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Improving Democracy and Human Rights Support

– Recommendations for the use of indicators
based on the case of Mozambique

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Improving democracy and human rights support

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Preface

The Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation (SADEV) is a government-funded institute that conducts and disseminates expert analyses and evaluations of international development cooperation. SADEV's overall objective is to increase efficiency in Swedish development cooperation.

Research at SADEV is conducted in two major areas. The first of these involves the organisation of international development cooperation, and focuses on issues such as the management and monitoring of executive organisation, the choice of modalities, donor coordination, and the internal efficiency of donor organisations. The second area is concerned with the short- and long-term impact of development assistance on the well-being of recipient country populations. Results of SADEV's research and evaluations are published as reports and studies. Interim studies are circulated as working papers.

This SADEV report elaborates on methods for improving the planning, follow-up and evaluation of democracy support, a field in which knowledge of results needs significant improvement. The study presents a set of guidelines for decision-makers and practitioners in their use of indicators (i.e. measures of inputs, outputs, processes, outcomes and effects), and should also be of interest to other development cooperation areas.

Anders Danielson
Director General
September 2006

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Summary of main conclusions and recommendations

The difficulties involved in following-up results of democracy and human rights (D/HR) support are frequently discussed. However, employing customised indicators and more elaborate methods for data collection can enable the assessment of intangible democracy objectives, such as the strengthening of the influence of civil society. Considering the crucial role played by D/HR objectives throughout Swedish development cooperation and in PRS (poverty reduction strategies) of several partner countries, developing these indicators is of great interest in order to increase our knowledge of goal-fulfilment.

PURPOSE OF THE REPORT

Employing state of the art guidelines in the field of evaluation of D/HR support, the report outlines criteria for the development of D/HR indicators and data collection. This can assist various stakeholders (planning-, decision-making- and implementing agencies) working with D/HR support to improve their use of indicators. In line with the guidelines and by scrutinising the case of Mozambique, the second largest recipient of Swedish support in 2005 and with similar D/HR objectives to most other Swedish partner countries, this report suggests indicators that enhance both planning and the tracking of progress in D/HR support.

MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Although Swedish-funded D/HR activities in Mozambique for 2002-2006 include two goals, democratisation through civil society and good governance through public sector reform, knowledge of the results are skewed towards medium-term governance outcomes, such as new legislation and increased numbers of audits. This report identifies certain prioritised D/HR objectives that are referred to in the cooperation strategy and the Mozambican PRS, for which it has been difficult to find suitable indicators, and thus to monitor. These objectives are outlined below along with their proposed indicators and are also of general interest to Swedish and international development cooperation as a whole:

1. INCREASED POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN CIVIL SOCIETY

- Formal organisational mechanisms for influencing CSO leadership and policy
- Number of CSO activities involving the wider community
- Number of questions/proposals raised during CSO activities by persons other than project leaders and staff
- Perceived influence over CSO activity amongst target groups
- Shares of urban respectively rural based CSOs with grass root participation - formal or informal

2. ENHANCED INFLUENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ON POLICY-MAKING PROCESSES

- CSO activity in major media fora
- Number of meetings with parliamentary committees/joint commissions/advocacy coalitions to which CSOs have access
- Diversity of CSOs represented at parliamentary committees/joint commissions/advocacy coalitions
- Number of policy changes consistent with CSO advocacy, in relation to number of CSO proposals for policy change
- Perception among CSOs/key observers and target groups of willingness of public institutions to engage in dialogue and give access to official information
- Percentage within different societal groups supportive of CSO advocacy and reform agenda

3. ENHANCED INFLUENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ON HR PROTECTION

- Number of policy changes consistent with CSO advocacy, related to number of CSO proposals regarding HR
- Percentage of CSOs/target HR groups involved in dialogue with public institutions

4. REFORM PROCESSES STRENGTHENING HR

- Percentage of target groups satisfied with public officials' responsiveness regarding HR
- Ways in which D/HR conventions are integrated into policy domains where the HR of the poor are weak (education-, health- etc)
- Volume of HR reporting by the State and CSOs to treaty bodies and/or international committees
- Number of and types of HR violations collected by CSOs/public institutions and/or international organisations
- Percentage of reported violations of HR that are successfully prosecuted or investigated
- Media coverage of HR issues and/or CSO HR activities
- Reach of media covering HR issues
- Public service providers' conduct towards vulnerable groups

These indicators adhere to general criteria discussed in this report for the elaboration of indicators. For example, they allow for comparison over time, measure processes (that are not unidirectional per se) and combine qualitative and quantitative data from varied sources (public, CSO, beneficiaries). The guidelines help planning, implementing, and assessing D/HR support, and are also useful for the development of other indicators than those referring to D/HR.

List of acronyms

CBO	Community Based Organisation
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
D/HR	Democracy and Human Rights
EC	European Commission
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SADEV	Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

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Karin Dawidson and Karolina Hulterström, SADEV

1.

Improving democracy and human rights support by using indicators

Democracy is a multi-faceted concept embracing political and social rights ranging from free and fair elections to accountable and transparent governance and civil society influence. Although these rights may appear in different forms in different national contexts, all democratic processes may be assessed on the basis of their realisation of two key democratic principles: the level of popular control and political equality (International IDEA, 2002:13). Democracy and human rights (D/HR) are among the most important common values on which to base cooperation between Sweden and its partner countries (Government of Sweden, 2003). A substantial share of Swedish support goes to this field, and development activities in other domains are also increasingly permeated by D/HR perspectives. Whereas in 2003/2004, the European Commission devoted two percent of its aid allocations, France one percent, the Netherlands four percent, USAID nine percent and the UK and Denmark 11 percent each to democracy assistance, Sweden allocated 17 percent of its total development assistance to D/HR (Youngs, 2006:20; Finkel et al., 2006:26) in 2003.¹ Along with growing budgets for development assistance this share is increasing.

As an illustration, out of Swedish disbursements of close to SEK 572 million to Mozambique in 2005 (the second largest recipient of Swedish support that year), approximately SEK 120 million was devoted to D/HR activities.² In addition to explicit D/HR support, an objective of current Swedish development cooperation policy is to ensure that D/HR perspectives permeate all development activities. Notwithstanding the crucial

role played by D/HR throughout Swedish development cooperation, little is known about the actual effects of this support (DAC, 2005:16). By improving the quality as well as the use of indicators (i.e. measures of inputs, processes, outputs, outcomes and impacts) (World Bank, 2004: 6), we may gain increased knowledge about the results of the Swedish aid. This reflects the 2005 Paris Declaration by which developing economies and donors commit themselves to results-driven development strategies (OECD, 2005a). In addition, since Sida is moving from project- to programme support (the provision of non-earmarked funding to plans and strategies at national and sectoral levels) there is a great need to improve monitoring mechanisms for programme performance, through joint efforts with partner countries, other donors and local organisations (Schmidt, 2004:7). In the context of increasing use of budget support and a greater focus on PRS's, improved use of indicators may enhance both the dialogue with partner countries and their ownership of the development process (Booth and Lucas, 2001).

With regard to indicators, new legislation strengthening D/HR is an explicit measure of progress, while more intangible democratisation objectives, which are equally important goals for Swedish support, such as the strengthening of the influence of civil society, are harder to estimate. Such developments can be measured however, by the use of carefully selected indicators. The use of indicators already at the planning stage enhances both the direction of development activities (at national, regional, project and other levels) towards overarching goals and the tracking of results. The discussion of which

indicators to use helps various stakeholders clarify their assumptions about what (and how) certain activities may contribute to goal achievement. Such discussions also form joint platforms for dialogue between governments, donors and civil society organisations (CSOs), other implementing partners and, ideally, beneficiaries, about how to reach the objectives.

It should be kept in mind that the formulation of indicators would be a fairly uncontroversial, almost technical endeavour, if goals, objectives and expected outcomes were clearly defined. However, as this is rarely the case, and the area of D/HR contains goals and objectives with multifaceted meaning, the formulation of indicators involves substantial room for interpretation and formulation of objectives. Where and by whom indicators are selected will henceforth affect the content of both specific programmes and the development co-operation in general. A poor person in Mozambique and an academic in Stockholm will have different views of what constitutes a meaningful measure of enhanced participation. Consequently, the importance of involving different sets of parties in the formulation of indicators cannot be overemphasised. However, as a desk study, this report cannot go further than to simply point out the importance of that diversity when indicators are formulated for specific contexts.

Regardless of their origin, there are many criteria that need to be fulfilled in order for indicators to be useful tools for planning and follow-up, such as that they measure changes, that they clearly reflect what we want to measure, that the data

they build upon is available etc (OECD/DAC, 2002). There are no clear-cut models for how to measure democratic development. By tailoring indicators to common ethical standards, such as those expressed in HR treaties, one may nevertheless develop feasible indicators within this area (Kapoor, 1996: 10). Along with general guidelines for the selection of indicators and methods for data collection, this report outlines a number of factors of special importance for D/HR indicators. The report endeavours to assist decision-makers, donor agencies and their field offices, CSOs and other practitioners in the field of D/HR support in their use of indicators to improve their planning and follow-up of D/HR activities. We have chosen Mozambique as a case study for this report due to the considerable Swedish democracy support to this country and because the content of that support, with its strong focus on civil society, resembles that of most other Swedish partner countries. In addition, although Mozambique has ratified/acceded to all major international HR treaties (with the exception of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the implementation of these conventions has been slow (Sida, 2005b). Human rights violations are frequent. The level of protection of women's rights, the rights of the elderly and the rights of the child is especially low. Mozambique has not lived up to its reporting obligations to treaty bodies and international human rights committees (MFA, 2005). Further, notwithstanding the growth in numbers of CSOs, civil society is still considered weak due to low capacity levels, limited organisational experience, restricted access to information

and limited contact with the decisionmakers. Democratic progress reported in documentation from Sida and by the Swedish embassy in Maputo³ often relates to medium-term objectives, such as new legislation. These data are important in order to follow-up on implementation but say little about the processes of decentralisation, popular participation and strengthening of the civil society and HR advocated in Mozambique's PRS (poverty reduction strategy) with which Sweden, along with other donors, align their cooperation strategies.

A new Swedish cooperation strategy for Mozambique is currently being developed. Swedish aid to civil society is to be continued and, in the context of budget support and intensified alignment, the objectives of this support are increasingly harmonised with those of the Mozambican PRS and the other donors.⁴ At present, Swedish D/HR support is channelled to the civil society through a special programme, but D/HR perspectives are also increasingly integrated into, and are to permeate, most other development activities in Mozambique. For the new Swedish-Mozambican cooperation strategy, the embassy in Maputo intends to further develop this trend.⁵ Also, due to a slow implementation of international D/HR conventions and the low degree of influence exercised by civil society in Mozambique, a recent Sida analysis suggests that the new strategy place emphasis on reform processes pertaining to the strengthening of HR and collaboration between Government and civil society parties (Sida, 2005b). It is also recommended that HR reporting, by the state and civil society, and the collection of statistics in this area be encouraged. According to the embassy in Maputo some of the

most difficult results to measure pertain to D/HR objectives such as: participation, opportunities of groups and individuals to influence policy-making and processes, CSO influence on new legislation and impacts of new legislation.⁶ Hence, planning and monitoring D/HR objectives greatly requires carefully tailored indicators for D/HR activities for the new cooperation strategy in Mozambique, in particular, and for future co-operation strategies, in general.

2.

Background to the selection of indicators:

Goals, activities and reasoning underlying Swedish democracy and human rights support in Mozambique 2002-2006

In order to identify suitable indicators for the objectives of Swedish D/HR support in Mozambique, we first need to consider the characteristics of this support. This section offers a brief depiction of the support for 2002-2006. Overarching goals and activity-level objectives have been identified by outlining Swedish D/HR support in a log frame,⁷ a model that outlines the goals and activities, which according to the strategy, should contribute to overarching goals (see Annex 1). Since the formulation of goals has been carried out continuously during the past decade, we present also those needs and objectives that were originally identified and developed into D/HR goals. The unravelling of goals has been done through the study of written documentation and interviews with key Sida informants, such as previous and current programme officers for D/HR in Maputo.⁸

IDENTIFICATION OF GOALS

The forms of the Swedish D/HR support to Mozambique for 2002-2006 were very much shaped by the 1999 Sida action plan for democratic governance (Sida AFRA275/99). This plan highlighted the need for developing a democratic civil society culture and defined the strengthening of the influence of civil society as its prime objective. On-going governance projects already dealt with public administration reform, and the civil society was considered very weak. In 2001 the action plan resulted in a D/HR fund, from which both public institutions and CSOs could apply for funding.⁹ Its main goals were (Emb/Maputo, 1999):

- **strengthening of local democratic decision-making and local administrations;**

- **effective, open and accountable public administration;**
- **strengthened capacity of the media;**
- **sustainable capacity to administer and carry out free and fair elections;**
- **increased capacity and enlarged numbers of members of CSOs;**
- **increased respect for women's rights and political participation among women;**

The following D/HR activities were entitled to receive funding (EmbMaputo/Sida, 2003):¹⁰

- **HR:** defence/promotion/dissemination and civic education of HR; support to paralegal assistance; promotion of an improved justice system
- **peace and non-violence;** promotion/dissemination and civic education of peace and non-violence; research for peace, conflict resolution and non-violence; protection and support of victims of violence
- **democratic development;** promotion/dissemination, civic education and research for inclusive democracy/socio-economic justice; dialogue between civil society and government; capacity building, institutional development, civil society networking
- **gender**

Applications must indicate how results are to be measured, although indicators in relation to the present situation only need to be defined 'if possible'. Due to revised guidelines for 2004-2005 (EmbMaputo17/04), applications also need to define target groups, relevance, sustainability, coordination with similar development activities and

risk assumptions (i.e. incidents that might have an influence upon the expected outcomes). Pertaining to these criteria, an evaluation of the relevance and coherence of the Swedish-Mozambican cooperation in 1996-2001 concluded that the strategy had been too vague about how goals were to be achieved. It was especially unclear about how decentralisation related to democratisation, as well as, to the actual causes of poverty (ISS/Sida, 2001). This is a common problem throughout Swedish democracy support. A Sida assessment of the evaluability of 28 democracy projects dating from 1996 mentions the lack of specifications of programme objectives and expected outputs among the main obstacles to follow-up and evaluation (Poate et al., 2000). Likewise, a Sida evaluation of the State Financial Management Project concludes that it is difficult to measure efficiency and effectiveness due to loosely defined outputs, the lack of indicators and time lines for achievement, together with incomplete records (McGill et al., 2004).

The two main D/HR goals discussed in the current co-operation strategy are 'Democratisation and conflict prevention through support for civil society, the media and culture', and 'To enhance the capacity of the government administration, increase transparency and accelerate the process of decentralization' (Emb/Maputo, 2004: 15-21). Activities related to governance are public sector reform and decentralisation, reform of the financial system, and the development of the General Financial Inspection, the National Institute of Statistics and a general external state audit function (Tribunal Administrativo) (Emb of Sweden/Maputo, 2004:15). Many of these activities have

however been phased out and there has been a shift in focus towards a greater emphasis on a strengthened civil society and democratic culture (Sida, 2005b). This support is largely channelled to and through CSOs and comprises short-term and long-term projects, some of them under umbrella support from Swedish CSOs. As an example, a number of Mozambican organisations are dealing with conflict prevention and have carried out electoral observations with support from Diakonia. The bulk of the direct support of democratisation has been managed by the Embassy in Maputo through its D/HR fund. Activities and organisations supported through the fund vary greatly. These include a media project that led to increased numbers of quality community radio stations. Another important effort is the support to the national CSO forum; LINK, which forms a common arena for Mozambican CSOs working for democratic development. The democratisation activities that have received funding reflect the fact that the guidelines for applications to the democracy fund were originally made broad in order to allow for flexibility. When the fund was initiated, the civil society was very fragile, and more importantly, had not been thoroughly studied. There was thus a need to analyse the character of the CSO activities before more focused and selective support could be employed. Another reason for the directives being broad was that they were based on the 1999 action plan for democracy, which had a very broad objective.¹¹ In 2001-2005, more than 30 different agreements with CSOs working with D/HR activities were signed (Sida, 2005c).

3.

Guidelines for better indicators for democracy and human rights support

Indicators are measures of inputs, processes, immediate outputs and more long-term outcomes and impacts of development activities (World Bank, 2004: 6). They thus incorporate the whole chain of development events and should, by indicating performance and policy failure, be used to inform decision-making (Schmidt, 2004:8, 9). This part of the report elaborates general guidelines for the development of indicators and data collection in the field of D/HR.

THE ROLE OF INDICATORS

Measurable and verifiable indicators allow us to ponder whether programme objectives are realistic and even more importantly, enable the tracking of results. It is imperative that performance indicators reflect changes – positive and negative - resul-

cooperation partners (Channel research, 2005). An improved use of indicators is especially important in the current context of increased provisions of budget support and stress on donor alignment. The focus on indicators may enhance both the dialogue with partner countries and their influence over their own development processes (Booth and Lucas, 2001). Indicators are also important means for beneficiaries themselves to evaluate results (International IDEA, 2002:11-13). Here is a simple illustration of how indicators may describe intervention elements (inputs, goals, outcomes etc) (based on Prennushi et al., 2000: 108):

Indicators may be more or less specific, in the sense that they are used to capture change ranging from specific project outcomes to extensive societal

3.1 ILLUSTRATION OF A SIMPLE LOG FRAME MODEL

1. Overarching goal Higher educational level	Indicator of change Literacy rates
2. Programme objective More people receive education	Indicator of change School enrolment rates
3. Intervention Increased spending on education	Indicator of change Number of new schools

ting from an intervention. The purpose of using indicators is to ease comparisons with what the situation looked like before the intervention, or would have looked like without the intervention (OECD/DAC, 2002). Apart from their direct utility in results monitoring, indicators also act as guidelines to improve proposals and reporting of

development at the highest level of aggregation. The nature of a specific indicator depends on the scope of the intervention and the type of change expected, along with the point in time at which one endeavours to find the results. Performance indicators should measure different aspects of trends on a regular basis toward the expected

outcomes. They should help managers filter incoming information and gain insights about what results to expect, as well as to identify unexpected results. An outcome normally consists of more than one single indicator. The World Bank, for example, uses six aggregated governance indicators; voice and accountability, political instability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption; each one based on a number of subjectivist and objectivist variables (Kaufmann et al., 2005). Yet the usefulness of such composite indicators always depends on the data quality and the characteristics of each individual component indicator. Below are a number of recommendations for the selection and elaboration of indicators.¹²

CRITERIA FOR SELECTING INDICATORS

The guidelines as outlined below aim at helping various stakeholders involved in development activities improve their use of indicators. The criteria focus on different aspects of indicators and apply to various levels of aggregation (national, local, activity) as well as to short-term and long-term objectives. To facilitate their use, the guidelines are divided into three types; relating to indicators' accuracy, practical use and contribution to the drawing of conclusions about change, respectively. Each one of these needs to be considered throughout both the stages of planning and evaluation. The first category helps to define indicators that as accurately as possible measure (or reflect) the phenomenon of interest, such as changes resulting from a particular intervention. The second category focuses on ensuring that indicators are realistic and can be successfully used in practice. This relates to data availability on the one hand, and to the importance of agreeing among the various stakeholders involved, including beneficiaries, about what indicators to use, on the other. A third category gives advice on how to avoid drawing ambiguous conclusions about underlying causes behind changes/results. By showing how to strengthen the reliability of conclusions based on indicators, these criteria also strive to ensure the usefulness of indicators for results-based management.

A. HOW TO ACCURATELY MEASURE THE 'RIGHT THING'

■ Ensure that indicators actually reflect outcomes and goals

First, we need to thoroughly consider what measures really reflect our objectives. Assume that we want to assess the development of a democratic culture. An easily accessible measure may be the number of political parties, but most would agree that such an indicator poorly reflects what we understand by a democratic culture (it is neither obvious that a larger number of parties per se leads to more pluralistic practices, nor that these parties represent democratic values). Instead we choose "attitudes in support for political freedom and civil rights among the citizenry" as a more valid indicator of the political culture.

■ Use realistic indicators, tailored in accordance with the level of political development and contextual characteristics

The same development activities may have quite different meanings in different cultural contexts and in countries at different stages of democratic development. Performance indicators need to adapt to such differences. As an illustration, CSO membership is frequently used as an indicator of civil society participation although it may not be the most suitable measure in societies where CSOs generally are not membership based. In this case, an indicator measuring participation in civil society (for example village or community-based) activities may be more suitable.

■ Consider the time lag for an expected result to occur – tailor different indicators for different stages and according to the magnitude of the intervention

Reform processes that result in new institutions, reformed political practices and transformed political cultures consist of many stages. Yet the reporting on results of D/HR activities tends to focus on quantitative medium-term outputs. Too little attention is paid to more long-term results, for example relating to implementation and effects of new legislation. It is well known that political

development consists of long-term processes and that change often occurs slowly and incrementally. As an illustration, in their study of impacts of American democracy support in 165 countries, Finkel et al. (2006:67-69) show that certain indicators, such as ‘conditions for civil society’, have a strong contemporary effect, while others, for example ‘the rule of law’, exert lagged effects. The ambition must thus be to tailor different indicators depending on the scope of the intervention, as well as for short-, medium- and long-term processes and results. The lesson learned is thus that we need to follow-up wider effects during quite some time after that a specific intervention has taken place.

- **Make sure that indicators also measure negative effects**

Indicators are sometimes erroneously formulated in terms of objectives or target values incorporating nuances such as ‘increased (legislation)’ and ‘enhanced (participation)’. These assume that change, in essence, is unidirectional. It is imperative that indicators are formulated in a neutral manner, employing terms such as ‘number (of legislative changes)’, ‘percentage (of population participating)’ and so on, since we are interested in measuring trends and we cannot know their direction in advance. Furthermore, the ‘worst’ case may not be ‘no change’ but rather deterioration with regard to certain goals. For example support to CSOs working with HR may intensify HR violations on a short-term basis, in a given country.¹³ Also, certain aid interventions that aim at creating pluralistic practices, such as support to oppositional groups, may, in fact, adversely impact on the very process of democratisation, leading to a return of authoritative tendencies among political leaders who fear they will lose power to competing groups (Burnell, 2004:409-412). Perhaps this is why the only negative effect of the American democracy support identified in the study by Finkel et al. (2006:75) relates to HR (the more US dollars spent by USAID on democracy support, the worse the recipient country fares with regard to respect for human integrity). Or, is it rather that this indicator reflects strengthened CSO capacity to report on HR abuse?

EXAMPLE 1.

TAILORING INDICATORS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PERCEIVED TIME LAG

Assume that the long-term objective of an intervention is to strengthen the rights of the elderly. There is presumably a considerable time lag to such an effect, involving not least changed attitudes among policy-makers, service-providers and citizens. **In order to investigate short- and intermediate results (leading us towards the overarching goal) we use as indicators: a) the number of established CSOs working with the rights of the elderly, b) the number of meetings with joint commissions that these CSOs have access to, c) the number of legislative changes protecting the rights of the elderly, d) an estimate of the quality of the new legislation, and e) cases of strengthened HR resulting from implementation of the new legislation.** This allows us to monitor a larger share of the process strengthening the rights of the elderly rather than just focusing on one outcome at one specific point in time.

- **Develop different indicators for different levels of intervention/aggregation**

Identifying output indicators at the project level may be rather straightforward. Indicators of national level developments are also increasingly attainable, with improved data collection in developing countries as well. How to find indicators for intermediary levels, linking the two, though, is among the greatest challenges. Designing these indicators, however, is crucial in order to relate project level activities and results to national trends. Also, while indicators at a high level of aggregation help estimating and comparing trends, intermediary indicators are needed to inform policy-making.

EXAMPLE 2.**DEVELOPING INTERMEDIARY INDICATORS**

Say that we have implemented regional projects in which CSOs gave legal assistance to groups of discriminated villagers and informed them about their rights. To design a subjectivist measure of the effects, we ask participants whether the activities helped to strengthen their rights. As a comparison, on the national level of aggregation, enhanced HR can be measured using a crude indicator such as the number of new HR legislation. **To link the two levels of aggregation to one another, we also use an intermediate measure in the form of the extent of organised advocacy within the field of HR.** Such an indicator may be the number of CSOs (at regional levels) working with HR.

- **Combine qualitative, quantitative, objectivist and subjectivist indicators**

Indicators that build upon different kinds of data have different advantages with regard to validity, measurability and reliability. By combining indicators using different quantitative and qualitative data, we maximise the ability to measure results. Qualitative measures, for example, may relate to the very essence of new legislation – are the laws realistic, do they actually produce practices more sensitive to HR in the context in which they are to be implemented? Experience from the field of constitutional reform shows that in order for new legal documents to contribute to the expected outcomes, they need to be sensitive to particular historical, cultural and social contexts (Carothers, 1999:161). Quantitative data, on the other hand, allows us to draw broader conclusions about the frequency and the spread of results and ease comparison. Further, perceptions of target groups (a subjectivist indicator) help assess the implication of a certain scope or spread of changes as indicated by objectivist data and to identify their underlying causes.

The dividing line between qualitative and quantitative information can be fairly vague. Quantitative measures of political development, such as those of the Freedom House and the Polity series, often build upon qualitative information that is rarely representative, and it is not clear exactly what is required for a country to advance on the standardised scales (Landman and Häuserman, 2003:10)

EXAMPLE 3.**COMBINING INDICATORS FOR ASSESSING CSO INFLUENCE ON HR**

We want to measure CSO influence upon the strengthening of HR. A quantitative indicator shows an increase of laws strengthening HR. How can we be sure that this increase was due to CSO advocacy? **A subjectivist indicator of CSOs' own estimations of their possibilities to influence new laws helps assessing the probability that new legislation strengthening HR is due to CSO advocacy.**

- **Scrutinise objectives and goals carefully**

Goals often contain several sub-level objectives that are not achieved simultaneously. For example, the strengthening of civil society often implies a desire to strengthen advocacy and CSOs' role as a watchdog on the government, on the one hand. On the other hand, a strengthened civil society is also often envisaged as a platform for the channelling of popular demands (i.e. participation) or a forum for the fostering of certain democratic values. It is clear that these two aspects of a strengthened civil society may not be reached through the same means and that they may in fact be negatively correlated.¹⁴ When designing indicators for a strengthened civil society it is thus crucial to consider whether they capture both dimensions or tend to be biased towards one of them. The context may necessitate not just one, but two indicators.

B. HOW TO CHOOSE INDICATORS WHICH ARE REALISTIC IN PRACTICE – AVAILABILITY AND AGREEMENT

■ Choose measurable indicators

Data availability and expenditure must be considered at an early stage of the planning process: a) what reference points are needed, and which ones are available, to measure change using the suggested indicator? In case of lack of data, consider alternatives to baseline data, such as self-evaluation, most similar system designs (i.e. reasonably comparable groups of individuals, villages, provinces etc. that can serve as control groups for comparisons); b) if data turns out to be scarcer than expected, or in case of financial restrictions for data collection, use a proxy, i.e. a category that is easier to measure, or to access, but which merely constitutes an (acceptable) approximation of the objective or goal.

EXAMPLE 4.

PROXY FOR WOMEN PARTICIPATION AND EMPOWERMENT

The number of women in parliament may not be a perfectly valid indicator of women's participation and empowerment, but in want of data it may suffice as a proxy. In other words, **if there is no other data at hand indicating women empowerment and participation and we have observed an increased number of women parliamentarians, we may assume that women's participation has improved in other areas, and that women's rights probably receive increased attention.**

■ Limit the number of indicators used

With too many indicators, performance monitoring and results-based decision-making will become unmanageable. It is better to focus on a few indicators that accurately measure the issues at stake, than to employ large numbers of indicators that may still not be appropriate due to problems such as lack of data, financial or capacity restrictions for data collection etc.

■ Elaborate indicators through participatory and interactive processes

Engage as many as possible of the stakeholders involved in the decision-making, implementation and follow-up of development activities when defining indicators. Firstly, the very fact of a discussion about how to measure results of interventions helps to direct those interventions towards shared overarching goals and objectives.¹⁵ Secondly, the exchange of experience between decision-makers and implementing agencies may in itself lead to the selection of more realistic indicators. The selection of indicators through a participatory process is especially important with regard to D/HR promotion as these are inherently ambiguous concepts with certain contextual interpretations. It is thus crucial to work with the commonalities that do exist - often expressed through the ratification of international conventions. Moreover monitoring indicators are only useful if they may in fact lead to policy improvement and that, in turn, requires commitment from policy makers. A first step towards a more interactive process is coordination. What indicators are already identified in PRSPs, by other donors etc?

■ Carefully consider the resources available for evaluation

It is an unavoidable fact that there is often a direct conflict between criteria increasing the probability of use on the one hand, and criteria enhancing validity and accuracy on the other. One may choose to measure popular participation through CSO membership data since such information is cheap and easy to access, although a survey (that is both more costly and time consuming) of the reach of CSO activities may produce a more valid indicator. In short, good indicators are often costly.

C. HOW TO ENSURE THAT INDICATORS FACILITATE THE DRAWING OF CONCLUSIONS ABOUT RESULTS

- **Indicators should allow for the study of trends**

Avoid defining indicators in terms of target values, such as ‘at least 50 percent of the population reached’, or ‘10 000 villagers participating’, since such definitions are actually objectives rather than indicators measuring change. Also, one may use isolated measuring points as indicators but should make sure that they allow for comparison over time. Trends are normally best measured by comparing relative sums (percentages). If this is not possible (e.g. if the lack of census data causes doubts about the actual size of a specific population), absolute numbers need to be indicated.

- **Be explicit about the criteria for drawing conclusions about change**

When creating indicators for value-laden objectives, such as enhanced ‘capacity’ or ‘quality’, it must be clear to all stakeholders what the criteria for assessing change are. CSO capacity may pertain to the ability to raise funds, launch a nation-wide advocacy campaign, attract new members – or perhaps all three.

- **Define rating criteria for positive and negative trends respectively**

When developing the indicators, it can be useful to simultaneously, but separately, define criteria for how much of a change that is to be considered as reaching or failing to reach objectives. These criteria will facilitate assessments of observed changes at later stages. Are the changes outstanding, satisfactory, dismal or even negative? As pointed out above though, make sure not to confuse formulations of indicators with those of objectives.

- **Consider possible perverse exogenous effects**

It is important to consider that donors’ emphasis on a few very specific indicators may result in exaggerated budgetary spending on these issues (and as a consequence, the neglect of other sectors) or biased reporting.

- **Enable the drawing of conclusions about the appropriate level of intervention**

In order to be able to draw conclusions about change at a later stage, it is important that indicators for different levels of aggregation have already been developed at the planning stage. One must be careful not to draw too broad conclusions about results of development activities at the project-level. As noted already, in the haste to report final results, intermediate results are often forgotten – notwithstanding the fact that it is easier to assess the attribution of specific development activities to intermediate outputs than to final aims. Example 1 equally serves to illustrate this point.

- **Relate the impact of your intervention to the impact of other factors with an effect on the issues at stake**

To enable more realistic and nuanced results-analysis we may ask ourselves a) what is the impact of other factors in relation to those caused by the development intervention in question? b) would the situation have been the same without the development intervention?

EXAMPLE 5.

HOW TO ENABLE MORE NUANCED RESULTS-ANALYSIS

A donor may choose to sponsor journalism training to encourage more nuanced media coverage of political developments, but a more critical media may just as well be the result of other factors, such as changes in media ownership or changes in the attitude of the political leadership (see Carothers, 1999:283-285). The media situation is most likely a product of several such changes in combination with development intervention. **By choosing indicators based on interviews with representatives of the media community we may assess the role of the training programme in relation to other activities. We may also compare this case with the impact of the training programme on another case where different local circumstances, such as political developments, are present.**

Indicators, however, are of little use in monitoring and evaluation if there is no data with which to study them. Hence, when defining indicators, one must simultaneously consider what data they require, and explore various methods for data collection. Evaluation is comparison and therefore normally depends on at least two sets of data. We need data on our indicators before (baseline data), during and after (target/monitoring data or programme reporting) an intervention. Comparisons of such data sets allow us to draw conclusions about the changes caused by a specific intervention. The data needed to study a valid indicator is nonetheless in many cases inaccessible - in particular when it comes to the period before the intervention. Scarcity of baseline data was identified as one of the greatest obstacles to evaluation in the large Sida study of the evaluability of D/HR support (Poate et al., 2000:64). Likewise, the lack of baseline data is identified as a serious impediment to monitoring and evaluation by the Embassy in Maputo (Rupp, 2006). Firstly, the scarcity of data implies, as discussed above, that we need to take data attainability into account by the planning stage of any project. The second implication is that we need to carefully consider alternatives to the often missing baseline data.

The following guidelines, although far from exhaustive, point to a number of considerations when selecting indicators and collecting data. In particular we focus on the common problem of deficient baseline data.¹⁶

GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR DATA COLLECTION

When discussing with the stakeholders involved in the development activities in question it is important to also come to terms with how the data should be collected. Make sure that the roles of different partners in data collection are well defined. Again, agreeing with other stakeholders involved in the same development activities about what indicators to use and how to collect the data is fundamental for any functioning system of results monitoring and evaluation: How and by

whom are different types of data to be collected, what should be the formats and deadlines for data delivery? The following are some general guidelines for data collection.

■ Existing data sets should be thoroughly examined

The use of indicators does not necessarily mean that those in charge of monitoring collect the data themselves. Much time, effort and resources can be saved if the data collection by various CSOs, local research centres, other donors and international organisations is thoroughly examined. This is especially important in relation to 'costly' data such as national level indicators that measure long-term objectives. For example, even survey-based data on popular perceptions of developments relating to D/HR, such as those produced by Transparency International and the Global Barometer Surveys, are now readily available (the New Europe Barometer, Latinobarometer, Afrobarometer) (see Landman and Häuserman, 2003; UNDP, 2005b).

■ Select samples 'wisely'

Costs can often be substantially reduced by working with very small samples and qualitative analysis. However, these samples must be very strategically selected. It is worthwhile to consider how our small sample of, say, CSOs or civic education participants should be viewed in comparison to the entire group of CSOs or participants targeted: Are they 'typical' of the entire group? Sometimes it may be fruitful to select a few 'critical cases' in order to assess change.

As an example, while Global Barometer surveys are based on random samples of target groups, several other similar surveys, such as the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, build upon very small samples of representative groups (Landman and Häuserman, 2003:5).

EXAMPLE 6.**CRITICAL CASES FOR ASSESSING CSO INFLUENCE**

We choose to assess civil society influence on policy by studying highly contested or sensitive areas such as HIV/Aids and FGM (Female Genital Mutilation). These are areas in which we expect our interventions for the strengthening of CSO capacity to have the least effect. We may therefore draw the conclusion that if civil society has been successful in advocating for policy change in these sensitive areas, then civil society will presumably have the capacity to influence less contested policy areas.

- **Try to find low-cost alternatives that give indications of real trends**

When data is scarce or too expensive and we often find ourselves lacking baselines, we may use beneficiary memory recall measures to get a picture of the situation prior to an intervention. Information derived from interviews, discussions with focus groups and other participatory activities can constitute realistic substitutes to baseline data. If contemporary assessments are not possible, 'self-evaluation techniques' whereby beneficiaries are asked to make their own personal assessment of project results may be considered. One should refrain, however, from making overly broad conclusions based on such data. It is well known that informants often have difficulties recalling details and their stories may be more or less coloured by personal opinions. It is therefore important to consult individuals from different groups in the community to get as nuanced a picture as possible.

In parallel to this, we may need to contemplate alternatives that are less subjective: Are there similar organisations or groups of people not targeted by the intervention who share important characteristics with the target group? Such reference points often serve as excellent proxies for baseline conditions.

4.

A brief look at the use of indicators in the democracy and human rights support in Mozambique

This section provides a brief overview of the types of indicators that characterise the follow-up of D/HR support in Mozambique, in order to identify where the greatest need for new indicators is found. The indicators used for follow-up of D/HR support were identified by analysing results reporting (e.g. result analyses and country analyses) and by interviewing key parties. However, due to time constraints, we were not able to thoroughly investigate the use of indicators in the field. Consequently, we do not attempt to draw broad conclusions about the quality of the indicators being used. Instead, we choose to focus on those D/HR objectives that lack indicators in order to exemplify how one may go about in developing suitable indicators for these kinds of objectives. Although this report builds upon the Mozambican experience, the guidelines and indicators later discussed are also relevant for other Swedish partnerships with similar D/HR objectives. Moreover, the indicators suggested serve as examples and sources of inspiration for development partners in Mozambique and elsewhere to improve their use of indicators.

D/HR INDICATORS IN THE SWEDISH-MOZAMBIKAN CO-OPERATION

Country reports and results-analysis carried out by the Embassy in Maputo indicate those aspects of Swedish support that are considered successful and those viewed as less successful. However, one cannot fully assess the use of indicators on the basis of this documentation since its format does not include thorough discussions about if, and what, indicators are used to measure the attainment of different objectives. Country reports and result

analyses give a broad picture of trends and impacts but reveal fairly little about the analyses behind the conclusions drawn. Yet this documentation hints at the indicators used. As a supplement to our desk study, we conducted one in-depth interview with the former D/HR programme officer at the embassy in Maputo and short email interviews with Sida staff in Stockholm and Maputo currently in charge (although in collaboration with other donors) of the D/HR support to Mozambique. The respondents were asked to identify a) the indicators used in order to measure results of D/HR support b) the objectives perceived as the most problematic to follow up and c) the D/HR goals and objectives with most need of better performance indicators. The following discussion is built on our interpretation of the documented result assessment as well as comments from the Sida officers.

An example of an assessment of performance is found in the country report of 2003 which found that cooperation with the Mozambican Ministry of State Administration was at a standstill due to delays of audits and misuse of funds that were aimed at strengthening administrative capacity and decentralisation. Some signs of successful results mentioned are the establishment of an anti-corruption unit, a new financial management system, a 'substantial number of audits' carried out by the General Inspectorate of Finance, a centralized and more transparent payment system at the Ministry of Planning and Finance, continued production of annual audits of the general State Account and the carrying out of surveys of the National Statistics Institute. These results are, however, effects of projects that were launched

several years prior to the introduction of the D/HR fund in 2001. The following results are said to be directly connected with Sida's current support i.e. through the fund initiated in 2001 (Emb of Sweden/Maputo, 2004:22-23):

- New family and anti-corruption laws adopted by parliament
- Rights of the elderly given more attention and the minimum basic pension modestly raised
- Conflict mitigation between Frelimo and Renamo (major political parties) made with good results
- Considerable youth participation in the local elections in Sofala district
- More qualitative and impartial journalistic coverage of the elections
- Improved voting procedures
- Increased attention to children in prisons and human rights reports
- Establishment of a prison reform unit
- Civil society participating in the first PRS (PARPA) poverty observatory
- Increased networking and improved capacity of civil society
- Discussions on an HR Commission initiated
- Improved media coverage and capacity, at national and local levels
- Decentralisation process, through the Local Government Reform programme, initiated in 2005
- Establishment of an implementation unit (UTRESP) to coordinate the public sector reforms, UTRESP supporting ministries to carry out functional analysis
- National e-Government strategy with implementation plan
- Strategic plans for improvement of the legal sector and the police elaborated
- Support to the elaboration of a strategy for external debt management leading to a new draft
- All provincial Ministry of Planning and Finance departments linked to the same payment system, improved access to financial data
- Improved timing and quality of audited State accounts reports by the External State Audit (Tribunal Administrativo), remitted annually to the National Assembly
- The General Finance Inspection carrying out substantial numbers of audits
- The National Institute of Statistics working according to operational and strategic statistics plans; statistics increasingly used for planning, management and monitoring of social and economic development
- Degree course in statistics at the university

It is interesting to compare the results reported for different years, especially when considering the time lag between different types of interventions and results respectively. The country report for 2004 states the following results of the Swedish democracy support (Emb of Sweden/Maputo, 2005:15-21):

- Civil society observations of electoral processes carried out in 2003 and 2004
- Civil society involved in monitoring and consultation in relation to the implementation of the PRS (PARPA)

When viewing this reporting in the light of our guidelines and of the new direction of Swedish D/HR support, we can draw a number of conclusions about the use of indicators and the need for additional indicators:

SUMMARY OF REFLECTIONS UPON THE INDICATORS USED

■ The lion's share of performance indicators pertains to formal, institutional aspects of governance and capacity building. Less is said about indicators pertaining to the goal of strengthening civil society. This is presumably due to Sweden's long involvement in formal governance activities, generating both the time and the need to develop these kinds of indicators. However, this may also be a result of civil society objectives being viewed as placed on a lower level of aggregation or as more short term in nature, as compared to longer-term, aggregated developments such as institutional capacity on the national level. Nevertheless, there are several reasons why the development of indicators about civil society strengths ought to be a priority. Firstly, this is an important goal in itself in Swedish development co-operation that should not be reduced to a short-term, project-level objective. A strong, pluralist civil society is clearly also a long-term goal pertaining to the highest level of aggregation (i.e. the national level). Moreover, only by using indicators at all levels of aggregation (e.g. project, region, nation) and by measuring effects at different points in time (short-, medium, long-term objectives) can one assess the entire programme theory underpinning democracy support in a particular country. It cannot be assumed that longer-term governance objectives are caused by (in this case) medium-term, programme level effects such as strengthened CSOs. Finally, most objectives can be short-, medium- or long term depending on the perspective taken, as well as measured on a range of different levels of spatial aggregation (e.g. project, programme, region, nation). Enhanced institutional capacity, new formal legislation etc may well precede (in time) goals such as a consolidated democratic culture or a more civic civil society. With such a perspective, governance goals become medium-term goals. Time measures and aggregation depends on the perspective taken.

■ There is a lack of indicators suited to measure long-term impacts of medium-term outcomes,

such as those regarding the effects of new legislation, reduced corruption or enhancement of service delivery efficiency.

■ Many albeit not all, of the indicators are better at measuring 'quantity' than 'quality'. The focus is on quantitative results such as numbers of audits and new laws and thus, again, there seems to be a need for indicators focusing on broader effects (such as the contents of legislation).

■ Most assessments relating to the role of CSOs appear to be built on very general observations and are biased towards the advocacy aspect of civil society. Few indicators seem to have measured the participatory and educational aspect of civil society (and hence the contribution to the overarching goal of supporting a democratic culture is partly lost).

Apart from our guidelines for the use of indicators, the next chapter's discussion is informed by current trends and needs in the Swedish-Mozambican co-operation, which is aligned to Mozambique's PRS and to other donors' activities, in the field of democratic development. As mentioned, a recent Sida analysis of the D/HR activities suggests that democracy support in the new cooperation strategy should focus on reform processes pertaining to the strengthening of HR (with a particular focus on groups, such as women, children and the elderly, in particular, who are left largely unprotected by both formal institutions and local and traditional structure), capacity building for CSOs, collaboration between government and civil society parties and HR reporting by the state and civil society (Sida, 2005b). The embassy points out, that D/HR goals that have been especially difficult to follow-up relate to participation and possibilities of groups and individuals to influence decisions and processes (interview, Rupp 2006). Other main difficulties encountered are how to measure longer-term impacts of new legislation that aim at strengthening HR and of reforms that are to enhance participation. A final obstacle forwarded by the embassy consists of the lack of baseline

data, relating to levels of participation and discrimination of different age and gender categories in particular.

Given that the Embassy in Maputo is already working with fairly elaborated indicators in the area of administrative capacity building and the expressed intention prior to the new co-operation strategy to shift focus from institutional capacity building, it seems appropriate that this endeavour to develop new indicators also puts its focus elsewhere. In line with the new cooperation strategy, Mozambique's PRS, and the needs expressed by the embassy, we have chosen to emphasise different aspects of civil society participation and influence, and HR enhancement. These are important overarching goals of Swedish development cooperation.

Both the broader debate on democracy support and the preparations for a new cooperation strategy for Mozambique have noted that the promotion of democracy should be perceived as a process rather than an absolute end (Wodzicki, 2006; Sida, 2005b). A process is a series of steps towards achieving a particular end. With regard to D/HR promotion there are two main approaches by which a process perspective may be understood. According to a first approach, democracy is understood as the process through which citizens demand and protect their political freedoms and civil rights, rather than the existence of a particular set of political institutions or the holding of elections (Wodzicki, 2006:6). The Swedish support of pluralism and participation (through a strengthened civil society) seems to fit this process-oriented concept of democracy. A possible

second approach entails viewing the attainment of democracy as a process in which objectives are reached through a long range of sequential steps. These two approaches combined necessitate a view of democracy as a process and the measuring of results by employing different kinds of indicators throughout the process. We are not only interested in the great leaps towards goal realisations, but also the small steps towards more, or even less, democratic practices. This argument links up with the recommendation of using different indicators at different points in time and at different levels of aggregation throughout a development process. Indicators need to measure short-, medium- and long-term effects among the target group, as well as on the regional and societal levels.

To sum up, what needs to be measured are processes of participation and influence of the civil society and the strengthening of HR.

5.

Suggested indicators for democracy and human rights support

Based on the discussions in the previous sections, a need to develop indicators for four important D/HR objectives for Mozambique has been identified. These objectives, as outlined below, permeate Swedish development cooperation with a large number of countries:

1. **increased popular participation in civil society**
2. **enhanced influence of civil society on policy-making processes**
3. **enhanced influence of civil society on HR protection (especially of women, children and the elderly)**
4. **reform processes strengthening HR (especially of women, children and the elderly)**

Due to our lack of knowledge of more specific characteristics of the Mozambican civil society we are not in a position to suggest precise indicators or adequate target values for all possible development activities under these objectives. Also, ‘those governed’ need to be involved in any detailed design of governance indicators to make sure that the indicators suit their needs and capabilities: ‘the role of national or local users is vital because democratic governance is essentially demand-driven’ (UNDP, 2006b:2). As a result, we limit ourselves to guiding practitioners and suggesting indicators specific enough as to fit the four objectives, but general enough to be translated into more precise indicators tailored for a particular programme, level of aggregation or local/national context.

While some define HR as encompassing only civil and political rights, others also include economic and social rights. The indicators we suggest may be defined to reflect either of these perspectives.

In the same manner, we use the term CSO in a broad sense. For example, in some contexts it may be more relevant to discuss participation or influence through CBOs (community based organisations, which represent a very low level of organisation, such as the neighbourhood level) than CSOs. Thus, where relevant, practitioners may include CBOs in this definition or simply exchange CSO for CBO. Advocacy or participation levels among different types of civil society groups can also be compared (i.e. urban versus rural, general development and specific D/HR objectives, etc). In these cases, the indicators we suggest may be further elaborated to suit those purposes. In this report we adhere to the generous definition that ‘Civil society is an arena, separate from the state, the market and the individual household, in which people organise themselves and act together to promote their common interests’ (Sida, 2004:5). As civil society constantly changes, and varies in composition from country to country, overly strict definitions of the term CSO may exclude certain groups that constitute important civil society parties in the societies in which the indicators are applied. Regardless of its exact composition, civil society constitutes an important arena for individuals to organise and influence developments in society. From this perspective, the opportunities civil society has to organise and influence form a fundamental human right in democratic societies.

After the presentation of each set of indicators we outline their strengths as well as their weaknesses. No indicator is perfect, so it pays to critically assess different kinds of indicators before trying them out in practice.

Objective 1: Popular participation in civil society

Indicator	Relevance	Data collection methods and costs	Comparability and target setting
1. Formal organisational mechanisms for influencing CSO leadership and policy.	Direct measure of instruments enabling participation.	CSO documentation. Costs: low.	Baseline previous CSO documentation.
2. Number of CSO activities involving the wider community.	Proxy for community involvement.	CSO documentation. Costs: low.	Baseline dependent on existing CSO documentation. Target setting highly contextual.
3. Number of questions/proposals raised during CSO activities by others than project leaders and staff.	Direct measure of community involvement.	In case of non-existing protocols, observations and interviews are needed. Alternative e.g. Afrobarometer data on Citizen engagement (Afrobarometer, 2006). Costs: low/medium.	Presumably no baseline. Share of participants active constitutes baseline for future comparison.
4. Perceived influence over CSO activity amongst target groups.	Perceived influence may not reflect real influence but affects future participation.	Interviews or participatory activities with target groups. Costs: medium/high.	Comparability presupposes that the selection of respondents is representative. Baseline data scarce – compare with other non-supported CSOs.
5. Shares of urban and rural based CSOs with grassroots participation – formal or informal.	Aggregated measure of participation.	CSO documentation, academic research. Costs: medium/high.	Possibly existing studied across time as baseline.

(Source: The indicators are influenced by examples outlined in Usaid/Center for Democracy and Governance, 1998: 113-223; 2000¹⁹; EC/European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, 2004²⁰, and have been elaborated further by the authors of this report. Commentaries for the indicators are those of the authors.)

OBJECTIVE 1:

INCREASED POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN CIVIL SOCIETY

An active civil society does not automatically lead to more democratic practices. On the one hand, civil society consists of a wide range of associations that may be economic, cultural, educational or based on specific social or political issues. However, not all of these are necessarily compatible with democratic practices or values. On the other hand, in order for civil society to act as a channel for pluralistic and democratic practices it is important that formal, public institutions create an enabling environment for popular participation and influence (Sida Division for Democratic Governance, 2002:9-11). Through organised forms of interests as separate from the state, such as CSOs and the

more small-scale CBOs, civil society plays a vital role for the sustaining and support of democratic practices. This supportive role has several dimensions of which we shall discuss two that have been identified as particularly relevant for Swedish-Mozambican co-operation: a) civil society as a means of participation, and consequently, b) a means for channelling interests of different societal groups and influencing policy making.¹⁷ These two interrelated civil society aspects are here treated as different stages in the process of democracy. The first objective, to increase popular participation in civil society, has two implications. Firstly, it emphasises the importance of people giving

voice to their concerns and interests. Secondly, the objective points to the virtuous effects of the participatory process itself in the form of increased tolerance, civic engagement, democratic values etc.¹⁸

Two indicators commonly used to measure participation pertain to the number of active CSOs and CSO membership figures. While data for such indicators are relatively easy to access and while they constitute a measure of formalised organisation, their usefulness is highly contextual. In societies where organisation is neither generally formal nor membership-based such indicators are less relevant. Participation may take other forms. In addition to this, measures of formal membership cannot be said to be valid indicators of active participation. For example, CSOs with large numbers of members but in which the members do not have a say contribute little to popular participation. Similarly, formal membership says little about what to expect with regard to attitudinal effects of participation. We have chosen to focus on enabling mechanisms for civil society participation in order to avoid such limitations. Finally, while an aggregation of the indicators on participation in individual CSOs will offer a measurement of participation in civil society as a whole, the last indicator directly aims at measuring popular participation in civil society as a whole. The table for Objective 1 presents our suggestions for how to measure popular participation in civil society. Below is an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed indicators.

Strengths

- In contrast to membership measures, indicators 1-2 illustrate formal mechanisms that enable citizens to participate. Indicators 3-4 then measure the very process of participation, by considering the degree to which other members than those representing leaderships actually participate.
- Indicator 5 measures popular participation in civil society as a whole.

Weaknesses

- Indicators 1-5 heavily depend on CSO data (that is usually rare) or on the gathering of new data through interviews and observations.²¹ Also, the indicators need to be supplemented by criteria defining what is meant with expressions such as ‘the wider community’, ‘perceived influence’ etc. Finally, the indicators do not aptly measure negative effects in the sense that they tell us little about the spectrum of interests that are, respectively are not, being represented.
- Attribution is always problematic for indicators on an aggregated level. With regard to the proposed indicators it is difficult to show that enhanced popular participation in civil society is an effect of Swedish development co-operation.

Once the degree and forms of participation in civil society have been considered the next step is to measure whose interests civil society organisations actually voice as well as whether that voice (i.e. participation) makes a difference. The second objective is thus directly linked to the question of representation. The objective entails a civil society that represents different societal groups or interests in general, and groups or interests traditionally excluded from political participation in particular. It also concerns the existence of channels for communicating citizen demands and the capacity of CSOs to advocate change - in relation to the interests of their ‘constituents’ or in relation to other prioritised development goals. Reflected by Objective 2, Influence of civil society on public policy, is thus the extent to which CSOs can voice their concerns, the degree of influence their concerns have over policy and whose concerns that are being voiced.

Objective 2: Influence of civil society on policy making processes

Indicator	Relevance	Data collection methods and costs	Comparability and target setting
1. CSO activity in major media fora.	Proxy for space open to, and occupied by, CSOs in public debate.	Desk study, most realistically of number of articles in major news paper. Costs: medium.	Baseline depends on sequential data. Target small increase in number, if no major political events.
2. Number of meetings with parliamentary committees/ joint commissions/ advocacy coalitions to which CSOs have access.	Proxy indicating the formal possibility for civil society to exert influence.	Monitoring records (govt./local govt./CSO etc). Costs: depend on existing records and data reliability.	Baseline of number of annual meetings to measure participation trends. Target normally small increase in number.
3. Diversity of CSOs represented at parliamentary committees/joint commissions /advocacy coalitions.	Indicates pluralism of interests influencing debate and policy.	Monitoring records (govt./local govt./CSO etc). Costs: depend on existing records and data reliability.	Baseline of number of annual meetings to measure participation trends. Target normally small increase in number.
4. Number of policy changes consistent with CSO advocacy, in relation to number of CSO proposals for policy change.	Indicates degree of influence.	CSOs' reporting. Official records Interviews. Alternative proxy data such as UNECA survey data on citizens' ranking of Parliamentary performance (UNECA, 2006) Costs: low/medium.	Baseline of policy changes consistent with CSO advocacy, related to number of CSO proposals for policy change, to measure influence trends. Target reasonably small increase in number.
5. Perception among CSOs/key observers and target groups of willingness of public institutions to engage in dialogue and give access to official information.	Measure of the degree to which public bodies are perceived as open to dialogue, and willing to share official information with CSO, and thereby allow them influence.	Surveys and interviews. Alternative see Afrobarometer Quality of representation data (Afrobarometer, 2006). Costs: in relation to scope.	Changes in public opinions may lag behind changes in actions and attitudes of public officials.
6. Percentage within different societal groups supportive of CSO advocacy and reform agenda (coherence between/ the degree to which stated interests of different societal groups coincide with CSO advocacy and reform agenda).	Indication of what interests are represented through civil society.	Survey data – proxies may be available in existing national surveys. Costs: low/high	Comparability depends on sequence data. Target setting highly contextual.

(Source: The indicators are influenced by examples outlined in Usaid/Center for Democracy and Governance, 1998: 113-223; 2000; International IDEA, 2002:66; EC/European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, 2004, and have been elaborated further by the authors of this report. Commentaries for the indicators are those of the authors)

OBJECTIVE 2:**ENHANCED INFLUENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ON POLICY-MAKING PROCESSES**

In an effort to measure effects beyond programme outputs (in the form of educational schemes and seminars), the indicators for Objective 2 aim at measuring channels of influence and finally, actual policy change. The table suggests a number of indicators that help measuring the influence of civil society upon the public debate as well as on policy making in general. The indicators include three key aspects that combined enable civil society influence: civil society's access to, and engagement, in public debate, its access to consultation and its part in major decisions (these aspects are discussed in Sida Division for Democratic Governance, 2002:34). Again, it should be stressed that neither 'the poor' nor 'civil society' consist of well defined homogenous groups. On the contrary, both categories are made up of different societal groups whose interests may just as well be in conflict with one another. The 'influence of civil society' may thus not be as easy to single out. Civil society is naturally a highly heterogeneous area in which many conflicting interests compete. Consequently, the indicators have been constructed so as to make possible the study of both the representativeness and influence of particular (groups of) CSOs as well as the pluralism and influence of the entire civil society.

Strengths

- These indicators reflect different aspects of the influence of civil society upon public debate and policy. The first indicator measures the space open to, and occupied by, CSOs in major media fora, which constitute one tool for civil society to disseminate information and thereby exert influence. Indicator 2 is an objectivist measure of the channels of influence available to CSOs while the third indicator reflects what civil society interests are represented. Regarding indicator 2, CSOs' participation in parliamentary processes is of particular importance, the parliament being a key policy-making institution.

- Indicator 4 is an objectivist measure of the actual success of societal interests in influencing policy. By contrast, indicator 5 is a subjectivist estimation (measuring the experiences of individual and organised citizens) of the degree of resonance of such activities. It also indicates the degree to which CSOs have access to official information. Civil society involvement requires information.

- A further strength of the fifth indicator is that it to some extent takes into account the time lag for an expected impact to occur since it builds upon CSO ex ante estimations, based on their own experience, of the impact of their activities to be expected.

- Indicator 6 measures the representational aspect of civil society on a national level - how well do interests pushed by a particular CSO or the entire CSO community coincide with the priorities of different societal groups? This indicator can also be adapted to measure the coherence between any group of interest in a particular society - women, elderly, disabled, ethnic minorities - and different CSO agendas.

- Together indicators 1-6 form a stronger indicator of influence than each one viewed in isolation.

Weaknesses

- Indicator 1 suffers from a common problem of limited media coverage in rural areas of developing countries. Resource constraints will presumably limit most analyses to studies of newspapers which further exacerbates this problem. CSO participation in debates carried out in other (more local) fora risk being overlooked.

- Like many indicators aiming at measuring overarching objectives on an aggregated level indicator 4 suffers from problems of causality/attribution. We cannot be sure that policy changes referred to by indicator 4 were actually caused by CSO interventions.

- Indicator 6 is highly dependent on the carrying out of national surveys that furthermore include questions touching upon political and social reform. Such data, however, is becoming more and more attainable (in Africa primarily through the work of the Afrobarometer).

Objective 3: Influence of civil society on HR protection (especially of women, children, elderly)

Indicator	Relevance	Data collection methods and costs	Comparability and target setting
1. Number of policy changes consistent with CSO advocacy, related to number of CSO proposals regarding HR/women's rights/ the rights of the child/the elderly.	Indicates degree of influence.	CSOs' reporting. Official records. Interviews. Costs: medium.	Baseline on previous impact of CSO advocacy difficult but necessary to measure influence trends.
2. Percentage of CSOs/ target HR groups involved in dialogue with public institutions regarding HR/ women's rights/the rights of the child/the elderly.	Reflects the degree to which public parties are open to dialogue.	Official documentation. Surveys and interviews. Costs: depend on the scope.	Changes in perceptions may lag behind actual changes in actions and attitudes of public officials.

(Source: The indicators are influenced by examples outlined in Usaid/Center for Democracy and Governance, 1998: 113-223; 2000; EC/European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, 2004, and have been elaborated further by the authors of this report. Commentaries for the indicators are those of the authors)

OBJECTIVE 3: ENHANCED INFLUENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ON HR PROTECTION (ESPECIALLY OF WOMEN, CHILDREN AND THE ELDERLY)

Due to an identified low level of formal protection of HR, relating to women, children and the elderly in particular, in Mozambique as in several other partner countries, there is a need to specifically follow up the influence of CSOs upon public policies in these domains. Since Mozambique has ratified/acceded to all major international HR treaties (with the exception of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Sida, 2005b) the indicators at hand need to focus upon the implementation of these conventions. HR indicators in general are measures of how and to what extent states fulfil international HR obligations (Raoul Wallenberg Institute, 2006:6). Again, if the same indicator is used to measure too many things, that indicator may become too general to be of practical use. The indicators listed above relate specifically to the objective of increased influence of civil society upon HR and should be tailored to the kinds of rights deemed as relevant for each specific case.

Strengths

- The influence of CSO activity on policy change as well as that of policy change on public opinion may be difficult to estimate due to time lags. Indicator 2 may be used as a proxy for the degree of influence of CSO activity on policy change in this case.

Weaknesses

- Again, it is possible that these indicators place too much emphasis on the role of CSOs. In some societies there may be other, traditional, practices that are more efficient ways of influencing public institutions.

Objective 4. Reform processes strengthening HR (especially of women, children and the elderly)

Indicator	Relevance	Data collection methods and costs	Comparability and target setting
1. Percentage of target groups satisfied with public officials' responsiveness regarding HR women's rights/the rights of the child/the rights of the elderly.	Indicates how target groups experience the protection of their rights.	Surveys. Alternative e.g. Afrobarometer data on citizens' Judgements of governance performance (Afrobarometer, 2006) Costs: depend on scope and existing surveys	Baseline on the basis of interviews about past experiences. Changes in public perceptions may lag behind changes in actions and attitudes.
2. Ways in which D/HR conventions are integrated into policy domains where HR of the poor are weak (education-, health- etc).	Qualitative measures that reflect the government's commitment to implement D/ HR conventions .	Qualitative changes, such as policies and formal and informal practices, listed by both experts and beneficiaries. Alternative see Afrobarometer Social services; education and health; and Access to government services data (Afrobarometer, 2006) Costs: low-medium	Baseline of existing official documentation. May be related to international conventions signed, e.g. the rights of the child.
3. Volume of HR reporting by the State and CSOs to treaty bodies and/or international committees.	Indicates both commitment to change and actual progress.	Official and CSO data. Alternative for example the Concluding Observations of the UN treaty bodies that monitor the implementation of HR conventions. Costs: low.	Baseline of previous State reporting (existing official data), for CSO reporting on basis of interviews.
4. Number of and types of HR violations collected by CSOs/public institutions and/ or international organisations.	Indicate commitment to change and progress.	Official documentation may need to be complemented by interviews/ surveys. Costs: medium/high.	Due to lack of data baseline may need to be based on interviews/surveys.
5. Percentage of reported violations of HR that are successfully prosecuted or investigated.	Direct indicator of progress.	Official documentation may need to be complemented by interviews/ surveys. Costs: medium/high.	Due to lack of data baseline may need to be based on interviews/surveys.
6. Media coverage of HR issues and/or CSO HR activities.	Qualitative or/and quantitative measure of importance given to HR	Media records. Interviews/surveys. Costs: low.	Baseline builds upon media records.
7. Reach of media covering HR issues.	Indicates citizens' possibilities to be informed on the HR situation.	Media records on HR reporting To be related to census (or other) data on the spread and use of radios, TVs, or other contextual channels for the dissemination of information. Costs: low.	Baseline builds upon, for example, census data on the diffusion of radios, TVs or other channels for informing the public and media records.
8. Public service providers' conduct towards vulnerable groups.	Subjectivist estimation of the respect of HR on the ground.	Interviews with individuals representative of vulnerable groups. Alternative e.g. Afrobarometer data on the State as provider and Degree of trust in governmental institutions (Afrobarometer, 2006). Costs: low to high depending on scope.	Baseline built upon information collected from interviews.

(Source: The indicators are influenced by suggestions in Usaid/Center for Democracy and Governance, 1998 113-223; 2000; International IDEA, 2002:66; EC/European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, 2004; Würth and Seidensticker, 2005; UNDP, 2006a, 2006b; Raoul Wallenberg Institute, 2006, and have been elaborated further by the authors of this report. Commentaries for the indicators are those of the authors)

OBJECTIVE 4. REFORM PROCESSES STRENGTHENING HR (ESPECIALLY OF WOMEN, CHILDREN AND THE ELDERLY)

The influence of civil society on HR (Objective 3) is part of broader reform processes pertaining to the strengthening of HR, as measured by the indicators for Objective 4. In order to prepare for an efficient follow-up of results though, it is important to tailor different indicators for different aspects of this broader process. As an illustration, the ratification of HR conventions does not automatically improve the HR situation and HR may be strengthened regardless of such conventions and therefore these issues need to be viewed as two objectives (Würth and Seidensticker, 2005:13). HR indicators need to be formulated so that they indicate both if and how different rights are realised (Raoul Wallenberg Institute, 2006:7). Grouped together the different indicators may at a later stage be used to create indexes of general HR developments.

In order for HR to be strengthened in any society, the state needs to adhere to three key obligations: respect (abstaining from practices and legal measures that impinge on HR), protection (preventing HR violations) and fulfilment (measures taken to guarantee HR) (UNDP, 2006a:4). In addition to this, disadvantaged groups need to have proper access to information in order to be empowered to defend their rights (ibid.:29). Objective 4 in this report and its suggested indicators attempt to embrace these duties and respond to the increasing need expressed by Sida (2005b) and the embassy in Maputo (2006) to measure processes that strengthen HR. Since Mozambique has ratified/

acceded to all major international HR treaties (with the exception of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Sida, 2005b) we have chosen to focus on indicators that reflect the process of implementation of these conventions.

Strengths

- Indicators 1-8 complement each other by measuring either quantitative or qualitative aspects of the HR situation. Moreover they measure both formal changes, such as the number of reported violations, and perceived changes, based on the views of target groups. One way of estimating whether HR are strengthened or weakened respectively is to conduct surveys on the perception of various target groups. These types of measurements may be biased due to time lags in between perceptions of target groups and changes in the behaviour and attitudes of public officials. They therefore need to be complemented by objectivist variables that indicate formal steps towards the strengthening (or weakening) of HR. Such variables may consist of action plans for the implementation of D/HR conventions.

- Indicators 2 and 8 are important estimations of real and qualitative changes on the ground – in many cases it is in the provision of public services that discrimination is the most visible, facing the poor in particular. These indicators are of special relevance to low income groups and can thus be considered pro-poor indicators (see UNDP, 2006b:8). What is more, these indicators allow the beneficiaries themselves to assess the HR situation.

- If there is a lack of capacity or resources to carry out interviews or surveys to collect these data, similar data can be found at several international organisations, both governmental (for example, the US State Department and the UK Foreign Office both produce narrative and qualitative reports) and non governmental (such as Human Rights Watch, the Observatory for Human Rights Defenders and others) (UNDP, 2006a:8).
- The indicators incorporate both mid- and long-term objectives. While the ratification of HR conventions is fundamental for HR strengthening, sustainable changes demand continuous local and international observation and activity (Würth and Seidensticker, 2005:15).

Weaknesses

- It is here imperative to add criteria for how to evaluate changes measured by indicators 1-8, e.g. in some contexts increased reporting or media coverage on HR issues may indicate that the HR situation is taken more seriously by the authorities while in other cases it may mean that the HR situation is in fact worsening.
- Several of these indicators heavily rely on the results of surveys. Financial constraints, however, may allow only small-scale surveys, which may not be especially representative.
- Indicators focusing on the role of media may be difficult to develop due to incomplete media records. Also, in some societies there may be other more relevant ways of disseminating information than through the mass-media.

It is apparent that defining good indicators may both be a time-consuming and a costly process. If done properly, however, it will generate benefits such as improved development interventions and enhanced tracking of results.

6. Lessons learnt and policy recommendations – obstacles and opportunities

This report has stressed that although impacts of D/HR support may be difficult to measure, there are methods that enhance the tracking of a wide spectrum of results in this area. It pays to take the time to carefully consider what data is available and how to best plan, follow-up and assess results against set objectives. Also, in order to set realistic objectives in the design of development activities and enable the collection of relevant data, it is imperative to engage as many stakeholders involved in democracy support as possible throughout all stages of planning, management, reporting and assessment. By taking a participatory approach, we may increase the efficiency of D/HR support. On the one hand, although differing from case to case, development activities will most likely better match local needs, and partner countries' level of ownership of their development processes will increase (Carothers, 1999:265-270). On the other hand, a carefully elaborated participatory approach will contribute to improved routines for planning and follow-up. This is in turn a prerequisite for results-based management, an important objective of the Paris declaration (OECD, 2005a). With regard to performance management though, decision-makers must leave some space for flexibility and be careful not to allow 'headquarters' to monopolise the selection of indicators. Detailed indicators and target values adapted to local circumstances are often most suitably designed by personnel in the field and by beneficiaries themselves (Carothers, 1999:270). However, encouraged use of precise indicators - designed by the appropriate party - for short- medium- and long-term objectives and for different levels of aggregation, will always contribute to enhanced knowledge about the effects of development cooperation.

In addition, to avoid over-generalisations based on unsuitable indicators, more attention should be paid to the quality of the indicators used. We must not forget that negative results are also results.

FILLING THE GAP – THE NEED FOR DIFFERENT INDICATORS FOR SHORT- MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES THAT REFLECT DIFFERENT STEPS THROUGHOUT DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES

As highlighted by this report, there is a need to develop indicators that measure results not only at different levels of aggregation but also at different points in time. If we are to understand democratisation as a process, we need to use different indicators to measure different parts of that process. Some of these may be instant (such as regime change following democratic elections) whereas others take more time to develop (such as the effective strengthening of HR). As noted, results of democracy support are frequently measured with, what might here be labelled, medium-level output indicators, such as new legislation. Indicators for objectives that may precede those of new legislation, for example pertaining to CSO influence, as well as for more long-term impacts, such as transformed practices resulting from new laws, are rare. The need for indicators at different stages of the development process has also been recognised in an ODI report on the use of PRS indicators (see Booth and Lucas, 2001:18). That report states that PRSPs often lack indicators for intermediate outputs and outcomes that relate specific interventions to final outcomes and argues that this is a problem since it weakens the link between

proposed actions and overall goals. Also, indicators for the intermediate level are important in order to identify progress throughout PRS implementation processes (Booth and Lucas, 2001:24).

SIMILAR INITIATIVES AND FUTURE AREAS OF INVESTIGATION

In order to improve our knowledge on how to design and use indicators so that they contribute to the assessment of results of development cooperation, we need to analyse the role of indicators in varied socio-cultural, political and economic contexts. Such experience will contribute to a general understanding of how the use of indicators may be improved. An important aspect worth further elaboration would be to improve the design of indicators so that they to a larger extent assist partner countries in their own conducting of reforms (see UNDP, 2006b). The UNDP Oslo Governance Centre, through its Governance Indicators Project, is providing assistance to developing countries in their monitoring and assessment of democratic governance (see www.undp.org/governance). In the same vein, International IDEA assists in democracy assessments (see www.idea.int/democracy/index.cfm) and the OECD Metagora Project aims at enhancing evidence-based assessments and monitoring of D/HR, with special focus on tools to obtain data (see www.metagora.org/html/index.html).

When having developed a wide range of indicators in this Sadev-project, for different aspects of democratic processes, it would be of great interest to assess the actual impact of Swedish democracy support in different political and economic contexts.

This would enable the drawing of conclusions about impacts at a general level later on. From a comparison, a study of the impact of American democracy support, while controlling for effects of variables such as economic development and performance, on a large set of democratisation indicators in 165 recipient countries during 1990-2003 shows that for every 10 million additional US dollars spent on democracy promotion a country is predicted to improve its Freedom House score by 0.25 units (Finkel et al., 2006:53).

Finally, joint efforts of governments, donors, civil society, specific disadvantaged groups and other stakeholders, in activities to develop and use indicators may be one way of directing development interventions towards more relevant issues. It could help marginalised groups voice their interests, increase the level of national ownership of development processes and ease donor alignment.

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Embassy of Sweden, Maputo, 17/04

Sida AFRA 275/99

DESO 0087/01

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Belfrage, Eva (se above), e-mail received 2006-05-02

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INTERESTING LINKS

International IDEA, Democracy assessment, www.idea.int/democracy/index.cfm

OECD, the Metagora Project, www.metagora.org/html/index.html

UNDP Oslo Governance Centre, the Governance Indicators Project, www.undp.org/governance

Annex 1.

Log frame models for Swedish D/HR support to Mozambique 2002-2006

Figures 1.1 and 1.2 (see below) are an attempt to outline D/HR goals, objectives and activities that receive Swedish support in Mozambique, on the basis of the cooperation strategy for 2002-2006 and decision memoranda. The figures illustrate the two main D/HR goals discussed in the current co-operation strategy: 'Democratisation and conflict prevention through support for civil society, the media and culture', and 'To enhance the capacity of the government administration, increase transparency and accelerate the process of decentralization' (Emb/Maputo, 2004: 15-21).

The outlining of the hierarchy of goals in the models, along with the types of activities that have received support, is a way of identifying assumptions about what actions are to lead to what expected results. In this case, the log frame model illustrates the assumptions articulated by the former programme officer for D/HR in Maputo, as well as the interpretation of assumptions made by the authors on the basis of written programme documentation. Fields in some figures are empty, because the authors deemed there to be a lack of data on the relevant issues.

1.1 Programme theory model for D/HR activities referred to in the cooperation strategy for Mozambique 2002-2006²²: Democratisation

Overarching goal	Indicator of success		
Reduce poverty (CS, p.1). Sustainable development.	Reduction of proportion of poor from 70% in 1997 to less than 60% in 2005, and less than 50% in 2010 (CA01, PARPA01).		
Goal	Indicator of change	Perceived mechanisms relating goal to higher goal	Risk assumptions
Democratic culture and debate. Peaceful conflict resolution. Respect for HR. Majority of poor defend their rights and exert influence. Increased participation. Enhanced transparency.			Weak institutional capacity.
Objectives	Indicator of change	Perceived mechanisms	Risk assumptions
Empowered civil society. Increased participation.	Civil society engaged in advocacy and influencing policy.	Rights perspective emphasised in advocacy. Non-violence emphasised. The poor exert influence through civil society.	Weak commitment of government to the PRS. Aid dependency.
Lower objectives/outcomes			
Capacity building and institutional development of CSOs.			
D/HR intervention			
Democracy fund for civil society: support to D/HR projects carried out by CSOs and by public parties.			

It is important to stress that other stakeholders, such as individual programme officers, implementing partners or, in this case, the government of Mozambique, may well have a somewhat different notion of the interpretations of the sector log frames. To put these assumptions and the means by which they are expected to be achieved in print may thus be an effective point of departure for discussion among stakeholders. Similarly, specifying indicators for different elements of the development interventions may serve as a basis

for discussion between the embassy and its various partners. Ultimately, the identification of indicators in a specific programme or project must be seen as joint exercise between the co-operating partners. The need for a highly interactive process with regard to the identification of goals and indicators is even more felt in development fields such as D/HR, which are concerned with ambiguous concepts about which there is little consensus, (see e.g. Kapoor, 1996).

1.2 Programme theory model for D/HR activities referred to in the cooperation strategy for Mozambique 2002-2006²³: Democratic governance

Overarching goal	Indicator of success		
Reduce poverty (CS, p.1). Sustainable development.	Reduction of proportion of poor from 70% in 1997 to less than 60% in 2005, and under 50% in 2010 (CA01, PARPA01)		
Goal	Indicator of change	Perceived mechanisms relating goal to higher goal	Risk assumptions
Democratic governance. ²⁴	Less corruption. Enhanced service delivery.	Increased economic growth and stability. Sustained level of FDI.	Other factors that influence Growth/FDI –how achieve? HIV/aids. Political instability. Natural hazards. Aid dependency. Decentralisation induced from above hamper local adaptation.
Objectives	Indicator of change	Perceived mechanisms	Risk assumptions
Increased state capacity. Transparency and decentralisation /local autonomy. Strengthened popular influence on local level.		Reformed institutions (e.g. Civil Min, Min of Fin, Statistical Bureau INE, Tribunal Administrativo) do better problem analyses, plan better, implement and follow up more efficiently. Audits impede corruption. Decentralisation assists drive for greater transparency and accountability (UNDP).	HIV/aids lead to a loss of competence within the civil service. Public institutions still linked to Frelimo. Political and economic powers intertwined (UNDP).
Lower objectives/outcomes	Indicator of change	Perceived mechanisms	Risk assumptions
New, decentralised, coordinated and modernised, systems for budgeting, audit, procurement and payment systems.		Judicial, financial, audit, procurement and public sector reforms lead to improvements in public management/e.g. enhanced control over state budget.	Reshuffling in civil service. Political will.
Sector intervention			
State economic and financial management. Anti-corruption. Audit and control. Public adm/decentralisation. Niassa: Public sector support.			

Endnotes

1. Due to changes in Swedish classifications from 2004 the figure for 2003 is indicated.
2. Among the recipients of the largest shares of Swedish D/HR support in 2005 were also Kenya that received grants of close to 315 Million SEK, out of which approximately SEK 101 million (or approximately 32 %) was disbursed to D/HR activities and Vietnam, which received development grants of close to SEK 313 million, out of which approximately SEK 81 million (or approximately 26%) was disbursed to the governance sector (Source: Sida country plans; Sida annual report, 2005).
3. Henceforward the Swedish embassy in Maputo will be referred to as 'the embassy in Maputo'.
4. E-mails received from Anton Johnston, Counsellor at the Embassy of Sweden/Maputo, 2006-04-25, and Lena Rupp, 1st Secretary/Programme Coordinator D/HR at the Embassy of Sweden/Maputo, 2006-05-03.
5. *ibid.*
6. *ibid* Johnston, 2006; Rupp, 2006.
7. One way of ensuring that development activities are clearly linked to programme objectives is to construct a logical framework (log frame) model. The concept implies the drawing of a flowchart that illustrates how results are thought to be produced by activities selected for support and how the results in their turn are supposed to contribute to programme objectives and overarching goals of development cooperation (see Vedung, 1997: 138-144, 159-163; Poate et al., 2000: 12-25; Rossi et al., 2004: 133-168; UNDP/GEF, 2005: 13-15; Sida at work, 2005: 25-35).
8. Apart from interviews with Sida staff at Sida/HQ, a short email survey was sent to the Embassy in Maputo and responded to by the Counsellor and the 1st Secretary/Programme Coordinator for D/HR.
9. Decisions DESO0703/00 and DESO0087/01; EmbMaputo17/04; Sida (2005) Review of the Sida fund for Democracy and Human Rights in Mozambique 20-25 of February 2005.
10. Recipient CSOs need to have documented experience and good track records - including planning, implementation, monitoring and reporting – democratic structures, good financial management and endeavour to acquire organisational improvements and long-term objectives (EmbMaputo/Sida, 2003).
11. Interview Belfrage, E., programme officer Sida/Europa, former programme officer at the Embassy/Maputo 2000-2004, 2006-03-22
12. These guidelines have been elaborated with the use of several sources such as Kapoor, 1996; Hatry, 1999: 55-100; (Poate, et al., 2000) European Commission, 2002; International IDEA, 2002; UNDP, 2002, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b; Schmidt, 2004; UNDP and the European Commission, 2004; OECD/Metagora, 2005; Kaufmann et al./the World Bank, 2005. The European Commission in collaboration with member states, OECD/DAC, the World Bank and UNDP have for example established principles and guidance for choice of indicators to be monitored in country strategy frameworks in an effort to enhance the measurement of performance against objectives, especially with regard to PRSPs and donor alignment (see European Commission/DG Development, Guidelines for the use of indicators in country performance assessment, Brussels December 2002).

13. Statistical analyses often have an advantage in detecting negative effects as they tend to utilise less sophisticated, and hence clearer, criteria for analyses and the drawing of conclusions.

14. This conflict is acknowledged and discussed in Sida's policy for civil society (Sida, 2004). See also Blair, 2006: 1-5.

15. Also, the sharing of the responsibility of reporting towards goals and objectives may motivate various stakeholders to perform better.

16. The sources are the same as for the criteria for selecting indicators.

17. Taken together these two goals might be said to cover the three dimensions of civil society stressed by Sida as important in the promotion of democracy (Sida, 2004:14).

18. This second participatory dimension of civil society is often referred to in terms of the fostering of a democratic culture. It is assumed that CSOs that themselves are built on democratic principles and work along democratic procedures may function as 'schools' in democracy. People participating in these organisations learn to appreciate democratic procedures and virtues, and hence a democratic culture based on tolerance, trust, solidarity and respect can develop (See e.g. Sida, 2004:14). This reasoning however presupposes that civil society actually functions as an arena for mass participation, in the sense that CSOs have members from, or at least come into contact with, different and large segments of the population. This aspect of civil society as a fosterer of a democratic culture, however has not been the primary focus of this report, as this was not viewed as a primary objective of the Mozambican co-operation.

19. The indicators have been modified and developed to suit this analysis. Usaid has, together with CSO- and World Bank staff and other experts developed perhaps the most elaborated indicators for D/HR support. In parallel to rule of law-, electoral-, and governance objectives, Usaid has a process oriented goal of 'Increased development of a politically active civil society' that goes hand in hand with Swedish democracy support. For further examples elaborated by Usaid see Center for Democracy and Governance (1998) Handbook of democracy and governance program indicators. Washington D.C.: Usaid, and Decentralization and democratic local governance programming handbook. Washington D.C.: Usaid, May 2000.

20. The European Initiative for Democracy and HR (EIDHR) is an instrument for the EC for financial support predominantly to the civil society and CSOs for activities in third countries that aim at the strengthening of HR and democratisation processes. EIDHR has developed indicators of change that operate as key performance indicators for the EC and EIDHR project operators within the thematic development programme of democracy and HR. See European Commission (2004) European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), Programming for 2005 and 2006; Channel research (2005) Generating impact indicators. European Initiative for Human Rights and Democracy, March 2005.

21. It might also be argued that the indicators fail to take into account other forms of participation than that in CSOs. We would however argue that if regarded a weakness, it rather refers to the formulation of goals than the development of indicators.

22. The log frame model was elaborated based on models described in Poate et al., 2000: 12-25; Rossi et al., 2004: 133-168; UNDP/GEF, 2005a: 13-15; Sida at work, 2005: 25-35. Sources indicated in the model refer to the documentation in which the arguments, as stated in the country strategy, had been taken: CA01 is the Sida Country Analysis of 2001, PARPA01 is the Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan of 2001, UNDP refers to Mozambique National Human Development Report 1998 and CS to the Country Strategy for 2002-2006.

23. The log frame model was elaborated based on models described in Poate et al., 2000: 12-25; Rossi et al., 2004: 133-168; UNDP/GEF, 2005: 13-15; Sida at work, 2005: 25-35. Sources indicated in the model refer to the documentation in which the arguments, as stated in the country strategy, had been taken: CA01 is the Sida Country Analysis of 2001, PARPA01 is the Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan of 2001, UNDP refers to Mozambique National Human Development Report 1998 and CS to the Country Strategy for 2002-2006.

24. Where nothing else is indicated the information comes from the Co-operation Strategy 2002-2006, 18-19.

Purpose of the report

Employing state of the art guidelines in the field of evaluation of democracy and human rights (D/HR) support, the report outlines criteria for the development of D/HR indicators and data collection. This can assist various stakeholders (planning-, decision-making- and implementing agencies) working with D/HR support to improve their use of indicators. In line with the guidelines and by scrutinising the case of Mozambique, the second largest recipient of Swedish support in 2005 and with similar D/HR objectives to most other Swedish partner countries, this report suggests indicators that enhance both planning and the tracking of progress in D/HR support.