and the IMF boards decided to irrevocably write-off almost all of Liberia's multilateral debt they held.

The IMF financed Liberia's debt relief, and the country's arrears to the Fund amounted to \$888 million. Financing this debt required a major collective effort—102 Member Countries contributed in an impressive display of international support for Liberia's transition. Pledges of support were mobilized by March 2008, laying the basis for the clearance of arrears, new IMF financing and the start of the heavily indebted poor countries process.

Attaining the completion point did not directly free up resources for debt service. Actual cash payments to external creditors have been kept at minimal levels for several years. Moreover, Liberia will still have some foreign debt (\$150 million) that will need to be serviced starting at the end of 2011. Debt relief has, however, opened up new opportunities such as mobilizing concessional financing from donors for critical infrastructure projects. This concessional financing has led to additional investment and jobs, has supported faster growth and has helped to reduce poverty.

Figure 2. Current Account Balance and Foreign Direct Investment



Source: IMF staff estimates

Further, the concessions enabled the government to relax its balanced budget policy and finance key projects.

The Liberian economy remains heavily dependent on external sources of investment and funding, as the domestic economy is largely service based. In the immediate post-conflict period, donor funding was dominant. After this period, Liberia signed a number of concessions with foreign companies, mostly in extractive industries. These constitute the largest potential source of government revenue for the foreseeable future, but will need to be appropriately structured if the average Liberian is to benefit.

Major challenges remaining include: i) ensuring broad-based, equitable growth that benefits all Liberians; ii) creating a favourable environment for employment growth (including access to infrastructure, services and a conducive macroeconomic regime); and iii) facilitating greater

access to credit for Liberia's own private sector, including small producers and entrepreneurs.

Inflation has remained fairly high, but has declined significantly since 2009 and the global financial crisis. Foreign direct investment has grown primarily due to concessions in the mining sector (iron ore and gold), while the current account deficit has actually increased as a result of a growth in imports (see Figure 2).

A series of institutional and legal reforms have been introduced in public financial management, debt management budget processes and tax policy and administration. The rebuilding of fiscal institutions has been a key focus. Changes have been introduced for better fiscal oversight and control, including establishing a cash management committee to ensure a balanced budget, introducing a new procurement policy and integrating the Bureau of the Budget into the Ministry of Finance. A Public Finance Management Act and its related institutions have been implemented since 2010. A debt management strategy has been prepared and issued. External audits have been institutionalized for the Ministries of Finance; Lands, Mines and Energy; Education; Health; and Public Works. A procurement law has been promulgated and tax incentives have been formalized in the revenue code. Planned reforms include restructuring the Bureau of Budget, reforming bank supervision, developing debt management software, introducing salary payrolls by direct bank payment and improving the medium-term macro-framework and national accounts. A new Commercial Code has been approved by the Legislature, which also passed an act to establish a commercial court. Changes in the Revenue Code were approved in 2009 by the Legislature and finalized by the Executive branch in 2010. A budget bill that involved significant changes in process and structure was passed with some delay in September 2010.

Liberian authorities aim to achieve middle-income status through a new development strategy, 'Liberia Rising 2030'. The strategy stresses inclusive growth, capacity building and

Table 5. Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals

Indicator	Current	Target
Goal 1 Eradicate Extreme Hunger and Poverty		
Proportion of population below \$1 (purchasing power parity) per day	63.81	27.55
Poverty gap ratio	40.78	20.39
Share of poorest quintile in national consumption	6.44	3.2
Prevalence of underweight children under five years	18.8	7.4
Percentage of population below minimum dietary level of energy consumption	38	19.5
Goal 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education		
Net enrolment ratio in primary education	49.3	100
Primary completion rates	57.6	80.6
Literacy rates of 15 to 24 year olds	74.8	80
Goal 3 Promote Gender Equality and Promote Women		
Ratio of girls to boys in primary education	0.88	1
Ratio of girls to boys in secondary education	0.69	1
Ratio of girls to boys in tertiary education	0.38	-
Share of women in wage employment in non-agricultural sector	11.4	50
Percentage of seats held by women in the national legislature	12.5	25
Goal 4: Reduce Child Mortality		
Under five mortality (per 1000 live births)	114	64
Infant mortality rates (per 1000 live births)	79	39
Percentage of one-year olds immunized against measles	59.7	100
Goal 5: Improve Maternal Health		
Maternal mortality rate (per 10,000 live births)	994	145
Percentage of births attended by skilled health personnel	46	97
Contraceptive prevalence (percent)	11.4	-
Adolescent birth rate (percent)	38	-
Goal 6 Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases		
HIV prevalence among adults 15-49 years (percent)	1.5	0.75
HIV prevalence among pregnant women (15-24)	4	8.2
Condom use as a contraceptive (percent)	25.2	50.4
Proportion of population aged 15 to 24 with comprehensive knowledge of HIV/AIDS (percent)	23.5	70
Percentage of HIV infected population with access to retroviral	17	62.1
Prevalence of malaria (per 100,000 population)	-	-
Deaths due to malaria (per 100,000 population)	-	-
Prevalence rate of tuberculosis (per 100,000 population)	282	141
Death rates due to tuberculosis (per 100,000 population)	62	91

Table 5. (cont.)		
Indicator	Current	Target
Percentage of tuberculosis cases treated and cured through short course	80	90
Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability		
Percentage of land covered by forest	59	42.1
Percentage of population with improved access to improved water sources	75	77.5
Percentage of population with access to improved sanitation	44	69.5
Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development		
Public sector external debt (medium- and long-term (\$ billion))	1.72	-
Public sector debt outstanding (percent of GDP)	388.8	-
Public sector debt outstanding including export arrears	-	-
External public debt service charges as percent of GDP	-	-
Aid per capita (current \$)	101.2	-
Internet usage (per 100 people)	15	-
Mobile cell phone subscription (per 100 people)	32	-

Source: United Nations

infrastructure investment. It is at an early stage of preparation, envisaging large-scale foreign investment in enclave sectors with resulting fiscal revenues devoted to essential infrastructure.

The strategy aims to create ‘growth corridors’ by integrating isolated areas and establishing links to international markets. It is anticipated that costs will decline as additional roads, power lines and ports come on-stream. The government expects this to encourage significant expansion of private-sector investment in the non-enclave sectors, creating needed employment and broad-based growth. Over the past four years, a total of eight companies have committed over \$10 billion to their Liberia operations. All are in primary, extractive, enclave industries.⁸

Major economic indicators reflect the fact that Liberia remains in a recovery mode. Its current

GDP per capita is \$240, and Liberia Rising 2030 primarily focuses on governance, rule of law, peacebuilding and restoring and expanding infrastructure and social service delivery in order to increase development potential.

Although government statistics place employment as high as 96 percent, 79 percent of this total participates in the informal economy. As wage employment is low, consumption is a better indicator of poverty. According to the 2007 Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire, 64 percent of the population lives on less than \$1 per day.⁹ However, Liberia seems on track to meet its commitments under Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 3, 6 and 8 (see Table 5).¹⁰ The remainder, most notably MDG 1 (eradicating extreme hunger and poverty) remain a major challenge. Poverty still needs to be halved to meet the MDG 1 target.

8 The companies are: APB Terminals, Arcelor, BHP Billiton, Cesep Ctanb, Chevron, China Union, Golden Agri Resources, Mittal and Sime Darby.

9 Source: Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services statistics.

10 Government of Liberia/UNDP, Progress, Prospects and Challenges Towards Achieving the MDGs: Millennium Development Goals 2010 Report.

2.2 SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATE AND MILESTONES

The structural barriers that resulted in the majority of the population being excluded from control over and access to the country's land and natural resource wealth have persisted in the modern Liberian state. While there are many secondary drivers of conflict, the structural, underlying causes of armed conflict consisted of inequitable access to natural resources and land on the part of certain groups; the use of state institutions (including the military) to preserve inequities; the resulting corruption of the government and the need to be in, or associated with, positions of power in order to gain wealth; and democratic exclusion of the majority, particularly in rural areas.

Liberia has been under a Security Council mandate since 1997 and has had a peacekeeping mission in place since 2004. United Nations Security Council resolution 1497 (2003) authorized the establishment of a regional multinational force in Liberia in order to support the implementation of the 2003 ceasefire agreement, to facilitate meeting the demands contained in resolution 1343 (2001), to prevent armed groups from using the territory of states to attack other states and to stabilize border regions between Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA—MANDATE

The Secretary-General's reports (in the form of recommendations to the Security Council) and the Security Council's resolutions define the UNMIL mandate. In his report to the Security Council of 11 September 2003 (S/2003/875), the Secretary-General proposed that the UNMIL mandate should be to support the National Transitional Government of Liberia and the other parties in the effective and timely implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 18 August 2003; monitor adherence to the ceasefire agreement of 17 June 2003; assist the National Transitional

Government in extending State authority; provide security at key government installations; ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel; facilitate the free movement of people, humanitarian assistance and goods; support the return of Liberian refugees and internally displaced persons and to support the provision of assistance and protection for Sierra Leonean and Ivorian refugees in Liberia by ensuring their secure return; and deploy United Nations troops to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

The United Nations Mission in Liberia was also mandated to advise, train and assist Liberian law enforcement authorities and other criminal justice institutions, including the judiciary and corrections systems; facilitate bilateral and multilateral assistance in the implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; guard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants and assist in their subsequent disposal or destruction; assist with elections; monitor and report on the human rights and provide training and capacity-building in the field of human rights and child protection; support gender mainstreaming; support the establishment and operation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; and cooperate with ECOWAS, the African Union and UN political and other presences in the West African sub-region on cross-cutting political and security issues of relevance to peace consolidation in Liberia.

The Secretary-General recognized the importance of a multidimensional approach to peacekeeping with provisions for coordination among other peacekeeping operations in the region and among peacekeeping, development and humanitarian entities and operations within the country.

The United Nations Mission in Liberia would be a multidimensional operation composed of political, military, civilian police, criminal justice, civil affairs, human rights, gender, child protection, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, public information and support components, as well as an electoral component in due course. The

*Mission would include a mechanism for the coordination of its activities with those of the humanitarian and development community.*¹¹

The structure of United Nations Mission in Liberia that he requested, however, vaguely defined the roles of the two Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General:

*With a view to ensuring a multidimensional approach to post-conflict peacekeeping and peace-building, the Secretary-General also recommended that United Nations Mission in Liberia be comprised of several divisions and units: Political; Military; Criminal Justice (police, judicial and corrections); Civil Affairs; Human Rights and Protection; Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration; Public Information and Support; and Safety and Security. Based on experience gained in other peacekeeping missions, the SG called for a pioneering, Integrated Mission: “the various components of the United Nations system in Liberia must develop an integrated understanding of and a common approach to the crisis in the country and its consequences. In this connection, my Special Representative has already started consultations.”*¹²

ONE UNITED NATIONS AND INTEGRATED MISSION

The UNMIL mandate was ground breaking, with its open-ended provisions to support the government re-establish state authority throughout the country and to support the development of institutions essential for the rule of law and the proper administration of natural resources. The resolution¹³ established UNMIL with up to 15,000 United Nations military personnel, including 250 military observers, 160 staff officers and 1,115 civilian police officers¹⁴ to assist in maintaining

law and order throughout Liberia. The resolution also had a civilian component with a mandate to:

- Develop and implement the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation for all armed parties;
- Provide security at key government installations;
- Facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance;
- Contribute to the protection and promotion of human rights;
- Support humanitarian and human rights activities;
- Support the national security sector reform programme, including the restructuring of the national police and the army;
- Assist the government in re-establishing state authority throughout the country;
- Support the development of the capacity of Liberian judicial and correctional institutions;
- Assist the government in restoring proper administration of natural resources; and
- Assist the government in the preparation of national elections.

The United Nations Missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone are widely quoted as pioneering examples of integrated peacekeeping missions. Yet despite its mention of support to humanitarian and human rights activities and the re-establishment of state authority, the integrated nature of the mandate has been left relatively vague and open to interpretation. There is still no discernible comprehensive strategy for state-building or structural change for the mission as a whole.

Liberia volunteered but was not selected as a pilot country for One United Nations, but the UN

11 S/2003/875.

12 S/2003/875.

13 S/RES/1509 (2003).

14 ‘Formed units’ refers to specially created units for specifically for the purpose of the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan. One such example is the all-women Indian police battalion that was constituted from different units from all over India specifically for deployment in Liberia.

country team opted to apply most of the underlying principles of this initiative. The country team is also discussing the options and details of how to move towards a common UN Programme, a feature that would break new ground—not only in conflict-affected countries, but also globally.

2.3 IMMEDIATE FUTURE

There are three events due to take place in the remaining months of 2011 that will have a major bearing on the UNDP role and the country programme's future:

ELECTION AND REFERENDUM

At the time of the ADR data collection, Liberia was preparing for presidential and congressional elections. During the course of finalizing of the report, the new government assumed office. The continuation and viability of a number of reforms initiated by the preceding government is promising.

POSSIBLE DECISION ON A DRAWDOWN OF THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA

It is understood that UNMIL is approaching the end of its mandate, even if to most observers the institutional gains in the spheres of governance and peacebuilding remain fragile. No timetable has yet been set for a drawdown, but

it is understood that following the presidential and congressional elections, there is to be an as-yet undefined transition period during which UMMIL is to be reduced in scope and size and transition to a United Nations country team under the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator. UNDP will need to gear itself and the UN country team up to operating in an environment without the UNMIL—providing security or technical capacity in key areas such as security sector reform and rule of law, or the political leverage stemming from the Security Council mandate.

JOINT UN COUNTRY PROGRAMME

The UN country team is moving towards the end of its programme cycle and the possibility of transitioning from a common UN Development Framework (United Nations Development Assistance Framework) with separate country programmes to a single United Nations Development Assistance Programme (UNDAP). The new UNDAP must address issues such as: i) how the UN country team deploys its capacity; ii) how funds are managed; and iii) how to synchronize programming and substantive decision-making in project and programme implementation.

Chapter 3 examines the UNDP programme response and its relevance to peacebuilding, transition and development needs in Liberia.

Chapter 3

UNDP RESPONSE

In Liberia, the UNDP role has been to support national priorities and, in the context of peacebuilding and supporting the transition from civil war, to contribute to achieving the peacekeeping mission's Security Council-mandated functions in conjunction with other UN country team members. Relevance, therefore, is determined by the presence of UNDP programmes in those thematic areas that are of high priority within the framework of the government's development plans as aligned with UNMIL priorities, and/or address the underlying potential causes of conflict in the interest of peacebuilding and a transition to stability and sustainable development.

Based on these criteria, the UNDP programme has a high degree of relevancy: UNDP is present programmatically in almost every area the government, UNMIL and the international community consider a priority to achieving a lasting peace.

3.1 OVERALL STRUCTURE OF THE UNDP PROGRAMME IN LIBERIA

The 2004–2007 UNDP country programme was developed in the immediate post-conflict recovery, reconstruction and peacebuilding context. The 'Comprehensive Peace Agreement' called on UNDP and other partners to assist the National Transitional Government of Liberia with post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, resource mobilization, aid coordination and the establishment of the Government Reform Commission. The UNDP programme therefore focused on the post-conflict humanitarian crisis and Liberia's most urgent and emerging priorities; there was no definitive programme framework during this critical four-year period. The 2004–2007 country programme included six priority areas:

- Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation;
- Democratic governance;
- Community-based recovery;
- Human rights, protection and gender;
- Capacity-building for HIV/AIDS response; and
- Environmental management.

Total programme delivery expenditures in the 2004–2007 period were \$174 million. Approved budgets totalled \$232 million (75 percent delivery), which, in the context of a post-conflict environment, is quite respectable. Delays incurred were primarily due to the long lag times between requisitions and payments, delays in the convening of procurement meetings and problems among staff that were new to UNDP and the ATLAS system.

The subsequent (and current) 2008–2012 country programme reduced the focus to two priority areas: democratic governance and pro-poor economic growth. This shift from six to two strategic areas was premised on the desire to consolidate and to ensure alignment with the UNDP corporate strategic direction.

The current programme also has three overarching themes intended to have both stand-alone projects and aspects mainstreamed into the rest of the programme: gender equality and women's empowerment, the fight against HIV/AIDS, and developing responses to climate change. In general, the shift to overarching themes appears to have eliminated some of the community-based recovery programmes that involved small-scale infrastructure rehabilitation. However, intended


results in the current country programme cover similar ground as the previous programme.

Gender was to be mainstreamed through all programme components, focusing on awareness creation and building capacities for policy formulation and implementation. This was to provide a means to involve women in decision-making at all levels, contributing to gender equality. HIV/AIDS concerns were also to be mainstreamed in all programme interventions, focusing on national capacity to galvanize all actors in the coordination of responses (including prevention, treatment and mitigation). With respect to managing environmental and ecosystem services, UNDP was to draw on its partnership frameworks with the United Nations Environment Programme, such as the Global Environment Facility for

mainstreaming environment and energy into national plans and the Nairobi Framework for Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation. In addition, opportunities were to be explored to enable the country to mobilize additional resources and promote private-sector development under the Clean Development Mechanism.

An analysis of expenditures and budgets (see Figure 3) reveals a significant overlap of programmes and projects in the other areas of focus continuing into the new cycle that could be reclassified into the two priority areas as necessary. It appears to have been difficult to eliminate several programmes that remain important to the national transition. For example, community projects linked to arms control and reintegration continued up until the fourth quarter of

Figure 3. Breakdown of Approved Budgets, UNDP Country Programmes



NOTE: UNDP, Liberia

2009. UNDP cannot be faulted for maintaining a consistent focus, as the key problems facing Liberia are structural and will take considerably more time and effort to overcome. This places a relatively low priority on 'normal' developmental issues, political pressures to do otherwise notwithstanding. Nevertheless, signs of the shift are evident in the changing percentages of the budget devoted to each area of focus. For example, crisis prevention and recovery declined from 57 percent of total approved budgets to 20 percent; MDGs and poverty reduction grew in importance from 3 percent to 23 percent. HIV/AIDS remained more or less constant throughout, while women's empowerment grew from less than 1 percent to 3 percent and energy and the environment has grown from zero to a fledgling 1.6 percent of total approved budgets. The total number of projects has been reduced from 301 to an almost manageable 70.

The 2008–2012 country programme, aligned with the national poverty reduction strategy and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, includes two key components: democratic governance and pro-poor economic development. The country programme aimed to consolidate earlier efforts in post-conflict reconstruction within the broad framework of these two key priority areas and promote an integrated approach to peacebuilding, recovery, reconstruction, and sustainable development in Liberia. Programme expenditures from 2008 to 2010 were approximately \$163 million.

The expected outcome of the programme's governance component was "enhanced national and local capacity to articulate, formulate and implement policies and programmes in a participatory, gender sensitive and accountable manner, for the promotion of democracy, growth and sustainable development."

As part of the programme focused on pro-poor development, UNDP intended to focus its assistance on capacity development for pro-poor

growth, with specific attention to mainstreaming the MDGs and establishing linkages to human development, human rights-based, and gender-focused approaches. In addition, the programme aimed to provide a mix of policy-level support and downstream interventions that will expand income opportunities and sustainable livelihoods for the poor and marginalized. The outcomes for this component include "promoting broad-based growth through revitalizing traditional economic sectors and stimulating private sector development" and "national economic policies and programmes implemented to support equitable, inclusive and sustainable socio-economic development."

Gender was to be mainstreamed through all programme components, focusing on creating awareness and developing capacity for policy formulation and implementation. A total of 3 percent of the programme budget was devoted to women-focused projects.


3.2 RELEVANCE TO GOVERNMENT PLANS AND PRIORITIES

Following the 2005 presidential and congressional elections, the Government of Liberia's plans have legitimately framed the nation's priorities. As perceived needs have shifted from urgent rehabilitation and reconstruction to capital construction of infrastructure for development and the longer-term strengthening of priority institutions of state, the government's plans have changed in content and time horizon. For the period under review, the government's plans are defined in four separate documents (see Figure 4):

'The Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme' (2005):¹⁵ Initially signed by the National Transitional Government of Liberia and the International Contact Group for Liberia, the 'Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme' was then endorsed and implemented by the current

15 Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme, 9 September 2005 (signed agreement).

Figure 4. Evolving Development Perspectives and Timelines



Source: UNDP

administration. The Assistance Programme was developed to improve the financial and fiscal administration, transparency and accountability of government. The main components of the Assistance Programme are financial management and accountability, budgeting and expenditure management, improving procurement practices and granting of concessions, establishing effective processes to control corruption, supporting key institutions, and capacity building.

‘The 150-Day Action Plan’:¹⁶ Issued by the Government of Liberia, the plan focused on short-term measures required to get the country running again (e.g. installing generators to run street lights in Monrovia for the first time in 14 years).

‘The Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper July 2006–July 2008’:¹⁷ During this period, unemployment in the formal sector was as high as 80 percent and most roads remained impassable, significantly weakening economic performance. The external debt burden was \$3.7 billion in mid-2005, equivalent to 800 percent of GDP and 3,000 percent of export earnings. Three quarters of the population lived below the poverty line of \$1 per day.


‘The Poverty Reduction Strategy July 2008–July 2011’:¹⁸ During this period, attention was shifted to the achievement of inclusive and sustainable economic growth, poverty reduction, progress towards achieving the MDGs and strengthening of key institutions.

16 Government of Liberia, 150 Day Action Plan: A Working Document for a New Liberia, Monrovia, 2006.

17 International Monetary Fund, Republic of Liberia - Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy: Breaking with the Past: from Conflict to Development, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., February 2007.

18 International Monetary Fund, Liberia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, International Monetary Fund Country Report No. 08/219, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., July 2008.

Figure 5. A Phased Approach to Post-Conflict Recovery in Liberia



Source: SSR— Security sector reform; DDRR— Disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, demobilization

These are supplemented by other important plans that lay a roadmap for critical steps in the process of transition, such as the ‘10 Year Capacity Development Plan’. A 30-year visioning exercise has also been recently launched, and it is expected that the preparation of a new poverty reduction strategy will begin following the elections.

These national strategies and plans capture the government’s changing perspective and priorities, shifting from short-term, relatively quick-fix priorities to longer-term, development and growth-oriented strategies. It also reflects an attempt to operationalize the transition into manageable phases.

The two UNDP country programmes during the period under review have addressed as many national priorities as possible. Adapting to the phased approach outlined in government plans and bolstered by the nature of the official development assistance available (see Figure 5), UNDP activities reflect an attempt to establish a niche during the immediate post-conflict phase.

THE IMMEDIATE POST-CONFLICT PHASE

During the immediate post-conflict phase, the government-defined priority was to rehabilitate and reconstruct infrastructure and facilities that

were critically important to the functioning of the institutions of state; disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and recovery (DDRR); and restoring law and order. UNDP adjusted its programme accordingly, taking on a relatively short-term focus that emphasized visible, physical outputs such as:

- Rehabilitating roads;
- Rehabilitating the physical facilities of courts, prisons, police precincts, the Senate and House of Representatives and other government institutions;
- Providing essential equipment and furniture critical to the function of the array of government institutions;
- Implementing projects in the context of reintegration of war-affected populations (e.g. demobilized combatants);
- Paying stipends to combatants going through the disarmament and demobilization component;
- Funding basic literacy programmes for war-affected populations;
- Rehabilitating schools and feeder roads at the community level;
- Providing seeds, fertilizers and essential tools to farmers; and

- Rehabilitating productive community-level infrastructure, such as levies, sluice gates and storage sites.

This approach not only reflects UNDP Liberia's adaptability and its ability to implement responsively, but also a broader UNDP strategy, driven by the Administrator at the time, to ensure that UNDP remained relevant in the early post-conflict phase. This strategy has been evident in other UNDP programmes in UN peacekeeping operations of the same period.¹⁹

UNDP success in developing this niche results from:

- The inability of other donors to deploy as rapidly to rehabilitate infrastructure in conflict areas;
- A willingness to take on physical and programmatic risk in areas that have been dominated by conflict and remain constrained by access, accountability and security;
- A perception that UNDP rules, regulations and capacity provide acceptable levels of efficiency, transparency and accountability in procurement and funds management;
- Its continued on-the-ground presence during the conflict and its ready in-country capacity at a time when many donors were just returning;
- The perception of all national parties that UNDP, as part of the UN, is sufficiently neutral to operate in zones held by opposition parties during the conflict; and
- Donors' positive perceptions of UNDP past performance in procurement and infrastructure rehabilitation.

While this emphasis on maintaining relevance in the immediate post-conflict period has been


instrumental in ensuring that UNDP has access to funding during the peak period for official development assistance, it has also tended to dominate UNDP programme strategy well beyond the immediate post-conflict period. Many UNDP projects continue to reflect a similar approach eight years after the cessation of hostilities; the provision of essential equipment and furniture and the rehabilitation of physical facilities continue to be a major feature of UNDP programme activities. This approach, while laying the foundations for future development, has been at the expense of longer-term capacity building, because it has:

- Detracted from programming for longer-term sustainability;
- Tended to favour substitution for the capacity of national institutions as a result of general donor unease with the capacity and accountability of Liberia's institutions of state; and
- Influenced the profile, structure and capacity of the UNDP presence in Liberia in that units focused on administration (the Direct Execution Unit) tended to take on atypical amounts of responsibility, at times relegating substantive technical advisers to the background.

The principal elements of the 2006–2008 interim and 2008–2011 poverty reduction strategy papers (the primary documents that define national priorities for UNDP programming) are structured under four pillars that are closely aligned with the UNMIL mandate.

¹⁹ Examples include Iraq and Afghanistan, in both of which UNDP provided services to the international community in the urgent rehabilitation of infrastructure and the payment of government salaries, among other things. See UNDP/Evaluation Office, 'Assessment of Development Results: Evaluation of UNDP Contribution in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan', New York, May 2009.

Figure 6. Relationship Among the Poverty Reduction Strategy, United Nations Development Assistance Framework and the UNDP Country Programme



Note: Poverty reduction strategy (PRS); Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP); Annual Work Programme (AWP)

Pillar 1: Enhancing National Security

- Rebuilding the armed forces, police forces and all security forces;
- Developing a national security strategy to guide security-sector reform;
- Conducting a national security assessment and formulating a strategy for national security;
- Rebuilding the Liberian security forces with a recruitment of 5,500 military, security and police personnel (at least 20 percent of which to be composed of women); and
- Establishing an early warning system.

Pillar 2: Revitalizing the Economy

- Creating jobs that have quick economic impact;
- Rebuilding infrastructure and economic sectors (e.g. agriculture, fisheries, forestry, mining, wood processing and manufacturing); and
- Accelerating economic growth as the foundation for poverty reduction and sustainable development.


Table 6. Significant UNDP Responses to National Priorities

Poverty Reduction Strategy Pillar	UNDP Response
Pillar 1: Enhancing national security	Capacity-building for the Liberia National Police
	Support to disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and recovery
	Support to demining
Pillar 2: Revitalizing the economy	Youth employment
	Microfinance
	Community-based reconstruction and development
	Millennium villages
	Market development project
	Liberia Decentralization and Local Development Programme
Pillar 3: Strengthening governance and the rule of law	ECBS, Senior Executive Service, Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals
	Capacity-building programme
	Support to the legislature
	Support to the Civil Service Commission
	Support to the Governance Commission
	Support to the Anti-corruption Commission
	Support to the Land Commission
	Support to decentralization
	Liberia Decentralization and Local Development Programme
	Strengthening the courts
	Support to prisons
	Support to public prosecutors
	Support to the public defenders
	Support to the judiciary
	Prevention of sexual and gender-based violence

Pillar 3: Strengthening Governance and the Rule of Law

- Working to change Liberians’ mindsets and value systems;
- Restructuring and strengthening central and local governance institutions, systems and processes and ensuring that the rule of law prevails;
- Laying the foundation for a new democratic culture;
- Achieving balanced development;
- Promoting a culture of accountability in order to meet the collective aspirations of the people;
- Establishing the rule of law in spheres of national life, conflict-sensitive policymaking and conflict management mechanisms;
- Addressing gender inequalities;
- Strengthening environmental rules and regulations;
- Rebuilding civil society and the media;
- Fostering broader participation in governance processes; and
- Reducing corruption.

Figure 7. Addressing the Sources of Conflict – UNDP and Peacebuilding



Pillar 4: Rehabilitating Infrastructure and Delivering Basic Services

- Rebuilding roads, telecommunication lines, water and sanitation infrastructure, electrical distribution networks, schools and health care facilities.

UNDP successfully aligned its programme activities with the two poverty reduction strategies by defining the priorities and outcomes of the UNDAF and focusing the country programmes and country programme action plans in accord with the four pillars (see Table 6 and Figure 6).

3.3 RELEVANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA'S MANDATE

Although UNMIL has been touted as a pioneering integrated peacekeeping mission, the resolutions outlining its underlying mandate did not clearly define the concept of 'integration'. Efforts have been made by the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator to further develop the concept and adapt it to the specific needs of Liberia under the slogan "At Work Together," moving "beyond mandates and specific programmatic areas, supporting flexible and innovative working relationships across the UN family."²⁰ This approach involves

20 United Nations Mission in Liberia, A Common Vision For Uncommon Results: an overview of UN integration in Liberia, (not dated), p.1.

departments, funds, programmes and agencies of the UN coalescing around the following:

- National plans, priorities and the government's stated direction (the poverty reduction strategies) under an integrated plan for the UNDAF; and
- An integrated UN work plan (introduced in 2009) that is a matrix of the planned activities of UN entities, specifying responsibilities, partners, time-frames and costs.

However, the focus has been primarily on structures and processes rather than an overarching strategy for Liberia that focuses on the core issues for long-term peacebuilding, the prevention of conflict and stable and sustainable development. The UNMIL mandate is fairly traditional in its explicitly stated function: the oversight and management of elections to transition Liberia to an elected government. It requires UNMIL to support reforms to the Liberia National Police and the armed forces of Liberia (reforming the armed forces has also been independently undertaken by the US government). The mandate is vague, however, regarding more complex aspects of nation-building, as it uses general terms to call on the UN to build state institutions.

In practice, the strategy for addressing stabilization and mitigating the underlying causes of conflict is found in national plans and has largely been developed by the government, UNMIL and the UN country team on the ground.

UNDP effectively utilized its comparative strengths to provide crucial support to Liberia to meet its early-recovery and post-conflict needs (e.g. the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, security sector reform and DDRR), and to capacitate the central ministries to fulfil the minimum functions necessary for maintaining the rule of law and security. In accordance with its mandate, each of these areas was to be supported by UNMIL. UNDP contributed to UNMIL operations by delivering in areas within its own mandate. The UNDP governance mandate placed it at the

centre of a number of UNMIL, National Transitional Government and the subsequent elected Government of Liberia priorities.

3.4 RELEVANCE TO THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF CONFLICT

UNDP has attempted to support national efforts spearheaded by the government that address the underlying structural causes of conflict—causes that have often served as flashpoints for armed confrontation.

Working with the Governance Commission, relevant ministries and targeted commissions that were later established, UNDP addressed issues such as the exclusion of large swathes of the population from decision-making and political power, inequitable land distribution, corruption, the continuing problem of impunity for human rights violations and the need to reform legislation that institutionalized the marginalization of certain ethnic, tribal and religious groups in Liberia (see Figure 7). It also addressed all of the key institutional aspects of the rule of law with the exception of the reform of the armed forces (reforming the armed forces falls outside the competence and mandate of UNDP).

3.5. SUPPORT TO AID COORDINATION AND POSITIONING AS A SERVICE PROVIDER

The integrated mission structure provides an opportunity for substantive coordination among UN entities. Target for resources assignment from the core (TRAC) often places UNDP at the centre of coordination efforts. Further, the Resident Representative is concurrently one of two Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General: the Resident Coordinator and the Humanitarian Coordinator. By virtue of its close links to the UNMIL, UNDP is in a particularly strong position to support broader aid coordination and to provide services in support of the international community's efforts to bolster the transition to peace and development.

In this respect, UNDP has positioned itself as a service provider to donors, the government and the UN by emphasizing the direct execution modality and by:

- Procuring equipment for the early rehabilitation of essential institutions of state;
- Managing contracts for rehabilitating and reconstructing essential state institutions;
- Procuring essential supplies to facilitate the functioning of a number institutions;
- Sponsoring a number of key positions in the government, including paying supplements and incentives to ensure the retention of staff in positions of central importance to the transition;
- Managing quick implementation projects on behalf of donors in order to build confidence among the population and to kick-start the transition; and
- Administering large multi-donor trust funds at both country office and headquarter levels in order to deliver funding for priority thematic and sectoral areas.

In Liberia, supporting coordination mechanisms and structures have evolved over time. Within the United Nations country team, it has moved from a somewhat loose arrangement ('At Work Together') to early steps in a significantly more structured 'Delivering as One' arrangement.²¹

During the emergency humanitarian phase, the UN relied on a series of clusters that brought both the UN and other aid agencies together to concentrate on areas including water and sanitation, nutrition, health, food security, early recovery and protection. In 2007, these clusters were folded into the government-led coordination framework of the Liberia Recovery and Development Committee. Following approval of the 2008–2011 poverty reduction strategy, this mechanism was replaced by the current, government-led

coordination groups, which are often thematic in nature but subsumed under the broader coordination of poverty reduction. The United Nations Development Assistance Framework output groups were organized for each of the five outcomes, headed by a convener from either a UN agency or a UNMIL section, with overall accountability to the Government of Liberia through the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator.


One of the integrated UN approach's strengths is that leadership of each output group can be provided by either the UN country team or UNMIL whichever has the strength in a given area. The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Police Commissioner convene two of the groups, and representatives from UN agencies, funds and programmes assemble the remaining three groups.

Each group presents its progress to the Strategic Policy Group every other month. The output groups agree on common work processes and work plans, each acting on behalf of the entire UN in Liberia for a particular outcome, aiming to bring together joint advocacy, policy support and advice, as well as technical leadership and expert opinion; to maintain links to cross-cutting groups; to share information on existing and pipeline programmes relevant to resource mobilization; and to create the possibility for joint outputs.

Four functional teams look after technical issues, such as communications, monitoring and evaluation, common administration services and programming. A series of thematic groups focus on cross-cutting issues (e.g. gender equity, children and youth, peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity, food security and nutrition, environment and climate change and macroeconomics) and are led by relevant sections, funds, programmes or UN agencies (see Figure 8).

21 Because UNMIL is an integrated mission, substantive coordination in Liberia has extended beyond the UN country team to encompass United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations.

Figure 8. Coordination Mechanisms in Liberia



Source: UNMIL

In the time available for the Assessment Report, it was not possible to assess the performance of each of these coordination bodies in detail. In general terms, however, other agencies and donors found UNDP-provided coordination support to be excellent. UN agencies expressed some concern about the volume of funds that tended to be channelled through UNDP—something perhaps inevitable in view of the convergence of

the UNDP mandate with the principal priorities of both the government and UNMIL.

A number of government institutions repeated the grievance that they were not being sufficiently consulted or given due importance in decision-making by these bodies. While this was the case in the immediate post-conflict period, UNDP Liberia assured the evaluation team that steps were

taken to gradually increase support to government's leadership of each of the thematic groups.

Though some UN system agencies resisted, the UN country team prepared a concept note that delineates the rationale for transitioning from 'At Work Together' to 'Delivering as One'²² Programme reforms will be based on four principles: One Leader, One Budget, One Programme and One Office.

The process also entails strengthening the government's capacity to plan, lead and implement its development priorities by bringing aid coordination under its control. Joint UN programmes, discussed further below, have been implemented as part of coordinated programming. In practice, however, despite mechanisms and instruments for coordination in Liberia programme implementation has tended to be done in parallel within a common programming framework, not jointly.

Multi-donor trust funds have served as a mechanism around which coordination can be structured. However, the focus on distributing resources similarly to other post-conflict countries has skewed the quality and nature of coordination—more attention is paid to distribution than to linking or making use of substantive agency mandates that would support common objectives or commonly agreed outcomes.

The move towards 'Delivering as One' is commendable and should be strongly supported by all UN member states. The transition constitutes a significant step forward in coordination and will ultimately lead to jointly managed funding and programming.

3.6 FACTORS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN FUTURE POSITIONING/REPOSITIONING

In 2006, the Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendations for a phased, gradual consolidation, drawdown and withdrawal of the UNMIL troop contingent.²³ The Security Council requested that the Secretary-General report on progress made towards achieving the core benchmarks set out in the Secretary-General reports of 8 August 2007²⁴ and 19 March 2008²⁵ and, based on that progress, make recommendations on further adjustments to the UNMIL military and police components.²⁶

A technical assessment mission, led by the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations with participation from the Department of Field Support, the Department of Political Affairs, Department of Safety and Security and, in situ, UNMIL and the UN country team, visited Liberia from 26 April to 6 May 2009. In addition to assessing the political and security situation in Liberia, the technical assessment mission assessed the status of core benchmarks and made recommendations for a UNMIL drawdown. The technical assessment mission also recommended that UNMIL develop a strategy for final drawdown following the scheduled 2011 elections. The results of the technical assessment mission are reported in the 'Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia' of 10 June 2009.²⁷

UNDP needs to begin planning for the transition. It will involve a handover from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Resident Coordinator and the UN country team.

22 United Nations in Liberia and the Government of Liberia, *Delivering as One: Concept Note*, Monrovia, Liberia, October 2010.

23 Security Council resolution 1712, UN Doc. S/RES/1712 (September 29, 2006).

24 UN Secretary-General, *Fifteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*, UN Doc. S/2007/479 (August 8, 2007).

25 UN Secretary-General, *Sixteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*, UN Doc. S/2008/183 (March 19, 2008).

26 Security Council resolution 1836, UN Doc. S/2009/1836 (September 29, 2008).

27 Security Council resolution 299, UN Doc. S/2009/299 (June 10, 2009).

UNDP has benefited greatly from the presence of UNMIL in the following ways and will need to make adjustments accordingly.

Security: Though the security situation has improved considerably, UNDP will need to make arrangements for transitioning security arrangements to UNDP leadership. The transition will be relatively straightforward in Monrovia, but UNDP should negotiate a handover of security infrastructure from UNMIL in the field, including communications facilities.

In-country Presence: During the UNMIL tenure, the UNDP and UN country teams had access to facilities and offices in the counties, which provided both technical and other support to UNDP project and Country Office staff. It is not clear how this can be replaced. UNDP may have to forgo a long-term presence in the field, opting to use long-term project personnel who are posted locally as focal points to make arrangements for missions and visits from the Country Office. Such project personnel will also need to serve as security wardens and focal points for security issues in their geographic areas.

Technical Capacity: UNDP programmes in rule of law, security and elections have benefited greatly from UNMIL capacities. Support to institutions in the rule of law and security sectors will need to continue for the long term in order to build national capacity to acceptable levels. To replace the loss of capacity, UNDP will need to find project resources to enable it to recruit in-house capacity in several areas: elections and/or parliamentary systems, civil police, the judiciary and courts, corrections, access to justice (including traditional justice) and legal reform (including constitutional and commercial law). This is in addition to other expertise that is required within UNDP to make its programmes more developmental.

National Ownership: The completion of the Mission should also signify the completion of a transition from extensive expatriate control and

influence over planning, coordination and implementation to Liberian control. UNDP must unequivocally support this transition, encouraging and supporting national leadership over aid coordination. UNDP needs to boost its capacity to support the Resident Coordinator in her or his role as the principal source of technical support and advice to the government in the coordination of aid. Direct execution modality projects need to emphasize ways in which national ownership is ensured over the substantive results of the assistance. Efforts currently underway to support the transition of some projects to a national execution modality should continue, focusing on building national capacities to adopt leadership roles. Transitioning to a national execution modality should be gradual, with a system of direct payment to start with leading to advances over a period of time. As part of the transition process, regular management and financial audits need to be conducted in order to assess performance.

UNDP will need to move immediately into its standard mode of operation, covering all areas within its mandate as soon as UNMIL departs. This transition has already begun, with additional funding being devoted to environmental issues and HIV/AIDS in the most recent country programme.

However, this transition should be staggered, as there are still significant gaps in governance and the capacity of state institutions. UNDP should focus on addressing the root causes of conflict and on building the capacities of key state institutions. Focussing attention on these areas will help to ensure long-term stability, peace and development in the country. This may entail eliminating support to other areas that are normally within the UNDP mandate. In this respect, the following would be of highest priority for UNDP:

- Overall governance reform;
- Land reform;
- Anti-corruption;
- Human rights and legal reform;

- Elections and strengthening of parliamentary systems;
- Institutions for the rule of law (broadly defined);
- Civilian components of the security sector;
- Strengthening of sub-national governance and democratic inclusion;
- Strengthening of civil society for advocacy and watchdog functions; and

- Employment-generation, including microfinance and small enterprise development targeting youth and women.

The following chapter analyses UNDP contributions to development results in the areas of governance, crisis prevention and recovery, Millennium Development Goals and poverty reduction, gender equality and women's empowerment, HIV and AIDS, and energy and environment.

Chapter 4

UNDP CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

4.1 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

SUPPORT TO ELECTIONS

Holding free and fair elections under Liberian leadership constitutes a core UNMIL objective and an important milestone on the way to UN drawdown. In 2004, the Security Council focused the mission's mandate on holding free, fair and transparent elections by October 2005 and convincing the international community to make funds available for reintegrating and rehabilitating ex-combatants.²⁸ The UNMIL played a critical role in conducting a credible, transparent, free and fair national election by offering logistical support to the National Elections Commission. In addition to providing security, the Mission played an advisory role in matters ranging from operational issues, legal concerns and external relations.

The Security Council authorized UNMIL to assist the government with the 2011 general presidential and legislative elections. The Mission provided logistical support, facilitated access to remote areas, coordinated international electoral assistance and supported Liberian institutions and political parties create an atmosphere conducive to conducting peaceful elections.²⁹

In 2005, UNDP managed the Liberia Emergency Governance Fund to support elections and continues to be the funding vehicle for the National

Election Commission (now in charge of the forthcoming constitutional referendum and Presidential and Congressional elections). UNDP has co-chaired the coordination committee for support to the National Elections,³⁰ providing appreciated leadership (including in moments of some difficulty and disagreement). The International Foundation for Electoral Systems and the National Democratic Institute, under contacts from the US government, are providing technical assistance to the National Election Commission. UNDP, in addition to administering funds and coordination, has made contributions in the form of:

- Procuring essential furniture and equipment, including computers for data-processing;
- Designing, organizing and convening voter education events and materials;
- Organizing and holding of train-the-trainer workshops for 60 community-based voter educator trainers to be placed in 15 counties;
- Fielding 40 voter education officers;
- Fielding national elections commission field officers to manage elections;
- Constructing warehouses for the storage of ballots and ballot boxes;
- Producing and transporting billboards;
- Procuring telecommunications equipment to monitor and manage elections;
- Printing voter registration regulations as flyers;

28 Security Council resolution 1561, UN Doc. S/RES/1561 (September 17, 2004).

29 Security Council resolution 1938, UN Doc. S/RES/1938 (September 15, 2010).

30 There are two coordination committees: the general coordination committee and the technical coordination committee. UNDP chairs the former.

- Printing and procuring ballots and registration cards;
- Procuring indelible ink and other essential supplies for the holding of elections;
- Printing and distributing 500 copies of guidelines for political parties;
- Distributing 20,000 voter registration posters; and
- Establishing a mobile media unit (film) for voter education and for recording the proceedings during elections.

According to programme partners, UNDP played a positive, assertive and leading role in coordinating support to the election process. The coordination has been described as transparent and inclusive. UNDP also played a decisive role when there was a perceived funding shortfall on the part of the National Election Commission. However, an analysis demonstrated that this was not the case and the National Election Commission accepted the finding.

Donors found procurement by UNDP to have been efficient, and found it convenient for UNDP to pay election workers' salaries. However, the considerable delays experienced in UNDP payment processing led to complaints and some very tense incidents in rural areas—in some instances, election officials were taken hostage over unmade payments.³¹

The joint outcomes of the support provided by donors (UNDP and the United States Agency for International Development in particular), have been the smooth and successful holding of by-elections for Senate seats, the smooth holding of voter registration in all 15 counties and the demonstrated ability of the National Election Commission to disaggregate and analyse the data collected during the registration processes (e.g. using computers to

graphically present analysis). Barring severe political obstacles, it is likely that the National Election Commission will be able to organize, manage and monitor the forthcoming elections successfully.

In the event that the National Elections Commission manages the elections smoothly, UNDP should strengthen the Commission's capacities to plan, manage funds, procure essential supplies, manage personnel and implement public awareness and information programmes—all of the functions that would need to be taken over under national execution—as a prelude to UNDP phasing itself out. This could be achieved either over one electoral cycle or by the completion of the next by-elections.

SUPPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE

From 2004 to 2009, UNDP assisted the Liberian legislature to address deficiencies in staffing and capacity, particularly in the standing committees of the legislature. This enabled the legislature to effectively perform its oversight and law-making functions, to strengthen the role of the legislature as an independent branch of government and to broaden citizens' democratic participation. The UNDP approach has been primarily one of facilitating the functioning of the National Legislative Assembly (both houses) with a view towards ensuring the smooth functioning of the institution rather than spearheading any major reforms or changes to the rules of procedure. UNDP has not provided any support for the development of political parties, many of which, while having been successful in the last legislative elections, remain rudimentary and heavily reliant on individual personalities rather than coherent political platforms.

31 The underlying cause of these incidents is disputed. Some suggested that the lists of electoral workers provided by the Election Commission were incomplete and others that the intermediary bank (ECOBANK) caused the delays. Nevertheless, the programme was under a UNDP direct execution modality and UNDP is at least partially, if not ultimately, responsible.

UNDP support to the legislature has been in line with:

- Poverty reduction strategy, Pillar III: Governance and the rule of law;
- United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2003–2005, Theme 2: Good governance, with the overall goal of creating an enabling environment for sustainable human development;
- Country programme document 2003–2007, Outcome 2: Capacity building for key governance institutions and mechanisms;
- United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2008–2012, Outcome 3: Democratic, accountable and transparent governance is being advanced in a participatory and inclusive manner and in accordance with human rights; the National Legislature better able to perform law making, representation and oversight functions; and
- Country programme document 2008–2012, Component I) democratic governance: Strengthening the capacity of the legislature.

Following the 2005 legislative elections, UNDP and the Conrad Adenauer Foundation conducted a workshop for new members of Congress. With The World Bank, UNDP supported the enhancement of the legislative budgetary process in Liberia (at this time the budget unit was a separate entity) and promoted a dialogue within government regarding the role and functions of the budgeting office.

Under the Capacity Building for Governance and Economic Management Project (2004–2008), UNDP applied \$350,000 for supporting the budget review process, procuring furniture and equipment, establishing a donor coordination committee, sponsoring of a team of consultants to undertake

a legislative needs assessment, and drafting of the ‘Modernization Plan 2009–2013: Making the Liberian Legislature 21st Century Compliant’ (based largely upon the legislative needs assessment and with funding provided by Agriculture Cooperative and Development Bank).³²

To date, the most significant UNDP contributions to the legislature are its support to the 2005 ‘Liberia Legislative Needs Assessment’ and the three-year process of drafting and publishing the 2009 ‘Modernization Plan’. UNDP rendered technical assistance to the drafting of the ‘Modernization Plan’, including preparing its annexed ‘Plan of Action’.

The UNDP ‘Legislative Needs Assessment’ recommended a three-pronged approach to transform and modernize the Liberian legislature. The recommendations included appointing a Joint Legislative Modernization Committee to guide the development of the Legislature, establishing a Donor Coordination Committee and formulating and implementing the ‘Modernization Plan’ owned by the legislature and facilitated by donors (principally UNDP).³³

The ‘Legislative Needs Assessment’ also recognized that the Liberian legislature suffered from significant educational and experience deficits among its legislators, undeveloped systems for processing legislation and managing house affairs, and serious infrastructure deficiencies that limited the legislature’s ability to exercise its powers. The ‘Legislative Needs Assessment’ further put forth a list of 50 legislative strengthening activities based upon comparative example from successful legislative strengthening projects in other African countries. These included upgrading infrastructure and strengthening representation, law-making, oversight and gender equality (including initiating public hearings on gender equality).

32 UNDP Liberia Project Document “Capacity Building for Governance and Economic Management Project” (2008).

33 UNDP Legislative Needs Assessment (copy on file with UNDP); Modernization Plan 2009–2013: Making the Liberian Legislature 21st Century Compliant: A Blueprint for Effective Representation, Law-making and Oversight (The Legislature of the Republic of Liberia 2010).

The main recommendations of the ‘Legislative Needs Assessment’ were accepted by the 52nd Legislature of the Republic of Liberia. The Joint Legislative Modernization Committee was appointed and a Donor Coordination Committee (chaired by UNDP) was formed. In July 2007, the Senate and House of Representatives initiated the process of formulating the ‘Modernization Plan’ and in August 2007, UNDP with funding from Agriculture Cooperative and Development Bank hired two consultants to design the five-year ‘Modernization Plan’ that was adopted in 2009.³⁴

The five pillars of UNDP support to the ‘Five Year Legislative Modernization Plan,’ with corresponding goals and representative mechanisms, are:

Pillar 1: Constituency Representation: To strengthen constituency representation and establish mechanisms for constituency contact, including:

- Legal structures for consultation (county councils, district councils, chiefs and elders);
- Civil Society and pressure groups;
- Establishment of a Constituency Office;
- Daily journal of proceedings;
- Publication of voter records; and
- Global contact with lawmakers via the Internet.

Pillar 2: Law-Making: To enhance law-making capacity of legislators through periodic training, exposure and orientation programmes, including:

- Lessons on how to initiate bills;
- Establishment and strengthening of the committee support office;
- Tracking system for bills;
- Publication of transcripts of debates; and
- Preparation of a directory of bills.

Pillar 3: Legislative Oversight: To enhance the functioning and efficiency of the Plenary of both Houses and improve the protocol for floor management, including:

- Public hearings;
- Establishment and strengthening of the Legislative Budget Office.

Pillar 4: Staffing: To improve the professional capacity and efficiency of staff.

- Legislative staff training.

Pillar 5: Work Environment: To make the work environment of the legislature conducive to efficient performance and introduce modern facilities.

- Research department and legislative library.

The President *Pro Tempore* of the Senate stated that, as a result of UNDP support, legislative capacities have significantly improved since 2006. The legislature makes frequent use of the ‘Modernization Plan’—particularly the ‘Plan of Action’. However, overall progress on the implementation of the Plan is occurring slower than it should. A greater focus upon actual implementation of the ‘Modernization Plan’ is urgently required. For example, there are currently no budgetary appropriations for the standing committees, hindering the legislature’s ability to craft legislation. Public outreach and public hearings are concepts that have not yet fully taken hold in Liberia.

While UNDP support was relevant, it continued only until 2009; UNDP did not directly engage with the legislature through 2011. However, UNDP is providing limited support via other legislative initiatives (e.g. the Anti-corruption Law). There would appear to be interest within the legislature for UNDP to provided additional support to the ‘Modernization Plan’s’ implementation—particularly

34 Modernization Plan 2009-2013: Making the Liberian Legislature 21st Century Compliant: A blueprint for effective Representation, Law-making and Oversight (The Legislature of the Republic of Liberia 2010).

with the first three pillars that intersect most closely with public participation in government, anti-corruption, gender equality and legal empowerment.

The legislature is currently focused on building mid- and junior-level staff capacities. For example, office staff needs to be trained on how to support a chief of staff and to perform research in the process of consultation on legislation. The US government recently provided funds to the Liberian legislature for the construction of a library that will service both houses, and it plans to support a documentation centre. The UN Democracy Fund provided a grant to the legislature to support interns for legislators, but there were differing views as to hiring and qualifications and most interns were not able to work with the committees due to resistance from staff and legislators. However, in its quest for logistical support, the legislature has now created a Committee Support Office that supports all standing committees.

SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE REFORM

The Government has worked hard to overcome the inherent lack of capacity in the civil service and the Liberian State Administration. It has sought a variety of means to bring back or retain highly qualified expatriate and resident Liberians to boost government capacity. National plans and programmes are well defined and often highly sophisticated in their construction, yet below the top layer, the state administration continues to suffer from a severe lack of capacity. In addition, state authority remains weak due to lack of access to remote areas as a result of factors such as poor road networks; low levels of state administration and lack of training; an immature revenue authority that cannot generate sufficient tax revenues to fund development; a highly centralized budgeting and budget management system and a lack of facilities (i.e. administrative buildings at the county

and district levels). Donors interested in demonstrating short-term successes have promoted project implementation units within key ministries that undermine the development of long-term capacity.

There is a long history of endemic corruption across all branches and agencies of the Liberian government and the private sector. Indeed, perceptions of corruption appear to reduce the confidence that the public is prepared to place in key institutions of state. It is generally understood that this is one of the key factors that corrodes state institutions' ability to deliver. It is seen as one of the potential causes of conflict in cities and rural areas.

In 2005/2006, Liberia ratified the UN Convention against Corruption and African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. Liberia is also a member of the African Peer Review Mechanism. Other key legislative changes undertaken by the government included the enactment of the Public Procurement Contract and Concession Act; the Judiciary Financial Autonomy Act; the adoption of a Code of Conduct for Liberian Public Servants; a Code of Conduct for Liberian Public Servants; removal of 'ghost' names from government payrolls, publication of the National Budget on the Ministry of Finance's website, among other initiatives.³⁵ Since 2004, however, the government has worked on increasing the level of transparency. While there is still a long way to go in rooting out corruption, Liberia placed 87th out of 178 countries surveyed by Transparency International in its 2010 report issued in December 2010.

The Governance Commission has been very active and has attempted, with varying degrees of success, to address critical constraints including in the areas of local governance and decentralization, corruption, land reform, human rights and civil service reform. The Governance Commission's work has resulted in the decentralization and a public sector reform policy being issued

35 Reno, William, "Anti-corruption Efforts in Liberia: Are They Aimed at the Right Traders?" *International Peacekeeping*, Volume 15, Issue 3, June 2009, pp. 387-404.

and the establishment of dedicated commissions for addressing corruption (the Liberian Anti-corruption Commission) and land reform (the Land Commission).

Continuous UNDP partnership in support of the Governance Commission (consisting of a group of eminent Commissioners under the Chairmanship of a widely respected former President of the Republic) has been central to the UNDP strategy for influencing and supporting the most complex and fundamental structural reforms in Liberia. The establishment of a Governance Reform Commission was provided for in the ‘Comprehensive Peace Agreement’ with a mandate to:

- Review the existing programme for the promotion of good governance in Liberia, with the objective of adjusting its scope and strategy for implementation;
- Develop public sector management reforms through assessment, reforms, capacity building and performance monitoring;
- Ensure transparency and accountability in governance in all government institutions and activities, including acting as the public ombudsman;
- Ensure subsidiarity in governance through decentralization and participation;
- Ensure a national and regional balance in appointments without compromising quality and integrity;
- Ensure an enabling environment, which will attract private sector direct investment; and
- Monitor, assess and report to the **National Transitional Legislative Assembly** on the implementation and impact of activities undertaken to encourage the practice of good governance in Liberia.

UNDP has, under its Senior Executive Service Programme and through consultancies, supported the Governance Commission in virtually all of its work—UNDP is the Governance Commission’s principal international partner.

The Commission generated studies on key issues such as fiscal decentralization and the alignment of traditional governance structures with official structures at the subnational or local level. This was done within the context of a national legislature that (a) has a ruling party that does not have a majority, and (b) in which a number of the former leaders with strong vested interests in the current system remain in office.

While the Governance Commission took on some of the most intractable structural issues that lie at the root of the malaise in Liberia that led to armed conflict, it tended to do so by establishing independent commissions to address each issue. In the absence of political will in the legislature, this resulted in commissions that extensively studied the issues involved, but were relatively powerless to implement change or enforce existing legislation—even where practical recommendations were generated. It is difficult to see which approaches could have been adopted otherwise, and it is likely that support to these commissions will need to be sustained over an extended period. In the absence of democratic pressure on legislators from the general population, change is likely to be incremental and often slow.

In this respect, the Governance Commission has, along with the Office of the President, been the driving force behind the creation of the Liberian Land Commission and the Liberian Anti-corruption Commission. UNDP supported the establishment and early functioning of these two commissions (UNDP support to these two commissions is discussed in the next subsection of this chapter). In addition, the UNDP supported the Governance Commission’s work on the national visioning exercise to 2030, on decentralization and local governance, on civic engagement and on public sector reform.

UNDP provided minimal support to the Governance Commission on civic engagement to establish a functional relationship between the government and civil society. This is likely to be of central importance if decentralization and democratic participation are to be promoted

in the future. UNDP supported the Commission's regional consultation with civil society organizations nationwide. However, it allocated a relatively low sum of \$25,000 for this purpose. Despite these limitations, the consultations led to the Governance Commission drafting a policy framework for civil society in Liberia.

UNDP supported the National Visioning Exercise, an exercise that addressed the structural, identity, social and developmental issues facing the nation. The exercise was geared towards transforming the nature of Liberian society and political structures with a focus on generating greater participation and prosperity for the nation—thereby returning it to the middle-income status that it lost 30 years ago.

In order to organize and support a national dialogue, UNDP allocated \$50,000 to support the fielding of four researchers to examine the culture and symbols of the nation and the history of indigenous groups and their relation to the modern Liberian state (some of which was also covered by the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, also supported by UNDP). In pre-consultations, political parties tended to send low-level representation that engaged one-on-one with university students and members of youth organizations, civil society organizations and traditional leaders. District Commissioners organized consultations which, combined with UNDP-supported workshops and conferences organized in Sierra Leone and Namibia,³⁶ drew on experience from neighbouring countries. The purpose of this exercise was to develop the elements of a plan for 2030 on how to go about consolidating peace and promoting nationhood.

UNDP provided substantial support to the Governance Commission's work on decentralization, channelling all of its funding, over \$1

million, to it. UNDP also supported the Governance Commission on Public Sector Reform. Budget- and function-driven, the Governance Commission tended to focus on merging and/or downsizing ministries. It has, in particular, been involved in the downsizing of the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Agriculture, and in promoting the professionalization of the civil service up to the post of Deputy Minister. Options for the merger of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs have also been reviewed. Work in this area has complemented that under decentralization, as the deployment of ministerial capacity under a regime of progressive deconcentration has been studied with respect to several key line ministries including the Ministries of Education, Health, Agriculture and Commerce in collaboration with the Liberian Institute of Public Administration.

DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE

The Governance Commission and the Ministry of Internal Affairs have, with strong presidential support, taken on a central role in spearheading a process of decentralization that is viewed as a means of overcoming a history of exclusion and marginalization. Following a period of technical review, the Governance Commission issued a Decentralization Policy that was subsequently approved by the Government. The constitutional referendum included a provision to introduce elections for local legislatures at the county level and for the election of local officials who are currently appointed by the President. However, this was rejected by the electorate and must be viewed as an important setback.

Because all of the most significant positions in the local administration are appointed from the

36 Republic of Liberia, Governance Commission, *Country-Led Governance Assessments: Sharing Experiences and Increasing Political Accountability*, Report on the Namibia Workshop, by Elizabeth Sele Mulbah, Commissioner, Windhoek 2-5 November 2009 and Republic of Liberia Governance Commission, *Report From Freetown Sierra Leone National Dialogue*, by Elizabeth Sele Mulbah, Observer and Commissioner, Freetown Sierra Leone, May 5-9, 2009.

centre, the principal accountability and reporting lines are directed towards Monrovia rather than local communities. Furthermore, many local officials possess homes in Monrovia where they spend significant periods. Subnational government units are now entirely financially dependent on the central government. Budgets are prepared at the centre and expenditure requests are submitted to Monrovia for payment. Ambiguity in the ownership of land resources favours local leaders prepared to take liberties with the allocation of land in an environment in which the centre's enforcement capacity is limited. In addition, the sparseness of Liberia's population, the small size of the average settlement (100-200 people per village) in the inland rural areas, and the considerable distance between them, suggest that they are likely to remain dependent on fiscal or equalization transfers from the coastal counties even if greater fiscal decentralization were to come into effect.

UNDP has taken a two-pronged approach in its work on decentralization and local governance. It supported a pilot programme through the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Liberia Decentralization and Local Governance Programme) that applied a United Nations Capital Development Fund model to demonstrate the viability of fiscal decentralization at the county and district levels. UNDP also

provided upstream support for policy development through the Governance Commission.

Under the overall guidance of the Governance Commission, staff consultants were recruited and local resources were used to prepare a fiscal study to inform the national policy on decentralization,³⁷ a study on the roles of traditional chiefs and their potential functions in decentralized governance in Liberia,³⁸ and a Liberia National Policy on Decentralization and Local Governance.³⁹ The two preparatory studies were produced under the Liberia Decentralization and Local Governance Project, supported jointly by the United Nations Capital Development Fund, UNDP and the European Community.

The Decentralization Policy was approved by the Government and generated both a bill that is in draft form before Congress as well as elements of the national constitutional referendum that is to be implemented prior to the 2011 elections.⁴⁰ The new policy, which was approved and issued by the government, provided the basis for some of the elements of the constitutional referendum, as well as a draft bill that is likely to languish in the legislature for some time to come.

37 Republic of Liberia, Governance Commission, Liberia Fiscal Decentralization Study to Inform the National Policy Framework on Decentralization, Commissioned by the Liberian Governance Commission with Support from the Liberia Decentralization and Local Governance Development Programme, Prepared by Jerome M. Hodge, Monrovia, Republic of Liberia, 2010.

38 Republic of Liberia, Governance Commission, Roles of Traditional Chiefs in a (sic) Decentralized Governance in Liberia, Consultancy Report, Commissioned by the Governance Commission with Support from the Liberia Decentralization and Local Development Programme, Monrovia, Republic of Liberia, 2010.

39 Republic of Liberia, Governance Commission, Liberia National Policy on Decentralization and Local Governance, January 2010.

40 See Governance Commission, Liberia National Policy on Decentralization and Local Governance, Paynesville, Liberia, January 2010. The new policy states: "Liberia shall remain a unitary state with a system of local government that shall be decentralized with the county as the principal focus for the devolution of power and authority." The policy does not cover the judicial branch of government and focuses on the executive and on the creation of elected bodies at the sub-national level. It calls for all existing administrative units to be restructured. It calls for the establishment of a County Legislative Assembly consisting of elected members and which include Paramount Chiefs from each Chiefdom and at least two members at large who are women and at least one woman representative. It also calls for the transformation of a number of key positions in the county executive that are currently appointed by the President into elected positions including the County Superintendent, the County Administrative Office and the District Commissioners, rendering them more accountable to their local constituencies.

The Liberia National Policy on Decentralization and Local Governance issued by the government in January 2010 is still pending ratification and promulgation in the form of a bill by the National Legislative Assembly. Concerns were raised by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs about the budget implications arising from the local elections, the personnel and operational costs of additional agencies, and the additional facilities that need to be constructed. Nevertheless, if promulgated by law in the form of an Act, this decentralization policy will constitute a sea change for Liberia. For it to work effectively, civil society will also need to be strengthened at the local level in a watchdog and advocacy function.

Some stakeholders stated that, to date, not enough work on the root causes of the conflict was being done in Liberia. The decentralization effort is a step in the right direction to embracing fundamental rights and freedoms and the quality of life for all Liberians. One of the hallmarks of the apartheid system in Liberia was the Hinterland law. The hinterland laws still exist to a large extent and stand in direct conflict with the Constitution of Liberia. The process of decentralization in Liberia will effectively abrogate the hinterland laws.

Consideration of the decentralization bill is unlikely to take place in the National Legislative Assembly until after the elections. Rejection of the

relevant sections of the constitutional referendum, however, has constituted an important setback.

The Local Governance and Decentralization project attempts to adapt and implement the United Nations Capital Development Fund Local Development Fund model in Liberia. The principle stated objective of the Development Fund is to demonstrate the viability of fiscal decentralization by placing significant funds under the control of local communities and official authorities at the district level and below. The intention is to establish community-based institutions for the identification, prioritization, design and implementation of projects at the local level. Institutions created are to be participatory, transparent and accountable to the community. Lessons learned are to inform national policy and to be scaled up if the concept of fiscal decentralization is accepted. In practice, however the focus has been less on the creation of institutions for effective management of resources, as is the norm with United Nations Capital Development Fund Local Development Fund projects, but rather to establish local institutions for the management of particular priority projects. In order to assess the replicability of the model, more effort will be needed in order to establish standard institutions at the local level if the as well as its value as a precedent for fiscal decentralization.

Overall, the policy calls for the County Superintendent, the District Commissioners, the Members of the County Legislative Assembly, the Paramount Chiefs, the Clan Chiefs, the Mayors and Members of City Councils all to be elected to four-year terms. The county authorities are to have the power to make economic development and administrative decisions and contract with local entities. The County Legislative Assembly is required to confirm the appointment of all heads of county administrative departments. It is also required to approve the local budget and issue local ordinances, rules and regulations, and establish additional agencies that “may be required for good governance.” County plans and budgets are therefore required to be submitted by the county executive to the County Legislative Assembly for review and ratification. Certain fiscal powers, including the raising and management of certain specified sources of revenue (mostly property taxes, licenses, inspection fees, fines and operating permits for local businesses) and the management of fiscal transfers from the centre in the form of equal amount of lump sum grants for each county. It also states that county personnel management “will be integrated with its budget planning”. The policy also recommends a standard structure for country government that allocates added capacity for functions to be shifted to the local level including revenue and budget, public works and utilities and health and social welfare, among others.

Importantly, the policy recommends that with the exception of the County Superintendent, the County Legislative Assembly can impeach the elected officials of the local executive branch of government. The Superintendent may be impeached by the National Legislative Assembly at the request of the President and be removed by a two-thirds majority vote in the National Legislative Assembly. The Decentralization Policy includes a provision that entitles citizens to petition for the impeachment of a Superintendent.

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION

To its credit, the government established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, but the legislature has largely cast the Commission's report and its recommendations aside on the grounds that its recommendations did not sufficiently propose a road map for reconciliation. The Supreme Court has since decided that the President is not compelled to implement the Commission's recommendations. The recently established National Human Rights Commission has been accorded a key role by the Truth and Reconciliation Act to develop a road map for human rights in Liberia.

In Liberia's rural areas, harmful traditional practices and trials by ordeal⁴¹ have resulted in numerous human rights violations and deaths.⁴² The incidence of sexual and gender-based violence and rape of women and girls has continued to be unacceptably high, despite an aggressive campaign against such violence conducted by UNMIL and the establishment of the special court.⁴³ Official discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered persons in violation of international treaties ratified by Liberia was registered.⁴⁴ Moreover, the death penalty remained in force (reintroduced in 2008) in violation of the 'Second Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,' to which Liberia acceded in 2005.⁴⁵ Many perpetrators of human rights violations during the conflict remain free.⁴⁶

UNDP provided support to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 2008 with separate project documents and funding from the United States Agency for International Development (\$500,000) and Swedish International

Development Cooperation Agency (\$1,100,626). The Peacebuilding Fund also contributed additional funding of \$350,000 in 2009.

UNDP provided support to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in line with:

- **Poverty reduction strategy, Pillar I:** Peace and Security;
- **United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2003–2005, Theme 1:** Conflict resolution, peacebuilding and relief, with the overall goals of seeking resolution of the armed conflict and initiating a peace process that addresses the root causes of conflict and the resulting humanitarian situation;
- **Country programme document 2003–2007, Outcome 2(c):** National reconciliation;
- **United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2008–2012, Outcome 1:** National and Local authorities increasingly have the capacity to provide security, manage conflict and prevent violence, respecting human rights throughout, and Outcome 3: Increased capacity of government and national human rights institutions; and
- **Country programme document 2008–2012, Component II:** human rights, rule of law, and national visioning and security and peace consolidation.

The objective of UNDP collaboration was to enable the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to fulfil its mandate to help restore the human dignity of victims and promote reconciliation by providing an opportunity for victims, witnesses, and others to give account of the violations and

41 Such as 'Sassywood' (forced swallowing of poisonous tree sap) and 'cowfur' (being burned with a hot object to determine innocence or guilt).

42 Human Rights Watch *2010 Annual Report on Liberia*; Amnesty International *Annual Report on Liberia 2010*.

43 Human Rights Watch *2010 Annual Report on Liberia*; Amnesty International *Annual Report on Liberia 2010*.

44 Amnesty International: *Submission to UN Universal Periodic Review 2010*.

45 Amnesty International: *Submission to UN Universal Periodic Review 2010*.

46 Amnesty International: *Submission to UN Universal Periodic Review 2010*.

abuses suffered and for perpetrators to relate their experiences in an interchange between victims and perpetrators; by providing psychosocial counselling, security and protection mechanisms surrounding Truth and Reconciliation Commission processes; and by enabling the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to conduct research and analysis to produce a final report.

The expected outputs of the UNDP collaboration were the participation of civil society and citizens in Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearing processes; the documentation of human rights violations and crimes against humanity; and the production (and submission to government) of a final and comprehensive report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.⁴⁷

UNDP and other donors supported the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and provided technical support through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Working Group of the International Donor Group. UNDP support to the Commission enabled it to hold hearings, to draft and publish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report and to hear over 30,000 witness statements.⁴⁸ Donors and stakeholders widely acknowledged UNDP support as satisfactory.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report's recommended that a number of members of the Liberian Government be indicted and barred from running for political office. These suggestions were not well received, and as a result, the report was alienated by both the administration and the congress.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report has not yet had the impact that UNDP or the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Chairman had anticipated. The report has been turned over to the National Human Rights Commission, and there is now a programme

being implemented (Pallava Hut) to discuss the report at the community level. However, there does not appear to be much political will to move the report's recommendations forward, and many stakeholders interviewed faulted the report for being long on analysis of the truth and short on approaches for reconciliation. A recent decision of the Supreme Court declared that the President of Liberia had no affirmative obligation to prosecute pursuant to the recommendations of the report. Thus, in many respects the window of opportunity for effective use of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission report to deal with the perpetrators may have passed.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings process and report did, however, succeed in increasing the visibility of the drivers of conflict (e.g. land and property disputes), which the government is addressing in various forms (for example, the Liberian Anti-corruption Commission and its dispute resolution task force). Further, by emphasizing women's experiences during the conflict the Commission advanced discourse on gender equality and women's rights. Minority rights were also raised throughout the Truth and Reconciliation Commission process, which led to an increased focus on the democratic inclusion of ethnic and religious minorities in Liberia.

Following the publication of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission report, neither UNDP nor UNMIL chose to engage the government on its recommendations. UNDP states that going forward, its role with regard to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission will most likely be to archive the report and testimony and to disseminate and raise awareness of the report's contents.

47 UNDP-USAID and UNDP-Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency "Support to the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission" project documents (2008).

48 UN Secretary-General, Fifteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, UN Doc. S/2007/479 (August 8, 2007).

SUPPORT TO THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

UNDP supported the establishment of the National Human Rights Commission, a process that took three years to complete. UNDP provided training, operational funds, capacity support, reporting capabilities and monitoring capabilities.

UNDP support in this respect contributed to the following:

- **Poverty reduction strategy, Pillar I:** Peace and security;
- **United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2006–2012, Outcome 1:** National and local authorities increasingly have the capacity to provide security, manage conflict and prevent violence, respecting human rights throughout; and
- **Country programme document 2008–2012, Component II:** Human rights, rule of law, national visioning and security and peace consolidation.

In 2005, the Liberian legislature enacted the law establishing the National Human Rights Commission.⁴⁹ Under the Act, the Commission is to protect and promote human rights in Liberia, covering rights, liberties and freedoms granted by the Liberian Constitution and statutes and any treaties or conventions that Liberia is a party to.⁵⁰

The Commission can take up any situation or violation of human rights it deems necessary and has the power to issue subpoenas and summonses to compel witnesses to provide documents or other evidence and testimony (it also has the discretion

to decline an investigation).⁵¹ The Commission will also function to act upon recommendations from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission report. It may also draw upon other governmental agencies in the furtherance of its mission.⁵² The Commission also has a duty to examine existing laws and administrative regulations and direct the government's attention to human rights violations. In addition, the Commission has reporting duties on the human rights situation in Liberia and ensure that national domestic legislation conforms to Liberia's human rights obligations. The commission is also empowered to cooperate with any UN agency and the African Commission on Human and People's Rights. The Commission has a public outreach and education function, and interfaces with the media to publicize human rights violations.

As a result of UNDP support, the National Human Rights Commission was formally established in November 2011, but in many respects is not yet fully functional. UNDP provided support for advocacy, awareness, training and dialogue on the critical roles of the Commission, and supported a conference on national human rights commissions. In 2010, capacity-building and ongoing support to the Commission assisted it to prepare its first work plan.

SUPPORT TO LIBERIAN ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES

The President won the election in 2005 on a strong anti-corruption platform, seeking to attack corruption as one of the root causes of conflict in Liberia. This provided new political will to anti-corruption efforts and was the impetus for UNDP and the Department for International

49 "An Act to Repeal the Act of 1997 Creating the Liberia Commission on Human Rights and to Create the Independent National Commission on Human Rights of Liberia," 11 March 2005.

50 "An Act to Repeal the Act of 1997 Creating the Liberia Commission on Human Rights and to Create the Independent National Commissions on Human Rights of Liberia," Art. III, Section 2 (11 March 2005).

51 "An Act to Repeal the Act of 1997 Creating the Liberia Commission on Human Rights and to Create the Independent National Commissions on Human Rights of Liberia," Article XVII (11 March 2005).

52 "An Act to Repeal the Act of 1997 Creating the Liberia Commission on Human Rights and to Create the Independent National Commissions on Human Rights of Liberia," Art. III, Section 2 (11 March 2005).

Box 1. The Jurisdiction of the Liberian Anti-corruption Commission

The 'Liberian Anti-corruption Commission Act' defined the Commission's jurisdiction by repealing laws that would have conflicted with its jurisdiction. * The Commission's jurisdiction overlaps with the Liberia National Police, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Ministry of Justice. It is important to note that the Commission's jurisdiction extends to instances of judicial corruption. The Commission has recently entered into a memorandum of understanding with other agencies to better define the contours of its jurisdiction. Also of note, a 'Code of Conduct' for government officials is now pending before the parliament that defines 'anti-corruption' and gives jurisdiction to the Capital at the Commission. Meanwhile, the Commission is itself preparing amendments to the Act.

The procedure for bringing a complaint to the Commission was intended to be as simple as possible. Any person may report corruption to the Commission via a telephone number. Once a complaint is filed, the Commission has 60 days to complete its investigation, gather evidence and submit a preliminary report to the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice then has 90 days to prosecute. The Commission is empowered to prosecute in lieu of the ministry of justice if the ministry of justice fails to prosecute; however, the Commission lacks a legal unit, effectively lacking the ability to prosecute.**

* PP II and page XV, Section 15.1, Liberian Anti-corruption Commission Act.

** Part XI, section 11.4, Liberian Anti-corruption Commission Act.

Source: Liberian Anti-corruption Commission.

Development to undertake two separate anti-corruption assessments in Liberia, both of which were completed in December 2005.

The UN-supported 'Anti-corruption Mission' report recommended that UNDP assist the government establish an anti-corruption regime, including the drafting of a National Anti-corruption Strategy, enactment of an Anti-corruption Act and the setting up of the Liberia Anti-corruption Commission.⁵³ The Governance Commission then conceived of and established the Liberia Anti-corruption Commission with the strong support of the President under an Act that it drafted with UNDP support in August 2008. UNDP also worked with the Governance Commission to develop a civil service code of conduct, but this stalled in the Legislature and has not been ratified.

In view of the importance of anti-corruption initiatives as a means of establishing institutional state legitimacy and eliminating an underlying cause of conflict, UNDP provided support to the new Liberian Anti-corruption Commission with a view towards:

- Supporting the Governance Commission to prepare the act establishing the Anti-corruption Commission;
- Strengthening the Anti-corruption Commission (procurement of vehicles, office equipment and computers, and printing and distributing 4,000 copies of the Anti-corruption Commission brochure);
- Conducting public awareness activities (consultants to design and conduct 15 county forums on combating corruption and the preparation training materials);
- Training Anti-corruption Commission Commissioners and staff (capacity building seminars and study tours);
- Developing and training civil society organizations for media interactions and monitoring; and
- Establishing relationships between the Anti-corruption Commission and other anti-corruption agencies through consultations and meetings.

53 Reno, William, "Anti-corruption Efforts in Liberia: Are They Aimed at the Right Traders?" *International Peacekeeping*, Volume 15, Issue 3, June 2009, pp. 387-404.

The Anti-corruption Commission credits UNDP with furnishing critical assistance in establishing the Commission. Assistance with logistics, provision of equipment, vehicles and computers helped to get the Commission office started. UNDP support enabled the Commission to reach 12 of 15 counties in Liberia and it enabled the Commission to hold town hall meetings throughout Liberia on corruption and the impact of corruption on the country. UNDP also funded overseas training in Tanzania for Commission staff. However, UNDP has not yet provided any funding for direct training of Commission investigators. Funding included \$500,000 provided by the Peacebuilding Fund.

The Liberian Anti-corruption Commission attempted to establish an Assets Declaration Regime for public officials, but stakeholders have not been cooperative. They worked with civil society to facilitate public outreach and established a National Integrity Forum with civil society (e.g. the local non-governmental organization Centre for Transparency and Accountability). The Commission noted that UNDP could have been much more involved with these public outreach initiatives.

The main objectives of UNDP support appear to have been met. UNDP stated that its efforts to support the Commission and other initiatives (e.g. a process whereby UNDP experts were embedded in the Ministry of Finance and vetted every contract) have decreased the level of corruption in the country. The United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2008–2012 midterm review notes that as a result of UNDP support, the national anti-corruption architecture was established (policy, strategy, the Liberian Anti-corruption Commission and the General Auditing Commission), Anti-corruption Commission capacity was strengthened and its secretariat is functional. This was corroborated during the evaluation through interviews with members of the Anti-corruption Commission, the Governance Commission and inspection of the Anti-corruption Commission facilities.

The Anti-corruption Commission is now integrated into the national budget. However, additional funding will be required to increase the impact of the Commission on public transparency and accountability. All logistics support provided by UNDP was turned over to the Commission. The capacity-building efforts were focused primarily on the Commission Secretariat as the core organ rather than the Commission. The General Auditing Commission is still dependent on donor support.

The Liberian Anti-corruption Commission carried out public education seminars in eight counties. The General Auditing Commission, with UNDP support, successfully conducted an audit of 38 state institutions. The Liberian Anti-corruption Commission successfully investigated high-profile corruption cases. There is a greater public awareness of the Liberian Anti-corruption Commission and a greater government transparency of the government due to UNDP support. There is corroborating evidence of a slight reduction in levels of corruption in Liberia. For example, Transparency International gave Liberia a score of 3.3 in its '2010 Corruption Perceptions Index'. This represents a marked improvement from Liberia's score of 2.1 in 2005 (2006 was not scored; the 2007 score was 2.1; the 2008 score was 2.4; the 2009 score was 3.1).⁵⁴

As of May 2011, the Liberian Anti-corruption Commission itself had received 50 complaints. Most of these concerned allegations of misappropriation, mismanagement or abuse of funds; all cases originated in Monrovia. Of the 50 complaints filed, nine were deemed to have merit by the Liberian Anti-corruption Commission and an investigation was commenced. Of the nine investigations, four were submitted to the Ministry of Justice for prosecution. Of these, the Ministry of Justice pursued just one case. A jury trial was held, but resulted in a hung jury (a retrial of the case is pending). Thus, to date not

54 Transparency International Global Corruption Perceptions Index (various 2004–2011), < http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi > (last visited June 25, 2011).

a single complaint filed with the Liberian Anti-corruption Commission has resulted in a conviction. Anecdotal evidence suggests that corruption is rife in the judicial system as well, and that juries have become professional in nature (i.e. jury members participating repeatedly in trials) and have been taking bribes. There is no clear evidence that this was the case in the one case of corruption that was tried.

SUPPORT TO THE LIBERIAN LAND COMMISSION

Liberia is rich in natural resources, including timber, iron ore, minerals, diamonds and gold. There are effectively two different systems of land ownership in Liberia. There is one legal regimen for residents of Monrovia and the coastal areas governed by a western statutory model based upon individual fee-simple, and a separate system utilized in the Liberian hinterland where indigenous Africans use customary systems, based upon community or collective ownership of land.⁵⁵ This has resulted in a system whereby land in the Hinterland is owned collectively, with only user rights to the shared property that are customarily owned on an individual or family basis.

Historically, there has also been large disparity in land ownership between women and men in Liberia, but the Equal Rights of Customary Marriage Law 1998 (approved in 2003) provides women in customary systems with rights of land tenure and inheritance.⁵⁶ Customary landowners can transfer deeds to the statutory system through

certain land deeds and titles, but the system does not provide for transfers from the statutory system to the customary system. Land tends to be controlled by village elders; Liberian youth (including many returning ex-combatants) find themselves with little means of accessing land in their communities, which has become a source of conflict.

The essential challenges that arise as a result of land issues and have been at the centre of violent armed conflicts in Liberia include post-conflict insecurity of tenure; illegal occupation and displacement as a result of violent conflicts and civil war; land rights documentation either missing or in disarray; organized fraud perpetuated in the land sector; malfunctioning land administration agencies; and courts that are perceived to be corrupt and lacking capacity.⁵⁷

The Hinterland Law and Aboriginal Law are still in force, impacting, for example, upon the ability of inhabitants of Liberia's interior to own land. The existence of these laws continues to enshrine a system beneficial to a small percentage of the population. Many disputes continue to arise concerning land tenure. While the Land Commission is operational, it lacks resources. Despite substantial reforms undertaken by the government with regard to logging and forests, the mining and extractive industries contribute relatively little to development in Liberia in proportion to their profits. The recently passed Liberian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative offers some hope in this regard. Concessions constitute the single most likely source of

55 *USAID: Land and Tenure Rights Portal, Country Profile for Liberia*, USAID (2010).

56 "The inability of the statutory and customary tenure systems to interact effectively aggravates the long-standing divide between the urban-based settler élites (and their indigenous supporters) and the rural, hinterland-based indigenous Liberians. The statutory system provides the legal basis for land and natural resource concessions (through state claims of ownership of tribal lands), some of which overlap and expand into customary lands. Such actions exclude many indigenous communities from their land base, and their food and livelihood sources (except as ill-paid workers). These issues helped to fuel the civil war and, post-conflict, have been exacerbated by the seizure and control by ex-combatants of two large rubber concessions – Guthrie and Sinoe plantations. Land-grabbing and claims of ownership of plantation land by local communities could also have security implications. By 2010, the government apparently succeeded in taking over control of Guthrie and Sinoe plantations from ex-combatants. Some of the ex-combatants were retrained through an NGO program, and others may have stayed on at the plantation under new management." *USAID: Land and Tenure Rights Portal, Country Profile for Liberia*, USAID, 2010.

57 "Land Governance Challenges: The Case of Liberia", Sawyer, A., Presentation for World Bank March 2, 2009.

badly needed revenue for the Government, but its ability to retain any resources is dependent on contract negotiations. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have provided technical support in the negotiation of new, or renewal of existing, concessions.

A Liberian Land Commission was established by an act of the National Legislature on August 4, 2009, with the mandate “to propose, advocate and coordinate reforms of land policy, laws and programs in Liberia.”⁵⁸ The Land Commission has no adjudicatory or implementation role. “The mandate of the Commission extends to all land and land-based natural resources both urban and rural land, private and public land and land devoted to residential, agricultural, industrial, commercial, forestry, conservation and any other purpose.”⁵⁹ The Land Commission recently created a Land Dispute Resolution Task Force that brings together all stakeholders involved in land dispute resolution. All members of the Task Force have recently signed a memorandum of understanding with the Land Commission that will formalize, standardize and coordinate land dispute resolution activities. The fact that the Land Commission does not have adjudicatory functions (these go to the court) constitutes an important shortcoming.

UNDP support to the Land Commission was delivered via its support to the Governance Commission (2004–2008) and is in line with:

- **Poverty reduction strategy, Pillar III:** Governance and the rule of law;
- **United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2008–2012, Outcome 3:** Democratic, accountable and transparent governance is being advanced in a participatory and inclusive manner and in accordance with human rights. Mechanisms

to resolve land disputes developed ensuring a gender, human rights and conflict-sensitive perspective; and

- **Country programme document 2008–2012, Component I:** Democratic Governance and public sector reforms.

UNDP supported the processes that led to the establishment of the Land Commission. UNDP support began with the convening of a group at the Governance Commission that brought together stakeholders and investors (e.g. Firestone) to identify issues to be addressed. This led to the preparation of an issues paper and ultimately to the Act on the Land Commission. UNDP supported the development of a National Information Centre that is collecting data on boundaries and parcels in rule areas of Liberia. It supported construction of the Land Commission’s premises and the functioning of its steering committee. UNDP provided support to the Governance Commission and the Law Reform Commission to conduct a desk review and analysis of Supreme Court cases and rulings on land matters, including customary land matters, in order to facilitate the Land Commission’s law reform work.⁶⁰ One of the first issues that the Land Commission dealt with was the sale of public land deeds and the establishment of a new process for land transfers.

UNDP support resulted in the operationalization of the Land Commission. A task force on land disputes was established, and a system for land dispute resolution is in place. Two county boundary disputes were resolved (through the boundary harmonization process), and only eight were remaining as of December 2010. A UNDP-supported National Urban Land Conference was held to open a dialogue on urban issues. Furthermore, a moratorium was placed on public land sales to curtail disputes while an interim policy is developed. The legal

58 Republic of Liberia Land Commission, *2010 Annual Report*.

59 Republic of Liberia Land Commission, *2010 Annual Report*.

60 2010 Annual Report, Republic of Liberia Land Commission, page 8; UNDP Governance Project Document.

framework for public land sales was also reviewed and an alternative dispute resolution mechanism is being established. The Land Commission is taking a lead role to address land issues; formal systems and improved capacities are in place to address land governance issues.⁶¹

UNDP support was highly relevant. However, the Land Commission's capacities remain weak. Going forward, there is a need for lower-level and mid-level staff training and the development of office managers to ensure sustainability. According to the Secretary-General, the risk of localized inter-ethnic conflict remains a major source of concern.

On October 13, 2008, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission released the findings of its 'Conflict Mapping Survey,' identifying land and property disputes as key threats to Liberia's peace.⁶² Land issues, including distribution and tenure, will continue to be one of the biggest issues with peace and reconciliation in Liberia. The Liberian Land Commission is a temporary body (it expires in five years) with a critical role to play in addressing conflict factors in Liberia; it is crucial to sustain and strengthen its capacities. Low levels of government funding and high dependency on donor assistance pose a risk to the Land Commission's capacity to fulfil its mandate.⁶³

The three-year Liberian Peacebuilding Programme (2011–2013) approaches land-related issues as critical drivers of conflict. The Programme's long-term strategy addresses land conflicts by supporting land reform legislation and reconciling the dual systems of land tenure currently prevalent in Liberia. The Programme's near-term goals include supporting local alternative dispute resolution mechanisms critical to solving land disputes. The Peacebuilding Programme will support the Land Commission's

Land Dispute Resolution Task Force that was established in 2010 to resolve critical land dispute cases in Liberia.

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVIL SERVICE

Following years of political upheaval and armed conflict, the largest constraint on the government is its capacity to manage the transition from peace to development and beyond. Civil service ranks have been decimated through losses to conflict and emigration—both within the region and to the United States in particular.

UNDP managed three separate emergency assistance programmes that were designed to bring back high-level, well-qualified professionals from the Liberian diaspora to take-up critical positions and/or perform priority tasks essential to the transition:

Liberia Emergency Capacity-building Support

This project, conceived in a meeting with the President of Liberia in March 2006, is intended to place senior cabinet level personnel at higher salary levels and with salary supplements with a view towards bringing back highly accomplished Liberians with senior level management experience in banks, in government and in private companies. Initially intended to fund 13 positions over a two year period, the programme has grown in size and duration—at its height it funded 40 positions for four years, most of which were at the ministerial level. The total cost of the programme to date has been approximately \$5 million, and has been supported by UNDP and the Open Society Institute. A project steering committee consisting of the Civil Service Agency, Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, UNDP and the Open Society Institute were to process the recruitment of personnel nominated and vetted by the President's office.

61 United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2008–2012 Midterm Review (2010).

62 UN Secretary-General, Eighteenth *Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*, UN Doc. S/2009/86 (February 10, 2009).

63 United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2008–2012 Midterm Review, UNDP Liberia (2010).

Senior Executive Service

Involving \$9.7 million over a three year period, this programme was intended to jump-start the civil service reform effort by inserting highly qualified civil servants in important managerial functions and providing a platform for transforming the civil service into a more professional, effective and accountable organ. This programme differs from the other two in that it targets qualified expatriates as well as Liberians working in the private sector or non-governmental organizations. The programme is designed to serve as a building block for long-term capacity-building and to drive comprehensive reform in the civil service. The Government of Liberia, UNDP (which managed the programme), The World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Humanity United, and the governments of Germany, Greece and Sweden jointly funded the programme.

Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals

To further supplement institutional capacity and to foster on-the-job training, UNDP drew on one of its well-evaluated best-practice models.⁶⁴ UNDP designed and approved a Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals project for Liberia that places highly qualified expatriate Liberians or people of Liberian origin in clearly defined assignments of limited duration (generally less than one year) with a view to producing pre-specified outputs and/or training incumbent Liberian staff.

The programme, which is intended to have a well-established system of assessing needs, developing terms of reference, advertising and selecting candidates and assessing performance, was jointly funded by UNDP and USAID and managed by a unit located in the Civil

Service Agency (but under Direct Execution). A project implementation committee consisting of UNDP, the Civil Service Agency, Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Ministry of State and the Liberia Reconstruction and Development Commission was established to oversee the programme. The programme has principally benefited the JFK Memorial Hospital, Civil Service Agency, the University of Liberia, the Cuttington University College, the Ministries of Agriculture, Health and Social Welfare, Education, Finance, State and Presidential Affairs, Planning and Economic Affairs, Commerce and Industry and the Liberia Reconstruction and Development Commission.

UNDP has had a major impact on the functioning of the Liberian civil service through these three programmes. A midterm, results-based evaluation of Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals and the Liberia Emergency Capacity-building Support has, in the absence of sufficient time to analyse the use of all of the outputs produced, indirectly credited the two programmes with most of the national achievements in macroeconomic management, planning and budgeting, health care, education, trade and commerce, governance reform and rural development.⁶⁵ While this type of attribution is difficult to verify, it is clear that these two projects and the Senior Executive Service have been the most significant factors bolstering public sector agencies' capacity. They are therefore largely responsible for consolidating the gains of peace, stabilizing the country, fostering development and raising the overall level of service delivery. The Liberia Emergency Capacity-building Support programme funded the entire cabinet and had a major impact on progress in Liberia over the past four years.

64 Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals projects have most famously been implemented by UNDP in Turkey, China, India and Cambodia among other countries.

65 UNDP, Open Society Institute, USAID, Mid-Term Independent Evaluation of the Liberia Emergency Capacity Building Support (Liberia Emergency Capacity-building Support) and Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals Projects, Monrovia, Republic of Liberia, July 2008, pp. 24-29.

Under the Senior Executive Service programme, 100 professionals⁶⁶ were placed in 28 government ministries and agencies and in all 15 of Liberia's counties. Less than 20 percent were drawn from the diaspora, though many have international work experience or education.⁶⁷

The surge in capacity provided by the three programmes enabled the government to focus on rapid development and longer-term structural reforms while filling an important gap in the shorter-term. Placement of Senior Executive Service personnel at the County level as County Development Officers has provided an important boost for local administration, placing qualified staff who perhaps would otherwise have been reluctant to serve in remote settings.

All three programmes provide terms of service that render it possible to recruit and retain highly qualified personnel. Although the terms are distinctly better than those provided for in normal government employment, they are not quite as high as that in other post-conflict countries (e.g. in Afghanistan and Iraq). It is understood that under the Liberia Emergency Capacity-building Support programme, a Minister's salary and supplements amount to approximately \$3,400 per month. Nevertheless, it is clear that the three programmes have created a dependence on external funding and good intentions expressed in the form of a clearly stipulated, graduated exit strategy (for instance under the Liberia Emergency Capacity-building Support programme) have proven difficult to

implement as provisions for the payment of higher salaries and supplements within the regular civil service payroll have not yet been possible. Although a few personnel have moved on, the majority of those recruited remain under the Liberia Emergency Capacity-building Support and Senior Executive Service programmes. The issue of sustainability applies in particular to these two programmes, as they are the ones that place personnel on a long-term basis, while Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals personnel are primarily intended to be consultants of limited duration.

While it is clear that capacity development is a long-term endeavour—no less in Liberia than it would be in any other country ravaged by war—the longer that such arrangements are in place without a viable exit strategy the greater the risk of dependence and/or the creation of a major shock to the system if such positions were to be terminated.

UNDP supported the preparation of a civil service census and data analysis associated with the exercise. It also funded the preparation of a code of conduct for public officials, the preparation of rules and procedures for the civil service and the '10-year National Capacity Development Strategy for Liberia'. The primary UNDP partner in this exercise was the Civil Service Agency of Liberia.

UNDP supported the Civil Service Agency of Liberia to implement the civil service reform strategy 'Smaller Government, Better Service'

66 Government of Liberia, Civil Service Agency, Senior Executive Service Success Stories: Faces Behind Civil Service Reform In Liberia, Civil Service Agency/UNDP, Monrovia, 2010.

67 Experts were placed in the following ministries and agencies: Office of the Vice-President; Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs; Ministry of Finance (Bureau of Budget); Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of Health and Social Welfare; Ministry of State for Finance, Economic and Legal Affairs; Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism; Ministry of Youth and Sports; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Land Mines and Energy; Ministry of Gender and Development; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Public Works; Ministry of Commerce and Industry; Ministry of Labour; Ministry of Internal Affairs; Ministry of Land and Mines; Ministry of State for Finance Economic and Legal Affairs; Ministry of Lands Mines and Energy; Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications; Civil Service Agency; National Investment Commission; Governance Commission; Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services; Centre for National Documents and Records Agency; Environmental Protection Agency; General Accounting Commission; Forestry Development Authority; James A.A. Pierre Judicial Institute; Monrovia City Corporation; Montserrado County; Margibi County; Sinoe County; Grand Bassa County; River Gee County; Grand Cape Mount County; Lofa County; Nimba County; Gbarpolu County; River Cess County; Maryland County; Bomi County Bong County; Grand Kru County; Grand Kru County and Grand Gedeh County.

(2008–2011). The strategy includes six parts, one of which is service delivery. The three-year implementation of the strategy is aligned to the poverty reduction strategy. The Smaller Government, Better Service strategy established costs for the civil service, established baselines and allowed the Civil Service Agency to identify ‘ghost’ employees on the civil service payroll. For example, in 2006, Liberia had a civil service with 42,000 persons on the payroll. There were no baselines, nepotism was rife and Liberia was severely impacted by the exodus of qualified personnel. Furthermore there was no merit-based system of promotion in the civil service. As a result of the efforts of the Civil Service Agency to strategize, as of 2011, there were only 37,000 persons on the payroll, also representing the removal of ‘ghost’ workers. The ‘right-sizing’ exercise was important to determine the architecture of society, organizational diagrams, costs and human resources. To date, however, only six ministries have been covered (including Ministry of Labour and the Civil Service Agency).

RECOMMENDATIONS

- **Governance Commission:** UNDP should continue to work with the Governance Commission as its principal counterpart and partner and the President’s Office to introduce overall structural governance reforms.
- **National Liberian Legislature:** UNDP should continue to support the Liberian National Legislature to develop its mechanisms for public participation, hearings, feedback and comment. UNDP should also support a mapping exercise for the rule-making and adjudication functions of agencies in order to identify how legislation is implemented and further elaborated upon by the state administration.
- **Civil society:** UNDP should develop a more substantial programme of support in order to strengthen civil society. This is likely to prove a significant challenge, given the current state of civil society in rural areas, and will need to be implemented over an extended period of

time. Such assistance could be implemented under the overall guidance of the Governance Commission, but should involve umbrella organizations from civil society and encompass advocacy and watchdog organizations, professional associations, labour unions and, to the extent appropriate, business owners. Such a programme could be implemented as a joint programme between UNDP and the International Labour Organization, which has a special mandate in this area resulting from its own tripartite governance structure.

- **Decentralization and subnational governance:** Depending on political prospects, a strategy should be developed by the Governance Commission for negotiating the decentralization bill through the House and Senate by breaking it into parts. Subject to legal opinion, it is possible that the Executive branch, without the Legislature’s endorsement, can already implement elements of the decentralization policy (although without fiscal means and authority, it is unlikely that implementation is likely to be meaningful).

UNDP should support the development of a negotiation strategy and should engage the International Monetary Fund, The World Bank and the Ministry of Finance into the process in order to ensure that fiscal decentralization is an integral part of the reforms. Such a process will require the President’s office or similar supra-ministerial institution to lead the process, staffed by the Governance Commission to ensure cross-ministerial and cross-governmental participation.

- **Human rights:** While there are inherent risks of addressing human rights issues in fragile political environments, UNDP should proactively support the National Human Rights Commission follow-up on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission recommendations that touch upon socio-economic, cultural and political rights—whether directly or indirectly—by holding conferences, creating knowledge products and empowering local civil society to address

these issues with the government. UNDP should continue to support the National Human Rights Commission to fulfil its mandate—particularly strengthening its Complaints, Investigation and Monitoring Department. This is particularly important in light of reports by the Secretary-General, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch of continuing human rights violations in Liberia.

- **Liberian Anti-corruption Commission:** Without a strong investigative and prosecution capacity, the Liberian Anti-corruption Commission will remain largely ineffective. UNDP should further capacitate the Liberian Anti-corruption Commission with recruitment of additional investigators and strengthen the Commission’s legal and prosecution units. Additionally, though the Commission’s plan of action includes conducting a citizens’ survey to document perceptions of corruption, it lacks the funds to implement the survey.⁶⁸

UNDP should further integrate its support to anti-corruption efforts with the National Anti-corruption Strategy. As indicated by the 2006 National Anti-corruption Strategy, anti-corruption measures must target a broad spectrum of actors and take a multi-pronged approach. “The ultimate success of the strategy depends to a large extent on all stakeholders meeting their roles and upholding their obligations as set out in the strategy.”⁶⁹ Whether the Liberian Anti-corruption Commission can carry out its full mandate will depend on political will and government decisions regarding its funding. UNDP should continue to support the Commission to advocate for the implementation of a Civil Service Code of Conduct and an Assets Declaration Regime for Liberian civil servants.

- **Land reform:** UNDP should continue to support the legislation reforms such as the Hinterland laws and Aboriginal Law that perpetuate different land tenure systems in Liberia—all Liberian citizens should have the right to participate in the statutory land tenure system.

UNDP should continue to support initiatives that place land disputes firmly on the local development agenda. UNDP should also support community-based justice initiatives to resolve land disputes and customary land issues.

UNDP should capacitate local non-governmental organizations in Liberia to monitor the land acquisition practices of corporations and foreign investors in Liberia, as these transactions interface with and impact upon local communities, the environment, biodiversity and climate change.

- **Legal reforms:** UNDP should continue to support the reform of legislation such as the Hinterland laws and Aboriginal Law that perpetuate different land tenure systems in Liberia—all Liberian citizens should have the right to participate in the statutory land tenure system. Legislative reform initiatives should take into account the views of traditional and local authorities. UNDP should support and facilitate their involvement by establishing forums for dialogue.
- **Civil service capacity:** Though the Liberia Emergency Capacity-building Support, Senior Executive Service and Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals programmes demonstrate clear added value, any new phase should be accompanied by a programme to gradually replace external funding with funding from the national budget. Consideration may also be given to supplementing salaries with non-cash incentives such as housing, cars or other perks that may have smaller impacts on the national budget.

68 The United Methodist University recently conducted a study (funded by Transparency International) of corruption in Liberia. The results of the study are due to be released in the near future. If the methodology is sound and the results complete, it may not be necessary to implement a second such study.

69 Republic of Liberia National Anti-corruption Strategy, p. 14 (December 2006).

Adjustments to the salary scale should be integrated into the civil service reform programme and should be accompanied by appropriate provisions for work planning and performance appraisals. Changes to salary increments (within-grade and promotions) should be linked to performance.

4.2 CRISIS PREVENTION AND RECOVERY: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND RULE OF LAW

SUPPORT TO DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, REINTEGRATION AND REPATRIATION

The 2003 signing of the 'Comprehensive Peace Agreement' and UN Security Council resolution 1509 provided UNMIL with the basis to prepare the DDRR processes in Liberia. UNDP was involved from the beginning these processes. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement called for UNMIL to be charged with tasks such as monitoring the ceasefire agreement, collecting weapons and small arms, coordinating humanitarian assistance and creating conditions for a DDRR/SSR process that included cantonment of ex-combatants, disarmament, reintegration and a restructuring of the Armed Forces, National Police and Special Security Services.⁷⁰

UNDP support to DDRR is in line with:

- **Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy, Pillar I:** Enhancing national security;
- **United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2003–2005, Theme 1:** Conflict resolution, peacebuilding and relief. The overall goal is to seek resolution of the present armed conflict and to initiate a peace process

that addresses the root causes of conflict and resulting humanitarian situation; and

- **Country programme document 2003–2007:** Regulation of security forces, through the strengthening of protection and human rights enforcement mechanisms and through the reintegration of ex-combatants.

In the immediate post-conflict period, UNDP participated in a task force of international organizations including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The World Bank, UMMIL, UNIFEM, UNICEF, USAID, World Food Programme and the World Health Organization. The task force led to the 2003 completion of an action plan for DDRR. The UN country team, including UNDP, assisted the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation with nationwide educational programmes for ex-combatants (in cantonment centres) and the distribution of information about DDRR.

The primary role of UNMIL in DDRR was to disarm and demobilize ex-combatants. The primary UNDP role was to support rehabilitation and reintegration, focusing on ex-combatants in designated counties. This was funded under a UNDP Trust Fund for Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation established in 2004 with initial pledges of \$11.3 million. The Fund was under the direct execution modality and served as a mechanism for donors to contribute to the process with guarantees of transparency and accountability. It ultimately funded over 200 projects.⁷¹

70 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement called for all irregular forces to be disbanded and for restructuring the Armed Forces of Liberia with the possibility of drawing from the ranks of the existing government, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy and Movement for Democracy in Liberia forces. It further called for an immediate restructuring of the National Police Force, the Immigration Force, the Special Security Service, custom security guards and all other statutory security units with objective of professionalizing them and inculcating in them a respect for human rights and democratic values. The Special Security Units (Anti-Terrorist Unit, the Special Operations Division of the Liberia National Police Force and paramilitary groups that operated within organizations the National Ports Authority), the Liberian Telecommunications Corporations, the Liberian Refining Corporation and the airports were all to be disarmed and restructured.

71 United Nations Mission in Liberia DDRR Programme Evaluation (2007).

The key objective of the 2004 UNDP DDR programme was “the consolidation of peace through the comprehensive disarmament and demobilization and sustainable reintegration of all ex-combatants into civilian society.” Ex-combatants of the Armed Forces of Liberia, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, Movement for Democracy, and other paramilitary groups and militia engaged in civil conflict in Liberia—some based in neighbouring countries—were entitled to DDR support based on UNDP-established eligibility criteria for participation. These criteria were loose and easily fulfilled (e.g. adult ex-combatants of the designated armed groups or under-age combatants who reported with one of the designated armed groups with proof of participation in the armed conflict).

DDR in Liberia was incentive-based, as “those who turned in more weapons would be given priority access to reintegration under the programme.” This resulted in numerous weapons being turned in, but also overwhelmed the UN benefits system; anyone who brought in a weapon was included in the programme. There was initial confusion among ex-combatants about the benefits that they would receive; commanders did not adhere to agreements and brought more combatants than anticipated to cantonment centres. Exceeding capacity led to riots at Camp Schieffelin in December 2002 and the suspension of DDR processes for four months.

The formal disarmament and demobilization component led by UNMIL officially came to a close in October of 2004. From December 2003 to December 2004, a total of 101,449 combatants disarmed and demobilized, including 22,313 women, 8,547 boys and 2,477 girls. UNMIL had also collected and destroyed over 23,000 weapons, approximately 33,000 pieces of heavy

munitions and unexploded ordinance, and over 7 million rounds of small arms ammunition.⁷² This effectively left a caseload of more than 107,000 ex-combatants to be processed through repatriation and reintegration projects funded by the UNDP Trust Fund and other projects funded by USAID and the European Union.

Between 2004 and 2007, the UNDP Reintegration and Repatriation Programme provided employment opportunities to eligible ex-combatants, including jobs in public works and infrastructure development, vocational training (e.g. mechanics, carpentry), agricultural projects, formal education and apprenticeship schemes. There are no records of how many of those who received vocational training were subsequently employed. Candidates picked their location based on communities’ needs (most communities were able to accept returnees, facilitating the process).⁷³ A residual caseload of former combatants was still undergoing reintegration and recovery as late as 2009.

UNDP, UNMIL and The World Bank supported an Emergency Employment Initiative, a joint initiative to rehabilitate critical roads, as an element of the national reintegration effort. By April 2007, it had generated over 15,000 short-term jobs in Liberia, including many for ex-combatants.⁷⁴

Overall, there is strong agreement that UNDP support to DDR was relevant and closely tracked the government’s priorities and the Security Council mandates from 2004 to 2007. The current Special Representative of the Secretary-General views UNDP support as satisfactory, contributing to the disarming of over 107,000 individuals and providing skills to an estimated 97,000 persons. The UNDP ability to capitalize

72 UN Secretary-General, *Fifth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*, UN Doc. S/204/972 (December 17, 2004).

73 UN Secretary-General, *Sixth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*, UN Doc. S/205/177 (March 17, 2005).

74 United Nations Mission in Liberia DDR Programme Evaluation (2007)(copy on file with UNDP Liberia).

on its comparative strength in funds management under difficult conditions to act quickly was viewed as exceptional.⁷⁵

Throughout the process, UNDP worked with a coalition of non-governmental organizations and UNICEF to ensure that the DDRR programme covered women and children. An estimated total of 11,780 children were demobilized, and over 9,000 children were reintegrated and settled in their communities under a UNDP-UNICEF memorandum of understanding that mandated UNICEF to coordinate reintegration programmes for children.⁷⁶

However, though women made up approximately 10 percent of ex-combatants that benefited from DDRR, there were no programmes specifically tailored to women's needs during the process (e.g. coping with post-traumatic stress of sexual and gender-based violence). Thus, women participated in the same programmes as the men. International non-governmental organization reports and the UNDP Midterm Evaluation were highly critical of the lack of political support for addressing women's needs within DDRR programmes.⁷⁷

The UNDP DDRR Programme in Liberia was not without its problems. Budgetary shortfalls delayed some projects and produced what has been described as a gap between disarmament and demobilization activities and reintegration and recovery activities.⁷⁸ The United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations rule of law contends that UNDP could have begun preparations and fund-raising for the reintegration and recovery component much earlier in the process. This would have averted some of the

violence that occurred as a result of UNDP and donor delays in fulfilling funding commitments.

No provisions have been made for funding upon UNMIL exit. Reintegration and recovery must be on-board at the very outset. Yet, the entire architecture of the international community, and indeed of the UN, mitigates against a proactive stance because it is based on a phased approach. Furthermore, it should be noted that while the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operation's funding is through assessed contributions, the reintegration and recovery component is entirely dependent on voluntary contributions—projects are subject to formulation and approval procedures more akin to development projects.

Some ex-combatants awaiting reintegration protested about delays in delivery of reintegration support, while those already in reintegration programmes complained of the late payment of benefits, delays in graduation ceremonies and the late distribution of toolkits resulting in agricultural seasons being missed. Some ex-combatants with links to former armed factions precipitated violence as a result of confusion over payment of school fees and other benefits that they believed were due to them by the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization Rehabilitation and Reintegration. Such disturbances occurred on many rubber plantations across the country.⁷⁹

According to UNDP and stakeholders interviewed, despite clear eligibility criteria for participation in DDRR, many ex-combatants dropped out after disarmament and demobilization and the receipt of cash benefits. They then sold their DDRR benefits ID cards to ineligible civilians

75 UNDP External Mid-Term Evaluation of the DDRR Programme (2006) (copy on file with UNDP Liberia).

76 Impact Evaluation of the Reintegration Programme for Children Associated with Fighting Forces (CAFF) in Liberia (April 2007).

77 UNDP Liberia Country programme document 2004-2007 Terminal Evaluation (2008) (copy on file with UNDP Liberia).

78 See, "The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia," Ebo, Adedeji, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Occasional Paper No. 9, Geneva, December 2005.

79 UN Secretary-General, *Progress Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia* (various 2004-2011).

who would then receive reintegration and recovery training. According to stakeholders interviewed, the problems experienced with DDRR in Liberia could have been prevented with more sophisticated ID cards. Moreover, many security incidents and kidnappings of UN staff—including hostage taking—were perceived to be the result of a lack of a strong identification system.

Community officials in Senjeh District, Bome County, stated that DDRR suffered from insufficient funding and many guns were retained—particularly in Lofa. Senjeh District, visited by the evaluation team, has over 4000 ex-combatants, including youth. Some of them went through DDRR (both male and female) and were trained in agriculture, masonry, carpentry, mechanics, electricity and agriculture. Yet employment opportunities have been few, and youth are frustrated.

The criteria for UNDP-supported vocational training were not strict; of the targeted 100,000 persons, less than half benefited from vocational training. Some political parties were excluded. The motorcycle taxis in Monrovia in particular are viewed as a success by UNDP. Yet, some of the training (e.g. computer skills) did not readily match demand, and the economic crisis is said to have negatively affected employment opportunities.

According to the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP reintegration and recovery programmes did not boost business skills or provide advice on how to compete in the marketplace. The emergency road building lacked a vocational training element for ex-combatants. There was also no psychosocial component to reintegration and recovery, as this was cut back in 2005. Furthermore, most community-based reintegration and recovery programmes were small scale and only reached a small percentage of the target population. In the absence of systematic monitoring of implementation, some community-based projects were reported to be

substandard and UNDP contractors abandoned others without informing the county commissioners. Ownership was reduced to some extent because UNDP directed communities to identify projects, but UNDP then conducted procurement in its direct execution modality unit with no connection or inclusion of local authorities—procurement rules and regulations did not allow for their inclusion.

Some quick-impact training was also problematic. In Kleh Community, Bome County, UNDP and UNMIL tried to address problems on a plantation. In 2004 to 2005, over 1,000 workers were taken from the plantation to train in Tumutu for new skills, but the company offered no jobs after the training was received. It was felt that the company should have driven the training, not UNDP and UNMIL.

Unlike other UNDP programmes in post-conflict settings (e.g. Cambodia), vocational training was not combined with microcredit or business advisory services; trainees were left to seek employment in a labour market that had no demand for their skills.

According to a midterm evaluation of the DDRR programme, “despite the title of the programme, rehabilitation was never developed for adults as a component. It was not defined...and simply got lost in the operation, without any specific programmatic reality. Eventually, some reintegration projects did include a rehabilitation component, but this was not standardized.”⁸⁰ The midterm evaluation also criticized the DDRR programme’s exclusive focus on economic reintegration (“the assumption that economic reintegration leads to social reintegration does not hold true. The lack of attention to the social dimension, in particular as regards both to reconciliation and psychosocial support was a major gap”⁸¹).

80 UNDP External Mid-Term Evaluation of the DDRR Programme (2006)(copy on file with UNDP Liberia).

81 UNDP External Mid-Term Evaluation of the DDRR Programme (2006)(copy on file with UNDP Liberia).

The effects of these shortcomings are still being felt; the Superintendent of Bong County said there are major issues with the local university as a result of concerns as to which students qualified for DDRR-related educational benefits. The last cohort of graduates owed tuition to the university, and the government of Liberia has made only partial payment. One hundred students were due to graduate in June 2011 for whom the DDRR-related payments had yet to be settled. Withholding students' degrees due to lack of payment could lead to local instability.

DDRR was completed, but many ex-combatants—particularly youth—are susceptible to recruitment by criminal gangs. As of 2011, there were virtually no reports of the types of ethnic violence one would normally see if DDRR had not worked as anticipated. However, there continues to be a large market for home-made weapons in the country, despite the local population's almost universal exhaustion from war. Sustainability of UNDP contributions to DDRR continues to hinge upon finding long-term solutions and jobs for ex-combatants—the under-30 population in particular. As of 2011, “security risks continued to be posed by high unemployment, severely limiting livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants and high-risk youth, many of whom resort to illegal activities.”⁸² The current global economic crisis further exacerbates underemployment, conflict and youth violence in Liberia.

Evaluation findings point that UNDP should explore broad-based economic and legal empowerment initiatives for youth, women and disabled persons that go beyond the specific reintegration and recovery context and link to poverty reduction. In particular, UNDP should explore ways to introduce essential services for promoting small enterprises. UNDP could also explore themes of corporate responsibility and mechanisms to include private corporations—particularly large

multinational corporations that have received concessions—in education and training initiatives in Liberia.

SUPPORT TO LIBERIA NATIONAL POLICE

A component of DDRR and security sector reform involved demobilizing the police and recruiting and training new candidates for the Liberia National Police. UN Security Council resolution 1509 placed the reform of the Liberia National Police (LNP) under UNMIL leadership. The UNMIL civil police arm, the United Nations police, has provided the overwhelming bulk of support to the LNP under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. UNDP, in close collaboration with the United Nations police and LNP, has been instrumental in managing several programmes, including training programmes at the National Police Training Academy and rehabilitating infrastructure through projects to renovate and construct police facilities. UNDP has also provided support to the Governance Commission to develop a draft national security policy, which has been finalized for approval by the President.⁸³

There has been a historical lack of trust of the police on the part of the public resulting from egregious abuses during the conflict and its immediate aftermath. The LNP is often delayed in its response to complaints and most people call the police directly using their mobile phones. The LNP is under-resourced and lacks mobility. According to a recent report by the non-governmental organization Common Ground, the strength of the police is low; they lack visibility and have limited capacity to respond. The number of police per capita of population is low. For example, in Bong County, there are a total of 87 police officers, a 1:1,500 ratio to population—and the force has only one vehicle available. There is only one female police officer at the police station, but some “live out in the county.”

82 UN Secretary-General, *Twenty-second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*, UN Doc. S/2011/7** (February 14, 2011).

83 UNDP Project Document for “Enhancing the Relationship Between the Police and Civilians in Communities”.

Many police stations lack a specialized sexual and gender-based violence unit, and alleged perpetrators of rape are often let free by the courts.

The Ministry of Justice has authority over the LNP. The LNP Strategic Plan was published in January 2009, but the LNP still has a relatively weak command structure and internal supervision. The police engage with civil society on an ad hoc basis and through Community Policing Forums established throughout Liberia and LNP Community Policing Coordination Units formed in all 15 counties. Yet, a limited understanding of the role of community policing—both on the part of the Community Policing Forum leaders and the police themselves—has limited the reach of community policing.

“Pending the government’s decision and legal implementation of a reformed National Security Architecture framework, emphasis for development rests with strengthening capacities and national primacy of LNP, the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, and Corrections.”⁸⁴ In an attempt to add structure and accountability to the security sector, the Governance Commission in January 2008 produced and published a National Security Strategy after a year of discussions with civil society, security organizations, both houses of the legislature and international partners. The Strategy identifies and prioritizes security threats and dilemmas. Government security agencies officially launched a new County Security Mechanism in December 2009 in order to enhance security policy and coordination at the county level. As of 2010, implementation of the National Security Strategy faced a number of gaps, principally the failure of the government to present to the Legislature the key piece of legislation governing the new security architecture, the Liberia Security Reform and Intelligence Bill.⁸⁵

UNDP support to the LNP is in line with:

- **United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2003–2005, Themes 1 and 2:** Conflict resolution, peacebuilding and relief. Overall goal: to seek resolution of the present armed conflict and to initiate a peace process that addresses the root causes of conflict and resulting humanitarian situation; to create an enabling environment for sustainable human development;
- **Country programme document 2003–2007, Outcome 2(c):** Regulation of security forces through the strengthening and protection of human rights enforcement mechanisms;
- **Poverty reduction strategy, Pillar III—Governance and rule of law, United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2008–2012, Outcome 1:** National and Local authorities increasingly have the capacity to provide security, manage conflict and prevent violence, respecting human rights throughout;
- **Poverty reduction strategy, Pillar III—Governance and rule of law, Outcome 3.2.2:** Increased institutional and operational capacity of Republic of Liberia institutions to deliver effective, independent, equitable, accessible and impartial justice to all, in accordance with international and national laws; and
- **Country programme document 2008–2012, Component II:** a) human rights, rule of law, and national visioning and b) security and peace consolidation.

From 2008 to 2009, UNDP implemented capacity building for the LNP project with German funding of \$1.4 million. The project sought to strengthen capacities through training and restructuring. The project had the stated objective of “strengthening the Ministry of Justice through the

84 Liberia Bureau of Corrections Report: “Justice and Security in Liberia: LNP, Bureau for Corrections and Rehabilitation, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization” (2010).

85 UN Secretary-General, *Twentieth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*, UN Doc. S/210/88 (February 17, 2010).

development of the Liberia National Police as a viable, democratically principled law enforcement agency.”⁸⁶ The project was intended to enhance LNP operational capacity throughout Liberia and build Ministry of Justice capacities with a view towards increasing public confidence in the LNP, increasing the LNP presence at county level, raising levels of integrity and accountability through education, strengthening institutional oversight and internal investigation, and developing and implementing a set of national police standards and practices.⁸⁷ The project sought to reinforce commitments to re-establishing national primacy within the security sector (including the LNP and the Ministry of Justice in particular) in areas of advanced and specialized training, facilities and equipment programmes in border areas, and reinforcing strategic security sector initiatives within the Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee Security Pillar of the Government.⁸⁸

The intended project outcomes were:

- National security authorities have assumed responsibilities from UNMIL with functional civilian oversight mechanisms;
- Security personnel are aware of and are held accountable for human rights standards; operational accountability mechanisms are in place;
- Population is aware of agencies’ functions and responsibilities within the security sector and avenues for accountability to seek redress;
- National security policy and architecture is in place and functioning in conformity with Liberia’s human rights obligations, with particular attention to violence against women; and
- Capacity development of LNP personnel and the Ministry of Justice.

86 UNDP Project Document for “Capacity Building for the Liberia National Police (LNP).”

87 UNDP Project Document for “Capacity Building for the Liberia National Police (LNP).”

88 UNDP Project Document for “Capacity Building for the Liberia National Police (LNP).”

The following core initiatives were implemented:

- Provide specialized and advanced training to LNP in order to professionalize and operationalize key directorates;
- Introduce county-level policing in line with the democratically-principled policing;
- Provide transportation equipment and vehicles;
- Build capacities through construction and equipping additional police facilities in rural and border areas; and
- Build the capacities of the Ministry of Justice.

Training

UNDP and UNMIL collaborated to provide training to the LNP on human rights and women’s issues, reaching over 3,000 police officers. UNDP also encouraged the LNP to implement gender-sensitive recruitment procedures. Restructuring the police has been undertaken with UNDP support and a vetting process was incorporated into the restructuring. Following UN training, however, other donors did not meet their infrastructure and capacity-building commitments (e.g. provision of generators, construction of barracks), which reduced the impact of UNDP efforts.

In 2008, UNDP, the United Nations police and the LNP organized a workshop in Accra, Ghana, leading to the formulation and publication of the 2009 LNP strategic plan.

UNDP supported the Liberia National Police Training Academy in offering a basic training course to officers and recruits. In 2009, 142 officers completed basic training (94 females; 47 Males), 153 recruits began the course (51 females; 102 males) and 606 officers completed advanced and specialized training (515 males; 91 females). Within the LNP Emergency Response Unit, four classes (393 trainees) received training with UNDP support (3 females; 390 males). The

number of women receiving training highlights UNDP efforts to promote gender equity within the LNP.

UNDP and UNMIL supported LNP efforts to increase the percentage of women police officers. The original goal was to raise the number of women police to 20 percent of the total force. Women police officers now comprise 15 percent, with recruitment following an upward trend. The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General noted that these efforts were bolstered by the UNMIL Indian all-female police unit. As of 2011, every county police station in Liberia has a women's police unit.

Some stakeholders interviewed (e.g. the Public Defender) expressed concern with the quality of training that LNP was receiving from UNMIL and stated that UNMIL must ensure that the units training the LNP are themselves qualified and capable. There is continuing concern over literacy rates within the LNP and a perception that continuing oversight mechanisms need to be developed to supervise recruitment and ensure that the LNP adheres to the requirement that all recruits are high school graduates. There are also reports of substance abuse among police and failure to wear their uniforms while on-duty. It is currently very difficult or impossible to monitor the police in Liberia.

Infrastructure

UNDP contributed to the UNMIL Mandate through the procurement of vehicles and essential equipment for the LNP and development of the LNP Strategic Plan. In 2006, with the support of Japan, UNDP procured 22 motorcycles and nine vehicles to enable LNP deployment to the interior. UNDP also provided a vehicle to the Police Standards Division, two buses to the Bureau of Corrections, three patrol vehicles to the Police Support Units, two trucks to the Emergency Response Unit and four pick-up trucks to Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ UNDP Liberia 2009 Annual Report.

Through its Community Security and Cohesion Programme, UNDP (with donor funding from Belgium, Germany and Norway), supported the construction of 10 police barracks and 10 police stations in the counties, seven classrooms and a boys dormitory at the National Police Training Academy in 2008. UNDP supported site selection for the construction of new police stations; the establishment of women and child protection units at police stations; provided technical support to the LNP to draft its strategic plan and plans for five regional hubs that will house emergency response units and police support units in strategic locations throughout Liberia.

UNDP support has improved LNP performance in the counties and has increased its mobility. For example, in Bong County, the LNP stated that UNDP had improved their work through the renovation of their police station, office furnishings and supplies and electrical wiring. They confirmed that the Women and Children Protection Section of the police station was operating well.

Police still require crime scene and forensic training. The LNP interviewed stated that in their opinion the relationship with their community was good. Community members interviewed by the evaluation team confirmed this. LNP has a community policing section that sends officers into the communities and conducts training on, for example, the prevention of mob violence and how citizens should utilize police. The evaluation team observed LNP on patrol on rural roads using UNDP-supplied motorcycles.

Establishment of the LNP Regional Hubs

UNDP acted as the executing agency for a comprehensive programming package to build LNP capacities within the context of the 2008-2013 LNP Strategic Plan. The Peacebuilding Commission and other donor funds funded these efforts. Further, UNDP is supporting the construction of five regional Justice and Security Hubs to house

Box 2. The Justice and Security Trust Fund

The Government of Liberia and its development partners recognized the need to establish a mechanism to facilitate a comprehensive, flexible and coordinated approach to implementing justice and security sector reform in Liberia, specifically addressing issues of policing, corrections and immigration. UNDP set up and launched the Justice and Security Trust fund in September 2009. The main objective of the Trust Fund is to support the strategic reconstruction and development of the Liberia National Police, Bureau for Corrections and Rehabilitation and Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization within the framework of the poverty reduction strategy.

According to the Strategic Plan for the Trust Fund, “The establishment of the Trust Fund seeks to strengthen the operational and technical capacity of the LNP, Bureau for Corrections and Rehabilitation and Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization within the context of overall security sector reform. Specifically, support will be provided in terms of strategic development, capacity strengthening, operational support, logistics and infrastructure. The LNP, Bureau for Corrections and Rehabilitation and Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization must achieve a level of effective and sustained operations to ensure the maintenance of law and order throughout Liberia. The Trust Fund will strengthen their capacities to professionally deliver operational service reflective of modern, democratically principled police, corrections, and immigration institutions that respect all citizen’s human rights, with particular emphasis on women and children.”

The Justice and Security Trust Fund is the only trust fund locally managed by UNDP. The Trust Fund is the main mechanism for funding rule of law and security sector reform in Liberia and UNDP and UNMIL work closely in cooperation to implement programmes under this trust fund. To date, however, the Justice and Security Trust Fund have been operationally challenged because it is not yet fully funded. Originally, UNMIL had viewed the trust fund as a way to coordinate donor support and UNDP performed initial costing estimates. As of 2011, however, donor interest remained low.

Sources: Interviews with the SRS (May 2011) and with Department of Peacekeeping Operations Africa II Division (April 2011).

LNP Emergency Response Units, Police Support Units and the Liberian Immigration Service. The Police Support Units will be in five regions and have 120 riot officers in each hub.⁹⁰

The principle of the regional hub is to increase the speed of deployment and overall efficiency and effectiveness through economies of scale. UNDP is supporting the construction of a regional hub in Bong to house the Police Support Units and the base of its operations. The LNP in Bong is responsible for monitoring the construction, but although the site has been surveyed and selected, construction of the hub has been not yet begun. Interviews with stakeholders in Bong stated that the LNP had undertaken its own assessment of citizens’ relations with police. Manpower is lacking within the Bong LNP (some police officers left to join the Police Support Unit). In addition, police lack mobility and need mobile phones to better perform in their jobs.

Community Policing

In 2009–2010, UNDP implemented an Enhancing the Relationship between the Police and Civilians in Communities project with Peacebuilding Fund resources of \$750,000 in partnership with the Ministry of Justice under direct execution modality. The intervention was directed at communities and community leaders, LNP officers and supervisors. It is anticipated that seminars and training will increase capacities for joint identification and addressing crime in the community. The provision of infrastructure and logistical support will enable community forums to be effective and facilitate the deployment of uniformed police in rural and high-crime areas.

The project’s intended results included an increased number of emergency and non-emergency calls between citizens and the police; reduced intra-community tensions

90 UNDP Annual Reports 2007–2009; See, UN Secretary-General, *Progress Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia (various 2004–2011)*.

Box 3. The Working Relationship between the Police and Community Leaders in Bong County

Liberia National Police officers interviewed in Bong County explained how community leaders interact with the police. The community leader is the direct representative and liaison for the government at the community level. Thus, the community leader is the first point of contact for the report of a crime. If the community cannot settle the crime (whether due to the nature of the crime or the level of criminality), then the community leader refers the case to the police for settlement or prosecution. It would appear that there is a *de facto* requirement in place in Liberia that citizens are obligated to try to get their community leader to settle a dispute before they refer the case to the police. The police are severely under-resourced and it is simply more economical for citizens to approach their community leaders *ab initio*. The LNP also educates communities on the types of cases that should be brought directly to the police and the proper procedures for doing so. Heinous crimes go directly to the police without the involvement of the community leaders. Such training has been conducted by the National Police in conjunction with United Nations police. Cases of sexual and gender-based violence also go directly to the LNP and the Women's and Children's Unit. LNP in Bong confirmed that UNDP had not provided any support to community policing.

and disputes through increased dialogue and community-based problem solving; enhanced ability for police and community to utilize non-violent means of conflict management; and a reduction in the number of security 'hot spots' noted for violent crime among citizens. The intended outcomes of the project included improved community security and public trust in the LNP and the criminal justice system; enhanced citizen/civil society and police cooperation; equal access to the police for all citizens and greater access to police in communities; effective and principled solutions to community crime problems through the development of joint community/police strategies; reduction of community insecurity; a 10 percent reduction in incidents of mob/citizen violence and neighbourhood vigilantism; increased citizen trust and cooperation through daily positive contacts with LNP patrol officers; increased quality of life in communities through effective crime prevention strategies; increased effectiveness of police officers in responding to crimes in progress; and increased investigative effectiveness.⁹¹

These outcomes were to be achieved through outputs that included five Community Policing/

Relation seminars delivered at LNP regional centres and in Monrovia. The seminars provide direct benefit to Community Police Forum Chairpersons, LNP commanders, supervisors and community police specialists, community stakeholders and representatives from local government, civil society and representatives of key line ministries.

In 2010, UNDP provided support by developing a community-policing manual. The concept of community policing was new to Liberia, and although no major programming had yet to be undertaken, the community-policing manual is perceived to be a positive step. UNDP also supported a community watch forum to serve as a vehicle for community members to liaise with police.

UNDP is also serving as the executing agency of the Liberia National Police Development Programme aimed at promoting community safety by institutionalizing community-oriented policing at local levels. In addition, the programme proposes to institutionalize community police forums and promote increased networking with communities and local government.⁹²

91 UNDP Liberia "Enhancing the Relationship Between the Police and Civilians in Communities" Project Document (2009).

92 UN Secretary-General, *Progress Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia (various 2004-2011)*; Peacebuilding Fund Project Document for "Enhancing the Relationship Between the Police and Civilians in Communities" (2009).

CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS OF THE POLICE

UNDP and UNMIL have begun to bridge the gap between citizens and the LNP. Members of Kleh Town in Bome County stated that they believed that the LNP was doing well and had improved its performance greatly over the past several years. The LNP was perceived as handling disputes as quickly as possible, given their often severe mobility constraints, and are seen to act professionally. Kleh community members stated that they would like a police station located in their community (currently, residents of Kleh must travel to a neighbouring police checkpoint). While County Authority is approached for land disputes, criminal matters are referred to the police who do a preliminary investigation/interviews with parties and then refer the matter back to the Chief in some instances (e.g. for misdemeanours or low-level juvenile delinquency issues) to attempt to settle the issue. If the Chief cannot settle the issue, then the County Attorney takes up the matter. According to the people interviewed in Kleh, the lack of a medical clinic that could handle cases of violence was a more significant problem than the lack of a women's unit.

Local officials and citizens in Bong stated that they viewed the new security hubs as a good measure. County officials intend for the hubs to house not only the police, but also immigration and drug enforcement authorities. Officials expressed a need, however, for more information to be distributed to the community about the role of the hubs.

Citizens interviewed in Bong County by the evaluation team stated that they sometimes have to reimburse the police for the cost of fuel to come by motorbike to their communities. They stated that the performance of the police varied, but in areas without magistrate courts, the police can circumvent the judicial process. They recommended that the number of police be increased and that they be provided with more vehicles to service local communities

Local authorities are taking it upon themselves to perform a demarcation of the jurisdiction

between customary law and the formal justice system. Authorities have held meetings (e.g. in Bong County) to inform communities about the limits of the jurisdiction of each.

Some stakeholders expressed criticism that UNDP and UNMIL support to security sector reform tended to focus on the number of troops and national police and on building new facilities rather than on changing the mindset of the Liberian security sector or implementing legislative reforms.

The United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations commented that UNDP had too strong a focus on maintaining order and the security of the government. Rather, UNDP should have taken a more strategic approach in assisting the government address gaps between settlers and natives, promoting a national dialogue on security sector reform and focusing upon what makes citizens secure and grants them access to justice. This will require a political will that has not existed and is largely beyond UNDP control.

Some stakeholders criticized the regional hub concept. In their opinion, the hubs appeared to be too militaristic (e.g. armed police stationed in barracks within walled compounds). They noted that because police in barracks are removed from their families, the arrangement is not conducive to changing mindsets. Some view the entire security sector reform approach as flawed and lacking a holistic approach. For example, the Ministry of Justice has authority over the LNP, but UNDP often overlooks it by approaching the LNP as an independent entity.

Other stakeholders were critical of the design of UNDP support to the LNP. One UNDP staff member stated:

Support to the police is very security sector reform-minded, and training and equipment is not linked sufficiently to the rule of law. In fact, it is completely separate from rule of law and has cost a lot in terms of donor resources. The hubs are expensive and the link to rule of law is not clear. What is needed within

UNDP/United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations and the Government of Liberia is a coherent rule of law programme that includes the entire rule of law, justice and security spectrum. There needs to be one programme. Currently, effectively there is no rule of law programme, just a series of isolated quick impact projects and procurements that have little, if any integration. The Peacebuilding Priority Programme does, however, include a rule of law programme.

Ironically, increasing LNP capacities has resulted in more arrests that have clogged the courts and the jails without a concomitant increase in capacity of these institutions. This illustrates the necessity of taking a strategic and holistic approach to rule law in Liberia.

ENHANCING COMMUNITY SECURITY AND COHESION: YOUTH AND PEACE

Marginalization of youth and women and mismanagement of national resources were widespread during the conflict and contributed to stark distribution inequalities. The condition of youth in Liberia—particularly with regard to employment—was identified as one of the key requirements for peace in the poverty reduction strategy paper. In 2008, the percentage of the population below the poverty line was highest for the 10 to 19 year age demographic at 67 percent.⁹³ A 2009 USAID ‘Youth Fragility Assessment’ found that the most frequent request from youths in Liberia was for vocational skills training.⁹⁴ Employment generation remains a key element of the Government’s poverty reduction strategy.

In December 2005, youth-focused civil society organizations in Liberia, the Ministry of Youth and Sports and other partners collaborated to develop the National Youth Policy. According to

the Ministry of Youth and Sports, “The overall goal of the national Youth Policy is to promote youth participation in the national decision-making process. It also aims to enable young people to provide input in community activities, national programs and democratically chosen youth-centred activities and initiatives.”⁹⁵

Key conclusions of the Africa Development Forum-V (made by the civil society organization themselves) were that Liberian youths were capable of intervening in conflict situations and participating in the peacebuilding process, and that therefore more opportunities should be made available for them to do so. Africa Development Forum-V deemed such participation—particularly by female youths—as crucial to youth social and political development in Liberia⁹⁶ and stated “youths should consider themselves as agents of positive change in their respective communities.”

UNDP supported youth participation as Peace Ambassadors under the Programme for Employment and Empowerment of Young Women and Men in Liberia that included a “Volunteers for Peace Project.” The project was managed by UNDP Liberia under the Peacebuilding Fund with a value of \$650,000 (of which UNDP contributed \$200,000 from its own core funds in 2009).⁹⁷ The programme is in line with:

- **Poverty reduction strategy, Pillar III:** Governance and rule of law;
- **United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2008–2012, Outcome 1:** National and Local authorities increasingly have the capacity to provide security, manage conflict and prevent violence, respecting human rights throughout; and

93 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Republic of Liberia (2008).

94 USAID, Liberia Youth Fragility Assessment, Prepared by Gary Walker, Jane C. Millar Wood, and Eric Allemano, April 2009.

95 *Africa Development Forum-V: Country Brief for Liberia*, Ministry of Youth & Sports Republic of Liberia (2006).

96 *Africa Development Forum-V: Country Brief for Liberia*, Ministry of Youth & Sports Republic of Liberia (2006).

97 UNDP Liberia 2009 Annual Report.

- **Country programme document 2008–2012, Component II:** a) human rights, rule of law, and national visioning; b) security and peace consolidation; c) youth and leadership development.

The programme provided support to 31 Youth Peace Ambassadors in all 15 counties. The programme aimed to diffuse potentially violent conflicts in communities and conduct training of trainers in conflict resolution and peacebuilding for community youth. In addition to programmatic funds, the UNDP project budget covered the Project Manager’s salary, staff training, equipment, furniture and staff travel.

The Peace Ambassador Programme commenced in 2009 and deployed a total of 31 Peace Ambassadors trained in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and land dispute facilitation.⁹⁸ Peace Ambassadors appear to be making an impact resolving low-level disputes within communities. According to UNDP Liberia, Peace Ambassadors have conducted radio talk shows, peacebuilding and gender-based violence awareness-raising events that attracted 6,000 participants nationwide, and a variety of campaigns such as sports competitions and community clean-up. These activities were planned, organized and implemented by Youth Ambassadors and district youth leaders and adapted to specific village community issues and needs. UNDP developed and supplied curriculum and course materials for Peace Ambassadors training of trainers workshops. The workshops focused on peacebuilding education and non-violent conflict resolution strategies and were attended by close to 700 community youth leaders.

Local representatives of the Ministry of Youth and Sports in Bong County stated that UNDP had been a very good partner. UNDP supported three major initiatives for youth in Bong: the Liberian National Youth Volunteers, Volunteers for Peace and a project with the Ministry of Agriculture. The Liberian National Youth Volunteers

have had three successive cohorts (the third group of graduated in 2010). Despite significant budget constraints, the Ministry is recruiting a fourth group. UNDP supported the Volunteers for Peace (Peace Ambassadors) programme, an initiative to place two volunteers per county to defuse conflict and mediate local disputes. UNDP has also worked with the Ministry of Agriculture to train youth on agriculture. Youth Volunteers and Volunteers for Peace engage with their communities to settle low-level disputes and mediate conflict. The Liberian Ministry of Youth and Sports has devised a plan to combine the National Youth Volunteers and the Volunteers for Peace into a single initiative

The UNDP Ambassadors for Peace initiative is highly relevant to promoting peace at the community level and meeting the poverty reduction strategy paper’s and Ministry of Youth and Sport’s objectives of instilling in youth a sense of participation and civic responsibility. It is too early to fully measure the impact of the Peace Ambassadors, but the programme appears to have mitigated a number of community-level disputes. The effects may be greater than directly observed—there is no documentation of the effects Peace Ambassadors are having on their peer group at large. Peace Ambassadors’ enthusiasm to participate in the programme without any remuneration bodes well for the initiative’s sustainability.

YOUTH CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

In 2009, UNDP supported the Federation of Liberian Youth establish secretariats in nine counties. UNDP assistance included provision of computers, office furniture, generators and other operational support such as hiring of a national consultant. UNDP also supported the non-governmental organization Common Ground to conduct a Youth and Violence Conflict Mapping in preparation for the 2005 elections and a photo registration process in 2011.

98 Midterm Review, CPAP 2008–2012, UNDP Liberia, p.33 (2010).

Box 4. The Peacebuilding Fund

As of May 2009, a total of 20 Peacebuilding Fund projects had been approved for Liberia, fully committing the allocated envelope of \$15 million. The pilot project, funded from the emergency funding window for alternative reconciliation approaches in Nimba County, was independently evaluated in September 2008. Positive findings enabled a national-level roll-out of the pilot programme. Liberia was the first Peacebuilding Fund recipient country to establish a dedicated national peacebuilding office, located in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The office is intended to build national conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding capacity and also carries the task of coordinating and managing the Fund's activities in the country.

The action agenda of the office focuses on training in conflict sensitivity, fostering community peacebuilding networks and strengthening results-oriented monitoring and evaluation. Other Fund-supported activities charting new ground included the youth peace ambassadors, the Tumutu comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration approach and the partnership with the Ministry of Justice to establish a gender-based violence unit to deal primarily and decisively with the abuse of women, which started during the conflict era and continues with impunity in the post-conflict period.

Source: UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund, UN Doc. A/64/217-S/2009/419 (August 3, 2009).

UNDP and international community efforts have shown results. Programmes in Liberia targeted to ex-combatants appeared to have been largely successful. The majority of former combatants had returned to their communities and many of the programmes developed under DDRR appear to be working. The Ministry of Youth and Sports has completed a draft 'National Youth Act' and established a framework for a National Youth Development Trust Fund.⁹⁹

However, youth crime continues to be an issue among 18 to 26 year-olds in both urban and rural Liberia. There are a number of criminal gangs in Liberia composed primarily of former members of militia. Although it is not clear that these networks could be mobilized, to any meaningful extent, for conflict, the gangs engage in low-level crime, particularly in urban Monrovia. The main issues that the LNP experiences with youths in rural areas of Liberia are drugs, intoxication and criminal gangs that perpetrate burglaries and other crimes. Sometimes the LNP is able to resolve low-level crimes committed by youths and mediate restitution working alongside village elders. The county attorney takes more serious cases against youths to court.

UNDP should continue to support programmes and civil society organizations that target the most vulnerable segments of the youth population in Liberia—particularly programmes that address drug and alcohol abuse and criminal gang activity. Such support should also be targeted to the neediest populations in Liberia (e.g. Monrovia's West End slum).

SUPPORT TO JUSTICE SYSTEM

UNDP provided important early support to the Ministry of Justice's strategic plan and encouraged its related agencies to develop their own strategic plans. UNDP also provided the Ministry of Justice with essential equipment (vehicles, safe, and office equipment). Through the Peacebuilding Fund, UNDP supported the Ministry of Justice in establishing the Office of Training and Development and a Human Rights Unit.

UNDP support to the Ministry of Justice is in line with:

- **United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2003–2005, Theme 2:** Good governance. Create an enabling environment for sustainable human development;

⁹⁹ Republic of Liberia, PRS Progress Report (2010).

- **Country programme document 2003–2007 Outcome 2:** Capacity building for key governance institutions and mechanisms;
- **Poverty reduction strategy Pillar III–** Governance and rule of law;
- **United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2008–2012, Outcome 2.2:** Increased institutional and operational capacity of rule of law Institutions to deliver effective, independent, equitable, accessible and impartial justice to all, in accordance with international and national laws; and
- **Country programme document 2008–2012, Component I:** Democratic Governance, sub-component b) public sector reforms; **Component II)** a) human rights, rule of law, and national visioning and b) security and peace consolidation.

In 2008–2010, UNDP implemented the Supporting the Ministry of Justice in Improving Prosecution Services project with \$1,099,106 from the Peacebuilding Fund. The project increased the public’s confidence in the criminal justice system’s capacity—in particular by training Ministry of Justice prosecutors. The project was implemented with the Ministry of Justice, the UNMIL Legal and Judicial Support Services Division, Pacific Architecture Engineering’s Justice Support for Liberia, The Carter Centre and the American Bar Association.

The intended outcomes of the project were:

- The Ministry of Justice’s internal management is enhanced and there is greater efficiency in its utilization of resources and personnel;
- Prosecutors are effectively trained in procedural and substantive areas in order to enhance the delivery of justice to the community;
- Effective coordination of donor funding to eliminate duplication and maximize impact;
- Institutionalization of standard operating procedures to create consistent application of rules and regulations through the creation of

accountability mechanisms and improvement in the professional delivery of services; and

- The creation of linkages between prosecutors, the police and communities served by them to enhance public trust and promote public safety and justice.

By building the capacities of the Ministry of Justice, the project aimed to develop a long-term plan for strengthening its prosecution services, enabling it to expand into rural areas, addressing issues related to women and youth and better managing and training of its personnel. The result would be the placement of qualified and well-trained personnel in all 15 counties operating under a set of standard procedures with ongoing refresher training and linkages to other actors (e.g. police and the public defender’s office). The project also included a community outreach component intended to raise public perception and faith in the justice system by ensuring timely, fair and equitable disposition of cases. Through the Solicitor-General’s Office, UNDP supported county attorneys (the direct representatives of the Ministry of Justice at the county level) providing motorbikes, typewriters, stationery and other office supplies.

UNDP supported the salaries for the head of office and two assistants for the first years of the project, after which time they were transferred to the Ministry of Justice payroll. The Office of Training and Development trained county attorneys and city solicitors on rule of evidence, criminal procedure, sexual and gender-based violence, juvenile justice, training coordination and preparing of annual work plans. The Project supported the Ministry of Justice to develop a set of training procedures and prosecutorial standards and policies (including a code of ethics). Mechanisms for community outreach were also developed.

The project recognized the need to address sexual and gender-based violence within the justice system. In conjunction with the Joint Programme to Prevent and Respond to Sexual and Gender-based Violence in Liberia, UNDP provided

logistical support to the establishment of a Sexual and Gender-based Violence Unit and training for county attorneys covered through another concept note submitted to the Peacebuilding Fund for ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law Sector to Effectively Address Sexual and Gender-based Violence in Liberia’.

The project also complemented the LNP Peacebuilding Fund project for Community Policing by facilitating a dialogue between prosecutors and LNP. The project was implemented in parallel with the three-year UNDP project Strengthening the Rule of Law and Administration of Justice, and complemented the Peacebuilding Fund, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Carter Centre Strengthening the Rule of Law project, which worked with communities to promote the participation of traditional leaders in the rule of law.

UNDP assistance has had a national impact upon Ministry of Justice prosecutors¹⁰⁰—particularly in their capacity to prosecute sexual and gender-based violence cases. Through the Solicitor-General’s Office, UNDP supported county attorneys (the direct representatives of the Ministry of Justice at the county level). UNDP provided motorbikes, typewriters, stationery and other office supplies to the county attorneys and city solicitors in some locations. UNDP supported training for the county attorneys because the majority of the incoming county attorneys were recent law school graduates. UNDP also supported non-lawyer ‘city solicitors’. UNDP faced a challenge identifying and tracking the city solicitors, however, because they are volunteers who provide support to magistrates and the Ministry of Justice lacks a good tracking system for them. This was magnified in rural areas. Often, city solicitors hold themselves out as lawyers when they are not. Currently the

Judicial Institute is providing the city solicitors with limited training.

UNDP also supported the Ministry of Justice to establish a Roving Prosecution Unit to bolster the resident county attorneys in the counties. Whenever major cases took place the roving prosecutors and UNDP supported vehicles were sent to support the resident county attorneys.

From 2008 to 2010, UNDP supported the border patrol and Bureau of Immigration to combat human trafficking and small arms. Although immigration is not mentioned in the UNMIL mandate, it became clear that it was crucial to peace and security. UNDP contributions included technical advice and vetting, recruiting and equipping the border patrol.

The ‘United Nations Development Assistance Framework Mid-Term Review 2010’ for outcome group 3, governance and rule of law, notes a correlation between UNDP support to the Ministry of Justice and a higher rate of convictions in criminal cases.¹⁰¹ As of December 2010, while the adoption of the Ministry of Justice implementation schedule was pending, the prosecution services had been strengthened through periodic training and operational support. Quality of representation to the state had improved and convictions had increased. Additionally, with UNDP support, the Human Rights Unit of the Ministry of Justice clarified its role within the Ministry of Justice. Through a country-wide approach, the Ministry improved its functional and human resource capacities and reduced the pretrial population in prisons.

SUPPORT TO BUREAU FOR CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION

Liberia’s correctional facilities are in a state of disrepair and almost all locations exceed their capacities. Sanitation and health are extremely

100 Despite its best efforts, the ADR was not able to meet with the Minister of Justice or Solicitor General’s Office during the in-country portion of its Mission to obtain additional data regarding the County Attorneys or city solicitors (i.e. number of cases investigated by the Ministry of Justice, percentage brought to trial and rates of conviction).

101 United Nations Development Assistance Framework Mid-Term Review 2010: Outcome Group 3 at p. 15 (2010).

poor. “Overcrowding of the prisons has emerged as a serious security threat, as widespread institutional and infrastructural weaknesses overwhelm the Bureau for Corrections and Rehabilitation. This, along with inadequate application of the bail system, allows serious criminals back into society, leading communities to resort to mob violence and vigilantism.”¹⁰² While the female inmate population is housed in separate quarters, in the male section of the prison juvenile inmates are mixed with the adult population. There is no dedicated juvenile detention facility in the county.

The Ministry of Justice states that while prison infrastructure for women and juveniles is satisfactory, there is a need for psychosocial counselling among the prison population and a greater emphasis needs to be placed on addressing substance abuse, teenage pregnancies, post-traumatic stress syndrome among inmates and the impact of role reversal (juveniles having to take care of their parents as a result of conflict). Juveniles who lost parents at an early age have no guidance or responsibility and lack a sense of civic responsibility.

A very large number of detainees, however, have languished in pretrial detention many years beyond the maximum number of years of a possible sentence had they stood trial and been adjudicated guilty. In 2010, 92 percent of Liberian prisoners were pretrial detainees.¹⁰³ A 2006 Assessment of the Liberian Juvenile Justice System “visited the Monrovia Central Prison and met 12 juveniles who all, with the exception of one, reported that they had been incarcerated for five to eighteen months.”¹⁰⁴

UNDP support to Bureau for Corrections and Rehabilitation is in line with the following:

- **United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2003–2005, Theme 2:** Good

governance. Overall goal to create an enabling environment for sustainable human development;

- **Poverty reduction strategy Pillar III:** Governance and rule of law; and
- **United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2008–2012, Outcome Group 3:** Increased operational and institutional capacity of the Bureau for Corrections and Rehabilitation, including improved infrastructure, in particular as regards the separation of female, male and juveniles, and measures focusing on rehabilitation programmes within the corrections system.

From 2008 to 2010, UNDP supported ‘quick impact projects’ to improve prison infrastructure at prisons. Throughout the Liberian prison system, UNDP provided vehicles to enable transferring inmates to and from court, training, reporting systems and office supplies and files to improve record keeping. To enable Liberia to comply with international human rights standards, UNDP is assisting the Ministry of Justice design a new prison. UNDP completed construction of the Gbanga Prison in November 2009 with Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency funds of \$40,742.

The Ministry of Justice criticized UNDP procurement processes and donor coordination as overly bureaucratic. The Ministry asserted that national counterparts need a greater say in the process and an increased level of ownership. Most UNDP counterparts on projects have repeated this outlook.

UNDP procurement took a long time and budgets were often insufficient to ensure that infrastructure, constructed or rehabilitated, complied with international standards. For example, a prison

102 Liberia Bureau of Corrections Report: “Justice and Security in Liberia: LNP, Bureau for Corrections and Rehabilitation, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization” (2010).

103 Amnesty International Report 2011 on Liberia.

104 Assessment of the Liberian Juvenile Justice System, ABA–Africa Law Initiative–UNICEF (July 2006).

that was constructed with UNDP support still lacks a well; inmates are forced to walk 200 to 300 yards to get water. However, according to the ministry, UNDP has refused to extend the current subcontract to build the well.

UNDP addressed pretrial detention and backlog by supporting public defenders, establishing a special fast-track courtroom at Monrovia Central Prison and providing equipment and training on case management to the court system. UNDP, with the American Bar Association, supported an initiative to place magistrates at prisons in a fast-track court geared towards reviewing pretrial detention cases and reducing the number of prison inmates languishing in pretrial detention. The Public Defender noted that UNDP had made a significant contribution to the problems of pretrial detention and prison capacity. The fast-track court has been a success and has made a significant impact at Monrovia Central Prison. UNDP support improved infrastructure and functionality at the Monrovia Central Prison and other locations, leading to more secure and humane facilities for some inmates and creating an environment more conducive to rehabilitation efforts. Limited progress was made in promoting public safety. The profile of Bureau for Corrections and Rehabilitation was enhanced as a component of rule of law sector.

However, as of 2010, the overall state of Liberia's correctional system remained inadequate and in a state of disrepair. The Secretary-General's report of 10 February 2009 stated:

“The Liberian corrections sector is still characterized by weak physical infrastructure and low budgetary allocation. The sector is additionally strained by massive overcrowding in most facilities. There were 31 separate incidents of prison breaks during the reporting period. The most serious was the riot and subsequent escape of 163 prisoners from Monrovia Central Prison in

December 2008, of which 85 remain at large. However, the government is focusing increasingly on the sector, and a draft Bureau of Corrections strategic plan is currently being reviewed. In addition, two new correction facilities were completed and rehabilitation work at seven others was conducted. Of the 500 officers targeted for the Liberian corrections system, 209 have been trained and deployed, with recruitment of the remaining 291 dependent on additional funding.”

This demonstrates there are, however, shortcomings in the infrastructure rehabilitation programme. As of February 2011, access to justice remained a critical challenge; the criminal justice system is under-resourced and lacks qualified personnel. Consequently, there remained a severe backlog of cases and 81 percent of the prison population consisted of pretrial detainees. Outdated laws, (e.g. magistrates' court jurisdiction limitations) contributed to delays.¹⁰⁵ Ultimately, the national budget must take over funding for correctional facilities; UNDP should support the government make this transition from donor to national funding.

SUPPORT TO THE JUDICIARY

The highly centralized justice system is comprised of a Supreme Court, Circuit Courts in the counties, Magistrate Courts and Justices of the Peace. The Supreme Court exercises supervision over all subordinate courts and all courts are empowered to apply both statutory and customary laws.

The five-member Supreme Court (one Chief Justice and four Associate Judges) is the final arbiter of the justice system. Circuit Courts have original jurisdiction for civil cases and for the most serious cases including murder, rape and aggravated assault. Magistrate Courts have both civil and criminal jurisdiction for lesser crimes and misdemeanours and refer more serious cases to

¹⁰⁵ UN Secretary-General, *Twenty-second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*, UN Doc. S/2011/7** (February 14, 2011).

the District Courts. Finally, Justices of the Peace handle a very limited range of civil and criminal matters.¹⁰⁶ In the state-sponsored customary justice system of the interior, the Government of Liberia created customary courts housed in the Executive Branch under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior that are governed by the revised Rules and Regulations Governing the Hinterland of Liberia of 2000. Technically, there is a right to appeal decisions of the Office of Tribal Affairs in District Court, but this has been rarely exercised.¹⁰⁷ The Liberian Constitution recognizes customary law and empowers all statutory courts to apply it.¹⁰⁸

A 2006 International Rescue Committee report stated that the Justices of the Peace, “originally created to increase access to justices in the communities far from magistrate courts ... have become a serious liability operating in a legal universe in which they are unaccountable and unsupervised. Justices of the Peace have detained people illegally and sentenced people to jail beyond their powers.” The same report found that in 2005, the failure of the Circuit Courts to adjudicate cases was paralyzing the justice system. Defendants routinely evaded prosecution because of inactivity in the Circuit Courts (even for cases of rape and murder).

Locally elected Town Chiefs, Clan Chiefs and Paramount Chiefs have original jurisdiction over low-level civil and criminal cases. The Town Chiefs handle cases within their town; the Clan chiefs among towns and any cases that cannot be solved are referred to the Paramount chief for resolution.

There are still several challenges in the functioning of the justice system. The problem is not with the quality of the laws in most instances, but in their enforcement and with the structure of the

legal system itself. Separation of powers could be strengthened. Within the Ministry of Justice there could be greater separation of its various law enforcement activities (i.e. investigation/arrest and prosecution). In general, checks and balances within the justice system need to be more clearly articulated. Currently, there is no separate prosecution service within the Ministry of Justice.

Rape is the most frequently reported crime and although there is a special rape law (viewed as problematic from a procedural due process perspective by many stakeholders in the rule of law sector), the challenge is following through with effective prosecutions. Rape cases are often settled out-of-court privately by payment of restitution by the accused to the victim or victim’s family thereby evading the formal justice system and enabling perpetrators to operate with relative impunity. The rape law has resulted in many cases of pretrial detention and is viewed by many stakeholders as unconstitutional due to its removal of bail proceedings in cases where rape allegations often lead to indefinite pretrial detention. The Law is currently being amended.

The Judiciary established a special court for sexual and gender-based violence cases as mandated by the 2008 Gender and Sexually-Based Violence Bill (Criminal Court E). In 2008, the Court overcame a number of early operational difficulties and successfully completed its first trial in July 2009.¹⁰⁹ The rate of case disposition within Criminal Court E is moving quickly but not as fast as initially predicted. The Ministry of Justice established a Sexual and Gender-based Violence Crimes Unit in February 2009. Lack of funding continues to hinder the work of Public Defenders and Prosecutors alike. For example, there are no funds available to transport witnesses from rural and inaccessible areas to courts to testify. The

106 Per Sec. 8.3(a) and (b) of the “Liberia Judiciary Law.”

107 Liberia: Resurrecting the Justice System, Africa Report No. 107, April 6, 2006, International Crises Group (2006).

108 Liberian Constitution, Chapter VII, Art. 3; Judiciary Law Republic of Liberia (1972).

109 UN Secretary-General, *Nineteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*, S/209/411 (August 10, 2009).

Public Defenders office is severely understaffed, but a new special prosecutor is fast-tracking cases.

An overall lack of capacity continues to plague both the civil and criminal justice system. Ministry of Justice prosecutors are largely staffed, but courts lack facilities and judicial staff below the level of judges themselves is severely ill equipped to support the Judiciary in its basic functions (i.e. opinion writing). As a result, the judicial process is often delayed; judges perform routine administrative and clerical tasks themselves. The courts are not computerized and even manual systems of case management, docketing and filing are deficient. While rates of case disposition have improved somewhat since 2004, there still exists a large backlog of cases that the court is struggling to resolve via fast-track initiatives.

The most urgent needs are to reduce the number of pretrial detainees and reduce case backlogs. The National Rule of Law Retreat in September 2008 was the first time the three branch of government engaged in dialogue regarding the rule of law and a resolution committing all branches to coordination was endorsed. The Judiciary subsequently drafted a five-year strategic plan.¹¹⁰

The jury system in both criminal and civil trials is widely believed to be corrupt. It is frequently reported that jurors serve repeatedly and are not above receiving payment from defendants. Jury tampering laws are difficult, if not impossible to enforce with the current manpower available.

Through 2008, UNDP support to the Judiciary and Ministry of Justice was delivered within a conflict resolution, peacebuilding, reintegration and sustainable recovery context. The goal of the 2003–2007 country programme document, ‘Capacity-building for Key Governance Institutions and Mechanisms’, does not specifically mention the judiciary, courts or

the Ministry of Justice, and these institutions were not enumerated in the document’s list of specific interventions.¹¹¹ However, support to the Judiciary could be implied by the country programme document language “regulation of security forces, through the development of protection and human rights enforcement mechanisms as well as reintegration of ex-combatants.”¹¹²

The United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2003–2005 (extended to 2007) was more specific and did include objectives for the Judiciary and Ministry of Justice under Theme 2, Objective 2, “to strengthen the Judiciary, rule of law and national capacity to promote and protect human rights.” The United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2003–2005 activities and indicators included support to the Judiciary (Justice of the Peace and Magisterial courts) for the dispensation of grass-roots justice; capacity building for human rights organizations (media, youth, women and legal organizations); information dissemination on human rights and the rule of law; and support to human rights education through media and radio dramas.

UNDP support to the Judiciary was in line with:

- **United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2003–2005, Theme 2:** Good governance. Overall goal to create an enabling environment for sustainable human development;
- **Country programme document 2003–2007, Outcome 2:** Capacity building for key governance institutions and mechanisms;
- **Poverty reduction strategy, Pillar III:** Governance and rule of law;
- **United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2008–2012, Outcome 1 and 3:** Outcome 1; National and Local

110 UN Secretary-General, *Eighteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*, UN Doc. S/209/86 (February 10, 2009).

111 UN Liberia Country programme document 2003–2007 pp. 4-5.

112 UN Liberia Country programme document 2003–2007 pp. 4-5.

authorities increasingly have the capacity to provide security, manage conflict and prevent violence, respecting human rights throughout. Outcome Group 3.2. The rule of law sector strengthened to provide effective, equitable, and accessible justice in accordance with human rights standards. 3.2.2. Increased institutional and operational capacity of rule of law institutions to deliver effective, independent, equitable, accessible and impartial justice to all in accordance with international and national laws. 3.3.2. Increased capacity of national institutions to protect vulnerable groups, in particular within the justice system, including addressing the needs of juvenile justice, women, the elderly and persons with disabilities; and

- **Country programme document 2008–2012, Component II:** a) human rights, rule of law, and national visioning and b) security and peace consolidation.

UNDP supported the Governance Commission formulate a public sector reform strategy, which identified issues and priorities on legal and judicial reform, a draft strategy paper for legal and judicial reform, and a terms of reference for the Law Reform Commission.

As Liberia moved on from early recovery, UNDP focus shifted towards long-term capacity building for democratic governance. United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2008–2012, Outcome 3 (Governance and Rule of Law) had the objective and states, “democratic, accountable and transparent governance is being advanced in a participatory inclusive manner and in accordance with human rights principles.”

In 2004, UNDP and UNMIL focused on rehabilitating Monrovia’s criminal and other courts (to be followed by the rehabilitation of courts

throughout the country).¹¹³ In 2006, UNDP funded a national consultant to support the Governance Reform Commission’s work on rule of law and the strengthening of the judiciary.¹¹⁴ UNDP supported the Judiciary to develop and institutionalize a Judicial Information Management System and provided training on drafting strategic plans. UNDP and UNMIL facilitated a pilot record-keeping system at the Supreme Court. The system is manual, and UNDP is supplying standardized file jackets having coded file numbers. Basic procurement of stationary and supplies by UNDP has, however, resulted in delays according to the Judicial Institute.

With UNDP support, the judiciary initiated a reform of the institution of magistrates, requiring new hires to have a college degree. With UNDP support, the Judicial Institute implemented a Professional Magistrates Training programme. The goal of the Supreme Court is to replace all unqualified magistrates within five years.

In an effort to increase court efficiency, UNDP and UNMIL are advocating for expanding the jurisdiction of the magistrate courts and creating appellate courts. This was supported in May 2011 with the Supreme Court’s agreement to the equivalent of regional hubs. The Supreme Court stated that UNDP support has been crucial in capacitating the court system and particularly the magistrate courts. As a result, the courts’ efficiency has continued to improve. For example, the Supreme Court was able to expeditiously adjudicate a number of cases relating to the 2005 Elections.

UNDP support to the judiciary, Public Defenders and the Ministry of Justice Prosecutors reduced the backlog of cases and rates of pretrial detention. The special fast track mobile court in Monrovia Central Prison resulted in the release of a number of detainees at Monrovia Central Prison in 2010.

113 UN Secretary-General, *Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*, UN Doc. S/204/299 (March 22, 2004).

114 UN Secretary-General, *Thirteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*, UN Doc. S/206/958 (December 11, 2006).

Beyond this, a number of cases were dismissed by Circuit Courts (including Criminal Court E) in 2010 on motions from either County Attorneys or Public Defenders pursuant to Sec. 18.2 Criminal Procedure Law and its guarantee of a speedy trial. The Supreme Court noted, however, that more could be done.

UNDP supported the establishment of a special court for sexual and gender-based violence cases. With UNDP assistance, the performance of 1st Circuit, Criminal Court E (the sexual and gender-based violence fast track court) overcame a number of its early operational difficulties in 2008, and successfully completed its first trial in July 2009.¹¹⁵ The rate of case disposition within Criminal Court E is moving quickly but not as fast as had been initially predicted. However, Criminal Court E was the most productive court among all Circuit Courts in Liberia in the first quarter of 2010. Additionally, the New Rape Law¹¹⁶ requires that rape cases be held in camera and Circuit Courts were complying with this requirement as of 2010.

According to the 'May 2010 End of Term Report and Analysis of Circuit Court and Cases Heard', there were 557 cases listed in the dockets of the circuit courts in the 10 counties reviewed for the May 2010 term of court. By the conclusion of the court term, 26 had been tried, 50 had been otherwise disposed of, and 480 remained pending; 14 percent of docketed cases were tried or otherwise disposed of. This compares with 9 percent of cases tried or otherwise disposed of and 91 percent pending in the February 2010 term. The increase in cases otherwise disposed of is mainly attributable to 28 cases dropped by prosecutors under Section 18.1 of the Criminal Procedure Law at Criminal Court B and the 9th Judicial Circuit in Bong: 12 cases at Criminal Court B, 16 cases in Bong. In terms of total

numbers of docketed cases, there is a slight decrease from February when one factors in Criminal Court E: 15 fewer cases.

Overall, the percentage of docketed cases tried remains remarkably consistent: 4 percent in February 2010 and 5 percent in May 2010. The increase in cases otherwise disposed of, from 5 percent in February 2010 to 9 percent in May is to be welcomed and may reflect the absence of evidence including against defendants in pretrial detention.

As of the May 2010 term, the overall rate of case disposition for cases in all Circuit Courts remained extremely high.¹¹⁷ UNDP and UNMIL are assisting the Supreme Court to begin addressing the issue of extremely old cases on the docket.

The Court credits UNDP support and training for improving the capacities of Supreme Court and most Circuit Court Judges to draft opinions. However, this support has not been extended to judicial staff. An Associate Justice of the Supreme Court complained that justices lack competent junior staff to draft opinions, which places the burden on the judges. At present, law schools in Liberia do not produce graduates capable of serving as law clerks within the court system.

In the future, the Judiciary will experience continuing capacity development needs, particularly with regard to the new Commercial Court and judicial training. UNMIL quick impact projects were helpful for the magistrate courts, but there is a need to upgrade assistance to the Circuit Courts. Other major needs of the judiciary include a clear and objective assessment of judicial support staff

While there has been marked improvement in the judiciary and magistrates since 2006, many more magistrate courts are needed to combat a generalized lack of access to justice. Resources are

115 UN Secretary-General, *Nineteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*, UN Doc., S/2009/411 (August 10, 2009).

116 New Rape Law Sec. 14.70(5)(a).

117 The Judiciary of Liberia: May End of Term Report & Analysis of Circuit Courts and Cases Heard.

still currently lacking to fund many of the judicial structures and envisioned by the Constitution. UNDP should utilize Judicial Institute resources to providing training to the second tier of court staff (i.e. mid and junior level).

In many locations throughout Liberia, town chiefs settle most cases. In some areas, the chiefs have actually taken over the magistrate courts. Each county needs a courthouse scaled to the size of its communities. UNDP must work with the Ministry of the Interior to develop a robust training programme for traditional authorities.

SUPPORT TO PUBLIC DEFENDERS

In 2009–2010, UNDP implemented the Strengthening Public Defence Project with \$750,066 from the Peacebuilding Fund. The project was a partnership with the Supreme Court, Judicial Institute, UMMIL Legal and Judicial Support Division and the Carter Centre. The project, in support of Peacebuilding Fund Priority Areas 3.1 and 3.2, aimed to provide an effective, accessible and trustworthy public defence system for underprivileged and economically challenged individuals.

The key expected outcomes of the project were to (1) increase citizens' confidence in the legal system to the extent that they will to seek and rely on trained and equipped public defenders, to decrease the numbers of prolonged pretrial detentions in withholding centres and at the Central Prison; (2) to expand citizens' due process rights; and (3) to support a functional, trained and equipped public defence system and to develop citizens' confidence in the criminal justice system's fairness and its capacity to respect basic human rights. These were to be achieved by assigning a Public Defence Training Coordinator to the Judicial Institute to coordinate the development of a curriculum for training, producing a

comprehensive training manual and programme for public defenders, recruiting public defenders and equipping the Public Defender's office.

Public defence monitors were to be commissioned to work in the counties on a roving basis to provide oversight of public defenders. The project was designed in conjunction with two other projects funded by the Peacebuilding Fund: the creation of the Sexual and Gender-based Violence Crimes Unit within the Ministry of Justice and a project to increase Public Prosecutors capacities through equipment and training. UNDP provided a Public Defence Training Coordinator housed at the Judicial Institute and two public defence monitors at the judiciary who travelled to the counties to supervise public defenders. The project focused on eight public defender offices, upgrading their offices, training new public defenders and their legal assistants and providing a set of law books and vehicles (with a fuel allowance). These outputs were meant to benefit not only citizens, but also judges, magistrates, defence attorneys, public defenders and police.

The project funded the salaries of the eight public defenders for 12 months each.¹¹⁸ The Judicial Institute carried out most of the activities, including training; the Carter Centre provided technical and logistical support. The UNDP role was to ensure accountability, transparency, timely implementation, management and results achievement. UNMIL provided technical and logistical support as requested.

Support from UNDP and the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative enabled the Public Defender's Office to expand its reach from Monrovia to the counties. The project funded salaries and UNDP provided 14 pickup trucks. These were delivered to the Judiciary for use of Public Defenders and project staff. As of

118 Public Defence Monitors were compensated at \$1,000 per month for 12 months. Public Defence Training Coordinators were paid \$1,500 per month for 12 months. The legal assistant received \$800 per month for 12 months. A total of four consultants were hired by the Project for total sub-contracts of \$12,800. Meanwhile, transportation costs for all public defender (vehicles and fuel) amounted to \$308,000.

November 2010, the Liberian judiciary had taken over paying all salaries. There is no provision, however, for operational costs of the vehicles provided by UNDP.

As of May 2011, 14 of 15 counties have public defenders (one public defender quit). There are 6 public defenders in Monrovia yielding a total of 20 public defenders. The Monrovia public defenders rotate to other locations in order to supplement the public defenders resident in the counties.

The American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative, with UNDP support, developed the curriculum for the public defenders. Originally, the UNDP support for the public defender training programme was intended to provide for three staff, but these were consolidated into one. UNDP also supported the recruitment and hiring of the Public Defender Training Coordinator within the Judicial Institute. UNDP is supporting the Judicial Institute's efforts to organize separate training for judges, the Supreme Court, prosecutors and public defenders.

The primary objective of UNDP support was to restore confidence in the justice sector. Recent reports sent to UNDP from public defenders are encouraging: UNDP-supported public defenders have even handled large and complex banking cases. In Grand Bassa and Sanda counties, citizens who had received representation were interviewed and their responses were favourable. Impact is low at present, but is laying the foundation for future change.

UNDP assistance resulted in greater representation of defendants by public defenders as a result of the increased number of public defenders in 2011, prior to which some counties did not even have a public defender. The Public Defender cited a reduction in the number of pretrial detentions and the fact that a recent Prosecutor's report shows a 25 percent improvement in the conviction rate and the ability to respond to cases quicker. Despite some shortcomings, it is perceived that the public defenders have improved access to justice.

The perception of the Public Defender is that the volume of cases defended by public defenders has increased since 2009 and, therefore, there remains a need for additional public defenders to service the magisterial courts. The Public Defender recommends increasing the number to 36 in order to allow servicing of both the circuit and magisterial courts.

The American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative offered a critical assessment of the initiative's design, implementation and sustainability. The American Bar Association notes that incoming public defenders under the UNDP programme were all new law school graduates sent into the field without any experience. In addition, the initiative only made provisions to send one public defender per county, which is viewed as insufficient. This, together with the recruit's lack of experience, caused the programme to struggle.

The American Bar Association further noted that UNDP had followed the practice of supplementing the salaries of newly hired public defenders. Salaries were set at \$1,200 per month (nearly 2.5 to 6 times higher than normal), a potentially unhealthy precedent, and each public defender also received a new vehicle. The short-term goal was met, but long-term sustainability of the initiative was undermined. A much larger issue is that training and supervision for judicial staff remains critical, including public defenders, in particular inexperienced new public defenders.

SUPPORT TO THE JUDICIAL INSTITUTE

As of June 2008, UNDP and USAID supported the Judicial Institute through the ABA. The Judicial Institute's mandate is to train judicial actors, prosecutors, staff, probation officers, judges, magistrates and public defenders. All these activities have been supported with UNDP funding.

The director of the Judicial Institute receives a salary paid by UNDP through the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals programme. This salary is due to be taken over by the government of Liberia in the near future.

Other donors were also active with the Judicial Institute. The German Agency for International Cooperation supported training for magistrates and established a research division within the Judicial Institute equipped with computers and wireless Internet. The German Agency for International Cooperation recently published 'Bringing a Case to Court', a training manual for the LNP, the judiciary and magistrates. USAID, through the American Bar Association, provided funds for the Judicial Institute's executive secretary, receptionist, office supplies and computers.

UNDP has supported training of public defenders, training in the counties for clerks, and in conjunction with UNMIL, record keeping systems. The last training for public defenders included judges and new law graduates coming into the judiciary. The Judicial Institute has provided training to new public defenders (all recent law school graduates) operating in the counties. The Judicial Institute developed the curriculum for these public defenders with the assistance of UNDP and USAID utilizing a USA-based non-governmental organization that provided training on an array of topics such as direct examination, how to interview clients, and how to standardize their work. A special curriculum was developed for child justice. The Judicial Institute has also developed specialized training on sexual and gender-based violence.

UNDP has not supplied any knowledge products to the Judicial Institute. UNDP and other donors supported the Judicial Institute's efforts to improve the quality of the Magistrate Court's training of new magistrates that will be sent to the counties. Sixty-three magistrates are graduating in June 2011.

The Judicial Institute stated that UNDP largest impact was its support in the training of the public defenders. The Supreme Court and Public Defender both credit the Judicial Institute as having played a crucial role in empowering Public Defenders and Magistrate Courts. The public defence coordinator supported by the project is located in the Judicial Institute and facilitates joint

planning of training needs, developing training curriculum and training coordination with other judicial staff. The Judicial Institute benefited immensely from these activities in terms of increased capacities and skills. While there is little concrete data available on the cases handled by magistrates, the recent data of the Supreme Court shows evidence of a favourable trend in backlog reduction and pretrial detention rates.

Going forward, the Judicial Institute states that its needs are to develop its curriculum for training (currently being supported by USAID), improving its office space and drafting a new strategic plan (the current strategic plan is in effect through 2011). Training on judicial ethics and misconduct is also needed. In addition, the Judicial Institute anticipates that with the establishment of a special Commercial Court in Monrovia, there will be an increasing need to train the judiciary on areas such as commercial law, maritime law, mineral law and extractive industries, petroleum law, arbitration, banking law, financial fraud and complex cases.

Some mechanisms are also needed to more fully address the needs of the Town Chiefs who interface with (and often substitute for) the formal justice system in Liberia. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, and not the Judicial Institute, is responsible for training Town Chiefs. Nonetheless, recent Judicial Institute training for magistrates included an open dialogue, where participants expressed a desire for newly graduated students to take over the magistrate courts. This, however, is not yet sufficient to meet the needs of the Town Chiefs. UNDP should work with the Ministry of Internal Affairs to devise more training for the Chiefs.

SUPPORT TO THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION

UNDP support to the Law Reform Commission is in line with the 2008–2012 United Nations Development Assistance Framework outcome 3.2.1 "increased operational capacity ... to review and make recommendations to revise civil,

criminal and commercial laws.” The 2008–2012 Development Assistance Framework Midterm review noted that UNDP support was responsible for having strengthened the Commission’s capacity to review and recommend revised laws and to compile and publish statutes and law reports. UNDP was also responsible for building the capacity of the Commission to provide training on legislative drafting to the relevant committees of the national legislature. The Law Reform Commission has generated recommendations for key legal reforms and has codified legal precedents and new laws and made them available for reference and research to members of the legal community and general public.

UNDP supported the publication of Volume 42 of the ‘Liberian Law Reports’, a gap filling exercise in that the remainder of the law reports were prepared and issued without UNDP support. The German Agency for International Cooperation provided funds to print 150 copies of the volume (40 copies were provided to the Supreme Court, 25 copies were provided to prosecutors and additional copies were provided to the Liberian National Bar Association, the Judicial Institute, government agencies and ministries and the law school).

The Supreme Court stated that the Liberian Law Reports have enabled lawyers and judges to more easily access case law and frequently cite to these volumes. The Commission has made the Liberian Law Reports available to private law firms for a fee (\$6,000 for all 42 volumes). The Commission is attempting to index the laws by year and subject.

The Law Reform Commission is currently operating under executive order; its legal status should be formalized through legislation with funding in the national budget.

SUPPORT TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND LEGAL EDUCATION IN LIBERIA

UNDP provided \$25,000 in seed funding and channelled American Bar Association assistance to the Liberian Bar Association. This

supported the Liberian Bar Association’s activities, assemblies, annual convention and law libraries. Because there is no system of mandated continuing legal education in Liberia, the assemblies and the annual convention are the only fora where members of the Liberian Bar can discuss new legislation and emerging trends.

As a result of UNDP and other donor support, the Liberian Bar Association can now lead legal-sector civil society organizations to influence reforms that impact the profession. The Bar Association now conducts civic outreach activities in order to instil a sense of civic duty and rule of law. Outreach includes meetings with students, conducting mock trials, discussing the issues that arise and demonstrating the importance of due process and the law.

UNDP has had a sustained partnership with the Louis Arthur Grimes School of Law, and in 2009, UNDP supported a comprehensive needs assessment for the school. As a result, UNDP provided the law school building with over 250 desks and chairs for students and a dedicated faculty office. UNDP also supported the law school’s computer lab by providing 30 computers and desks, a satellite Internet connectivity and two generators. The UNDP needs assessment laid the foundation for drafting of the law school’s ‘Five-year Strategic Plan’.

UNDP support has been mostly procurement based, not technical (the American Bar Association provided curriculum development). The ‘United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2008–2012 Midterm Review’ notes that UNDP support to the institutional and administrative capacity of the Law School has enabled it to deliver quality instruction.

While the curriculum could be considered robust, with the rapid expansion of concessions and foreign investment (particularly in its extractive industries, petroleum sector, shipping and ports), there is a need to develop advanced commercial law courses at the law school. Such courses should include Banking Law, Secured Transactions,

Corporate Compliance, Foreign Corrupt Practices, Financial Crimes, White Collar Crimes, Anti-money Laundering, Maritime and Petroleum Law. UNDP should also support the law school to develop an advanced curriculum designed to train future judges, lawyers, legislators and leaders of Liberia that emphasizes commercial law.

UNDP, UNMIL and other partners have engaged with traditional authorities around the country. UNDP supported a process leading to a National Conference on Traditional Authorities. The United Nations Mission in Liberia described the Conference as a major event, and the Liberia justice and legal community's willingness to participate as significant. UNDP support to Customary Justice Systems aligned with United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2008–2012 CP Goal: 3.2.3. National Framework for the practice of a customary system of justice to ensure conformity with human rights standards, including gender equality, upholds the rule of law, and complements the formal justice sector.

From 2008 to 2010, UNDP funded county and regional dialogues on the issue of customary and statutory justice systems. In 2010, the National Conference on Access to Justice convened a broad range of government leaders, traditional authorities, and community leadership from around the country. A uniform and standardized approach to customary and statutory legal regimes will enhance access to justice and provide a clear framework for legal redress. Recognizing the importance of incorporating customary law and traditional authorities into a coherent system of justice is a major step in legal reform and enhanced access to justice.

There is a continuing need for all rule of law, justice and security actors to understand how the traditional system works, what its proper limits are, Liberia's statutory and common law and international human rights conventions and covenants to which Liberia has acceded. Other donors, including the US Institute of Peace and the Carter Centre, are supporting community-based justice initiatives that

cooperate with traditional authorities in Liberia and are supporting academic and policy studies on the role of customary justice in Liberia.

UNDP Liberia received very good support from the Regional Bureau for Africa and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), but has received little or no support from the Regional Centres.

The UNDP Liberia/BCPR relationship has been crucial; BCPR support and the participation of its Gender Adviser made possible UNDP Liberia's flagship programmes on police, judiciary and the legislature. This has helped UNDP Liberia maintain the expertise necessary to support the government. BCPR also help UNDP Liberia shape its peacebuilding concept note into a 'Peacebuilding Priority Plan', fielding six BCPR experts. In addition, BCPR assisted UNDP Liberia to develop the Peacebuilding Programme and supported the formulation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector programmes.

With specific regard to rule of law, BCPR included Liberia as one of 20 members of its Global Rule of Law programme. Early in the process, BCPR provided a \$2.9 million grant for three years. In parallel with this theme was the joint Peacebuilding Fund, created with an additional \$1 million per year. The BCPR grant was targeted primarily towards building better public defenders and a better judiciary equipped with vehicles. Additionally, Peacebuilding Fund resources were utilized to train Ministry of Justice prosecutors, build the capacity of the Judiciary and undertake community security and social cohesion programmes (i.e. community policing done jointly with UNMIL). These efforts ultimately lead to the creation of the Justice and Security Trust Fund with UNDP and BCPR support.

These two processes occurred in parallel. UNDP Rule of Law Unit staff continues to handle all programme functions under the Peacebuilding Fund while the Liberian Peacebuilding Programme continued to be the coordinating mechanism. BCPR attempted to lead donor

coordination and suggested that stakeholders engage, but this was not followed through to the extent thought feasible.

BCPR also linked gender and rule of law, focusing on sexual and gender-based violence. BCPR funded a Senior Gender Adviser in the country office whose role it is to mainstream gender throughout the programme by focusing on substantive, upstream and responsive approaches.

BCPR has worked on linkages between UNMIL and the United Nations country team. The 2003 post-conflict needs assessment was an early planning document. The Corporate Council on Africa also had much analysis on conflict leading to the 2006 Development Assistance Framework, which contained a strong element of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The UNDP country programme had even more conflict analysis. The Development Assistance Framework established an integrated coordination structure under the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. This allocated certain responsibilities to UNDP departments and evolved as a primary source of the integrated framework known as 'Development Assistance Framework Plus'. From 2006 to 2009, headquarters provided some support, but no formal support from headquarters was provided for the Integrated Mission Framework. However, UNDP country support teams collaborated with UNMIL. This also laid the groundwork for participation in the Peacebuilding Fund.

Donors (primarily the Netherlands) are exhibiting interest in investing in the UNDP BCPR Global Rule of Law Programme. The Global Programme ended in 2011, but donors appear to be willing to continue to fund at 2010–2011 levels. UNDP Liberia must be clear that it needs to bolster the rule of law area. UNDP must decide whether the rule of law is to be implemented as a development investment or a peacekeeping investment going forward. Development is a UNDP comparative strength, whereas the Department of Peacekeeping Operations often lacks a development perspective outside police

and corrections. Gender and women's rights must be included as a strong component of the rule of law. UNDP comparative strengths include programme management, matching practitioner-practitioner networks and transitions to a knowledge-based organization.

UNDP Liberia has not been able to tap into the technical capacities of the Bureau for Development Policy or its outposts at the Regional Centres in Dakar or Johannesburg. UNDP corporate should facilitate securing support and expertise for the country office. For example, because the Elections Unit in the Bureau for Development Policy did not mobilize and was unable to react quickly enough to meet the needs of the country office, UNDP had to approach the European Community for support. Opportunities in the field are often time-sensitive and must be seized upon quickly—headquarter support needs to be leveraged in a timely manner.

The UN Secretary-General's Rule of Law Coordination Resource Group was designed to be a mechanism to effect coordination in the rule of law sector—particularly between UNDP and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Resource Group has the following functions: (1) to coordinate the UN approach to rule of law assistance (including transitional justice); (2) to conduct a periodic review of ongoing guidance in rule of law and identified interests and harmonize headquarters-level policy; and (3) to provide a forum where members can submit best practices. To date, this has not resulted in any significant realignment of UN agencies' activities in rule of law; however, work continues and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (in partnership with the Vera Institute) is formulating rule of law indicators that should be implemented system-wide in the near future.

The Rule of Law Coordination Resource Group, through its Joint Strategic Plan, identified Liberia as a potential pilot country; however, the Resource Group did not carry out any programming in Liberia. A core group was established in Liberia

to decide on coordinating country team rule of law programming in Liberia. A videoconference was held between this core group and UN Headquarters and, while no formal mechanism was established, the Resource Group stated that the effort might have encouraged UNMIL to strengthen its joint programming mechanisms. Liberia remains resistant to conducting a mapping exercise, as this is viewed as a distraction from programming.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- UNDP should explore broad-based economic and legal empowerment initiatives for youth, women and disabled persons that go beyond the specific ex-combatant context and that link to other areas of the UNDP country programme document. UNDP could also explore public-private partnerships and corporate responsibility initiatives to engage private corporations with education and training initiatives in Liberia.
- UNDP should take a more strategic and holistic approach to its engagement with the LNP and security sector in Liberia from a pro-poor, access to justice and legal empowerment agenda.
- UNDP should continue its support to the Sexual and Gender-based Violence Crimes Unit at the Ministry of Justice and the new sexual and gender-based violence fast-track court. UNDP should also strengthen its support to the mobile court housed within Monrovia Central Prison, as this shows great promise of reducing the backlog of pretrial detainees. UNDP should also continue to support the Mobile Prosecution Unit of the Ministry of Justice to bolster the criminal justice system in the counties.
- The UNDP country programme has targeted national-level government institutions as the main beneficiaries of capacity development; however, these stakeholders attest to a lack of ownership

over programming. UNDP has to a much lesser degree empowered county and district-level authorities or pursued a broad-based pro-poor/legal empowerment/service delivery agenda at the community level to the extent originally targeted.


- UNDP often proceeded as if mere procurement of infrastructure equated to a shift in the outcome. It is felt that UNDP could have delivered much more in the way of technical expertise and knowledge products as part of its implementation, drawing much more heavily upon the resources of the UN country team and affiliated UN agencies.

4.3 MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND POVERTY REDUCTION

UNDP Liberia prioritized pro-poor economic and policy development in the 2003–2007 and 2008–2012 country programme. The poverty reduction priorities in the 2003–2007 country programme included support to community-based recovery, human rights protection and gender, capacity-building for HIV/AIDS response and environmental management. The country programme continued its focus¹¹⁹ on capacity development for pro-poor growth with attention to achieving MDG goals and human development, human rights and gender-based interventions. UNDP poverty reduction initiatives were spearheaded under the economic policy and management component. Three major UNDP outcomes were “National mechanisms and capacities for MDG-based conflict-sensitive planning analysis and monitoring strengthened,” (Outcome 1), “Increased access to productive employment and equal opportunities for sustainable livelihoods especially for vulnerable groups, and in consideration for conflict factors,” (Outcome 2), and “household food security improved,” (Outcome 3). Targets and indicators included strengthening donor coordination mechanisms, strengthening MDGs awareness at the national and local level,

119 UNDP Liberia, Country Programme Action Plan, 2008–2012 between the Government of Liberia and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Liberia.

Figure 9. Poverty Reduction Strategy Projects: Completion Rates (Percentage)



Source: Buchanan Retreat: the Liberia Reconstruction & Development Committee, 2nd Annual PRS Review Retreat Report, Nov. 2010.

accurately measuring national human development, developing and disseminating a national MDG report, and strengthening and building the capacity of the Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services to generate gender disaggregated data.

The outputs associated with these outcomes included strengthening the systems for developing MDG-based strategies, strengthening government capacity for economic governance, establishing support systems for national statistics and information management systems, mainstreaming the MDGs in national planning processes and strengthening capacities for formulating and implementing microfinance policy. Other outcomes included supporting women's

access to vocational training, business skills development and microcredit schemes, increasing the number of women and youth employed in labour intensive programmes in infrastructure, supporting the establishment and functioning of national food security and nutrition policy and monitoring system and strengthening environmental management systems.

UNDP Liberia focused economic policy and management on three areas: policy support and economic policy management, aid coordination and statistical development and national capacity development with eight annual work plans.¹²⁰ Under pro-poor economic recovery, UNDP had four work plans: policy support and economic management; aid coordination; support to national capacity development; and communication for development.

STRENGTHENING OF PLANNING AND BUDGETING

UNDP supported the establishment of systems for planning, strengthened staff capacities to perform their functions to internationally recognized standards and provided equipment and financial resources. UNDP built capacity by providing technical advisers with various competencies. Supported policies include the 'National Data and Dissemination Policy', the 'National Trade Policy' and the 'National Industrial Policy'. UNDP advisers supported the government in poverty reduction strategy development processes, development of the national visioning planning framework, development of economic policy and research strategy and development of monitoring and evaluation systems for the poverty reduction strategy. UNDP also supported the development of 'County Development Agendas' that were prepared using the District Development Councils under the Local Development and Decentralization project as the forum for consultation with community members for the identification of local

120 UNDP Liberia, Country Programme Action Plan, Mid Term Review 2008- 2012, Report of Independent Consultants, July 26, 2010.

priorities. UNDP supported the poverty reduction strategy annual review reports, which have been printed and disseminated to stakeholders, and provided technical advisers to the government on all four pillars of the poverty reduction strategy.

According to poverty reduction strategy completion projections (see Figure 9) and government monitoring systems, areas supported by UNDP and other partners have a projected completion rate of over 85 percent. Governance and rule of law has a projected completion rate of 87 percent; economic revitalization projects' completion rate is projected at 86 percent. UNDP has been instrumental in supporting the poverty reduction strategy monitoring and evaluation process, which by June 2011 was on track with a 100 percent projected completion rate.

UNDP has strengthened the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs and Ministry of Finance capacities in national-level gender budgeting. UNDP is collaborating with UN Women to pilot and expand the programme to the sub-national level.

STATISTICS

Statistics continue to be critical bottleneck to systematic planning and preparation of reliable projections in Liberia.¹²¹ UNDP played a critical role in establishing the Liberian Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services (LISGIS) through the provision of resources, equipment and technical and human resources. UNDP effectiveness in supporting LISGIS is achieved through a combination of technical support and capacity building, funding and the provision of equipment, and regular and joint coordination of processes. LISGIS has started producing data, some of which has supported poverty reduction strategy preparation.

According to LISGIS, the country is building more credible and more systematic statistics and data management systems, has established a core cadre of statisticians, and with UNDP support, developed a National Strategy for the Development of Statistics.¹²² With the National Strategy for the Development of Statistics, Liberia has a national framework for the production, compilation, analysis and dissemination of national statistical and spatial data. UNDP has supported LISGIS efforts to train staff at both the national and county levels. The trained staff had started the data collection process at the county levels. LISGIS has rolled out data dissemination capacity-building for local officials in all 15 sub-counties¹²³ and set up central statistics and informational offices at the sub-county level.

They have also been provided with equipment and logistical support for data collection. The Liberia Population and Housing Census has been carried out under the leadership of LISGIS, and followed up with capacity building of government staff to undertake census analysis and prepare 14 thematic studies. UNDP, in collaboration with UNFPA, provided the necessary technical assistance to enable LISGIS to carry out these activities.

LISGIS has also started publishing statistics to guide national planning and decision making processes. A mechanism for providing data services to stakeholders has been developed and new research and statistical products based on identified needs in the country have been developed with UNDP contribution. UNDP provided support to LISGIS efforts to enhance their capacity and the capacity of staff of government ministries, counties and institutions to collect and analyse data disaggregated by gender and age. UNDP helped to achieve this by placing a gender statistics expert to assist LISGIS

121 Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-information Services transition from the National information Management Center (formerly at the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) into a statistics Office.

122 Republic of Liberia, National Strategy for the Development of Statistics July 2008, developed with funding from African Development Bank.

123 Funding provided by European Commission.

mainstream gender in statistics. LISGIS has also been able to upgrade the Agriculture Survey Questionnaire to tabulate gender statistics and is working on health and education sector information. This will set up a foundation for disaggregation of data in all national statistics, and enable better targeting of specific groups for development support and services. Furthermore, LISGIS has been able to develop core welfare indicators and questionnaires and labour force surveys. The UNDP collaboration with LISGIS would have benefited from involvement of International Labour Organization.

MONITORING THE MDGs

The UNDP country programme action plan (CPAP) included an output for mainstreaming the MDGs and human rights into local and national development planning processes and the adoption of human development as an overarching planning framework. UNDP supported the preparation and publishing of the 'Liberia Human Development Report' and the Liberia MDGs reports for 2004, 2008 and 2010.¹²⁴ The reports were produced in collaboration with a government subcommittee on MDGs and coordinated by UNDP-sponsored technical advisers and consultants. Over the last three years, Liberia's increased national focus on the MDGs lead to increased budgetary allocations devoted to achieving the Goals.

The main responsibility for coordination remains largely with UNMIL/UNDP, as government still demonstrates less commitment in establishing MGDs coordination mechanisms. However, a civil society organizational structure for coordination of MDGs is in place and works with UNDP. The MDG report highlights that

MDG status in a number of areas are unlikely to be achieved, with the exception of Goal 6 (combat HIV/AIDS), Goal 3 (promote gender equality and women empowerment) and Goal 8 (develop a global partnership for development).¹²⁵ According to the latest report, progress towards achieving the MDGs is slow because the MDGs have not been adequately prioritized in the poverty reduction strategy. Although Liberia is not yet a signatory to the MDGs, the government won a UN MDG award for outstanding leadership commitment and progress towards gender equality and empowerment of women. The 'MDGs 2010' report recommends "strengthening data collection tools and capacity, decentralize data collection functions," an area which UNDP has invested in by supporting LISGIS.

The communication for development outcome is "strengthened media capacity for MDGs advocacy and support to democratic process" in Liberia. UNDP outputs¹²⁶ included working with the various partners¹²⁷ with activities such as training journalists in specialized areas of reporting, support for the Journalism Development Award competition, capacity-building support to the Ministry of Information, and support for the development of media laws, accountability and policy.

Through capacity-building initiatives, UNDP strengthened media reporting on sexual and gender-based violence through media outreach, discussions and talk shows, announcements and other forms of publicity. These efforts contributed to a high level of community awareness of sexual and gender-based violence. UNDP also built media capacity for reporting on human development and gender-sensitive reporting, including

124 The 2004 and 2008 MDG Reports were written by consultants supported by BCPR New York. The 2010 Report is the first to be developed through national processes supported by UNDP.

125 UNDP/ Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Millennium Development Goals 2010 Report, Progress Challenges and Prospect towards Achieving the MGDs, 2010.

126 Reflected in UNDP Communication work plan for 2010.

127 Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism, Press Union of Liberia, Institute for Media Development & Dignity, University of Liberia (Department of Mass Communications, Liberia Media Center & Center for Media Studies and Peacebuilding.

supporting the development of a gender-sensitive media strategy to promote equal participation of men and women in the media.

LAUNCHING AN INCLUSIVE FINANCIAL SECTOR

Support to an inclusive financial sector was one of the key strategies for poverty reduction under the economic policy and management programme area of UNDP. A key objective for the UNDP programme was “capacity development for formulation and implementation of a microfinance policy to promote socially responsive business enterprise with an emphasis on small and medium-enterprises.” This builds on UNDP-supported projects under community-based recovery and development. Providing microcredit to cooperatives and women’s groups lead to the establishment of village savings and loans associations that focused on credit for poor and vulnerable groups.

Microfinance support is implemented at the national level to strengthen microfinance regulation and build microfinance institutions’ capacities to deliver services to the poor. In the area of regulation, UNDP has worked the United Nations Capital Development Fund to support the Central Bank of Liberia develop a framework and policy for regulation of microfinance services that are already in place, leading to the Microfinance Regulatory and Supervisory Framework for Liberia.¹²⁸ The programme is working with seven microfinance institutions to reach 53,000 clients.

The programme supported a foundation course (undertaken jointly with Cuttington University Graduate School) in microfinance aimed at strengthening service delivery and professionalizing the sector. The programme also supports microfinance institutions to transition into non-bank financial institutions and to develop financial products that are attractive to the poor.

Women’s group members interviewed by the evaluation team in Bomi and Bong complained that the microfinance institutions’ loan terms and recovery practices are exploitative. They noted that interest rates were usurious—30 percent over 3 months (about 150 percent compounded per year), and that in the event that payments were not made, microfinance institution staff were known to visit homes and demand assets as payment, intimidating the women and sometimes using violence.

Moreover, there is no mechanism to ensure that the intended beneficiaries are reached. According to the Ministry of Gender Development, this approach promoted by UNDP and the United Nations Capital Development Fund to deliver credit services to women is inappropriate for the women, and funds are not invested where they would have the most impact on achieving the MDGs. Programme resources should instead be given to women’s groups and village savings and loan institutions to boost their loan schemes and build their capacity to use credit.

UNDP entered into these controversial arrangements because the country office does not have the requisite technical experience to appropriately design or monitor the programme. The terms on which loans are provided are left to the microfinance institution concerned or, in the case of village savings and loan associations to the women members. No substantive technical advice or training is provided.

SUSTAINABLE LOCAL ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT

Sustainable Local Economic Empowerment is the second component of the 2008–2012 CPAP pro-poor economic development pillar. The component has two outcomes on productive employment and food security.

128 Central Bank of Liberia: 2009. Micro Finance Regulatory and Supervisory Framework for Liberia, June 2009.

COMMUNITY BASED RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT

The Community Based Recovery and Development programme was designed and implemented in quick implementation mode during the immediate post-conflict period and has continued to the present, perpetuating a humanitarian assistance mode of intervention. The programme focused on supporting agricultural production at the community level and on projects to increase employment opportunities for vulnerable groups, women and youth in particular. Where microfinance was provided under a Village Loan and Savings Association arrangement, seed money was not provided—principal was based on contributions from women members. Women received training on how credit works and record keeping.

During the 2004–2007 CPAP, the programme aimed to build community capacities by providing basic services, supporting peacebuilding activities, rehabilitating and establishing community infrastructure for social services and developing agriculture. UNDP supported numerous projects in education, health, markets, feeder roads and food security structures for seed and agro-processing.

In most instances this involved rehabilitating infrastructure and facilities through subcontracts to local firms. The selected subcontractors were largely based in Monrovia due to the advertising process applied by the UNDP direct execution modality unit. According to the midterm evaluation, key documented results included restoration of infrastructure and social services (which stabilized people's lives and helped them return to their villages and communities), creation of District Development Councils in 15 counties (which increased community-level planning and management and increased participation in development activities), humanitarian support to

families (which provided services such as school, clinics, water and markets) and improving security and peacebuilding within communities fractured as a result of the conflict.¹²⁹

The UNDP midterm review documents 165 projects implemented between 2007 and 2008, reaching a total of 200,000 beneficiaries in 2008. The midterm review report further documents that by 2009, 56 schools and education facilities, 20 health facilities, several bridges, up to 200 kilometres of roads and two markets (that include day care and play facilities) were rehabilitated or constructed.

As part of the Food Security Joint Programme, UNDP built 14 food storage facilities including drying floors to reduce post-harvest losses through spoilage. Collaboration between the government and the UN Joint Programme on Food Security and Nutrition provided post-harvest processing and storage facilities and rehabilitation and improvements to market facilities at the county level.¹³⁰

The midterm review of the Community-based Recovery and Development programme recorded a total of 22,100 beneficiaries of microloans. Women's groups in Bong County cited positive benefits from the village savings and loans schemes, which have empowered them by increasing their productivity and providing them with added independence. The women had started several micro-business projects. Despite high interest rates, funds from microbusinesses enabled women to pay school fees and meet other immediate needs.

Interest rates imposed by village savings and loans associations vary somewhat and are imposed by the members themselves, but rates of most groups are still high (20 to 30 percent over a three-month period). Women receive loans in proportion to their contributions to the Village Savings and

129 Highlighted in UNDP Liberia Country Programme 2004-2007, Terminal Evaluation 2009 pg 39

130 Includes UNDP, FAO, UNICEF, WFP, UNOPS, WHO, United Nations Mission in Liberia, World Bank, and on Government side - Ministry of Agriculture with Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Health and Social Welfare, Gender and Development, Education and Public Works.

Loan Associations Fund. The savings and loan associations provide women an opportunity to have savings they never had before and a safety net for urgent cash requirements.

Participation in the Community Based Recovery and Development projects was based on interest, with a cash incentive offered during training. One of the projects for agriculture (horticulture) visited in Bomi County had dropped from a membership of 18 members to four members. Members interviewed said their colleagues dropped out of the groups and common projects after the cash incentive ended. The cash incentives undermined the continued participation and sustainability of the project for the majority of group members; they did not see any additional benefit from projects that were designed by Ministry of Agriculture county agricultural extension workers without taking economic viability into consideration.

MILLENNIUM VILLAGE

The Millennium Village is a highly political venture that was launched with presidential support and UNDP assistance in partnership with the Earth Institute of Columbia University, in Kokoyah in Bong County in 2008. The Earth Institute provided technological and resource-intense support to the programme, which did not benefit from UNDP experience in area-based development.

A midterm review in 2010 reported the programme trained 2,220 farmers, provided tools and equipment to 16 groups, and supported the immunization of 12,000 children. The programme started slowly, with limited progress against targets. For example, although the programme started in 2008, the 2011 implementation targets were originally intended for 2010. Implementation has had challenges with delayed implementation by contractors, coupled with delivery of lower quality work than expected (an issue of concern strongly noted by community leaders). In a few instances, contracts were defaulted on, leaving projects incomplete.

UNDP monitoring could have been more effective. During meetings with community leaders, it was apparent that there was a breakdown in communication between the UNDP project team and the community representatives, characterized by mistrust on both sides.

The project has been top-down, with most decisions and priorities perceived as being made by project staff. UNDP procurement procedures were of particular concern to community members who felt that the community representatives were sidelined and not involved in procurement decision-making. In turn, UNDP and project staff were concerned that involving community leaders in procurement processes would result in corrupt practices associated with allocating subcontracts to local contractors with limited capacity.

According to the Bong county local government leadership, they have not been sufficiently involved in planning or managing the Millennium Village programme. There is limited or ineffective social and community organization or mobilization.

The project has not explored the potential for substantive collaboration with other UN Agencies with valuable experience and technical expertise. Agencies that could have been associated with the programme include the Food and Agriculture Organization, International Labour Organization, UNICEF and the United Nations Population Fund.

The project has not collected any area-wide baseline data to support planning and the monitoring of MDG targets. An exit strategy has not yet been defined.

YOUTH EMPLOYMENT

Liberian youth were the backbone of the militia during the years of civil war. As such they were deprived of education and any marketable skills. To the extent that some of them benefited from the DDDR process, they were reintegrated into local communities—with and without jobs. Employment opportunities are rare, even for those youth

who have benefited from education. Youth constitute more than 50 percent of Liberia's population and continue to be faced with particularly high unemployment rates.¹³¹ Youth crime continues to be an issue within the 18- to 26-year-old population; they are particularly susceptible to drugs and criminal gang activities. As such, the large number of youth constitutes both a promise and a threat to the stability of the country.

UNDP support to youth has been sporadic and piecemeal, often delivered in a humanitarian mode with relatively little long-term support or mentoring. As part of the Community Based Recovery and Development programme, UNDP was to have supported business skills development among youth and the establishment.¹³² Furthermore, the subcomponent on democratic governance and rule of law under the state capacity and institutional strengthening component had a specific focus on youth leadership training. UNDP support to youth has been primarily through the Ministry of Youth and Sports. The 2004–2006 youth programme (extended to 2007) focused on capacity-building for the Federation of Liberian Youth and Ministry of Youth and Sports. UNDP supported a mapping of youth organizations in five counties and formed youth secretariats at the district level. UNDP supported the establishment of a national youth development trust fund.¹³³

A Youth Action Plan (2007) was developed by Ministry of Youth and Sports with UNDP support. UNDP also worked with non-governmental organizations and civil society to support youth. With the Federation of Liberian Youth, UNDP provided job training to over 500 Liberian youth in administration and clerical skills. Some graduates of the training were reported to have secured employment. However, placement is not systematically monitored, which

renders assessing performance very difficult. This is symptomatic of all UNDP programmes providing support for youth employment. There is little follow-up to monitor the results of training and job placement.

Other areas of youth-focused activities include UNDP support to the Common Ground project to conduct “youth and violence conflict mapping” in preparation for the 2005 elections. A photo registration process for youth was completed in 2011. Local representatives of the Ministry of Youth and Sports in Bong County appreciated UNDP as a partner, particularly the UNDP-supported Liberian National Youth Volunteers initiative. The Volunteers for Peace initiative has placed two volunteers per county to defuse conflict and mediate local disputes. UNDP worked with the Ministry of Agriculture to train youth on agriculture. Youth Volunteers and Volunteers for Peace each engage with their communities to settle low-level disputes and mediate conflict. According to county officials in Bong County, the volunteers had assisted with the settlement of land disputes. UNDP is also supporting the construction of a Youth Centre in Bong County. In Beajah District, Bome County, Youth Peace Ambassadors have worked at the grassroots level to address low-level disputes, sexual and gender-based violence and HIV/AIDS education and domestic affairs. They intervene in some land issues and attempt to resolve the issues in conjunction with the local Chief.

UNDP supported the training and deployment of Peace Ambassadors.¹³⁴ The overall impression of the parents consulted by the evaluation team was that they approve of the categories of training identified by their community leaders and UNDP. The lack of job opportunities for youths on plantations and the lack of skills training continue to be issues, and youths complain that they have

131 Also see 17th Secretary-General's Progress Report, 15 August 2008.

132 UNDP and Government of Liberia, Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) for Liberia, 2008–2012.

133 Ibid.

134 UNDP Administrator Helen Clarke inaugurated the Peace Ambassador Programme during her visit to UNDP Liberia in 2009. UNDP 2009 Annual report.

no meaningful economic opportunities available. Youth leaders in Bomi County stated that they would want to take part in the greater marketplace, not simply be trained as ‘rubber tappers’ for the Plantations. Agriculture training is viewed as key, because farming is believed to have more potential in the future.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- UNDP should review the best practices and experiences of other country programmes in other post-conflict situations (e.g. Afghanistan, Cambodia, Central America, Sudan) in designing and managing Area Development Schemes, adapting modalities and approaches as necessary. UNDP needs to utilize the experience gained with community-based development planning and management systems. Attention needs to be given to developing such capacity first in order to create delivery capacity so that funds and programmes can be managed effectively at the community level, reflecting the perceived needs of the communities themselves rather than officials in Monrovia.
- Baseline development data urgently needs to be collected and analysed at each location of the Community-based Recovery and Development and Millennium Village projects not only for monitoring results, but also to enable systematic planning of development projects. UNDP urgently needs to boost its technical capacity in the area of microfinance and strengthen its monitoring of the UNDP/United Nations Capital Development Fund microfinance interventions in order to ensure that the resources invested reach the intended beneficiaries and that they are delivered on terms that are in keeping with sound and equitable practices. Current microfinance institution practices should be investigated, and UNDP should terminate relationships with institutions where malpractice or usurious practices are found.
- UNDP should continue to support employment creation, particularly for youth in Liberia, as youth unemployment constitutes one of the most likely causes of future instability. A much more systematic programme should be developed in this regard. UNDP should work with the International Labour Organization to develop demand-oriented vocational training and to determine the skills that are most marketable through consultations with multinational corporations that have signed concessions in Liberia. Consideration should be given to working out partnerships with the private sector to support targeted vocational training.
- It is ineffective to provide vocational training to youth if there is no follow-up to determine whether the training has led to employment or to determine the training’s usefulness in the workplace. UNDP needs to set up systems for follow-up monitoring, particularly methodologies based on surveys of ex-trainees and their employers.
- UNDP should also work with the International Labour Organization to develop small business and microfinance advisory support, drawing on best practices (e.g. from the Association of Cambodian Local Economic Development Agencies) that successfully provided community-based and managed microfinance to conflict-affected communities in the immediate post-conflict period.¹³⁵
- UNDP has placed a number of technical advisers that made positive contributions to national processes and built government capacities. UNDP should harness their comparative advantage and technical competence in order

135 Established as a network of non-governmental organizations with UNDP/International Labour Organization support, within four years the Association of Cambodian Local Economic Development Agencies was registered as a bank. With the recent opening of the Cambodian Stock Exchange in Phnom Penh, the Association of Cambodian Local Economic Development Agencies is set to be one of the first two Cambodian companies to go public.

to strengthen capacities within UNDP. For example, technical advisers inside LISGIS could fill gaps in UNDP for monitoring and capturing gender-disaggregated data for the UNDP programmes.

- Practical experience gained in creating employment should be assessed on a periodic basis and the knowledge gained used to develop national policies that are geared towards job creation and improving conditions for small- and medium-sized enterprises. Such policies should include both legislation and economic incentives. The latter should be developed in collaboration with The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

4.4 GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT

The Government of Liberia has been a champion of gender equality and women's empowerment. In 2010, it won the United Nations MDGs Achievement Award for MDG Goal 3 for its commitment, progress and outstanding leadership towards achieving gender equality and women's empowerment. Liberian women have a history of playing crucial roles in peacebuilding and participated in negotiating the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Human development indicators for women are low, like for all Liberians. However, women's indicators are worse than men's in education, employment, health, access to services and general livelihood status. Recognizing these challenges, the government has made positive progress towards establishing gender strategies and initiatives to advance its effectiveness in gender mainstreaming and promoting women's rights and women's economic empowerment.

The Ministry of Gender and Development is tasked with spearheading strategies and policies for transforming gender equality. A National Gender Policy (2009) is in place. In March 2009, the country adopted the Liberian National Action Plan to implement Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. Liberia has also established a civil society organization and women's forum to monitor implementation of the Liberia National Action Plan. A gender equity bill is under discussion to promote quotas to ensure gender inclusion in Liberia.


The frequency of rape, sexual exploitation and abuse continue to be high. For example, 15 to 20 rapes per week are still being reported, and victims range in age from infants to over 60.¹³⁶ The country has established strategies and plans to address sexual and gender-based violence. The country developed the 'National Gender-based Violence Plan of Action' in 2006 and the 'National Standard Operating Procedures for the Prevention and Response to Sexual and Gender-based Violence' in 2009. The 'Sexual Assault and Abuse Prosecution Handbook' was developed in 2008, and the government and UN are implementing a Joint Programme on Sexual and Gender-based Violence.

Liberia has made advancements in mainstreaming gender into security sector reform. Progress in the Ministry of Justice includes establishing a special unit of the criminal court to handle sexual offences, holding gender and security sector reform sensitization campaigns for security personnel, providing psychosocial counselling programmes for convicts and perpetrators of sexual and gender-based violence crimes and appointing female personnel to top-level administrative positions.¹³⁷ The LNP took the lead in the security sector when it approved its gender policy in February 2005. The country has achieved a 15 percent recruitment initiative

136 UNDP/BCPR, Review and Lessons Learned from the Global Programme on Advancing Women Peace and Security Report, By Jane Lawry-White, February 2011.

137 Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Mapping Study on Gender and Security Sector Reform, Actors and Activities in Liberia, Validation workshop Report, March 2011

Figure 10. Liberia: Progress on Gender Equality in different positions



for women in the police force, falling short of its target of 20 percent female representation in the security sector by 2011.

As a post-conflict country, Security Council resolution 1325 is an important instrument for guiding support for gender issues in Liberia. Liberia is among the pioneer countries to develop a Security Council resolution 1325. Furthermore, according to UNDP supporting full implementation of resolution 1325 will also lead to “achievement of the UNDP Eight Point Agenda” for women’s empowerment and gender equality in crisis prevention and recovery¹³⁸.

138 UNDP Eight Point Agenda for Women’s Empowerment and Gender Equality in Crisis Prevention and Recovery.

139 Some of the projects include a women empowerment project on Economic Empowerment of Women (Japan), Sweden Support to Empowerment (Sweden), Norway Support to Colloquium, EC Support to International Women Colloquium (European Commission), Ongoing since 2009 Gender Equality and Economic Empowerment mainly supported by Denmark, Global Gender Equalities (UNDP and various sources) Support To Angie Brooks Center since 2009.

In the 2008–2012 UNDP country programme, gender was placed largely under democratic governance and pro-poor economic growth but was also an overarching theme to be mainstreamed in areas across the entire country programme. The primary goals of gender mainstreaming were creating gender awareness, building national capacity for policy formulation and implementation and strengthening women’s decision-making.

UNDP Liberia has had a series of gender programmes ranging from activities within mainstream UNDP programmes to stand-alone projects and joint programmes implemented with other UN Agencies. Since 2005, UNDP funding for gender equality and women’s empowerment projects has amounted to \$4,156,000. Some of the projects that started in 2005 are still ongoing and have been implemented in collaboration with Ministry of Gender Development.¹³⁹

Gender equality and the empowerment of women are high on the government’s agenda. The government recognizes the gender gaps that exist and encourages all development partners, including UNDP, to support programmes targeting gender equality and women’s empowerment. The UNDP-supported Ministry of Gender Development has the primary mandate for coordinating implementation of national priorities. UNDP support includes establishing the National Gender Policy and developing initiatives in line with it.

PROGRESS ON GENDER EQUALITY IN DIFFERENT POSITIONS

UNDP prioritized gender gaps and developed programme components for increasing women’s participation in governance, women’s presence in the police force and reducing poverty and

Table 7. Mapping UNDP Liberia's progress on Security Council resolution 1325 commitments

	Action Plan Commitments	Status^a	UNDP Support and Comments
1.	Conflict resolution /engagement in peace process	On track	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Supported women's participation in the Accra Peace process; Contributed to Women in Peacebuilding Programme establishment of peace huts; and Supported training and preparation for women to appear before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
2.	Gender-responsive planning processes	On track	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNDP has laid a foundation for institutionalizing gender in strategic ministries and government institutions; Support to Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Finance on gender budgeting will provide opportunities to allocate resources for more equitable growth; and Response to data gaps through capacity-building for LISGIS to collect disaggregated statistics will lead to informed national decision making
3.	Financing gender equality and women's economic Empowerment	Way to go	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNDP support for microcredit through partnership with Ministry of Gender and Development, central banks and microfinance institutions. Three microfinance institutions supported with 53,000 clients in seven counties; approximately 95 percent of clients are women; and The focus on institutional strengthening of microfinance institutions is still problematic, less client friendly and less focused on the needs and challenges of women clients
4.	Deployable civilians capacity		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not Applicable to UNDP
5.	Increasing the proportion of women in governance institutions	On Track	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity-building for women political aspirants, elections training manuals, civic and voter education, women's community-based and civil society organization training, 33 civil society organization microgrants for voter education in 15 counties, 41 radio stations mobilizing women to register for elections.
6.	Support for rule of law (state security, justice legislative framework)	On track	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collaborated with other organizations to achieve housing of Women and Child Protection Units at the county level. Contributed to sexual and gender-based violence court and crime unit, trained prosecutors and integrated sexual and gender-based violence in the curriculum; Provided direct support to legislative capacity and drafting processes; Advocated process for inheritance law and amendment of rape laws; Contributed to legal aid support for indigent women; Contributed (with others) to the increase of women in police towards the target of 20 percent; and Curriculum revision for policy academy to make it gender-responsive.
5.	Economic recovery	Way to go	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Several community projects supported based on community choices. Far too small, and some are still in formative stages.

	Action Plan Commitments	Status^a	UNDP Support and Comments
	Local development	Way to go	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Micro-community projects focused on promotion of citizen's participation, and health, education, roads and agriculture; and • Overall outcomes for Community Based Recovery and Development undermined by incentive mechanism.
	Employment service delivery	Unlikely	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employment on infrastructure projects such as roads/ bush clearance; short term in nature and not sustained.
	Participation in DDDR	Unlikely	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Small percent of women involved and did not include women that provided auxiliary combat services.

a. Status with the regard to likelihood of achieving UNDP programme results.

increasing livelihoods. Projects also include components to build women's capacity to manage small- and micro-enterprises, access micro-credit and secure wage-based employment. UNDP programming effectiveness is apparent in strengthening the government's responsiveness to gender equality and women's empowerment issues and through its leadership and management commitment to programme initiatives that address priority gender gaps.

IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325

Security Council resolution 1325 is an important instrument for guiding support for gender issues in Liberia. Liberia is among the pioneer countries to develop a resolution 1325 Country Action Plan--the Liberia National Action Plan. The action areas of commitment for resolution 1325 include supporting post-conflict planning, conflict resolution and peacebuilding, deployable civilian capacities, including restructuring of state institutions from a gender perspective such as electoral processes, security institutions and public sector management systems and legislative reforms including citizenship and violence against women. The resolution 1325 action plan recommends increasing the proportion of women in decision-making in governance institutions and supporting institutions that provide state security, administration of justice and the legislative framework, and supporting legal reform from a gender perspective

and implementing systems that ensure that women and girls have access to justice and law enforcement institutions (See Table 7 for progress on Security Council Resolution 1325).

IMPLEMENTING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325

UNDP support effectively initiated processes that will lead to the realization of many action areas of Security Council resolution 1325 and the establishment of a Security Council 1325 Secretariat at the Ministry of Gender and Development. An important result of UNDP support has been to the Ministry of Gender and Development's efforts to develop the country's gender priorities stipulated in the 'National Gender Policy', which is an important process that guides post-conflict planning for gender equality. With UNDP support, the Ministry has been able to roll out the 'National Gender Policy' nationally.

Gender planning and gender budget initiatives spearheaded by Ministry of Gender and Development with LISGIS, Mutual Fund Education Alliance, UNDP and UN Women are expected to strengthen the national focus towards increasing the portion of resources allocated to identifying gender action areas.

UNDP supported Liberian women's participation in conflict resolution initiatives and peace processes. The UNDP programme has had some positive gains in the area of governance, gender-based violence and economic recovery through

pro-poor support. Under economic recovery, women and youth participated in wage employment and in providing services during UNDP-supported DDDR projects. Overall, the UNDP programme has distributed gender-based initiatives in the priority action areas of Security Council resolution 1325, which will significantly contribute to achieving the resolution's goals.

NATIONAL POLICIES AND STRATEGIES FOR GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT

UNDP initiatives have effectively supported institutionalizing gender in government systems and instruments, a significant step in placing gender targets on government plan and budget agendas. Key areas are strengthening government policies and strategies, developing gender budgeting and statistics, and supporting law reforms to address women and girls' security and vulnerability.

In the area of policies and strategies, UNDP programme initiatives have been effective in advocating for mainstreaming gender action areas in processes for strategic national institutions. UNDP has successfully advocated to include gender targets in the '10-year National Capacity Development Strategy', 'Civil Service Reform Strategy', and 'National Police Strategic Plan' among others. UNDP achieved this by placing gender expertise in the strategic government bodies in order to help develop the concept and design policies and strategies.

In the Gender Planning and Budgeting and data disaggregation initiatives, UNDP supported the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs and LISGIS to increase social inclusion and ensure that vulnerable groups (women, youth and children in particular) are integrated into national development processes. A UNDP-supported senior gender adviser introduced the process of strengthening human resource capacity in LISGIS for the collection of gender statistics. LISGIS staff and their government counterparts have been trained nationally and at county levels and are able to collect data disaggregated by gender and by age.

Using seed funding for the senior gender adviser from BCPR to invest in the Gender Statistics and Gender Budgeting Initiative, UNDP strengthened the institutional capacities of the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs. The gender-responsive budgeting initiative has made outreach efforts to the ministry of finance and institutions in the health, social welfare, agriculture and legislative sectors.

In the context of legal reform and women and girls' security, UNDP support resulted in passing the inheritance and rape laws, whose provisions are designed to benefit and protect the rights of the vulnerable, women and girls in particular. UNDP success was partly through collaboration with other agencies and direct support of national institutions and civil society advocacy organizations such as the Association of Female Lawyers. UNDP addressed increasing women's security by increasing in the number of women in the police force. UNDP collaborated with national and UN institutions to introduce the Accelerated Learning High School Diploma programme, designed for young women who wish to join the police force. This contributed to increasing the number of female recruits to 15 percent, up from a negligible number before the initiative.

UNDP has a comparative advantage in identifying and matching gender technical capacity and expertise to partners that need the capacity to address gender gaps within their institutions. Key areas of UNDP achievement include building technical expertise in key entry points for gender mainstreaming in strategic government processes and building institutions' capacity to attract finances from development partners to support gender initiatives. For example, UNDP-provided gender expertise enabled the integration of gender statistics into the national statistics policy, resulting in government-generated sex-disaggregated data. UNDP technical advisers provided the resources and expertise to enable the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Finance to utilize gender budgeting.

UNDP has had a partnership with Ministry of Gender Development since its establishment. Support has included providing gender technical advice and resources; results have included the development and roll out of the National Gender Policy and the establishment of the 'Liberia National Action Plan for the Implementation of UN resolution 1325'.

UNDP effectiveness and efficiency is challenged by the absence of sustainability mechanisms for ensuring continued capacity among counterparts so that less external technical capacity is needed in the future. There was no evidence of an exit strategy for capacity-building that would ensure that human resource capacity has been strengthened to continue without the UNDP technical advisers.

SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

UNDP is a key partner in the UN Joint Programme of Sexual and Gender-based Violence, which aims to operationalize the 'Gender-based Violence Plan of Action' in Liberia. UNDP supports initiatives that strengthen the criminal justice system, provide security and protection for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, and improve coordination and management mechanisms of sexual and gender-based violence in the country.

Key strides in curbing sexual and gender-based violence have included the establishment of Women and Child Protection Units at police stations in Monrovia and 11 counties so far. UNDP strengthened the Units by providing housing infrastructure, training and logistics support.

The Women and Child Protection Units face challenges in effectively responding to community needs. The Units are inadequately equipped and cannot effectively follow-up cases to conclusion. According to interviews with the police and UN Agencies, many of the Units are understaffed and logistics (e.g. transport, recording materials) are not provided. However, the Units' challenges are in proportion to the challenges faced by the entire LNP, whose capacity is still developing.

UNDP has supported data collection on sexual and gender-based violence, security and protection services, and has raised awareness and knowledge of the issues in schools. UNDP has initiated processes to establish an endowment fund for sexual and gender-based violence at the county level.

WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN GOOD GOVERNANCE

UNDP support for mainstreaming gender in governance has been effectively targeted, has led to increases in women's electoral participation and has strengthened their capacity for political participation. Working with the National Elections Commission, UNDP provided civic and voter education to rural women.

UNDP supported women's community-based and civil society organizations' efforts to expand their outreach to different parts of the country. UNDP awarded voter education microgrants to 33 civil society organizations, 30 percent of which were women's organizations. Forty-one radio stations in 15 counties aired messages related to women's electoral participation.

UNDP facilitated political parties' steps towards mainstreaming gender in their manifestos. Inter-party dialogue sessions were held with 17 political parties, with many pledging to have a minimum of 30 percent women's participation. The parties also pledged to identify and support female candidates. The parties also agreed to advocate for laws and protocols that ensure women's rights.

UNDP initiatives' effectiveness is due to the targeted technical capacity that has been built at the National Elections Commission for mainstreaming women's political participation in elections. UNDP recruited technical advisers, a gender and elections specialist and a national technical adviser on women's political participation who have worked side by side with the National Elections Commission to roll out the project.

Table 8. UNDP Responsiveness to Gender Equality and Women’s Economic Empowerment

<p>Gender Mainstreaming in UNDP Liberia/Organizational-level mainstreaming:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leadership and senior management commitment and support • Assessment of annual work plans to address gender gaps • Gender Resource Team, established to spearhead internal processes • Senior gender advisers at Resident Coordinator’s office and director technical adviser • UNDP Gender Strategy in progress • 113 Staff trained in basic gender awareness 	<p>Governance Capacity and Women’s Participation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support to elections • Capacity for women aspirants, women targeted for civic education and voter registration • Gender issues included in political party manifestos
	<p>Support for Livelihoods/Women’s Economic Empowerment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Microcredit schemes • Post-harvest infrastructure • Micro-projects; agriculture
	<p>Institutionalization of Gender</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategies and policies, legislation and infrastructure • National security • Strategy, comprehensive support to Ministry of Gender Development, roll out of national gender policy, LNP strategic plan, National Strategy for the Development of Statistics, Civil Service Reform Strategy, Legislative Reforms (inheritance, rape), Women and Child Protection Units, gender-based violence criminalization
	<p>Gender Planning and Budgeting</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data Disaggregation • Gender statistics / gender budgeting Initiative in LISGIS and Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs • Strengthening capacity in gender statistics and gender budgeting processes and increasing social inclusion
	<p>Access to Gender Expertise</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Placed technical adviser for capacity-building in strategic government bodies • Support to National Elections Commission, Ministry of Gender Development, LISGIS, Ministry of Justice, resulting in strategies, policies and instruments.
	<p>Partnership and Collaboration in Joint Programmes and other initiatives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resulting in positive influence on progress in gender, work with the Gender Theme Group

Women political aspirants’ capacities have been built in a non-partisan manner, enabling them to compete in elections. Among the results is the development and production of training manuals through the national elections commission, which should provide the National Elections Commission with technical guidance to continue to increase women’s participation in future election processes.

Whether political parties continue to prioritize gender and women’s issues is beyond the control of UNDP. However, the increase in women’s

political participation in general should have a positive effect on increasing women’s participation in political parties.

ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT AND LIVELIHOODS SUPPORT

The UNDP country programmes prioritized initiatives for strengthening economic empowerment and livelihoods of the poor and vulnerable, women and the youth in particular. The overall UNDP programme approach has been

to integrate pro-poor initiatives into a number of projects and joint programmes, for example the UN Joint programme on Food Security and the Joint Programme on Gender Equality and Women's Economic Empowerment.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that successes in mobilizing women in village savings and loan associations have increased their confidence in managing credit and participating in business.¹⁴⁰ Anecdotal evidence also suggests that UNDP programme initiatives, particularly those integrated with food security support for women's groups, have had positive results on their communities.¹⁴¹ Women's groups were supported with post-harvest storage facilities (e.g. drying floors), women's community centres, and for some groups, children's day care centres. Establishing post-harvest infrastructure for storage and processing helped to reduce post-harvest losses and helped increase benefits from agricultural production. Other initiatives that have benefited women include UNDP-constructed markets and feeder roads that opened up opportunities for women to market their produce.

Though UNDP shows great commitment in strengthening women's empowerment, programme effectiveness is still a challenge. Initiatives that promote employment creation, community participation and community-level livelihood strengthening have been implemented, but because of the limited documentation of results it is difficult to assess outcomes. Because the numerous activities and projects that UNDP has implemented are spread out among stakeholders and community groups, it will be difficult for UNDP staff to follow-up, maintain programme coherence and track outcomes.

Investments in microcredit schemes through microfinance institutions under the UN joint

programme on gender equality and women's economic empowerment are controversial and have no clear results on the ground.

UNDP COMMITMENT TO GENDER EQUALITY

A combination of leadership commitment and resource mobilization has contributed to UNDP programme effectiveness. A close analysis of the UNDP country programme action and work plans suggests a positive pattern for gender planning in the strategies and actions taken across UNDP. All programme units had leeway to take initiative, fund-raise and develop gender-based projects based on relevance and need within their specific programme areas. Projects for elections, gender-responsive budgeting, gender-disaggregated statistics, poverty reduction initiatives and rule of law and security have all grown out of the individual UNDP programme goals (See Table 8).

At the centre of UNDP management, there is a deliberate organizational consciousness to strengthen its internal capacity for programming and the external capacity to support its counterpart organizations. Both the UN Resident Coordinator in Liberia and UNDP Country Director have prioritized attaining gender equality and women's empowerment targets and have recruited (and have benefited from) full-time gender advisers. The gender technical adviser provides professional advice in mainstreaming gender in UNDP programmes. Incrementally, and in a more protracted manner, this strategy is resulting in a positive practice that has influenced several government processes to integrate gender in their plans.¹⁴²

Though UNDP has made strides in supporting gender equality in programmes, attaining gender parity at the country office remains a challenge; women

140 Evidence from ADR meetings and women in the village savings and loans associations, May 2011, and UNDP Liberia CPAP Midterm Review Report.

141 Interview with community groups in Bong County, ADR May 2011, and UNDP Liberia CPAP Midterm Review Report.

142 UNDP BCPR in New York supported UNDP Liberia with a gender technical adviser with seed funds for the programme.

staff constitutes only 20 percent of the workforce.¹⁴³ According to a UNDP report, the country office has set itself a target of 45 percent female staff by end of 2011, which has yet to be achieved.¹⁴⁴

UNDP developed the gender awareness of UNDP staff and their capacity to address gender priorities within their programme areas. Within UNDP Liberia, a Gender Resource Team of 12 members, representing all programmes and operations, has been established with a specific terms of reference. The Gender Resource Team members are the gender advocacy organ within UNDP and the in-house coordination mechanism for gender mainstreaming. The internal gender thematic group within UNDP promotes knowledge of gender mainstreaming and gender support to their respective programme units.¹⁴⁵ A total of 113 UNDP staff have been trained in gender awareness, 23 in gender analysis and mainstreaming, and 30 have received training in gender and organizational change.¹⁴⁶ UNDP is supported by a Senior Gender Adviser to develop a Gender Work Plan, a subsidiary of the UNDP annual work plan. The country office Human Resource Unit will be maintaining the gender marker development exercise (rolled out in March 2010) and the gender parity data matrix.

PARTNERSHIPS AND COLLABORATION WITH UN AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT COUNTERPARTS

UNDP found synergies working with other UN agencies and national stakeholders to advance common programme goals. UNDP has had successful partnerships with the United Nations

Population Fund in the population census, with UN Women on gender-responsive budgeting and with the United Nations Capital Development Fund (in collaboration with the Central Bank of Liberia) in microfinance. Formal collaborations with UN agencies include the Joint Programme on Gender Equality and Women's Economic Empowerment¹⁴⁷ and the second three-year phase of the Joint Programme on Sexual and Gender-based Violence. Other initiatives UNDP has worked on with partners include the pilot project Model County Initiative to Eliminate Sexual and Gender Based Violence.

UNDP staff are members of the UN Gender Thematic Group. Based on interviews with UN partners, UNDP staff participation has been both professional and beneficial to the group. The UN Gender Thematic Group has contributed to mainstreaming gender in the poverty reduction strategy and increased gender-awareness across the government. Because of their effectiveness in working together, the thematic group was cited as a model for UN 'Delivering as One'.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- UNDP should respond to the Ministry of Gender Development's specific request to support its capacities to mainstream gender in government from national to local levels in the short-, medium- and long term.
- UNDP should continue to support gender mainstreaming in government in partnership with the Ministry of Gender Development. UNDP coordination of its programmes with

143 Data from UNDP Liberia report Gender Steering and Implementation Committee Reporting Template. Progress Report on the Implementation of the Gender Equality Strategy for 2009-2010. Final Version.

144 Ibid.

145 Terms of Reference for UNDP Liberia Gender Resource Team.

146 Source: UNDP Liberia, UNDP Liberia's Achievements Towards meeting the Goals of Established by the UNDP GES (2008-2013). Country Office Achievements.

147 Signed by the International Labour Organization, Scientific and Cultural Organization, The World Bank, UN WOMEN, UNDP, United Nations Educational, United Nations Mission in Liberia and the United Nations Office for Partnerships and three government Ministries: Ministry of Gender and Development, Ministry of Labour, and Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs.

the Ministry of Gender Development has not been well streamlined and is dependent on project initiatives supported by UNDP at the time. Because the Ministry of Gender Development has the mandate to coordinate gender mainstreaming in government, any technical support on gender should work with the Ministry of Gender Development to strengthen their effectiveness and increase their efficiency in executing their mandate. UNDP should strengthen its role in leveraging resources for implementation of gender initiatives and work with the Ministry of Gender Development to reach out to other sectors.

- Gender actions and strategies promoted by UNDP in government institutions should be closely coordinated with the Ministry of Gender Development in order to reinforce the Ministry's mandate. This would strengthen the role of the Ministry in monitoring policy implementation and ensure that frameworks and action plans are developed and coordinated within the overall national gender policy framework.
- The assessment of UNDP performance in implementing gender equality activities has been undermined by the absence of an effective results-based monitoring mechanism. This also affects the feedback loop that can inform management actions. Limited information exists on beneficiaries and the extent to which UNDP programmes have created change. UNDP should develop and institutionalize systems for creating baselines and the collecting data on performance indicators with a view towards demonstrating evidence of change.

4.5 HIV AND AIDS

According to current statistics, Liberia has a remarkably low HIV/AIDS prevalence rate for a country emerging from conflict and with relatively open borders: 1.5 percent for adults between 15 and 49 years of age, according to the Demographic and Health Survey 2007) (this may have to do in part with the quality and coverage of surveillance testing).¹⁴⁸ In 2009, a higher prevalence rate of 4 percent was recorded for pregnant women aged between 15 and 24 years, somewhat lower than the 5.5 percent recorded in 2007. Urban studies indicate a higher prevalence for urban populations, particularly Monrovia at 2.5 percent to 2.7 percent, compared to rural areas at 0.8 percent;¹⁴⁹ four out of 13 urban centres studied in 2006 and 2007 had a prevalence rate of 7 percent and above.¹⁵⁰ Less than 5 percent of the population have responded to voluntary testing—and men do not respond readily. 17 percent of the population with advanced HIV have access to antiretroviral drugs. The National AIDS Commission is new and still in the process of establishing itself.

HIV and AIDS programmes in Liberia tend to also address malaria and tuberculosis as they are primarily supported by the Global Fund on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund). Malaria is reported to account for 35 percent of outpatient deaths, with pregnant women and children under 5 years recorded as most vulnerable.¹⁵¹

UNDP has had two types of HIV and AIDS programmes as part of its support to the Government of Liberia. The major support was with funds from the Global Fund, which were channelled through UNDP to the government. UNDP also developed an HIV/AIDS Programme within its country programme action plan, funded from Target for Resources Assignment

148 Base year is 2007. Source: Republic of Liberia MDG 2010 Report, Progress Challenges and Prospect towards Achieving the MDGs.

149 Ibid.

150 Ibid.

151 Ibid.

from the Core (TRAC) resources. The Second HIV/AIDS UNDP Liberia's programme initiative was primarily focused on developing policy, supporting service delivery, promoting awareness and reducing stigma.¹⁵²

Beginning in 2007, UNDP focused Global Fund resources on institutional development and prioritized human resource development for response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. UNDP supported access to treatment, availability of drugs and the operationalization of the National AIDS Commission.

UNDP embarked on institutional assessments of the government's capacity to deliver HIV/AIDS programmes, particularly on the part of the Ministry of Health. This was followed by a systematic effort to build management capacity within government institutions. Furthermore, the HIV/AIDS programme has become more multi-sectoral in approach and includes a wide range of stakeholders. Round 6, Phase 1 of the Global Fund ended in April 2010, and also ended UNDP's role as the principal channel of funding.

UNDP has registered significant successful management of the Global Fund and has effectively transferred capacity and responsibility to the Government of Liberia. The National AIDS commission has been set up and is now operational. An institutional assessment the government's capacity to deliver HIV/AIDS programmes was completed. Over 3,000 health workers have benefited from training supported by UNDP. The programme has provided treatment and free antiretroviral drugs to some 2,970 people, set up some 62 centres for prevention of mother-to-child transmission services and 18 antiretroviral treatment centres in the counties. Eighty-five testing centres have also been established. It should be noted that the HIV/AIDS sector has several key players; outcomes should be attributed to UNDP and other partners, including those in the Joint Programme.

Based on the interviews conducted by the evaluation team, UNDP effectively built capacities in the Ministry of Health to manage the Global Fund on behalf of the country. In 2010, UNDP passed managerial functions of Global Fund resources to the Ministry of Health; the Ministry of Health is now fully responsible for the HIV/AIDS component. UNDP still leads in managing the malaria and tuberculosis components, though it expects to transfer management to the Ministry of Health by the end of 2011.

HIV/AIDS activities are also planned under Community Security and Social cohesion Programme for "strengthening capacity of selected [community-based organizations] and non-governmental organizations to provide quality care and support to orphans and People Living with AIDS by incorporating income generating activities into HIV/AIDS interventions in partnership with others."

UNDP core programme support to HIV/AIDS supported by TRAC funds was evaluated positively, having contributed positively to orphans and vulnerable children.¹⁵³ Working with UNAIDS on the Leadership Development Programme to build the capacities of women living with HIV/AIDS was evaluated as effective, as was the training provided in 2010 to 29 women from the Liberian Women Empowerment Network and Light Association.¹⁵⁴

At the start of the programme, UNDP seconded three technical advisers to the Ministry of Health, which is now able to fully staff the programme. Two of the technical advisers have been phased out and the third will be phased out at the end of his current one-year contract. UNDP has also handed over the monitoring and evaluation component to the Ministry of Health. UNDP has also supported Ministry of Health to establish a Health Management Information System. The programme also supported the establishment of the National AIDS Commission in 2009.

152 UNDP Liberia Country Programme, 2004-2007. Terminal Evaluation, September 2009.

153 UNDP CPAP 2004-2007 terminal evaluation Report.

154 Transformational Leadership Programme. Success Stories

Under the UNDP CPAP 2008–2012, HIV/AIDS was designed as part of the component on State Capacity and Institutional Strengthening in the democratic governance and rule of law programme area. HIV/AIDS activities are planned under public administration reform, with activities to support the poverty reduction strategy and sector plans of government to mainstream HIV/AIDS and support the National AIDS Commission.

UNDP staff interviews evaluated the HIV/AIDS core interventions as not having had significant results and lacking sufficient implementation capacity and commitment. Furthermore, the HIV/AIDS core programme has been inadequately funded, with only \$60,000 allocated for the current CPAP.

UNDP has not fully implemented plans to work on the HIV/AIDS Workplace programme with the Ministry of Internal Affairs or with the National AIDS Commission and line ministries. UNDP support is supposed to be provided as part of overall programme coordinated by UNAIDS. A major constraint cited by UNDP Liberia has been delays and problems with decentralization efforts in Liberia. For example, the county health teams that are supposed to roll out the programmes are said to have limited capacities to handle the HIV/AIDS programme. It is doubtful, however, whether decentralization could have been expected to be rolled out rapidly enough given the numerous political and policy constraints to deliver the requisite capacity for implementing the sector's urgent programme activities. Other challenges cited during interviews include poor data collection mechanisms

and non-streamlined supply chain management. The latter also affects the wider Global Fund-supported programme.

4.6 ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Liberia has 42 percent of the Upper Guinea Moist Forest ecosystem of West Africa, the second largest tropical forest in the world.¹⁵⁵ The country also has the “second largest block of primary tropical rainforest in West Africa, and a forest cover of 45 percent, making it one of the 34 biodiversity ‘hotspots’, which are also an important reserve valuable for preventing global warming and climate change.”¹⁵⁶ Accordingly, illegal logging and animal poaching threaten the forest. Liberia's forests and national resources were plundered during the long years of conflict and “timber was a key resource for armed factions” in addition to diamonds and gold.¹⁵⁷

The post-conflict environment in Liberia is affected by factors such as “shifting cultivation, soil erosion, unregulated timber exploitation, poaching and hunting, inappropriate mining schemes, insufficient public education and awareness, inadequate law enforcement, and insufficient training in biodiversity management.”¹⁵⁸ These have negative effects on poverty and threaten biodiversity. Forest cover has been depleted at a rate of 1 to 2 percent annually, with over 50 percent of the forest destroyed over the past four decades.¹⁵⁹ Poor waste management and sanitation threaten human health and contribute to poor environmental conditions; only 11 percent of the population has access to flush toilets, and only 25 percent to latrines.¹⁶⁰

155 UNDP Liberia Country Programme 2004–2007 Terminal Evaluation Final Report, September 2009.

156 Ibid.

157 Ibid.

158 UNDP Liberia Programmes. Energy and Environment.

159 Government of Liberia/UNDP State of the Environment Report, Liberia 2006.

160 Ibid.

Box 5. Environment Conventions Ratified by Liberia

- Ramsar Convention on Wetlands (2003)
- Cartagena Protocol on Bio-safety (2002)
- Convention on the protection of the World's cultural and natural heritage (2002)
- Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol (2002)
- Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2002)
- Convention on Biological Diversity (2000)
- Convention to Combat Desertification (1998)
- Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1996)
- Vienna Convention for the protection of the Ozone Layer (1996)
- Convention on International Trade in Endangered species of Wild Fauna and Flora (1981)

Source: UNDP Liberia Country Programme 2004-2007 Terminal Evaluation Final Report, September 2009.

Liberia has signed several international conventions and protocols with respect to protecting the environment and its biodiversity. A number of policies and legislation have been enacted to establish stronger coordination mechanisms in the sector. A National Environment Policy was passed in 2002, and an Environmental Protection Agency established in the same year. The Environmental Protection Agency is mandated to supervise, monitor, and coordinate any issues related to the environment. The Agency is responsible for the production of the 'Biodiversity Action Plan' and the 'Liberia State of the Environment' report.

Timber is among Liberia's major sources of income, in addition to other extractive industries such as rubber, agriculture and minerals. The government has ratified the concessions for iron ore and palm oil, and at the time of the ADR mission was in the process of negotiating offshore oil exploration concessions.

Among the overarching themes of the 2008–2012 country programme is developing

responses to climate change in partnership with key players (e.g. the United Nations Environment Programme) and the private sector. In the previous 2004–2007 CPAP, UNDP worked to bring "greater transparency to the management of Liberia's environment [and] turn Liberia's Forest Development Authority and the Environmental Protection Agency into expert, principled and modern agencies free of corruption."¹⁶¹

Under the CPAP, UNDP aimed to strengthen environmental management systems. Among the targets and indicators was the preparation and implementation of a National Environment Action Plan. UNDP also set out to strengthen the Environmental Protection Agency.

UNDP, in collaboration the Global Environment Fund, UNEP and 12 national partners, has a programme for mainstreaming environment and climate change into national development policies and strategies.¹⁶² The programme draws linkages between poverty and the environment in development programmes and practices. The programme includes outputs for updating the

161 UNDP Liberia Country Programme 2004-2007 Terminal Evaluation Final Report, September 2009.

162 Mainstreaming Environment and Climate change in National development policies and strategies in Liberia, Annual Work Plan 2011.

state of the environment report, for training and capacity development of policy makers in environment and an output for establishing cross-sectoral multi-stakeholder inter-agency coordination mechanisms.

In practice, the UNDP programme in the environmental sector is relatively small compared to other areas of focus. It is also fragmented, and outcomes are difficult to discern, particularly as monitoring data pertaining to anything beyond outputs is not being collected.

UNDP supported the development of a National Resource Management strategy and a National Environment Action Plan. A National Disaster Management Response Commission has been established with UNDP support in order to coordinate disaster responses. UNDP procured laboratory equipment for the Environmental Protection Agency and set up four field offices.¹⁶³

In 2006, UNDP provided substantive support to the production of the first 'State of the Environment Report' for Liberia. Training was provided to strengthen national capacities for the management of national resources in the context of combating climate change. UNDP documents report training 300 participants (41 percent of which were women) in disaster risk management and disaster risk reduction. Teachers, farmers and community members were also trained in environmental issues and sustainable agriculture.

UNDP provided solar panels to a select number of schools to provide lighting with the expressed intent of enabling evening shifts at the schools. The solar panels do not appear to have been provided in conjunction with any other support to youth, children, or the schools themselves. It is therefore difficult to link the provision of these solar panels to educational outcomes in what are clearly underserved schools.

One school that had solar panels installed claimed

to have just begun using the panels for adult literacy classes in the evenings, but the school was empty in the middle of the day and children had been co-opted to work on school vegetable gardens introduced by another donor. The capital cost associated with the installation of the solar panels is relatively high and it is unclear whether the experiment is replicable without external funding. The sustainability of the experiment will also need to be assessed over time, as maintenance, upgrading and replacement of solar cells is apparently delegated to the local community. Solar panels have also been provided to HIV/AIDS voluntary counselling and testing centres in Grand Cape Mount and Bong Counties.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Although environment, energy and sustainable development fall within the UNDP mandate, and although there is clearly a need to begin addressing the issue in Liberia, there is a more urgent need for UNDP to devote its attention to the priority governance areas identified in this report. Any further involvement in the environment and natural resources sector would benefit from a more comprehensive and concerted approach and a clearer strategy. Until such time, there is a distinct impression that support has been largely in the form of one-off interventions of limited scope or, as in the case of the solar panels, quick implementation projects and are, as a consequence, of limited value.
- Given the imminent departure of the UNMIL and the added burden that is likely to be placed on UNDP in the governance and rule of law sectors, it is recommended that UNDP phase out its support to the environment and natural resources sector so that it can concentrate on delivering capacity under the broad rubric of democratic governance and rule of law. Consideration should be given to returning to the sector in a future country programme.

163 UNDP Liberia 2010, CPAP Midterm Review 2008–2012.

4.7 SUSTAINABILITY

In the interest of urgency and humanitarian action, UNDP has been called upon to adopt a number of modalities that are detrimental to long-term sustainability and may even impinge upon the extent of national ownership. Most have been justified on the grounds that in the immediate post-conflict period Liberia did not possess sufficient capacity to manage donor resources effectively, that Liberian institutions were prone to rent-seeking and bad management practices and that assistance had to be delivered rapidly and efficiently in order to consolidate the results of the comprehensive peace agreement, to gain the confidence of the Liberian public, to demonstrate the peace dividend and to ensure that emergency humanitarian assistance was delivered in a timely manner.

However, the same modalities are still in place seven to eight years after the peace agreement. Though the conditions that initially provided justification have improved, structural inertia has crept into both UNDP and the international community's modalities, preventing a systematic transition to greater Liberian control and responsibility.

The following are the key modalities of concern:

Direct execution: While the direct execution modality, if managed correctly, does not preclude full national ownership of the results of assistance and their consequent sustainability, establishing a Direct Execution Modality Unit at UNDP placed control over programme procurement and recruitment within the purview of administrative rather than substantive programme staff—sometimes reducing the quality of the inputs procured and reducing ownership of both UNDP project personnel and counterparts. It has also been argued by many project personnel that the Direct Execution Modality Unit's emphasis on cost control reduced the effectiveness and ultimate sustainability of many activities and their resultant outputs and affected the professional standard of the items procured and consultants recruited.

Funding of key government positions: The funding of key government posts at cabinet and

mid-management levels has been discussed at some length above, and while the salaries paid are not as high as in some other post-conflict countries they still remain up to 10 times higher than the regular salaries of officials with similar rank and responsibility. Increases in revenue and reductions in the total number of civil servants on the government payroll are unlikely provide the clear exit strategies that need to be worked out—whether phasing out begins immediately or several years in the future.

Capital expenditures without recurrent costs: Most UNDP-funded development projects have created new institutions, introduced new equipment or constructed new facilities or infrastructure, all of which place additional demands on the government's recurrent budgets. While the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs has repeatedly cautioned about the need to avoid projects will raise demand on the recurrent budget without making provisions to ensure that they can be accommodated, there are a number of new installations that currently remain dependent on budget support provided by external donors, sometimes channelled through UNDP.

Budget support: Budget support in most priority state institutions constitutes a familiar feature in Liberia. Operational costs, salaries, salary supplements and professional incentives are still often funded from external sources. Such funding, which has been relatively plentiful in the five years after the election of the government, must be expected to decline in the short- to medium-term—particularly if the Security Council mandate ends and if peacekeeping operations are phased out.

Project implementation units: In order to ensure efficient and rapid delivery in a transparent and accountable manner, donors and UNDP have installed project implementation units in a number of government agencies at the national, county and district levels. These units involve either national or international personnel that are paid considerably more than would otherwise be possible from the national

budget. While this tends to ensure recruitment and short-term retention of qualified personnel, it also tends to ensure that national resources are channelled to co-finance the projects in question. While such units may raise delivery rates as well as the quality of delivery, they are nevertheless of limited duration. In other countries, the units have demonstrated a tendency to skew national priorities and lead to a loss of capacity upon the completion of external funding (though there is no evidence of this in Liberia).

Short project time-frames: On average, projects seem to last for three years. It is difficult, if not infeasible to build sustainable capacity in such a short period of time, particularly given the level of capacity that exists in the country. Time-frames, therefore have tended to create unrealistic expectations on the part of UNDP, donors and the national counterparts.

The sustainability of community-based, rural development projects was negatively affected by the sparse distribution of population and the distance between inhabitations. These factors tend to increase the difficulty of introducing effective cost-recovery mechanisms for services or purchasing inputs that can be expected to ensure long-term sustainability. Most such schemes are likely to depend on external support or subsidies for a long period of time unless a mechanism is found to ensure that economies of scale can be achieved.

In the absence of sound technical advice, the terms on savings and loans in the form of micro-credit appear usurious. While it is understood from communities that repayment rates are high, the rates being charged are almost certain to result in non-performance or defaults in the long run if they remain uncorrected.

Land ownership also constitutes a concern for the long-term sustainability of many of the agricultural schemes that have been introduced. Land has been allocated by the communities themselves for project-related cultivation activities, but the legal and ownership status the properties are often uncertain. Competing ownership claims on

the same land are common in both in Monrovia and rural areas and if they arise will affect the chances of sustainability.

Structural reforms must be anchored in broad and overwhelming national ownership if they are to be sustainable. Further, structural reforms that seek to break up long-standing vested interests with a view towards broadening participation in democratic decision-making are never easy to implement and ensuring ownership to sustain political momentum is particularly difficult. Ownership requires a combination of public majority support and change agents within the government if resistance is to be overcome in the private sector and in the legislature. This can prove particularly difficult in a country such as Liberia where civil society organizations are in nascent form and the population is scattered, illiterate and long suppressed.

Agents for change within the government are well known and are spearheaded by the Office of the President and the key commissions for reform that have been established (e.g. governance, anti-corruption, land, human rights). The challenge that arises is to bring public pressure to bear on the overall reform process. Securing this pressure will require an extended, strategic programme of support for civil society organizations. In the absence of this broad-based ownership and support, the reforms proposed to date will either be fragile and subject to ready reversal or will not progress as the work of the commissions will be easily neutralized by opposition within the national legislative assembly.

While it is understood that effective and lasting capacity development is likely to require extended and sustained support over many years, there must also be some concern regarding the sustainability of initiatives to date because of the following:

- Heavy dependence on external funding for a higher, merit-based salary scale for key positions;
- The payment of salary supplements;

- The widespread introduction of project implementation units with a view towards demonstrating quick and visible results for the domestic electorate as well as the public in donor countries; and
- Dependence on external funding for operational costs arising from new ventures.

With respect to dependence on external funding, although the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs has sought to ensure that only schemes that can eventually be sustained under the national budget are entered into, this has not always been possible and there has been considerable expansion of recurrent liabilities.

These distortions have been introduced largely because of the emphasis on short term, ‘emergency’ assistance during the early stages of a phased approach to post-conflict transition. This has had a tendency to carry over well beyond the first few years after the election of the new government as it has largely become an accepted and simpler modality that remains in demand for obvious reasons.

It is not clear that UNDP support has been undertaken with well-articulated exit strategies in place. UNDP projects appear to be significantly geared towards procurement and the start-up phase with little sustained engagement over time. Stakeholders interviewed by the evaluation team often cited the infrastructure support that they had received from UNDP, but cited examples of substantive technical support, mentoring and training far less often.

Transitioning management of the Global Fund to the Ministry of Health provides an example of capacity-building for long-term programme sustainability. Two of the technical advisers originally seconded by UNDP have been phased out and the Ministry of Health has fully staffed the programme, which it currently manages independently. The Ministry of Health is also able to manage its monitoring and evaluation component, which was originally implemented by UNDP.

Decentralization plans, as spelled out in the National Decentralization Policy, have major long-term budgetary implications that need to be addressed, such as:

- The funding of county legislators’ salaries, their secretariat, operational costs of each legislature, and the costs of periodic elections;
- The construction of facilities for local legislatures and in some instances, improvements for local government offices at the county and/or district level;
- The funding for additional services that are likely to be requested at the local level.

There will need to be a concerted debate on how these liabilities are to be met. At present, the decentralization plan remains unfunded and faces opposition in congress.

Although the Liberian Anti-corruption Commission is now integrated into the national budget framework, additional funding and posts will be required to strengthen the investigative and prosecutorial arm of the Commission in order to provide it with credible enforcement capacity. A failure to do this will lead to a loss of credibility. All equipment provided has been turned over to the Commission for full ownership. The Commission itself continues to be dependent on external funding for its operations.

The Land Commission has a statutory five-year mandate and UNDP should explore mechanisms to support civil society organizations as a parallel to the Land Commission. UNDP should also encourage the government to extend the Land Commission’s mandate as it is unlikely that land tenure problems in the country can be affected, let alone resolved, within the remaining two years of its current mandate.

Ultimately, issues relating to equal rights and fundamental freedoms for all Liberians expressed in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission report ought to be addressed if peace in Liberia is to be consolidated in the long term. Ethnic

groups and their issues will continue to be an issue in Liberia. In addition to ensuring greater inclusion for all ethnic and tribal groups, this also may mean provisions for inclusion of religious minorities (e.g. the percentage of Muslims in the Liberian population is currently estimated to be 25 percent and expected to grow in the future). Thus, promoting diversity and equity should be key benchmarks for UNDP going forward.

The LNP, more than any other arm of the government, will face questions of sustainability once UNMIL drawdown begins. Indeed, it plays a centrally important role in ensuring the continued stability of Liberia. “The LNP will become the chief provider of security in Liberia as the United Nations Mission in Liberia is reduced ... the question of oversight is critical....The Emergency Response Unit whose combat capabilities and roles differ from LNP need special oversight.”¹⁶⁴

A 2009 RAND Corporation report stated:

Analysis of the range of police oversight mechanisms, other African cases, and Liberia’s situation leads us to the following conclusion: Liberia needs a mixed (government independent) LNP oversight system with a broad mandate for enhancing police professionalism and assuring the public. Such a system should be clear, relatively simple, manageable, and comprehensible to the Liberian people. It should complement and strengthen both the government’s normal management of the LNP and the LNP’s ability to operate. These goals would be best achieved by a government-chaired, mixed-membership, multi-tiered system with the authority and competence to (1) consider every aspect of police policy and performance and (2) make recommendations that the government would be obligated in turn to consider and address. Such a system would borrow from government-independent hybrid systems used elsewhere in Africa ... and offer manageability, permanent professionalism, and public confidence

Common Ground asserts that the Government of Liberia has not done enough to take the lead in security sector reform to date. Security sector reform can be undermined by a lack of political will to undertake reforms. However, the government claims that it is making strides. The LNP has a lot of resources into the Regional Hubs, but ultimately the LNP must ensure the effectiveness of community policing within a holistic approach to security sector reform.

As of May 2011, no timeline had been developed for the UNMIL departure/drawdown, but it is expected that its exit from Liberia will be phased. Many gaps remain in Liberia concerning perceptions of security and political participation. For example, civilian oversight of the military has not been addressed to date, but UNMIL and UNDP are now discussing this with the goal of adhering to Development Assistance Committee principles for security sector reform and working with the UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa. UNMIL initiated a workshop in 2010 to discuss the departure of the Mission from Liberia. The UNMIL drawdown was also addressed by a 2009 Technical Assessment Mission from UN Headquarters that identified and set forth a number of benchmarks for a drawdown of UNMIL. These include freezing troop strength at 8,000 and benchmarks for the rule of law and security sectors. The departure of the Mission will leave huge gaps, particularly in logistics (e.g. the departure of UN air assets will have a huge impact in the absence of private air companies operating domestically within Liberia).

Many of the Technical Assessment Mission benchmarks have subsequently been revised. For example, in the area of corrections, 500 corrections officers were originally required to be trained, but this was reduced to 300. With regard to the police, after the requisite 3,500 police were trained it became clear that more were needed. Thus later, UNDP/UNMIL developed the Police

164 “Oversight of the Liberia National Police,” Gopert, C, Davis, R. and Lawson, B.S., RAND National Defense Research Institute Occasional Paper, (Prepared for the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense) RAND Corporation 2009.

Support Units and the 300 strong Emergency Response Unit (developed with UNMIL and US support). The Emergency Response Units were designed to support the regular unarmed police and are to be implemented and exist in all five regions of Liberia. The Police Support Unit is undergoing training and the goal is to have 600 officers ready for the elections. The original 3,500 benchmark for police has been revised to 7,000 before UNMIL can withdraw.

The Judicial Institute's operational budget is now fully funded by the government of Liberia. Thus, the Judicial Institute is becoming sustainable by definition as it is transitioning to full funding by the government. The Judiciary is committed to absorbing the salaries of Public Defender cadres and this will provide sustainability. The Judicial Institute will need to develop better plans for reducing its reliance upon donor funding. Impact will be further sustained by the continued integration of best practices on child justice by Judicial Institute in trainings for the Judiciary, magistrates and public defenders and prosecutors. The operational cost of the sexual and gender-based violence Unit/Ministry of Justice remains donor dependent.

There is evidence of sustainability of some of the processes and results attained in the area of gender equality and women's empowerment supported by UNDP show evidence of sustainability. This includes the dissemination and institutionalization of the 'Sexual and Gender-based Violence Manual', which has become a national document that is also used for training magistrates and judges.

UNDP and other partners have supported legislation enacted by the government that has far-reaching and lasting consequences for the protection of women and girls. Examples include an amendment of the customary law to enable women to inherit property, the banning of teenage marriage, establishment of the Sexual and Gender-based Violent Crime Unit within the Ministry of Justice, and the rape law that was passed in 2009.

Women's groups have expressed enthusiasm for the community skills and capacities passed on by UNDP to establish the village savings and loans associations. The associations have established their own by-laws and seem to be administering loans on a regular basis. Through a combination of repayments with interest and periodic membership fees, the capital of the associations is growing and has greatly empowered women in a sustainable manner.

The only threats to sustainability lie in the risk of robbery, as the women do not have ready access to commercial banks. Repayment terms also tend to preclude the use of the loans for productive agricultural purposes, as the time-frame for repayment is too short. The tendency is currently to use the funds for stop gap, urgent cash requirements. All three problems can be overcome if added substantive technical advisory capacity is attached to the project so that the women involved can better structure the products provided by their village savings and loans associations.

Over the last two UNDP country programme action plans, UNDP has been the primary recipient and channel for the Global Fund. UNDP built institutional capacity into Ministry of Health to take over, and the transition was successfully completed in 2010. Tuberculosis and Malaria activities will be handed over to the Ministry of Health in 2011. The handover seems to be on track—UNDP has withdrawn staff responsible for functions that have been taken over by Ministry of Health. The government has also established the National AIDS Commission and is continuing to strengthen its capacity. However, in terms of operational activities the Ministry of Health and the government are still highly dependent on external resources in the area of HIV and infectious disease control.

UNDP has supported the establishment of policies and legislation to coordinate the energy and environment sector. UNDP is continuing to build capacities within government institutions and communities, which should provide some level of results continuity. However, the

programme is heavily dependent on external support rather than government resources. With stronger government coordination and greater attention to regulating extractive industries (managing concessions in particular), the country may gain access to additional resources to address the challenges faced.

4.8 OVERALL EFFICIENCY

By accepting the notion of a phased approach to post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding, UNDP has sought to establish a niche for itself in the immediate, post-conflict, humanitarian phase. In order to do so, it has created space in the management of donor funds and in the procurement of goods and services in support of projects that are of critical importance to peacebuilding. This entails the delivery of services that are often mission critical to the government and the international community. Competitiveness is based on the following factors:

- UNDP fiduciary responsibility and the continued perception of its ability to accountably manage resources on behalf of the international community;
- UNDP rules, regulations and procedures, particularly in the procurement of goods and services and the quality and timeliness of its reporting;
- The ability of UNDP to deploy capacity to manage funds and their administration under difficult and often insecure conditions where other donors are unable to place personnel;
- The efficiency and timeliness of UNDP procurement practices;
- The quality and standards of UNDP procurement practices; and
- The overall role that UNDP plays in the coordination of development assistance, both within the context of the UN country team, but also more widely in the context of overall official development assistance to Liberia.

The efficiency and timeliness of UNDP procurement was repeatedly criticized in interviews

by virtually all government counterparts. In the difficult institutional environment of post-conflict Liberia, delivering on its fiduciary responsibility while meeting important deadlines poses a difficult challenge. The relative heaviness of UNDP procedures has often resulted in goods or services being delivered late—sometimes even beyond their date of usefulness. Some end-users interviewed even stated that UNDP procurement had become a bottleneck that hampered the achievement of results.

The relative lack of monitoring and evaluation carried out by the country office between 2004 and 2011 and the availability of data (including the data sources originally set forth in UNDP project documents that were to be used as measurement of stated indicators) continue to hinder efforts to assess the efficiency of UNDP programming, particularly from a cost-benefit perspective. Despite the creation of a monitoring and evaluation unit in UNDP in 2009, much more needs to be done to establish meaningful baselines for indicators at the outcome and impact levels.

In terms of cost efficiency, UNDP appears to have followed a pattern of squeezing the maximum out of very low budgets when national entities are involved. Allocations for activities such as workshops, local consultancies and publications have been sparse, even by local standards. This may not be the best policy, as it affected product quality and created a degree of ill will and friction.

However, maximum use has been made of national experts and consultants—both in Monrovia and in the field—ensuring that products are in line with national institutions, legislation, culture and social practices, thereby raising efficiency and effectiveness of the programmes and their implementation.

The operations of the UNDP Direct Execution Unit have been a source of controversy both within and outside the country office and have tended to dominate programme work. Chief technical advisers have complained of having relatively little say in programme management and the large volume of funding channelled through UNDP, combined with the urgency of requests

particularly during the immediate post-conflict phase, have stretched the country office's administrative capacity. This has resulted in a number of administrative problems that have been dealt with in audits and special investigations.

UNDP underestimated the costs associated with funds management and execution. The practice of sharing support costs between headquarters and the country office has resulted in the country office subsidizing the management of direct execution from its administrative budget. Because of the large ratio of third-party funding to TRAC resources, this has proved to be a problem of some concern. UNDP will need to renegotiate support cost arrangements, reconsider the distribution of support costs between the country office and headquarters units (with more resources being allocated to the country office), or strategically restructure its administrative support activities with a view towards redistributing the burden.

While UNDP programmed in response to the 2006–2008 interim and 2008–2011 poverty reduction strategy papers and reformulated the United Nations Development Assistance Framework as of 2008 (including adjusting the percentages of budgetary resources to place increased emphasis on the MDGs), it did not transition as quickly as it could have from a post-conflict to development framework (e.g. disarmament and demobilization was completed in 2009; by 2011 some bilateral donors appear to have transitioned towards economic empowerment and development).

The UNDP approach has remained highly project-based and could have benefited from a more coherent strategic approach that capitalized on synergies between country office and UN country team programmes and coordinated much more effectively at the local community level where interventions are largely parallel in nature.

There is a proliferation of strategic planning, project and trust fund documents that govern the activities and implementations of UNDP Liberia. It is not clear how these interrelate to each other. Ultimately, the key issue is to determine how UNDP planning documents and UNMIL and

their outputs ultimately support Liberia's poverty reduction strategy. The new United Nations Development Assistance Framework should focus on how to transition from a post-crisis context towards development and how to clearly identify the set of capacities UNDP Liberia will need to do its job and fulfil its mandate within the context of the pending UNMIL drawdown.

Overall, in the rule of law sector there needs to be further integration, better planning and clearer communication among and between all donors. Donor coordination in Liberia has been difficult because the government is weak and donors are overstretched. The relationship with the judiciary and political factors makes it even more difficult for donors to coordinate.

UNDP needs to have a clear, comprehensive strategy for the rule of law sector. There is virtually no community-based justice component, no legal empowerment of the poor approach and there has to date been no strategic mapping of the country office's engagement with the justice sector. At the programme level, UNDP has not been extensively involved to date with community-based justice initiatives or, for that matter, pursued a legal empowerment approach.

According to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, conflict prevention is an area that UNDP could devote more attention to going forward.

The Peacebuilding Fund mapping exercise improved donor relations, but in many areas donors have historically not coordinated in Liberia. For example, a case tracking system was simply abandoned by UNDP and other donors weren't clear on where to pick it up. USAID states that it coordinated more closely with the UNMIL Rule of Law Unit than with UNDP. UNDP communicates closely with UNMIL through the United Nations Development Assistance Framework working group. For every new initiative undertaken by UNMIL, the Rule of Law Unit meets with UNDP.

Chapter 5 provides key conclusions and recommendations based on the analysis of ADR findings.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The broader, programme-level conclusions and recommendations arise from the analysis presented in this report. More detailed, project-specific findings and recommendations are contained throughout the report and included in thematic discussions of Chapter 4.

5.1 CONCLUSIONS

Conclusion 1: UNDP has contributed to all of the most significant priorities of the transition in Liberia as defined by the government, UNMIL and leading analyses of the structural causes of Liberia's conflict. It has successfully secured a niche for itself during each stage of a phased approach to the transition from conflict to development.

By responding to the wishes of the government and attempting to address as many priorities as possible, UNDP has thinly spread its capacity, thereby lacking technical depth and compromising programmes' sustainability and effectiveness. This is exacerbated by the government's wish to have a neutral agency such as UNDP in a leadership role and the President's direct and successful efforts to mobilize resources by ensuring UNDP involvement.

UNDP has carved out a niche for itself in the immediate post-conflict phase. It has played a service role for the international community, serving as a funds manager, including providing direct budget support on behalf of donors to the government, substituting in the absence of government capacity, and implementing programmes in rural areas in which many bilateral agencies did not have capacity or were not prepared to accept the risks inherent in weak government capacity. UNDP has also played a role in early rehabilitation

as a procurement agent and general contractor, rehabilitating essential infrastructure through quick implementation projects, paying national salaries and salary supplements from trust funds, and administering quick implementation projects that are often of questionable sustainability.

Programme fragmentation is a consequence of a quick implementation project approach that has dominated UNDP activities. Programmes are broken into individual project activities that often fail to build on potential synergies among projects. It has proven difficult for UNDP to switch (back) to a more developmental mode, and UNDP has continued to play this role as recently as the end of 2010. This has delayed efforts to accord national institutions greater responsibility, may have reduced national ownership of individual programmes, delayed the development of national capacities to take charge of development, and has, over time, bred a degree of frustration and resentment on the part of Liberians.

Although an effort is currently underway to establish systems and develop national capacities to take on more direct responsibility for official development assistance-funded programmes, the government would have benefited had such an effort begun earlier—even bearing in mind UNDP and donors' legitimate concerns.

Conclusion 2: The service role has strengthened UNDP capacity to support aid coordination by the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the Resident Coordinator and the Humanitarian Coordinator, particularly by virtue of the UNDP role in the administration of donor funds.

The UNDP programme has played a central role in supporting UNMIL and has consistently addressed most priority areas in the UNMIL mandate throughout the period covered by this review. UNDP has also showcased the natural partnership that is based on complementary mandates that exist between peacekeeping operations and UNDP—a complementarity that arises particularly from the UNDP mandates in governance and capacity development, areas such as democratic governance, social, political and economic inclusion, rule of law, security sector reform and decentralization, and the creation of economic opportunities that are of priority in a transition.

The long-term UNDP presence and mandate complements the short-term, renewable mandate of peacekeeping missions, as they are together faced with the task of establishing peace and long-term stability. While collaborations within the United Nations country team have benefited from years of global reform, beginning in 1997 active, substantive collaborations among UNDP, the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations and the Division of Public Affairs are more recent and need to be rendered more substantively, expanding beyond the country level to the global level. Collaborations remain largely personality-based and need to be further institutionalized for the sake of effectiveness and efficiency in future Security Council-mandated operations.

Although the concept of an integrated mission has not been clearly defined, efforts to work more closely under UNMIL leadership have resulted in the Mission adopting a more developmental approach to the transition in Liberia. UNDP has benefited greatly from this collaboration, as it has enabled it to enter into themes at the core of its mandate that are, in turn, of central importance to any post-conflict transition. UNDP has also benefited from the standing technical capacity of UNMIL in a number of key governance disciplines—capacity that is funded from assessed contributions for the duration of the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operation's mandate in the country. Nevertheless, although a more holistic approach has

been taken, UNMIL has not presented a comprehensive strategy for the implementation of its mandate as a framework for UNDP involvement, and UNDP has taken its cues from the poverty reduction strategy papers and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework prepared jointly with the UN country team.

Conclusion 3: The United Nations integration strategy has been vague. Perhaps as a result, some potential benefits of United Nations integration have not been sufficiently exploited. For example, while UNDP has supported government-led efforts to define necessary structural changes, there is relatively little evidence of UNDP using the UNMIL Security Council mandate as leverage with the National Assembly—for example, to exert pressure for change in the areas of land reform or anti-corruption and human rights.

UNDP tended to abide by the model it adopts in countries in normal development circumstances. The full potential of bringing the capabilities of the UN system to bear in a truly integrated manner has not been exploited. Joint programmes and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework have, to date, involved the parallel implementation of programmes by members of the UN country team. Active joint programming has not taken place. This is very visible on the ground and has reduced programmes' effectiveness.

Conclusion 4: UNDP has had relatively little in-house technical advisory capacity in areas of security sector reform, rule of law, elections, policing and microfinance. Where such capacities exist, they are stretched thin.

As a result, UNDP has, in most areas, limited itself to an administrative role and has depended heavily on UNMIL capacities (supplied through assessed contributions) or other agencies (such as International Foundation for Electoral Systems). While intra-UN collaboration appears to have worked relatively well, the impending UNMIL drawdown is going to require UNDP to boost its in-house technical and substantive capacities.

UNDP effectiveness in managing construction contracts as part of decentralization has been affected, and at times seriously compromised, by UNDP Liberia's lack of capacity to conduct regular monitoring—particularly in rural areas. This is particularly challenging as the government has insisted that many UNDP flagship projects maintain nationwide coverage. This has resulted in the abandonment of some projects and mediocre product quality and severe design shortcomings in others. The lack of flexibility where design or strategy has had to be adapted (whether due to design flaws or changing circumstances has) reduced the usefulness of some products (e.g. prisons constructed without a water supply).

The lack of adequate technical capacity in micro-finance has led to inappropriate choices and if not addressed soon will negatively affect programme success. To retain the niche that it carved out itself in the immediate post-conflict period in Liberia (and in other countries in the future), UNDP will need to expand beyond the perceived comparative advantages that secured this role for UNDP in the first place—its mandate in areas of highest priority for stabilization and peacebuilding during the transition—and compete on the basis of the efficiency of its administration and the reliability, transparency and accountability of its financial management.

The transition, however, has brought to light—yet again—the cumbersome nature of UNDP procedures and the difficulty in ensuring financial accountability in a fluid post-conflict environment with weak national institutions. Despite this, UNDP has preserved its niche because of its perceived neutrality, its willingness to take risks, and its willingness to proactively investigate and correct problems whenever they have arisen through audits or special investigations, and translating them into prompt punitive action. Furthermore, some procedures that UNDP has to abide by appear to be superfluous and may not affect accountability; procedures that would benefit from rationalization and streamlining.

Conclusion 5: To its credit and that of the government, UNDP has sought to address each of the most intractable structural causes of conflict. These areas of work remain key to long-term stability and development, and in most such cases the work involves addressing power relationships and entrenched vested interests. To date, the approach has been to establish special commissions for each issue. These commissions have begun work to analyse the issues, develop policies and seek redress. However, they are mostly ineffectual—in that they have insufficient enforcement capacity and have been blocked by vested interests that persist and, for the most part, now reside in congress.

A comprehensive strategy is required if effectiveness is to be raised. This includes differentiating between policy measures requiring congressional approval from those that can be implemented under executive authority, strengthening the enforcement or prosecution capacity of commissions where the mandate already exists, forging alliances with civil society organizations (including the media), and ensuring that the general public is fully informed on the issues. In most instances, the commissions' work will need to be carried out over an extended period and mandates extended where they are time-bound.

The de-concentration of responsibilities and obligations to sub-national governments has so far taken place without fiscal decentralization or the transfer of asset ownership to sub-national agencies. Fiscal decentralization is essential if UNDP programme achievements are to be sustained and implemented programmes' priorities are to be based on needs as they are perceived and prioritized by local communities—not by authorities in county capitals or in Monrovia.

Conclusion 6: There remains a significant capacity deficit at the level of middle management and below in all government agencies. Education levels are low, and it is currently difficult to recruit and retain well-qualified Liberians. The problem is severe in Monrovia and is considerably more so at subnational government levels. If

the decentralization plans currently championed by UNDP and the Governance Commission are to succeed, sufficient incentives need to be put in place to attract well-qualified and experienced civil servants to local government posts for extended periods of time.

UNDP programmes have placed a significant number of highly qualified Liberians in government agencies in critically important posts on a long- and short-term basis. This has contributed greatly to progress. Policy documents and other outputs prepared by government agencies are of higher quality than those produced in many other post-conflict countries. However, in order to attract and recruit them, these officials are paid substantially higher salaries and supplements than their colleagues on standard government contracts.

There is no evidence that the payment of supplements for select positions has skewed priorities. The supplements have, however, created some resentment among other staff, but more importantly, constitute a challenge to sustainability in the absence of a coherent and systematic exit strategy. While some programmes, such as the HIV/AIDS programme with resources from the Global Fund, have managed to successfully implement an exit strategy, the majority of such arrangements persist. Other UNDP projects have made use of project implementation units that have been placed in ministries to ensure the achievement of results in a timely manner, although this has been less common than in the case of other donors' projects.

Furthermore, institutions developed under UNDP projects and programmes have created additional recurrent budget obligations for the government. Though the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs had sought to ensure that only initiatives that can be borne on the national budget are created, their efforts have been unsuccessful. Both the key positions in government and new institutions are going to have to be funded under the national budget. For this reason, UNDP is going to have to work out a clear exit strategy on a case-by-case

basis in order to prevent major setbacks after external funding has drawn to a close.

Conclusion 7: As other UNDP programmes in Liberia, rural and community development programmes are fragmented and largely consist of projects implemented quickly, in a semi-humanitarian assistance mode. The development experience gained by UNDP in other post-conflict settings worldwide has not been sufficiently utilized, and as a result, the programmes are insufficiently sustainable.

In cases where UNDP has worked with new partners such as the Earth Institute on community-based development schemes, UNDP has failed to contribute practical experience gained worldwide to the detriment of programme performance. UNDP has worked with the Earth Institute largely because of the funds that have been attracted as a result, even though its operational experience is not as diverse as that of UNDP and the UN system.

Pilot UNDP/ United Nations Capital Development Fund programmes to demonstrate the viability of fiscal decentralization have had less of a focus on establishing mechanisms for effective and replicable resource management and more of a focus on mechanisms for the management of community-specific crops or projects. They have, therefore been less convincing as a practical demonstration for possible future fiscal decentralization in an environment in which there is political resistance to decentralization. UNDP support to many community-based projects has relied heavily on self-help. While positive, in terms of impact the projects would have benefited greatly from more technical guidance and more significant UNDP resources.

Conclusion 8: Cost efficiency is difficult to assess. However, there has been extensive use of Liberian nationals as professional project and programme staff, which improves national ownership and reduces implementation costs. Overall cost efficiency is affected by associated security costs. Security-related costs are likely to

rise with the departure of UNMIL, as UNDP is heavily dependent on the Mission for security. The absence of critical mass and the considerable distances between settlements in many parts of Liberia render it difficult to ensure the sustainability of services even in part through cost-recovery.

Conclusion 9: While activities and outputs are monitored and reported on a project-by-project basis to fulfil donor requirements, there appears to be no systematic framework for monitoring development results at the outcome/impact or the local/national levels.

Project-level monitoring varies in terms of quality. In this respect, donor reporting requirements are diverse and onerous. For example, in order to demonstrate the results achieved with their funds, many donors require tracking their individual contributions to a project in which multiple donors may have been involved. This type of reporting tends to be driven more by the donor's own domestic audience than development concerns.

Donors also often place considerable added burdens on the government and UNDP because of the variety of formats and content requirements. Some donors have complained that the reporting renders it difficult to attribute outputs to specific sources of funding, a relatively narrow concern that places considerable additional burden on the country office. Experience elsewhere with area-based development programmes, for example, has demonstrated the importance of collecting extensive baseline data both for monitoring and planning purposes. This has not been done on either the UNDP Community-based Recovery and Development project or the Millennium Village project.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: UNDP should not assume that a drawdown of UNMIL signifies a definitive transition to peace, growth or human development. The gains made are fragile, and the structural causes of conflict still need to be addressed. Therefore, UNDP should not spread itself thin by

taking on the full range of activities that normally fall within its mandate. UNDP focus should involve more geographically and thematically targeted projects and programmes.

UNDP should resist political pressures to extend project coverage to all 15 counties. Rather, it should seek to perfect an approach on a pilot basis for each project before applying the experience gained to scale-up and replicate. UNDP needs to ensure that sufficient resources are secured and that intensive substantive technical advice is integrated into the budget. In substantive terms, UNDP should focus on those governance and poverty reduction activities that serve to bolster the gains made in stabilization and peacebuilding.

Recommendation 2: There is an urgent need for a coherent, strategic and comprehensive programme approach (as opposed to a project-based approach) for each area of UNDP focus. This is currently lacking, causing UNDP interventions to be fragmented and run in isolation. Synergies and mutual reinforcement need to be captured with a view towards enhancing overall results at the outcome level. The success of the UNDP programme depends on the extent to which broader structural impediments of progress are addressed.

In order to enable the commissions established to effectively address the most intractable, structural causes of conflict, UNDP should conduct strategy workshops with the Governance Commission and the other key commissions to develop a political strategy for overcoming existing barriers. For example, in the wake of the recent referendum, the fundamentally important decentralization strategy needs a concerted plan to ensure that its most important elements are retained and stand a chance of being implemented.

UNDP urgently needs to develop a comprehensive strategy using a team of international consultants to implement the policy options that are already prepared in order to address these structural constraints. This will include a strategy for working with congress and may include

strengthening the internal capacities of the existing commissions (e.g. increasing the investigative and prosecutorial capacities of the anti-corruption commission). It should also include a wide-ranging and systematic strategy for strengthening the role of civil society organizations as watchdogs and advocates of change with a view towards strengthening their capacity to bring pressure to bear on the national legislature and other loci of entrenched vested interests. This may need to be done through the preparation of a new project that would focus specifically on strengthening civil society organizations as an integral part of UNDP interventions in the governance sector.

Recommendation 3: UNDP needs to transition away from quickly implemented projects to longer-term development project activities that increasingly place national institutions in the lead of programme management and implementation. These activities should also shift their emphasis from infrastructure rehabilitation and the procurement of equipment to long-term capacity building by developing relevant systems and providing cutting-edge advisory services.

While it is strongly recommended that UNDP should launch long-term capacity development programmes with a strong developmental content as early as possible, it is also recognized that there is demand for UNDP to continue to differentiate approaches from the immediate post-conflict period. At the global level, UNDP should use this and other Assessment of Development Results reports of countries in conflict to reform and streamline its procurement and other administrative procedures. This will raise programme efficiency and delivery speed without compromising accountability and will enable UNDP to retain its ability to compete for resources during the immediate post-conflict period.

There is an urgent need for UNDP to streamline its administrative procedures with a view towards raising efficiency and the timeliness of implementation as this has clearly become

a major impediment to UNDP competitiveness—particularly in conflict-affected countries. This streamlining will need to be undertaken at the corporate level, and UNDP should prioritize the elimination of time-consuming steps that create delays without meaningfully improving accountability. Such an effort should involve relevant headquarters units, country offices and a select group of partners (especially government counterparts) and contractors. A failure to treat this process with due seriousness will result in severely negative impacts on UNDP's ability to mobilize resources. Eventually, inefficiency problems will extend beyond Liberia and lead to negative impressions of UNDP over easily-avoidable incidents.

Recommendation 4: With respect to building capacities in a sustainable manner, every UNDP project should have an explicit exit strategy. For such a strategy to be practical, it is essential that it be developed in conjunction with Liberia's Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs and the counterpart government agency, so that resulting recurrent costs can be earmarked in the national budget (in a phased manner, if necessary).

The strategy development process should either be an integral part of the formulation process or should be undertaken systematically during the project inception phase. In the former case, it should be incorporated into the project document, which is subject to joint signature by all parties to the project. In the latter case it should be the subject of a separate memorandum of understanding that is signed by all parties to the project. Development of such a strategy should be viewed as a prior obligation or prerequisite for all projects. In this context, UNDP should use its role in coordination to ensure a common approach among donors to the payment of salary supplements and incentives to civil servants. The objective should be to minimize dependence and maximize the potential for Liberian self-sufficiency within the framework of time-bound technical cooperation programmes.

Recommendation 5: Furthering government efforts to promote gender equality, improve women's access to economic resources and address gender-based violence should be a key dimension of the UNDP programme. It is critical for UNDP programming to recognize that addressing gender equality-related issues impacts both programme effectiveness and progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Gender-related interventions alone are not a substitute for the necessary broader programmatic integration.

The government has made concerted efforts to address the incidence of sexual and gender-based violence and pervasive lack of women's equitable access to economic and social resources. UNDP support to the government in this regard has been important. UNDP should continue to support Ministry of Gender and Development to enable a systematic integration of gender equality priorities in government policies and programmes. UNDP-promoted gender-related activities and strategies in government institutions should be closely coordinated with the Ministry of Gender and Development in order to reinforce the Ministry's mandate to strengthen monitoring of gender equitable policy implementation.

Capacities at the subnational government level in gender equitable programme implementation are weak. Non-governmental organizations working on gender-related issues and women's empowerment have an important role in supporting subnational governments. UNDP should increase its support to such organizations, and where required, facilitate building and strengthening their capacities.

UNDP should pay sufficient attention to including gender dimension in all its programmes and activities. This requires strengthening performance and progress monitoring with specific gender indicators. UNDP should develop and institutionalize systems for creating gender-disaggregated baselines.

Recommendation 6: The importance of the UNDP mandate in integrated peacekeeping missions has been recognized. Member States should consider allocating an assessed budget for governance and essential development aspects of the work of peacekeeping missions.

UNDP should be more closely involved in formal planning missions, and peacekeeping missions should have clearer comprehensive peacebuilding strategies from the outset that draw on the capacities of all relevant funds, programmes and agencies that constitute the UN country team. UNDP should assign suitably senior staff or other representatives to participate in mission planning exercises.

UNDP needs to work on transitioning the lead role for coordination to government institutions. UNDP should provide technical advice and support in this regard. In this context, UNDP should begin partnering with key agencies from the international community and spearhead the implementation of the national capacity development strategy. This strategy should constitute a central feature of the next country programme in Liberia.

Recommendation 7: UNDP and UNMIL will need to initiate a systematic handover process at least six months before the Mission's departure.

This should include establishing a joint committee with the government to determine the orderly handover or removal of Mission infrastructure and facilities. This will have four possible outcomes: handover to the UN country team for use by UN agencies; handover to the government; shipment to an ongoing UN peacekeeping mission elsewhere; or auction on the open market in Monrovia.

In the event that equipment is handed over, steps should be taken to ensure that sufficient resources are available to enable their continued operation. Such equipment may include communications facilities, petrol stations, guest houses, office space or other buildings, vehicles, generators, computers and office equipment. Several precedents exist for such processes and the primary

objective should be to continue to contribute to Liberia's development and to minimize disruption resulting from the Mission's departure.

Recommendation 8: 'Delivering as One' is an important initiative that, if properly designed and implemented, should greatly enhance the effectiveness of UN-supported programmes by harnessing the technical capacity of the entire United Nations system for joint implementation of programmes and activities.

In the case of Liberia going forward, UNDP should wholeheartedly embrace the Delivering as One initiative and seek partnerships with key UN agencies (e.g. the Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Labour Organization) in order to more effectively deliver programmes that would benefit from these agencies' established technical expertise. Project activities within the joint programmes should be jointly planned and actively integrated.

Recommendation 9: UNDP should seek to create in-house technical advisory capacity in each of the priority thematic areas at a relatively senior level. Such an advisory team would provide technical guidance in the management of UNDP projects and provide advisory services to relevant government agencies, the Resident Coordinator, UNCT and UNDP Liberia senior management. Such capacity may need to be funded from TRAC resources in the form of a project and could be integrated into the current Policy and Planning Unit.

In order to greatly strengthen its capacity to support the UN system in peacekeeping operations and to ensure a smooth transition beyond, UNDP should establish a global network of experts in several areas: elections; parliamentary development; rule of law (defined broadly); security sector reform (particularly small arms, disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and recovery and vocational training); community policing; decentralization and local governance; civil society organization development; community-based area development; and small

enterprise development and employment generation (particularly for youth).

More effort should be made to tap capacity available through the UNDP Regional Centres in both South Africa and Senegal. High-level of demand from other countries notwithstanding, the Regional Centres need to be more responsive to requests for assistance from countries such as Liberia where UNDP performance is very much in the limelight and can affect UNDP standing worldwide.

UNDP and its associated organizations have well-developed models that have delivered positive results in most of the thematic areas addressed by UNDP Liberia's programmes in countries that are in similar circumstances. UNDP Liberia needs to make greater use of the experience gained by UNDP as an organization in the implementation of similar programmes worldwide. This may include recruiting former programme managers as short-term consultants to provide advice on programme approaches, strategies and modalities. Good examples of projects from which UNDP would greatly benefit include area development schemes (e.g. Afghanistan, Cambodia, Central America and Sudan), microfinance and small- and medium-enterprise development (e.g. Association of Cambodian Local Economic Development Agencies).

Recommendation 10: Cost-efficiency should not necessarily be associated with low costs alone. Cost considerations need to be balanced with those of quality and professional standards. UNDP needs to deploy additional capacity at the county level to ensure that physical monitoring and oversight of implementation is more systematic and effective. This should be accompanied by a properly funded effort to collect baseline data for planning, setting priorities and monitoring results.

There is a tendency to pressure contractors' fees as much as possible—particularly when it comes to national contractors. Realistic cost estimates need to be made and the practice of assessing quality or technical standards needs to be given

additional importance. This is only possible if technical experts are associated with the procurement process and the practice of accepting the lowest bid is abandoned. The past independence of the Direct Execution Modality Unit should not be accepted again and all procurement needs to ensure that substantive and technical considerations are taken fully into account.

The scattered nature of settlements negatively affects the economic viability of projects at the community level. Alternative strategies will need to be rapidly developed in order to ensure more effective cost recovery at the local level. Strategies include working on cooperative arrangements between relatively distant communities

and mobilizing funding for feeder roads and other forms of communication that will enable the networking of neighbouring—but relatively distant—communities.

An emphasis should be placed on local outcome indicators. For instance, productive activities, should, in addition to monitoring increases in production and productivity, also monitor changes in income of the beneficiary communities. UNDP Liberia should work with its donors to develop a more standardized reporting format. The ideal format would be ensure that core accountability requirements are met and focus on monitoring results. Transaction costs associated with preparing reports in multiple formats should be eliminated.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

INTRODUCTION

The Evaluation Office (EO) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conducts country evaluations called Assessments of Development Results (ADRs) to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidence of UNDP contributions to development results at the country level, as well as the effectiveness of UNDP strategy in facilitating and leveraging national effort for achieving development results. ADRs are independent evaluations carried out within the overall provisions contained in the UNDP Evaluation Policy.¹⁶⁵ Based on the principle of national ownership, the EO seeks to conduct ADRs in collaboration with national governments whenever agreed and possible. The purpose of an ADR is to:

- Provide substantive support to the Administrator's accountability function in reporting to the Executive Board;
- Support greater UNDP accountability to national stakeholders and partners in the programme country;
- Serve as a means of quality assurance for UNDP interventions at the country level; and
- Contribute to learning at corporate, regional and country levels.

The ADR in Liberia will be conducted in 2011 towards the end of the current UNDP programme cycle of 2008–2011 with a view to contributing to the preparation of the new UNDP country programme starting from 2012 as well as the

forthcoming United National Development Assistance Framework scheduled to start in the same year.

CONTEXT

Liberia faced two rounds of prolonged and brutal civil war between 1989–97 and 2000–03. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2003 ended the fourteen years of violent conflict. The agreement contained guidelines for peacebuilding, reconstruction of democratic political order in Liberia, and sustainable social and economic development. Also in October 2003, the two-year National Transitional Government was formed with a mandate to address post-conflict recovery and governance issues and conduct free, fair and democratic presidential and general elections, which were held in October 2005. The result of this historic election was the accession to the presidency of Africa's first female president in January 2006. With a relatively stable political environment since 2006, efforts have been underway for economic recovery and development.

The national strategies and policies under implementation are aimed at peacebuilding, security, good governance and sustainable macroeconomic reforms. These include a Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS, 2008–2011), National Capacity Development Strategy and a National Food Security and Nutrition Strategy. With international support, efforts are underway to strengthen peace and mechanisms for justice and reconciliation. A post-PRS planning and visioning exercise has just been launched in view of the conclusion

¹⁶⁵ See <www.undp.org/eo/documents/Evaluation-Policy.pdf>. The ADR will also be conducted in adherence to the Norms and the Standards and the ethical Code of Conduct established by the United Nations Evaluation Group (www.uneval.org).

of the ongoing PRS in December 2011. There are two main transitional justice processes that have been operating in Liberia: the official truth-seeking process, mandated to facilitate national unity, reconciliation and justice; and the Security Sector Reform process, to restore security through police and army rebuilding, reform and training.

UNMIL was established in October 2003 to assist the peace process. UNMIL is headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and 2 Deputy SRSGs (responsible for Rule of Law, and Recovery and Governance, respectively). The UNMIL mandate includes support to implementation of the peace process, security reform, humanitarian activities and promotion of human rights. This includes assistance to the Liberian Government in conducting 2011 presidential and legislative elections, by providing logistical support, particularly to facilitate access to remote areas, coordinating international electoral assistance and supporting Liberian institutions and political parties in creating an atmosphere conducive to the conduct of peaceful elections. There is phased scaling down of the peacekeeping forces.

While Liberia is poised to make development gains, formidable challenges remain in recovery and reconstruction and development. First, the impacts of the prolonged civil war pose constraints for rebuilding state institutions, national infrastructure, restarting service delivery, and participation of citizens to contribute to economic growth and rebuilding the state. Although peace and stable government have brought about improved economic conditions, a majority of the population continues to live in poverty. Liberia remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with extremely low development indicators. Acceleration of progress in achieving MDGs, including through their fuller integration in national policy frameworks remains a challenge. Strengthening governance is constrained by institutional, monetary, and capacity challenges, particularly in setting up effective mechanisms for service delivery.

Second, Liberia had strong women's movement, which contributed to working for peace in the subregion. In the past four years there has been progress in formulation of legislations for gender equality and participation. In 2009, Liberia adopted a 'National Action Plan for the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325'. However, much remains to be done in ensuring women participate in all aspects of recovery and transition; and political, social and economic development. Sexual exploitation and abuse and gender base violence are major concerns.

Third, as Liberia's efforts to entrench democracy and a strong human rights culture advance, the root causes and legacies of the conflict, justice and reconciliation, consolidating peace, and strengthening rule of law remain a priority for state authorities, civil society and Liberia's international partners. Many of the conflict factors that led to Liberia's civil crisis are yet to be comprehensively addressed, particularly tensions over ethnicity and land issues.

Liberia is currently preparing for General Elections in December 2011, which will be the first elections to be fully conducted by the Liberian authorities under the Constitution since 2003. The elections are critical for the consolidation of peace and democracy in the country.

UNDP IN LIBERIA

Over the past three decades UNDP has been supporting the Government of Liberia in humanitarian, post-conflict recovery and development activities. The two country programmes included in the ADR responded to humanitarian needs, post conflict recovery and reconstruction and development needs of Liberia.

The 2004-2007 UNDP Programme was developed in the context of post conflict recovery and reconstruction and support to peace and justice. The CPA called on the UNDP and other partners to assist the National Transitional

Government of Liberia with post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, resource mobilization and aid coordination, as well as the establishment of the Government Reform Commission with the objective of promoting governance in Liberia. The UNDP programme therefore focused on post-conflict humanitarian crisis and Liberia's most urgent and emerging priorities and there was no definitive programme framework during this critical four-year period. UNDP Country Programme for 2004–2007 included six priority areas: i) disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation; ii) democratic governance, iii) community based recovery, iv) human rights, protection and gender; v) capacity building for HIV/AIDS response; and vi) environmental management. The programme expenditure for 2004–2007 was \$119 million.

The 2008–2012 UNDP country programme is aligned with the national PRS and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework and includes two key components, viz., democratic governance and pro-poor economic development. The programme aimed to consolidate earlier efforts in post-conflict reconstruction within the broad frame of these two key priority areas and promote an integrated approach to peace-building, recovery, reconstruction, and sustainable development in Liberia. The programme expenditure from 2008 to 2010 is approximately \$163 million. The expected outcome of the governance component of the programme is “enhanced national and local capacity to articulate, formulate and implement policies and programmes in a participatory, gender sensitive and accountable manner, for the promotion of democracy, growth and sustainable development.”

As part of the programme on pro-poor development, UNDP intended to focus its assistance on capacity development for pro-poor growth, with specific attention to mainstreaming MDGs and establishing links to human development, human rights-based, and gender-focused approaches. In addition, the programme aims to provide a mix of policy level support as well as downstream

interventions that will expand income opportunities and sustainable livelihoods for the poor and marginalized. The outcomes for this component include “promoting broad-based growth through revitalizing traditional economic sectors and stimulating private sector development;” and “national economic policies and programmes implemented to support equitable, inclusive and sustainable socio-economic development.” Capacity development is a key area of UNDP support. Gender is to be mainstreamed through all the programme components, focusing on creating awareness, and developing capacity for policy formulation and implementation.

SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

Since this is the first ADR in Liberia, the period covered will include the ongoing country programme (2008–2011) and the previous country programme (2002–2007). While the emphasis will be on the ongoing country programme, the ADR will cover ongoing projects that started in the previous programme and the analysis may take a longer-term perspective where appropriate.

The ADR will assess UNDP contributions to the national effort in addressing development and humanitarian challenges, encompassing social, economic and political spheres. It will assess key results, specifically outcomes—anticipated and unanticipated, positive and negative—and will cover UNDP assistance funded from both core and non-core resources. It covers all UNDP activities in the country including non-project activities and engagement through regional and global initiatives.

The evaluation has two main components; (a) the analysis of UNDP contributions to development results through its programme outcomes, and (b) the strategy it has taken. For each component, the ADR will present its findings and assessment according to the set criteria provided below. Further elaboration of the criteria will be found in the ‘ADR Manual 2010’.

UNDP CONTRIBUTIONS BY THEMATIC/ PROGRAMMATIC AREAS

Analysis will be made on the contribution of UNDP to development results of Liberia through its programme activities. The analysis will be presented by thematic/programme areas and according to the following criteria:

- Relevance of UNDP projects, outputs and outcomes;
- Effectiveness of UNDP interventions in terms of achieving stated goals;
- Efficiency of UNDP interventions in terms of use of human and financial resources; and
- Sustainability of the results to which UNDP contributes.

Key questions:

- Has UNDP played a relevant role in assisting Liberia address its post-conflict recovery and reconstruction needs and development challenges, based on the comparative strengths that UNDP brings to the country;
- Did UNDP respond appropriately to the evolving country situation and national priorities by adapting its role and approaches? How responsive were corporate tools in realigning to national priorities?
- How did UNDP address national capacity issues in promoting national ownership of UNDP support and interventions?
- What is UNDP contribution to strengthening national capacities in the areas of sustainable recovery; institution building and implementation of governance reforms (decentralization, national monitoring and evaluation architecture); and stimulating pro-poor economic recovery?
- What is the UNDP contribution to enabling peace, reconciliation, justice and security?

- Did UNDP effectively respond to national priorities in promoting gender equality in recovery and reconstruction and development?

UNDP CONTRIBUTIONS THROUGH ITS POSITIONING AND STRATEGIES

UNDP positioning and strategies are analysed both from the perspective of the organization's mandate¹⁶⁶ and the development and humanitarian needs and priorities in the country as agreed and as they emerged. This would entail systematic analyses of the UNDP place and niche within the development and policy space in the country, as well as strategies used by UNDP to maximize its contribution through adopting relevant strategies and approaches.

The following criteria will be applied:


- Relevance and responsiveness of the country programme as a whole;
- Enhancing comparative strengths; and
- Promoting UN values from human development perspective.

Key questions:

- What are the long-term strategic objectives of UNDP in the priority area versus short-term programmes? How did UNDP position itself in addressing long-term strategic objectives in the area of peace, justice and security and governance?
- How can UNDP consolidate its contribution in priority areas, and what can and must UNDP do, and what areas it should let go?
- What are the lessons from the interface between integrated mission and UNDP? What is the impact of integrated mission on UNDP programme results and vice-versa?
- How did the UNDP programme address emerging development issues in Liberia, viz., disaster management, environment and climate change?

166 For the UNDP Strategic Plan, see <www.undp.org/execbrd/pdf/dp07-43Rev1.pdf>.

Figure A1. From findings to recommendations



The ADR will address significant factors important to UNDP, which include capacity development, gender, South-South cooperation, partnerships for development and coordination of UN and other development assistance. Liberia is becoming a Delivering as One self-starter, the first of its kind in an integrated peacekeeping mission setting. In this context the evaluation will examine:

- What are the implications for the UNDP forthcoming programme planning in Delivering as One, particularly in the area of strategic partnerships and coordination activities?

Although a judgement is made using the criteria above, the ADR process will also identify how various factors have influenced UNDP performance. The evaluation criteria form the basis of the ADR methodological process. Evaluators generate findings within the scope of the evaluation and use the criteria to make assessments. In turn, the findings and assessment are used to identify the conclusions from the evaluation and to draw recommendations. The process is illustrated in Figure A1. The above questions will be further elaborated in the inception report.

EVALUATION PROCESS

The ADR process is set out in five phases as follows, representing a specific set of achievements and activities that should be normally completed before the next phase can begin.

Preparation phase

- Inception phase
- Main evaluation phase
- Report writing phase
- Dissemination and follow-up phase

PHASE 1: PREPARATION

The EO has carried out preliminary research to prepare for the evaluation and will upload relevant documents to a special Web site for the evaluation team. The Task Manager has undertaken a preparatory mission and held discussion with key stakeholders prior to the preparation of this Terms of Reference for the evaluation. The evaluation team leader is identified and the Evaluation Office is in the process of constituting the evaluation team.

PHASE 2: SCOPING MISSION

The team leader will carry out a one-week scoping mission in the country and outline the

evaluation design. Based on the preparatory work by EO and other information and materials obtained from the government, UNDP Liberia and other sources, the team leader will analyse, inter alia, national documents and documents related to UNDP programmes and projects over the period being examined. The team leader will also request and hold briefing sessions with country office programme staff to deepen the understanding of their work portfolio and activities. With the preliminary research, the evaluation team is expected to develop a good understanding of the challenges that the country has been facing and the responses and the achievements of UNDP through its country programme and other activities.

Inception report

Based on the preliminary research above, the team leader will develop an inception report, which should include:

- A Brief overview of key development challenges, national strategies and UN/UNDP response to contextualize evaluation questions;
- Evaluation questions for each evaluation criteria (as defined in the ADR Manual);
- Methods to be used and sources of information to be consulted in addressing each set of evaluation questions;
- Selection of projects/activities subject to in-depth examination;
- Possible visits to project/field activity sites;
- Outline of the evaluation's approach to qualitative data analysis, specifying specific tools to be used; and
- The profiles of other members of the evaluation team

The Task Manager will provide guidance and a detailed outline to be followed in preparing the report. The UNDP Liberia Focal Point will be fully involved in this process both as resource person and participant.

PHASE 3: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Data collection

Based on the inception report, the team will carry out the evaluation by collecting data.

- The field visits and observations should normally be arranged through UNDP Liberia;
- The team will collect data according to the principles set out in Section 6 of this terms of reference and as further defined in the inception report; and
- All interviews will be conducted based on indicative interview protocols, and (electronic/Word) summaries of each interview will be prepared based on an agreed structure to be define in the inception report's qualitative data analysis approach.

Data analysis

The evaluation team will analyse the data collected to reach preliminary assessments, conclusions and recommendations.

- Once the data is collected, the evaluation team should dedicate some time (up to one week) to its analysis. The Task Manager will join the team during this phase to assist in the analysis and validation;
- Where possible, the evaluation team should develop data displays to illustrate key findings;
- The outcome of the data analysis will be preliminary assessments for each evaluation criterion/question, general conclusions, and strategic and operational recommendations;
- Once the preliminary assessments, conclusions and recommendations are thus formulated, the evaluation team will debrief Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs and country office to obtain feedback so as to avoid factual inaccuracies and gross misinterpretation.

Feedback workshop

In order to obtain their feedback to be incorporated in the early drafts of the report, a validation workshop will be organized at the end of the data collection and analysis phase to present preliminary findings, assessments, conclusions and, possibly, emerging recommendations to the evaluation reference group and other key stakeholders.

PHASE 4: DRAFTING AND REVIEWS

First draft and the quality assurance – The Team Leader will submit a complete draft of the report to the EO within three weeks after the feedback workshop. The EO will accept the report as a first draft when it is in compliance with the terms of reference, the ADR Manual and other established guidelines, and satisfies basic quality standards. The draft is also subject to a quality assurance process through an external review.

Second draft and the verification and stakeholder comments – The first draft will be revised by the Team Leader to incorporate the feedback from the external review process. Once satisfactory revisions to the draft are made, it becomes the second draft. The second draft will be forwarded by the EO to UNDP Liberia and the Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA) for factual verification and identification of any errors of omission and/or interpretation. The draft evaluation report will also be forwarded to the evaluation reference group for comments and inputs. The Team Leader will revise the second draft accordingly, preparing an audit trail that indicates changes that are made to the draft, and submit it as the Final Draft. The EO may request further revisions if it considers it necessary.

Stakeholder Workshop – A meeting with the key national stakeholders will be organized to present the results of the evaluation and examine ways forward in Liberia. The main purpose of the meeting is to facilitate greater buy-in by national

stakeholders in taking the lessons and recommendations from the report forward and to strengthen the national ownership of development process and the necessary accountability of UNDP interventions at country level. It may be necessary to incorporate some significant comments into the final evaluation report.

PHASE 5: FOLLOW-UP

Management response – UNDP Liberia will prepare a management response to the ADR under the oversight of RBA. RBA will be responsible for monitoring and overseeing the implementation of follow-up actions in the Evaluation Resource Centre.¹⁶⁷

Communication – The ADR report and brief will be widely distributed in both print and electronic versions. The evaluation report will be made available to UNDP Executive Board by the time of approving a new Country Programme Document. It will be widely distributed by the EO and at UNDP headquarters, to evaluation outfits of other international organizations, and to evaluation societies and research institutions in the region. UNDP Liberia and the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs will disseminate the ADR to stakeholders in the country. The report and the management response will be published on the UNDP Web site¹⁶⁸ and in the Evaluation Resource Centre.

EVALUATION MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

UNDP EVALUATION OFFICE

UNDP EO will conduct the ADR in collaboration with the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Government of Liberia. The EO Task Manager will provide overall management of

167 See <<http://erc.undp.org/>>.

168 See <www.undp.org/eo/>.

and technical backstopping to the evaluation. The Task Manager will set the terms of reference for the evaluation, select the evaluation team, receive the inception report, provide guidance to the conduct of evaluation, organize feedback sessions and a stakeholder meeting, receive the first draft of the report and decide on its acceptability, and manages the review and follow-up processes. The Task Manager will also support the evaluation team in understanding the scope, the process, the approach and the methodology of ADR, provide ongoing advice and feedback to the team for quality assurance, and assist the Team Leader in finalizing the report. The EO will meet all costs directly related to the conduct of the ADR.

GOVERNMENT COUNTERPART IN LIBERIA

The Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs is the government counterpart of UNDP in Liberia. The ministry will facilitate the evaluation team's conducting of the ADR by: providing necessary access to information source within Government of Liberia, safeguarding the independence of the evaluation and jointly organizing the stakeholder meeting with the EO. It will be responsible within the Government of Liberia for the use and dissemination of the final outcomes of the ADR.

In order to ensure the active engagement of Government of Liberia and other stakeholders, an Evaluation Reference Group will be constituted. The Evaluation Reference Group will include:

- Government: Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs (Chair);
- Civil Society: Representative of a women's non-governmental organization and faculty member of the University of Liberia;
- UN: UN Resident Coordinator; and
- International agencies: The World Bank and UNICEF.

The Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs will invite the members of the groups. The Ministry will also coordinate the inputs of the other ministries and national agencies (Ministries of Justice, Gender and Development, Public works, Labour and others) pertaining to UNDP programme throughout the ADR process.

The Evaluation Reference Group will provide inputs to the terms of reference, inception report, particularly on key evaluation questions, and to the preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations to be made by the team. The reference group will participate in the stakeholders' workshop organized at the end of the main mission. The reference group will provide feedback to the ADR team as deemed appropriate during the evaluation process.

UNDP LIBERIA

The country office will support the evaluation team in liaison with key partners and other stakeholders, make available to the team all necessary information regarding UNDP programmes, projects and activities in the country, and provide factual verifications of the draft report. The country office will provide the evaluation team support in kind (e.g. arranging meetings with project staff and beneficiaries or assistance for the project site visits). To ensure the independence of the views expressed in interviews and meetings with stakeholders held for data collection purposes, however, the country office will not participate in them.

During the entire evaluation process and particularly during the main mission, the country office will cooperate with the ADR team and respect its independence and need to freely access data, information and people that are relevant to the exercise. The country office will ensure timely dispatch of written comments on the draft evaluation report. From its side, the ADR team will act in a transparent manner; will interact regularly with the UNDP country office and national government counterparts at critical junctures.

THE EVALUATION TEAM

The Evaluation Team will be responsible for conducting the evaluation. This will entail, inter alia, preparing the inception report, conducting data collection, structured data documentation and analysis, presenting preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations at debriefings and the stakeholder workshop, and preparing the first, second and final drafts of the ADR report as well as a draft Evaluation Brief.

The EO will establish an evaluation team to undertake the ADR. The team will constitute the following members:

- Team Leader, with overall responsibility for providing guidance and leadership for conducting the ADR and for preparing and revising draft and final reports. The Team Leader will have significant experience across a broad range of humanitarian and development issues, and good understanding of UNDP and UN programming in post conflict context. It is estimated that the workload of the team leader would be 55 days.
- Two Evaluation Specialists (International and national consultants) will support data collection and analysis. Team Specialists, who will support the Team Leader and provide the expertise in specific subject areas of the evaluation, will be responsible for drafting relevant parts of the report. Specialists will be contracted to cover the following areas: governance, pro-poor economic development

Activity	Responsible party	Estimated time-frame
ADR initiation and preparatory work	Evaluation Office	October 2010
Preparatory mission	Evaluation Office	November-December 2010
Selection of the evaluation team leader	Evaluation Office/country office	January 2011
Scoping mission, Inception Report	Evaluation Office/Team Leader	March
Selection of other evaluation team members	Evaluation Office/Team Leader	February
Data collection-Main mission	Evaluation Team	March-April
Data analysis	Evaluation Team/Evaluation Office	March-April
Validation workshop	Evaluation Office, Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs and Evaluation Team	April
Submission of the first draft	Team Leader/Evaluation Team	End May
External review	Evaluation Office	June
Submission of the second draft	Team Leader/Evaluation Team	July
Review by UNDP Liberia, RBA and Evaluation Reference Group	Evaluation Office and Evaluation Reference Group	July
Submission of the final draft	Team Leader/Evaluation Team	July
Stakeholder workshop	Evaluation Office	First week of June
Editing and formatting	Evaluation Office	August
Issuance of the final report and Evaluation Brief	Evaluation Office	September
Dissemination of the final report and Evaluation Brief	Evaluation Office, Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs and country office	September

and gender. It is estimated that workload of the team specialists would be approximately 35 days each.

- The EO Task Manager will act as a member of the team and provide support to both the design of the evaluation and the process of data analysis.

TIME-FRAME

The time-frame and responsibilities for the evaluation process are tentatively as follows:

The time-frame above is indicative of the process and deadlines and does not imply full-time engagement of the evaluation team during the period.

EXPECTED OUTPUTS

The expected outputs from the evaluation team are:

- An inception report, providing the evaluation matrix as specified in Sections 4 and 5 of this document (maximum 10 pages without annexes);
- The first, second and final drafts of the report 'Assessment of Development Results – Liberia' (approximately 55 pages for the main text);
- Draft for the Evaluation Brief (2 pages); and
- Presentations at the feedback and stakeholder meetings.

The final report of the ADR will follow the standard structure outlined in the 'ADR Manual 2011', and all drafts will be provided in English.

PERSONS CONSULTED

United Nations Development Programme, New York

- Mr. Babacar Cisse, Deputy Regional Director and Deputy Assistant Administrator, Regional Bureau for Africa, UNDP
- Ms. Violet Baffour, Area Officer, Regional Bureau for Africa, UNDP
- Mr. Suppiramaniam Nanthikesan, Monitoring and Evaluation Adviser, Regional Bureau for Africa, UNDP
- Mr. Jordan Ryan, Bureau Director and Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery, UNDP
- Mr. Bruno Lemarquis, Deputy Director, Policy, Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery, UNDP
- Ms. Malin Herwig, Policy Specialist for Inter-Agency Matters, Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery
- Mr. Moises Venancio, Evaluation Focal Point, Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery, UNDP
- Ms. Roma Bhattaacharjea, Gender Adviser, Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery, UNDP
- Mr. Alejandro Alvarez, Rule of Law Adviser, Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery, UNDP
- Ms. Shibani Malhotra, Rule of Law Adviser, Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery, UNDP
- Ms. Suki Beavers Cluster Leader, Gender Team, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP
- Ms. Raquel Lagunas, Institutional Development Adviser/Cluster Leader, Gender Team, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP

United Nations, New York

- Mr. Dmitri Titov, Assistant Secretary-General, Department of Peacekeeping Operations
- Mr. Raisedon Zenenga, Director, Africa Division II, Department of Peacekeeping Operations
- Ms. Gloria Ntegeye,
- Mr. Adedeji Ebo, Chief, Security Sector Reform Unit, OROLSI, Department of Peacekeeping Operations
- Mr. Thorodd Ommundsen, Senior Associate Sector Reform Unit, OROLSI, Department of Peacekeeping Operations
- Mr. Jared Rigg, SSR Adviser, Security Sector Reform Unit, OROLSI, Department of Peacekeeping Operations
- Mr. Edric Selous, Director, Rule of Law Unit, Executive Office of the Secretary-General
- Ms. Sanna Kyllonen, Associate Rule of Law Officer, Rule of Law Unit, Executive Office of the Secretary-General
- Ms. Marije L. Balt, Coordinator, Security and Development, Peacebuilding and Stabilisation

United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)

- Ms. Ellen Margrethe, Løj, Special Representative of the Secretary-General
- Ms. Henrietta J.A.N. Mensa-Bonsu, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Rule of Law)
- Mr. Moustapha Soumare, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative

Ms. Smaro Skoulikidis, Office of the Resident Coordinator/HC/DSRSG

UNDP Liberia

Mr. Dominic Sam, Country Director

Ms. Maria-Threase Keating Deputy Resident Representative (Programme)

Mr. Christopher H. Anderson, Deputy Country Director (Operations)

Ms. Mariam Traore, Programme Manager, Global Fund, UNDP

Mr. Fitsum G. Abraha, Economic Adviser, Head of Strategy and Policy and Strategy Unit

Mr. Stanley M. Kamara, Economic Specialist, Assistant Resident Representative, Strategy and Policy Unit

Ms. Michele Tan, Resource Mobilisation and Partnership Development Specialist, Policy and Strategy Unit

Ms. Nessie Golokai, Assistant Resident Representative, Governance

Mr. John Walker, Assistant Resident Representative, Pro-Poor

Ms. Angelance Browne, National Programme Officer, United Nations Capital Development Fund

Ms. Shipra Bose, Senior Gender Adviser

Ms. Sue Tatten, Chief Technical Adviser, Rule of Law

Mr. K.N.S. Nair, Chief Technical Adviser, Decentralisation and Local Governance

Mr. Abdoul Anziz Said Attoumane, Chief Technical Adviser, Launch of an Inclusive Financial Sector

Mr. Teakon Williams, Head, Compliance Unit

Ms. Yvonne N.J. Wolo, Programme Associate for Monitoring and Evaluation, Compliance Unit

Masaneh S. K. Bayo, Programme Manager, Human Rights, Gender /Protection Programme

Stanely M. Kamara, Economic Specialist/ARR Strategy and Policy Unit (SPU)

Shipra Bose, Senior Gender Adviser

Mr. Donald G. Kokeh, Project Engineer/SIC, Bong

Mr. Sampson VK Dolo, Community Development Assistance

Ms. Songha Chae, M&E Officer, UNDP

Mr. Stephen Kolee, KMV Project Manager

Mr. Samule Davis, KMV Project Engineer

Ms. Madhumita Sarkar, Programme Adviser, UN-Government of Liberia on Sexual and Gender Based Violence

Liberian Governance Commission

Mr. Amos Sawyer, Former President of the Republic and Chairman and Commissioner for Political and Legal Reform

Ms. Elizabeth Mamai Korpo Sele Mulbah, Commissioner, Civic Engagement and National Identity

Mr. Yarsuo Weh Dorliae, Commissioner, National Decentralisation and Local Governance

Mr. S. Jubaru Carlon, Commissioner, Public Sector Reform

Mr. Abraham B. Mitchell, Public Sector Reform Programme Analyst

Mr. David Kialain, Public Sector Reform

Dr S. Jabaru Carlon, Commissioner, Public Sector Reform

Ms. Ruth Jappah, Commissioner, National Integrity

National Election Commission

Mr. James M. Fromayan, Chairman

Mr. Jonathan Weedor, Commissioner

Liberian Anti-corruption Commission

Ms. Frances Johnson-Morris, Executive Chairperson

Mr. Joseph K. Acgei, Vice-Chairperson

Ms. Sandra Howard-Kendor, Commissioner,
Education and Prevention

Mr. Osman Kanneh, Commissioner,
Enforcement

Mr. Daniel B. Tipayson, Executive Director
Civil Service Agency

Hon. Dr. C. William Allen, Director-General

Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs

Mr. Sebastian T. Muah, Deputy Minister for
Economic Affairs and Policy

Deputy Minister for Regional and Sectoral
Planning

Deputy Minister for Administration

Ministry of Internal Affairs

Mr. Soko v. Sackor I, Deputy Minister for
Administration

Mr. J. Allison Barco, Assistant Minister

Mr. Amadu J. Kiawu, Consultant

Mr. Losine N. Sanyon Training Manager

Mr. Augustus M. Bailey, SES/Human Resources
Adviser

Ministry of Justice

Mr. M. Wilkens Wright, Solicitor General

Ms. Hillary Sirleaf, Assistant Minister of Justice
for Corrections

Ministry of Gender and Development

Ms. Varbah Gayflor, Minister

Civil Service Agency

Dr. William Allen, Director General

Liberian Institute for Statistics and Geo-Information Services

Dr. Edward T. Liberty, Director General

UN Agencies

Ms. Esperance Fundira, Resident Representative,
United Nations Population Fund

Ms. Izeduwa Derex-Briggs, Country
Representative, UN Women

Mr. George K. Mburathi, Representative a.i.,
Food and Agriculture Organisation

Mr. Joseph K. Boiwu, Assistant Representative,
Food and Agriculture Organisation

Mr. Fazulul Haque, Deputy Representatives,
United Nations Children's Fund

Ms. Lilit Umroyan, Child Protection Officer,
United Nations Children's Fund

Mr. Lakis Papastavrou, Chief Technical Adviser
and Head of Country Office, UNOPS

Mr. Michael Dickson, Technical Adviser,
UNOPS

Bilateral and Multilateral Partners

Mr. Yuri Sobolev, Resident Representative,
International Monetary Fund

Mr. Ohene Owusu Nyanin, Country Manager,
Resident Representative, World Bank

Ms. Paula Vazquez Horyaans, Head of Section,
Operations, European Union

Ms. Francesca Varlese, Governance, Operations
Section, European Union

Mr. Shitau Mura, Country Manager, Japan
International Cooperation Agency

Non-governmental Organizations

Mr. Dan Sayee, Executive Director, National
Democratic Institute

Mr. Oscar Bloh, Country Director, Liberia,
Search for Common Ground
Mr. Francesca Pastora, Executive Director,
Local Enterprise Assistance Programme

Ms. Ruth Kullah, Executive Director,
Liberty Finance

Mr. Lancedell Matthews, Executive Director,
NARDA

Mr. Peter M. Quaqua, President, Press Union of Liberia

Oscar Bloh, Countru Director Liberia, Search for Common Ground

Francesco Pastora, Director LEAP

T. Maxwell Gngsby, Deputy Secretary for Programmes, FLY

Robert H. Pyne, Deputy Secretary for Finance, FLY

Jeneba Z Kandii, Administrative Assistant, FLY

Mamakiziel S. Sirarr, Deputy Secretary Administration, FLY

Community Groups (Partial List)

Community Based Organisations

Women and Children Development Association (WODAL)

Kpatoloi Women Development Association (KPWODA)

Bong County

Anthony B. Sheriff, Development

Anita Rennie, Country Coordinator, MGD

NCC Isaac Diranah, Direcor/LIDS

Edwin J Gbaire, County Councilor, Ministry of Youth & Sports

John Y. Luckie, Coordinator

Alice K Wasee, Secretary/Supt MIA

Monica Khishen Honora, County Coordinator, MoA

Luclei F, Herber, Supt Bong County

Millennium Village Project Steering Committee

Alphonse Klembia, Boinsen District Youth President

Kamah Torkpah, Boinsen District Women Leader

James M. Dianke, D.E.O Representative

Teage Bonyole, Gbecala Town Chief

Nelson K. Gblorkon, Citizen

David N. Wall, Kokoyah Development Chairman

Samuel Nahleh, General Town Chief

Nixion L. Kpee, District Administrative Assistant

G. Joseph Isotoe, City Mayor

Saxladay, SOMah

Scholastica L. Jasy, Admin Clerk

Jallah Ford, MVP Agriculture Officer

Joseph M. Gweenei, Health Coordinator, KMVP

William Tarpeh, District Commissioner

Annex III

SELECT REFERENCES

A/65/354 – S/2010/466. Women's Participation in Peacebuilding, Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly 65th Session, 7th September 2010

DCAF, Mapping Study on Gender and Security Sector Reform, Actors and Activities in Liberia, Validation Workshop Report, in Collaboration with LILEA, March 2011

Ministry of Gender and Development, Gender Based Violence Reports for Liberia, Monthly for January 2011, February 2011, March 2011, April 2011

Ministry of Internal Affairs, LDLD/Local Development Fund Operational Guidelines

Republic of Liberia, Government, UN Joint Programme on Sexual and Gender Based Violence Six Monthly Reports: July December 2010, January – June 2010, and Progress Report 2009.

Republic of Liberia, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Volume II: Consolidated Final Report, Monrovia, June 30 2009.

S/RES/1325, Women in Armed Conflict, 31 October, 2000

United Nations Development Programme, Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery, Review and Lessons Learned from the Global Programme on Advancing Women Peace and Security Report, By Jane Lawry-White, February 2011.

United Nations Development Programme, Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery, Women, Peace and Security: Global Policy and UNDP programming thematic summary brief, Roma Bhattacharjea, Senior Gender adviser, UNDP/BCPR, New York.

United Nations Development Programme, Country Office Report Gender Steering and Implementation Committee Reporting

Template. Progress Report on the Implementation of the Gender Equality Strategy for 2009-2010

United Nations Development Programme, Country Programme Action Plan, 2008-2012 between Government of Liberia and United Nations Development Programme.

United Nations Development Programme, Framework and Methodology for Generation and Use of Sex Disaggregated Data, a MGD – UN (DP) Collaboration, Briefing Note July 2010

United Nations Development Programme, Making Budgets Gender Responsive, A Ministry of Finance and (UN)DP collaboration Policy Workshop on Gender Responsive Budgeting for Ministry of Finance and other relevant Government of Liberia Institutions, UNDP Liberia, Concept Note, January 2011

United Nations Development Programme, Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation Report for UNDP Liberia, 2006. LDDRRP, Capacity Building and Human Rights Awareness, Community Based Recovery, HIV/AIDS, Monrovia, 2006.

United Nations Development Programme, UNDP Liberia's Achievements Towards meeting the Goals of Established by the UNDP GES (2008-2013). Country Office Achievements.

United Nations in Liberia and the Government of Liberia, Delivering as One: Concept Note, Monrovia, Liberia, October 2010.

United Nations, Delivering as One: Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on UN System-Wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance and the Environment, United Nations, New York, 9 November 2006

UNMIL, A Common Vision For Uncommon Results: an overview of UN integration in Liberia, (not dated),

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF UNMIL

The actual terms of reference for UNMIL are laid out in Security Council resolution 1509 of 2003 and cover:

SUPPORT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT

- To observe and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and investigate violations;
- To establish and maintain continuous liaison with the field headquarters of all the parties' military forces;
- To assist in the development of cantonment sites and to provide security at these sites;
- To observe and monitor disengagement and cantonment of military forces of all the parties to the conflict;
- To support the work of the Joint Monitoring Committee ;
- To develop, as soon as possible, preferably within 30 days of the adoption of the resolution, in cooperation with the Joint Monitoring Committee, relevant international financial institutions, international development organizations, and donor nations, an action plan for the overall implementation of a disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation (DDRR) programme for all armed parties; with particular attention to the special needs of child combatants and women; and addressing the inclusion of non-Liberian combatants;
- To carry out voluntary disarmament and to collect and destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDRR programme;
- To liaise with the Joint Monitoring Committee

and to advise on the implementation of its functions under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the ceasefire agreement; and

- To provide security at key government installations, in particular ports, airports, and other vital infrastructure

PROTECTION OF UNITED NATIONS STAFF, FACILITIES AND CIVILIANS

- To protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, without prejudice to the efforts of the government, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities.

SUPPORT FOR HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS ASSISTANCE

- To facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to establish the necessary security conditions;
- To contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Liberia, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including refugees, returning refugees and internally displaced persons, women, children, and demobilized child soldiers, within UNMIL capabilities and under acceptable security conditions, in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, related organizations, governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations; and
- To ensure an adequate human rights presence, capacity and expertise within UNMIL to carry out human rights promotion, protection, and monitoring activities.

SUPPORT FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

- To assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of police, in cooperation with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), international organizations, and interested states; and
- To assist the transitional government in the formation of a new and restructured Liberian military in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations and interested States.

SUPPORT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE PROCESS

- To assist the transitional government, in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international partners, in the re-establishment of national authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a functioning administrative structure at both national and local levels;
- To assist the transitional government in conjunction with ECOWAS and other

international partners in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions;

- To assist the transitional government in restoring proper administration of natural resources; and
- To assist the transitional government, in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international partners, in preparing for national elections scheduled for no later than the end of 2005.

Resolution 1509 (2003) also recognized the importance of protecting children in armed conflict in accordance with UN resolution 1379 (2001) and related resolutions; demanded that all parties cease using child soldiers and cease all human rights violations and atrocities against the Liberian population, and stressed the need to bring to justice perpetrators of human rights violations; reaffirmed the importance of a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peacebuilding in accordance with resolution 1325 (2000), recalling the need to address violence against women and girls as a tool of warfare, and encouraged UNMIL to actively address these issues.

Annex V

LIST OF PROJECTS, BUDGETS AND EXPENDITURES

Project Title	Project Status (ongoing/completed)	Start Date	End Date	Award Amount ('000)	Approved Budget 2008 to 31 Dec. 2010	Total Expenditure 2008 to 31 Dec. 2010
Country programme 2008-11						
Emergency Assistance	Ongoing	2000	2011	933,902	591	267
Community Reintegration	Completed	2004	2010	14,255,744.00	2,281	484
POEM III					20	16
UNDP Microfinance project	Ongoing	2005	2012	2,339,289	1,077	958
Capacity Building For Aid Coordination	Ongoing	2005	2010	3,954,574	306	373
HIC Transition	Completed	2006	2008	1,675,000	325	391
The Liberia Transitional Support	Completed	2006	2009	11,123,779	3,988	3,478
HSF – Rebuilding Communities	Completed	2008	2010	7,080,192	3,175	2,462
The D4D Project	Completed	2007	2009	652,090	279	219
Emergency Infrastructure	Completed	2007	2010	15,827,287	7,830	6,102
Liberia Development Forestry Management Project	Ongoing	2007	2010	1,897,871	1,484	1,155
National Youth Volunteer Service	Ongoing	2007	2010	1,748,537	671	597
Participatory Poverty Assessment	Completed	2007	2009	160,506	73	60
Community-Based Recovery	Ongoing	2008	2011	7,191,915	6,915	5,573
Economic Policy & Management	Ongoing	2008	2012	5,589,957	4,549	4,064
Aid Coordination	Ongoing	2008	2012	1,379,000	783	715
Youth Empowerment	Ongoing	2008	2012	2,354,818	1,955	1,959
Millennium Development Village-Liberia	Ongoing	2008	2013	2,278,913	1,963	1,902
Tumutu Agricultural Project	Completed	2008	2010	1,217,813	1,218	1,123
UNDP-UNEP Poverty Environment Initiative (PEI) Liberia	Ongoing	2007	2010	11,126,222	125	40
Improve Food Security	Ongoing	2009	2011	4,246,053	3,185	2,713
Volunteer for Peace	Closing	2009	2010	908,366	908	880
Supporting Peaceful Re-integration of High Risk Youths	Ongoing	2009	2010	494,686	495	501
Creating Livelihood Opportunities for Workers in Guthrie	Ongoing	2009	2011	1,349,265	1,100	674

Project Title	Project Status (ongoing/completed)	Start Date	End Date	Award Amount ('000)	Approved Budget 2008 to 31 Dec. 2010	Total Expenditure 2008 to 31 Dec. 2010
Sen Economist (Support Cost)					40	8
Economist Programme	Ongoing	2010	2010	23,964,628	309	305
Strengthening Urban and Rural Market Structures	Ongoing	2010	2011	250,000	10	10
Total					45,655	37,029
Democratic Governance						
Governance	Completed	2004	2010	10227211	1,014	506
Protection of IDPs	Completed	2004	2009	3561499	673	494
IF National Implementation Arrangement	No information				20	20
Support to RFTF Implementation	Completed	2004	2009	1864873	26	(1)
Support to the Organization of 2005 Elections	Completed	2005	2010	5784644	134	209
UN Support for National HR Project					14	14
EUEOM Liberia 2005 P	Completed	2005	2010	3514648	302	85
Programme Effectiveness-Development					-	-
Liberia Emergency Capacity Building Support Project	Ongoing	2006	2010	14100613	8,163	6,897
Communication Budget	Completed	2006	2008	368,810	300	(2)
Strengthening the Capacity of CST	Ongoing	2006	2010		4,089	3,225
Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals	Ongoing	2006	2011	2625799	1,295	1,280
Organizational Effectiveness Towards Development Outputs	Ongoing				584	614
Development of National Human Rights Action Plan	Ongoing	2006	2010	723,983	467	135
Coordination for Results (see 55430)	Ongoing	2007	2011	55430	1,307	847
Coordination Capacity of UNCT	Ongoing	2007	2011	3,688,931	1,074	1,307
Senior Executive Service	Ongoing	2007	2011	9733257	8,532	5,293
Building a National Integrity	Completed	2007	2009	642255	379	350
Legislative Strengthening	Ongoing	2007	2010	150,000	181	95
Liberia Decentralization	Ongoing	2007	2011	5,000,000	2,383	2,522
Support to MOF Resource Management Unit	Closing	2007	2010	3,612,283	2,057	1,569
Strengthening Rule of Law	Completed	2008	2010	400,000	567	344
Communications for Development	Ongoing	2008	2012	1217750	918	1,027

Project Title	Project Status (ongoing/completed)	Start Date	End Date	Award Amount ('000)	Approved Budget 2008 to 31 Dec. 2010	Total Expenditure 2008 to 31 Dec. 2010
Strengthening Rule of Law & Administration	Ongoing	2008	2012	3,373,086.00	2,354	2,370
Public Administration & Civic Engagement	Ongoing	2008	2012	2443500	1,696	1,538
National Capacity Development	Ongoing	2008	2012	3570000	2,214	2,136
PSIA Decentralization Project	Ongoing	2008	2010	159385	161	64
Support to Strengthening Nat'l Institutional Capacity (DEX-NEX)	Ongoing	2008	2012	1630000	550	553
Support for MDGs Achievement					35	23
Prog. On Anti-corruption Development Effectiveness					3	-
Rule of Law and Admin	Ongoing	2009	2011	2,817,550	2,068	2,025
Inclusive Globalization					-	-
Supporting Liberian Anti-corruption	Ongoing	2009	2010	500,000	491	446
Improving Persecution	Ongoing	2009	2010	1,082,000	1,049	1,076
Strengthening Public Defense	Ongoing	2009	2010	750,066	736	960
Strengthening State Capacity for Peace Consolidation (Woodrow Wilson)	Ongoing	2009	2010	610,100	610	489
Strengthening the Capacity	Ongoing	2009	2011	3,000,000	3,506	3,544
Liberia Peacebuilding Fund Tech. Secretariat (PBO)	Ongoing	2009	2010	920,000	563	557
TOKTEN USAID Grant	Ongoing	2009	2012	3427384	1,533	1,485
Common Services - UNCT					197	190
Promoting Democracy & Good Governance Thru Dev.	Ongoing	2010	2010	100,000	100	86
Support to 2010 - 2012 Liberian Electoral Cycle	Ongoing	2010	2012	27,000,000	6,526	4,324
PDG/OECD Capacity Support to the Nat'l Police	Ongoing	2010	2011	78791	50	23
National Long Term Vision & Economic Growth Strategy	Ongoing	2010	2010	500000	670	528
GPECS/Spanish Contribution to 2010-2010 Elections	Ongoing	2010	2012	75179	400	276
Total					59,991	49,523

Project Title	Project Status (ongoing/completed)	Start Date	End Date	Award Amount ('000)	Approved Budget 2008 to 31 Dec. 2010	Total Expenditure 2008 to 31 Dec. 2010
Crisis prevention and recovery and Rule of Law						
DDRRP-Liberia	Completed	2004	2010	62,607	3,071	2,254
Development Support Service	Completed	2004	2009	46	150	98
Support to the Police Academy	Ongoing	2004	2010	6040	180	69
Reestablishment of Correction	Ongoing	2006	2010	1606	369	194
DDRR EC 3rd Contribution	Completed	2006	2010	17,000	3,849	2,924
Demobilization of the LNP	Completed	2006	2010	3,911	1,388	395
Capacity Building for LNP	Completed	2006	2010	1,100	197	2
Support to Demobilization of LNP	Completed	2006	2010	221	216	53
Enhance Capacity of TRC	Completed	2006	2010	3,038	896	777
Restructuring and Training of LNP	Ongoing	2006	2010	610	2,172	2,325
Enhancing SSR Reform	Ongoing	2007	2010	1,000	3,737	1,871
EC Support to the Police Academy	Ongoing	2007	2010	1,495	1,084	280
Support to Implementation of ECOWAS Prog for PADEP	Completed	2007	2009	45	38	38
Enhancing Police Reform	Ongoing	2007	2010	1,400	1,912	1,399
USAID Support to Enhance the	Completed	2007	2009	1,030,637	531	499
Norwegian Contribution-UNDP/DDRR	Completed	2007	2010	7,000,000	5,842	5,956
Development of CPR	Completed				30	30
Support to TRC with Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency Funds	Completed	2008	2010	1,285,629	1,241	1,139
Capacity Building of LNP	Ongoing	2007	2011	1,600	1,612	1,482
Enhancing Community Security and Social Cohesion	Ongoing	2008	2012	900	11,196	10,496
TRC Final Reconciliation	Completed	2009	2010	350	350	348
Enhancing Relationship between Police and Civilians	Ongoing	2009	2010	750	923	433
Total					40,061	32,629
Energy and Environment						
PIMS 3456 BD MSP PHASE II Nat'l Reporting to CBD	Ongoing	2005	2010	1,828	1	-
PIMS3387-LD-PDFA-Lib	Ongoing	2006	2011	527	431	425
PIMS 3918 BD MSP GLO Support to CBD 2010 Targets	Ongoing	2008	2011	2,818	20	20
Emergency Support to Flood in Liberia	Completed	2007	2008	122	47	46
LIR/PHA/53/INV/13/TERMINAL	Completed	2008	2010	147,742	132	119

Project Title	Project Status (ongoing/completed)	Start Date	End Date	Award Amount ('000)	Approved Budget 2008 to 31 Dec. 2010	Total Expenditure 2008 to 31 Dec. 2010
Environment and Natural	Ongoing	2008	2012	2,172	1,272	1,282
Disaster and Climate Risk Management	Ongoing	2008	2010	906	773	646
PIM 1839 CAN for Imp	Ongoing	2008	2011	230	227	232
PIMS 3975 – LDCF Enhancing	Ongoing	2009	2010	98	136	104
Enhancing Resilience of Vulnerable Coastal Areas	Ongoing	2010	2011	170	8	8
Strategic Approach to Int'l Chemicals Management	Ongoing	2010	2012	231	58	12
PIMS 4439 Lib Agriculture Enhancing Resilience to CC	Ongoing	2010	2011	75	42	44
Liberia High Level Support to Water Supply and Sanitation	Ongoing	2010	2013	2,900	-	-
Total					3,147	2,938
Women's Empowerment						
Economic Empowerment of Women	Ongoing	2005	2011	1,549	907	893
Addressing SEA & GBV in Post Conflict	Completed	2007	2009	300,262	151	149
Sweden Support Empowerment	Ongoing	2008	2010	397	515	301
Finnish Contribution to International Women Colloquium	Completed	2008	2009	406,152	462	274
EC Support to International Women Colloquium	Ongoing	2008	2010	1,095	1096	681
Global Gender Equalities	Ongoing	2009	2011	10,982	764	575
Norway Support to Colloquium	Ongoing	2009	2010	267	553	262
Gender Equality and Economic Empowerment	Ongoing	2009	2011	3,111	1772	1448
Support To Angie Brooks Centre	Ongoing	2010	2011	197	197	190
Total					6,417	4,773
HIV/AIDS						
HIV/AIDS Prevention	Ongoing				147	123
EPPR	Ongoing	2006	2011	1,720	1,213	693
HIV/AIDS Programme for PHC					18	19
Strengthening HIV/AIDS	Ongoing	2007	2010	17,131	15,400	14,983
Malaria Control	Ongoing	2008	2011	20,199	17,179	15,816
Tuberculosis Control	Ongoing	2008	2011	9,509	8,317	6,767
					42,274	38,401
Total					197,545	165,293

Project Title	Project Status (ongoing/completed)	Start Date	End Date	Award Amount ('000)	Approved Budget 2008 to 31 Dec. 2010	Total Expenditure 2008 to 31 Dec. 2010
Country programme 2004-07						
Vulnerability Analysis	Completed	2003	2008	50589	50	0
UNDP Microfinance Project	Ongoing	2005	2012	2250289	785	623
Capacity Building For Aid Coordination	Ongoing	2005	2010	3,954,574	306	373
Economic empowerment of Women	Completed	2006	2010	1549296	643	165
HIC Transition	Completed	2006	2008	1,675,000	1,350	1,060
Participatory Poverty Assessment	Completed	2007	2009		87	0
Liberia NV Youth Service	Ongoing	2007	2010	1748537	95	51
The D4D Project	Completed				320	133
Democratic Governance						
MDG Benchmarking	Completed	2004	2005	46629	47	0
Governance	Completed	2004	2010	10227211	9213	7738
Protection of IDPs	Completed	2004	2009	3561499	2940	2261
IF National implementation Arrangement					38	33
Development Support Services	Completed	2004	2009	361600	212	154
Voter Education	Completed	2004	2005	80000	80	0
Support to RFTF Implementation	Completed	2004	2009	1864873	1839	1375
Senior Economist Liberia-Ghana	Completed	2005	2005	273298	273	0
Support to the Organization of 2005 Elections	Completed	2005	2010	5784644	5651	2320
EUEOM Liberia 2005 Project	Completed	2005	2010	3514648	3213	2076
Security - MOSS	Completed	2005	2009	1005122	280	0
Support to Field Offices	Completed	2006	2007	950000	950	873
Liberia Emergency Capacity Building (Gov)						
The Liberian Transitional Support	Completed	2006	2009	11123779	7135	4925
TOKTEN (GOV)						
Development of National Human	Completed	2006	2011		10	0
Coordination for Results	Ongoing	2007	2011	1764820	93	91
Senior Executive Service (GOV)	Ongoing	2007	2011	9786689	850	124
Building a National Integrity	Completed	2007	2009	642255	261	-
Legislative Strengthening	Completed	2007	2010	205308	23	24
Liberia Development Forestry Sector Management	Ongoing	2007	2011	2033685	711	355

Project Title	Project Status (ongoing/completed)	Start Date	End Date	Award Amount ('000)	Approved Budget 2008 to 31 Dec. 2010	Total Expenditure 2008 to 31 Dec. 2010
Liberia Decentralization & Local Development	Ongoing	2007	2011	3742199	106	43
Support for the MOF Resource Management Unit	Completed	2007	2010	3612283	1555	245
National Capacity Development	Completed	2007	2007	540000	540	15
Support to the Ministry of Education DDRR Scholarships	Completed	2007	2007	63554	64	64
Communications Budget	Completed	2006	2008	368810	69	66
Crisis Prevention and Recovery and Rule of Law						
Emergency Assistance programme	Ongoing	2004	2011	933902	333	176
PA for DDRRP	Completed	2004	2004	415940	416	497
PA for DDRRP	Completed	2004	2007	613600	115	1
Community Reintegration	Completed	2004	2010	14255744	11974	9934
LDDRRP	Completed	2004	2004	1000	1	0
Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation	Completed	2004	2009	1003828	502	501
DDRRP	Completed	2004	2009	1640000	1645	1653
DDRRP-Liberia	Completed	2004	2010	62607855	59537	55689
CSOs in Post Conflict Countries					209	89
Support to the Police Academy	Completed	2004	2010	6040160	3281	3038
PA for Small Arms Control	Completed	2005	2006	1300756	1312	1066
Re-establishment of Corrections System in Liberia	Completed	2006	2010	1606548	1245	801
DDRR EC 3rd Contribution	Completed	2006	2010	17681471	13832	12079
Demobilization of LNP	Completed	2006	2010	6357372	4938	3689
Capacity Building for LNP	Completed	2006	2010	1415170	1218	1034
Support to Demobilization of	Completed	2006	2010	536097	200	109
Enhance Capacity of the TRC	Completed	2006	2010	1804025	909	662
Arms for Development Project	Completed	2006	2008	2832636	2695	2029
Strengthening Capacity of CST	Closing	2006	2010	7646326	3557	1830
Restructuring and Training of LNP	Ongoing	2006	2011	8578709	6339	2967
Emergency Infrastructure Project	Ongoing	2007	2011	16176341	9200	8277
Enhancing Security Sector Reform	Ongoing	2007	2011	4751738	1965	252
EC Support of the Police Academy	Closing	2004	2010	2578835	1495	1461
Support to Implementation of ECOWAS Prog for PADEP	Completed	2007	2009	45	15	6

Project Title	Project Status (ongoing/completed)	Start Date	End Date	Award Amount ('000)	Approved Budget 2008 to 31 Dec. 2010	Total Expenditure 2008 to 31 Dec. 2010
USAID Support to Enhance the TRC	Completed	2007	2009	1037637	500	0
Norwegian Contribution - UNDP DRR Residual Caseload	Completed	2007	2010	5896861	56	0
Energy and environment						
Liberia National Biodiversity	Completed	2004	2009	197881	18	18
Support for the Project National	Completed	2005	2008	834921	821	582
PIMS 3456 BD MSP Phase II: National	Completed				21	19
Emergency Support to flood	Completed	2007	2008	122191	75	28
Women's empowerment						
Strengthening Gender Mainstreaming	Completed	2005	2006	80561	81	70
Economic Empowerment of Women	Completed	2006	2010	1549296	643	165
Women and Leadership - DGTTF	Completed	2007	2008	250000	250	249
Addressing SEA & sexual and gender-based violence in post-conflict	Completed	2007	2009	300262	150	0
HIV/AIDS						
HIV/AIDS Prevention	Ongoing	2004	2010	1483143	1336	1186
Strengthening HIV/AIDS & Prevention	COMPLETED	2004	2007	7,658,187	7,658	7,680
Tuberculosis Control & Management	COMPLETED	2004	2007	4,534,017	4,534	4,519
Malaria Control & Prevention	COMPLETED	2004	2007	12,140,921	12,140	12,185
EPPR	Ongoing	2006	2011	1720712	472	323
Strengthening HIV/AIDS Prevention	ONGOING	2007	2010	17,130,650.28	17,130	17,027



*Empowered lives.
Resilient nations.*

United Nations Development Programme
Evaluation Office
220 East 42nd Street
New York, NY 10017, USA
Tel. (646) 781 4200, Fax (646) 781 4213
Internet: www.undp.org/evaluation

ISBN #: 978-92-1-126322-0
e-ISBN: 978-92-1-054998-1
SALES #: E.11.III.B.24

