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Sida Evaluation

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Evaluation of Sida's Humanitarian Assistance

Final Synthesis Report



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The views and interpretations expressed in this report are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

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Foreword

This evaluation was a collaborative effort between Sida's Humanitarian Team, Human Security Department, Secretariat for Evaluation and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs' Department for Security Policy. The primary purpose of the evaluation was to inform the revision of the Government's strategy for Sida's humanitarian assistance 2008-2010. The evaluation process was participatory, involving key users of the evaluation, so as to facilitate lessons learning for Sida and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs staff, and apply these to the revised humanitarian assistance strategy for Sida and future humanitarian programming.

The evaluation was conducted by Development Initiatives. On behalf of the management group¹ for the evaluation we would like to express our appreciation to the team leader Tasneem Mowjee and the evaluation team. We would also like to express our appreciation to the reference group members² for their valuable contributions and advice throughout the evaluation process.

A key finding of the evaluation is that Sida is a highly respected donor and leader in the humanitarian field. Nevertheless, the evaluation identifies a number of challenges that need to be addressed urgently, including overstretched and overburdened humanitarian staff, which results in a lack of follow up and lessons learning. There are also opportunities for improvements in feeding back field experience for policy and advocacy work as well as developing more strategic relationships with partner organisations. Sida could also do more

1 The management group comprises: Per Byman and Patrick Kratt (Humanitarian Team, Sida); Henrik Hammargren and Jessica Eliasson (Human Security Department, Sida); Katarina Kotoglou (Secretariat for Evaluation, Sida); Mikael Lindvall/Jakob Hallgren and Eva Areskou (Department for Security Policy, Ministry for Foreign Affairs).

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in making the linkages between humanitarian and development aid more comprehensive and systematic, as well as strengthening the integration of disaster risk reduction and disaster preparedness in humanitarian programming.

There are a number of mutually supportive reports and products prepared as part of the evaluation: synthesis report, country case studies for the Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Kenya and Somalia, and lessons learned products – all available at www.sida.se

The findings and views are those of the evaluation team and do not necessarily reflect the views of Sida, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, management group, reference group, or its members.



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- Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) offices in Goma, Bunia and Indonesia
- International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Goma
- International Organization for Migration (IOM) Kenya (particularly in Eldoret)
- Free Pentecostal Fellowship in Kenya (FPFK)
- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Regional Office in Nairobi
- Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in Kenya
- Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) in Dadaab
- Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) Switzerland in Dadaab
- Save the Children UK in Dadaab
- Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI) in Nairobi
- Concern International in Nairobi
- Oxfam GB in Nairobi

- PLAN Indonesia
- Islamic Relief Indonesia

Last, but not least, the evaluators are grateful to Sida staff members, Sida's partner organisations (at headquarters and field level), donor representatives, local authorities and crisis-affected communities for giving up valuable time to participate in this evaluation.

Abbreviations

AAA	Accra Agenda for Action
ATHA	Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action
BAPPEDA	Badan Perencana Pembangunan Daerah
BNPB	Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CHAP	Common Humanitarian Action Plan
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIVSAM	The Team for the Co-operation with Civil Society Organisations
COOPI	Cooperazione Internazionale
CRED	Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
DFID	the UK Department for International Development
DI	Development Initiatives
DPRR	Disaster Preparedness and Risk Reduction
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Aid Office
ERF	Emergency Response Fund
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FTS	Financial Tracking Service
GBV	Gender-based violence
GENCAP	Gender Standby Capacity Project
GHD	Good Humanitarian Donorship
GFDRR	Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Project
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HRF	Humanitarian Response Fund

ABBREVIATIONS

HRI	Humanitarian Response Index
HUM	Humanitarian department
HUMSAM	Humanitarian Consultative Group
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
INCAF	International Network on Conflict and Fragility
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ISDR	International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs
MSB	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
MSF	Médécins Sans Frontières
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PMU	PMU Interlife
RC	Resident Coordinator
RRM	Rapid Response Mechanism
RRMP	Rapid Response to Movements of Population
SEK	Swedish Kronor
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS	United Nations Departments of Safety and Security
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WHO	World Health Organisation
WFP	World Food Programmes

Executive Summary

This report presents the findings from an evaluation of Sida's humanitarian assistance from 2005–2010, with a particular focus on 2008–2010 as the period of implementation for the current humanitarian strategy. The evaluation focused on *Sida's strategy, organisation and management* as well as *mechanisms and channels for funding*. *Sida's main aim in undertaking this evaluation is to inform the revision of the humanitarian assistance strategy for Sida.*

METHODOLOGY

The team reported back to the management and reference groups at the end of each of the following phases of the evaluation:

1. *Inception phase*, which involved a stakeholder analysis and resulted in the *inception report* that guided the rest of the evaluation.
2. *Policy, management and organisation review phase*, which examined Sida's internal management systems and procedures as well as relationships with partners at headquarters level. It included a consultation with donors on shared challenges with implementing the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) principles. This phase resulted in the *interim report*, which outlined how Sida could address the administrative challenges that the evaluation identified.
3. *Country case study phase*, in which the team covered the *Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)*, *Kenya* (including consultations with aid agencies working in *Somalia*) and *Indonesia*. The team produced *four case study reports* (one for each country) that assessed the extent to which Sida is delivering on the 8 sub-goals of its current humanitarian strategy.

This report synthesises the findings and recommendations from the previous phases and reports. As in the interim report, the recommendations are based on the following assumptions:

- Despite the tremendous pressure on humanitarian staff, *it will be challenging to increase the number of staff working on humanitarian issues at*

headquarters in the short term. Without extra resources, the existing team needs to find ways to maintain and improve its impact through working smarter and exploiting potential efficiency gains.

- The *pressure to demonstrate concrete results and accountability to taxpayers will continue to increase*, and thus that it is imperative that the humanitarian team adopts a greater results orientation, and is supported in concentrating on measuring, monitoring and improving the overall impact of its programmes.

INTERNATIONAL, STRATEGIC AND FUNDING CONTEXT

The international humanitarian context has evolved over the period covered by this evaluation, with new challenges arising in an already complicated landscape. Sida's staff members are overburdened with their administrative responsibilities and do not have time to utilise the findings on developments in the humanitarian context produced by the research organisations that they fund. So the evaluation identified contextual challenges that Sida should address in its next humanitarian strategy. These include: ensuring effective funding at country level, reconciling tensions between different sets of principles that Sweden has signed, recognising the need for longer-term funding for chronic crises, the growing incidence of natural disasters, funding according to the severity of crises, maximising the value of humanitarian reform, improving accountability to aid recipients.

An analysis of Sida's humanitarian funding demonstrates that it is a *significant and generous donor*. In 2008 and 2009, Sweden was the world's 5th largest humanitarian donor, providing SEK 4.16 and 4.64 billion respectively. Sida's humanitarian funding has the following key features:

- a. It is mainly *focused on Africa* with, on average, 60% of Sida's funding from 2005–2010 flowing to the continent.
- b. It is largely *focused on complex emergencies*, with 78% of funding spent in these crises from 2005–2010.
- c. It *does not have a sectoral or thematic focus*
- d. It is *very supportive of the UN Appeals process*.
- e. The *UN is the main channel for Sida's funding*, receiving, on average, 46% of Sida's total humanitarian budget from 2005 to 2009.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

It can be difficult for donors to reconcile the tensions between the GHD principles, Fragile States principles and the Paris Declaration/Accra Agenda for Action (AAA). Though Sida has been successful at linking its humanitarian and development funding through its country team structure, it has been *very careful to protect the independence of its humanitarian aid*. Due to this, perhaps, the issue of tension between the GHD and other sets of principles did not arise in discussions.

The *extent to which Sweden's policies and strategic guidelines on cross-cutting issues are applied depends on individual staff members* because there is no systemic approach to ensuring that cross-cutting issues are integrated into Sida-funded humanitarian programmes.

Sida tasked DI with assessing the extent to which it is delivering on the 8 sub-goals of its humanitarian strategy, all of which are drawn from the GHD principles. The findings are summarised under each goal.

a. Promoting the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD principles 5, 12 and 13)

Sida's first sub-goal focuses on three aspects of the GHD principles in particular:

- Timeliness, flexibility and predictability of funding
- Supporting quick response to rapid onset disasters by providing unallocated funds to suitable organisations
- Encouraging and supporting a long-term perspective in partners' programming.

Sida has been a timely donor, particularly when providing funding through framework agreements. However, Sida's partners have found that its *decision-making has slowed down in 2009–2010*. There are several possible explanations for these delays, including the fact that *Sida's humanitarian aid is increasingly subject to the same rules and regulations as development cooperation* so it takes longer to prepare for funding decisions and get these approved. The introduction of *new requirements and funding rules* (particularly on audits) has led to lengthy discussions with partners. UN agencies also noted delays due to *mistakes in filling out standard grant agreements* and the *inability of Sida staff to travel to*

a country prior to the publication of the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP), which delays decision-making. Finally, Sida's humanitarian staff members have an *extremely heavy workload*.

Sida's partners also value it as a *flexible donor*. This flexibility has different aspects:

- Sida provides substantial amounts of *un-earmarked funding* to UN agencies.
- Sida is responsive to *country contexts* and *partner requests*, particularly to *adapt activities to changing needs*.
- Sida allows partners to *back-date expenditure* so they can respond with their own funds while waiting for funding from Sida.
- Partners are able to *engage in preparedness, recovery and capacity building*.

Sida is also able to provide *multi-annual humanitarian funding*, which is unusual for a donor. This has several benefits because it enables partners to:

- *Set aside time to plan programmes properly.*
- *Take stock of programmes mid-course, and to incorporate lessons learnt into future programming decisions* without the need for excessive paperwork.
- *Incur lower operational costs.*
- *Feel free to advocate* on what could be contentious issues.

However, Sida's *current multi-annual framework agreements do not guarantee predictability because funding levels are set on an annual basis*.

b. Promoting needs based humanitarian assistance (GHD principle 6)

There are *two challenges* with needs-based humanitarian funding: *the generation of reliable, comprehensive and comparable data on needs, and ensuring that donors use available evidence*. Sida is addressing the first challenge by funding initiatives intended to produce better data on humanitarian needs. Due to *a lack of staff time to gather and use a range of information sources for funding decisions*, Sida has tended to equate UN Appeals with humanitarian needs even though it recognises that CAPs remain deeply flawed (despite recent improvements). Sida's *difficulties with needs-based funding are exacerbated by its lack of capacity to monitor the use of its grants*. This means that it cannot assess whether it is meeting the humanitarian needs of crisis-affected populations or not.

Even if donors have perfect information about the extent of humanitarian needs, they simply do not have the funds to meet them all. This means that they *require clear and transparent criteria for the allocation of funding across emergencies and for selecting projects within emergencies*. Currently, Sida's country envelopes and project funding decisions are heavily influenced by what it funded the previous year. *Since CAPs do not help Sida to prioritise between crises, it could consider developing a transparent 'severity of crisis' index*. It could also address the challenges with traditional needs assessments, which focus on the supply side of assistance, by making *greater use of risk assessments that examine the hazards and vulnerabilities that pose the greatest threat to mortality, morbidity and livelihoods*. To fund within a crisis, it could *develop a checklist of issues that its staff members can consider when making funding decisions* within crises. Projects that address priority needs and highest risks and which are not already funded would be the first choice in every situation. Staff could then choose between projects which address the same degree of risk/need on the basis of, for instance, the capacity of partners, the contribution to disaster risk reduction and the fit with country strategy priorities.

Sida's humanitarian funding has been largely focused on conflict situations (an average of 78% from 2005–2009). However, it needs to ensure adequate funding for natural disasters as well. Otherwise, it *risks failing to respond to the full spectrum of humanitarian needs that also include significant needs in disaster situations*.

**c. Strengthening humanitarian coordination
(GHD principle 10)**

In 2009, Sweden was the largest donor to OCHA and Sida provides *substantial funding to OCHA for its coordination role* at country level. Yet, strengthening humanitarian coordination requires more than funding for OCHA – it also *requires advocacy for change* on issues such as those identified in the case studies.

**d. Strengthening local capacity
(GHD principle 8)**

Sida does not explicitly require its partners to strengthen local capacities and has no mechanism to assess its performance on this goal. Nonetheless, the case studies found that Sida's *longer-term funding arrangements allow Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to work through local partners and strengthen their capacities* and also *to strengthen the capacities of crisis-affected communities*.

Sida cannot finance local NGOs directly but some of the country-level pooled funds that it supports have provided substantial funding to them (particularly the DRC Pooled Fund). However, *OCHA*, which manages these funds, *does not have the human or financial resources to strengthen their capacity to programme, manage and account for these funds*, particularly as its funding is short-term. Capacity strengthening is also not within the remit of these pooled funds.

Sida's engagement with strengthening the capacity of local authorities for disaster management is much weaker than its support for strengthening the capacity of local NGOs and communities.

e. Supporting the link between humanitarian contributions and prevention (GHD principle 8)

Due to its internal DRR policy from 2006, Sida has focused its bilateral humanitarian *disaster risk reduction support on global and regional mechanisms with limited support for national and local disaster preparedness and risk reduction (DPRR) initiatives* other than through the GFDRR. This is despite their primary role in helping those most affected by disasters and evidence from all the case studies that there is an *urgent need to mainstream DPRR at country level. Financing prevention is not in the remit of the pooled funds that Sweden supports* though some Emergency Response Funds (ERFs) have started to do it. Therefore, it needs to support DPRR bilaterally and advocate for pooled funds to be able to support prevention activities.

f. Reducing the gap between humanitarian support and recovery contributions (GHD principle 9)

Integrating humanitarian staff members into conflict country teams, as part of its October 2008 reorganisation, and providing *flexible funding to support recovery activities* has made it easier for Sida to bridge the gap between humanitarian and development funding. It has tended to support recovery activities bilaterally because *the pooled funds that Sweden finances have a limited ability to cover recovery activities*. The team found a number of good practice examples of this in DRC.

However, *Sida's country strategies do not reflect the full range of assistance that it is providing* (especially when humanitarian funding exceeds development aid, as in the DRC). It would be helpful if humanitarian officers in country teams were engaged in developing the strategies, ensuring that all Sida's aid to a particular situation is coherent and working towards common overall goals. This would allow

humanitarian concerns, such as prevention, to be mainstreamed across all Sida's programming. Sida probably needs to *take a strategic decision about whether it wants to develop one coherent umbrella to govern its priorities, policies and funding (humanitarian and development) in each emergency situation*. This would facilitate a division of labour and engagement of both development and humanitarian staff across Sida and the MFA.

**g. Strengthening the humanitarian system
(GHD principles 10, 21 & 22)**

Sida aims to strengthen the humanitarian system by supporting research and methods development in the humanitarian field as well as quality assurance. The team interpreted this goal more broadly to encompass the humanitarian reform process (which Sweden has supported strongly).

Sida has supported research and methods development in several ways though there is *little evidence that Sida-funded research programmes at global level have any impact on field level programming*. It has also *encouraged Swedish NGOs to adopt the accountability principles developed by the Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP) initiative*.

Sida, together with the MFA, has been *proactive in shaping international humanitarian debate* on the humanitarian system, such as UN reform and the development of the GHD principles. This *leadership role has earned Sweden the respect of humanitarian actors*, allowing it to support the progressive agendas of other donors. But the case studies identified areas where the international community, particularly the UN system, still needs to make considerable progress. These include:

- *The role of Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs)*, particularly performance assessment.
- *The performance of pooled funding mechanisms* (the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), Common Humanitarian Funds (CHF) and ERFs) in supporting prevention and recovery activities and improving UN agency accountability.

If Sweden was to *take a 3–5 year leadership role in GHD*, which currently lacks a secretariat function to ensure continuity, it would strengthen its ability to deliver on these advocacy issues.

h. Strengthening humanitarian principles (GHD principles 2 & 4)

Sida's humanitarian partners widely regard it as *a donor that adheres to humanitarian principles and is independent from political control*. This means that Sweden has a good opportunity to promote their wider application, for instance with private sector actors and in defending humanitarian space in highly politicised environments like Afghanistan or Somalia. However, *Sida needs to ensure that commitment to humanitarian principles does not preclude effective engagement with development actors* or hinder its ability to address inter-connected risks.

GHD principles not covered by Sida's strategic sub-goals

Sweden could be the leading GHD member if Sida implemented the full range of principles. For example, it could adopt principle 7 on beneficiary involvement as a goal, engage with its partners to promote accountability, effectiveness and efficiency (principle 15) and encourage regular evaluations (principle 22). It could also do more to support principles 19 and 20 on the primacy of civilian delivery of humanitarian action.

The assessment of Sida's performance against its strategic goals and the outcome of a participatory exercise with various stakeholders, including aid recipients, suggests that Sida should adopt an amended set of humanitarian goals (summarised in Figure 10 in Annex 2).

INTERNAL MANAGEMENT

Although Sida has had some success in linking its humanitarian and development funding, *staffing limitations have been a major barrier to the effectiveness of its humanitarian aid*. These include:

- a. *Humanitarian staff members being overstretched and overburdened* because they tend to manage larger budgets and a larger number of grants than their development colleagues.
- b. *A high staff turnover rate, which leads to steep learning curves and a loss of institutional memory*, as well as a loss of continuity in relationships with partners.
- c. *A focus on administering grants which has meant a lack of focus on accountability, results and collecting evidence* to inform policy and advocacy, which is not providing sufficient job satisfaction. This creates the risk of a de-skilled and demoralised cadre of humanitarian staff.

A funding database that is not fit for purpose and a lack of adequate guidance on new grant management procedures have exacerbated the situation. *If Sida does not address these challenges, it runs the very real risk of losing its position as a leading humanitarian donor.*

The relationship between Sida's humanitarian staff at headquarters and field levels is challenging due to a lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities, a limited focus on humanitarian issues at field level, a lack of effective information flows to and from the field and the lack of clear communication links with the MFA. As a result, Sida is missing opportunities to inject field-level evidence into policy discussions at the global level and making *inadequate use of its field presence to deliver on humanitarian goals*. It needs to develop mechanisms for *more information and feedback from the field and to improve the application of research to field priorities*.

Sida and the MFA have a *very good working relationship* on humanitarian issues. This is reflected in the *regular and detailed discussions in the joint Humanitarian Consultative Group (HUMSAM) meeting*. However, the articulation to the field is weak. *An explicit, common advocacy strategy or change agenda – on mechanisms such as pooled funds and clusters, OCHA, the CERF and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) – would help to provide a framework for a more systematic division of labour between Sida and MFA humanitarian staff.*

FUNDING PROCESSES

The country case studies found that *Sida's bilateral funding best help it to deliver on its strategic sub-goals* but country-level pooled funding mechanisms have a number of advantages as well. For example, they can *finance local NGOs*, which Sida cannot. ERFs/HRFs can also provide fairly quick funding for *response to small and medium-scale disasters*. In addition, pooled funds help Sida to *support a much larger number of organisations, sectors and geographical areas* than it can bilaterally and *OCHA monitors projects to an extent that is well beyond Sida*. Finally, CHF managers in DRC and Somalia have made an effort to coordinate their funding with bilateral donors.

For Sida, one challenge with *pooled funding mechanisms* is that they *have a limited ability to fund recovery activities* (partly due to their remits and partly due to the short-term nature of their funding). The CERF, which is financed by the MFA, is not able to finance prevention/preparedness activities or recovery at present. Another challenge is that *they are not always timely*.

As noted, Sida's humanitarian staffing challenges have made it difficult to focus on accountability and tracking results. *Other challenges with measuring results* range from a lack of time and expertise to a limited field presence and restrictions on the ability to travel to the field. These difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that *Sida has not used the humanitarian sub-goals systematically to guide funding decisions or as a guiding framework for field visits.*

ACCOUNTABILITY AND LESSON LEARNING

The evaluation found *mixed evidence* of the extent to which pooled funds and Sida-funded humanitarian organisations are *involving aid recipients* in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of projects. Also, *Sida does not have feedback loops to ensure that information from accountability processes inform its funding decisions.* This may be because *accountability to crisis-affected communities is not one of the 8 sub-goals of Sida's humanitarian strategy* though it is part of the GHD principles. Nevertheless, Sida has *supported global initiatives that promote accountability to crisis-affected populations.*

The factors that limit Sida's ability to measure results also hamper its ability to learn and share lessons so Sida needs to engage more strategically with its partners, particularly research and methods organisations, to be more systematic in capturing and sharing good practice.

EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS

Sweden is a highly respected humanitarian donor, regarded as a thought leader in the field. Its comparative advantages are:

- *Freedom from political control* (so that it can adhere to humanitarian and GHD principles)
- *Active engagement and taking a leadership role in international debates*
- *Ability to provide multi-annual funding for humanitarian aid*, which is more appropriate for chronic crises than the short-term approach of many other donors.
- *Willingness and ability to link humanitarian and development assistance*, which is better able to respond to the range of needs of crisis-affected communities.
- *Ability to invest in disaster preparedness and prevention*, as well as *support recovery* from the early stages of a crisis.

Sida relies on implementing organisations to turn these strengths into effective results for crisis-affected communities. To increase the impact of its work, it will need to *continue to drive strategic and practical improvements in its partnerships as well as the humanitarian system more widely*. One barrier to this will be Sida's humanitarian staffing challenges.

Sida is not alone in facing restrictions on its humanitarian staffing. Most donors are being required to manage larger humanitarian budgets with limited staffing, both at headquarters and in the field. So Sida has the opportunity to *work with other donors to share funding information and to undertake joint missions and joint tracking of funding*. Donors have expressed interest in greater cooperation and coordination though this remains more of a challenge at field level (particularly when there is an absence of donor coordination mechanisms) than at headquarters level.

Overall, the evaluation concludes that, while Sida can be proud of its achievements, it has significant opportunities to *increase the effectiveness of its work and enhance its reach and influence*, particularly in the areas of DRR and recovery. In order to *deliver its humanitarian strategy*, it will need to make some *realistic choices* about staffing and deploy not only its humanitarian staff but its *whole institution more effectively, strengthening links with the field and the MFA*.

Recommendations and Quick Wins

The analysis in each section or sub-section of the report is followed by detailed recommendations based on it. Section 8 groups these recommendations thematically under nine headings. This section provides an overview of the recommendations that are presented in section 8. The report also includes a set of ‘quick wins’ or actions that Sida can take immediately and relatively easily in order to improve its humanitarian assistance. These are listed separately below.

1. *Increase the focus on results, with a specific focus on beneficiary involvement and accountability*
 - Sida should *decide and publicise the results it wants to see from its humanitarian assistance.*
 - Sida should *include accountability to crisis-affected communities as a goal in its revised strategy* and ensure that it implements the full range of GHD principles.
 - Sida should explore ways to *access feedback from crisis-affected communities and use this as part of the evidence base for funding decisions.* This should include the use of technology and innovative mechanisms to improve accountability.
2. *Institutionalise Sweden’s leadership roles on Recovery and on Disaster Preparedness and Risk Reduction and mainstream DPRR and recovery in programming* (see quick wins 5 and 6 below as well)
 - Sida should work to become *a leading donor on DPRR*, promoting cooperation between humanitarian and development staff members and working with the MFA to take advantage of the less politicised space available for improving policy and practice on DPRR at global and field level.
 - Sida should *ensure that DPRR is mainstreamed in its funding decisions* to deliver more effective humanitarian assistance to disaster-prone countries, and that it addresses the challenge of climate change across the humanitarian and development parts of its programme.

3. *Use Sweden's reputation to go beyond protecting humanitarian principles and actively promote their wider application in complex settings.*
 - Sweden should use its reputation to *champion humanitarian principles and to develop realistic guidance for their application by a wide range of actors in complex settings* where Paris Declaration and fragile states principles are also relevant.
 - Working with the MFA, Sida could work to *defend humanitarian space in highly politicised settings where the line between aid and military objectives is blurred*, such as in Afghanistan and now Pakistan.

4. *Streamline grant administration*
 - Sida urgently needs to *streamline its administrative procedures for humanitarian funding in order to provide timely grants and to free up time for staff members to focus on strategic objectives and results*. Multi annual frameworks are one effective way to do this.

5. *Improve the methodology and practices for allocating resources according to the severity of crises, levels of risk and criteria for prioritisation.*
 - At a global level, Sida should *develop or adopt a severity of crisis model to guide the determination of geographical funding envelopes*, so as to ensure that its funding for each emergency is guided by systematic and comparable evidence on severity.
 - Sida should also *develop criteria to guide fund allocation within crises* (see quick win 4).

6. *Make working through others more effective and invest in improving the system*
 - Sida should collaborate with the MFA in prioritising work which *maximises the effectiveness of the humanitarian system in two areas: pooled funds (including the role of OCHA as manager) and humanitarian coordinators*.
 - Sweden's position as a respected leader amongst donors offers the opportunity to have a greater influence on the GHD initiative, to improve the practice of current members and encourage emerging donors to join. Therefore, it should *consider playing a leadership role in GHD over the next 3–5 years*.
 - Sida should ensure that its *humanitarian goals and focus on results are reflected in all its partnerships*

- Sida should move towards a *more systematic relationship with its NGO partners, built on the Principles of Partnership*, and including regular consultation and information sharing.
 - Sida should take up current opportunities to add *value to work on coordination*.
 - Sida as a whole should improve the effectiveness of recovery efforts by *promoting links between humanitarian and development coordination mechanisms* at country level to ensure that humanitarian and development efforts create synergies rather than undermining each other.
7. *Enable Sida country teams to engage strategically with humanitarian issues and strengthen links to the MFA*
- Sida should ensure *that humanitarian staff members are well integrated into all Country Teams*, engaged in developing umbrella country strategies that reflect the magnitude and contribution of humanitarian funding and advocating for humanitarian concerns to be mainstreamed across Sida's programming.
 - To facilitate a division of labour, Sida and the MFA should consider *the feasibility of establishing common advocacy strategies* on issues like pooled funding, clusters or recovery.
 - Sida needs to *clarify the roles and responsibilities of field staff vis-à-vis humanitarian staff in Stockholm*. This should enable field staff to make more time for dealing with humanitarian issues, enable Sida humanitarian assistance to benefit from field presence and reduce the burden on staff members in Stockholm.
 - The ATHA training programme has already proved useful for Sida staff members and NGO partners. Sida could build on this by providing *systematic ATHA training to all MFA and Sida staff working in the Conflict and Post-Conflict department as well as countries at risk of crisis*. This would mean that the Humanitarian team would have trained staff members to draw on to follow up on humanitarian funding and also in responding to sudden onset crises.
 - *Sida and the MFA should establish better communication links with Sida staff in the field* to ensure that field staff receives clear guidance on Sweden's policy stances on humanitarian issues and to make better use of field experience to inform Sweden's global advocacy and engagement in international fora.

8. *Build on existing work on local capacity*

- Since Sida cannot fund local NGOs directly, it should take steps to *enable local NGOs to have greater access to country-level pooled funding*.
- Work on local capacity should be common ground between development and humanitarian staff, particularly in-country. So, Sida should *strengthen linkages between its humanitarian and development funding* (learning from the DRC experience) to ensure that the local capacities strengthened with humanitarian funding get longer-term support and that development funding strengthens government capacity for disaster management and humanitarian coordination.

9. *Improve the quality of evidence and information and lesson learning*

- Sida should *prioritise information gathering, monitoring and communication for its staff in order to improve the quality of its evidence base*.
- Sida needs to develop *systematic ways to capture and communicate good practice*, research findings and lessons learnt from the activities that it finances among its partners and other donors.
- Sida should *develop a strategy to maximise the benefits from seminars and meetings to share good practice, lessons learnt and cutting edge research*.

QUICK WINS

#1 – Expand the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM)

- Sida could expand the RRM to include *non-Swedish NGOs with a proven rapid response capacity and experience*, aiming to have at least one partner *covering each of the major life-saving sectors*. Sida could also consider linking this mechanism to a UN agency with multi-sectoral response capacity, such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), *building on the experiences and best practice model of the RRMP mechanism in DRC*. This would enable Sida to respond rapidly and more effectively to major sudden onset crises.

#2 – Expand multi-annual framework agreements

- Sida should substantially *increase the number and extent of its multi-annual framework agreements*, thus reducing its administrative burden and speeding up decision-making. This will also free up time

to monitor the impact of its funding, and allow it to develop more strategic partnerships. It should also consider specifying the amounts that it will provide each year at the start of the agreement (with provisos on the availability of funds built in).

#3 – Participate actively in CAP workshops

- Sida’s humanitarian staff *should participate actively in CAP workshops at field level* (at least in the countries where it is providing substantial funding) so that they can gather information on the country context and priorities (i.e., the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) before the CAPs are launched and also ensure that Sida’s priorities (e.g., system strengthening) are reflected in the CAPs.

#4 – Develop criteria for allocating funds within emergencies

- Sida should *develop fund allocation criteria that prioritise the greatest risks to lives and livelihoods* and provide *a checklist that can help its staff members to decide between projects that address the same level of risk* (using criteria that include partner capacity and performance and a project’s fit with country strategy priorities).

#5 – Increasing support for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency’s (MSB) disaster preparedness work

- The relationship with MSB could become more systematic and strategic. Sida should also consider increasing its *support for MSB’s disaster preparedness work*, which would also support its obligations under the Hyogo Framework for Action.

#6 – Advanced Training Programme on Humanitarian Action (ATHA) training on DPRR

- *ATHA should begin teaching a module on DPRR*, with a particular focus on disaster preparedness, as a standard part of all its courses. This module should be available to Sida staff members as well as partners.

#7 – Develop guidance on recovery programming

- Sida should *reinforce its leading international role on policy and finance for recovery programming* that sets the stage for, and does not undermine, future development work. It could start by using the practical field experience that the Human Security Department has

been collecting to develop solid policy/guidance on funding recovery, perhaps with the support of lessons learnt during this evaluation. This guidance should also be developed in conjunction with multilateral and NGO partners, to take account of field realities.

#8 – Increase support for partners’ field research

- Sida should provide *more support to its partners to undertake field-level research* that will improve current and future programming. It could do this *through provisions in multi-annual framework agreements*.

#9 – Extend ATHA training across Sida

- The ATHA training programme has already proved useful for Sida staff members and NGO partners. Sida could build on this by *providing systematic ATHA training to all MFA and Sida staff working in the Conflict and Post-Conflict department as well as countries at risk of crisis*. This would mean that the humanitarian team would have trained staff members to draw on to follow up on humanitarian funding and also in responding to sudden onset crises.

#10 – Develop a simple humanitarian tracking database

- Sida should *develop a simple database (possibly using Excel) to allow the humanitarian team to better track and analyse its funding* (e.g., by sector, partner, emergency).

#11 – Learn from other Sida departments

- While the Sida at Work initiative is still developing guidance, the Humanitarian team could *draw on the experience and practice of other departments within Sida*. A number of interviewees singled out the Team for Cooperation with Civil Society Organisations (CIV-SAM) as a progressive team. For example, it is undertaking risk assessments better than other Sida departments. The fact that the Humanitarian team is funding some of the same organisations could make it easier to establish links with CIVSAM.

#12 – Involve field staff in Sida’s Humanitarian Days

- Sida can *involve field staff members working on humanitarian issues in its Humanitarian Days* in Stockholm to be able to draw on their field experience and establish better communication links with the MFA.

#13 – Ensure project documents available online

- Sida should *ensure that project documents are available online* and searchable (even through a platform as simple as SharePoint) to ensure that all field staff can access them. This will *enable* them to *follow up on projects more effectively*.

#14 – Regular consultation forums with partners

- Sida could *establish an annual consultation forum with its partners* to discuss its funding plans for the year ahead and strategic issues. This would replicate good practice by other donors. e.g., the Danish MFA meets with the Danish NGO Forum on a regular basis to discuss various issues. Germany has an annual meeting with NGOs for feedback on funding allocations and thematic issues.

Introduction

This report presents the findings from an evaluation of Sida's humanitarian assistance from 2005–2010, with a particular focus on 2008–2010, which is the period covered by Sida's current humanitarian strategy. Sweden's humanitarian assistance is guided by the Government's Humanitarian Aid Policy¹. The MFA updated the 2004 policy in 2010. Sida's Strategy for Humanitarian Assistance 2008–2010 (2007) operationalised the 2004 policy. To take account of the revised Humanitarian Aid Policy, a new four-year strategy will be prepared at the end of 2010.

PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION

One of Sida's aims in undertaking this evaluation was to inform the revision of the humanitarian assistance strategy for Sida. Another reason for commissioning this evaluation was that, while Sida has undertaken a number of country, thematic and organisational evaluations of its humanitarian assistance during the last 10 years, it has not yet undertaken a comprehensive review of its humanitarian assistance. Therefore, Sida felt that it was timely to commission an independent and objective evaluation of its humanitarian assistance. It is also an opportunity to locate Sida's humanitarian assistance in the context of new developments in the sector and the wider international context.

Based on the Terms of Reference (ToR) (see Annex 1), the inception report identified the following objectives for the evaluation:

- a. Assess humanitarian assistance financed by Sida from 2005–2010, with a particular focus on 2008–2010 as the period of implementation for the humanitarian strategy. The assessment will focus on the humanitarian assistance strategy for Sida, organisation and management as well as mechanisms and channels for funding and Sida-funded programmes.

¹ Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2010) Humanitarian Aid Policy 2010–16 (UF2010/39010/SP)

- b. Draw out lessons that can feed into the revision of the humanitarian assistance strategy for Sida. Recommendations should aim to build on Sida's strengths and comparative advantage.
- c. Ensure that the evaluation is conducted with a focus on enabling Sida staff to learn lessons and apply these to the revised strategy and Sida's future humanitarian programming.

USERS OF THE EVALUATION

According to the ToR, Sida policy and operational staff and managers, and staff at the MFA and embassies will be the primary users of the evaluation. Swedish and international NGOs and multilateral organisations as well as other donors are likely to be secondary users of the evaluation. The team conducted a participatory stakeholder analysis at the beginning of the evaluation to identify key stakeholders. It has also used a participatory approach throughout the evaluation, with an emphasis on allowing participants time to reflect on their working methods, to ensure that the evaluation process is useful for the primary users (not just the reports produced).

METHODOLOGY

Annex 3 describes the methodology used for this evaluation and provides a list of those consulted. In line with objective 3 of the evaluation, the team has ensured that the process is interactive and participatory. It has also involved Sida's humanitarian team closely, through discussions and presentations of findings, in order to build ownership of the outcomes of the evaluation.

The team has conducted the evaluation in phases, reporting back to management and reference groups at the end of each phase.

These phases were as follows:

- a. *Inception phase*, which involved a stakeholder analysis and resulted in the *inception report* that guided the rest of the evaluation.
- b. *Policy, management and organisation review phase*, which focused on Sida's internal management systems and procedures as well as its relationships with partners at headquarters level. It included a consultation with donors on shared challenges with implementing the GHD principles. This phase resulted in the *interim report*, which outlined ways in which Sida could address the administrative challenges that the evaluation identified.

- c. *Country case study phase*, in which the team conducted case studies in the *DRC*, *Kenya* (including consultations with aid agencies working in *Somalia*) and *Indonesia* (see Annex 3 for an explanation of how the team selected the case study countries). The case studies involved consultations with Sida partners, government representatives, donors and crisis-affected communities as well as visits to Sida-funded projects. The team produced *four case study reports* (one for each country) that assessed the extent to which Sida is delivering on the 8 sub-goals of its current humanitarian strategy. These reports will be available separately.

In addition, to support the lesson learning process, the team is producing brief papers and short films highlighting success stories and ‘learning from experience’ from Sida-funded projects. These will be available separately.

This report synthesises the findings and recommendations from the previous phases and reports. As in the interim report, the recommendations are based on the following assumptions:

- Despite the tremendous pressure on humanitarian staff, *it will be challenging to increase the number of staff working on humanitarian issues at headquarters in the short term*. Without extra resources, the existing team needs to find ways to maintain and improve its impact through working smarter and exploiting potential efficiency gains.
- The *pressure to demonstrate concrete results and accountability to taxpayers will continue to increase*, and thus it is imperative that the humanitarian team adopts a greater results orientation, and is provided with support to concentrate on measuring, monitoring and improving the overall impact of its programmes.

STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The report starts with the context for Sida’s humanitarian aid – the international humanitarian field, the policy and strategy context and trends in Sida’s humanitarian funding. It goes on to summarise findings on the extent to which Sida is achieving its strategic sub-goals. The report then focuses on the main elements of the framework for analysis presented in the inception report (see Annex 3 on methodology) – Sida’s internal management, funding processes and external relationships with partners and other donors. The last two sections draw together the main findings and conclusions.

1 International, strategic and funding context

Summary

Although Sida finances several research and training organisations that analyse trends and shape policy/practice in the humanitarian field, Sida's staff members lack the time to utilise their research. So, for this evaluation, DI outlined developments and challenges in the international humanitarian context that Sida should take into account in its revised humanitarian strategy. In the future, **Sida should request the research and training organisations that it finances to make annual presentations/provide training on the latest trends and developments in the humanitarian field (perhaps during its Humanitarian Days) so that its staff members can keep up-to-date and adapt their funding accordingly.**

This section provides an overview of the key events in the evolution of Sida's humanitarian aid before analysing Sweden's humanitarian funding from 2005–2010. The analysis highlights that **substantial proportions of Sida's humanitarian funding go to Africa and complex emergencies; that Sida does not have a sectoral or thematic focus and that the UN is the main channel for Sida's funding**, as it very responsive to UN funding Appeals.

This section begins by outlining changes in the international humanitarian context in the last five years that Sida should take into account when it updates its humanitarian strategy. It goes on to outline the strategic context for Sida's humanitarian assistance and provide a timeline of the key developments that have shaped Sida's humanitarian aid since 2005. The section concludes with an analysis of Sweden's humanitarian funding from 2005–2010.

1.1 THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN CONTEXT

The international humanitarian context has evolved over the five years covered by this evaluation, with new challenges arising in an already complicated landscape. Sida finances research organisations that analyse trends in the international humanitarian system and

work to shape humanitarian policy and practice (see section 2.3.7). It also funds ATHA for its NGO partners, but which Sida staff members can also attend. However, Sida's humanitarian staff members are overburdened with their administrative responsibilities so they do not have time to utilise the research produced by these organisations. This means that they are unable to keep up to date with emerging trends and ensure that Sida's humanitarian assistance adapts to changes in the international context.

Therefore, as part of this evaluation, DI presented an overview of the key developments in the international humanitarian context, highlighting the following challenges that Sida should take into account when developing its next humanitarian strategy.

Country level funding

- a. Donor funds often flow through a myriad of intermediaries, e.g., passing from the CERF to a UN agency to an NGO to the beneficiary – increasing the risk of inefficiencies in the system.
- b. Resources from sources other than donors, for example the diaspora and the private sector, are often not taken into account in planning or delivering humanitarian responses.

Conflicting guiding principles

- c. Strengthening capacity, whether of local NGOs or of state-run systems, remains a real challenge for humanitarian actors funded under short-term contracts that require quantifiable results.
- d. Humanitarian assistance has no division of labour requirements. This complicates transition funding for donors, who may have to then disengage from countries where they have significant experience and effective partnerships to comply with the provisions of the Paris Declaration.

Longer term chronic programming

- e. Much of what is called humanitarian work is not about short-term, 'life-saving' emergency response, as is the generally assumed. Instead, donors often finance the same crisis year after year, mainly addressing chronic problems.




Figure 1: Long, Medium and Short-term Humanitarian Assistance

- f. Since 2002, long-term humanitarian assistance has accounted for over half of humanitarian spending (comprising 79% of total humanitarian aid in 2007 – Figure 1).
- g. Poor countries tend to get most of their international aid as humanitarian aid – for example, DRC has received around 40%




Figure 2: Total number of natural disasters per year

of total Official Development Assistance (ODA) as humanitarian assistance every year since 1994.

Growing incidence of natural disasters

- h. The incidence of natural disasters is steadily increasing. Figure 2, based on the CRED database, shows the total number of natural disasters per year between 1978 and 2008 with a clear upward trajectory. The number of people affected by disasters is also increasing, often related to smaller-scale events having an inverse impact on extremely vulnerable populations. Since 1980, the number of people affected by extreme weather events, many of which are linked to climate change, has doubled (from 121 million to 243 million a year) and is expected to increase a further 54% to more than 375 million people a year on average by 2015². This is likely to have a major impact on humanitarian assistance – requiring a response to a larger number of smaller-scale events alongside response to ongoing conflict situations, and a re-focusing of funding on reducing the underlying vulnerability of poor people to conflict and disaster events. The pressure on donors to “write big cheques” to reduce their administrative burden poses a challenge to their ability to address small – and medium-scale disasters.
- i. The challenges posed by the increasing number of extreme weather events will be compounded by the scarcity of resources (energy, water and food). To address them, donors will need to support affected countries to develop greater disaster response and preparedness capacity, strengthen local capacity and find integrated approaches to risk reduction.

Response equal to need?

- j. Huge efforts are currently underway to improve needs assessments, but these could be misguided. It is not clear how the impact of an emergency response will be improved by more technically accurate assessments. A focus on risk, rather than needs (which are implicitly tied to what the assessing agency is competent to deliver), may be a more appropriate, and less politicised, way to plan a response.

² See Vidal, J. (2009) *Climate change will overload humanitarian system, warns Oxfam*. Article available from: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/apr/21/climate-change-natural-disasters>

- k. Ensuring that funding decisions are linked to the relative severity of the crisis remains a challenge. CAPs and Flash Appeals only ever provide a fragmented view of the severity of crises, as their total funding requests are based on existing on-the-ground institutional capacity and variable pricing (a “need” covered by an NGO will have a smaller cost, and thus value, than the same “need” covered by a UN agency, for example).

Maximising added value of humanitarian reform

- l. The cluster approach is now bearing fruit, especially in increasing accountability, predictability and mutual learning at field level. However, it is also an added resource burden on both UN cluster leads and NGOs, especially those who are designated as co-leads, and donors need to review how to best support this added burden. There is also a challenge in ensuring that local government officials are included in clusters as co-leads and that clusters are able to coordinate the growing assistance from the private sector.
- m. The concept of “Provider of Last Resort” remains unclear to both donors and operational agencies. International funding and capacity to meet the full range of humanitarian needs will never exist so donors need to support an appropriate prioritisation process at country level.
- n. Strengthening of the HC system is still at a very early stage, despite its importance. Conflicting accountability lines are at the heart of this problem, especially where the HC is also the Resident Coordinator and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG). Serious change in this area will require coordinated donor advocacy.
- o. Pooled Funding mechanisms have become increasingly popular, reducing transaction costs for donors, fulfilling GHD commitments and creating the perception of a better focus on priority needs. However, they suffer from inadequate monitoring and evaluation, and have sometimes become overly slow and bureaucratic delivery mechanisms. Donor action will be required to ensure that these instruments live up to expectations.

Accountability

- p. Donors have very limited means for acquiring first hand information from affected populations, often relying instead on delivery

agencies that have a vested interest in providing information that will lead to positive funding decisions.

- q. Aid recipients lack the information necessary to hold aid providers to account and the current humanitarian system does not include adequate feedback loops. Accountability remains focused between donors and operational organisations. But with few independent sources of information, limited field presence and very few comprehensive evaluation exercises, donors are often unable to properly verify the impact of their funding.

Although Sida does not have mechanisms in place to monitor changes in the international context systematically and ensure that its humanitarian assistance adapts accordingly, its staff members analyse country contexts when they prepare assessment memos for humanitarian funding decisions. This analysis usually relies heavily on information presented in UN Appeals because staff members face both budgetary and time constraints that restrict their ability to travel to the field regularly.

Sida responds not only to the UN's Consolidated Appeals when they are launched but also when they are revised mid-way through the year. This enables it to respond to changes in the situations on the ground. Also, Sida offers its partners a lot of flexibility to adapt to fluid situations, including re-allocating funds to newly emerging priorities or new areas of need, which they appreciate greatly (see section 2.3.1).

1.2 EVOLUTION OF SIDA'S HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND ITS STRATEGIC CONTEXT

The Swedish Government's Humanitarian Aid Policy for 2010–16 (UF2010/39010/SP) outlines the following goal for Sida's humanitarian assistance: *“to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity for the benefit of people in need who are, or are at risk of becoming, affected by armed conflicts, natural disasters or other disaster situations”*.

The policy states that Sida's humanitarian work shall be based on the Geneva Conventions from 1949, and the three Additional Protocols from 1977 and 2005, as well as deferring to other instruments related to International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Refugee Law, Human Rights Law, the United Nations Convention on the Rights

of the Child, legal instruments with a bearing on natural disasters, and established international practice in the field. Sida is also required to respect the 23 principles of the GHD, which Sweden was instrumental in developing. The policy outlines three focus areas for Swedish humanitarian assistance:

- Flexible, fast and effective humanitarian assistance to meet current and future humanitarian needs
- A strong and coordinated international humanitarian system
- Better interaction with development assistance and other forms of action and actors.

Taking into account the wide body of guidance mentioned in the policy, Sida developed a Strategy for Humanitarian Assistance 2008–2010, which has guided this evaluation. The strategy outlines eight sub-goals that facilitate the implementation of Sida’s humanitarian programme, and guide the measurement of its results. These goals are all drawn from the GHD principles. Annex 2 on supporting evidence provides an overview of the sub-goals.

Although the MFA’s humanitarian policy guides Sida’s strategy, under Swedish law, neither the Minister nor the MFA can direct Sida on when or where to respond to humanitarian crises. This separation exists to ensure that Sida remains neutral and independent, and therefore free from political imperatives. However, Sida and the MFA play complementary roles in Swedish humanitarian assistance. The MFA is responsible for core funding to multilateral organisations while Sida responds to Appeals and is responsible for programme funding to multilaterals and also support to NGOs. As part of this division of labour, the MFA funds the CERF as a global pooled mechanism while Sida funds country-level pooled funds (CHFs and ERFs). Also, Sida supports the MFA in its advocacy role, e.g., in the GHD Initiative and on the CHF Working Group. Sida




Figure 3: Timeline of key events for Sida's humanitarian assistance

and the MFA have a good working relationship and coordinate their activities through the HUMSAM that meets every two weeks or as agreed by Sida and the MFA.

Figure 3 below provides a timeline of events that have been important in shaping Sida's humanitarian assistance.

1.3 ANALYSIS OF SIDA'S HUMANITARIAN FUNDING: 2005–2010

An analysis of Sida's humanitarian funding demonstrates that it is a *significant and generous donor*. In 2008 and 2009, Sweden was the world's 5th largest humanitarian donor, providing SEK 4.158 and 4.639 billion respectively. DARA's 2009 Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) ranks Sweden as the top donor on its generosity and burden-sharing indicator. The other key features of Sida's humanitarian funding are as follows:

Sida's humanitarian funding is mainly *focused on Africa* with, on average, 60% of its funding flowing to the continent (Figure 4). However, 75% of the total funding that the CAPs requested from 2005–2009 was for Africa (see Figure 9 in Annex 2).

Sida's humanitarian funding is largely *focused on complex emergencies*, with 78% spent in these crises from 2005–2010 (Figure 5). As Figure 10 in Annex 2 shows, UN Appeals have requested an average of 82% of total funding for complex emergencies.




Figure 4: Sida's geographical funding allocations 2005-2009




Figure 5: Sida's funding channels 2005–2010

Sweden's humanitarian funding *does not have a sectoral or thematic focus*³. An analysis of OCHA's Financial Tracking System (FTS) showed that 24% of its funding was multi-sectoral (mostly general support for refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)), 19% went to pooled funds (including the CERF), and 12% to coordination and support services.

Sida is *very supportive of the UN Appeals process*. 46% of its funding from 2005 to 2009 went to CAPs and Flash Appeals, 39% was un-earmarked and 15% flowed outside of Appeals. These figures are slightly distorted by the fact that, in 2005, Sweden provided \$16.6 million to Iraq outside the appeals process.

The *UN is the main channel for Sida's funding*, receiving, on average, 46% of the total humanitarian budget from 2005 to 2009 (Figure 5).

³ It was not possible to get a sectoral breakdown of Sida's humanitarian funding from its database so DI used OCHA's Financial Tracking System (FTS) which does not distinguish between funding from Sida and the MFA.

2 Guiding Principles and Cross-Cutting Issues

Summary

It can be difficult for donors to reconcile the tensions between the GHD principles, Fragile States principles and the Paris Declaration/AAA. Though Sida has been successful at linking its humanitarian and development funding through its country team structure, it has been **very careful to protect the independence of its humanitarian aid**. Due to this, perhaps, the issue of tension between the GHD and other sets of principles did not arise in discussions.

Although Sida has policies and strategic guidelines on various cross-cutting issues, the **extent to which these policies and strategic guidelines are applied depends on individual staff members** because there is no systemic approach to ensuring that cross-cutting issues are properly integrated into humanitarian programmes supported by Sida funding.

Sida's humanitarian goals are drawn from the GHD principles and **Sida is performing relatively well** against these goals (e.g., in **providing flexible funding, supporting recovery and local capacity strengthening, being a principled donor and financing humanitarian coordination and research and methods organisations**). However, it needs to **improve the speed of its funding, develop criteria for allocating funding between and within crises, support disaster preparedness and risk reduction at country level and implement GHD principles not covered by its current goals**.

This section begins by outlining how Sida's humanitarian assistance fits in with the various guiding principles to which Sweden is a signatory. It goes on to examine the extent to which Sida's humanitarian funding takes account of cross-cutting issues. The section concludes with a summary assessment of the extent to which Sida has achieved the 8 sub-goals of its humanitarian strategy and been successful in implementing the full range of GHD principles.

2.1 GUIDING PRINCIPLES

In addition to the *GHD principles*, Sweden has signed up to the *Fragile States principles* and the *Paris Declaration/AAA*. *It can be difficult for donors*

to reconcile these different sets of principles because, for example, the GHD principles of neutrality and impartiality clash with the requirements for state-building and peace-building under the Fragile States principles, and also with the Paris Declaration's emphasis on government ownership. This is a particular challenge *when all three sets of principles are being implemented in the same country*, for example in Sudan.

Although Sida has humanitarian staff members based in country teams in the Conflict and Post-Conflict Department to improve linkages between its humanitarian and development funding, it has *been careful to protect the neutrality and independence of its humanitarian funding*. So, Sida's humanitarian funding to a particular country is still guided by the humanitarian strategy and not the country strategy that governs its development funding. Also, the head of the humanitarian team is responsible for humanitarian funding decisions, not the country team director.

Sida has been successful in linking its humanitarian and development funding, particularly in the DRC (see good practice example 4 below). But perhaps due to the emphasis on the GHD principles and on protecting the independence of humanitarian aid, the issue of tensions between the GHD principles on one hand and the Fragile States principles and the Paris Declaration/AAA on the other did not arise in discussions with Sida staff members. Of the case study countries, DRC is the one where the tensions between GHD and other principles should have been most manifest because there has been significant pressure on humanitarian actors to adhere to the UN's International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) that has been determined largely on political grounds and without consultation with humanitarian organisations. However, Sida staff members did not raise concerns about these tensions, perhaps because Sida is focused more on traditional humanitarian and development programming and is not supporting the security elements of the international stabilisation agenda.

2.2 CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

Sida has policies and strategic guidelines on cross-cutting issues that complement its humanitarian strategy. These include especially its gender equality policy⁴, which places gender equality at the centre of

4 Sida (2005) *Promoting Gender Equality in Development Cooperation: Policy*. Department for Democracy and Social Development, Gender Equality Team.

Sida's mission to promote and create conditions for poverty reduction in partner countries, and its strategic guidelines on DRR⁵. There are also relevant sections on humanitarian assistance in Sida's guidance documents on gender based violence, HIV/AIDS and environment⁶. Finally, the strategy for multilateral cooperation⁷ provides guidance for humanitarian contributions to multilateral agencies, and its Guidelines for Grants to NGOs for Humanitarian Projects⁸ set out funding modalities for NGOs.

In practice, the extent to which these policies and strategic guidelines are applied depends on individual staff members because there is no systemic approach to ensuring that cross-cutting issues are properly integrated into humanitarian programmes supported by Sida funding. In DRC, the Sida staff member dealing with humanitarian issues takes a keen interest in gender issues and has engaged in informed discussions with UNICEF's Gender Standby Capacity Project (GENCAP) advisor and ICRC. In Kenya and Indonesia, there is an urgent need for DRR because both countries are affected by recurrent natural disasters but Sida's failure to incorporate it into its humanitarian programming means that it has missed opportunities to strengthen the resilience of local communities. This is discussed further in section 2.3.5.

2.3 GHD PRINCIPLES AND SIDA'S STRATEGIC SUB-GOALS

Sida tasked DI with assessing the extent to which it is delivering on the 8 sub-goals of its humanitarian strategy and the GHD principles

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- 5 See Kratt, P., June 2005: *Reducing the risk of disasters: Sida's effort to reduce poor people's vulnerability to hazards*. Sida's policy on DRR will be encapsulated in the forthcoming policy on environment and climate change and also reflected in the revised humanitarian strategy.
 - 6 Sida Gender Secretariat (2007) *Action Plan for Sida's Work Against Gender-Based Violence: 2008–2010*. Department for Democracy and Social Development. Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden (2008) *The Right to a Future – Policy for Sweden's international HIV and AIDS efforts*. Sida Environment Policy Division (2004) *Sida's Environmental Management System: Policy and Action Plan for Environmentally Sustainable Development*.
 - 7 Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2007) *Sweden's Strategy for Multilateral Development Cooperation*.
 - 8 Sida (2007) *Guidelines for Grants to NGOs for Humanitarian Projects*.

more broadly, both during the policy, management and organisation phase and the country case study phase. This section summarises the findings under the heading of each goal. Since each sub-goal is based on one or more of the GHD principles, the title of each goal includes corresponding GHD principle numbers in brackets.

2.3.1 Promoting the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD principles 5, 12 and 13)

The 8 sub-goals in Sida's humanitarian strategy are all drawn from the GHD principles. Therefore, the first sub-goal focuses on three aspects in particular:

- Timeliness, flexibility and predictability of funding
- Supporting quick response to rapid onset disasters by providing unallocated funds to suitable organisations
- Encouraging and supporting a long-term perspective in partners' programming.

According to an assessment of the first two GHD indicators: committing funds in the first 3 months of the year (by 31 March) and committing funds to a Flash Appeal within 6 weeks of its launch, Sida is a very timely donor (see figures 6 and 7 below). It has almost always performed better than the DAC donor average and its performance is comparable to that of DFID, which is a larger, better-staffed donor. However, this emphasis on timeliness has a cost, in terms of tremendous pressure on already over-burdened staff and at the expense of analysing how best to allocate funding (the interim report includes an activity calendar that highlights a bottleneck for the first few months of the year, once CAPs are launched. Quick Wins 1 and 3 outline options to address this challenge – attending CAP workshops to think through funding options before the CAPs are launched and making greater use of Sida's RRM.

Evidence from the country cases studies suggests that Sida's funding to partners is generally timely, particularly framework agreements. However, *timely funding by Sida and the MFA does not necessarily translate into timely project implementation.* The DRC, Kenya and Indonesia case studies all found that, when Sweden channels its funding through pooled mechanisms, there can be delays in approving proposals and disbursing funds.

The evaluation also found examples of delays in bilateral funding from the Kenya and Somalia case studies and NGO partners in




Figure 6: GHD Indicator 1 – Total Funds Committed in First Quarter

Stockholm felt that *Sida’s decision-making has slowed down in 2009–2010* (the GHD indicator data in figures 6 and 7 is only available up to 2008). NGOs and research and methods organisations have experienced delays of between 4–9 months in signing funding agreements. Sida’s RRM is a pre-arranged draw-down funding mechanism to enable NGOs to respond quickly to sudden-onset disasters. But Sida is in the process of reviewing and revising the RRM since *timeliness in responding to sudden-onset crises was Sida’s lowest score on DARA’s 2009 HRI*. It was ranked 20th out of 23 donors on this indicator though it was ranked fourth on timeliness in responding to complex emergencies.

There are several possible explanations for these delays. One is that *Sida’s humanitarian aid is increasingly subject to the same rules and regu-*




Figure 7: GHD Indicator 2 – Funding Committed to Flash Appeals within 6 Weeks

lations as development cooperation and it takes longer to prepare for funding decisions and get these approved. Another is the introduction of *new requirements and funding rules* (particularly on audits). Sida has not always been clear with what it wanted the organisations to provide and this has led to lengthy discussions. UN agencies also noted delays to decision making due to *mistakes in filling out standard grant agreements* and the *inability of Sida staff to travel to a country prior to the publication of the CAP*. This may have knock-on effects if Sida's funding agreement with an organisation covers several countries because the total decision may be held up because of a delay with one country. Finally, as discussed in greater detail in section 3.1, Sida's humanitarian staff members have an *extremely heavy workload*.

Quick Win #1 – Expand the Rapid Response Mechanism

Sida could expand the RRM to include **non-Swedish NGOs with a proven rapid response capacity and experience, aiming to have at least one partner covering each of the major life-saving sectors**. Sida could also consider linking this mechanism to a UN agency with multi-sectoral response capacity, such as UNICEF, **building on the experiences and best practice model of the RRMP mechanism in DRC**. This would enable Sida to respond rapidly and more effectively to major sudden onset crises.

Sida's partners also value it as a *flexible donor*. This flexibility has different aspects:

- Sida provides substantial amounts of *un-earmarked funding* to UN agencies (Somalia case study).
- Sida is responsive to requests to *adapt activities to changing needs* (Kenya case study).
- Sida allows partners to *back-date expenditure* so they can respond with their own funds while waiting for funding from Sida (Indonesia case study).
- Sida's flexibility in the use of humanitarian funding has *enabled partners to engage in strengthening capacity, preparedness and recovery* (see sections 2.3.4, 2.3.5 and 2.3.6 below). As a result, the Swedish Red Cross is regarded as one of the most flexible members of the Red Cross Movement.
- Sida staff members highlighted the fact that they have flexibility for individual decision making, which enables them to be *responsive to country contexts and partner requests*.

When Sida's funding is channelled through UN agencies to implementing partners, it can lose some of its timeliness and flexibility (see DRC and Kenya case studies). This is due to the institutional procedures of the UN agencies.

As Sida's strategy points out, it is able to provide *multi-annual humanitarian funding*, which is unusual for a donor. The Kenya and Indonesia case studies found examples of project funding for 16–18 months. This enables partners to take a longer-term approach, especially in chronic crises where it is clear that a short-term response is inappropriate. Sida also has multi-annual framework arrangements with research and methods organisations, some NGOs (both Swedish and non-Swedish) and a couple of UN organisations (OCHA and UNICEF). The DRC case study identified several benefits of these multi-annual framework agreements:

- *Partners set aside time to plan programmes* properly. They have developed strategies that address priority needs and support recovery where possible.
- Funding stability allows partners to *take stock of programmes mid-course, and to incorporate lessons learnt into future programming decisions* without the need for excessive paperwork.
- Partners incur *lower operational costs*. For example, partners have been able to buy cars rather than renting them at high cost, take out longer-term leases on premises at lower rates, avoid overdraft fees, and negotiate better terms with suppliers.
- NGOs feel that they have the *freedom to advocate* on what could be contentious issues.

However, as noted in the interim and DRC reports, Sida's *current multi-annual framework agreements do not guarantee predictability because funding levels are allocated on an annual basis*.

Quick Win #2 – Expand multi-annual framework agreements

Sida should substantially **increase the number and extent of its multi-annual framework agreements**, thus reducing its administrative burden and speeding up decision-making. This will also free up time to monitor the impact of its funding, and allow it to develop more strategic partnerships. It should also consider specifying the amounts that it will provide each year at the start of the agreement (with provisos on the availability of funds built in).

Quick Win #3 – Participate actively in CAP workshops

Sida's humanitarian staff **should participate actively in CAP workshops at field level** (at least in the countries where it is providing substantial funding) so that they can gather information on the country context and priorities (i.e., the CHAP) before the CAPs are launched and also ensure that Sida's priorities (e.g., system strengthening) are reflected in the CAPs.

2.3.2 Promoting needs based humanitarian assistance (GHD principle 6)

Members of Sida's humanitarian team have written a paper on evidence-based decision-making that makes it clear that there are *two challenges with needs-based humanitarian funding: the generation of reliable, comprehensive and comparable data on needs, and ensuring that donors use available evidence*. Sida is addressing the first challenge through funding for initiatives intended to produce better data on humanitarian needs, such as Acaps (Assessment Capacities project). But, as one of the participants at the donor consultation meeting for this evaluation pointed out, the challenge with common needs assessments is political rather than technical and UN agencies and NGOs have no interest in working together on needs assessments and sharing information.

To address the existing challenges with traditional needs assessments, which focus on the supply side of assistance, *Sida could make greater use of risk assessments that examine the hazards and vulnerabilities that pose the greatest threat to mortality, morbidity and livelihoods*. For example, in a flood situation, the most immediate risk to morbidity may come from water-borne diseases, followed by livelihood and morbidity risk from the destruction of crops, etc. To respond to these risks, Sida would first make sure that all aspects of a response to water-borne disease risk were adequately funded by it or other donors, before moving on to funding the most appropriate response to crop failure, etc. Risk levels will change over time as the response and the context evolve, so Sida would need to continue to analyse the situation and ensure ongoing discussions with partners and other donors.

Even if donors have perfect information about the level of humanitarian needs, they simply do not have the funds to meet all the needs. At the donor consultation meeting, participants acknowledged that

donors are risking their credibility if they push the system to undertake joint needs assessments but then fail to provide adequate funding to meet the needs identified. This means that donors *require clear and transparent criteria for the allocation of their humanitarian budgets across emergencies and for selecting projects within emergencies*. Currently, Sida's country envelopes are heavily influenced by what Sida funded the previous year. A review of Sida's decision-making documents (assessment memos) shows that it often justifies funding decisions within an emergency on the basis of previous allocations as well. The lack of clear and transparent criteria for allocating funding across and within crises means that Sida is *leaving itself open to charges of being driven by media or political considerations* as it is not clear to external actors how Sida makes its funding decisions. For example, Swedish NGOs argued that the humanitarian team's funding decisions have been taken "on weak grounds" and without consultation with partners.

Good practice example 1

In Indonesia Sida set out the following criteria to allocate funding for the West Sumatera earthquake response in 2009:

- Support to sectors that Sida had supported in Indonesia in the past and therefore had knowledge and experience of WASH, protection and early recovery). This ruled out the health, agriculture and education sectors.
- Support to sectors that are less likely to receive support. This ruled out shelter, which has traditionally received strong support from the government. However, without a humanitarian presence in the field, it was difficult for Sida to know what other donors were likely to fund.
- Ruling out the World Food Programme (WFP)-led sectors – food and nutrition, and logistics and communication – because Sweden provides substantial un-earmarked funding to WFP each year.
- Limiting the number of recipient organisations to facilitate monitoring and follow-up.

The criteria that Sida used for funding to West Sumatera (see good practice example 1) could be a very useful starting point for *Sida to develop criteria that its staff members can apply consistently across crises*. As they stand, they are not ideal because, by rejecting sectors that Sida has not financed before, it missed the opportunity to fund agriculture which received no support except for a CERF grant even though farmers were amongst the most affected by the earthquake. The Feb-

ruary 2009 assessment memo for funding to Somalia is also a good example of providing clear justifications for the selection of particular sectors. Sida's criteria should prioritise projects that address the greatest risks to lives and livelihoods and which are not already being funded. To help staff decide between projects which address the same degree of risk, Sida should develop a checklist based on, for instance, the capacity of partners, the contribution to disaster risk reduction and the fit with country strategy priorities. Such guidance would help humanitarian staff to justify their decisions and reduce their reliance on previous allocations as the basis for future spending.

Due to the *lack of clear criteria for funding and a lack of time for staff to gather and use a range of information sources to make funding decisions*, Sida has tended to equate UN Appeals, particularly CAPs, with humanitarian needs. A review of its funding decision documents reveals a heavy reliance on the analysis in CAPs. This is even though its staff recognise that the CAPs remain deeply flawed (despite recent improvements) and are more a reflection of what international agencies can provide in response to a crisis than a full and complete picture of what crisis-affected populations require. They are also far from comprehensive, since many NGOs (particularly local NGOs) do not participate in the CAPs, and the projects presented do not include needs in areas where the agencies have no presence or capacity to respond. Finally, most donors seek to fund 'priority' sectors or activities in the CAPs. This can lead to situations such as in Haiti, where shelter was very well funded but Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) was not. This is despite the fact that a lack of sanitation facilities poses a far greater risk to people's lives than a lack of shelter. This highlights the importance of donor coordination and working towards decision-making that is based on a wider range of evidence than just 'needs' alone.

Although Sida is striving to respond to humanitarian needs, section 1.3 highlighted the fact that, on average, 78% of Sida's humanitarian funding from 2005–2009 has gone to complex emergencies. But section 1.1 demonstrated that the humanitarian context is increasingly dominated by natural disasters that are affecting rapidly growing numbers of people who are becoming increasingly vulnerable. If Sida does not ensure adequate funding for natural disasters, it *risks failing to respond to the full spectrum of humanitarian needs that also include significant needs in disaster situations*.

The *difficulties with needs-based funding are exacerbated by the fact that Sida currently has so little capacity to monitor the results of its funding or the use of its grants*. This means that Sida has no way to assess whether it is meeting the humanitarian needs of crisis-affected populations or whether it is, in fact, simply meeting the needs of implementing agencies (because these are essentially what is presented in CAPs and project proposal documents). This suggests an urgent need for Sida to streamline its grant administration to free up time for monitoring and follow up.

Recommendations:

- At a global level, Sida should *develop or adopt a severity of crisis model* to guide the determination of geographical funding envelopes, so as to ensure that its funding for each emergency is truly in proportion to the severity of needs.
- Sida could improve its grant management by *developing criteria and priority areas for the allocation of additional funds that become available at the end of the year*. At present, it tends to channel this through ERFs and projects which enable it to disburse the money quickly. However, it could use these funds more strategically, e.g., to provide additional funding to under-funded emergencies.
- Sida should ensure that its humanitarian staff members *prioritise information gathering, monitoring and communication in order to improve the quality of the evidence base* for decision-making.

Quick Win #4 – Develop criteria for allocating funds within emergencies

Sida should **develop fund allocation criteria that prioritise the greatest risks to lives and livelihoods** and provide a **checklist that can help its staff members to decide between projects that address the same level of risk** (using criteria that include partner capacity and performance and a project's fit with country strategy priorities).

2.3.3 Strengthening humanitarian coordination (GHD principle 10)

In 2009, Sweden was the largest donor to OCHA and Sida provides *substantial funding to OCHA for its coordination role* at country level. Of the four case study countries, Sida has funded OCHA in Kenya, Somalia and the DRC. In 2010, Sida has given OCHA SEK5 mil-

lion (US\$0.69million) for DRC, making it OCHA DRC's third largest donor.

Financing humanitarian coordination is about more than funding OCHA though. The introduction of the cluster approach as part of the humanitarian reform process has raised the issue of funding cluster coordination, including for NGOs that act as co-leads in some countries. The DRC case study found that in North Kivu, for example, two local NGOs and four international NGOs represent the rest of the NGO community on the provincial inter-agency coordination forum. This requires a significant investment of time because it involves pre-meeting preparation with other NGOs, meeting attendance, and reporting back information and decisions.

Good practice example 2

In Kenya, NGOs cite the UNICEF-led Nutrition Technical Forum as an example of good practice in coordination and allocating CERF funding. This is because it makes fair, transparent, systematic allocations. Members list the nutritional status in each province, prioritising areas of greatest need. Funding is also allocated on the basis of what each member already has available. NGOs play an active role in agreeing priorities.

Pooled financing mechanisms, to which Sweden contributes substantially, *have the potential to strengthen humanitarian coordination*. In DRC and Somali, which have CHFs, the managers argued that the allocation of money brings actors around the table and supports coordination. There are examples of how this can be done well, for example, from the nutrition cluster in Kenya (allocating CERF funding). In DRC, though, humanitarian agencies have expressed concern that discussions around fund allocation can take up a lot of time and distract clusters from more substantive coordination. Kenya and Indonesia have much smaller ERFs and OCHA tries to ensure that the projects that it funds are coordinated by having cluster lead agencies on the boards that review proposals. However, in Kenya, OCHA needs to increase representation on the board and, in Indonesia, involving the shelter cluster lead in reviewing proposals did not prevent overlaps in some ERF-funded projects.

Strengthening humanitarian coordination requires advocacy for change as well as funding since the case studies identified the following challenges:

- Weak links between provincial and national clusters in DRC and between coordination mechanisms for Somalia in the field and in Nairobi.
- Weak government engagement in humanitarian coordination in DRC. This will make it very difficult for clusters to handover to government and/or local authorities in stable areas. Even in Kenya and Indonesia, where there are stronger and more stable governments, government capacity for co-leading clusters is fairly weak.
- Low levels of local NGO participation in clusters in Indonesia
- The failure of clusters to involve the private sector, even though they may provide substantial assistance during a disaster response (as in Indonesia)
- Absence of links between humanitarian and development coordination mechanisms (and even humanitarian and development actors) in Kenya and DRC.

Recommendations:

- Having *NGOs as cluster co-leads* can strengthen the operation of clusters considerably, but *has a cost* for NGOs. Sida, together with other donors, *needs to be prepared to fund these costs*. It can do this bilaterally at country level or through CHFs if they are already financing UN agency cluster coordinators.
- Sida should consider *promoting the use of a mechanism like the RRMP* in DRC in other emergency situations *to support the 'provider of last resort' role* of clusters.
- Sweden, together with the international community, should *strengthen the capacity of local government authorities to take a lead in coordinating emergency response* activities where this is appropriate.
- Sweden should *encourage clusters globally to engage with and include the private sector*.
- Sida should *participate actively in the boards of country-level pooled funds*, where these exist, to provide strategic direction and ensure that they support substantive coordination effectively.
- As part of its commitment to strengthen humanitarian coordination, Sida could *support the documentation of good practice in cluster coordination and work with the MFA to disseminate it*.
- Sida should *advocate for stronger links between humanitarian and development coordination mechanisms at country level* to ensure that humani-

tarian and development efforts create synergies rather than undermining each other.

- It should work to strengthen government engagement in humanitarian coordination in DRC so that it will be easier for clusters to hand over to government authorities in stable areas.
- In countries where the government should play a strong role in humanitarian response but where capacities are weak, Sida could support government co-leadership of cluster both financially and by supporting training for them in this role.
- In countries where humanitarian and development coordination mechanisms co-exist, such as Kenya, Sida should encourage the government to link the two sets of mechanisms, perhaps by organising joint meetings for sector groups (e.g., health, water) that are relevant in both humanitarian and development arenas.

2.3.4 Strengthening local capacity (GHD principle 8)

Strengthening local capacity in humanitarian contexts can take three broad forms:

1. Strengthening the coping capacities of at-risk communities and/or
2. Organisational and technical development of local organisations (faith based, women's groups, NGOs, etc.) to provide humanitarian assistance (beyond sub-contracting) and/or
3. Strengthening/rebuilding state institutions/systems (e.g. health system strengthening) to provide the basic services that may be provided by humanitarian organisations in the absence of state capacity.

Good practice example 3

Sida's longer term funding to the IRC in North Kivu allows it to spend time and resources to train local community-based women's organisations in the delivery of psycho-social services. This is now leading to a good standard of work that is cost-effective. Programmatic funding also allows IRC to focus on the longer-term goal of moving from technical oversight (more or less direct programme implementation) towards a focus on management support and training that builds capacity to manage programming without IRC oversight. Short-term project based funding would not have allowed IRC to develop this approach.

Sida does not have explicit requirements that its partners should strengthen local capacity and, at headquarters level, has no mechanism for assessing its progress on this goal. The participatory exercise to identify how Team Sweden is delivering on the elements of effective humanitarian assistance highlighted the lack of information (see section 2.3.4 in Annex 2). But the Kenya and DRC case studies found that NGOs that have Sida framework agreements or longer-term funding arrangements tend to work through local partners and strengthen their capacities (see Good Practice Example 3)⁹. International NGOs interviewed for the Somalia case study also found Sida very supportive of a partnership approach with Somali NGOs, which was in contrast to the approach of some donors. As the Kenya case study found, if the local partners are rooted in the community, they can have a greater impact than just the physical assistance they provide (reducing tensions between communities in conflict, for example). Framework agreement NGOs are also able to work on a sustained basis to strengthen the capacities of crisis-affected communities. NRC's camp management training and youth education programmes in the Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya are good examples of the transformative power of such activities.

Sida cannot finance local NGOs directly but the country-level pooled funds that it supports can do so. In some cases, the funding is substantial. For example, in DRC, in 2010, the Pooled Fund has made more grants to local NGO (104) than to international NGOs (77), with around 24% of the first allocation of 2010 going to local NGOs. In 2009, the HRF for Somalia channelled 29% of its funding (totalling US\$2.7 million) through local NGOs. In June 2010, it was converted into a CHF and NGOs have expressed concern that this will mean less funding for local NGOs. During the first CHF allocation of US\$15 million (in August 2010), the local NGO share did fall to 9% of the total (or US\$1.5 million) but this is only part way through the year so it is too early to draw conclusions about trends. The ERFs in Kenya and Indonesia have found it more difficult to finance local NGOs, due to administrative challenges in Indonesia and a lack of awareness about the ERF amongst Kenyan NGOs. In fact, the only local organisation funded by the Kenya ERF is the Kenya Red Cross Society.

Though country-level pooled funds can finance local NGOs, OCHA does not have the human or financial resources to strengthen their capac-

9 In Kenya, though, longer-term funding for Swedish NGOs did not necessarily translate into longer-term and predictable funding for their local partners.

ity to programme, manage and account for these funds, particularly as it is providing short-term humanitarian funding¹⁰. Capacity strengthening is also not within the remit of these pooled funds though some donors have encouraged the Pooled Fund to take on this role. In Indonesia, OCHA has requested international NGOs to mentor and support local NGOs. This is quite a responsibility for international NGOs (who remain accountable for the ERF grants made to their local partners and receive no additional funding for their capacity strengthening activities) and requires a long-term process¹¹.

Sida's engagement with strengthening the capacity of local authorities for disaster management and coordinating humanitarian response is much weaker than its support for strengthening the capacity of local NGOs and communities. In Indonesia, the government requires capacity strengthening, particularly at local levels. This is mainly due to the fact that many provincial disaster management structures are new and local government officials are struggling to grasp what the paradigm shift from disaster response to DPRR means in practical terms. Several donors and international agencies are supporting projects to strengthen government capacity. Sida, however, has had no humanitarian presence in the field so it has been unable to work on this issue. Kenya and DRC receive significant amounts of Sida funding and it has a field presence in these countries so it could consider more proactive bilateral engagement in strengthening the humanitarian capacity of the government.

Recommendations:

- Sida's multi-annual framework agreements enable international NGOs to work with local partners. However, it should *ensure that the flexibility and predictability that the international NGOs enjoy is passed on to local partners.*

10 OCHA manages the pooled funds covered by this evaluation (in Indonesia Kenya and Somalia) but, in DRC, the Pooled Fund is managed jointly by OCHA and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). UNDP is responsible for monitoring Pooled Fund projects and undertaking capacity assessments of NGO applicants. Through these processes, it has tried to provide support, training and tools to local NGOs.

11 An international NGO that has helped local partners to access ERF grants pointed out that strengthening capacities in emergency contexts is challenging because of the short-term nature of humanitarian funding and because international NGOs often deploy contract staff (rather than permanent staff) for sudden-onset situations or in the early stages of a crisis.

- Sida should *emphasise* its focus on *strengthening local capacity* in its humanitarian funding agreements *with partners so that they can promote this, in turn, with their partners.*
- Sida should *work with OCHA to ensure that its administrative requirements for ERFs/HRFs* (e.g., requiring proposals in English and US\$ bank accounts) *do not become barriers that prevent local NGOs from accessing funds.*
- Sida should encourage OCHA Somalia to *ensure that Somali NGOs do not lose their access to CHF funding due to new requirements and procedures.*
- Sida should encourage OCHA to *promote the ERF to Kenyan NGOs* and provide guidance to enable them to access funding.
- Work on local capacity should be common ground between development and humanitarian staff, particularly in-country. So, Sida should *strengthen linkages between its humanitarian and development funding* (learning from the DRC experience) to ensure that the local capacities strengthened with humanitarian funding get longer-term support and that development funding strengthens government capacity for disaster management and humanitarian coordination.
- In Indonesia, Sida could consider supporting AusAID's plan to deliver disaster management training through provincial universities to build up a critical mass of trained government officials as this is a promising way to tackle the challenge of staff turnover in government agencies.

2.3.5 Supporting the link between humanitarian contributions and prevention (GHD principle 8)

In accordance with its Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction, since 2006, Sida has focused its bilateral humanitarian *disaster risk reduction support on global and regional mechanisms.* This has included funding to ProVention, International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' (IFRC) Global Alliance, International Strategy for Disaster Reduction's (ISDR) regional work plans and the World Bank's Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). Sweden remains the largest donor of ISDR¹². Sida has also funded MSB's *disaster preparedness work, focused on strengthening local civil defence operations* in

¹² The MFA contributes about half of Sweden's support to ISDR, including for climate change adaptation work.

at-risk countries, through training and exercises, limited equipment purchases and developing early warning systems.

Due to the global and regional focus agreed as a division of labour between the humanitarian and development budgets, Sida's *support for national-level structures and local DRR initiatives remains limited* (other than through the GFDRR). This is despite their primary role in addressing disaster risk for those most likely to suffer humanitarian consequences from disaster¹³. The evaluation team did not find examples of DPRR programming within Sida's portfolio in the case study countries. But there is *an urgent need to mainstream DPRR at country level as well*. DRC, with a United Nations Environment Programme/ Global and Regional Integrated Data Disaster Risk Index ranking of 5 (out of 7), is in the same category as hurricane-prone Pacific Island states and only one level below Haiti. The 2010 Natural Disaster Risk Index rates Indonesia as the country second most at-risk from extreme weather and geophysical events (after Bangladesh). The case studies did not find evidence that work on disaster risk reduction at global and regional levels has yet had any impact on the communities who live in disaster risk areas in these countries. In Kenya, particularly, the failure to incorporate DPRR into humanitarian programming is a missed opportunity because 'Natural Resources and Environment' is a focus area of Sida's development programme so Sida would be able to link its humanitarian and development efforts. In Somalia, although violent conflict is the main reason for the humanitarian crisis, the situation is exacerbated by drought and localised flooding. Some of Sida's partners have DPRR components in their humanitarian programmes but Sida has not financed these to date.

Sida has a 13-point action plan for mainstreaming DRR into its development assistance (Kratt 2005) but *no guidelines on how to mainstream disaster preparedness and risk reduction* across its humanitarian programming.

Financing prevention activities is not in the remit of the pooled funds that Sweden supports though the Kenya ERF has a couple of preparedness projects and the HRF in Indonesia is intending to start financing disaster preparedness, particularly pre-positioning emergency stocks

13 Funding and capacity building for National Platforms for Disaster Risk Reduction in at risk countries, for example, is supposed to come from development budgets, but this work is not yet sufficiently implemented

for response to rapid onset crises. Some interviewees in Kenya were frustrated that the CERF cannot finance disaster prevention activities even though this has the potential to save more lives than a response programme in a context of recurring natural disasters.

Recommendations:

- Sida's focus on DRR at global and regional levels has not had any visible impact on reducing disaster risk for vulnerable communities in the case study countries. To ensure the effectiveness of its humanitarian assistance to disaster-prone countries, Sida should ensure that DPRR is mainstreamed in its funding decisions and that it addresses the challenge of climate change across the humanitarian and development parts of its programme.
- Sida could become a leading donor on DPRR. The space for improving policy and practice on DPRR at global and field level is much less politicised than the equivalent space for conflict prevention. Sida could promote cooperation between its humanitarian and development staff members and work with the MFA to take up this opportunity to build on its current work. This would enable it to simultaneously address the humanitarian consequences of disasters and shape the debate on disasters – including climate change impacts – at this critical time.
- Sweden should work with like-minded donors to ensure that the CERF can finance prevention activities to enhance its effectiveness and contribute to its life-saving objective. It should encourage OCHA to be flexible about financing preparedness activities through ERFs where appropriate.

Quick Win #5 – Increasing support for MSB's disaster preparedness work

The relationship with MSB could become more systematic and strategic. Sida should also consider increasing its **support for MSB's disaster preparedness work**, which would also support its obligations under the Hyogo Framework for Action.

Quick Win #6 – ATHA training on DPRR

ATHA should begin teaching a module on DPRR, with a particular focus on disaster preparedness, as a standard part of all its courses. This module should be available to Sida staff members as well as partners.

2.3.6 Reducing the gap between humanitarian support and recovery contributions (GHD principle 9)

Integrating humanitarian staff members into Conflict Country Teams, as part of the October 2008 reorganisation, has made it easier for Sida to bridge the gap between humanitarian and development funding in conflict and post-conflict countries. The integration has allowed humanitarian staff to interact more closely with their development counterparts, as well as creating a structure that could eventually allow for one coherent umbrella Sida strategy for each emergency situation. These achievements have complemented Sweden's leading role in the DAC's International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), which has led to the development of a framing paper that will guide the work of donors.

Good practice example 4

In DRC, Sida has provided **a continuum of humanitarian to development funding** for MSF Switzerland, which has been able to start a proper handover of its hospital programme in Bunia to local authorities. Sida has also **contributed to the Pooled Fund from the development budget** in order to finance the recovery objective of the Humanitarian Action Plan. In addition, by funding UNICEF's RRMP (with humanitarian funding) and its Programme of Expanded Assistance for Returnees Plus programme for returnees in support of the UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (with development funding), **Sida is able to provide support across the spectrum of displacement** in the DRC (where this is a complex phenomenon).

Unlike many donors, Sida is able to provide *flexible funding to support recovery activities*. In Somalia, Sida's NGO partners appreciated this particularly because, after 19 years of conflict, humanitarian assistance is clearly not a short-term activity and yet many other donors provide very short funding (for 3–6 months) and have restrictive definitions of what constitutes emergency programming. In DRC the team found a number of good practice examples (see box). In Kenya, Sida financed a cash transfer programme through Oxfam and Concern in 2009 with bilateral humanitarian funding as well as two 'pilot' projects in Nairobi's informal settlements through the ERF. Since urban development and addressing the problem of growing informal settlements in Nairobi is part of Sweden's country strategy,

this offers an opportunity to connect humanitarian and development funding. In Indonesia, perhaps due to the lack of a humanitarian field presence, Sida has not supported the recovery elements of its partners' programmes even though funding for livelihoods and longer-term assistance for activities like psycho-social support have been the greatest gap in the response to the 2009 West Sumatera earthquake.

Sida has tended to support recovery bilaterally because *the pooled funds that Sweden finances have a limited ability to cover recovery activities*. Due to its emphasis on short-term, life-saving activities, the CERF does not fund recovery programmes though recipient agencies can use CERF money to leverage longer-term support (as IOM has done in Kenya). The remit of ERFs also tends to exclude recovery funding although OCHA has recognised the need to support recovery activities in Indonesia, which is why it has changed the fund from an *Emergency Response Fund* to a *Humanitarian Response Fund*. In Kenya, the ERF has tried to address chronic vulnerability in Nairobi's informal settlements even though it can only fund projects once for 6 months.

Although the new Country Team structure is working well in many cases, the *country strategies do not reflect the full range of assistance that Sida is providing* (especially when humanitarian funding exceeds development funding, as in DRC). This is partly because country strategies cannot mention figures on planned humanitarian funding and they must be phrased so that they are not interpreted as governing Sida's humanitarian work. The humanitarian team has also been keen to keep humanitarian funding independent from political influences and development priorities in the country strategy. However, it would be helpful for humanitarian officers on Country Teams to be more engaged in the development of these strategies, thereby making sure that all Sida's aid to a particular situation is coherent and working towards common overall goals. This will also allow for humanitarian concerns, such as prevention, to be mainstreamed across all Sida's programming, for example through disaster risk reduction efforts.

Sida probably needs to *take a strategic decision about whether it wants to achieve one coherent umbrella governing its priorities, policies and funding (humanitarian and development) in each emergency situation*. The existence of such an umbrella would facilitate a division of labour and engagement of both development and humanitarian staff within Sida and

between Sida and the MFA. Country teams have made it easier for Sida to bridge the gap between development and humanitarian assistance and created a structure which could potentially be used as an umbrella. This may not be feasible or desirable in all countries, but clarity on the humanitarian strategy for a given country and structured, systematic information on humanitarian priorities is likely to increase the effectiveness of Sida's humanitarian aid.

Recommendations:

- Sida should *replicate the good practice on linking humanitarian and development funding that it has developed in DRC* to other countries, such as Kenya, otherwise it risks missing opportunities to support recovery effectively.
- Sida needs to *learn from the Country Teams that are working effectively* to ensure that its humanitarian staff members are well integrated into all Country Teams, engaged in developing umbrella country strategies that reflect the magnitude and contribution of humanitarian funding and advocating for humanitarian concerns to be mainstreamed across all Sida's programming.

Quick Win #7 – Develop guidance on recovery programming

Sida should **reinforce its leading international role on policy and finance for recovery programming** that sets the stage for, and does not undermine, future development work. It could start by using the practical field experience that the Human Security Department has been collecting to develop solid policy/guidance on funding recovery, perhaps with the support of lessons learnt during this evaluation. This guidance should also be developed in conjunction with multilateral and NGO partners, to take account of field realities.

2.3.7 Strengthening the humanitarian system (GHD principles 10, 21 & 22)

According to Sida's humanitarian strategy, this goal means that Sida will support research and methods development in the humanitarian field as well as quality assurance. It will also strengthen Swedish and international humanitarian capacity through strategic secondments of qualified Swedish humanitarian staff to important international humanitarian organisations.

The evaluation team interpreted this goal more broadly to encompass the humanitarian reform process (which Sweden has supported strongly). It took the view that the humanitarian system should be taken to mean local response capacity as well as international organisations.

Sida has supported research and methods development in the humanitarian field in several ways:

- *Funding organisations that focus on research and the development of standards*, such as the Overseas Development Institute, Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance, Feinstein International Center and the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International. All these organisations appreciate and value Sida's support although two have experienced difficulties in recent re-negotiations of their funding agreements, particularly with changing audit rules.
- Giving international NGOs such as the Norwegian and Danish Refugee Councils some *un-earmarked funding that they can use to develop or strengthen internal systems*. NRC has used this to develop a core activity database that it can use to monitor outputs and outcomes. While negotiating a two year framework agreement with Sida in 2009, the Danish Refugee Council requested SEK 500,000 per year to support its quality, compliance and accountability initiatives¹⁴.
- Funding the *ATHA*. This is greatly appreciated by Swedish NGOs because their developing country partners can attend courses. It has also proved useful for training Sida staff who are working on humanitarian funding but do not have humanitarian experience.

Sida has also *encouraged Swedish NGOs to adopt the accountability principles developed by the HAP initiative*. As a result, three of the seven humanitarian NGOs that Sida funds have sought certification.

The evaluation came across *a few examples of field-level reviews and studies used to improve current and future programming in DRC and Indonesia*. One example is IRC's research on its Gender-based violence

¹⁴ In 2009, DRC requested that Sida contribute to its work on two policy issues: 1) Developing methods to further link protection and livelihood in its analysis and programming and 2) Documenting, reviewing practice and further strengthening DRC's work with gender as an operational principle. The focus areas for 2010 were to be agreed through discussion with Sida.

(GBV) and health programmes in DRC. It is trying to include reflection on GBV and a greater understanding of the problem into its programme to increase impact. It has also included a surveillance mechanism for mortality in response to criticisms of its famous mortality survey¹⁵. It is experimenting with cheaper, more sustainable ways to measure mortality, rather than adopting a snapshot approach. However, there is a greater need to document the advantages and disadvantages of using different approaches (e.g., to temporary shelter in Indonesia or conditional vs. unconditional cash transfers in Nairobi's informal settlements) and success stories (such as the RRMP in Danish and Norwegian Refugee Councils' camp management training for Somali refugees) to improve practice across the humanitarian field.

One challenge for Sida is that there is *little evidence that Sida-funded research programmes at global level have any impact on field level programming*. Organisations in DRC reported that global level research has not supported them in their work or been disseminated at field level. The few exceptions to this came from larger NGOs, whose technical departments at global level may from time to time disseminate technical research findings to field colleagues.

Another difficulty, as noted in section 1.1, is that *Sida's humanitarian staff members are too over-burdened to take advantage of the research that they finance*. This means that they are unable to keep up-to-date with developments in the international humanitarian field. Even when partners organise seminars and meetings in which Sida staff and partners can participate, these tend to be ad hoc and not part of a systematic approach to capturing and sharing lessons and good practice.

On other aspects of the humanitarian system, such as UN reform and the development of the GHD principles, Sida, together with the MFA, has been *proactive in shaping international humanitarian debates*. In 2008 and 2009, the Swedish Permanent Mission in Geneva was instrumental in facilitating dialogue between donor and recipient country government representatives on common

15 Coghlan, B, Brennan, R. J., Ngoy, P., Dofara, D., Otto, B., Clements, M., Stewart, T. (2006) Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A nationwide survey. *Lancet* 2006, No. 367: pages 44–51. IRC continued its mortality surveys, with the last, *Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An ongoing crisis*, published in 2007 and available from: <http://www.theirc.org/special-reports/congo-forgotten-crisis>.

challenges in the humanitarian arena. This leadership role in international humanitarian debates has earned Sweden the respect of humanitarian actors, allowing it to support the progressive agendas of other donors, such as DFID. However, the case studies identified areas where the international community, particularly the UN system, still needs to make considerable progress. These include:

- The role of HCs, particularly how their performance is assessed.
- The performance of pooled funding mechanisms (the CERF, CHFs and ERFs) in supporting prevention and recovery activities and improving UN agency accountability.

Recommendations:

- Sida should *request the research and training organisations that it finances to make annual presentations/provide training on the latest trends and developments in the humanitarian field* (perhaps during its Humanitarian Days) so that its staff members can keep up-to-date and adapt their funding accordingly.
- To ensure that global level research that it finances is available and used at field level, Sida should *require its research and methods partners to target their dissemination at actors in the field* (e.g., through workshops, short briefing or good practice papers etc.) and *actively promote lesson learning between its partners*. Sida should require future research that it funds to demonstrate relevance to field priorities.
- Sida needs to work closely with the MFA to *use its country experience to inform Sweden's advocacy on humanitarian reform processes and other issues* in global fora. For example, it could use its country-level experience of how the terms of reference and complex accountability lines of HCs impact on effective humanitarian response to support the MFA in advocating for reform.

Quick Win #8 – Increase support for partners' field research

Sida should provide **more support to its partners to undertake field-level research** that will improve current and future programming. It could do this **through provisions in multi-annual framework agreements**.

Quick Win #9 – Extend ATHA training across Sida

The ATHA training programme has already proved useful for Sida staff members and NGO partners. Sida could build on this by **providing systematic ATHA training to all MFA and Sida staff working in the Conflict and Post-Conflict department as well as countries at risk of crisis.** This would mean that the humanitarian team would have trained staff members to draw on to follow up on humanitarian funding and also in responding to sudden onset crises.

2.3.8 Strengthening humanitarian principles (GHD principles 2 & 4)

Sida's humanitarian *partners widely regard it as a donor who upholds humanitarian principles and is independent from political control.* They have appreciated this particularly in Somalia, where humanitarian agencies are struggling with the growing politicisation of humanitarian aid. Sida has participated actively in Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) discussions of humanitarian principles and IHL and, when NGO partners have raised particular concerns, it has followed up on these in the informal donor group for Somalia and other inter-agency fora.

In DRC, a consortium of organisations, including Sida-funded organisations, continues to train the Congolese army (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo) in IHL. But there has never been an evaluation of this work, and it is difficult to say whether there has been any lasting impact, given the continued high rate of violations.

Sida is not funding the promotion of IHL in Indonesia but OCHA highlighted the need for the Indonesian and international armies that tend to respond to natural disasters in the country to be trained in humanitarian principles, gender issues etc. and understand the *modus operandi* of humanitarian actors. The private sector is also playing an increasing role in humanitarian response, in Indonesia and other natural disasters, not just as contractors but by donating goods and services. It is important that these private sector actors are aware of the international standards with which their assistance should comply and also of humanitarian principles.

Sida's emphasis on humanitarian principles and keeping humanitarian aid independent from political objectives is important. But *Sida needs to be careful not to ignore government priorities in its humanitarian funding* since these are not automatically political; they may be simply what Sweden has a whole is advocating on. For example, as European Union (EU) President in 2009, Sweden pushed for a broad humanitarian agenda at the UN, including special attention for the needs of IDPs and greater international support for national and regional capacity building. However, these priorities were not reflected in Sida's funding. The government has been taking a strong position on ensuring that Sida implements its priorities so Sida could make an effort to adopt the government's priorities for humanitarian assistance where these do not compromise its principled position.

Recommendations:

- Sweden should use its reputation to *champion humanitarian principles and to develop realistic guidance for their application by a wide range of actors in complex settings* where aid effectiveness and fragile states principles are also relevant.
- *Working with the MFA, Sida could defend humanitarian space in highly politicised settings* where the line between aid and military objectives is blurred, such as in Afghanistan and now Pakistan.
- Sweden should *advocate for the international community to ensure that all troops responding to natural disasters have prior training in humanitarian principles and the modus operandi of humanitarian agencies*. It should support work to *promote awareness of humanitarian standards and principles amongst the private sector*.

2.3.9 GHD principles not covered by Sida's strategic sub-goals

Sida has the opportunity to help establish Sweden as the leading GHD member by *implementing the full range of GHD principles*. For example, it could incorporate principle 7 on beneficiary involvement as a goal against which it measures progress, focus more on strengthening local capacity and engage with its partners to promote accountability, effectiveness and efficiency (principle 15) and encourage regular evaluations (principle 22).

It could also do more to support GHD Principles 19 and 20 on the primacy of civilian delivery of humanitarian action. In DRC, for example, it could advocate for more regular security assessments by

UNDSS to increase access for UN agencies. There are many areas of eastern DRC that NGOs consider safe but which UN agencies can only access with military escorts, due to the United Nations Department of Safety and Security's (UNDSS) security rules.

Recommendation:

- One of the challenges with the GHD initiative has been a lack of continuity in leadership and secretariat functions. Sweden should *consider playing a leadership role in GHD over the next 3–5 years*. Its position as a respected leader amongst donors offers the opportunity to have a greater influence, not only to improve the practice of existing members (e.g., on funding across the humanitarian-development divide, ensuring adequate support to under-funded crises etc) but also to support emerging donors to join the initiative.

2.3.10 Suggested goals for Sida's revised humanitarian strategy

Based on the assessment of Sida's performance against its strategic goals and the outcome of the participatory 'spokes' exercise with various stakeholders, including aid recipients, the team suggests that Sida adopts an amended set of goals. These are presented in figure 10 in section 2.3.10 of Annex 2 with an explanation. This shows that the proposed goals are very similar to the existing goals though the evaluators suggest the addition of two goals – complementing Sida's funding with policy, advocacy and research in an integrated manner and ensuring strong beneficiary engagement.

3 Internal Management

Summary

The **organisational structure** that Sida introduced in October 2008 has helped it to link humanitarian and development funding. But **staffing limitations have been a major barrier to the effectiveness of its humanitarian aid, particularly following up on funding and lesson learning.** A funding database that is not fit for purpose and a lack of adequate guidance on new grant management procedures have exacerbated the situation. **If Sida does not address these challenges, it runs the very real risk of losing its position as a leading humanitarian donor.**

Sida also faces **several challenges in the relationship between humanitarian staff at headquarters and field levels.** These include the lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities, the fact that humanitarian issues are usually a small part of field staff responsibilities, a lack of effective information flows to and from the field.

Sida and the MFA have a **very good working relationship** on humanitarian issues. This is reflected in the **regular and detailed discussions in the joint HUMSAM meeting.** However, the **division of labour between MFA and Sida on policy issues** is not clear to Sida's partners.

This section starts with an overview of structures and challenges in Sida's management of humanitarian aid in Stockholm. It then goes on to examine relationships between Sida staff members at headquarters and in the field. It concludes with a review of Sida's relationship with the MFA on humanitarian issues.

3.1 MANAGEMENT AT HEADQUARTERS

As noted in figure 3, *Sida introduced a new organisational structure on 1st October 2008. Its aim was to create an “efficient and effective results-oriented organisation as one of the leading actors in international development cooperation”¹⁶.* During this re-organisation, Sida introduced the prac-

16 See the Mid-Term Review of May 2010, which lists the objectives of the new organizational structure.

tice of placing humanitarian staff members (either full – or part-time) in country teams in the conflict and post-conflict department. There have been many benefits of this, particularly in linking humanitarian and development funding (as described in section 2.3.6). However, there has also been some *lack of clarity on responsibility for grants*. For example, where a country team has a humanitarian officer, Sida has transferred responsibility for follow up to the country team. These systems need to be very clear and ensure adequate oversight of humanitarian funding otherwise follow up of grants could fall between cracks and Sida could miss valuable opportunities for advocacy and lesson learning.

Sida's management of its humanitarian grants has other positive features, such as flexibility and the ability to provide longer-term funding (as noted in section 2.3). However, it also faces serious challenges, some of which are Sida-wide rather than restricted to the humanitarian team. Humanitarian staff members are very aware of these challenges and helped to identify these for the evaluation team. They are willing to learn and improve their working methods and have used their initiative to suggest better working practices. However, *Sida's staffing limitations*, discussed below, *have been a major barrier to implementing these improved working practices*.

The most serious challenge to Sida's effective management of its humanitarian assistance is that its *humanitarian staff members are overstretched and overburdened*. One reason is that humanitarian staff members manage a larger number of contracts than their development colleagues and may also manage larger budgets. Table 2 (see section 3.1 in Annex 2) shows that Sida's humanitarian funding has ranged from 11.36% of its total budget in 2005 to 14.5% in 2009. Yet, of Sida's 670¹⁷ staff members, only 12 in Stockholm¹⁸ are designated to work on humanitarian issues. This translates into 1.8% of total staff and means that humanitarian staff members tend to manage a larger number of grants (see table 3 in Annex 2) and larger budgets than their development colleagues (an average of SEK 223 million per humanitarian staff member vs. an average of SEK 23.5 million per development staff member).

The administrative burden on humanitarian staff members has grown significantly because Sida's *humanitarian aid is increasingly subject*

17 As of October 2010 (excluding National Programme Officers).

18 Approx. 3 work on humanitarian issues in the field.

to the same rules and regulations as development cooperation and has lost many of the exceptions that made it easier to manage. For example, grants over SEK 100 million¹⁹ need to be presented to the Sida Decision Advisory Committee for approval. Although only a few grants, such as the OCHA and ICRC multi-annual agreements have been submitted to this committee so far, this is a challenge because humanitarian staff members have much less time than their development colleagues to prepare submissions to the committee²⁰.

The fact that Sida's humanitarian aid is required to comply with a growing set of internal rules and regulations has led to *increased bureaucracy and less timely responses to crises*. If this trend continues without Sida streamlining the administration of grants (for example through multi-annual agreements), it risks becoming slow and inefficient.

The high workload means that humanitarian staff members are focused almost entirely on administering grants, which is not providing sufficient job satisfaction. If they are not allowed the time and opportunity to engage in follow up, develop expertise in priority areas and have substantive discussions with partners, *Sida could end up with a de-skilled and demoralised cadre of humanitarian staff*.

Sida's *humanitarian staffing situation is exacerbated by a high turnover*. The humanitarian team was affected disproportionately by Sida's decision to discontinue temporary contracts in 2009 because it had relied heavily on staff on short-term contracts. The team has also faced staffing shortfalls because some members have been ill or on maternity/paternity leave. High staff turnover *leads to steep learning curves* because staff members constantly have to start from scratch to learn about the country context or implementing partners that they are responsible for. It also results in a *loss of institutional memory* when staff members leave, unless they move to positions in other parts of Sida at Stockholm, in which case their colleagues can still draw on their knowledge. Finally, staff turnover means a *loss of continuity in funding relationships with partners*. One international NGO was dealing with its 5th desk officer over two years. This has made it difficult for the organisation to continue to have substantive discussions at its annual meeting with Sida.

19 In extremely urgent emergencies, this requirement may be waived.

20 The committee's knowledge of humanitarian issues also needs to be strengthened.

One of the consequences of the intense pressure on humanitarian staff members has been a *lack of focus on accountability, or on the results achieved with Sida's funding or on collecting evidence that can inform future policy and advocacy*. Section 4.2 discusses this issue in greater detail.

Also, Sida's *ability to track and analyse its funding and capture information for lesson learning is hampered by a funding information database that is not fit for purpose*. This is a Sida-wide problem. An external company audited and evaluated the information system and found it not user-friendly, as it cannot be searched, and because, for humanitarian work, there is no proper field for sectors. There are also significant data quality issues.

Another Sida-wide problem is the *lack of adequate guidance for staff members on key aspects of grant management*, such as risk and results management. Sida has also introduced new audit rules that were unclear and have led to significant delays in signing funding agreements with research and methods organisations. This has led to different interpretations of how to do things by individual desk officers and an inconsistent application of procedures. The 'Sida at Work' initiative is intended to address these problems by providing guidance and a computerised system of financial controls and lesson learning. It is expected to deliver by the end of 2010.

If Sida does not address the challenges outlined above, it runs the very real risk of losing its leading position in the humanitarian field. Sida staff members and an external interviewee voiced concerns that its reputation was gained a few years ago and is no longer underpinned by a solid, adequately staffed structure. If this does not change, one Sida staff member asked, *'How long before the bubble bursts?'*

A potential obstacle to addressing Sida's humanitarian staffing challenges is that, at the time of data collection, it appeared that *Sida's leadership role and respected position within the humanitarian aid field had not been recognised by development staff members and senior managers*. This raises the risk that senior managers will not be willing to strengthen staffing on the humanitarian side even though this could undermine Sida's ability to maintain its leadership role.

Recommendations:

- In order to follow-up on results and learn lessons, Sida urgently needs to *increase staff capacity for managing humanitarian grants*.

It also needs to streamline its administrative procedures for humanitarian funding in order to provide timely grants and to free up time for staff members to *focus on strategic objectives and results*. One option is to expand multi-annual funding agreements and the RRM.

- The humanitarian team should take steps to ensure that senior management and leadership in both Sida and the MFA recognise the leadership role that Sweden has played in the humanitarian field.

Quick Win #10 – Develop a simple humanitarian tracking database

Sida should **develop a simple database (possibly using Excel) to allow the humanitarian team to better track and analyse its funding** (e.g., by sector, partner, emergency).

Quick Win #11 – Learn from other Sida departments

While the Sida at Work initiative is still developing guidance, the Humanitarian team could **draw on the experience and practice of other departments within Sida**. A number of interviewees singled out CIVSAM as a progressive department. For example, it is undertaking risk assessments better than other Sida teams. The fact that the Humanitarian team is funding some of the same organisations could make it easier to establish links with CIVSAM.

3.2 HEADQUARTERS-FIELD RELATIONSHIPS

As noted in Annex 3, Sida chose the case study countries to examine how its grant management varied between countries where it has a humanitarian field presence and those where it does not. Of the countries selected, Sida has staff members with humanitarian responsibilities in DRC, Kenya and Somalia but not in Indonesia. This section is based on information from the DRC and Kenya case studies as it was not possible to consult Sida staff working on humanitarian issues in Somalia at field level. Consultations with Sida staff members based in the Embassies and with responsibility for humanitarian issues identified a number of challenges.

Humanitarian issues are often a small part of field staff responsibilities.
In the DRC, the head of Sida's cooperation was responsible for the

humanitarian portfolio, amongst various other responsibilities. She left her post shortly after the evaluation field visit and responsibility for humanitarian issues has been transferred to a staff member responsible for health programming. Humanitarian responsibility includes monitoring the implementation of Sida-funded projects. However, they have inadequate time and resources for this, given the size of Sida's DRC portfolio. The entire Kenya country team is based in Nairobi but responsibility for Sida's humanitarian assistance to Kenya rests largely with a humanitarian team member in Stockholm and a staff member in the Nairobi Embassy combines responsibility for humanitarian issues with responsibility for other issues, currently agriculture and rural development (on which Sweden is the lead donor in Kenya so this is a major responsibility). This staff member had taken on humanitarian responsibilities because the person who dealt with humanitarian issues, together with the water sector, had left shortly before the Kenya visit.

Humanitarian funding decisions are made in Stockholm and *field staff are not clear about their roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis Stockholm*. In DRC, Sida staff members requested clarification on specific responsibilities, e.g., should they engage actively with other donors in-country or is their role restricted to monitoring and follow up? Also, which issues and dialogue topics should the field be tracking because they are a priority for Stockholm? In Kenya, the field officer pointed out that he is asked for input when the humanitarian officer in Stockholm is preparing the assessment memos on which Sida's funding decisions are based. This is helpful for ensuring that Sida's humanitarian funding does not contradict or undermine its development efforts. But field-based staff members do not have to provide input into humanitarian funding decisions because humanitarian issues are an add-on to their normal responsibilities. This means that they only provide input or give feedback on the humanitarian situation if they have the time, as a "by the way". Field staff members in both countries argued that if they had a clear idea of their tasks and responsibilities and these were incorporated into their annual operation plans, they would be able to allocate more time to humanitarian issues.

Although Sida is aiming to increase its field presence, it has not created new field posts and, in 2008, it changed the compensation

scheme for staff members moving from Stockholm to the field. This means that they are financially slightly worse off when they take up a field post. Sida does not provide additional incentives to work in the tougher environments where it is providing humanitarian aid. As a result, *it can be difficult to fill humanitarian field posts* and Sida is increasingly recruiting local staff.

Information flows to the field are sub-optimal, with field staff having to request the information that they need. Since humanitarian officers in Stockholm make funding decisions, field staff do not always receive all project documentation. This means that they have incomplete information when trying to follow up on projects, which can be particularly problematic when the Stockholm desk officer is away for an extended period of time, as in Kenya.

Sida staff members in the field do not receive adequate guidance on humanitarian issues. This may be because staff members in Stockholm are concerned about over-burdening their colleagues but this reduces the effectiveness of Sweden's field-level policy engagement. In DRC, field staff would like to understand better the concepts of stabilisation and transition assistance and know more about how to approach the linkages between these and humanitarian aid so that they can contribute to the development of the 2011 HAP. Another barrier to guidance for field staff is the lack of direct communication links with the Human Security Department in Sida or with the MFA (because all communication on humanitarian issues is channelled through the humanitarian officer in Stockholm so, for example, links between the humanitarian team and the Head of Cooperation in DRC are only informal). This has meant that field staff in DRC do not know Sweden's priorities for the GHD initiative, despite requests made to both MFA and Sida. This restricts discussions with other donors in the Kinshasa-based GHD group. The Sida representative on the Pooled Fund Board also had no information about what Sweden is advocating in the CHF Working Group or what position it is taking on issues such as using the CHF to support cluster coordination. This makes it difficult for them to play an active role on the Pooled Fund Board and Sweden risks becoming a 'sleeping partner' in such cases. Similarly, in Kenya, the humanitarian officer had not engaged actively in the ERF, even though Sida is the larger of the two donors to the fund, and was unaware that OCHA has faced some management challenges.

The role of Sida field staff vis-à-vis the MFA needs to be clarified and better communication links established. The MFA has sometimes requested Sida staff in DRC to provide situational analyses and report on humanitarian issues and the UN system but this is outside their job description. Also, though Sida is supposed to follow up on MFA funding to WFP and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (because they are humanitarian agencies), field staff find it very difficult to obtain information on how much funding the MFA has provided to them for a given country. The lack of a direct link between Sida field staff and the MFA has meant that Sida staff have not shared issues relating to the performance of the CERF that have been discussed by the Pooled Fund Board.

Due to the lack of links between Sida field staff and both Sida and MFA staff in Stockholm, *Sida is missing opportunities to inject field-level evidence into policy discussions at the global level.* Field staff are not invited to Humanitarian Days or other global meetings, and there is no system for them to input their observations. They will also not have access to the future SharePoint-based knowledge management system and this will further exclude their important contributions.

These challenges highlight the fact that Sida's current structure for headquarter-field relations on humanitarian issues fails to maximise the benefits of its field presence.

Recommendations:

- Sida needs to *clarify the roles and responsibilities of field staff vis-à-vis humanitarian staff in Stockholm.* This should enable field staff to make more time for dealing with humanitarian issues and reduce the burden on staff members in Stockholm.
- *Sida and the MFA should establish better communication links with Sida staff in the field* to ensure that field staff receive clear guidance on Sweden's policy stances on humanitarian issues and to make better use of field experience to inform Sweden's global advocacy and engagement in international fora.

Quick Win #12 – Involve field staff in Sida's Humanitarian Days

Sida can involve field staff members working on humanitarian issues in its Humanitarian Days in Stockholm to be able to draw on their field experience and establish better communication links with the MFA.

Quick Win #13 – Ensure project documents available online

Sida should **ensure that project documents are available online** and searchable (even through a platform as simple as SharePoint) to ensure that all field staff can access them. This will **enable** them to **follow up on projects more effectively**.

3.3 SIDA-MFA RELATIONSHIP ON HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

Sida has a *very good working relationship with the MFA* on humanitarian issues. This is reflected in their *regular and detailed discussions in the joint HUMSAM meetings* that take place every two weeks or as agreed between Sida and the MFA. It is vital that Sida continues this positive relationship to ensure coordination between the MFA's core funding and Sida's country/programme funding to the same partners. HUMSAM-based coordination also enables Team Sweden to speak with one voice to partners. In addition, it allows the MFA to draw on Sida's field based experience as evidence for its advocacy work and get ongoing input into global policy dialogues. The value of this coordination has been shown, for example, in the MFA's engagement in the GHD Initiative, the MFA's chairing of the CHF Working Group, engagement in INCAF, role in the 2010 Montreux meeting and numerous annual consultations with multilateral organisations.

The evaluation explored the complementarity of Sida and MFA funding through interviews with multilateral partners at headquarters level as well as by examining CERF funding in Kenya and Indonesia. The team did not find any overlaps or contradictions between the two types of funding although it did not find any specific synergies either.

Although Sida and the MFA have a good relationship and complement each other's funding, the *division of labour between MFA and Sida on policy issues* is not clear to most of Sida's implementing partners. They also find it a challenge when they have several contact points with 'Team Sweden' across MFA, Sida and MSB. For example, Sida's focal point for UNICEF is located in the Human Rights team of the policy department but the humanitarian team negotiates the funding that it provides. In 2009–10, the humanitarian team

shifted from 3-year thematic funding (that made it very difficult to track how UNICEF had spent Sida's money and whether it had spent previous tranches) to an agreement linked to CAPs. The MFA also has a focal point for UNICEF and there were gaps in communications both within Sida and with the MFA during this negotiation process. Sida and the MFA have faced an additional challenge in relations with UNICEF because the MFA's Multilateral Department has tended to focus on development issues in its discussions, even though UNICEF undertakes substantial humanitarian programming. WFP also has multiple contacts with 'Team Sweden' because it receives core funding from the MFA (but from the Department for Multilateral Development Cooperation rather than the Security Policy Department), even though it is primarily a humanitarian organisation²¹), project funding from Sida, and logistics cluster support from MSB, funded by Sida.

Recommendations:

- The members of 'Team Sweden' need to clarify the division of labour between themselves and ensure consistent messaging to partners. The MFA is attempting to do this on the development side by, for example, developing a coherent Team Sweden-wide strategy with multilateral organisations. On the humanitarian side, one option is to include discussions of organisational relationships in the HUM-SAM.
- To facilitate a division of labour, Sida and the MFA should consider *the feasibility of establishing common advocacy strategies* on issues like pooled funding, clusters or recovery.

21 The Department Multilateral Development Cooperation and Security Policy Department have been discussing shifting responsibility for WFP to the Security Policy Department for 2 years but this has not happened due to staffing issues.

4 Funding Processes

Summary

The country case studies found that **Sida's bilateral funding best help it to deliver on its strategic sub-goals** but country-level pooled funding mechanisms have a number of advantages over Sida's bilateral funding.

Sida faces several challenges with measuring the results that it is achieving with its humanitarian funding. These range from a lack of time and expertise to a limited field presence and restrictions on the ability to travel to the field. The difficulties with measuring results are exacerbated by the fact that Sida has **not used the humanitarian sub-goals systematically to guide funding decisions or as a guiding framework for field visits.**

This section begins by examining the advantages and disadvantages of the different funding channels that Sida uses to deliver on its strategic goals. It goes on to review the challenges that Sida faces with tracking the results of its funding, which is going to become increasingly important. Humanitarian aid has been largely left out of government discussions about measuring results and the government has been content with reports that provide anecdotal evidence. But it has started requiring more concrete results from humanitarian aid as well.

4.1 FUNDING CHANNELS AND MECHANISMS

The country case studies assessed the extent to which Sida's funding channels and mechanisms are helping it to achieve the 8 sub-goals of its humanitarian strategy. The table below summarises the different channels that each case study reviewed.

Table 1: Review of funding channels per case study

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	Indonesia	Kenya	Somalia
Bilateral funding	Bilateral funding	Bilateral funding	Bilateral funding
Pooled Fund	Humanitarian Response Fund	Emergency Response Fund	Humanitarian Response Fund /Common Humanitarian Fund
Rapid Response to Movements of Population	Central Emergency Response Fund	Central Emergency Response Fund	

The case studies found that *Sida's bilateral funding best helps it to deliver on its strategic sub-goals*. This is because it is fairly timely, very flexible and permits partners to incorporate prevention and recovery activities. Sida's multi-annual framework agreements also enable partners to strengthen the capacity of local organisations and engage in advocacy. However, Sida's project funding has become slower in the last couple of years and it is clear that the administrative burden of managing a lot of small grants is beyond Sida's current human resource capacity.

Sida also channels its funding through several OCHA-managed country-level pooled funds – ERFs/HRFs and CHF. In 2009, it contributed SEK329 million (or 12.3% of the humanitarian budget) to CHFs. One advantage of these mechanisms is that they *can finance local NGOs*, which Sida cannot (though the Kenya and Indonesia ERFs have only funded a few local NGOs). The ERFs/HRFs can provide fairly quick funding for *response to small and medium-scale disasters*, which has been particularly useful in Indonesia due to the sheer number of such disasters. Pooled funds also help Sida to *support a much larger number of organisations, sectors and geographical areas* than it can bilaterally and *OCHA monitors projects to an extent that is well beyond Sida* (see section 5.1). CHF managers in DRC and Somalia have also made an effort to coordinate their funding with bilateral donors.

For Sida, one of the challenges with *pooled funding mechanisms* is that they *have a limited ability to finance recovery activities* (partly due to their remits and partly due to the short-term nature of their funding). The CERF, financed by the MFA, is not able to finance prevention/preparedness or recovery at present. Another challenge is that *they are not always timely*. Some of the delays (in Kenya and Indonesia) were with the disbursement of funds by OCHA Geneva but the establishment of a unit dedicated to managing ERF/HRF funds should reduce these. The Pooled Fund in DRC was relatively timely but experienced significant delays with disbursing its first allocation in 2010. Channelling funding through UN agencies, whether bilaterally or through pooled funds can result in delays and reduced flexibility for implementing organisations, as the review of CERF funding to Kenya demonstrated.

The case studies did not examine Sida's RRM because its partners had not used the instrument in the case study countries. Also, Sida was in the process of revising the RRM and extending it beyond Swedish NGOs.

Recommendation:

- *Sida should engage actively with pooled funding mechanisms at field level to promote effectiveness and accountability* since they are an important channel for its humanitarian assistance. It should also work with the MFA to advocate for necessary changes at a global level, e.g., through the CHF Working Group and the CERF Advisory Group.

4.2 MEASURING RESULTS

The staffing challenges that Sida's humanitarian team face have made it difficult for it to focus on accountability and tracking results (see section 3.1). Other challenges with project follow-up include:

- *A lack of expertise*. Since Sida does not have thematic or sectoral focus areas, staff members are generalists and have not been able to develop the knowledge and expertise to be able to assess projects. Also, some staff members join the team without any humanitarian experience.
- *No specific incentives to track results and capture and share lessons*. Sida has a system of results contracts but staff members can decide their own objectives, which tend to be output focused, e.g., the number

of projects and funding decisions for which a staff member will be responsible. Managers are expected to discuss how a staff member is performing to achieve objectives twice a year but there is no link between achieving objectives and salaries. So there are no specific incentives to monitor the results achieved with Sida's funding.

- *A lack of clarity on results that NGO partners should report against.* Although Sida has asked Swedish NGOs to report on results in more detail, it has not explained what results it wants them to report on and how they should track and report on these results.
- *A limited field presence.* Humanitarian responsibilities may be a very small percentage of the work of Embassy staff members and they may lack both the time and the expertise for engaging with humanitarian actors (see section 3.2). As a result, Sida has not been as active as it could have in field-level fora and debates (e.g., CHF Boards).
- *A limited travel budget for Stockholm-based staff* has compounded this problem. In 2009, when staff should have travelled to the field to assess the situation and engage with CAP processes in preparation for 2010 funding decisions, there was a ban on travel. This meant that they could not get field-level information to make informed funding decisions for the majority of their 2010 grants. This is particularly problematic for funding to countries where Sida does not have a field presence because field visits are the only means of monitoring Sida-funded activities.
- There is a *lack of spare capacity in the team*, meaning that if one staff member is travelling or on leave, other team members cannot cover his or her day to day responsibilities.
- The *heavy workload* of humanitarian staff members and *pressure to disburse funds* as early in the year as possible has meant that they prioritise funding decisions over monitoring grants.
- *High levels of funding to UN agencies that provide only general, global reports* to donors, which makes it very hard to track how Sida's money was spent and its impact. While partners greatly appreciate the fact that Sida provides un-earmarked and flexible funding, if it does not track how partners use its funding, it runs the risk of supporting inefficiencies in the humanitarian system.

- *Some Sida-funded programmes do not lend themselves to easy reporting on programme impact, especially in the short-term (e.g., to address GBV in DRC). Sida needs to look at how best to assess the impact of its humanitarian aid in these cases.*

When Sida staff members are able to travel to the field to visit projects, its partners appreciate the interaction with them. For example, in Kenya, the Stockholm desk officer encouraged one NGO partner to examine longer-term solutions to the drought and submit a suitable project application. But the issues that Sida's humanitarian staff examine and discuss with partners depend largely on their personal interests and expertise. They have *not used the strategic sub-goals as a guiding framework for their field visits*, perhaps due to the lack of adequate indicators, although they could still provide a useful basis for making qualitative assessments of Sida's achievements. Since humanitarian staff members do not use the strategic sub-goals to assess results in the field or the reporting submitted by partners, they have found it *difficult for Sida to report in detail against these goals in Sida's annual report*.

Sida has also *not used the humanitarian sub-goals to guide funding decisions* – although the assessment memos state which of the sub-goals the funding decisions will meet, there is no tangible evidence that the sub-goals (other than the one on needs-based funding) have driven decision-making. *If the sub-goals are not fully reflected in funding agreements*, partners may be unaware of them. In Indonesia, for example, OCHA has interpreted the HRF's mandate fairly narrowly. This has meant that it has insisted that NGOs build semi-permanent rather than permanent latrines even though these would have a greater long-term impact without costing much more. It emerged that this was largely because they were unaware of Sida's goal of supporting recovery activities.

Recommendations:

- Sida should *decide and publicise the results it wants to see from its humanitarian assistance*, working with the MFA and partners to define results in terms of the outcomes for people affected (such as increased security, reduced risk of disease). It should be careful to avoid confusing results with process objectives (such as increased use of pooled funds).

- Sida should *invest in the capacity to monitor results against its humanitarian strategy* so that it can use information on results gathered across its global humanitarian portfolio to assess progress and improve performance. *The goals of the humanitarian strategy should drive funding processes*, from decision-making to reporting. Therefore, it should:
 - Incorporate the humanitarian goals into funding agreements and ensure that partners are aware of these goals through discussions.
 - Ensure that NGO partners, at least, report against these goals.
 - Use the strategic sub-goals as a guide to assess projects, particularly during field visits.

5 Accountability and Lesson Learning

Summary

Sida faces several challenges with monitoring humanitarian projects directly but the pooled funds through which it channels its humanitarian assistance have more robust monitoring mechanisms in place, particularly for NGO projects.

Accountability to crisis-affected communities is not one of the 8 sub-goals of Sida's humanitarian strategy though it is part of the GHD principles. But Sida has supported global initiatives that promote accountability to crisis-affected populations. The evaluation found **mixed evidence of the extent to which Sida-funded humanitarian organisations are involving aid recipients in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of projects.** Also, **Sida does not have feedback loops to ensure that information from accountability processes inform its funding decisions.**

The factors that limit Sida's ability to measure results also hamper its ability to learn and share lessons so Sida needs to engage more strategically with its partners, particularly research and methods organisations.

This section looks at two aspects of accountability – the monitoring procedures that Sida's partners have in place to be accountable to donors and the extent to which they are accountable to crisis-affected communities.

5.1 DONOR ACCOUNTABILITY

As noted in section 4.2, *Sida faces several challenges with monitoring humanitarian projects directly.* Even in DRC, where Sida's humanitarian portfolio is larger than its development programming, the current level of staffing in Kinshasa is insufficient to provide comprehensive monitoring. Staff members in Stockholm and Kinshasa have established some division of labour, still there are no formal criteria for how and when to monitor programming, and so this is done, and information is shared, on an ad hoc basis. This means that Sida is

reliant on its partners' internal monitoring and evaluation systems and the reports that they provide.

The *pooled funds* through which Sida channels its humanitarian assistance *have more robust monitoring mechanisms* in place, *particularly for NGO projects*. The DRC Pooled Fund collects data on basic results indicators every six months, mostly output based statistics such as the number of beneficiaries targeted and number of wells dug. Its beneficiary data are disaggregated by gender and include the number of children. These indicators form the basis of the Pooled Fund's annual report. The Unit also tries to visit every NGO project. However, OCHA does not have the mandate to monitor UN agency projects so it cannot verify the figures that UN agencies provide. UNICEF's RRMP programme in DRC lends itself to accurate reporting of output results. It has now developed an online database – ActivityInfo – that can report on results in real time, including generating tables and graphs. In addition, UNICEF funds RRMP partners to provide dedicated monitoring staff members, who focus on the implementation of gender and protection standards.

In Indonesia, OCHA has been active in trying to visit every HRF project, even if these are in remote locations. In Kenya, though, OCHA's ability to visit projects is restricted by a small travel budget and lack of adequate staffing. In Somalia, OCHA has been developing a monitoring and evaluation system for the newly established CHF. This has been challenging because donors have different expectations and requirements, OCHA's mandate does not extend to monitoring UN agency projects and there are limitations on what is feasible in the Somalia context. Donors and OCHA are exploring whether Cluster leads can play a role in monitoring CHF-funded projects along with options such as the use of webcams and NGO peer reviews.

5.2 ACCOUNTABILITY TO CRISIS-AFFECTED COMMUNITIES

The Terms of Reference for this evaluation did not use *accountability* as a heading and it *is not one of the 8 sub-goals of Sida's humanitarian strategy*. But, as a signatory to the GHD principles, Sida is supposed to “request implementing humanitarian organisations to ensure, to the greatest possible extent, adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the

design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response” (7). It is also responsible for supporting initiatives that promote accountability to crisis-affected populations (21).

As described in section 2.3.7, Sida finances the Humanitarian Accountability Project and has promoted it amongst its Swedish NGO partners. So it *can be said to support initiatives that promote accountability to crisis-affected populations.*

The evaluation found more *mixed evidence of the extent to which Sida-funded humanitarian organisations are involving aid recipients in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of projects.* Some organisations did involve affected communities in planning and implementation. Examples include a cash-for-work project in Kenya, implemented by the Kenya Red Cross Society and an NRC camp management training programme in the Dadaab refugee camps. In the latter case, project participants have been trained as trainers and established self-help coaching groups so that they can continue to training and project activities after NRC has closed the project.

The team came across one example of an NGO involving aid recipients in monitoring and evaluation. Plan Indonesia had adopted *an innovative approach to monitoring* its temporary shelter programme. Working with an Indonesian media company, Axis, it trained 30 children from 6 villages to use video cameras and make documentaries. It then gave the children cameras and asked them to visit those who had received cash grants from Plan to build temporary shelters and follow their progress with the construction work. The children enthusiastically visited the project beneficiaries almost every day and were able to identify challenges with the project as well as positive aspects.

Sida-funded organisations are more likely to simply consult crisis-affected communities during monitoring and evaluation rather than involving them in undertaking these activities. For example, in Indonesia, UNDP’s RISE programme staff members undertake monitoring visits every six months and ensure consultation with stakeholders. This has included going on local radio to answer questions from the local community.

As noted in the previous section, pooled funding mechanisms have monitoring systems for donor accountability. But, like individual humanitarian agencies, the extent to which they consult affected communities varies. The Pooled Fund in DRC and OCHA in Indo-

nesia have consulted aid recipients during visits to NGO projects but the evaluation was not able to determine how systematic this was.

Although Sida's partners and the pooled funds that it supports may consult aid recipients and involve them in programme design, implementation and monitoring, *Sida does not have feedback loops to ensure that information from accountability processes inform its funding decisions.* It is up to partners to decide whether to share the feedback that they receive from aid recipients in their reports and this does not happen systematically. For example, the Pooled Fund Unit does not share the reports from its monitoring visits to NGO projects. It has argued that this is because it has a vast number of monitoring reports since it may have a few hundred projects being implemented simultaneously and it tries to visit every NGO project at least once. It would be overwhelming for Pooled Fund Board members if the Unit shared all these reports with them but it has yet to work out how best to use all this information.

Recommendations:

- To ensure that it implements the full range of GHD principles, *Sida should include accountability to crisis-affected communities as a goal in its revised strategy.* It should then *incorporate this into its funding agreements and ensure that partners consult/involve crisis-affected communities systematically.*
- Sida should *explore ways to access feedback from crisis-affected communities* and use this *as part of the evidence that it uses for its funding decisions.* This should include the use of technology (particularly mobile phones) and innovative mechanisms to improve accountability.

5.3 LESSON LEARNING

The factors that limit Sida's ability to measure results also hamper its ability to learn and share lessons from the humanitarian activities that it finances. In particular, the fact that staff members have too little time to follow-up on humanitarian funding also means that they have little time to engage with partners to learn lessons and then share these with other partners. For example, one framework agreement NGO that has an annual meeting with Sida bases these on a theme, making presentations and engaging Sida in discussion. However, this has been difficult in the last year or two because of the rapid turnover of Sida's humanitarian desk officers. However, the NGO has decided to hold

a seminar for its field and headquarters staff in Stockholm so that Sida can participate.

Some of the research and methods organisations that Sida finances have also tried to create opportunities for sharing learning. For example, the Feinstein International Center organises annual seminars with the MFA, NGOs and the Red Cross as part of its framework agreement with Sida. An interviewee argued that Sida could make more strategic use of this partnership to raise its profile and ensure that it retains its position as a thought leader. It could also draw on the expertise of individual Center staff members for briefings and to get their opinions on particular issues.

The seminars and meetings that Sida's partners organise tend to be isolated events rather than adding up to a coherent exercise in capturing and sharing good practice, the latest research and lessons learned from the field. *Sida needs to find a way to ensure that the whole adds up to more than the sum of its parts*, e.g., by focusing on a particular theme each year. It could also draw together lessons from humanitarian project evaluations and assessments into an annual report, highlighting success stories.

Recommendations:

- Sida should *develop a strategy to maximise the benefits from seminars and meetings to share good practice, lessons learnt and cutting edge research*. One option is to organise these meetings around a theme each year. The meetings could also be organised at the time of Sida's Humanitarian Days to ensure that field as well as headquarters staff can benefit from them.
- Sida needs to *develop systematic ways to capture good practice and lessons learnt* from the activities that it finances. It should *then disseminate these widely amongst its partners and other donors*.

6 External Relationships

Summary

Sweden is a highly respected humanitarian donor, regarded as a **thought leader in the field**. Sida relies on implementing organisations to turn its strengths into effective results for crisis-affected communities. Sida's **partners** at both headquarters and field levels **have a very high regard for Sida as a donor** but they wish to engage Sida in strategic dialogue.

Most donors are experiencing the challenge of managing larger humanitarian budgets with limited staffing, both at headquarters and in the field so Sida has the opportunity to **work with other donors to share funding information and to undertake joint missions and joint tracking of funding**. Donors have expressed interest in greater cooperation and coordination though this remains more of a challenge at field level than at headquarters level.

As has been noted earlier, *Sweden is a highly respected humanitarian donor*, regarded as *a thought leader in the field*. Sida has to rely on implementing organisations to turn the strengths highlighted in section 2.3 into effective results for crisis-affected communities. This section begins by summarising the characteristics of Sida's relations with its partners (based on evidence presented through the report).

The greatest challenge for Sida's humanitarian aid is its limited staffing, which then limits its ability to follow up on its humanitarian funding and gather field level evidence to inform its policy and advocacy work. Sida is not alone in facing such challenges and there is a greater willingness amongst donors to work together to address them. This section also provides an overview of how Sida could increase cooperation with like-minded donors.

6.1 RELATIONS WITH PARTNERS

Consultations with Sida's *partners* at both headquarters and field levels revealed that they *have a very high regard for Sida as a donor*. This is due to its flexibility, multi-annual funding (which benefits partners in

several ways) and adherence to humanitarian and GHD principles. But they wished to engage more with Sida in strategic dialogue. Swedish NGOs, in particular, felt that the humanitarian team had not been able to engage fully with them because they were short-staffed. This has meant, for example, that invitations to consultation meetings have been sent out late and not sent to all the relevant actors. In addition, Sida is not yet consulting regularly with the majority of its NGO partners. This *lack of engagement is a missed opportunity* because Sida could get better information on field realities through its partners and also consolidate lesson learning.

Recommendations:

- Sida should move towards a *more systematic relationship with its NGO partners*, built on the Principles of Partnership²², and including regular consultation and information sharing.

Quick Win #14 – Regular consultation forum with partners

Sida could **establish an annual consultation forum with its partners** to discuss its funding plans for the year ahead and strategic issues. This would replicate good practice by other donors. e.g., the Danish MFA meets with the Danish NGO Forum on a regular basis to discuss various issues. Germany has an annual meeting with NGOs for feedback on funding allocations and thematic issues.

6.2 RELATIONS WITH DONORS

Since most donors are experiencing the challenge of managing larger humanitarian budgets with limited staffing, both at headquarters and in the field, Sida has the opportunity to *work with other donors to share funding information and to undertake joint missions and joint tracking of funding*. Despite the existence of GHD groups in countries such as Sudan and the DRC, a study found that, at country level, donors tend to coordinate their work informally, either bilaterally or in a small group²³. But, the donor consultation meeting for this evaluation highlighted interest amongst donors in increasing coordination and cooperation in a number of ways:

²² <http://www.globalhumanitarianplatform.org/pop.html>

²³ According to an ECHO and Channel Research study to map donor coordination.

- *More formal information sharing on funding decisions and the performance of implementing partners*, both at field level (e.g., through the GHD group in the DRC and the informal donor group in Somalia) and at headquarters level (with the GHD initiative establishing a web-based secure tool to enable donors to report their funding decisions). Although donors tend to feel that funding information is sensitive, there is growing agreement that it is important for them to share this information, at least amongst the major donors. E.g., in 2010, ECHO made funding information on all the countries in its annual strategy public. Although information on ECHO's allocations to individual partners is more sensitive, it is willing to share this information with Member States. This would enable all donors to make better funding decisions but would be particularly helpful for donors with almost no field presence.
- *Undertaking joint missions*, either from headquarters (e.g., DFID and IrishAid undertook a joint mission to Liberia in summer 2010 to assess their support to IFRC) or at field level (as Sida and ECHO have discussed in the DRC). ECHO has staff members going out on mission regularly so it should be relatively straightforward for Member States to organise to join these missions. Donors could use a forum like the GHD website to post a list of missions that they are undertaking and use this to coordinate trips.
- When a donor has limited or no field presence, it could *establish an agreement with a donor that has staff on the ground to follow its funding*. In DRC, Sida provides information on humanitarian issues to the Norwegian MFA because Norway does not have an Embassy in the country. They have discussed formalising the relationship with a Memorandum of Understanding. DFID has relied on ECHO to track its funding in the Central African Republic. Donors could also agree that a representative from one country tracks funding for a small group and reports to them jointly (an adapted version of the Joint Donor Office in Juba). In Somalia, some donors face strict restrictions on travel to the field so they have discussed whether those who can make field visits (such as ECHO and Denmark) can follow up on projects funded by the others.
- When donors are jointly funding a programme, they could *agree to accept one proposal and reporting format*. If ECHO is one of the donors, the others would probably have to use its format because it is not

able to use other formats. This could be acceptable to a flexible donor like Sida and would greatly reduce the administrative burden for NGOs.

Although donors have shown a willingness to work together much more closely at headquarters level, the country case studies highlighted the need for greater donor coordination and cooperation at field level. In Kenya, donor representatives felt that it would be beneficial to have a GHD group. The challenge may be that not all GHD members have a full-time person working on humanitarian issues; Norway, Sweden and Germany do not. However, *the absence of a GHD forum means that donors may be unaware of important funding decisions by their colleagues*. For example, although the Norwegian and Swedish Embassies in Nairobi are in the same building, neither knew that the other was funding the ERF until they found out through OCHA. It also means that the two donors have missed out on opportunities to collaborate to provide strategic direction to the ERF.

In Indonesia, there are no formal mechanisms to coordinate the efforts of donors to build the government's disaster management capacity. As a result, the government feels as if it is being 'bombarded' by piecemeal efforts. There are also several fora to discuss DRR issues but these do not extend to ensuring that donor and government activities are coordinated. *The absence of coordination mechanisms makes it far more difficult for donors like Sida, which do not have a humanitarian presence in the country, to ensure that their efforts to support DRR and government capacity complement those of other organisations.*

Recommendations:

- Sida could *establish a 'coalition of the willing'* with ECHO, DFID, the Netherlands, other Scandinavian donors and CIDA to undertake a range of activities such as sharing field mission reports, sharing funding information, and conducting joint monitoring visits.
- Sida could *build closer partnerships with like-minded donors in order to learn from their good practice*, such as DFID's guidelines on risk assessment.

7 Conclusions

This section draws together the main conclusions from the report organised as eight key messages.

Message 1: *Sweden is a highly respected humanitarian donor, regarded as a thought leader in the field.*

Its comparative advantages are:

- *Freedom from political control* (so that it can adhere to humanitarian and GHD principles). Sida's partners deeply appreciate this in a world where aid is increasingly politicised and expected to contribute to security objectives.
- *Active engagement and taking a leadership role in international debates* (so that it has been instrumental in the development of the GHD principles and taken a leading role in INCAF).
- *Ability to provide multi-annual funding for humanitarian aid*, which is more appropriate for chronic crises than the short-term approach of many other donors. It also has many benefits for partners (such as reducing operating costs and enabling them to take longer-term approaches that are more appropriate in chronic crises than short-term activities). It has also enabled them to establish more stable relationships with local partners and invest in strengthening local capacities.
- *Willingness and ability to link humanitarian and development assistance*, which is better able to respond to the range of needs of crisis-affected communities.
- *Willingness to invest in the humanitarian system as a whole*, rather than simply funding projects that involve delivering goods or services to crisis-affected communities. Sida does this in various ways, including by funding coordination, research and methods organisations and the ATHA programme.
- *Ability to invest in disaster preparedness and prevention*, as well as *support recovery* from the early stages of a crisis.
- *Provision of flexible funding* which allows partners to adapt to rapidly changing situations. Sida often lets partners determine priorities/

activities, particularly UN agencies and framework agreement partners, instead of cherry-picking activities.

While Sida can be proud of its achievements, it has significant opportunities to *increase the effectiveness of its work and enhance its reach and influence*, particularly in the areas of DRR and recovery. In order to fulfil its potential, it will need to make some *realistic choices* given that its humanitarian staff members are stretched, staff turnover is relatively high and the likelihood of an increase in staff numbers is slim. In these circumstances, *to deliver its humanitarian strategy*, Sida will need to deploy not only its humanitarian staff but its *whole institution more effectively, strengthening links with the field and the MFA*.

Message 2: Sida faces *significant challenges with its humanitarian staffing* Sida's humanitarian staff members manage proportionally larger budgets than their development colleagues since humanitarian aid constituted 14.5% of Sida's aid budget in 2009 but only 1.8% of its total staff work on humanitarian issues (approx. 12 out of 670). This means that, in 2009, *a humanitarian staff member managed an average of SEK 223 million whereas a development staff member managed an average of SEK 23.5 million*. Also, humanitarian grants tend to be smaller than development grants so humanitarian staff tend to manage a larger number of grants than development staff (based on a random sample – 56 and 45 grants managed by humanitarian staff, and 12 and 14 managed by development staff). This *disparity carries enormous management risks* because humanitarian staff members are being required to shoulder much greater responsibilities than their development colleagues in far more volatile contexts and the administrative burden of preparing and managing a lot of small grants is simply beyond its current human resource capacity. Therefore, the need to *streamline grant administration* and free up humanitarian staff capacity is a precondition for achieving many of Sida's objectives.

One reason why Sida allocated fewer human resources to the management of humanitarian aid is that it used to be exempt from some of the rules and regulations to which development assistance is subject in order to keep it quick and responsive. But humanitarian aid is increasingly subject to the same rules and Sida has introduced new requirements for grants (e.g., on audit). This has meant that humanitarian staff members have had to fulfil more onerous

requirements, which has increased their workload. An unintended consequence of these changes has been that Sida's humanitarian decision-making has slowed down. *When introducing agency-wide changes, Sida's senior management needs to pay greater attention to the implications of these for humanitarian work.* Otherwise, these may jeopardise Sweden's reputation as a leading humanitarian donor which would be damaging because *Sida's humanitarian aid makes a vital contribution to its position in the international community.*

One way to reduce pressures on humanitarian staff members in Stockholm would be to *ensure effective field-level support.* However, *currently, Sida's staff members in the field only spend a very small proportion of their time on humanitarian issues,* which keeps the burden on headquarters staff. They are also not supporting headquarters staff members as effectively as they could because *they are unclear about their roles and responsibilities.* This means that they do not set aside enough time for humanitarian issues.

Message 3: *A number of factors prevent Sida from focusing on the results of its humanitarian funding*

One of the consequences of the pressure on humanitarian staff time has been a lack of focus on the results achieved with Sida's funding and collecting evidence that can inform future policy and advocacy. The evaluation identified the following specific reasons why Sida has not focused on monitoring the use of its humanitarian grants or tracked the results that it is achieving:

- As already noted, the humanitarian team is under *pressure to disburse funds quickly,* particularly at the beginning of the year. This means that it *prioritises preparing funding agreements over checking how funds have been used.*
- Linked to this is the fact that the *staff are not given any specific incentives to track funds.* Sida has a system of results contracts but staff members can decide their own objectives, which tend to be output focused (e.g., the number of grants that they manage) rather than results focused (e.g., they are not required to visit Sida-funded projects during field trips). Sida does not link rewards to the achievement of results.
- *Sida's funding database does not require staff to enter the results achieved with annual funding* because this only applies to multi-annual fund-

- ing. The fact that the funding database is not fit for purpose does not help.
- The *goals of Sida's humanitarian strategy do not drive its funding processes* (decisions, partnership agreements and field visits) so Sida's humanitarian team has been *unclear about what results* it wants to track. Since the humanitarian sub-goals are not reflected in funding agreements, NGOs have not reported against these goals. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that it is difficult to measure the results of some of the activities that Sida supports, e.g., efforts to address GBV in DRC or disaster prevention. As a result, Sida has not built an evidence base on which to base its humanitarian funding decisions and also why it has not taken up opportunities to capture and disseminate good practice and lessons learned.
 - Sida's humanitarian staff *lack training and* many lack the *expertise* to know what to look for when they make field visits.
 - Sida's *limited humanitarian field presence* is a barrier to monitoring Sida-funded projects but the humanitarian team is making *inadequate use of the field staff* that Sida does have, with sub-optimal information flows in both directions. The humanitarian team needs to develop methods for effective information flows and feedback from the field.
 - Humanitarian staff at headquarters have a *limited ability to travel to the field*. This is due to a restricted travel budget as well as limited team capacity, which means that it is difficult to cover for a staff member who is out travelling.
 - UN agencies, which are the main channel for Sida's funding, provide general, global reports and this makes it difficult to track the specific results achieved with Sida's funding.

The evaluation concludes that, if Sida is to demonstrate that its humanitarian funding decisions are objective and evidence-based, it needs to *improve the quality and credibility of the information and evidence on which it relies*. At its most basic, Sida needs to improve its information systems on funding allocations (current and pipeline), even if this is a simple Excel spreadsheet. Sida humanitarian staff members also need to shift their priorities away from grant management and towards gathering evidence and monitoring outcomes and results. The use of proxy indicators of progress, such as support for pooled

mechanisms, or delivery via the CAP, is not enough to demonstrate that Sida is meeting its goals. *Sweden has invested heavily in establishing a **principled** model for its humanitarian funding but there is now a case for supplementing this with more attention to accountability, direct information on delivery and **results**.*

To ensure results from their total funding portfolio, the humanitarian team also needs to *ensure that the country level pooled funds through which they channel funding work as effectively as bilateral assistance*. Therefore, Sida country teams will need to develop the knowledge and capacity to engage effectively in the management structures of pooled mechanisms at field level.

Sida also needs to enable field based information to inform the international policy work in the MFA and its participation in international fora. *An explicit, common advocacy strategy or change agenda – on mechanisms such as pooled funds and clusters, OCHA, the CERF and DRR – would help to provide a framework for a more systematic division of labour between Sida and MFA humanitarian staff.*

Message 4: Sida could *work through others more effectively*

The character of Sweden's humanitarian assistance is that it works through other organisations (OCHA and UN agencies, country-level pooled funds and framework agreement partners). So, to increase the impact of its work, it will need to *continue to drive strategic and practical improvements in its partnerships*. Sida's *relationships with its partners are mature and valued* though Sida has the opportunity to apply the Principles of Partnership more fully. Sida as well as its partners see *multi-annual framework agreements as a very functional mechanism*: timely, flexible, permitting prevention and recovery and, de facto, increasing local capacity. Sida has the opportunity to expand its framework agreements, ensuring that partners pass on these benefits to their local partners to ensure effective delivery for crisis-affected communities.

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, Sida invests in system-wide improvements. Its principled approach has given it an advantage in humanitarian coordination and relations with partners and agencies. It has been able to use that advantage to good effect in areas like recovery and the development of pooled financing mechanisms. But the evaluation provides evidence that Sweden has considerable additional *potential to use its reputation to drive improvements and*

reforms in the humanitarian system at country and international levels. This means that Sida has a strong incentive to work with the MFA. Sida and the MFA have a good working relationship on humanitarian issues but there are opportunities for improvements, e.g., on assessing the humanitarian performance of the UN agencies to which the MFA provides core funding, linking Sida's field experience to the MFA's role in global advocacy and engagement in international debates and promoting system changes (including in the principles and values that govern the humanitarian system).

Achieving Sida's potential to provide effective humanitarian assistance also relies on collaboration between Sida's humanitarian and development staff. This already works well in some cases, such as some Country Teams, but would be aided by *stronger links between development and humanitarian activities*, building on Sida's existing work on strengthening local capacity *and, where appropriate, common strategies* for crisis situations.

Message 5: Sida needs to *improve the allocation and prioritisation of its humanitarian funding*

Funding according to need has been a vital principle for Sida. At its most fundamental this is about demonstrating that decisions are not based on political or media priorities. While Sida is investing in initiatives to improve humanitarian needs assessments, *like any donor, it does not have the resources to meet all needs and it needs a better tool box to help it prioritise between crises and within crises.*

Partly because of the lack of clear criteria for funding and partly due to a lack of time for staff to gather and use a range of information sources to make funding decisions, Sida has tended to equate UN appeals and the CAP in particular with humanitarian needs. *Since CAPs do not help Sida to prioritise between crises, Sida could consider other ways to get closer to achieving its goal of funding according to need.* These include *a transparent 'severity of crisis' index* which can provide a more reliable benchmark for funding priorities between crises. Sida might also prioritise better if it addressed risk of future needs as well as a snapshot of existing need.

Within crises, Sida humanitarian staff are seeking stronger guidance on the criteria for project selection. This does not mean selecting particular sectors (such as health) but *developing a clear process which gives them a hierarchy of issues to consider.* This is already happening in some countries.

Projects that address the greatest risks and which are not already being funded would be the first choice in every situation. But to help staff exercise choice between projects which address the same degree of risk, Sida should develop a checklist based on, for instance, the capacity of partners, the contribution to disaster risk reduction and the fit with country strategy priorities. Guidance on the process would help humanitarian staff to justify their decisions and reduce their reliance on previous allocations as the basis for future spending. Greater engagement with the development of the CAP at field level would also provide Sida with better information (including about risks) for its decisions.

Message 6: *Sida's commitment to humanitarian principles should not preclude effective engagement with development actors*

Humanitarian principles represent the values and intellectual framework that underpin Sida's humanitarian assistance. At the same time, many of the places in which Sida is providing assistance and much of what it wants to achieve lie in the grey zone between humanitarian and development assistance. Humanitarian, Paris and Fragile States principles cannot always be reconciled in these circumstances. *Sida needs to achieve a delicate balance to ensure that commitment to the humanitarian principles does not preclude effective engagement with development actors or its ability to address the range of inter-connected risks that crisis-affected communities face.* Sweden's strong reputation for adherence to humanitarian principles, combined with an openness about situations where they cannot be seen as absolutes, gives it a good opportunity to promote their wider application, for instance with private sector actors and in defending humanitarian space in highly politicised environments like Afghanistan or Somalia where lines between military and aid objectives are blurred.

With the integration of humanitarian staff members into conflict and post-conflict country teams, Sida has made more progress than most donors on linking humanitarian and development assistance. But to build on this progress, Sida will need to *develop clear policy guidance* which helps it to *balance two competing priorities:*

- a. *Protecting humanitarian funding from undue political influence* or from becoming just an instrument of development policy and

- b. Responding to humanitarian crises as effectively as possible by *taking advantage of all the tools, relationships and assets in country teams as well as the MFA.*

Stronger linkages between its humanitarian and development funding would increase Sida's ability to engage with local authorities on humanitarian issues, particularly in countries like Kenya and Indonesia, where they have a strong role to play but lack capacity.

Message 7: Sida can *ensure systematic links between humanitarian and development funding and take up opportunities to finance DPRR at field level*. Sweden is already perceived as a leader on recovery and transition issues. The DRC case study highlighted some very good examples of Sida using its development budget to take over from both its own humanitarian projects and those of other donors, such as ECHO. Sida has also gone beyond funding to take a leadership role in INCAF, which has tackled difficult debates about the artificial divide between humanitarian and development budgets and how donors can better use the full range of tools available to them to finance recovery (both in services and security).

However, Sida has missed opportunities to support better links between its humanitarian and development programming in some countries. For example, in Kenya, working in Nairobi's informal settlements is a development priority and Sida has funded projects in the informal settlements with humanitarian funding but there had been no attempt to link this to development activities, even though there is an urgent need for longer-term funding to continue the humanitarian projects. In disaster-prone countries such as Indonesia, Sida is providing humanitarian aid but has not focused on disaster preparedness. This is a real missed opportunity to reduce the impact of natural hazards and prevent them turning into disasters.

One reason for the lack of linkages between humanitarian and development funding on climate change and DRR at country level may be that Sida's humanitarian funding for DRR is focused at the global and regional levels. But, in many of the countries where Sida is providing humanitarian aid, investment in DPRR would be far more effective in addressing the needs of vulnerable groups. There is also a need for an international champion for DPRR so Sida could *make DPRR a stronger element of its humanitarian assistance*, building staff

capacity to apply a DPRR lens to its humanitarian work. *This would enable it to cover the spectrum of humanitarian assistance from prevention to recovery.* A DPRR lens would also provide a framework for stronger collaboration with development actors and mainstreaming at country level and could be built into multi-annual framework agreements and Sida's strategic partnerships.

Message 8: Sida has opportunity to *take the lead in putting affected communities at the centre of humanitarian aid*

Sida has the opportunity to help *establish Sweden as the leading GHD member by implementing the full range of GHD principles, particularly by incorporating principle 7 on beneficiary involvement* as a strategic goal against which it measures progress. Sida finances the Humanitarian Accountability Project and has promoted it amongst its Swedish NGOs. However, the evaluation found mixed evidence about the extent to which Sida's partners involve aid recipients in the design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of projects.

While Sida's partners may consult aid recipients, *Sida does not have feedback loops* to ensure that beneficiary views and information from accountability processes inform its funding decisions. Partners can decide whether or not to share feedback from aid recipients so this does not happen systematically.

8 Recommendations

The conclusions from the evaluation (section 7) identify the major factors which will determine the choices open to Sida in deciding the scope and nature of its future humanitarian assistance. The evaluation has resulted in nine general recommendations, listed below. The report presents some additional specific recommendations and quick wins (which are recommendations that Sida can implement relatively easily and immediately for quick impact). These were listed at the end of the executive summary according to who they are addressed to.

These recommendations are not a list from which to pick and choose. They are an interwoven set of choices and actions which are mutually re-enforcing. These opening paragraphs summarise the relationship between them.

First, Sweden needs to make some decisions about shifts in strategic orientation. The use of the word ‘shifts’ is deliberate because these are not major changes in direction. Nonetheless, if Sweden adopts these changes with conviction, they will have powerful consequences for its future contribution to humanitarian assistance.

In summary, the report recommends that Sida makes three strategic choices. It should

- 1. Increase the focus on results, with a specific focus on beneficiary involvement and accountability*
- 2. Institutionalise Sweden’s leadership roles on DPRR and mainstream DPRR and recovery in programming*
- 3. Use Sweden’s reputation to go beyond protecting humanitarian principles and actively promote their wider application in complex settings.*

Underpinning these recommendations is the knowledge that Sida is unlikely to increase the number of staff engaged in humanitarian issues despite the fact that, at the time of the evaluation, just 1.6% of Sida’s staff is engaged in humanitarian assistance, despite the fact that 14.5% of Sida’s disbursements are humanitarian. Therefore, a necessary pre-condition for the recommended changes is that Sida

frees up staff time for more strategic work so the following are specific recommendations on how:

4. *Sida should streamline grant administration and*
5. *Improve the methodology and practice for allocating resources according to the severity of crises, levels of risk and criteria for prioritisation.*

Realistically, for Sweden to achieve its potential as a leading humanitarian donor, Sida's humanitarian team has to leverage its activities by harnessing assets across and beyond Sida. It has to work closely with staff working on development issues and the MFA; use the MFA's international engagement and political capital in bodies that can affect the humanitarian system; work through strategic partnerships with the organisations it funds as well as with other donors and governments and agencies in recipient countries. The recommendations are that Sida should:

6. *Make working through others more effective and invest in improving the system*
7. *Enable Sida country teams to engage strategically with humanitarian issues and strengthen links to MFA*
8. *Build on existing work on local capacity*
9. *Improve the quality of evidence and information and lesson learning*

The rest of this section provides more detail on these general recommendations.

1. *Increase the focus on results, with a specific focus on beneficiary involvement and accountability*
 - Sida should *decide and publicise the results it wants to see from its humanitarian assistance.*
 - It should invest in a process to work alongside MFA, development colleagues and partners to define results in terms of the outcomes for people affected (such as increased security, reduced risk of disease).
 - It should be careful to avoid confusing results with process objectives (such as increased use of pooled funds).
 - Sida should *include accountability to crisis-affected communities as a goal in its revised strategy* and ensure that it implements the full range of GHD principles.

- It should incorporate this into its funding agreements and ensure that partners consult/involve crisis-affected communities systematically
 - It should invest in the capacity to monitor results against its humanitarian strategy so that it can use information on results gathered across its global humanitarian portfolio to assess progress and improve performance.
 - Sida should explore ways to *access feedback from crisis-affected communities and use this as part of the evidence base for funding decisions*. This should include the use of technology (particularly mobile phones) and innovative mechanisms to improve accountability.
2. *Institutionalise Sweden's leadership roles on Recovery and on Disaster Preparedness and Risk Reduction and mainstream DPRR and recovery in programming*
- Sida should *reinforce its international role on policy and finance for recovery programming* that sets the stage for, and does not undermine, future development work.
 - The humanitarian team should take steps to ensure that senior management and leadership in Sida and the MFA recognise the leadership role that Sweden has played in the humanitarian field.
 - It should apply the practical field experience that the Human Security department has been collecting to develop solid policy/guidance on funding recovery, perhaps with the support of lessons learnt during this evaluation. This guidance should also be developed in conjunction with multilateral and NGO partners, to take account of field realities.
 - Sida should work to become *a leading donor on DPRR*, promoting cooperation between humanitarian and development staff members and working with the MFA to take advantage of the less politicised space available for improving policy and practice on DPRR at global and field level.
 - Sida could pick up on this opportunity to build on its current work, simultaneously discharging its obligation to address humanitarian consequences of disasters and shap-

ing the debate on disasters – including climate change impacts.

- Sida should *ensure that DPRR is mainstreamed in its funding decisions* to deliver more effective humanitarian assistance to disaster-prone countries, and that it addresses the challenge of climate change across the humanitarian and development parts of its programme.
 - ATHA should begin teaching a module on DPRR, with a particular focus on disaster preparedness, as a standard part of all its courses. This module should be available to Sida staff members as well as partners.
 - The relationship with MSB could become more systematic and strategic and Sida should also consider increasing its support for MSB's disaster preparedness work, which would also support its obligations under the Hyogo Framework for Action.

3. *Use Sweden's reputation to go beyond protecting humanitarian principles and actively promote their wider application in complex settings.*

- Sweden should use its reputation to *champion humanitarian principles and to develop realistic guidance for their application by a wide range of actors in complex settings* where Paris Declaration and fragile states principles are also relevant.
- Working with the MFA, Sida could work to *defend humanitarian space in highly politicised settings where the line between aid and military objectives is blurred*, such as in Afghanistan and now Pakistan.
 - Sweden should advocate for the international community to ensure that all troops responding to natural disasters have prior training in humanitarian principles and the modus operandi of humanitarian agencies.
 - It should support work to promote awareness and application of humanitarian standards and principles amongst the private sector.

4. *Streamline grant administration*

- Sida urgently needs to *streamline its administrative procedures for humanitarian funding in order to provide timely grants and to free up time for staff members to focus on strategic objectives and results*. Multi

annual frameworks (see below) show the strongest prospects but other specific immediate actions include

- Extend the RRM to include non-Swedish NGOs with a proven rapid response capacity, aiming to have at least one partner covering each of the major life-saving sectors;
 - Set up a simple database to allow the humanitarian team to better track and analyse its funding by sector, partner and crisis;
 - Seek out practical lessons from successful Country Teams and other Sida departments.
 - Develop criteria and priority areas for the allocation of additional funds that become available at the end of the year. At present, it tends to channel these funds through ERFs and projects which enable it to disburse the money quickly. However, it could use these funds more strategically, e.g., to provide additional funding to under-funded emergencies.
 - Sida should *substantially increase the number and extent of its multi-annual framework agreements*, thus reducing its administrative burden and speeding up decision-making. This will also free up time to monitor the impact of its funding, and allow it to develop more strategic partnerships.
 - It should consider specifying the amounts that it will provide each year at the start of the agreement (with provisos on the availability of funds built in).
 - It could improve the effectiveness of multi-annual frameworks by including terms and conditions that ensure that the flexibility and predictability that the international NGOs enjoy are passed on to local partners; that emphasise strengthening local capacity; and that allow more support for undertaking and disseminating field-level research.
5. *Improve the methodology and practices for allocating resources according to the severity of crises, levels of risk and criteria for prioritisation.*
- At a global level, Sida should *develop or adopt a severity of crisis model to guide the determination of geographical funding envelopes*, so as to ensure that its funding for each emergency is guided by systematic and comparable evidence on severity.

- Sida should also *develop criteria to guide fund allocation within crises*. These should prioritise the greatest risks to lives and livelihoods and provide a checklist for deciding between projects that address the same level of risk (using criteria that include partner capacity and performance and a project's fit with country strategy priorities).
 - Sida's humanitarian staff should *participate actively in CAP workshops at field level* (particularly where it is providing substantial funding) so that they can gather information to support their decision-making and ensure that Sida's priorities are reflected in CAPs.
6. *Make working through other systems more effective and invest in improving the system*
- Sida should collaborate with MFA in prioritising work which *maximises the effectiveness of the humanitarian system in two areas: pooled funds (including the role of OCHA as manager) and humanitarian coordinators*.
 - The humanitarian team should work with staff at field level to ensure active engagement with pooled funding mechanisms including participation in pooled fund boards to promote effective management and accountability.
 - Sida should work with the MFA to use country-level experience to advocate for necessary changes at a global level, for instance through the CHF Working Group and the CERF Advisory Group.
 - Sida should support the MFA to work with like-minded donors to ensure that the CERF can finance prevention activities and encourage OCHA to be flexible about financing preparedness activities through ERFs where appropriate.
 - Sida should use its country-level experience of how the terms of reference and complex accountability lines of HCs impact on effective humanitarian response to support the MFA in advocating for reform.
 - Sweden's position as a respected leader amongst donors offers the opportunity to have a greater influence on the GHD initiative, to improve the practice of current members and

encourage emerging donors to join. Therefore, it should *consider playing a leadership role in GHD over the next 3–5 years*.

- Sida should ensure that its *humanitarian goals and focus on results are reflected in all its partnerships*
 - It should incorporate the humanitarian goals into funding agreements and ensure that partners are aware of these goals through discussions
 - Ensure that NGO partners report against these goals
 - Use the strategic sub-goals as a guide to measure results and assess partner projects, particularly during field visits.
- Sida should move towards a *more systematic relationship with its NGO partners, built on the Principles of Partnership*, and including regular consultation and information sharing.
 - It could establish an annual consultation forum with its partners to discuss its funding plans for the year ahead and strategic issues. This would replicate good practice by other donors.
- Sida should take up current opportunities to add *value to work on coordination*.
 - Sida should improve the operation of clusters at country level by meeting the costs of NGOs if they take on cluster lead roles or support CHFs to finance these costs if they are already financing UN agency cluster coordinators.
 - Support the ‘provider of last resort’ role of clusters by promoting the use of a mechanism like the RRMP in DRC in other emergency situations
 - The MFA and Sida should encourage clusters globally and nationally to engage with and include the private sector
 - Sida should support the documentation of good practice in cluster coordination as part of its commitment to strengthen humanitarian coordination, and work with the MFA to disseminate it.
- Sida as a whole should improve the effectiveness of recovery efforts by *promoting links between humanitarian and development coordination mechanisms* at country level to ensure that humanitarian and development efforts create synergies rather than undermining each other.
 - It should work to strengthen government engagement in humanitarian coordination in DRC so that it will be easier

for clusters to hand over to government authorities in stable areas.

- In countries where the government should play a strong role in humanitarian response but where capacities are weak, Sida could support government co-leadership of cluster both financially and by supporting training for them in this role.
- In countries where humanitarian and development coordination mechanisms co-exist, such as Kenya, Sida should encourage the government to link the two sets of mechanisms, perhaps by organising joint meetings for sector groups (e.g., health, water) that are relevant in both humanitarian and development arenas.

7. *Enable Sida country teams to engage strategically with humanitarian issues and strengthen links to the MFA*

- Sida should ensure *that humanitarian staff members are well integrated into all Country Teams*, engaged in developing umbrella country strategies that reflect the magnitude and contribution of humanitarian funding and advocating for humanitarian concerns to be mainstreamed across Sida's programming.
 - Sida should replicate the good practice on linking humanitarian and development funding that it has developed in DRC to other countries to avoid missing opportunities to support recovery effectively.
- To facilitate a division of labour, Sida and the MFA should consider *the feasibility of establishing common advocacy strategies* on issues like pooled funding, clusters or recovery.
- Sida needs to *clarify the roles and responsibilities of field staff vis-à-vis humanitarian staff in Stockholm*. This should enable field staff to make more time for dealing with humanitarian issues, enable Sida humanitarian assistance to benefit from field presence and reduce the burden on staff members in Stockholm.
- The ATHA training programme has already proved useful for Sida staff members and NGO partners. Sida could build on this by providing *systematic ATHA training to all MFA and Sida staff working in the Conflict and Post-Conflict department as well as countries at risk of crisis*. This would mean that the Humanitarian team would have trained staff members to draw on to fol-

low up on humanitarian funding and also in responding to sudden onset crises.

- *Sida and the MFA should establish better communication links with Sida staff in the field* to ensure that field staff receives clear guidance on Sweden's policy stances on humanitarian issues and to make better use of field experience to inform Sweden's global advocacy and engagement in international fora.

8. *Build on existing work on local capacity*

- Since Sida cannot fund local NGOs directly, it should take steps to *enable local NGOs to have greater access to country-level pooled funding*. These include:
 - Working with OCHA to ensure that its administrative requirements for ERFs/HRFs (e.g., requiring proposals in English and US\$ bank accounts) do not become barriers to access
 - Encouraging OCHA Somalia to ensure that Somali NGOs do not lose their access to CHF funding due to new requirements and procedures
 - Encouraging OCHA to promote the ERF to Kenyan NGOs and provide guidance to enable them to access funding.
- Work on local capacity should be common ground between development and humanitarian staff, particularly in-country. So, Sida should *strengthen linkages between its humanitarian and development funding* (learning from the DRC experience) to ensure that the local capacities strengthened with humanitarian funding get longer-term support and that development funding strengthens government capacity for disaster management and humanitarian coordination.
 - Sida should work with other donors to strengthen the capacity of local government authorities to take a lead in coordinating emergency response activities where this is appropriate.
 - Sida will need to look for opportunities to strengthen government capacity on a country-by-country basis. For example, In Indonesia, it could consider supporting AusAID's plan to deliver disaster management training through provincial universities to build up a critical mass of trained government officials.

9. *Improve the quality of evidence and information and lesson learning*
- Sida should *prioritise information gathering, monitoring and communication for its staff in order to improve the quality of its evidence base.*
 - Sida needs to develop *systematic ways to capture and communicate good practice*, research findings and lessons learnt from the activities that it finances among its partners and other donors.
 - Sida should ensure that project documents are available online and searchable (even through a platform as simple as SharePoint) to ensure that all field staff can access them. This will enable them to follow up on projects more effectively.
 - Sida should ensure that the global level research that it finances is available and used at field level by requiring its research and methods partners to target their dissemination at actors in the field (e.g., through workshops, short briefings or good practice papers etc.) and actively promote lesson learning between its partners. Sida should require future research that it funds to demonstrate relevance to field priorities.
 - Sida should proactively seek opportunities to work with other donors in gathering, analysing and sharing information and developing common good practice.
 - It should establish a coalition of the willing with ECHO, DFID, the Netherlands, Scandinavian donors and CIDA to undertake a range of activities such as sharing field mission reports, funding information and conducting joint monitoring visits.
 - Sida should *develop a strategy to maximise the benefits from seminars and meetings to share good practice, lessons learnt and cutting edge research.*
 - During the humanitarian days in Stockholm (which should involve field as well as headquarters staff) Sida should
 - Request the research and training organisations that it finances to make annual presentations/provide training on the latest trends and developments in the humanitarian field so that its staff members can keep up-to-date and adapt their funding accordingly
 - Organise meetings around a theme each year
 - Draw on the experience of field staff members working on humanitarian issues to establish better communication of field realities particularly to inform the MFA.

Annex 1: Terms of Reference

EVALUATION OF SIDA'S HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Terms of Reference

15 January 2010

1 INTRODUCTION

Sweden's humanitarian assistance is a component of the Swedish development cooperation system, while recognizing its distinctive origins and unique characteristics. It is guided by the Government's Humanitarian Aid Policy (2004), based on international humanitarian law, its associated humanitarian principles as well as the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) principles. Sida's strategy for Humanitarian Assistance 2008 – 2010 (2007)²⁴ operationalises the policy.

Sida is a key actor of Sweden's humanitarian action, responsible for responding to appeals and for multi-bi and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) support. Other actors include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), providing core support to multilateral agencies and mechanisms and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), providing (Sida-funded) in-kind/technical/staff support to primarily United Nations (UN) humanitarian activities.

Annually, 12–13% of the development cooperation budget is allocated to humanitarian aid, including multilateral core contributions managed by the MFA. Swedish humanitarian assistance is carried out through financial support to a mix of organisations reflecting their comparative advantages, including the UN, the Red Cross Movement and NGOs, through a variety of mechanisms.

While Sida has undertaken a number of country, thematic and organisational evaluations of its humanitarian assistance during the last 10 years, no comprehensive review of Sida's humanitarian assistance has been undertaken. Sida is therefore carrying out a comprehensive, independent and objective evaluation of its humanitarian assistance during the period 2005 – 2010, with particular focus on the last three years of implementation of Sida's humanitarian strategy.

24 Government Decision No. UD2007/46656/SP, 19 December 2007.

Such an assessment is particularly pertinent after five years of implementation of humanitarian action in line with the Government's humanitarian policy, providing an opportunity to assess progress made against the Government's humanitarian policy, Sida's humanitarian strategy, as well as Sida's practice of humanitarian assistance against new developments in the sector and wider international context.

2 BACKGROUND

2.1 Policy framework for humanitarian action

Sweden's overarching Policy for Global Development (PGD) states that "humanitarian assistance is a significant element of the policy for global development", notes that "some features of humanitarian work distinguish it from long-term development cooperation". Humanitarian action has therefore been positioned as a distinct component of the Swedish development co-operation system and its unique characteristics are explicitly acknowledged in order to safeguard its neutrality and impartiality.

The Humanitarian Aid Policy (2004) remains the principal policy guidance for Swedish humanitarian action. It confirms the location of humanitarian action within a broader development context and reaffirms its distinctive origins and core principles. The policy indicates that the objective of Swedish humanitarian assistance is to help save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity for the benefit of people in need who are, or are at risk of becoming affected by armed conflicts, natural disasters or other disaster situations.

It outlines the goals and principles for Swedish humanitarian action, stressing the central role of the UN in directing and coordinating assistance (General Assembly Resolution 46/182), the special status of the international Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, especially the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) due to its role assigned to it by the Geneva Convention as well as the vital role of NGOs in implementing humanitarian action. The policy re-states and elaborates on commitments made under the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Initiative.

The Humanitarian Aid Policy (2004) was described in the OECD/DAC 2005 Peer Review as 'far reaching and advanced'. In 2009, the DAC Peer Review indicated that the policy was still relevant, but lacked specific objectives and measurable indicators as well as identification of

particular contributions of Swedish humanitarian action to the PGD or the policy coherence agenda outlined in Global Challenges.

2.2 Sida's strategy for humanitarian assistance

In December 2007, the Government approved the *Strategy for Sida's Humanitarian Assistance 2008–2010*. This document serves to operationalise Sweden's humanitarian aid policy. The primary goal of the strategy replicates the government policy but is given greater definition by eight sub-goals that broadly correspond to Sweden's GHD commitments. These include:

- 1) Ensuring timeliness, predictability and flexibility of humanitarian assistance;
- 2) Promoting needs-based humanitarian assistance;
- 3) Strengthening humanitarian coordination;
- 4) Strengthening local capacity;
- 5) Supporting the link between humanitarian contributions and prevention;
- 6) Reducing the gap between humanitarian support and recovery contributions;
- 7) Strengthening the humanitarian system; and
- 8) Strengthening the humanitarian principles.

The strategy includes a results matrix which specifies the relevant results by sub-goal. The strategy is, in turn, underpinned by operational guidelines for NGOs accessing Swedish humanitarian assistance that specify eligibility criteria, formats and follow-up. Since the finalisation of the humanitarian policy and strategy there are other policies and strategies related to cross-cutting issues that are relevant to humanitarian action, including in the areas of gender, sexual and gender based violence (SGBV), HIV/AIDS, environment and disaster risk reduction (DRR) that have been adopted²⁵. Furthermore,

25 For instance, the Sida 13-point action plan for integrating disaster risk reduction. *Reducing the Risk of Disasters: Sida's efforts to reduce poor people's vulnerability to hazards* (Sida, 2005) (the DRR policy is managed and overseen by Sida's Policy Team for Environment and Climate Change). Other policies, strategies and guidelines on gender environment and HIV/AIDS are applicable to Swedish humanitarian action. There are also specific instructions regarding incorporation of SGBV when assessing humanitarian projects. Sida's humanitarian strategy furthermore refers to the special needs of people living with HIV/AIDS and all implementing partners are responsible for carrying out an analysis of environmental impacts.

Sweden's Strategy for Multilateral Development Co-operation (2007) contains specific guidance for supporting humanitarian action by multilateral agencies. As the DAC Peer Review (2009) pointed out, however, while these policies and crosscutting issues are applicable to Swedish humanitarian action it is less evident how they are embedded into humanitarian decision making and management in practice.

2.3 Financing humanitarian action

Sida is a key actor of Sweden's humanitarian action, responsible for responding to appeals and for multi-bi and NGO support. Other actors include the MFA, providing core support to multilateral agencies and mechanisms, and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), providing (Sida-funded) in-kind technical staff support to primarily UN humanitarian activities. Sida²⁶ enjoys autonomy in allocating humanitarian resources. However, in practice there is a close dialogue with MFA in determining these allocations, though only at general level inter alia through the coordination fora of HUMSAM²⁷.

Annually, 12–13% of the development cooperation budget is allocated to humanitarian aid, including multilateral core contributions managed by the MFA. During the period 2005 – 2009, Sweden's net total humanitarian disbursements amounted to over 19 BSEK. This amount excludes many DRR activities and contributions to the UN Peacebuilding Fund²⁸, which supports stabilisation

26 Unlike development assistance, however, the locus for decision-making on humanitarian allocations remains primarily at Sida headquarters but input is sought from field offices in reaching these decisions. Neither the minister nor MFA can instruct Sida where and when to respond to crises. This is made possible by Swedish law, which enshrines implementing agencies' independence. It also ensures there is a separation from political imperatives and that available resources are allocated to the direst situations in accordance with the principle of proportionality whilst ensuring that less visible emergencies are not forgotten.

27 For the continuous follow-up on humanitarian and peace and security issues, Sida and MFA exchanges information within the HUMSAM coordinating committee, which meets on a bi-weekly basis. HUMSAM is led by Sida's Department for Human Security and its members include Sida's Department for Conflict and Post-conflict countries, Sida's Humanitarian Team and MFA's section on humanitarian policy and conflict (SP).

28 Sweden has made multi-year pledges to the UN Peace-building Fund amounting to 400 MSEK in total.

activities that link humanitarian relief, recovery and development assistance in countries emerging from conflict.

Swedish Humanitarian Aid 2005–2009 (MSEK)					
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
MFA	1468	1593	1439	1739	1964
Sida	1877	2012	2064	2419	2675
Total	3345	3605	3503	4158	4639

Sweden carries out its humanitarian assistance through financial support to a mix of external organisations reflecting their comparative advantages, including the UN, the International Red Cross movement, MSB and NGOs.

Sweden supports the central and unique role of the UN in leading and coordinating humanitarian contributions. Sida supports the UN through responding to appeals. In 2009, Sida channelled about 50% of its humanitarian assistance through the UN. This support is complemented by MFA's coreorganisational support to UN entities, including the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP), UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR) and UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In 2009, key UN recipients of Sweden's (MFA and Sida) humanitarian assistance included UNHCR, WFP, UNRWA, OCHA, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO).

Sweden also allocates assistance through pooled funding mechanisms. Sida allocates assistance through country-based pooled funding mechanisms, such as the Common Humanitarian Funds (CHF) in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Emergency/Humanitarian Response Funds in among others Afghanistan, Colombia, Ethiopia, Haiti, opt and Somalia. MFA supports the global Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) – a stand-by fund managed by OCHA and accessible by all UN operational humanitarian agencies. As a result, in 2009, Sweden was the largest donor to OCHA, fourth

largest donor to the UNHCR and the third largest contributor to the CERF as well as to the CHF.

The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement holds a special position in humanitarian work, particularly the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) due to its assigned task of monitoring and promoting international humanitarian law. Sida responds to the ICRC and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRCs) appeals and has entered a humanitarian framework agreement with the Swedish Red Cross. In 2009, about 25% of Sida's humanitarian assistance was provided to the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. To complement these efforts, MFA supports the ICRC with core funding. As a result, Sweden is the fifth largest donor to the ICRC.

NGOs are significant implementing partners of Sida's humanitarian action. Their roots in the civil society within countries affected by humanitarian situations give them a unique role to reach out to those affected. Swedish and international NGOs that meet Sida's basic requirements for delivering humanitarian assistance may apply for funding provided that they comply with established codes of conduct.

After assessing an organisation's capacity and policy, Sida may, following consultations with MFA, approve humanitarian framework agreements to established partners. In 2009, Sida had entered into humanitarian framework agreements with 3 NGO partners, MSF, DRC and NRC in addition to its framework agreements with ICRC, the Swedish Red Cross/IFRC and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB). Sida is seeking to expand this modality during 2010.

Organisations judged by Sida to be particularly suitable can obtain special unallocated funds Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), which, in accordance with existing guidelines and Sida's approval in each individual case, may be used for limited and quick response (timeliness) to rapid onset disasters. In 2009, Sida had entered into separate RRM agreements with 6 NGO partners, PMU (Pentecostal Mission), Church of Sweden, Diakonia, Save the Children Sweden, Plan Sweden and the Swedish Mission Council. Essentially these agencies have the discretion to allocate pre-positioned funds for emergency operations in the immediate aftermath of crises with minimal recourse to Sida; however subject to formal approval by Sida. The frameworks above also include RRM funds.

3 PURPOSE, USE AND USERS OF THE EVALUATION

The purpose of the evaluation is to carry out an independent assessment of Sida's humanitarian assistance during the period 2005–2010 (with particular focus on the last three years of implementation of Sida's humanitarian strategy), including Sida's strategy for humanitarian assistance, organisation, management, and mechanisms for implementation of humanitarian assistance.

The evaluation will provide lessons for policy, strategy and programme improvement and primarily serve as an input for the revision of Sida's strategy for humanitarian assistance.

It will particularly focus on Sida's strengths and comparative advantages and how those could be further strengthened. It could furthermore provide an input for the MFA's revision of the Government's humanitarian policy during 2010.

The evaluation is to be formative with a strong learning element, by generating knowledge and lessons for strategy and programme development. The evaluation will focus on results whilst also taking into account processes involved in the planning and delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Primary intended users of the evaluation are Sida policy and operational staff and managers, staff at the MFA and embassies. Secondary users of the evaluation include relevant Swedish and international NGOs, multilateral organisations and international donors.

4 EVALUATION QUESTIONS/ISSUES

The evaluation is to be based on the OECD/DAC Evaluation Criteria²⁹. Questions and issues³⁰ to be covered by the evaluation are presented below. These are not exhaustive and the evaluation team is

29 See 'Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies', OECD / DAC (1999). 'Evaluating Humanitarian Action using the OECD / DAC criteria', ALNAP (2006) and Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities. OECD / DAC (2008).

30 Issues and questions build on evaluations and reviews of humanitarian assistance undertaken by other international donors and agencies. including the Netherlands (2005). Finland (2005). Belgium (2008). Switzerland (2008) and Australia (2009).

expected to further elaborate on these during the course of the evaluation process and in the inception report (see below).

Relevance

To what extent was Sida's humanitarian assistance provided in line with the Swedish humanitarian policy and Sida's humanitarian strategy objectives, goals and procedures, and the needs, priorities and rights of the affected populations?

Issues to consider:

- Interaction, consistency and responsiveness to new humanitarian developments (international humanitarian law, humanitarian principles and humanitarian policy at the international level).
- Design and implementation of humanitarian assistance based on needs assessments and priorities of the affected populations.
- Consistency with basic principles such as impartiality and independence.
- Type of activities supported and modalities of implementation (channels, implementing partners, agreements), including complementarity of Sida's assistance with that provided by MFA and other donors.
- Level of access secured to groups in need.

Effectiveness/Efficiency

To what extent did Sida's humanitarian assistance provided achieve its purpose?

Issues to consider:

- Realization of the immediate needs of the affected populations, including with faith-based organizations.
- Assistance and protection taking into consideration specific needs of women, children and elderly.
- Mechanisms, channels and implementing partners for delivering humanitarian assistance, including organization, management, monitoring and evaluation structures.
- Thematic areas, including health, water and sanitation, education, food security, protection and early recovery.
- Adherence to the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) guidelines and principles on humanitarian activities and Sphere standards.
- Adherence to the GHD principles and links to the application of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, and the

Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile Situations .

- Criteria used for selecting implementing partners.

Were the financial resources and other inputs effectively used to achieve results?

Issues to consider:

- Aid management, programme and project cycle, staffing, tasks, agreement modalities, responsibilities and cooperation between Sida and the MFA.
- Efficient use of financial and staff resources and other inputs used to achieve results, including complementarity with other actors.

What have been the wider effects of the humanitarian interventions?

To try to establish, where possible, the immediate wider effects of the support provided, the following issues may be addressed:

- Effects of humanitarian assistance in terms of reducing the immediate vulnerability of the affected population and fostering preparedness and people's coping mechanisms.
- Effects of humanitarian assistance on the emergency situation of conflict, including relations between recipients of aid and other vulnerable groups.

Connectedness

To what extent have humanitarian activities taken into account the specific context in the recipient countries with their longer-term and interconnected challenges, including link to prevention and longer-term development? And to what extent has development efforts built on humanitarian gains and demonstrated flexibility in these contexts?

Issues to consider:

- Initiatives to support the transition from humanitarian assistance to long-term development activities.
- Needs and conflict analysis informing the choice and the design of interventions.
- Institutional capacity-building as part of assistance provided.
- Linkages between relief, recovery and development (decision-making processes, exit strategy, handover to government departments / development agencies, adequate funding post-response, country teams include both development and humanitarian staff), local capacity-building.

Coherence

To what extent was Sida's humanitarian action coherent with that of other actors?

Assessment of coherence should focus on the extent to which different actors (including developmental, military and political actors) were coherent, complementary or contradictory. Issues to consider:

- Coherence with policies and interventions other than humanitarian support and possible effects of diverging interests, including longer term development objectives and goals in country or regional programs /strategies.
- Coherence with those of other actors and partners, including country government, UN agencies, NGOs etc.

Coordination

How effective has coordination at policy, strategic and implementation levels been?

Issues to consider:

- Mechanisms, processes and incentives for coordination.
- Coordination and working arrangements with partners.
- Capacity building of humanitarian coordination agency/ bodies. promotion of action-oriented and effective coordination, globally and in-country.

5 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

5.1 Data collection methods and analytical tools

The evaluation will include a combination of data collection methods and analytical tools, including: (i) structured literature and document review; (ii) semi-structured key informant interviews and focus group discussions; and (iii) stakeholder analysis and organisational mapping. Where applicable, survey work may also be undertaken. The evaluation team should present and further elaborate on the approach and methodology in the tender.

The evaluation team shall take care to establish the reliability and consistency of the information by triangulation, e.g. comparing and checking similar information from various sources.

In order to promote learning, the evaluation team shall propose suitable and effective ways for feedback of the evaluation findings and lessons to stakeholders through a participatory approach. The

evaluation team shall present in the tender how they intend to promote a participatory approach throughout the evaluation process.

Structured literature and document review

A structured literature and document review can be used to compile and assess past reviews and evaluations and ensure that existing findings and lessons are taken into account. The review can also aim to answer specific questions to inform the analytical process. Documentation will include policy and strategy documents, project and programme documentation, reviews and evaluation reports. The literature listed under Annex A can be used as a point of departure, but it is expected that additional documentation will be collected during the evaluation process.

Key informant interviews and group discussions

Key informant interviews should be conducted as individual interviews or with small groups on the basis of semi-structured interview guides. Issues to be probed can follow from the major issues listed under section 4 above, and the findings from the structured literature review. Key informant views should be cross-checked and triangulated.

Key informants will be selected from the following categories of stakeholders:

- Sida in the field and at HQ (including the humanitarian team and conflict-post conflict teams, human security policy department, and other policy teams including environment and climate change, gender, health)
- MFA
- MSB
- Other international donors and multilateral organisations
- Red Cross family
- Swedish NGO representatives
- International and local implementing partners
- Beneficiaries at programme and project sites

Further, Sida is undertaking a review of mine action at the same time as the evaluation of humanitarian assistance. Synergies shall be sought between the two processes.

Sida will inform the relevant stakeholders about the evaluation, its purpose, and use. It is, however, the responsibility of the evalua-

tion team to make all practical arrangements for field visits and interviews.

Stakeholder analysis and organisational mapping

In addition to the structured literature review, key informant interviews and focus group discussions it is proposed to use stakeholder analysis and organisational mapping. A stakeholder analysis can be used to determine the interests and influence of different actors in relation to a policy or strategy. Stakeholder analysis can be conducted with individual key informants or groups. Organisational mapping can be used to trace the cause-effect flow of resources and decision making following policy and strategic investment decisions. It provides an overview of the formal and informal institutional framework and organisational practices in which decision making takes place. The analysis can also generate findings on how policy and strategy stakeholders have identified and managed risks and opportunities.

5.2 Evaluation phases

It is proposed that the evaluation includes four phases: (i) inception phase; (ii) review of policy, strategy, organisation and management structures; (iii) country case studies and field work; and (iv) analysis and reporting.

Inception phase

The inception phase should ensure that Sida, the MFA, and other stakeholders through a participatory approach have an opportunity to feed in key questions and issues they want the evaluation to address and contribute as appropriate to the evaluation process. The inception phase should also serve as an opportunity to determine the focus areas and issues for the evaluation.

The inception report shall be submitted three weeks after signing of the contract. It should clearly state the purpose and objectives of the evaluation, why the evaluation is being done, who the primary intended users of the evaluation are, and how these will be involved in the evaluation process. The inception report should present a full approach and methodology, including detailed description of the methodology, research strategy, and analytical approach, including evaluation questions, description of sources of evidence, and data collection process and methods. It should also include a work and

time plan, with key dates for field work, report submissions and dissemination activities.

Review of policy, strategy, organisation and management structures

The second phase of the evaluation will focus on a review of the relevance of the policy and strategy objectives and goals, and assess broadly the progress made in implementing the humanitarian policy and strategy since 2005. In particular, the review will assess (i) to what extent humanitarian assistance was implemented in accordance with the policy and strategy objectives and goals; (ii) to what extent humanitarian programs are supported by current mechanisms and management systems; and (iii) to what extent the current systems and mechanisms allows for the integration of key lessons across the humanitarian programs.

The review will include desk based research, key informant interviews and group discussions in Stockholm, telephone interviews with selected international stakeholders and actors, and survey work as applicable. The evaluation team will present an intermediary report with preliminary recommendations, which will be discussed with the management and reference groups.

The review will distinguish between the two main types of disaster and emergencies: natural disasters (floods, droughts, earthquakes, etc.) and man-made disasters or complex emergencies (conflicts), while also taking into account the increasing trend of inter-linked and simultaneous crises affecting already vulnerable populations.

The review will include:

- i. An analysis of the policy and strategy framework for Swedish humanitarian assistance, including the relevance of the humanitarian policy and strategy objectives and goals.
- ii. An analysis of the organisation, management, and implementation structures for Swedish humanitarian assistance (including humanitarian assistance funded bilaterally and multilaterally).
- iii. A brief overview of the international context, organisation and management of humanitarian assistance, including key institutions, actors, trends in volumes, and main concepts and issues.
- iv. An overview of other policies and cross cutting issues relevant for humanitarian assistance, for instance gender, HIV/AIDS, disaster risk reduction, environment and climate change, as well as

state and peace-building and recovery, transition financing, protection of refugees and IDPs, mine action, food aid and food security etc.

- v. An overview of funding and distribution of Swedish humanitarian assistance (main instruments, volume, channels, geographic sectoral/thematic distribution, number of programme/projects and size, contributions to CAP and flash appeals etc.).

Issues to be covered by the review include:

- Relevance of the policy and strategy objectives and goals taking into account the context in which humanitarian programs are implemented.
- What priorities set by the policy and strategy were not adequately addressed, and why?
- To what extent were the policy and strategy coherent with other policies and strategies that mention humanitarian assistance (e.g. gender, HIV/AIDS, environment, disaster risk reduction etc.)?
- To what extent are funding decisions based on technical review and needs based assessment?
- To what extent have requirements for monitoring and evaluation under funding agreements been implemented?
- Were there any systematic attempts to reflect on lessons, or feed them back for improved programming?
- What are the key experiences and lessons learnt during the period of implementation? What is working well? What preliminary recommendations could be made for Sida's new humanitarian strategy?

Country case studies and field work

The third phase of the evaluation will involve twolthree country case studies, including two weeks field work in country. Based on the following criterias (i) type of disaster and emergency (e.g. natural disaster and conflict); (ii) the level of expenditure; (iii) the range of assistance offered; and (iv) the level of presence and engagement in country, possible country case studies may include CAR, DRC, Indonesia, Philippines, Kenya, Somalia or Sudan.

Activities to be covered by the case studies will be selected to represent a cross-section of the various types of humanitarian interventions financed and implemented through different channels and partners.

The country case studies will include:

- i. A brief analysis of the context and background of the crisis.
- ii. An analysis of the way the response is/was organised.
- iii. An analysis of Sida's response in terms of coordination with the humanitarian aid actors and donors, authorities and beneficiaries.
- iv. An analysis of the choice and implementation of interventions.

The case studies will be implemented using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. Data and information will be collected through desk research and field work. The desk research will include a review and synthesis of findings from existing reviews, evaluations and relevant project and programme documents. Field work will involve a variety of methods, including key informant interviews and group discussions. Survey work may also be undertaken where applicable.

During field work the evaluation team will meet with representatives from Sida, the Swedish embassy and implementing partners, other donors and multilateral organisations, representatives from central and local authorities, NGOs, and beneficiaries of the interventions.

At the end of the field work, a de-briefing will be provided in the field and to the management group and reference group in Stockholm. Country case study reports with provisional conclusions and recommendations will be prepared and presented three weeks after the end of field work.

Analysis and reporting

The final phase of the evaluation involves the integration and analysis of the results of the various phases of the evaluation, including the review and country case studies. Validation of findings should be done by comparison of the review and country case studies, as well as triangulation and additional fact-finding to close the existing gaps. The evaluation and the reporting must follow the OECD/DAC's evaluation quality standards (see Annex A). The evaluation report shall be no more than 50-pages long, excluding an executive summary and annexes. Country case study reports will be annexed to the evaluation report. Possible limitations of methods and findings should be discussed in the report. The report should also discuss lessons that can be drawn from the findings and reflect on possible

adjustments to Sida's strategy, organisation and management of humanitarian assistance. Annexes to the report should give more detailed information, including on the context, results, and methods used in the evaluation (questionnaire / checklist and material from the focus group discussions etc.). See Sida's Evaluation Manual (2007) for further guidance on the report structure.'

The management and reference group will provide feedback on factual errors, conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned. The report should reflect these comments and acknowledge any substantive disagreements.

The report will be published and distributed electronically and in hard copy. It is the responsibility of the evaluation team to ensure that the report is professionally edited (checked for grammar, typos, formatting, consistency in presentation of data and references) and of publishable quality.

6 TIMING, REPORTING AND DELIVERABLES

One week after contract start the evaluation team will meet with the management group for a 'kick off meeting. Three weeks after signing of the contract a draft inception report should be submitted and presented to the management group. A draft intermediary report following the second phase of the evaluation should be submitted end of May 2010. Country field work will be undertaken during July – August 2010. A feedback/progress report meeting will be arranged with the management group after the end of the field work. Draft country reports will be submitted three weeks after the end of field work. A draft evaluation report will be submitted and presented in October 2010. Sida shall submit comments on draft reports within ten days after receiving it from the evaluation team.

Dissemination activities will be discussed with the management group and carried out during November – December 2010. The evaluation team should be prepared to present their findings to Sida, MFA and others as appropriate. Dissemination activities will be determined on completion of the intermediary report, country case study reports and synthesis report.

The evaluation team will work against the deadlines set out in these Terms of Reference and the timeliness of the delivery of

reports is of importance. Any changes to these deliverables, for instance, issues arising during the inception phase must be agreed with the management group. Team composition and timelines will be agreed prior to commencement of each of the country studies, including any follow up visit to the country if major issues remain unresolved.

Activity / Deliverables	Timing
Inception phase	March – April 2010
'Kick off meeting' with the management and reference group	One week after contract start
Submission and presentation of draft inception report	Three weeks after contract start
Submission of final inception report	One week after receiving comments
Review of policy, strategy, organisation	April – June 2010
Submission and presentation of draft intermediary report	End of May
	comments
Country case studies and field work	July – August 2010
Meeting with management and reference group for feedback/progress report from field work	End of field work
Submission and presentation of draft country reports	Three weeks after end of field work
Submission of revised country reports	One week after receiving comments
Analysis, reporting and dissemination	September – December 2010
Submission and presentation of draft synthesis report	October
Submission of revised synthesis report	One week after receiving comments
Dissemination activities	November – December

7 TEAM AND QUALIFICATIONS

The consultant/organisation is responsible for identifying and engaging an evaluation team appropriate to each country context from within their company/organisation/consortium. The consultants need to show they have experience from the relevant countries and regions. The organisation of the evaluation is the responsibility of the evaluation team and should be specified and explained clearly in the tender. The team should include at least one developing country national as a full team member. The evaluation team must have strong evaluation skills, understanding of the local context and be multidisciplinary (see Invitation to Tender, section 7.4).

8 EXPECTED LEVEL OF INPUTS AND BUDGET

It is estimated that the team leader will provide around 4.5 person months of services. Other team members will provide a total estimated input of around 5 person months of services. The total cost (fees and reimbursables) must not exceed SEK 2,500,000.

9 ORGANISATION AND MANAGEMENT

The organisations and management structure of the evaluation will include a management group and a reference group.

The management group will include representatives from Sida's humanitarian team and conflict-post-conflict department, the departments for human security and evaluation, and representatives from the MFA. It will be responsible for the day to day management of the evaluation, including contracting of the evaluation team, quality assurance, approval of inception report, intermediary report, country case study reports, and the final report.

The reference group will include experts from across the institutional spectrum (academia, civil society, etc). Acting as advisors, the members of the reference groups will assist the management group and guide the evaluation process from an independent and impartial perspective. The reference group will be consulted before finalising the inception report, intermediary report, country case study reports, and the final report.

The basic principles for the organisation and management structure are to:

- Safeguard the independence, credibility and quality of the research and evaluation process;
- Ensure an efficient research and evaluation process (within time and budget);
- Ensure appropriate involvement, cooperation and ownership of main stakeholders;
- Ensure that the researchers and evaluators access the needed information and stakeholders; and
- Ensure that the results of the research and evaluation process are disseminated and followed up on.

ANNEX A: LIST OF KEY DOCUMENTS

- *Government's Humanitarian Aid Policy (GoS, 2004) – Sida's strategy for Humanitarian Assistance 2008–2010*
- *Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles*
- *OECD/DAC Peer-Review of Sweden's development assistance 2009*
- *OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards (2009)*

Annex 2: Supporting Evidence

This annex provides supporting evidence for the findings presented in the main body of the report. For ease of reference, the section numbers and titles below correspond to the section numbers and titles in the main report.

1.2 Evolution of Sida’s humanitarian assistance and its strategic context

The following is a summary of the 8 sub-goals of Sida’s current humanitarian strategy. They are all drawn from the GHD principles, which are listed after Sida’s goals to facilitate comparison.

1 Promoting the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship

Sida’s humanitarian assistance shall be characterised by timeliness, predictability and flexibility. Sida will also prioritise active donor coordination at all levels. Sida shall only support organisations that work with a high level of competence and quality and comply with established codes of conduct. After assessing an organisation’s capacity and policy, Sida may, following consultations in HUMSAM, approve humanitarian framework agreements to established partners. Sida may also consider other agreement forms with humanitarian actors with the aim of finding mechanisms to meet humanitarian needs quickly and effectively. Sida shall encourage and support a long-term perspective in its partner organisations’ programming.

2 Promoting needs based humanitarian assistance

Sida shall ensure that the humanitarian assistance is based on needs and well-founded needs analyses. Special importance shall be attached to support for “Forgotten Crises”.

3 Strengthening humanitarian coordination

Sida shall support existing multilateral mechanisms for the coordination and implementation of international humanitarian assistance, with the aim of strengthening the effectiveness of the collective international response to humanitarian crises. In this respect, Sida

shall fund humanitarian activities by responding to appeals from UN humanitarian organisations, the ICRC and the IFRC.

Sida shall give high priority to promoting strategic and operative coordination between the different humanitarian actors, i.e. national authorities, humanitarian organisations and donor countries, with each one contributing according to its special roles, mandates and conditions.

4 Strengthening local capacity

Where consistent with the humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality, and where reasonable with regard to the urgency of a contribution, Sida shall prioritise financial support to organisations with local partners and which support the use of the country's available local structures and resources to handle crisis situations.

Extremely vulnerable groups shall be given special priority by Sida based in humanitarian crises. It is also vital that these target groups as far as possible participate in formulating and influencing expected support.

5 Supporting the link between humanitarian contributions and prevention

In accordance with Sida's strategic guidelines, DRR activities should primarily be financed from the development appropriation. However, a portion of the humanitarian appropriation may be used to build international emergency preparedness, especially through the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, within the framework of the UN humanitarian agencies and through the MSB.

6 Reducing the gap between humanitarian support and recovery contributions

Sida shall maintain a preparedness to finance early recovery and other activities in the transition between disaster conditions and long term development.

7 Strengthening the humanitarian system

Sida shall encourage and support qualified research and methods development in the humanitarian field. Sida shall contribute to strengthening the Swedish and international humanitarian capacity through strategic secondments of qualified Swedish humanitarian staff.

8 Strengthening the humanitarian principles

Sida shall participate in and support interventions to disseminate knowledge and deepen insight into the rights of civilians and the duties and responsibilities of conflicting and occupying parties according to IHL.

Sida shall account for and promote an understanding of the reasons for and principles of Swedish support for international humanitarian action to the Swedish general public.

Principles and good practice of humanitarian donorship

Endorsed in Stockholm, 17 June 2003 by Germany, Australia, Belgium, Canada, the European Commission, Denmark, the United States, Finland, France, Ireland, Japan, Luxemburg, Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland.

Objectives and definition of humanitarian action

- The objectives of humanitarian action are to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations.
- Humanitarian action should be guided by the humanitarian principles of *humanity*, meaning the centrality of saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found; *impartiality*, meaning the implementation of actions solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations; *neutrality*, meaning that humanitarian action must not favour any side in an armed conflict or other dispute where such action is carried out; and *independence*, meaning the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.
- Humanitarian action includes the protection of civilians and those no longer taking part in hostilities, and the provision of food, water and sanitation, shelter, health services and other items of assistance, undertaken for the benefit of affected people and to facilitate the return to normal lives and livelihoods.

General principles

- Respect and promote the implementation of international humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights.
- While reaffirming the primary responsibility of states for the victims of humanitarian emergencies within their own borders, strive to ensure flexible and timely funding, on the basis of the collective obligation of striving to meet humanitarian needs.
- Allocate humanitarian funding in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments.
- Request implementing humanitarian organisations to ensure, to the greatest possible extent, adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response.
- Strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises, with the goal of ensuring that governments and local communities are better able to meet their responsibilities and co-ordinate effectively with humanitarian partners.
- Provide humanitarian assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development, striving to ensure support, where appropriate, to the maintenance and return of sustainable livelihoods and transitions from humanitarian relief to recovery and development activities.
- Support and promote the central and unique role of the United Nations in providing leadership and co-ordination of international humanitarian action, the special role of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the vital role of the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and non-governmental organisations in implementing humanitarian action.

Good practices in donor financing, management and accountability

(a) Funding

- Strive to ensure that funding of humanitarian action in new crises does not adversely affect the meeting of needs in ongoing crises.
- Recognising the necessity of dynamic and flexible response to changing needs in humanitarian crises, strive to ensure predict-

ability and flexibility in funding to United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and to other key humanitarian organisations

- While stressing the importance of transparent and strategic priority-setting and financial planning by implementing organisations, explore the possibility of reducing, or enhancing the flexibility of, earmarking, and of introducing longer-term funding arrangements.
- Contribute responsibly, and on the basis of burden-sharing, to United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals and to International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement appeals, and actively support the formulation of Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP) as the primary instrument for strategic planning, prioritisation and co-ordination in complex emergencies.

(b) Promoting standards and enhancing implementation

- Request that implementing humanitarian organisations fully adhere to good practice and are committed to promoting accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in implementing humanitarian action.
- Promote the use of Inter-Agency Standing Committee guidelines and principles on humanitarian activities, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the 1994 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief.
- Maintain readiness to offer support to the implementation of humanitarian action, including the facilitation of safe humanitarian access.
- Support mechanisms for contingency planning by humanitarian organisations, including, as appropriate, allocation of funding, to strengthen capacities for response.
- Affirm the primary position of civilian organisations in implementing humanitarian action, particularly in areas affected by armed conflict. In situations where military capacity and assets are used to support the implementation of humanitarian action, ensure that such use is in conformity with international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles, and recognises the leading role of humanitarian organisations.
- Support the implementation of the 1994 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief and the 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to

Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies.

(c) Learning and accountability

- Support learning and accountability initiatives for the effective and efficient implementation of humanitarian action.
- Encourage regular evaluations of international responses to humanitarian crises, including assessments of donor performance.
- Ensure a high degree of accuracy, timeliness, and transparency in donor reporting on official humanitarian assistance spending, and encourage the development of standardised formats for such reporting.

1.3 Analysis of Sida's humanitarian funding: 2005–2010

Figure 8 shows the share of funding requested in UN Appeals for Africa and the rest of the world. This demonstrates that requests for Africa are a large percentage of UN appeals, averaging 74.7% from 2005–2009. The percentage requested for Africa peaked in 2006–07 at around 88% before decreasing to 66.6% in 2009. However, the actual amount requested has increased from US\$4.5 billion in 2007 to US\$5.5 billion in 2008 and almost US\$6.5 billion in 2009.




Figure 8: Shares of UN Appeal requests for Africa and the rest of the world: 2005–2009




Figure 9: Shares of UN Appeal requests for natural disasters and complex emergencies: 2005–2009

Figure 9 shows the shares of UN Appeals for natural disasters vs. complex emergencies, including Consolidated and Flash Appeals. In a few cases, such as Zimbabwe, an appeal was for both natural disasters and a complex emergency. These have been classified as either natural disaster or complex emergency depending on which type of emergency predominates in the appeal (the Zimbabwe appeal is classified as complex emergency). Figure 10 demonstrates that complex emergencies make up the overwhelming share of Appeal requests (2005 was a notable exception due to the tsunami). In 2006 and 2009, they comprised 97% and 98% of the total amounts requested (though, due to the substantial increase in the total amount requested through Appeals, the actual amount in 2006 was US\$4.9 billion while the amount requested in 2009 was US\$9.5 billion). The preponderance of complex emergencies is not surprising because the UN only launches appeals for major crises. So, the very large number of small and medium-sized disasters highlighted in Figure 2 would not feature in the Appeals.


2.3.4 Strengthening local capacity

During Sida's Humanitarian Days in May 2010, the evaluation team conducted a participatory exercise with those attending the meeting. This included staff members from Sida (the humanitarian team as

well as a few country team directors), MFA (from Stockholm as well as the Geneva and New York Missions) and MSB. The team asked the participants to identify the key elements of humanitarian assistance and to rate the extent to which Team Sweden was delivering on each element. The results from this exercise are presented below. There is a question mark against local capacity strengthening because the participants did not know how well Sida was delivering on this, even though it is a strategic goal.

The diagram of the results of the spokes technique shows that some of the elements are linked, e.g., security and access for humanitarian actors depends on host country will to a large extent. Also, Sida staff from Stockholm need to be able to travel to the field and follow up on previous projects in order to make timely funding decisions for the following year (particularly on the CAPs).

The evaluation team also asked Sida's partners and aid recipients in case study countries to identify the key elements of humanitarian assistance and to rate how the international community was performing in delivering on them. It then compared the results from the different stakeholders against the Humanitarian Day results. These are presented in the individual country case study reports and have been used as the basis for suggesting revised goals for Sida's humanitarian strategy (as presented in Figure 10).



2.3.10 Suggested goals for Sida's revised humanitarian strategy

1. Promoting GHD principles	Holistic programming, complementing funding with advocacy, policy work and joint research
2. Promoting needs based humanitarian assistance	2. Response that is appropriate to the severity of the crisis
3. Strengthening humanitarian coordination	1. Providing timely, flexibility, predictable funding that supports independence and longer-term approaches
4. Strengthening local capacity	1. Working with effective partners, based on performance and results achieved
5. Supporting the link between humanitarian contributions and prevention	6. Sustainable programming that takes account of recovery and local coping capacities
6. Reducing the gap betw humanitarian support and recovery contributions	4. Support local capacity and constructive working relationships with local authorities
7. Strengthening the humanitarian system	5. Supporting and advocate for prevention peace-building, disaster preparedness and risk reduction
8. Strengthening humanitarian principles	3. Strengthen humanitarian coordination
	7. Strengthening the humanitarian system, and promoting international standards and lesson-learning
	Strong beneficiary engagement, including consultation and feedback

Figure 10: Sida's current and proposed humanitarian goals

Figure 10 above shows Sida's current humanitarian goals on the left and the proposed goals on the right. The goals are both colour and number coded to show the relationship between them. This demonstrates that all the existing goals are reflected in the proposed goals, with the exception of goal 8, strengthening humanitarian principles, which is not represented as a goal because humanitarian principles and international humanitarian law already underpin Sweden's humanitarian policy and Sida's humanitarian strategy. Goal 1, promoting GHD principles, is turned into two more detailed goals to highlight precisely what Sida seeks to achieve through this goal. Based on the results of the spokes technique with Sida's partners as well as crisis-affected communities, the evaluators propose two additional goals – complementing Sida's funding with policy, advocacy and research in an integrated manner and ensuring strong beneficiary engagement.

3.1 Management at headquarters

Table 2 below lists Sida's humanitarian and development budgets from 2005–2009 and shows humanitarian aid as a percentage of the total budget each year (the ToR listed the figures for humanitarian aid and Sida provided the development aid figures).

Table 2: Sida's humanitarian funding as a share of its total budget: 2005–2009 (in MSEK)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Humanitarian aid	1,877	2,012	2,064	2,419	2,675
Development aid	14,644	15,515	15,893	14,497	15,760
Total budget	16,521	17,527	17,957	16,916	18,435
Humanitarian aid as % of total	11.36%	11.48%	12.98%	14.3%	14.5%

Table 3 below shows the portfolios managed by a random sample of 2 humanitarian and 2 development staff members in 2010.

Table 3: Sample portfolios of humanitarian and development staff

Staff member	Budget managed	Number of grants
Humanitarian staff 1	SEK 1.1 billion	56
Humanitarian staff 2	SEK 351.5 million	45
Development staff 1	SEK 136 million	12
Development staff 2	SEK 134 million	14

Annex 3: Methodology

The inception report for this evaluation outlined the methodology that the team would use. This section outlines how the team applied the proposed methodology. As summarised in the introduction, DI conducted this evaluation in phases.

The *inception phase* involved kick-off meetings in Stockholm with Sida and MFA staff members and a participatory stakeholder analysis with the humanitarian team. Based on the consultations, the team prepared the *inception report* that has guided the rest of the evaluation.

The *policy, management and organisation review phase* focused on Sida's internal management systems and procedures as well as its relationships with partners at headquarters level. In this phase, the evaluation team consulted Sida, MFA and MSB staff members in Stockholm and conducted a focus group with Swedish NGOs. It also undertook interviews with Sida partners at headquarters level (UN agencies, international NGOs with framework agreements, and research and methods organisations, including ATHA). One team member facilitated a consultation with donors around the ECOSOC in New York on shared challenges with implementing the GHD principles. This phase resulted in the *interim report*, which outlined ways in which Sida could address the administrative challenges that the evaluation identified.

The team undertook *country case studies* in the *DRC, Kenya* (including consultations with aid agencies working in *Somalia*) and *Indonesia*. On the basis of four criteria listed in the ToR, Sida shortlisted Central African Republic, DRC, Indonesia, Philippines, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan as possible case studies. DI used the following criteria to select DRC, Indonesia and Kenya/Somalia from this list (based on discussion with Sida):

- a. A geographical spread, i.e., Africa vs. Asia. So at least one case study country should be in Asia and two in Africa as this is a major focus for Sida. Since Sida contributes more humanitarian aid to Indonesia than to the Philippines, this seemed the logical choice. Also, Sida does not have a field presence in Indonesia so

this provided an opportunity to examine how this affects working methods compared with countries where Sida has a presence.

- b. The existence of a country-level pooled funding mechanism to be able to compare this as a channel of funding with bilateral funding. The DRC has been one of the largest recipients of CERF funding and it also has a sizable CHF and the Rapid Response to RRMP mechanism.
- c. By type of disaster, i.e., natural disaster vs. conflict. Selecting Kenya means that the team can cover both Somalia as a conflict situation and Kenya as a country mainly affected by natural disaster (though it was also affected by post-election violence in December 2007). This is because all the international actors operating in Somalia are based in Nairobi.

In each case, team members spent around two weeks in country consulting Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators, Sida staff in Embassies, donor representatives, UN agencies, NGOs (international and local), pooled fund mechanism administrators and affected populations. Excluding affected communities, the team consulted




Figure 11: Framework of Analysis

around 175 individuals across the case studies (Annex 4 lists those consulted throughout the evaluation). Team members visited around 26 Sida-funded projects in DRC, Kenya and Indonesia. The security situation in Somalia meant that the team did not travel into the country to consult local actors and beneficiaries but it did interview Somali refugees in the Dadaab camps in Kenya. The team produced *four case study reports* (one per country) that assessed the extent to which Sida is delivering on the 8 sub-goals of its current humanitarian strategy.

The interim and case study reports are organised around Sida's strategic sub-goals but the inception report presented a framework of analysis to guide data collection and analysis that went well beyond the humanitarian goals, as figure 11 below demonstrates. This report has been organised around the building blocks of the framework, with each section addressing the questions listed below.

Evaluation questions

The evaluation questions listed below are based on those in the ToR but reflect the introductory discussions that the team had in Stockholm on 29–31 March. They are organised under the headings in the framework of analysis rather than those used in the ToR because these provide a clearer structure and ensure that the questions cover the issues that Sida has identified as most important. DI translated these questions into a more detailed questionnaire that team members used for semi-structured interviews.

Guiding Principles

1. To what extent is Sida's humanitarian assistance in line with Swedish humanitarian policy and the 8 sub-goals of Sida's humanitarian strategy? Detailed questions on each sub-goal, including promoting needs-based humanitarian assistance, supporting local capacity etc.
2. To what extent has Sida implemented the GHD principles (including those not reflected in the 8 sub-goals of the strategy)? How does it monitor compliance with the GHD principles? What lessons has Sida learnt from its efforts to implement GHD principles and how could it improve its implementation in future?
3. How does Sida's humanitarian aid fit in with the different sets of principles to which the Swedish government subscribes (i.e., GHD, Fragile States, Paris Declaration/AAA)? How do staff members

reconcile tensions in countries where more than one set of principles applies? Are there examples of good practice and lessons learnt from Sweden's experience as well as that of other donors?

4. What systems does Sida have in place to take account of the different and changing priorities of different social groups, particularly women and children, within crisis-affected populations when it makes funding decisions?
5. To what extent does Sweden's humanitarian action reflect changes in the international humanitarian context and respond to emerging trends? What systems does Sida have in place to analyse global trends and the contexts in which it is operating?

Cross cutting Issues

- To what extent does Sida's humanitarian assistance take account of cross cutting issues? In what ways have both Sida and the organisations that it funds mainstreamed cross cutting issues? What systems are in place to enable Sida to monitor that its implementing partners attend/adhere to cross cutting issues? How could attention/adherence to cross cutting issues improve?
- Do Sweden's policies on cross cutting issues provide adequate guidance for humanitarian situations?

Internal Management

1. How is Sida organised and what are its staffing, management and implementation structures for humanitarian action? Examine the tasks and responsibilities of Sida humanitarian staff, Sida's current funding and management systems.
2. To what extent is the division of labour between Sida and the MFA efficient? Does Sida's humanitarian funding complement the MFA's humanitarian aid effectively?
3. In what ways could Sida improve its internal management of humanitarian aid as well as the ways in which it complements the MFA's humanitarian assistance?
4. What are the links and relationships between headquarters and field levels, both within the Swedish government and between Sida and implementing partners? Do Sida/MFA staff members in the field have the authority and capacity to initiate programmes and projects?
5. How does humanitarian information and decision-making flow, both within Sida and across the Swedish government more

broadly? To what extent do formal and informal arrangements for information flows support lesson learning across the humanitarian programme?

6. What linkages are there between Sweden's humanitarian, recovery and development programming, in terms of systems and structures, decision-making, exit strategies, ensuring adequate funding for the full spectrum of activities and coordination?
7. To what extent are Sida's humanitarian funding decisions coherent with Swedish development and security programming?
8. What structures and incentives do Sida humanitarian staff members have for sharing information and coordinating their work with other actors?
9. How does Sida assess the performance of staff members and reward them?

Funding processes

- How is Sweden's humanitarian aid portfolio divided by type of emergency, mechanism, channel and sector?
 - What are the advantages and disadvantages of the different mechanisms, channels and partners that Sida supports?
 - Are Sida's funding criteria and decisions congruent with the results that it wishes to achieve with its humanitarian aid?
 - What systems and structures does Sida have in place to assess the results and effectiveness of its humanitarian funding (including for monitoring and evaluation)?
1. How has Sida-financed assistance been delivered on the ground (with perspectives from implementers and aid recipients) against the target results agreed with Sida? What have been the lessons learnt and what obstacles have hindered progress?
 2. At country level, how has the Sida-financed humanitarian activity fitted with the broader humanitarian response (in terms of timeliness, flexibility, predictability, appropriateness, coordination with other actors)? What has been its added-value?
 3. From the perspective of implementing partners and humanitarian aid recipients, how relevant is Sida-financed assistance?

Accountability

Although accountability was not used as a heading in the ToR and is not one of the 8 sub-goals of Sida's humanitarian strategy, Sida is accountable to constituencies in Sweden and crisis-affected popula-

tions. Under the GHD principles, Sida is supposed to “request implementing humanitarian organisations to ensure, to the greatest possible extent, adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response” (7). It is also responsible for supporting initiatives that promote accountability to crisis-affected populations (21). Therefore, DI added this issue area.

- To what extent do implementing organisations take account of the views of aid recipients, including women and children, inform them about their assistance programmes and ensure accountability to them? To what extent do pooled fund managers ensure accountability to aid recipients and finance local organisations/capacity?
- What mechanisms does/could Sida have for feedback loops, to ensure that aid recipient perspectives (differentiated by age and gender) and implementing agency performance inform funding decisions?
- How does Sida ensure accountability when funding countries where it does not have a field presence?
- Does Sida support accountability initiatives and research institutions to help improve humanitarian assistance and systems? Has this support been effective? What lessons has Sida learnt and are there ways in which this support could be improved?

External Relationships

- Where is Sweden located in the international humanitarian system? What are its strengths and comparative advantage (that it should build on in the revised humanitarian policy and strategy)?
- How does Sweden use its leadership role to influence humanitarian policy at a global level and how does it coordinate efforts with other donors/humanitarian actors to ensure results, especially where it has a limited field presence? What lessons has Sweden learnt and what opportunities can it identify to strengthen inter-donor synergies and its global advocacy?
- What are the key characteristics of Sida’s relationships with its implementing partners? How does Sida ensure that these relationships contribute to the achievement of its humanitarian objectives?
- In what ways does Sida support coordination between humanitarian actors, both in the countries where it works and globally?

Participatory approach

The ToR for the evaluation emphasised a participatory approach. This has two elements – tools and process. During the evaluation, the team used the following tools:

- a. A *stakeholder analysis* during a brainstorming session with Sida's humanitarian team and a couple of members of the Management Group during introductory meetings. The results were presented in the inception report. The diagrammatic representation of the stakeholder analysis located stakeholders according to their level of influence on the evaluation and Sida's humanitarian assistance as well as their level of interest in these. The process highlighted the fact that Sida's humanitarian team would like some influential stakeholders to take a greater interest in their work.
- b. '*Spokes*' technique, with Sida, MFA and MSB staff members who participated in Sida's Humanitarian Days in Stockholm in May as well as Sida's partners and aid recipients during the country case studies. The result from the Humanitarian Days exercise is presented in Annex 2 (while results from each case study are presented in the case study reports). Participants in the exercise were asked to identify the elements of effective humanitarian assistance and rate the extent to which Sweden (or, in the case of aid recipients, the international community as a whole) have delivered on each element. The aim was to compare the perspectives of Team Sweden with those of partners and aid recipients at field level and use this to develop a set of humanitarian objectives that better reflects the priorities of field level stakeholders.
- c. A *SWOT analysis* (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) with Sida's humanitarian staff, which formed the basis of the interim report (Annex 5 presents a summary with the detailed version in the interim report). The evaluation team also asked Swedish NGOs to identify its strengths and weaknesses as a donor.
- d. *Network mapping* with individual Sida staff members to get an understanding of the informal information flows and interactions between staff members. The interim report presented the results, which showed that Sida has a flat structure in which staff members are comfortable with connecting with their colleagues across the organisation. However, the sheer number of links suggests that some of the communication needs to be streamlined to

reduce the burden on individual staff members, including the number of meetings they need to attend.

- e. An *activity calendar* with a small group of humanitarian staff members, with the outcome presented in the interim report. The aims were to:
 - a. Get an overview of the tasks that team members undertake
 - b. Identify particularly busy periods for the team and bottlenecks
 - c. Identify opportunities for follow-up and lesson-learning

The calendar showed that Sida's humanitarian staff are fully occupied with allocating funds (which includes analysing the CAPs and preparing assessment memos) and processing grant agreements from mid-December to the end of April. This is their busiest time and obviously a bottleneck. It also showed that they spend comparatively little time on field visits and follow up.

The evaluation has also been a very interactive process, involving regular presentations and discussions, not just with the management group but the humanitarian team more widely. At the end of each phase, the team has presented draft reports to Sida and discussed findings before finalising the reports. The table below lists the feedback sessions and presentations in Stockholm. In addition to this, the team provided feedback to crisis-affected communities in DRC, Kenya and Indonesia through radio interviews.

Date	Presentations made
22 April 2010	(Virtual) presentation of international humanitarian context and analysis of Sida's humanitarian funding 2005–2010
28 April 2010	Discussion with Management Group of questions related to international humanitarian context
21 May 2010	Debriefing presentation on policy, management and organisation review findings to Management Group
7 June 2010	Presentation of draft interim report to Humanitarian Team and Sida members of Management Group
14 July 2010	Presentation on key findings from DRC and Kenya/Somalia country case studies to donor meeting in New York
6 Sept 2010	Presentation of country case study findings to the Humanitarian Team

Date	Presentations made
6 Sept 2010	Presentation of interim report key points to MFA staff members and Swedish NGOs
7 September 2010	Outline of elements of effective humanitarian assistance, together with indicators for measuring these, to the Humanitarian Team (to form the basis of Sida's revised humanitarian strategy)
26 October 2010	Presentation of draft synthesis report to management and reference groups and the Humanitarian Team and discussion of recommendations

Data collection

The team has used *two main data collection methods* during this evaluation. One of these was a *document review*, during the policy, management and organisation review phase as well as the country case studies. In the former case, the documents reviewed were mainly Sida and MFA policies, strategies and guidelines (particularly on cross-cutting issues). In the latter case, the documents included reports and project documents. Annex 5 provides a consolidated list of the documents that the team consulted. The aims of the document review were to:

- a. Gather information on major developments in the international context for Sida's humanitarian action.
- b. To review policies/strategies relevant to Sida's humanitarian aid (such as the Policy for Global Development and the MFA's Strategy for Multilateral Development Cooperation) and understand the guidance available to Sida staff members on cross-cutting issues.
- c. Review the findings from major studies, such as the Somalia Arms Monitoring Group and Human Rights Watch studies in Kenya.
- d. To check findings from project visits against proposal documents and reports.

The team also collected data through *semi-structured interviews and focus groups*. The team made particular use of focus groups during the country case studies, especially with aid recipients. The aid recipient focus groups were disaggregated by gender. Since the team had to rely on Sida's partners to organise the focus groups and often had a limited time for each project visit, it was not possible to disaggregate

them by age as well (except for two focus groups with young people participating in a youth employment training project in Kenya).

As the list in Annex 4 demonstrates, the team consulted a wide range of stakeholders:

- a. Sida staff members in Stockholm (including the legal, administrative and audit departments) and in the field
- b. MFA staff in Stockholm
- c. MSB
- d. International donors
- e. UN agencies
- f. Red Cross organisations
- g. Swedish and international NGOs receiving Sida funding
- h. Research institutions and organisations working on “quality” or accountability initiatives
- i. Local NGOs
- j. Local government representatives
- k. Beneficiaries of Sida-funded projects

In addition, DI undertook an *analysis of Sida’s humanitarian funding*, which is presented in section 1.3. This was based on data drawn from Sida’s funding database as well as the FTS (though the team was careful to use the two data sets separately as they are not comparable).

Lesson learning

The team’s discussions with Sida have emphasised the importance of conducting this evaluation in a manner that supports continuous learning by Sida staff members, and the underlying principles of knowledge management more generally – through people, process and products.

As outlined above, DI has ensured that the evaluation process is fully participatory and involved a range of *people* within Sida. In particular, DI has tried to ensure that Sida’s humanitarian team takes ownership of findings and recommendations by working closely with it. The use of participatory tools (particularly the SWOT analysis and spokes technique) and consultations on findings at the end of each phase of the evaluation have ensured a sustained engagement.

To ensure a learning-focused *process*, DI has conducted interviews and group discussions using tools that encourage a two-way exchange and also encourage participants to learn from, and build

on, each other's experiences. DI has offered best practice examples, where appropriate, drawing on the experiences of other donors in particular.

To reinforce the lessons from this evaluation and to ensure that they are absorbed as knowledge by as wide an audience as possible, DI will deliver the following *products* to supplement the formal evaluation reports:

1. *Success stories* – brief case studies of successful Sida projects covered during the evaluation, promoting sharing of good practice examples across the organisation.
2. *Learning from Experience* – short briefing papers on Sida-financed projects that Sida as well as its partners can use to improve future programming.
3. *Short films* on Sida-funded projects that highlight lessons learned and success stories.

The evaluation team will also remain available to support Sida's efforts to share its lessons learnt, good practice and success stories with the wider humanitarian aid community.

Annex 4: Persons and Institutions Consulted

The table below lists those consulted throughout this evaluation, organised by type of organisation.

Table 4: List of those consulted throughout the evaluation

Name	Surname	Job title/Organisation
Sida		
Anna	Ahlgren	Legal Department
Doris	Attve	Humanitarian Team
Gunilla	Backman	Health and Social Security team, Department for Human Development
Anna-Klara	Berglund	Programme Manager, Health and Humanitarian Assistance, Team Somalia-Sudan
Kerstin	Bertzholtz	Requisitions and contracts
Ylva	Blondel	Humanitarian team
Per	Byman	Team Director, Humanitarian team
Magnus	Carlquist	Country Director, Sudan-Somalia team
Maher	Daoudi	Humanitarian officer, oPT team
Maja	Edfast	ATHA, Programme officer, Partnerships team
Jessica	Eliasson	Policy Specialist, Department for Human Security
Frederik	Frisell	Senior Programme Officer, Humanitarian team
Anna	Furubom Guittet	First Secretary, Swedish Embassy, Kinshasa
Henrik	Hammargren	Director, Department for Human Security
Elisabet	Hedin	Policy Specialist, Department for Human Security
Gry	Hjeltnes	Humanitarian officer, Iraq and MENA team
Eva	Johansson	Country Director, Afghanistan team
Annika	Jayawardena	Country Director, Kenya Team
Peter	Kaaman	Humanitarian team

Name	Surname	Job title/Organisation
Helen	Karstersson	Audit department
Japhet	Kiara	Humanitarian Officer, Kenya Country Team
Katarina	Kotoglou	Secretariat for Evaluation
Patrick	Kratt	Deputy Director, Humanitarian team
Francois	Landiech	Humanitarian officer, DRC Country Team
Hans	Magnusson	Head, Conflict and Post-conflict Department
Joakim	Molander	Director, Secretariat for Evaluation
Henrik	Mungenast	Humanitarian Officer, oPT team
Kerstin	Nordvaller	Controller
Åsa	Palmgren,	Head of Country Programme, Swedish Embassy, Kinshasa
Göran	Paulsson	Head of Team, Health and Social Security, Department for Human Development
Helen	Rask	Director, Iraq and MENA team
Johan	Schaar	Head, Environment, Climate and Community Development team
Annika	Siwertz	Counsellor, Embassy of Sweden, Jakarta
Alex	Tameno	Programme Officer, Roads and Environment, Swedish Embassy, Nairobi
Gunnel	Unge	Humanitarian Officer, Afghanistan country team
Eva	Werner Dahlin	Conflict and Post-conflict Department
MFA, Sweden		
Eva	Areskoug	Humanitarian policy and conflict issues, Security Policy Department
Johan	Borgstam	Ambassador, Swedish Embassy, Kinshasa
Jakob	Hallgren	Geneva Mission, now Director, Humanitarian policy and conflict issues, Security Policy Department
Magnus	Lennartsson	New York Mission
Mikael	Lindvall	Former Director, Humanitarian policy and conflict issues, Security Policy Department
Harriet	Pedersen	Deputy Director, Department for Multilateral Development Cooperation and Head of UN section

Name	Surname	Job title/Organisation
MSB		
Patrick	Jansson	Deputy Head, Operations Section
Donor Agencies and Government Representatives		
Mia	Beers	USAID
Mukendi	Badiambila	Assistant au Programme, ECHO North Kivu
Marlies	Budde	Department for Economic Cooperation, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Nairobi
Tak	Chow	UK Mission, New York
Jean-Marie	Delor	ECHO Representative, North Kivu
Stef	Deutekom	Policy Officer for Somalia, Netherlands Embassy
Patrick	Dupont	European Union
Ulla-Maija	Finskas	MFA, Finland
Seb	Fouquet	DFID, Kinshasa
Anna	Gebremedhin	MFA, Finland
Gerard	Howe	Deputy Head Programmes, Senior Social Development Adviser, DFID, Jakarta
Gustya	Indriani	Deputy Programme Manager, DFID, Jakarta
Stijn	Janssen	MFA, Netherlands
Donal	Kenneally	Deputy Director, Emergency and Recovery Section, IrishAid
Corinna	Kreidler	ECHO Kinshasa
Dirk	Koch	Netherlands Embassy, Kinshasa
Emma	Leonard	Deputy Director, Emergency and Recovery Section, IrishAid
Anar	Mamdani	CIDA
Ibrahim	Maalim	Senior Deputy Secretary, Ministry of State for Special Programmes, Office of the President, Kenya
Vincent	Matioli	Ministry of State for Special Programmes, Office of the President, Kenya
Feilin	Mclaughlin	IrishAid
Siv Catherine	Moe	First Secretary, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Nairobi
Musa	Muritiria	Department for Refugee Assistance, Government of Kenya, Dadaab

Name	Surname	Job title/Organisation
Yusak	Oppusunggu	Program Specialist, USAID, Indonesia
Jeong	Park	Disaster Management Advisor, AusAID, Jakarta
Nugroho	Retno	BAPPEDA Prov. Sumbar
Jennie	Richmond	DFID
Linda	Rupidara	Programme Officer, ECHO, Jakarta
Julia	Stewart-David	ECHO
Pauline	Torehall	MFA, Denmark
Asnul		BAPPEDA Kota Pariaman
Syahrul		BAPPEDA Kota Padang
UN Agencies		
Sentosa Budi	Alluhri	UNDP RISE Project, Indonesia
Rosilawati	Anggraini	Humanitarian Officer, UNFPA Indonesia
Luluwa	Ali	Humanitarian Affairs Officer (ERF manager), OCHA Kenya
Ernest	Balola	Pooled Fund Monitoring Unit, UNDP, Goma
El-Mostafa	Benlamlah	UN Resident Coordinator, Indonesia
Mark	Bowden	UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, Somalia
Isabella	Castrogiovanni	Chief, child protection, UNICEF Somalia
Sr. Macrina	Cheruto	Peacebuilding Supervisor, IOM Eldoret
Aeneas C.	Chuma	Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, Kenya
Nantenin	Condé	Repatriation Officer, UNHCR Bunia
Jeanine	Cooper	Head of Office, OCHA Kenya
Andrea	Dedomenico	Head of Pooled Fund Unit, OCHA/UNDP Pooled Fund Management Unit, DRC
Meissa	Dieng Cisse	Evaluation Specialist, OCHA/UNDP Pooled Fund Management Unit
Astrid	Dionisio	Child Protection Specialist, UNICEF Indonesia
Diane	Duffour	Pooled Fund Officer, OCHA DRC
Jean-Charles	Dupin	Head of Office, OCHA, Ituri
Riki	Falantino	BAPPEDA Kota Pariaman

Name	Surname	Job title/Organisation
Ysabel	Fougery	Policy Manager, CAP Section, OCHA
Kiki	Gbeho	Head of Office, OCHA Somalia
Fabrizio	Gentiloni	Chief, External Relations and Support Mobilisation Branch, OCHA
Megan	Gilgan	Chief, field operations and emergency, UNICEF Kenya
Max	Hadorn,	Head of Office, OCHA DRC
Irawati M.	Hapasari	Programme Officer, UNDP Indonesia
Medi	Herlianto	Deputy National Project Director, DR4, UNDP/BNPB, Jakarta
Jorge	Holly	Head of Office, UNHCR Bunia
Mirza	Imran Raza	Immunization specialist, UNICEF Somalia
KatriSofia	Kangas	Donor Relations Officer, Government Donor Relations Division, WFP
Bornwell	Kantande	Senior Operations Officer, UNHCR sub-office, Dadaab
Dr Vijay Nath	Kyaw Win	Medical Officer, WHO Indonesia
Ignacio	Leon-Garcia	Head of Office, OCHA Indonesia
Gloria	Kisia	Nutrition, UNHCR Dadaab
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Annex 5: SWOT Analysis

Figure 12 below summarises the outcome of the SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analysis that DI undertook with Sida's humanitarian team during the policy, management and organisation phase of the evaluation. The interim report provides the detailed analysis.

Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Significant, generous, timely donor, leader in humanitarian field• Flexible: unearmarked funds, operational flexibility, responsive to partner requests• Multi-annual funding capacity• Rapid Response Mechanism• HUMSAM – strong Sida/MFA working relationship• Integration of staff into conflict country teams• Funding research and standards development, HAP, ATHA• Proactive in international humanitarian debate• Upholds principles and independent from political control
Weaknesses	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• New rules/requirements = increased bureaucracy, funding delays• No criteria for developing funding envelopes or allocating envelopes to projects• Very limited capacity to monitor funds/results/impact, weak accountability, weak lessons learning• No area of specialisation or clear added value, MFA/Sida division of labour and messaging unclear to partners• Humanitarian aid not adequately reflected in country strategies• Humanitarian staff members overstretched and overburdened, high turnover• Funding database not fit for purpose• Inadequate guidance on aspects of grant management, lack of clarity on responsibilities for grants/decision making

Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International leadership role not recognised by senior management • Unable to determine if the needs of crisis-affected populations are met • Open to charges of partiality or politicised decision making (no funding criteria) • Disasters insufficiently addressed, DRR opportunities missed • Overstretching could reduce international leverage, lead to missed opportunities to support MFA advocacy • Potential for a de-skilled and demoralised cadre of humanitarian staff • Increased bureaucracy risks leading to less timely response
Opportunities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementing full range of GHD principles, increasing influence on GHD initiative • Increased collaboration, lessons learning and monitoring with like minded donors • More strategic relationships with NGOs • Criteria for the allocation of funding envelopes and project-level decisions • Regular consultation fora with priority partners, more strategic lessons learning • Extending RRM mechanism to disaster preparedness • Mainstreaming DRR through humanitarian programming • Become a leading donor on recovery and DRR issues • Defending humanitarian principles

Figure 12: Summary of SWOT Analysis

Annex 6: Bibliography

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Evaluation of Sida's Humanitarian Assistance

Final Synthesis Report

The purpose of this evaluation is to inform the revision of the Government's strategy for Sida's humanitarian assistance 2008-2010. It focuses on the implementation of the strategy, organisation and management, as well as mechanisms and channels for funding humanitarian assistance. The evaluation process was participatory so as to facilitate lessons learning and apply these to the revised humanitarian strategy for Sida and future humanitarian programming.

A key finding of the evaluation is that Sida is a highly respected donor and leader in the humanitarian field. Nevertheless, the evaluation identifies a number of challenges that need to be addressed urgently, including overstretched and overburdened humanitarian staff, which results in a lack of follow up and lessons learning. There are also opportunities for improvements in feeding back field experience for policy and advocacy work as well as developing more strategic relationships with partner organisations. Sida could also do more in making the linkages between humanitarian and development aid more comprehensive and systematic, as well as strengthening the integration of disaster risk reduction and disaster preparedness in humanitarian programming.

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