

# Returning Home

## An Evaluation of Sida's Integrated Area Programmes in Bosnia and Herzegovina

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## Foreword

Since 1995 Bosnia and Herzegovina has been one of the major recipients of Swedish development cooperation. In total, Sweden has invested some SEK 2 billion in the country during the period 1996-2005. A large share of these funds, approximately SEK 1.2 billion up to June 2005, has been disbursed to the Integrated Area Programmes that, in accordance with Annex 7 of the Dayton agreement, were intended to establish sustainable return for displaced Bosnians.

In 2003 the Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit (UTV) started an independent evaluation of the Integrated Area Programmes (IAP). One of the reasons for evaluating these programmes was the large amount of funds involved. In addition the programmes have been regarded as successful in accomplishing the goal of sustainable return. UTV wanted to both test the validity of this assessment and document possible lessons to be learned. We were also interested in finding out more about the social and economic consequences of the repatriation process. After all, Sweden has been one of the major financiers of this process, which is one of the largest of its kind in modern history.

The evaluation process has been highly participatory. Representatives from Sida's Balkans Unit at the Europe Department in Stockholm, the Swedish embassy in Sarajevo and the implementing NGOs have been involved throughout all the phases of the evaluation. One of the purposes of this participatory approach has been to engage and create space for the stakeholders of the programmes to reflect upon their experiences and possibly draw lessons from these and the findings from the evaluation experiences. Findings from the evaluation derive from a triangulation of research methods aimed at capturing the views and perspectives of the returnees. In addition, the evaluation has arrived at independent conclusions and lessons learned, which are documented in this report.

Eva Lithman

Director

Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit



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# Acronyms

ARC	American Refugee Committee
BCS	Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CHF	Cooperative Housing Foundation
CMR	Centre for Multiethnic Research
CRI	Cross Roads International
DEM	Deutsche Mark
DFID	UK Department for International Development Cooperation
DPA	Dayton Peace Agreement
EKI	Economic Credit Institution
FOI	Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (The Swedish Defence Research Agency)
HDZ	Hrvatska Demokratska Stranka (Croatian Democratic Party)
ILO	International Labour Organisation
HVM	Housing Verification and Monitoring Mission
IAP	Integrated Area Programme
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IDS	Institute of Development Studies
IMF	The International Monetary Fund
IMG	International Management Group
INCOR	Information and Counselling on Repatriation
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IO	Implementing Organisation
KM	Konvertible Marka (BiH currency)
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council



NTNU	Norges teknisk-naturvetenskaplige universitet (The Norwegian University of Science and Technology)
OHR	Office of the High Representative
PLIP	Property Legislation Implementation Plan
PMU	Pingstmissionens Utvecklingsamarbete (The Swedish Pentecostal Mission)
PULS	Croatian Opinion Poll Institute
RS	Republika Srepska
SDA	Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party for Democratic Action)
SDP	Socijal Demokratska Partija (Social Democratic Party)
SDS	Srpska Demokratska Stranka (Serbian Democratic Party)
SEK	Svenska kronor (Swedish currency)
SFOR	Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SNDS	Stranka Nezavisnih Socijaldemokrata (Independent Social Democratic Party)
SRSA	Swedish Rescue Services Agency
UGOR	Association of Citizens Dismissed Workers of the Republic of Croatia
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UTV	Sida's Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit

# Executive Summary

The war in former Yugoslavia came to Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992. Up until December 1995, when the Peace Agreement was signed at Dayton, approximately half of the pre-war population of 4.2 million people had fled from their homes. About 400 000 houses were destroyed and almost 200 000 people killed. The humanitarian crisis was urgent, and the situation for the displaced persons particularly pressing.

The Dayton Agreement dealt with the issue of the displaced Bosnians in Annex 7. In order to mitigate the effects of the ethnic cleansing during the war the first paragraph in the annex stated that, 'all refugee and displaced persons have a right freely to return to their home of origin'. In addition it was claimed that, 'the early return of refugees and displaced persons is an important objective of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina'. Return was thus placed high on the international agenda and many countries and organisations moved in to support the displaced Bosnians. One of the greatest and most challenging social experiments of all times thus began. Former enemies of war were to live as neighbours again.

Sweden, through Sida, has been one of the major contributors to the return processes. Between 1995 and 2005 SEK 1.2 billion has been disbursed to so called Integrated Area Programmes, which aimed to establish sustainable returns for displaced persons. During these ten years Sida and its implementing partners have contributed to the reconstruction of 14 806 private dwellings, and the return of at least 50 000 people. When the programme ends in December 2007 an additional 2 000 houses will have been reconstructed and another 7 000 people assisted. Almost all the houses are built through an assisted self help approach, where the returnees are provided with construction materials and technical assistance to rebuild their own houses. The programmes have also targeted the repair of schools and healthcare facilities, local infrastructure, electricity lines and water distribution networks as well as mine clearing, all depending on local needs in the respective areas and on the assistance given by other actors. Generally, food security components such as seed, fertilisers, hand tools, livestock and sometimes machinery have also been provided to the returnees.

Over the years Sida has both developed the Integrated Area Programmes and supplemented them with interventions aimed at income generation and job creation through micro credit schemes and support to agriculture projects. These projects have sometimes been considered under the umbrella concept of the Integrated Area Programmes, but according to a strict definition of

the programmes it is questionable if these projects should be included. The reason is that they have included both returnees and others and that they have not been implemented in all programme areas. However, they do complement the Integrated Area Programmes as part of the general Sida programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This aims at achieving European integration by the development of a democratic and sustainable society through economic development, institution building, promotion of the rule of law, and local administration development.

In 2003 the Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit (UTV) at Sida started an evaluation of the Integrated Area Programmes. The main intent of the evaluation was to explore what actually happened, socially and economically, when people returned. Several questions were addressed: Did the displaced persons, for example, want to return in the first place? Did the return form a starting point for social integration or reconciliation or did social tensions increase? Do returnees feel at home now that they have returned? Have they been able to survive economically? Do they intend to stay in their rebuilt homes?

The evaluation team put together by UTV, tried to answer these questions, which can be categorised under the evaluation criteria of impact, sustainability and relevance. The methods used were:

1. A case study analysing the reconstruction of the village Grapska, carried out by Hans Skotte, architect and researcher at the Department of Urban Design and Planning at NTNU in Trondheim, Norway.
2. An anthropological study, made by the social anthropologist Melita Čukur of the Centre for Multiethnic Research at Uppsala University, consisting of two case studies – one in a village which is given the fictitious name Selo and the other in a suburb to Sarajevo.
3. A survey of 2 000 families who received support to rebuild their houses and 1 000 families in a control group. The survey was designed and analysed by the sociologist and specialist on the Balkans Kjell Magnusson of the Centre for Multiethnic Research at Uppsala University, and was carried out by the Croatian opinion poll institute PULS.

In addition, data has been gathered through documents and at workshops and seminars with programme stakeholders in Sarajevo. During the course of the evaluation the team has also been able to gather substantial information about the effectiveness and efficiency of the programmes. Thus conclusions take account of all five evaluation criteria.

As regards effectiveness it can be concluded that the Integrated Area Programmes have been successful. The major reason behind the success is the way the programmes were implemented: assisted self help in combination with the transfer of agency to village committees – in particular their role in the selection of programme ‘beneficiaries’. The implementing strategy,

which in many ways bears the characteristics of a rights-based approach to programming, strengthened social trust, collective confidence as well as self-esteem. It involved the returnees as actors, rather than passive recipients of aid and resulted in trusting and good relationships between implementing partners and returnees. Besides this, the approach cut construction costs for the financier, which meant that more people could be helped for the same amount of money. Thus the programmes can also be considered as highly cost-efficient.

Another important success factor of the programmes has been their flexibility. Sida formulated the overall strategies and goals, while they trusted the NGOs to operationalise these strategies through flexible and contextualised decisions on the ground. What has happened is that stakeholders have developed different perceptions and strategies over the life of the programmes. These developments are obviously relevant and natural adjustments to take account of a constantly changing context, but a problem has been that they have not been adequately processed: i.e. overall goals and strategies of the programmes have not been reformulated, stipulated and documented. An effect of this has been a fragmentation or 'projectification' of assistance: the 'P' in the Integrated Area Programmes has thus been at least blurred. In addition, it is difficult to evaluate effectiveness of interventions when the goals are amended over time.

It is quite clear that Sida and its partners did things the right way. But did they, as well as all the other donors of the return process, do the right thing? The evaluation concludes that the programmes have been highly relevant not only in relation to country needs, global priorities and donors' policies, but also in relation to the requirements of the returnees. The returnees believe that it was right to assist displaced persons to return to their homes. Generally they wanted to return home, and as they have returned they feel secure and at home. Now most of them want to stay put. The return had important ethical dimensions: for many the return was a symbolic act, an unambiguous shout of '*We're back!*'.

What does this mean for social relations, for the re-integration of communities and possible reconciliation? The evaluation shows that neither the returnees, nor people who stayed in the areas during the war, interact much across ethnic lines. This is true both in rural areas and in towns. Since interaction is so rare one could hardly speak of social reintegration, or of reconciliation. People are not living together, but rather side by side. Thus this evaluation, together with findings from other studies in other parts of the world, defies the popular assumption that living closely together leads to interaction and subsequent integration. In other words, resettling refugees does not imply reconciliation. This is an important conclusion of this evaluation but it should be noted that the return of the refugees has enabled possibilities for future interaction, and perhaps even reconciliation, at local level. It can be regarded as a first crucial step in a long and challenging journey.

Moving on to the economic impact of the programmes it is obvious that financing the reconstruction of houses and infrastructure replenished a significant amount of fixed capital. Furthermore it has contributed to the economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina by mainly using locally produced materials. But even if the programmes evidently have had an important economic impact in this sense, they have not had any significant long term effects regarding the economy at local level in the target areas. Clearly it is very difficult for many returnees to survive in their former homes particularly in isolated rural areas.

So, the Integrated Area Programmes has assisted 50 000 people to regain their homes and property, and the implementation strategy has contributed to building social and human capital in their communities. However, there are still major challenges to overcome if the returnees, and in particular the children, shall stay and prosper in these homes. Lack of work and job opportunities, lack of trust in other people, in politicians and the international community, has lead to a sense of hopelessness and thus a lack of meaningful action and fruitful initiative. Thus, it must be acknowledged that the Integrated Area Programmes alone cannot ensure the sustainability of these societies.

# Introduction

By Joakim Molander

Since the war in former Yugoslavia came to an end with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has been one of the major recipients of Swedish development cooperation. In total, Sweden invested some SEK 2 billion in the country during the period 1996–2005, with the main objective of maintaining peace and stability in the Balkans and promoting transition to a market economy. A large share of these funds, approximately SEK 1.2 billion up to July 2005, was disbursed to so-called Integrated Area Programmes (IAPs) that, in accordance with Annex 7 of the Dayton agreement, worked to establish sustainable return for displaced Bosnians. The remaining funds have mainly been disbursed to projects within the human rights and democracy sector. Currently Sida is strengthening support to economic and social development and institution building (particularly within the judiciary).<sup>1</sup>

In 2003 the Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit (UTV) at Sida decided to make an independent evaluation of the IAPs. The three major reasons for commissioning the evaluation were that:

1. BiH has been one of the major recipients of Swedish development cooperation during the last decade, and the IAPs have been the largest Swedish intervention in the country in financial terms.
2. International support to refugee return in BiH has been an unprecedented ethical, social and financial undertaking to which Sweden, through the IAPs, has been an important contributor. Thus it could be regarded as an obligation to assess and learn from the impact of this major undertaking.
3. Sida has promoted and assisted the self-help approach to house reconstruction. This approach cut costs for the financier and is regarded as having important social and symbolic dimensions. Furthermore the Swedish IAP concept has included infrastructure components such as repair of schools and healthcare facilities, repair of local infrastructure, electricity lines and water distribution networks and mine clearing as well as agriculture components aimed at establishing some food security for the returnees. This comparably comprehensive approach to reconstruction has been regarded as contributing to sustainable return, and Sweden

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<sup>1</sup> For further details regarding Swedish support to BiH, see the Swedish Country strategy for development cooperation. Bosnia and Herzegovina. January 2003–December 2005. (Regeringskansliet/UD 2002).

has assessed the programmes as very successful.<sup>2</sup> Since no comprehensive evaluation of the programmes has been undertaken so far, this assessment remains to be proven, but if it is correct there should be important lessons to be learned from the IAPs.

This is the evaluation report. The report starts with an introduction to the programme theory of the IAPs, as formulated by Sida staff. The programme theory has been reconstructed through documents written by, and interviews with, Bo Elding, Per Iwansson and Björn Mossberg. This introduction chapter is concluded with a short description of the purpose, methodology and organisation of the evaluation.



<sup>2</sup> According to the Swedish country strategy for BiH (2003–2005) '(t)he IAPs have played a significant role in efforts to ensure the sustainable return of refugees, in supporting the economy at local level and in specific reconciliation projects.' (p6). The country strategy also concludes that '(t)he importance of integrated area programmes (IAP) in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been immense since the war ended. Not only have they helped mitigate the physical damage left behind by making resources available for the reconstruction of housing and infrastructure, these highly specific programmes have also contributed substantially to reconciliation at local level.' (p16).

## The IAP programme theory

The war in former Yugoslavia came to Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992. Up until December 1995, when the Peace Agreement was signed at Dayton, approximately 400 000 houses were destroyed and almost 200 000 people killed. Approximately half of BiH's pre-war population of 4.2 million people fled from their homes.<sup>3</sup> More than one million people fled outside the borders of BiH; most into Croatia and Serbia although a large number had made it into Western Europe. Almost one million people were internally displaced persons within BiH borders. Most of these had taken refuge with relatives and friends, or gathered together in empty private houses. Certain of these houses had been abandoned by others, some were summer cottages, barns, stables etc. However the situation was more urgent for several hundred thousand people. They had been collected in schools and other public buildings which had been repaired to varying degrees by different donor organisations. These development cooperation organisations, which were coordinated by UNHCR, also constructed temporary emergency housing.

During the war, Sweden contributed almost SEK 1 billion in humanitarian assistance. More than half of these funds were channelled via UN agencies, primarily UNHCR. Most of the rest went through large-scale NGOs such as the Red Cross and Caritas. Support consisted of emergency supplies for displaced persons: food, medical supplies, mattresses, blankets, clothes etc. as well as shelter. Besides the housing programmes Sweden supported indirectly through UNHCR, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs commissioned the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) to put up prefabricated houses in Srebrenica and Sokolac during the war. Sida financed the repair of buildings which could be used as collective accommodation (called collective centres) and constructed new houses in Živinice and Srebrenik. These activities were implemented by the consultancy company Hifab.

In 1994 Sida began to plan more extensive and organised support. A special team was established in Stockholm for this purpose led by Bo Elding. The team developed their previous experience of cooperation with Hifab and also involved Per Iwansson<sup>4</sup> and John Wood<sup>5</sup> in the work of planning. By the end of November 1994 plans were so advanced that they could be codified into a proposal, written by Per Iwansson and Bo Elding<sup>6</sup>. In the assessment memo they argued for continued humanitarian assistance for the duration of the war while more long-term development cooperation could be started up in the peaceful, central parts of BiH:

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<sup>3</sup> The figures come from Per Iwansson, "Betydelsen av Sidas bistånd för återvändande av flyktingar and internflyktingar på Balkan" (The importance of Sida's support to the return of refugees and internal refugees in the Balkans) (Sida 2004). The actual number of displaced persons differs in different sources. Iwansson refers to more than 2 million displaced persons in his report.

<sup>4</sup> Who has been Shelter Officer in BiH for UNHCR since 1992.

<sup>5</sup> Who worked with the Lutheran World Federation's (LWF) refugee programme in BiH.

<sup>6</sup> Bo Elding and Per Iwansson, "Planering av det svenska biståndet till Bosnien/Herzegovina" (Planning of Swedish support to Bosnia/Herzegovina) (Sida 1994-11-24).



One aim which is also reflected in humanitarian assistance is to *improve the basic living conditions of the people affected by the war*. A more specific aim for the longer-term development cooperation is to *stimulate reunification and peaceful coexistence*. This may appear over ambitious today but is, however, the basic philosophy behind the interventions. Security, your own house and an economically sustainable employment are the three primary preconditions for this. Measures that support the return processes and the reorganisation of local societies are essential, even if this occurs within ethnically defined areas.<sup>7</sup>

In addition they asserted that as far as possible activities should be based on 'local resources and knowledge, both human and physical'<sup>8</sup>, and described the main elements of the support according to the following:

One primary component in the long term development cooperation should therefore be *assistance to house owners to repair their houses*, when this would mean return of refugees or reactivation of the local society. *New housing* is necessary, preferably together with a piece of land for subsistence cultivation, as a more suitable type of refugee housing than the current collective centres, and as new permanent housing for the future. The land is owned by the villages or the local municipality who are able to allocate at least small-scale plots of land. *Repair of buildings for social services* (primary education, healthcare etc), should also be included in housing projects where suitable. The same applies to the necessary *elementary infrastructure, especially water and sanitation*. However, housing projects should primarily be selected where expensive infrastructure measures are minimised. *The construction sector and construction material production should also be supported in all phases*, in order to create as many employment opportunities as possible from these investments in housing which will benefit the local community.<sup>9</sup>

As early as the end of 1994 the main components of what was later to become Sida's Integrated Area Programmes (a term that was coined towards the end of 1995) were consequently in place. The programme would be based on long term thinking – the idea was not to act quickly but to be thorough. The aim was, as Bo Elding put it, 'not merely a large number of repaired houses but a large number of repatriated owners of houses'.

According to the 'Guidelines for Sida support to housing projects in former Yugoslavia'<sup>10</sup>, which was drafted by Per Iwansson in May of 1995, Sida

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<sup>7</sup> As above, pp 2-3.

<sup>8</sup> As above, p 3.

<sup>9</sup> As above, p 5.

<sup>10</sup> Per Iwansson, 1995-05-03.

would prioritise ‘repairs of damaged houses where a house owner or municipality receives assistance in the first phase of return to normal living and normal social life.’ It is also stated here that ‘the greatest priority will be assigned to projects which can encompass different ethnic groups thereby taking a step towards reconciliation.’<sup>11</sup> Repairs would be performed using help to self help, a method which has sometimes been utilised in other disaster situations in the world. This method is described by Iwansson as follows:

Repairs of individual houses will be carried out using some form of self help, where the recipient provides an input in the form of work or activities carried out by, for example, a working team organised by the municipality. The development cooperation organisations purchase the material and distribute it, supply a certain amount of technical assistance, and may finance specialist construction inputs.<sup>12</sup>

Implementation organisations were necessary to develop the concept. Partly for administrative reasons it was decided to seek those within Sida’s framework NGOs. In this manner it would be possible to avoid time-consuming public procurement processes and at the same time facilitate long term cooperation. In 1995 the Sida team identified Swedish NGOs including LWF, Caritas and PMU Interlife (which took the name Cross Roads International in BiH).

At the end of 1995 serious operations could begin. Sida opened an office in Tuzla on 1<sup>st</sup> November, and the architect Björn Mossberg was recruited as field manager. At the same time the Dayton Agreement was under negotiation in Ohio. When it was finally signed in Paris on 14<sup>th</sup> December conditions for activities in BiH changed. According to Paragraph 1 in Annex 7 of the Dayton Agreement ‘all refugee and displaced persons have a right freely to return to their home of origin’ and ‘they shall have the right to have restored to them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them’. In addition it was stated that ‘the early return of refugees and displaced persons is an important objective of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina’. Return was therefore placed high on the agenda of the international community and large numbers of countries and organisations moved in to support the displaced Bosnians.

In spite of the new situation which had occurred as a result of the Dayton Agreement, Sida generally retained the principles already adopted. Work was initiated in the central regions of BiH as previously planned. LWF and SRSA established themselves in Tuzla. At this point in time LWF also had an office in Čapljina which was moved to Sanski Most in Northwest BiH in 1997. In addition Caritas opened an office in Sarajevo which mainly specialised in

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<sup>11</sup> As above, p 3.

<sup>12</sup> Se above, p 4.

restoring flats in the town, while Cross Roads International established itself in Zenica. Sida established long term cooperation with these implementing organisations (IOs) based on the scenario where the IOs were the project owners while Sida participated in the planning, choice of region and follow up. In addition, Sida arranged joint meetings for coordination and learning and was responsible for political assessments and coordination with other donors.

Even if Sida did not conclude agreements with the IOs on the basis of public procurement procedures, clear guidelines were stated for the programmes. A good description of the framework of the programmes can be found in a paper written by Per Iwansson and Björn Mossberg in 1998. There they write:

The IAP concept involves several essential components. Quite large individual project budgets are allowed, which makes it easier to fulfil multi-sectoral needs. Individuals and the local community are expected to get involved. Assistance is based on the principle of help to self-help in order to foster a social process of rebuilding society. The individual participation also guarantees to some degree a commitment to the process of return.

The projects use an approach which always includes repair of private houses through assisted self-help. If the owners are willing to return and rehabilitate their houses themselves, they are given enough materials to repair the house to a basic functional standard. Projects also target the repair of schools and healthcare facilities, repair of local infrastructure, electricity lines and water distribution networks and mine clearing, all depending on local needs and on what assistance is given through other actors.<sup>13</sup>

Generally, agriculture components are included. Villages and home owners get seed, fertilizers, hand tools and sometimes livestock and machinery.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> On p 7 Iwansson and Mossberg add to their description: 'Most often this involves repair to the local electrical distribution system and the water distribution system including intake from wells. Minor road repairs and bridge reconstructions have been done. Some through village or municipal labour input, others through companies contracted by the IO. Planned projects for 1998 are in some areas coordinated with other donors (USAID, ECHO) in provision of major "outside" infrastructure connections. [This type of cooperation was further developed later.] Schools and health posts and occasionally other buildings (sports hall, community centre) are repaired through local builders awarded contracts in tender procedures organised by the IO.'

<sup>14</sup> Concerning agriculture Iwansson and Mossberg state on p 7: 'Assistance consists in its simplest form of distribution of seed for one or two agricultural seasons and assistance for the preparation of soil, tools and some machinery. Many projects include distribution of livestock (e.g. one pregnant cow per family). The IO [in most cases LWF, who complemented Cross Roads' and SRSAs' house programme with agricultural support] analyses local needs and capacities and identifies the beneficiaries (often from a larger group than those who only receive help with house repairs) in cooperation with local agricultural expertise. It purchases necessary goods and animals and organises distribution together with local agricultural authorities. Agreements about assistance are signed with individual beneficiaries and the village council which is given responsibility for implementation.'

Projects may also include income generation and job creation through micro credit schemes or other minor support (e.g. repairs to a damaged factory). Today, some projects include minor support to organisations which form part of local civil society.<sup>15</sup>

Selection of regions for programmes was considered to be especially important. Sida and its IOs made these choices together based on a number of strategic criteria as listed by Iwansson and Mossberg. These were:

1. *Needs and possibilities for return. Identified ownership.* 'Areas are chosen where the original population had to leave during the war, where houses and infrastructure are damaged or destroyed, where rightful owners can be identified and return home'<sup>16</sup>, writes Iwansson and Mossberg, who also state that Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), will be prioritised.
2. *Political openness. Minority return.* As time passed the return of minorities became possible. Minority return was prioritised by Sida, but was not pushed for unless a certain readiness was shown by the local authorities. The task of the IOs was to establish this readiness through dialogue with these authorities.
3. *Local initiative: 'help to self-help'.* One of Sida's central selection criteria was that there was a local initiative to promote returns at municipal, village and individual levels. Only in exceptional cases would support to reconstruction be provided without the active participation of the local village council and the returnees.
4. *Local economic sustainability.* One factor considered was the area's potential for agriculture or other generation of income. Björn Mossberg has later indicated, however, that clearly the most important factor was whether the people really wanted to return or not.
5. *Cost-efficiency.* The cost-efficiency of the project was not calculated on the actual financial costs alone, these were weighed against the International Management Group's (IMGs) selection criteria. These criteria gave much weight to the number of family members in a house.

Even when a village fulfilled all the criteria listed above and was offered help, Sida generally did not finance the reconstruction of all the houses in the village. The opinion was that the international community simply did not have enough resources to finance the entire reconstruction of BiH. Instead returnees were prioritised according to certain special criteria. In this context the different IOs applied different selection methods and criteria. In certain cases the local committees have borne total responsibility for the administration of the selection process; in other cases the IO in question has defined the

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<sup>15</sup> Per Iwansson and Björn Mossberg, "From house repair to integrated area programs. Experience of Sida support to return and reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina", pp 1-2.

<sup>16</sup> As above, p 3.

selection criteria while the local committees have made the selection of recipients.

Given the difficult circumstances in BiH after the war, Sida's principles for support were somewhat controversial. As concerns the prioritisation of internally displaced persons there was political pressure to promote refugee return from Sweden. However, Sida maintained that this was not in line with Sida's focus on poverty. IDPs were considered to be those hardest hit and living in the worst circumstances. This was also something that the Bosnians were well aware of, which would make it politically difficult to motivate support to refugees in Sweden. Notwithstanding approximately 300 Swedish Bosnian refugees were included in the programmes. However these returned on the same conditions as other displaced Bosnians, and assistance was granted to families who had lived in villages in which Sida also financed IDP returnees. In addition these families were forced to give up their permanent residence permits in Sweden.

Furthermore, some felt that the self help principle was slow and demanding. Sida continued to maintain that the system possessed advantages over the hiring of building contractors, since:

1. Firstly, self help is more cost efficient. The houses are cheaper for the financiers so that most people can receive help. According to Hans Skotte's contribution to this evaluation, self-help houses cost EUR 7 000–8 000 each – approximately 60% of the price of a contractor-built house.
2. Secondly, it was believed that the fact that the owners themselves built their house promotes permanent return. During the construction process the returnees become acclimatised to their previous environment. In addition there is a higher degree of identification with a house built by the individual him/herself.
3. Thirdly, residential houses in BiH have traditionally been built by house owners themselves. Structures are therefore simple and most house owners have experience of construction activities. When they build themselves they also design the house as they want it.
4. Fourthly, the self-building process includes psychosocial dimensions. People who have lived in displacement for years find something constructive to use their time on. At the same time they are often cooperating with relatives or other people in the community. There is also, of course, a strong symbolic value in rebuilding your home with your own hands.

The local initiative and local ownership requirements can also be criticised as taking too much time. The reason for emphasising this principle was to ensure more sustainable return. At the same time participation and transparency are created as concerns selection of those to receive support.

Iwansson and Mossberg wrote their paper in 1998 and Sida has since then financed inputs which complement the area programmes. This specially applies to job creation and microcredits. LWF in Tuzla later developed a training programme in modern agriculture with additional grants and microcredits for greenhouses, irrigation plants, seed, plants, fertiliser and machines which has provided returnees and many other Bosnians the opportunity to develop commercial agriculture.<sup>17</sup> In addition to this, LWF established contacts between buyers and sellers of agricultural produce. They also administered collective transport of agricultural produce. Sida has also financed the so called Cow How project and projects aimed at organic farming. In the latter case the Economic Cooperation Network (ECON) has been the major IO. In addition, two microcredit organisations: World Vision and their microcredit organisation EKI plus Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF) have been supported. According to calculations carried out by Per Iwansson in 2004, these organisations have granted approximately 1 300 housing loans. All these projects have sometimes been considered under the umbrella concept of the Integrated Area Programmes, but actually the links between them and the other components in the programmes have been weak. Sometimes the organisations listed above have complemented each other within the same regions, sometimes not. In a strict definition of the IAPs, these projects should not be included.

## Outputs from the IAPs

Since 1995 the international community has financed the reconstruction of approximately 135 000 of the around 400 000 houses destroyed in BiH. One million of approximately two million displaced Bosnians have returned to their homes. Within the framework of the Integrated Area Programmes Sida has financed the rebuilding of a total of 14 806 houses up to June 2005. This is more than 10% of the total number of houses financed by the international community.

The largest of Sida's IOs has been LWF, who has maintained an office in Sanski Most and Tuzla. The office in Sanski Most has been responsible for both house building and agricultural support primarily in northwest BiH. Up until June 2005 they had built 3 357 houses and 12 schools. LWF in Tuzla has complemented SRSAs' and Crossroads' house building programmes with agricultural support. This support has been aimed at returnees. In addition they have developed the more commercialised form of agriculture described above.

As previously mentioned, SRSA worked in Srebrenica during the war. In the final phase of the war they established an office in Tuzla which implemented house construction for Sida in northern BiH, from Doboij in the west to

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<sup>17</sup> Totally it is estimated that, up to 2004, approximately 24 600 families have received agricultural support financed by LWF.

Bratunac in the east. In contrast to the other IOs who assisted a selection of people in different villages, SRSA often reconstructed entire villages. Up until August 2003 they had constructed 3 620 homes, 11 schools and 5 community centres. SRSA finalised its activities in BiH in 2003. Their field organisation was then incorporated into LWF's Tuzla office which then expanded its activities to include house construction. LWF Tuzla has built 760 houses since then.

Swedish Caritas initiated cooperation with Swiss Caritas who were already active in BiH using Sarajevo as a base. They have been working with flat reconstruction in Sarajevo and with house building southeast of Sarajevo in Foca and Goražde among other locations. Up to 2004 they had been responsible for the reconstruction of a total of 2 571 housing units. As Caritas has primarily worked with the repair of flats, their programme has not included any larger scale infrastructure or agriculture components. There was a shift in 2004–2005 towards the construction of houses and as a consequence Caritas developed agricultural support.

After contact with Sida, PMU Interlife established an organisation in BiH under the name of Crossroads International, based in Zenica. They have been working in central BiH, in areas such as Jajce, Travnik and Maglaj. Crossroads has concentrated on house building while LWF has dealt with the agricultural support. Up to 2002 they had built 3 514 houses, ten schools and one healthcare centre. In 2003 their field office was taken over by an organisation called PEP International, which has built a further 517 houses financed by Sida.

In addition to this the British Salvation Army built 467 houses around Šipovo in the Srpska Republic between 1997 and 1998.

## The Evaluation

In 2003, Sida's board approved a comprehensive evaluation of the IAPs to be commissioned by the independent evaluation department of Sida, UTV. Terms of references were established in consultation with Sida's Balkans Unit at the Europe Department in Stockholm. The result was that UTV decided to evaluate the programmes based on three criteria: relevance<sup>18</sup>, sustainability<sup>19</sup> and impact<sup>20</sup>. The relevance of the programmes was to be assessed from the perspective of the recipients. The basic issue in this context is if the target group really wanted to return to their ruined homes. Sustain-

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<sup>18</sup> 'The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies.' (DAC, *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management*, p. 24.)

<sup>19</sup> 'The continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed. The probability of continued long-term benefits. The resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time.' (DAC, *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management*, p. 36.)

<sup>20</sup> 'Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.' (DAC, *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management*, p. 24.)

ability is judged according to whether the returnees and their families stay once they have returned. In practical terms, it is a question of whether returnees can support themselves, and, if belonging to a minority, be accepted socially by the majority. Both these evaluation criteria are connected to the wider issue of the impact the programmes actually had – intended and unintended. One important question is whether the return formed a starting point for social integration or reconciliation or whether it actually increased social tensions.<sup>21</sup>

The evaluation has focused on giving the returnees' views but their perspectives have also been taken into account through two workshops with IOs and Sida staff in Sarajevo and a reference group of participants from Sida's Balkans Unit and Per Iwansson. The two workshops served both as learning opportunities for the evaluation's stakeholders and as a means of collecting data. The first workshop held in October 2003 initiated the evaluation process and has been documented in UTV Working paper 2004:1. The second workshop held in May 2005 concluded the evaluation process and has been documented in an aide memoire, part of which provides background information for the conclusions of the evaluation.

In addition to this, the evaluation incorporates three different studies: an anthropological study consisting of two case studies (in a village which we will call Selo and a suburb to Sarajevo), a survey of 2 000 families who received support to rebuild their houses and 1 000 families in a control group, plus a case study of the reconstruction in the village of Grapska. The anthropological study was made by the social anthropologist Melita Čukur of the Centre for Multiethnic Research at Uppsala University. She carried out field work in April–June 2004 and November 2004–January 2005. Kjell Magnusson, sociologist and specialist on the Balkans at the same institute, designed the 2000 plus 1000 family survey implemented by the Croatian opinion poll institute PULS. This is published in its entirety as UTV Working paper 2005:1. It is included here as a summary by Kjell Magnusson. Interviews for this survey were made in the summer of 2004. The case study in Grapska was carried out by Hans Skotte, architect and researcher at the Department of Urban Design and Planning at NTNU in Trondheim, Norway. Skotte expands on the fieldwork he carried out in Grapska for his doctoral thesis in 2001–2002<sup>22</sup>, and conducted a follow-up within the framework of this study in 2004. The Executive Summary, this Introduction and Conclusions have, with inputs from the rest of the evaluation team, been written by Joakim Molander, evaluation officer at UTV.

The three studies are intended to complement each other as far as content and methodology are concerned. Hans Skotte's contribution is based on interviews with returnees in Grapska. These have been analysed with the help

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<sup>21</sup> For a more detailed description, see ToR, Annex 1a.

<sup>22</sup> See Hans Skotte, *Tents in Concrete. What Internationally Funded Housing Does to Support Recovery in Areas Affected by War: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Doctoral thesis NTNU 2004:61 (Trondheim 2004).



of a theoretical framework he has established. Through the application of this framework and through his professional expertise as an architect, Skotte has contributed an urban planning perspective. Among other things he concludes that Sida and the relevant IO in Grapska, SRSA, worked in an extremely professional manner. Through the self-help concept, the high degree of village level ownership and by financing a large number of houses in the same village they have contributed to more than merely rebuilding *fixed and environmental capital* – housing, infrastructure and the physical environment. The programmes have also contributed to the strengthening of *human capital*, i.e. capabilities, skills, knowledge and the ability to use them, as well as to *social capital*, i.e. trust, commonly held institutions and values, collective action – and so on. Consequently, in Grapska, he contends that what has been rebuilt is not just houses, but homes. While Skotte's conclusions are based on only the one case in which the specific context of course played an important role in the results achieved, they do provide extremely important insights into what can be regarded as a best practice example.

Several of Skotte's conclusions seem to be supported by the anthropological field studies carried out by Melita Čukur. These confirmed that returnees appreciated the self-help concept and the individuals who assisted them, but at the same she found a communications gap between implementers and recipients. The two parties have not, apparently, always understood each other, which may have serious consequences for the programmes' effect and sustainability. Čukur's studies also show that returning has by now been locally accepted, but have not led to anything that could be interpreted as reconciliation. Furthermore returnees currently live in financial misery and are not optimistic about the future. Čukur, with Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian (BCS) as her mother tongue, carried out in-depth interviews and had them transcribed. Thus the studies must be acknowledged as of high methodological quality. At the same time they must of course be read with due consideration to the methodological limitations that characterise qualitative research.

In order to provide a methodological complement to the anthropological studies and, to some extent, test their validity, a survey was also undertaken. For scheduling reasons this was not carried out after the anthropological material had been analysed. However the study does form an important methodological complement. Generally speaking it also confirms the conclusions drawn from the qualitative studies. It even provides, in spite of the existence of suspicion and mistrust between the ethnic groups, a hopeful picture of people's attitudes to others with different ethnicities. In addition it shows that most people wanted to return home, and that the programmes have been relevant to their target groups to a considerable degree. Finally it confirms that people in BiH do live in extremely difficult financial circumstances.

The validity and reliability of the scientific studies mentioned above have also been tested. This was done at reference group meetings in Stockholm and at seminars and workshops in Sarajevo. Sida staff in Stockholm and

Sarajevo as well as IO staff have studied and commented on drafts verbally and in writing. The material was discussed thoroughly at the 24–25 May 2005 Sarajevo workshop. While the evaluation team are grateful for the invaluable questions and comments throughout this process of review, the team assumes full responsibility for the conclusions drawn.

# Rebuilding the community of Grapska

By Hans Skotte

## Introducing the village, the challenge and its IAP validity

This is an evaluative investigation into the reconstruction of Grapska. Grapska is a fair sized village<sup>23</sup> beside the Bosna river plains, 12 km North of Doboj in what is now Republika Srpska (RS). Before the war it had a population of about 2.800 people, of which about 4/5 were Bosniaks<sup>24</sup>, and 1/5 Serbs. The village lies in the heart of the strategic link between Belgrade, Banja Luka and Knin, known as 'The Posavina Corridor'. The villages and towns of this corridor were savagely damaged in the 1992–95 war. During the Serb campaign to establish and secure the link, the Bosniak population of Grapska was expelled and most of their houses and property destroyed or stolen. This was in May 1992. Reconstruction of the Bosniak part of the village did not start in earnest until 1999.

During the 7 year displacement most of the Grapskanian Bosniaks had stayed in near-by municipalities on the Federation side. Here they reorganised their Village Committee and worked incessantly to secure support for a return to Grapska. By the summer of 2004 close to 400 houses had been rebuilt, and according to the Village Committee, 1 300 Bosniaks had returned. Sida had funded building materials for about 2/3 of the buildings; the rest were built from Diaspora remittances. Only a very small number were funded by other organisations. Aside from houses, Sida had funded the rebuilding of the school and the health centre, as well as some agricultural support. USAID funded the necessary infrastructural reconstruction.

What makes Grapska worth presenting is not so much the reconstruction itself as *the way* it was carried through. Grapska is valuable in showing how the reconstruction links up to local agency, and thus, how it has supported the reconstitution of a community. This also highlights the crucial role played at the tactical level by Sida's implementing partners – for Grapska, the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA).

<sup>23</sup> Since it had more than 2000 people and less than 10% of its working population was employed in agriculture, it was defined as an urban area. But in name only.

<sup>24</sup> 'Bosniak' is a term used throughout this paper. It is an old term brought back into common usage in the late 1990s. 'Muslim' (with capital M) was the term used prior to and during the war for the 'narod' or 'nation' of muslims.

This will be the main concern of this article.

Grapska is not a 'typical' case 'representing' the IAP program. Not at all; no generalisations – except analytical or theoretical – may be made. However, this village was chosen for rebuilding as part of the IAP, the rebuilding was implemented within the program and any study – this one for example – will shed light on the potential of the program always keeping in mind the circumstances and the context ascribed to Grapska.

What follows provides insights into the process of realising the IAP strategy. It investigates the chain of logic between stated and tacit policies constituting the 'IAP approach' as moulded by the policy makers in Stockholm, and on to the outcome – the rebuilt and resettled village. This is done to better understand the interaction between policy, the contextually embedded decisions made in the field, and the resultant contribution towards re/development as seen by the target population.

For the sake of readability, method and definitions are made part of annex 2. Here it suffices to say that the data on which this paper rests were collected through interviews with more than 50 people, the studying of relevant documents and drawings, at first in 2000–2002, then with a follow-up in the summer of 2004. Much of this material has previously been used to underpin my PhD research on internationally funded post-war housing in Bosnia and Herzegovina<sup>25</sup>.

## The reconstruction of the village – as implemented by the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA)

Seven years after expulsion, four years after the formal end of the war, a large proportion of Grapska's former inhabitants returned to start rebuilding. They were given material support by SRSA, guarded by SFOR, and financially bolstered by their own Diaspora. I investigated Grapska and the reconstruction processes during the winter and spring of 2002 almost 10 years after its initial destruction, and made a follow-up visit in the summer of 2004.

In times of disaster and loss, it is the past that guides the reflexive action that steers reconstruction i.e. that constitutes agency, an embedded prerequisite for a sustainable local recovery. And this in turn, provides the context for – and thus should determine the tactics of – any outside reconstruction assistance.

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<sup>25</sup> Tents in Concrete; *What Internationally Funded Housing Does to Support Recovery in Areas Affected by War; The Case of Bosnia Herzegovina* (2004), Doktoravhandling ved NTNU 2004:61, NTNU, Trondheim, Norway



*A post-war map of Grapska and surrounding villages to the North of the regional centre of Doboj. Grapska is shown divided: Grapska Gornja the part inhabited mostly by Bosniaks, and destroyed during and after the war, and Grapska Donja with its predominantly Serb population where no (Serb) houses were destroyed. Note the extensive agricultural areas between the village and the river Bosna*

## Industrialisation, urbanisation and the de-ruralisation of Bosnia

The post-W.W.II industrialisation concentrated national investment in regional centres throughout Yugoslavia. Doboj became such a centre due to its strategic importance in the country's emerging communication network. For Grapska, located 12 km away from Doboj, this meant access to a whole array of new employment opportunities. This did not mean leaving agriculture; instead, the country went through a process of 'de-ruralisation' where the head of household left for industrial work in the cities, either close by as was the case with Grapska, or elsewhere in the country or abroad.<sup>26</sup> Formal employment brought cash earnings to support the (extended) family and finance new village investments, mostly new housing. *The industrialisation of Bosnia thus enhanced the reproduction of village life-styles and traditional, ethno-religious values.* This happened irrespective of whether the villages were mono-ethnic, as many were, or spatially shared, as was the case with Grapska. Village life was conducted and reproduced according to the *habitus*<sup>27</sup> of each of the ethno-religious groups in an almost pre-modern 'multi-nationality' (Andrić 1995, Bringa 1993).

In 1991 37.2% of Bosnia's population lived in 'de-ruralised' villages, while 49.5% lived in urban areas. Grapska's 2.785 pre-war inhabitants were statistically placed among the de-ruralised.

Rebuilding de-ruralised villages is problematic in that their very existence depended, not on their meagre agricultural capacities, but on external linkages and earnings. With these destroyed, what draws displaced people back is in part the existential need to re-establish one's ontological security, or simply to regain some meaning in life. Placing it within Bourdieu's theoretical perspective, reconstruction is about recreating objective structures of one's *habitus*. This fundamental human claim is made manifest through the right to regain your property, or perhaps just to regain the right to genuinely choose whether to return or not. Yet without addressing the network that constitutes one's 'home environment' this may turn out to be a temporary return.

It happened in Norway. More than 250 fishing villages in Northern Norway were totally destroyed in World War II. They were rebuilt because people insisted on moving 'back home' – to places actually established generations earlier. Once rebuilt, many were soon abandoned in favour of more cen-

<sup>26</sup> By 1990, 8% of the Bosnian work force was employed as 'Gastarbeiters' abroad (Mønnesland 1995). In the late 1960s–early 1970s Yugoslavia was the single largest exporter of labour in Europe. In the 1980s, 611,000 Yugoslav Gastarbeiters with their families were living in Germany (Williams 1996).

<sup>27</sup> 'Habitus' is a concept in social theory developed by Pierre Bourdieu. 'Habitus' is a system of long-lasting (but not permanent) transposable dispositions acting as schemes or schemata that structure perception, conception and practice of a given group or society. Habitus consists of a network of historical relations 'deposited' within each of us. These deposits, invisible to outsiders as well as to ourselves, empower us to act and interact in a way that makes sense to us and to others within the 'social field' in question, say within the Muslim population of Grapska. The Serb population would thus hold a slightly different habitus. Habitus thus structures cultural practice (Bourdieu 1977, 1990, 2002)

trally located places, simply because 'back home' could no longer keep up with peoples' technological or societal aspirations or, for that matter, with national political objectives. Many of the housing reconstruction programs in Bosnia are of the Norwegian post-WW II kind. This may be why about one fifth of the internationally funded houses have been now abandoned<sup>28</sup>.

Grapska, however, was de-ruralised in an almost suburban fashion because of its close proximity to industrial centres, and hence formal employment opportunities. Eighty percent of its workforce was commuters. At the same time they had large and rich farmland albeit partitioned into tiny family plots. Grapska eventually came into Sida's IAP program part by choice, part by chance, as was the case for most of the village reconstruction programs.

### Internal linkages; pre-war Grapska

Grapska lies in a large amphitheatre-like landscape divided by a low ridge. To the South lived the 'Muslims'<sup>29</sup>, to the North the Serbs, cf. Figure 1. The division was not absolute. About 80 inter-marriages and the impact of formal 'urban plans' brought about some genuine territorial integration. However, the overall division between the ethno-religious groups was echoed in the topography of the land, i.e. into 'Gornja ('upstream' – South) & Donja ('downstream' – North). Between the village and the river Bosna are large areas of agricultural river bed land which in pre-W.W.II was the main resource of the village, and the rationale behind the first settlements. With the return of the refugees these resources again proved crucial to sustain life.

Although the village is old, the pre-war building stock of 584 inhabited houses was not. The built environment was mostly of typical Bosnian 'contemporary vernacular', i.e. two-story concrete structures with plastered clay block infill walls. These houses were all built by their owners with the help of family or hired labour. The relatively large housing area per capita (four people to the house) was due to rising affluence, and the demise of the extended family. Traditionally, houses were built big enough to accommodate the families of sons. However, by the time of the war many 'next generation' had anyway built their own houses<sup>30</sup>, or had moved to flats in the city. In addition, one could discern a tendency in which the urbanised young no longer automatically moved back to the village to take care of their parents.

Now that the war has scattered young Grapska families all over the world, this is no longer a tendency, it is a major fact of life. Obviously, Grapska's

<sup>28</sup> The total financial investments could be as high as SEK 1 billion.

<sup>29</sup> Prior to the war 'Muslim' was the formal name of their 'nation' or 'narod'. Today the old term 'Bosniak' has been reintroduced. I use Bosniak throughout.

<sup>30</sup> Which were also 'built big enough to possibly accommodate the next generation's families'.

older people will suffer hardship, and those in more remote villages probably greater hardship.<sup>31</sup>

It is impossible to present a 'correct' picture of what social life was like in pre-war Grapska. Each inhabitant would probably paint his or her own. People interacted irrespective of ethnic origin as they did throughout Bosnia up until the late 1980s. A small qualification is required: The interaction was conditioned by a traditional codex of behaviour. An ascribed identity 'we – them – us' was prevalent also in Grapska, particularly among the old. The secularised young were seemingly not particularly conscious about it.

Two issues arise from these social practices. 1) The sanctity of home, the house, the private space where one's ethno-religious affiliation was embedded. 2) The commons, the mutually held communal fields where collective action took place. This was the 'us arena' where villagers through collective action organised public services and implemented infrastructural improvements. This was a neutral arena for mutual improvement of life, for institutional development, for the sort of modernisation that in urban centres had led to an increase in 'mixed marriages'. Grapska claims to have had a very high level of public services signifying a similarly broad commitment on the part of all its citizens – and a relatively high level of 'mixed marriages'. All this changed in Bosnia in the late 1980s with the rising ethno-religious tension.

### Linkages ripped; the war and the interregnum of exile

The physical destruction of Grapska started on May 10th 1992 at 12.00 noon when the Yugoslav (Serb) army opened fire from positions in the fields in front of the village. What happened that day and the ensuing days was so atrocious that it is included in the war crime indictments of both Milošević and Plavić. The commander, Nikola Jorgić, has already been given five consecutive life sentences for his crimes in Grapska, including the mass killing of 26 Bosniaks. The withholding of information about their burial site is still the single most antagonising element in the conflict between the returned Bosniaks and the Serb inhabitants of the village.

The experience of their violent expulsion from Grapska is an experience beyond words for those who survived, as it is for this writer. However it is quite evident from the interviews and from analysing the action and the outcome of their activities upon return, that these experiences make fundamental referential nodes to any subsequent 'network of meaning' for people having been displaced in this way (Porteous & Smith 2001). For many people these experiences also made dramatic impacts on their health and their sub-

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<sup>31</sup> Many of the reconstructed villages funded by international donors will in the not so distant future be badly affected because of the returnees' very high mean average age combined with the lack of local institutional resources and political will. In a return and reconstruction project implemented in 2002 comprising about 2900 returnees, SRSA recorded a mean age of 54.25 years.



sequent ability to cope with the oncoming difficulties. Subsequently, for any action to make sense, it will in some way have to refer back these incomprehensible acts of terror.

During the war the displaced sought refuge throughout Bosnia and abroad all according to the network or entitlements they commanded. When it became apparent that Grapska would end up on the Serb side, many left the country for good. There are no reliable figures, but village sources indicate that *at least* 20% of the Grapska families have settled permanently in other countries.

Most of those who remained in Bosnia eventually settled as close to Grapska as possible. Doboj Istok, the (new) Federation municipality bordering the entity divide, about 25 km from their village, thus became the centre for Grapskanians 'in exile'. Here they re-established their Village Committee largely as a result of pressure from their own growing Diaspora who needed an address and someone to handle the material assistance they provided. This in turn constituted a 'pull effect' towards the villages in Doboj Istok and Gracanica<sup>32</sup> which also widened the legitimacy of the Village Committee. The growing organisational strength of the exiled Grapskanians was to prove crucial in setting up the reconstruction process, both instrumentally, but most of all in maintaining and supporting the collective process of return.

At the end of the war more than half of the houses in Grapska were still partly habitable, although damaged and looted. Those least damaged were occupied by 52 Serb families displaced from Panjik on the Federation side at the very end of the war. They retrofitted their houses by not only looting the other houses left standing, but also by destroying them in a furious attempt to ensure that the Bosniak population would not (be able to) return. '*Why is it so important for the Muslims to live here?! Why could they not go somewhere else?!*' one of their Serb neighbours asked me – echoing the rhetoric of similar conflicts elsewhere.

This post-war 'networked destruction' rolled on for 4 years. The last house to be destroyed was blown up in August 1999, a mere week before the first UNHCR bus brought Bosniaks back to start preparing for the reconstruction. By the time the reconstruction started almost all houses not inhabited by the displaced Serbs were destroyed 'beyond repair'.<sup>33</sup>

In Grapska most of the houses were destroyed – *after the war was over*. Similar stories abound<sup>34</sup>. Not only family homes, but significant historical buildings were obliterated during the early post-war years as well.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Klokotnica and Brijesnica in the Doboj Istok municipality and Gracanica, Pribave, Lohinja, Stjepan Polje and Lukavica in Gracanica municipality. These villages held most of the displaced Grapskanians during the war.

<sup>33</sup> IMG (International Management Group) was set up to assess the damage and advice on building and infrastructure to the UNHCR. They established a grading system for damage assessment. Here destruction 'beyond 70%' was deemed 'destroyed'.

<sup>34</sup> The Serbs from Panjik showed me similar Serb villages in the Federation that were destroyed long after the fighting was formally over.

<sup>35</sup> Professor Hamidovic has estimated that 50 historically significant buildings were destroyed in Bosnia – *after the signing of the Dayton Agreement* (private conversation May 2002).

## Return and reconstruction; international engagement and local agency

In April 1996 Ekrem Buljabasić filled his car with foodstuff and flour and passed the invisible – yet sharply perceived – entity border back into Grapska. The foodstuff was for the destitute Serb IDPs now living in the village, but the delivery also had a tactical purpose: as long as the displaced Serbs were living in the remaining houses, at least these would not be further damaged.

The reconstruction of Bosnia and the assistance rendered to the displaced has in many ways been a game. Donors were exclusively focusing on programs of reconstruction for return, but there were not sufficient funds for all destroyed houses to be rebuilt. Some areas were selected ahead of others. Even in the communities selected, only some of the destroyed houses were funded for reconstruction. This selection, arbitrary as it often was, will forever carry consequences for the regional development of BiH, whether the selection was done with this in mind or not. Lacking any overall strategy, the international housing interventions were implemented according to presumptions, contextual perceptions and/or professional capacity (or lack thereof) on the part of the field staff of donors or INGOs (Skotte 2003). In this respect Sida stands out<sup>36</sup>. Their field perspectives were drawn up by professional planners. And as we shall see, it shows<sup>37</sup>.

Whatever the formal criteria for support, catching the attention and interest of *'neka organizacija'* ('some organisation') came to be a crucial first step towards local reconstruction. During their displacement the people from Grapska also participated in this fight for attention. First they linked up to World Vision who promised to reconstruct 50 houses, – but later withdrew. Then Tuzla Municipality promised some – but insufficient – material for 9 houses. By the summer of 1999 the Village Committee approached the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) while they were preparing a housing project for displaced Serbs near Zwornik. Because the Serb target group refused to comply with the self-help principle, SRSA pulled out – and so had funds to spare.

Sida, through SRSA, subsequently made these funds, around 1.4 mill DEM, available for the reconstruction of Grapska. The reconstruction and return to Grapska could start. Much more was to follow.

SRSA is not formally an NGO. It is a part of the Swedish Civil Defence and is the government's official body for accident prevention and response. Its international engagement makes up around 1% of their activities of which their work in Bosnia was their largest single international project since their establishment in 1988. Head of office in Bosnia was Mr Kaj Genneback, a

<sup>36</sup> Although there were planner-architects employed by some of the other agencies in BiH as well, e.g. GTZ, USAD and UNDP, Sida was unique in consistently employing architect-planners in strategic positions in BiH.

<sup>37</sup> Embedded in the profession of physical planner-architects is an acknowledgement of the bounded relationship between the physical, social and the economic dimensions of society. Understanding the interdependence between these elements and devising ways of handling – or even manipulating them, is what planning is about.

building engineer employed by SRSA in 1996. I draw attention to SRSA's head of office because again we will see the tactical importance played by an organisation's head of office.

Sida had set two primary conditions for providing funds for reconstruction: 1. The beneficiary must already live in BiH – or in Sweden; 2. The house owner must have valid property rights to the plot of the destroyed house – or to some equivalent plot in the village. In addition SRSA would only support families. Furthermore Sida pursued a *policy of concentration*, of focusing on certain areas of the country, and of providing funds for large numbers of people to return so as to initiate a 'social movement'. This was deemed to have a significant impact on: 1) physical and psychological *security*, 2) the character of the *environment*, and 3) the social and economic *multiplier effect* – including reducing unit costs of infrastructure, transport and logistics.

In addition there was an added feature of this policy of concentration. The sheer number of returnees was expected in due course to yield a sizeable impact on the local democratic processes. Again the intentions proved to be – just that: intentional. The political realities did not allow due democratic processes to take root – as of yet. More on that later.

According to the IAP principles housing reconstruction had to abide by the 'assisted self-help' approach, an approach at first highly contested (UNHCR 1998) and hotly debated among more or less informed agency personnel in BiH (Mossberg & Iwansson 2001). As far as mere cost is concerned, my own data<sup>38</sup> show that one self-help home costs about 60% of a contractor's price. However, this figure varies from case to case, partly because of varying content in the comparative figures, but also from substantive differences, e.g. contextual constraints, varying logistic input, etc.

In the self-help programs run by SRSA the house owners were given materials, some basic building tools and machines to share, internal transport, technical advice and real-time technical support<sup>39</sup> – on condition that the owners committed themselves to complete their houses within a given time frame (a somewhat flexible requirement). The amount of material was based on the pre-war Yugoslav quantity standard and SRSA's own building design reflecting the number of people returning.<sup>40</sup> SRSA also lent technical support to the house owner if he – at his own expense – altered or increased the size of the house. *About 90% of the 'SRSA-houses' in Grapska were actually extended during their construction.*

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<sup>38</sup> Basically collected from experienced building professionals working with Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), and Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA)

<sup>39</sup> This person would also act as a general monitoring agent, not the least pertaining to local kick-backs and corruption. In a previous project in Klisa near Zvornik, SRSA were thus able to uncover the fact that people had paid the Head of the Village Committee to be placed on the list of house owners eligible for support. The project was put on hold until a new organisation was established and new names were brought forward.

<sup>40</sup> Each selected family received materials according to drawings based on these standards:

2–3 persons: 7x6 m, 1 floor	4 persons: 8x7 m, 1 floor
>4 persons: 8x7 m, 1½ floors (two rooms in attic)	2 families: 8x7 m, 2 floors.

But it is the *shifting of responsibility* onto the people who are to benefit from their support that sets the SRSA approach apart from other assisted self-help programs in Bosnia. SRSA insists on dealing with the villagers through a formal body organised by the returnees. Grapska was well prepared through their Village Committee, which subsequently were delegated the responsibilities to:

- develop a set of transparent selection criteria upon which the agreed number of beneficiaries were to be selected
- obtain all the required formal approvals from the local administrative bodies
- nominate a number of people among the beneficiaries who SRSA will authorise to control, confirm and sign papers on behalf of SRSA regarding material deliveries

Through my ten years of following the process in BiH, I have not encountered any reconstruction program known to have transferred so much ‘real power’ to the beneficiaries. The issue of selecting beneficiaries is, by other NGOs, considered both a cumbersome, complex and extremely sensitive task, as it deals with substantial outright gifts. It is about selecting winners and losers.

This shifting of responsibilities also transferred some of the administrative workload away from SRSA thus reducing their overheads to about half of the NGO average of 10%.<sup>41</sup> This approach was based on a set of plain and down-to-earth propositions on the part of Kaj Genneback: *‘I’m not here to do what they can do better’*. By not entering into the selection procedure the SRSA approach might be seen as insensitive to the needs of the most vulnerable. SRSA claims that identifying ‘the vulnerable’ remains very difficult whatever the circumstances. ‘Female-headed households’ may in fact include sons and daughters, brothers and in-laws who are just as qualified – and available – for doing building work as the ‘absent husband’. The same goes for the old. *‘So what do we know about who receives remittances from abroad?’* SRSA’s presumption was that the people affected would have a much more comprehensive picture of the vulnerabilities and capacities of the applicants. In addition, SRSA relied on the reflexive self-control of the system: the large group not receiving support, would certainly not tolerate major misappropriations of funds.

## Rebuilding Grapska

For return to succeed, the people must *want* to go back, they must recognise a *future livelihood potential* – and they must *dare* to return. It is evident that ‘wanting to return’ was not enough to set off a return process (UNHCR 1998, Iwansson 2004). To facilitate a return-driven reconstruction the re-

<sup>41</sup> One major international NGO working in Krajina spent as much as 20% of their project funds on the process of selecting beneficiaries alone, according to the then Head of Office in Knin.

turnees must command entitlements or capabilities, i.e. human and social capital and material and/or financial resources, to *invest* in the reconstruction effort. In addition there is the matter of security. Most of this was beyond the capacity of the internally displaced Grapska community. In the following I will show how outside agents, organisations, institutions and individuals, provided these resources in a way that interacted with the capital endowments of the returnees, i.e. their own capacities to organise (sustained by their own history), their building skills, and their capacity to work. These issues will be dealt with successively.

### Security

House, home and security are concepts bundled together. No wonder then that the issue of security took on, and still retains, such a central place in the minds of the Grapskanians when approaching reconstruction and return. SFOR as part of their mission patrolled most reconstruction arenas, Grapska was thus kept under 24-hour surveillance during the initial stage of reconstruction. The presence of SFOR proved to be a crucial ‘tool of return’: *‘Without SFOR Grapska would not have been rebuilt, it would have been too dangerous’* according to the Chairman of the Village Committee. In Grapska SFOR saved a number of houses, already wired, from total demolition. The uneasy feeling of fear prevailed for many years. For some it is still there<sup>42</sup>.



*An aerial photograph taken towards the centre of (Gornja) Grapska. The main road runs along the bottom of the picture. Taken by SFOR during the summer of 2000.*

<sup>42</sup> A colleague in Mostar East confessed that it took 5 years of ‘peace’ before he felt confident enough to visit Western part of town. And still today I know many Bosniaks who feel unease about visiting the RS part of the country, and who refrain from doing so – 10 years after Dayton!

## Selecting beneficiaries

SRSA has supported housing reconstruction in three phases comprising 80, 98 and 75 families or houses respectively. The Village Committee set up the following criteria for prioritising house owners eligible for support:

- Stayed in BiH during the war.
- Participated in the war
- Victims of war, social cases, lost family members, woman-headed households
- The number of family members
- Permissions and formal return documents in order
- Commitment to return

There is a significant difference between these selection criteria as compared to those set by the other international agencies in selecting worthy housing beneficiaries (cf. those employed by the UNMIK in Kosovo (UNMIK 2000)<sup>43</sup> or NRC's INCOR criteria<sup>44</sup>).

Two features stand out, 1) prioritising those who have in some way contributed to the war, and 2) the disqualification of refugees. The first favoured those 'of fighting age', i.e. the relatively young as well as the 'able-bodied' in preference to the 'unable'. Hence Grapska has a relatively low mean average age for its returned population – *35.53 years* (as of Jan 2002) compared to other SRSA projects (footnote 32). In spite of being disqualified from SRSA materials many former refugees are back in Grapska. They have rebuilt their houses from savings made in exile, from remittances from family members who stayed on, or from the micro credit system Sida later funded through World Vision. By and large the criteria and the final selection have been respected throughout. There are no indications of favouritism, corroborated by the fact that the secretary of the Village Committee as well as other elected members was not qualified for support during the first two phases<sup>45</sup>.

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<sup>43</sup> The criteria for vulnerable families shall be:

- no access to adequate income either through a steady job, through remittances of family members abroad or through income-producing land or other assets
- families with over 8 children under the age of 12 years
- female-headed families without able-bodied members
- families with elderly, handicapped or chronically ill family members

and:

- if the family is facing homelessness
- if the family is at risk (safety or health) as a result of their current living conditions
- if the family is unable to fund housing reconstruction

<sup>44</sup> The final selection criteria: 1) Social category of family; 2) Family with war victims; 3) Family with war invalids (Certificate about degree of invalidity of family members; 4) Present accommodation situation (Certificate from authorized department); 5) Number of family members; 6) Certificate about school education; 7) Certificate about occupation and place of employment. Cf. NRC 61RN6RS197,

<sup>45</sup> Not all villages included in the IAP had committees with such local standing. As will be shown later the very funding for the Grapska reconstruction originated from an IAP project which failed due to a village committee's fraudulent activities.

In Grapska the vulnerable were not the prime target group. However, widows, particularly 'war widows' were prioritised. These were assisted in rebuilding their house by relatives and friends. On the other hand, a number of them withdrew from the program prior to construction. They felt they did not command the entitlements (relatives, brothers, sons, remittances, physical capacity, etc) they deemed necessary to rebuild – and return. They were left in displacement looking for 'some organisation' to help them. And some have in fact been assisted.

The rationale behind the selection criteria rests upon the notion that the collective action of war shall underpin the collective support for post-war reconstruction<sup>46</sup>. The Grapska criteria are, in effect, similar to the criteria set up by the US Congress (the 'GI Bill' of 1944, and the Housing Act of 1949) regarding housing credit after WW II (Hansen 1949). Similar arrangements were made in Norway at the time (Ustvedt 1978).

Going back

Returning to Grapska had become an obsession; individual experiences and memories were being reproduced and reinforced through ongoing social re/construction among the displaced Grapskanians. We find the same reactions among other communities in exile. As more news kept coming on yet more destruction even during the post-war years, the more determined people claim to have been on going back: '*This is a war we shall win!*'<sup>47</sup> Returning became an extension of the war and a symbol of defiance.

Return thus contains an element of contest, and contests are about confidence. So when, in the fall of 1999, the first 9 house owners of Grapska – duly selected by the Village Committee – were provided with the first batch of building materials by the Tuzla municipality, the reconstruction became a celebratory event. Ekrem Buljbasic's house was reconstructed in 27 days. '*There were 500 people here who wanted to help me!*' he said.

## IAP applied; international reconstruction investments in Grapska

By the time SRSA started organising for the reconstruction of Grapska the IAP approach had resulted in inter-agency division of labour. Sida had struck strategic alliances with USAID to take on infrastructural investments, water, sanitation, electricity, etc. while the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) was to focus on livelihood, i.e. agricultural support. SRSA and Sida were well known by name, as was USAID to a certain extent. The organisation that delivered

<sup>46</sup> "The war is not over until the reconstruction is complete" is a statement by Ayatollah Khomeini, quoted from a poster at the 3rd International Conference on Reconstruction, Tehran, 2–8 March 1997

<sup>47</sup> "The war is not over until the reconstruction is complete" is a statement by Ayatollah Khomeini, quoted from a poster at the 3rd International Conference on Reconstruction, Tehran, 2–8 March 1997

the 'livelihood packages' – LWF, however, was by 2001 only known as '*Neka Organizacija*' ('Some Organisation') This might signify how little impact LWF's contribution was perceived to have had.

#### SRSA'S material contribution

SRSA's first program, signed in late 1999, funded 80 houses, plus taking over the 9 houses partially funded by the Tuzla Municipality. Half a year later, another 98 houses plus a new school were funded by SRSA/Sida. In other words, SRSA set out to initially fund about one-third of the destroyed housing stock of the village. This is a much higher concentration of investment than is usual in BiH (UNHCR 1998, Solberg 2002). In 2003, after I had done my in-depth studies in Grapska, Sida/SRSA supplied materials for the health centre which was also built on a self-help basis, and a third housing phase comprising 75 houses.

An estimated 85% of the materials provided by SRSA were produced in BiH, most of it bought from the Federation side. Only about 20% of the deliveries came from RS, primarily sand and gravel. Within RS there was a widespread opposition to these 'return projects'. Building merchants therefore showed no particular interest in the Grapska project. In addition the companies on the Federation side were much more experienced in doing business with the international organisations, and were thus better prepared to act within a transparent tendering environment than were their RS competitors. These differences have levelled out, but there is still an expressed commercial affinity to link up to 'one's own side'.

#### USAID'S waterworks and infrastructure investments

In contrast to SRSA, USAID undertook their infrastructure work as regular tendered contractor work comprising new water, sanitation and electricity networks totalling KM 1,035,000. These investments were replacing what was deliberately destroyed during and after the war by local Serbs. The contract was awarded to a contractor from Banja Luka, with only a few Grapskanians employed. For budgetary reasons this work took place after the houses were constructed. The returned population therefore had to drill for water for domestic use and for construction. When mains water finally reached the taps, after about a year, inflated bills showed that the contractor had either deliberately or through poor workmanship installed a system which leaked. There might be practical or technical reasons, yet it is not at all improbable, as the Bosniaks claimed, that the leakages were intentional, i.e. politically motivated. Whatever the cause, *it exposed a structural weakness – an accountancy deficit – in managing building works in an aid context*<sup>48</sup>. The contractor is

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<sup>48</sup> This was recently brought to the fore in Afghanistan where the Planning Minister Ramazan Bachardoust resigned in disgust over the closed and profit-oriented practices of international NGOs (Der Spiegel, 30.03.05)



not accountable to the end user for workmanship or quality of delivery. Contractual obligations are usually to an international implementing agency that by economic logic is primarily focused on relationship with the donors. The 'beneficiaries' are excluded.<sup>49</sup>

It is worth noting that extending the piped water connection to the Serb part of the village was not part of the USAID program; fair enough, since there was no piped water there before. However, as I touched upon earlier, the development of the technical infrastructure had been an important arena for the ethno-religious interaction in Bosnia. By neglecting the opportunity to negotiate with the Serbs in Grapska Donja, an opportunity was missed for launching acknowledged processes that might have carried seeds of reconciliation and social recovery, one likely to carry a much wider impact than most other 'governance', 'democracy', 'reconciliation' type programs financed by the international community. The Bosniaks themselves would most certainly not approve of such an extension, history was far too painful for that, but the international agencies must have the capacity to look beyond immediate history. They would be the ones to see the importance of such an infrastructural initiative. They did not.

#### Livelihood support

Sustained return requires sustainable livelihoods. Today (2004) about 70% of the people in Grapska make a living from agriculture. Grapska has been re-ruralised.

There is an apparent confusion within the village as to what, and from whom, agricultural support actually was rendered. When initially interviewed '*neka organizacija*' – 'some organisation' was always referred to as donor. Although Sida, through the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) provided two tractors, farm machinery, seeds, poultry, livestock etc., LWF was not known by name. An RS-based NGO, 'Zdravo da ste' ('Hi Neighbour') also donated livestock and was remembered by name '*because they seem more worried about the wellbeing of the cows than the wellbeing of the people*', as Ekrem Buljbasic put it. In addition to the agricultural support from (what proved to be) LWF, another 'some organisation' (Church World Service) also donated 'sustainability support'. Others may well have done so too. The problem with identifying the level of livelihood support, and the discrepancy between what was donated and what was reported during my investigations in Grapska, may simply be that much of it was sold, – for livelihood reasons. The stories of chain saws being sold about throughout Bosnia. LWF provided 75 such saws to the 262 'Sida/SRSA-families' of Grapska. I don't know how many are in use.

Since then there has been a steady increase in re-cultivation. In 2004 about 90%, i.e. about 400 ha, of their land is in use, providing substantial yields

<sup>49</sup> One major reason why most NGOs turned to the self-help approach in housing, was to circumvent the steadily growing volume of complaints from the house owners about the workmanship of the contractors. These were often baseless, which made them even more cumbersome to handle.

sold at local markets or brought to Federation side mills. This is in part the direct result of the internationally funded agricultural support. For the 2004 season 10 MT of seed was donated by ‘some organisation’, and finally LWF has been duly recognised when they recently introduced their livelihood program by supplying fourteen greenhouses. *From my most recent data it seems fair to say that the livelihood component of the IAProgram was slow in coming*<sup>50</sup>. There is still a large potential left to tap in agriculture.

There is only one unit of production aside from farming. A tinsmith has, through assistance from ‘some organisation’, whose name the owner has forgotten, established a workshop on the ground floor of his rebuilt house, taking on work primarily from the village (*...but now the good times are over*), and for SRSA or other international NGOs. With the building works now declining and the ‘celebration phase’ coming to a close, a relentless search is going on for institutionalised income. Because of local political realities, this search is primarily directed towards the international agencies still in the country. ‘Some industry’ is now called for in the way ‘some organisation’ had been called for earlier.

Aside from the 3 or 4 grocery shops, two competing coffee houses have been established. One serves alcohol, the other not. There are works underway on a centrally located building whose purpose is not yet decided. For shops, offices, production? Not even the owners know.

Developing a basis for a sustainable livelihood is the one most serious challenge facing Grapska. Although there have been some institutional improvements in RS, Bosniak livelihood interests are felt to be openly sabotaged. Whereas housing reconstruction was a collective enterprise, employment or livelihood issues are individual endeavours – and all the more easy to obstruct. *Being a Bosniak in RS is like being a foreigner*, says the chairman of the Village Committee.

#### Private housing investments in Grapska

The housing reconstruction in Bosnia has been an international undertaking. First and foremost through international reconstruction programs that in total built or repaired something like 130–140.000 housing units. Other housing has been funded through private remittances from abroad. According to The National Bank of Bosnia, remittances stand at about 1200 million KM per year<sup>51</sup>, the multiplier effect (and hence the development dynamics) of which is normally much higher than that of international aid.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> By January 2002 there were 5 tractors, 5 horses and 20 heads of cattle. The pre-war figures were 48 tractors, 75 ‘two-wheelers’, and 649 heads of cattle. In mid-2004 Grapska commanded 8 tractors, ‘a number’ of ‘two-wheelers’ and about 100 heads of cattle. Figures stem from the immaculate work of the Village Committee Secretary, Mr Ferhid Hurtic.

<sup>51</sup> Private correspondence with the National Bank of BiH (2002)

<sup>52</sup> In East Timor only about 20% of the massive amount of international aid is actually spent within the country (Hill & Saldanha 2001).

*The sheer volume of private investment is one of the most significant impacts of the Sida/SRSA reconstruction program in Grapska. By February 2002, there were 55 privately financed houses completed or in progress – in addition to the 187.5 SRSA-houses. By June 2004 the figures were 97 and 262.5 respectively. In addition ‘Some Organisations’, know and unknown<sup>53</sup>, had provided another 15. In total 381 houses had been built during the 4 ½ years since people started coming back. Almost all the SRSA houses were extended or altered in ways that required private funding. These private investments were made possible in all but a few cases through funds generated abroad. Only the most recent investments have been paid for through local earnings much of which stemmed from recirculating remittances. Nineteen houses have been repaired or completed through loans from the Sida/World Vision funded housing credit scheme.*

In 2002 I interviewed house owners and building merchants, SRSA staff and Sida diplomats. Deciphering the collected information I found that close to 1 million KM has already been invested in the privately funded houses – with another half million required to complete them. Since then the number of private houses has increased by about 80%. *We are talking about a total investment in privately financed housing at around 2,5 million KM.*

I found that by February 2002 private investments close to 1,5 mill KM have gone into extensions and alterations of the SRSA-houses. Some of these funds were in fact re-circulated remittances. This figure has increased too. *Private investments in SRSA houses now stand at about 2 mill KM.*

By 2002 the value of the material supplied by SRSA for housing in Grapska, KM 2,806,689, was almost matched by the private housing investments funded through remittances from abroad. This is not considering the value of the self-help labour, the infrastructure investments carried by USAID, and the school investments funded by SRSA/Sida. When combining all these elements of expenditure and cost, the conclusion would be that *the international contribution towards the reconstruction of Grapska is almost matched by private investments and economic commitments on the part of the inhabitants.*

About half of these private investments were spent locally within Republika Srpska, totalling something like 900,000 KM +/- 100,000. About 20% of this was domestically produced; the rest was imported from Croatia and Serbia, but also from Italy, Hungary and Montenegro. SRSA's material provisions, however, had an 85% domestic share – and thus made a much more significant long term contribution to Bosnia's recovery than did the remittances spent on imported building materials.

Yet the remittance funded reconstruction of Grapska represents a text book example of the early stages of capital formation, which might well be called

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<sup>53</sup> Mercy Corps: 10 houses (2004); "Some German organisation": 1 house to one individual family; The Malaysian Government: 1 house to one individual family; "Some Sarajevo organisation": 1 house to one individual family; Tuzla Canton: 2 houses to the families of soldiers killed in the war.

‘economic development’. What we see is fixed, environmental, human and social capital being generated and sustained by recurrent circulation of injected external financial capital transformed through human labour.

#### Organising the self-help construction of SRSA houses

Almost all the houses destroyed in Grapska had been built by their owners. That fact also signified an emotional link, what Anderson/Woodrow would call ‘motivational capacity’, for return (Anderson & Woodrow 1989). Many of the former houses were never formally registered. This applied for most family houses throughout former Yugoslavia (Zegarac 1999). As often in Bosnia, when ‘minority houses’ were to be rebuilt in ‘majority areas’, a whole array of formal objections were presented. This was also the case in Grapska. None of the objections were heeded, however, and by the fall of 2000 they stopped coming. These skirmishes took place without SRSA taking notice, let alone intervening on behalf of the ‘beneficiaries’. Most NGOs would have intervened.

There was no set pattern as to how each ‘SRSA-owner’ organised their reconstruction work, it was all due to family links, proximity, the bartering or exchange of services, access to cement mixers, the rate of progress, etc. The socially vulnerable, the ‘war-widows’ or wives widowed during the reconstruction period, were all helped primarily by their extended family, but also by their immediate neighbours.

Among the returnees were 30 fully-qualified craftsmen. These were called upon – particularly for roof constructions and for plumbing and electrical work – at a daily rate of DEM 50/day or more. In fact, the reconstruction of Grapska was based on paid services almost as much as on exchange of labour. *‘The fact that we are brothers does not mean that our wallets are sisters’*, was often quoted.

#### The houses

Most of the SRSA-houses were built to pre-war size which meant increasing the volume by 60–80%, sometimes even doubling it in floor area from that of SRSA model and the supplied material. In almost all cases only one floor was completed and furnished (as SRSA had stipulated). The extra space was left unused, sometimes even open, much as was the case before the war. Between 2002 and 2004 however, several open floors had been fully completed and occupied by family members.

Grapska rebuilt the standard two-and-a-half floor, ‘four quadrant’, column/beam ‘contemporary vernacular’ so prevalent in the Balkans. The prospect of market-based energy prices obviously did not deter the owners from choosing absolute volume over lower future energy bills. The fact that most of the external walls are left un-plastered will further aggravate the insulation capacity. It is also worth noting that only small amounts of building materials

were recycled. The damage was almost total and most of what could be recycled had been recycled already by the Serbs. Here again there were differences: during the 2002–04 period a noticeable number of houses had been plastered. Progress is afoot.

In addition to the extensions, much effort – and private investments – went into interior improvements. This supports the contentions presented earlier that where the outer imprints seems similar, the interiors signifies one's belonging and one's aspirations. They are very much part of the objective structures of one's habitus.

### The guiding motives

Why is so much of the returnees' capital spent on their houses? What motives or reasons do they give?

*'Don't you ever think that this house has come cheap. I had to forsake a university education for my daughter in order to have the second floor built'*, stated a man who has built a new, rather delicate, two-story house on the foundations of his former home – with the second floor left unused. Why was so much extra effort and scarce resources put into rebuilding houses beyond any functional needs? Consistent references were made to what had been there before. That was the benchmark for what was to be. Returning to Grapska was returning to their old house. Building their house – as they did themselves – was rebuilding their old house. This is a crucial observation as the meaning projected into the new building has changed by its very destruction, by the war, by the exile. What people have been forced to go through will directly affect the way they understand and interpret the world and hence guide their own actions. It is not only 'rebuilding the world as it was', it is rebuilding the house in a way that makes (strategic) sense today. It is 'Back to the Future', a recurrent slogan in all reconstruction debates.

Comments on *'getting even (with their neighbours)'* are a forceful reason behind the housing priorities people made. A similar attitude was also documented in research on return done by Anders Stefanson<sup>54</sup> in Banja Luka<sup>55</sup>. It is all about what housing does, or says: The fact that houses seemed to require a certain size to be acceptable actually entails that the *concept of house* under the given circumstances also holds size or at least visual impact as an attribute. For the returnees it does not make sense otherwise. This honours the environment as retaining a certain scale in the urban landscape enhances the quality of the built environment. *...and besides'*, as most home owners said, *'someone in the family might need a flat sometime in the future, – who knows'*.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>54</sup> Paper presented at the Second IDP Conference, NTNU, Trondheim, 16.–18. Sept 2004

<sup>55</sup> Even Nicholas Bullock refers to a similar motives regarding the reconstruction of London after the Blitz (Bullock 2002)

<sup>56</sup> This is almost ad verbatim what I remember my own father said when he started rebuilding our family house bombed during WW II. He rebuilt the house about the same size – with three flats, one for the family and two smaller ones for his two sons to move into in due course. Neither of us did.

The house-as-symbol-of-the-future referred to above is similar to that observed regarding the houses funded by Grapskians living abroad. They build their houses as a 'virtual return', a way of keeping all options open, of deferring existential decisions. They might come back; they might move in – but then again, they might not. This interaction – or tension – between the exiled post-war agents and their respective societal structures may in fact reinforce the feeling of exile. When realising this gradual loss, it becomes imperative to cling on to – or reproduce – the 'objective structures', the physical environment that once moulded the habitus of the now exiled Grapskian: hence the investments in 'virtual return'. This has always been a commonplace phenomenon among emigrants.

As far as it has been possible to ascertain, no village has been able to muster the relative number of privately funded houses as Grapska has. The reasons given for Grapska's high level of private investment refer to *the scale of return, the mode of reconstruction – and the strength of local agency*. Once SRSA set in motion their large scale return program guided by local agency, it was deemed both a viable private investment venture – and a trustworthy social commitment. Furthermore, these investments may also be seen as Diaspora's contributions to the ongoing 'war of reconstruction', conspicuously so, as on average they are much larger and more grandiose than most 'local' houses. These private houses contributed towards changing the physical environment of the village out of proportion to their number. An opposite approach, which forcefully reconfirms the symbolic powers imbued in private housing, comes from the displaced now settled abroad. They say they will not return but want the ruins of their house to remain as monuments – symbols of the violent Serb assault. The village leadership firmly opposes such 'monuments' which indicates that the 'war of reconstruction' may soon be over – and the long and ardent task of re-establishing societal and operational links between Serbs and Bosniaks may enter a new stage.

## Conclusions

There are several ways of evaluating how the IAP Program affected the reconstruction of Grapska. The somewhat static assessment of 'efficiency', 'effectiveness', 'impact', 'relevance' and 'sustainability' make up the OECD/DAC parameters of evaluations, subscribed to also by Sida. This evaluation framework emerged from analyses of 'development aid'. It is worth noting that the external driving forces and the internal dynamics of any post-war or post-disaster scene may differ significantly from that of the development scene. A modified evaluation guide, *Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance Programs in Complex Emergencies* (Hallam 1998), takes account of this. It retains the static approach but adds 'connectedness', 'coverage' and 'coherence' to the OECD/DAC parameters.

Yet most post-emergency phase assistance, be it labelled 'reconstruction', 'humanitarian' or 'transitional' assistance, operates in a recovery environment with distinct post-event properties. The story on Grapska is a case in point. These dynamics, in my view, the OECD/DAC/Sida evaluation frameworks do not sufficiently address; they invariably remain project oriented. There is, however, among donors and international agencies an added interest in 'impacts'<sup>57</sup>, the most obvious being DFID's introduction of the 'Sustainable Livelihoods Approach'<sup>58</sup>. This may indicate a shift towards a broader and more impact oriented evaluation regime<sup>59</sup> that also investigates how the wider societal dynamics are affected by the intervention in question. In a post-conflict setting this may in fact be the ultimate objective of the donor's endeavour.

Here I will first analyse the implementation and IAP Program in Grapska on the basis of a three-pronged 'societal capital filter' resting on the same theoretical base as DID/IDS' 'sustainable livelihoods approach'. In closing I will transpose my conclusions into the evaluation framework subscribed to by Sida.

### Assessing the capital contributions to Grapska


My research on the recovery impact of SRSAs housing program in Grapska used the notion of societal capital and its interaction as the analytical filter. This is in fact related to the conceptual underpinnings of IAP, i.e. that positive societal change depends on several sets of interlinked (integrated) interventions (developments) taking place simultaneously. I envision society – broadly speaking – as an arena of interaction between the following three<sup>60</sup> asset bases, or capitals: 1) fixed and environmental capital, in our case housing, infrastructure and the physical environment; 2) human capital, i.e. capabilities, skills, knowledge and the ability to use them (e.g. state of health); and 3) social capital, i.e. trust, commonly held institutions and values, collective action etc. Development is achieved when replenishing one also strengthens the others in ways that leave the inhabitants and their institutions with the capacity to make wider, more strategic choices. Amartya Sen is an obvious reference (1990, 1999) so is R.D.Putnam (1993, 1995). A similar analytical approach has been applied to previous housing studies, re Stafford et. al 2001.

<sup>57</sup> See <[http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/measuring\\_impact\\_resource.htm](http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/measuring_impact_resource.htm)> for list of references. Even more to the point: The ToR for this Sida evaluation also focused more on impacts that has been the case until recently.

<sup>58</sup> Initially developed and operationalized by Institute of Development Studies <<http://www.livelihoods.org>>

<sup>59</sup> The Capability-Vulnerability matrix introduced by Anderson & Woodrow in 1989 is an older precedent.

<sup>60</sup> Within this approach society might be constituted through many more 'modes of capital', financial capital being the most obvious, political capital is another. My three capital modes are the most basic and leaving financial capital out is held to be the most appropriate in cases where capital replenishment is wholly initiated through international aid (Stafford et. al. 2001).



*This figure shows in principle how the capitals interact. Strengthening one might strengthen the others – or drain the others, pass through them, as it were – all depending on the way the replenishing process is being conducted. This model is drawn – intentionally – to allude to the principles of an electric motor – or an electricity generator.*

#### Fixed and environmental capital

Sida replenished a significant portion of Grapska's fixed capital by way of financing the rebuilding of a significant number of houses, reconstructing infrastructure, rebuilding the school and the health centre – and to a minor degree, providing support for cultivating the land. The composite impact on recovery depended on how this capital injection interacted and enhanced other capital modes to create flows beneficial to the people of the village. So it was not merely a matter of building houses appropriate to the functional needs of the returnees. With the Grapskianians taking over the reconstruction it became a venture of recreating the village.

Each completed SRSA house was – in addition – a significant personal investment due to the privately funded extensions. The level of risk involved in these investments subsided with the growing number of houses. This also helps explain the large number of 'houses of virtual return' financed by members of Grapska's Diaspora. The fact that so much private funding has been channelled into housing rests on the confidence of permanent return due to the *high number of returnees* and the large investments both by Sida/SRSA/USAID and the returnees themselves. One feeds on the other: development.

The fact that added investment resulted in bigger houses, also made them into what Rapport (1994) labels 'lose fit' structures easily allowing for future changes and adaptations – be they internally or externally driven.



The mosque stands out as the most conspicuous and convincing example of flow from fixed capital interacting with human and social capital. Without the Sida investments in housing no mosque would have been built, obviously. Yet the mosque was one of the first buildings reconstructed. It was independently and voluntarily financed, primarily through remittances from abroad. Its sustaining impact on the lives of the villagers is as obvious as the causal chain leading back to the Sida investments.

Environmental capital comprises the land and the man-made environment – gravely depleted during the war. The Serb neighbours made large areas of agricultural land into commercial gravel pits, a business which, on a smaller scale, is still ongoing (2004) due to the non-intervention policy of the police and the local authorities.

Housing links up to the environment in ways that make a distinction illusive. Replenishing fixed capital allows the returnees to cultivate the land and plough earnings back into financing housing extensions. The agricultural potential of the land has been ignored: by default in the case of Sida and the international agencies, intentionally, in the case of the returnees. The latter put their efforts and financial means into strengthening the fixed capital of their houses – and the symbolic flows drawn from that, rather than invest in means of increasing harvests. Then again, they were never farmers in the first place.

The new housing has changed the overall environment. It carries a *new meaning*: most obviously that of *anticipation and hopes for future development* for the village people, but also an unambiguous shout of ‘*We’re back!*’ These signals are attuned to the ‘newness’ of the structures, which invariably will make the remaining ruins lose their horror as they are overtaken by weeds and trees. But for many years still the ruins of the brother’s house or the remnants of the house of the murdered neighbour will remain powerful ‘war memorials’<sup>61</sup>. They constitute ‘objective structures’ of hatred, violence, and degradation<sup>62</sup> and act as obstacles in processes of reconciliation (Galling 1994). Eventually though, they will be rendered meaningless (Winter & Ivan 1999).

The dense physical, cognitive, and even existential effect of the housing program in Grapska has thus made an immense contribution towards replenishing the environmental capital of the village. It enables the returnees to tap into the environmental capital that once gave rise to the settlement, i.e. the good agricultural land, and to enjoy the built environment that constitutes the communal space. We are witnessing contributions towards recovery.

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<sup>61</sup> In cognitive psychology they are referred to as ‘objects of rehearsal’, which allow the public or the person to rehearse the events which the memorial commemorates or signifies.

<sup>62</sup> Re the aforementioned Grapskanian who intends to make the ruins of his house into a local ‘war memorial’.

## Human capital

Human capital refers to the capacities, the capabilities, health, knowledge, skills of the people of the community and its ability to draw benefits from them. The Village Committee's selection criteria favoured Grapskanians who were relatively young, able-bodied, and mostly highly motivated. Many of the returnees were well educated or qualified tradesmen. Their skills were called for. The combination of the 'assisted self-help' approach and the remittance-funded private housing created a labour market where skilled tradesmen were able to earn up to DM50 a day. But the building skills of the non-professionals were reactivated through the self-help strategy too. This approach enabled Sida/SRSA to fund 265.5 houses. The same funds would have resulted in only about 160 contractor-built houses.<sup>63</sup> The multiple impact on the other capital modes, and thus on the prospect of recovery, would have been significantly lower, if organised and built by contractors. This was made evident by the accompanying infrastructure investments by USAID. They did it the traditional way: Project delivery.

The medical doctor, himself a Grapskanian, confirmed reduced use of medicines among the returnee village population. The epidemiological status of the village was described as one of *normal prevalence and scale of illnesses relative to the age groups of the population*. It may therefore be inferred that the housing program – and the way it has been implemented – has positively impacted the physical and psychological well-being of the population. Assessed in conjunction with the age composition, this directly impacts Grapska's potential for recovery.

*Self-confidence* constitutes part of the flow from human capital. Part of the SRSA tactics was to have the villagers themselves deal with the RS authorities in Doboј. In other return and reconstruction programs representatives from the implementing NGOs normally handled this sometimes tense interchange, but not so in Grapska.<sup>64</sup> This has taken some of the 'mystique of power' away from the Serb nationalist authorities. Confronting them as the Grapskanians had to, has strengthened the human capital of the returnees – and may have eroded part of the symbolic capital base of the Serb nationalist authorities. In their encounters with the local Serb authorities, the villagers could, when required, seek assistance from the OHR office in Doboј. The point is that it was the village people who decided, and, not SRSA or Sida.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Using the 60% figure presented earlier.

<sup>64</sup> These third party go-betweens are either NGO staff using translators, or English speaking young university-educated Bosnians employed by an NGO. An Italian NGO was even funded to run a 'democracy program' in Grapska and Panjic, the home village of the displaced Serbs living in Grapska 1995–2002. None of my interviewees, not even the Village Committee were aware of such a program.

<sup>65</sup> There is, however, at least one meeting recorded where SRSA/Sida initiated a meeting with the Doboј authorities on behalf of the villagers. But this did not alter the overall practice.

Social Capital is a concept that is almost branded. It is the 'missing link' of development (Grootaert 1998), the 'glue of society' (ibid), and the basis for the new institutionalism (Maskell et al. 1998, Putnam 1993). Whereas the other capital modes may be replenished, even in some cases be provided for from the outside, social capital can only come from within. This is where the 'ownership of development programs' approach and 'recipient responsibility' strategy have their theoretical nest, closely related as they are to the endogenous growth theory (Romer 1994). It is how the international housing programs affect the social capital accumulation which is the ultimate test on its recovery contribution.

*The organisational strength of pre-war Grapska and its capacity to retain a legitimate village organisation during displacement is the social capital base on which the housing program was founded. The organisation was instigated by international support, not least from Grapska's Diaspora. It was possible to retain and extend that base because most of the displaced villagers lived close to each other, and close to Grapska. All this ensured and required a high level of social trust.<sup>66</sup> Living together and acting together gave social strength, and a strong resolve of return fuelled by uninterrupted 'psychological rehearsals', and undoubtedly a certain patriotic peer pressure. The importance of these social capital components cannot be overstated.*

SRSA responded to the strength of the returnees by delegating to the inhabitants the most important decisions on reconstruction: who shall receive free materials and thereby be able to return? The selection process enhanced social capital formation as did the re/construction strategy of self-help. *'It would have weakened the organisation; it would have weakened the village – or the spirit, if the houses were to have been built by contractors – while the villagers stood watching'*, commented the Chairman of the Village Committee, Safet Buljabasic.

Instead the SRSA approach required interpersonal contact and entailed a certain level of social interdependency. All for the good of what Safet Buljabasic called *'the village spirit'*. This spirit also made it possible to rebuild the health centre as an assisted self-help project, i.e. as a collective endeavour – like in the old days, but with the fundamental difference that this time no Serbs took part.

The post-war relationship between the returnees and their neighbours has not been directly affected by the reconstruction. They remained firmly separated, in spite of occasional chance encounters. Although interaction is inevitable, it was not sought. There was no social trust between the groups. As a result of the war, the social capital within Greater Grapska had been totally eroded. There were no signs that the housing investments, seen as replenishment of fixed capital had had any rub-off effects on any of the other capital modes of Greater Grapska. Reconciliation is definitely beyond housing alone.

And renewed interactions are slow in coming. In 2002 the Village Committee identified one prime example of joint action: the two parts jointly cleared the

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<sup>66</sup> Active trust – or passive (acting in trust, because breaking it would be a lesser good).

drain channel leading from the village to the river Bosna. When I asked in mid-2004 for new examples, I was told again of the clearing of the drain channel. It seems there had been no joint efforts at village level within Greater Grapska for close to three years. Yet, '*we cannot go on living like this*', said Ekrem Buljbasic, '*we have to rebuild the circle*'.

Tension lingers on. The scarce employment opportunities available are usually allocated to Serbs. I was told about Bosniaks offered jobs at salaries significantly lower than Serb co-workers. The individualised hassle by Dobož authorities now (2004) experienced by Grapskians when trying to realize livelihood initiatives is, along with the local practice of allocating public land to Serb IDP settlers, indicative of the still ongoing erosion of inter ethno-religious trust. This is further supported by the fact that external social or economic linkages from Grapska lead to the Federation side, not to the local Serb dominated area. Yet, as one of the members of the Village Committee mentioned in explaining these linkages, '*when Mercator<sup>67</sup> opens on Dobož, maybe then we'll go there*'.

One of the central intentions behind IAPs policy of funding large scale returns to specific areas was the anticipated political dividends. The high number of returned Bosniak voters was expected to have democratic impacts. This has *so far* failed to happen. The way the local authorities conducted the process of voter registration prior to the 2004 local elections ensured that most returned Bosniaks remained disenfranchised. Of the anticipated 800 eligible voters in Grapska, the Serb authorities would initially only allow 220 Grapskians to vote. In other return villages within Dobož municipality it was the same, worst in Kotorsko where Sida/SRSA also had funded most of the housing reconstruction. Here the 900+ strong Bosniak electorate was only allowed 200 votes, whereas the number of Serbs eligible for voting was reportedly 700 from a resident population of about 200<sup>68</sup>. After the elections, representatives of the international community in Bosnia expressed disappointment at the low voter turn-out.

Social capital remains eroded within Bosnia proper. As it is an aggregate outcome of endogenous efforts, any international effort to replenish social capital always has to work through other capital modes, through other tactical means. Social capital may thus only grow out of *the way projects and programs are implemented*, and only to a limited extent through their actual objectives or products. This remains the chief challenge both for donors and agencies in designing and implementing projects in conflict infested environments. It also highlights the limitations of development-oriented evaluation frameworks in such environments.

<sup>67</sup> A Slovenian owned chain of large shopping centres with outlet throughout the Balkans

<sup>68</sup> These are figures given to me on by Muhamed Spahic, Head of the Village Committee of Kotorsko on June 24 2004. The large number of Serb voters in Kotorsko reflected the number of Serb IDPs who had lived in the village prior to the Bosniaks' return. I subsequently reported these incidents of vote rigging to the National Election Commission, to OHR, and to the Swedish and Norwegian Embassies. Outcomes unknown.



*Grapska, June 2004, looking North. The reconstructed houses are located in the now exclusive Bosniak part of the village. In the back at the foot of the tree-clad hill lies the Serb part with the Orthodox Church on the hilltop behind. The village school funded as part of the Sida package is seen to the left with agricultural fields behind.*

## Grapska evaluated within the OECD/DAC framework

### Efficiency

Sida defines efficiency as ‘the extent to which the costs of a development intervention can be justified by its results, taking alternatives into account’ (Sida 2004:25). Making cost comparisons (‘taking alternatives into account’) is an almost futile undertaking in emergency settings. Even in reconstruction settings it is difficult given the lack of a commonly held accountancy framework. A figure often required by donors is that of ‘cost per returnee’. This is a highly unreliable fraction because the constituting figures are not known, are accrued differently, or are simply ‘strategically reported’. I have seen many examples.

SRSA spent a total of 4.189.579 KM<sup>69</sup> or about 19 mill SEK in Grapska<sup>70</sup>. This was accompanied by at least the same amount of private investment made by Grapskanian returnees or the Grapska Diaspora. By the summer of 2004 about 1300 people had returned.

The way SRSA tendered for materials, the way they organised and managed the project, was in accordance with practices I know well<sup>71</sup>. From observations and SRSA interviews it was obvious to me that there was a professional

<sup>69</sup> KM 3.876.837 for 262 housing units, KM 275.773 for the school and KM 36.968 for the health centre built by the inhabitants, converted into SEK at around 4,5 SEK = 1 KM

<sup>70</sup> In addition there were the USAID infrastructure investments of KM 1.035.000, the Sida-funded agriculture support channelled through LWF, the support rendered by Tuzla Municipality and various international and national organisations, totalling – tentatively!! – KM 4 – 4,5 mill

<sup>71</sup> I have spent 20 + years in the ‘building business’ abroad and in Norway, many of them as buildings manager for public interventions.

air around the work headed by Mr Kaj Genneback. His decision to transfer numerous administrative tasks to the Village Committee also meant a saving. Hence SRSA ran with an overhead of about 5% which is half the maximum (and norm) allowed on EU-funded projects. USAID allowed up to 22% overhead on their projects, but then again all their projects were outsourced to a private US building management firm.

There is ample evidence that the Grapska projects were very efficiently implemented both in cost and quality.

#### Effectiveness

This deals with ‘the extent to which a development intervention has achieved its objectives, taking their relative importance into account’ (ibid.). There was an overriding *political* objective of assisting displaced people back to their former homes. This was supported by a prevalent *public* assumption that bringing people back, would in time heal social rifts and lay the basis for the re-emergence of a one-state Bosnia. Beyond this the international efforts were grounded in *the moral ought*, i.e. in responding to the grave injustice wrought upon the displaced civilians (and perhaps also to compensate for lack of international efforts to stop it when they could see it happening). This made housing reconstruction a central strategic tool in the hands of the international donors.

Sida’s IAP was born within this normative framework: It was set to ‘bring people back’! As was shown earlier, the agency held no clearly formulated objectives beyond the goal of return through the means of housing reconstruction ‘in an integrated way’<sup>72</sup>. Tactically there were other considerations, i.e. an anticipated democratic momentum embedded in ‘policy of concentration’. Because strategic and tactical goals tend to overlap in interventions like these, the true outcome of the Grapska project seems in fact to be the result of tactical considerations made by the local Sida staff and the head of SRSA in Tuzla. These concerned

- *The location of Grapska* with its rich farmland placed within the regional communication network, close to urban centres – and, not least, in proximity to the entity border, and the displaced Grapskanians’ former ‘homes away from home’.
- *The policy of concentration*. Sufficient numbers of ‘beneficiaries’ to constitute a critical mass, i.e. to constitute a ‘social movement of return’. Which in fact it proved to be.
- *The transferral of agency to the Village Committee*, thus making the returning population formulate the selection criteria, select ‘beneficiaries’ and deal with the local Serb authorities in person. This not only brought symmetry to the relationship between donor/foreign NGO and the local popu-

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<sup>72</sup> There is still some confusion as to what IAP’s ‘integrated’ component tactically entailed.

lation, it strengthened social trust, collective powers and self-esteem among the returnees – not least in their relationship to the Serbs. The impacts of this will be dealt with later.

- *The assisted self-help approach.* Not only did this extend the effect of the available funds, it allowed the returnees to extend their capacities, and most importantly, allowed the returnees to regain a meaningful relationship to their ‘new’ old environment.

On this tactical level Sida seems to have made few ‘integrated considerations’ in the initial IAP sense. Funds were, however, made available for rebuilding the school and the health centre<sup>73</sup>, but on issues of livelihood Sida’s initial contribution seems not to have made any significant impact. What actually sustained the returned population was the influx of foreign funds either from returning refugees or through remittances. The fact that Sida apparently provided rather meagre livelihood support, may also be the result of close monitoring of the impact of the aforementioned remittances, and may thus be a sign of very efficient assistance.

Whatever the causal linkages, the sustained return to Grapska came as a result of Sida’s initial funding for the reconstruction of close to three hundred houses. Due to *the way these reconstruction efforts were carried through* an additional one hundred houses have been built and an even larger population has returned. The project has been exceptionally effective in bringing people back to Grapska<sup>74</sup>.

#### Impacts

My own research has focused on the impacts of the material contribution that Sida/SRSA made to support return. Impacts are the ‘totality of the effects of a development intervention, positive and negative, intended and unintended’ (ibid). Hence it also addresses the societal effects, not merely the material; it literally looks into all rub-off effects. I have in a prior chapter on ‘capital effects’ argued that the very dynamics of recovery or re/development depend on positive and parallel impacts from the intervention in question; in our case housing reconstruction.

In presenting the effectiveness I listed the most important tactical considerations made by Sida/SRSA. These proved to hold crucial consequences for the overall effects, or impacts, of the three-phased housing project, i.e. *the way the project was implemented* holds the key to its many positive impacts.

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<sup>73</sup> By the summer of 2004 it still remained empty because the political authorities in Doboj had not provided funds to cover its operating costs.

<sup>74</sup> OHR’s Housing Verification and Monitoring Unit (HVM) made their visits to Grapska in January 2002 and confirmed that 88% of the SRSA houses were occupied at the time. During week-ends the occupancy rate was close to 100% the reason being that people initially tended to stay on in Doboj Istok as explained above. The 3. phase was monitored in March 2003. By then only 59% of the houses were occupied for apparent reasons: the houses had not been completed. The true occupancy rate today is unknown, but it is far higher than the national average of 76%. HVM bases this figure on multiple visits to about 57.000 houses out of an estimated 137.000 re/built by the international community.

- Grapska's location next to the entity border, across which most of the returnees lived during their displacement, made it possible for people to return in stages thereby retaining their contacts – for some even their employment – at their 'displacement home'. This in particular was important for the young people, many of whom had only faint memories of old Grapska.
- Assisting more than 260 families to rebuild their houses made the social movement that Sida/SRSA anticipated, but it also unleashed an unexpected rush of private housing investments, mostly through funds accrued abroad. They stand as a manifestation of the confidence people had in the success of the Sida/SRSA's return projects, both in financial terms, but also as a symbolic investment. These investments carried further impacts. The funds circulated within Grapska constituted a market, and explains why so many people were able to let go of their 'refugee status', return, and economically survive during the first years. This was not accounted for by Sida. In fact the sheer volume of the privately funded new housing and the additional funds going into the extension of the SRSA-houses is unique in the Bosnian context – as far as I have been able to ascertain. It could hardly have been anticipated during planning. From my data, albeit collected 'qualitatively', there are indications that, when adding the value of unpaid labour, Sida funds are about matched by private funds. Indeed unique.
- The impact of the transferral of agency – from SRSA on to the local Village Committee is crucial in explaining the phenomenon of private commitments. It allowed for strategic choices to be made by a legitimate and accountable body representing the returnees<sup>75</sup>. An unexpected impact of this relates to the support criteria they posited. Because it favoured those of 'fighting age', Grapska has a relatively young returnee population, about 35 years (January 2002), which is a favourable mean average age for a working population.

The fact that the returnees also had to face and deal with the local Serb authorities on their own, and not hand-led by some international democracy-NGO, strengthened their collective purpose, carrying as they did, the moral upper hand<sup>76</sup>. It also strengthened their self-confidence which may explain their determined response to the voter registration charade in June 2004. No other village in the Doboj area<sup>77</sup> responded so firmly.

<sup>75</sup> In fact it represented all former Grapskians. Several of the Committee members were not even residents of Grapska when I did my field studies in 2002. Some actually had built houses in Doboj Iсток, yet were Committee members. All of them had moved back to Grapska by 2004.

<sup>76</sup> Re earlier explanations on the shift in public perceptions on the 'right of return' about the time of the Grapska return.

<sup>77</sup> Even the chairman of the Village Committee of Kortorsko enviously commented upon Grapska's organisational strength during a visit in June 2004.



- The self-help approach was embedded in the IAP not for financial reasons, but, according to Mossberg and Iwansson, because it carried values ‘that cannot be measured’ (2001:2). One effect could be measured: housing built through assisted self-help costs less so perhaps as many as 30% more units could be built. For Grapska this meant 75 houses which could have made a significant difference to the quest for the ‘critical mass’.

But the one most significant impact of the self-help approach in Grapska was that it allowed people to infuse their new home with new meaning. It enabled them to make choices – a crucial constituent in re/building a home. And they did so in a reflexive manner. Partly to regain or recreate the symbolic content of the home they lost, partly as an act of defiance directed at their Serb neighbours. Hence in all but a very few cases the SRSA houses were extended – through private funds – to match their former houses.

- The overall economic impact of the Sida/SRSA housing programs is difficult to gauge. About 85% of the building materials provided by SRSA were domestically produced, whereas only about 20% of the materials used for the private houses and the SRSA extensions were made in Bosnia. Furthermore, the Bosnia-made materials mostly originated from the Federation side. Initially, about half of the material used for the privately funded building works was bought from building merchants in RS. However from 2003 onwards most of the materials were brought in from the Federation side, a tendency not anticipated<sup>78</sup>.
- The ultimate – intended – impact of the housing support to Grapska: contributing towards lasting reconciliation and peace, does not reveal itself. There seems to be no increase in joint efforts or substantial contact between the two groups of the village. The conditions are reminiscent of the spatial segregation observed elsewhere in the world. This challenges the popular assumption that spatial proximity causally leads to interaction and subsequent integration. Bosnia reminds us of Northern Ireland in this respect. In Grapska the IAP approach has made manifest the right of recuperating one’s territory, one’s property, one’s home, yet reconciliation is beyond a three phased housing project. It is worth reminding ourselves that it took generations, and ‘an economic Wonder’ to undo the political and societal damage of the Second World War.

The political disempowerment of the returning Grapskanians in the first domestically organised local elections, defies the expected democratic impacts of large scale minority return. It is a most sobering reminder of the limited thrust for civil change external actors actually carry in other countries’ internal political affairs.

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<sup>78</sup> It might however have a less political explanation: Filux, the local Serb side building merchant reshuffled its business, consequently the Grapskanians found it more convenient to go to the Federation side. Dobojski is visited ‘only if we have to...’

Due to the tactical approach brokered by SRSA the impacts have been wide, positive and dynamic. Beyond manifesting the human right of displaced people to return to their homes, the over-all political impacts have been meagre.

#### Relevance

There is absolutely no doubt among the returned population as to the relevance of the intervention. For them it is absurd even to raise the issue. So it is for the donor in regard to Grapska.

There may be reasons, however, to question the international community's strong focus on housing alone. It may be worth quoting Sida's 'relevance' definition: 'The extent to which a development intervention conforms to the needs and priorities of target groups and the policies of recipient countries and donors' (ibid). Beyond the overriding focus on housing, all return programs added some token 'livelihood component'. It is fair to say that housing reconstruction was seen as the very key for 'people to be able to return'. But return is a complex process, more complex as the years pass (Zetter 1999, Kibreag 2002). The house is but one node in the network that constitute 'home' or 'home environments' as Amos Rapoport (1994) insists on labelling it. There are other crucial network nodes such as livelihood, family, clan, access to services, communications etc. Under normal circumstances the house as home is built as a *resultant* of all these nodes. Returning to the house without these other network nodes present, may not make sense for people. This could be the ultimate reason why more than 25% of all internationally funded housing units in Bosnia may still be unoccupied, according to HVM<sup>79</sup>.

On the other hand housing has an exceptionally high multiplier effect (between 2 and 4), much higher than of manufacturing according to Habitat-ILO (1997;32) – when built from locally produced materials and by local labour. As such it is a highly relevant mode of intervention – as long as it is implemented in ways that rest upon, and support, the reestablishment of other crucial nodes in the network that constitutes home. The success of the SRSA-led reconstruction of Grapska is a case in point.

#### Sustainability

In this context it is necessary to confine the meaning of this overused term to the 'ability to maintain the benefits of the intervention beyond the initial support phase'<sup>80</sup>. In this limited sense, the Grapska intervention has indeed provided lasting benefits. The strengthening of all capital modes as discussed

<sup>79</sup> This phenomenon of 'empty houses' is emphatic in reconstruction arenas. It has been reported upon from Rwanda, the Caucasus, Iran, Central America, and now even in post-tsunami Thailand. It is only in Bosnia that the phenomenon has been systematically monitored.

<sup>80</sup> "The continuation or longevity of benefits from a development intervention after the cessation of development assistance" as per Sida's definition (Sida 2004;25)

above, make public a community reclaiming its rights, its possessions and its history in ways that reveal strong human and social assets. These are necessary, yet not sufficient, inputs for a sustainable future. Compared to most 'rebuilt' minority return communities in the country, Grapska stands better prepared to succeed than most others – due to the way SRSA and Sida chose to implement their return support program.

There are reasons to believe, however, that providing more focused livelihood support from the beginning, e.g. specialist agriculture advice and credit, would have given future development a more solid economic footing. The productivity increase from using tractors, for instance, is enormous when the alternative is to work by hand. The marginal effect of a couple of houses on the other hand, was negligible, making support for the purchase of tractors and farm equipment a legitimate alternative. This would also be more in line with the sustainability perspective of the 'integrated approach'.

But a lasting recovery lies beyond the community of Grapska, strong as it may be on societal assets. Their expulsion and their return show for the entire world that their lives also depend on others. So will their future. The village so far runs on its own, well supported by their patriotic Diaspora. This would normally indicate a high probability of developmental success. But again, it depends on re-establishing external links to the splintered political and social environment of the region and the country. Sustainability in this wider sense still hangs in the air.

#### End notes

By placing DAC's evaluation criteria within the societal capitals framework we see how the question of sustainability trails back into the past. Sustainability is, and we now draw on the seminal work of Anderson and Woodrow (1989), crucially dependent on the bundle of capacities mustered by the society in question itself, the roots of which were there long before any foreign intervention. What SRSA did in implementing the IAP program was to trust, rally – and thus enhance and reinforce – these capacities. It is the capacities of Grapska society itself which are the keys to its future.

Long-term recovery depends on the combined 'geographical capital' of the place in question. This concept – termed by Bird et al. (2002) – tries to explain why some communities fight poverty more successfully than others. This literally places the societal assets into a geographical or spatial sphere. Each place holds its own composite set of 'geographical capital'. This is the lock into which we place the keys to Grapska's future.

Sida recognised the potential in Grapska's location and agricultural resources. SRSA acknowledged the organisational and personal capacities of its people. From this recognition and acknowledgement emerged a community rebuilding process unique to this village. The belief that these unique elements may be remodelled and replicated elsewhere is the *raison d'être* of this paper.

# Dilemmas of return – two anthropological case studies

By Melita Čukur

## The Selo case study

The remote mountain village of Selo<sup>81</sup> in Republika Srpska is just a few kilometres from the border of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has now just 1 200 inhabitants or 238 households while the pre-war population was 2 008 or 367 households. Of these 367 households 106 were Croatian, 7 Serbian and 254 Bosniak.

When hostilities started, most of the villagers fled to the nearby municipality of Žepče. Their own village, near the frontline, was completely destroyed during the war.

Return to Selo started in 1998. 167 houses were donated by Cross Roads International (CRI), 15 were built by the American Refugee Committee (ARC), and 32 by the owners themselves. USAID provided for electricity in the village. CRI also built the road to the village, repaired bridges, and constructed a school and a community house. Selo does not have tap water – there is no water main, nor does the village have a stationary telephone network.

Households which had received CRI donations were entitled to a follow-up donation from the Lutheran World Federation. Four Serbian households received CRI donations, while the remaining Serbian households were reconstructed by their owners. According to the CRI-representative, the Croats declined to return, even though in a neighbouring village two Croat houses had been restored by CRI.

## Purpose and method

The aim of the anthropological study was to map the beneficiaries' perception of their economic and social situation, and to analyze the impact, relevance and sustainability of Sida's contributions within the Integrated Area Program. The issue of whether the return program has had an effect on the process of reconciliation was also studied. Proposals for desirable and necessary measures that might enable and further this process are also taken into account.

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<sup>81</sup> In order to protect the integrity of the villagers and the respondents this is a fictitious name.

The choice of setting for the fieldwork was made by Joakim Molander, evaluation officer of Sida in Stockholm.

The methodology of the study was inductive and qualitative. The anthropological approach, or 'life story' method, enables the researcher to concentrate on what the informants see as important. Bearing in mind that discourse related to aid is a significant aspect of 'the new life' of most of the informants; the topic of donations was very often brought up spontaneously. In some interviews the issue was discussed on my initiative.

During my two months stay in the village (May, June 2004) 37 interviews were conducted -most were tape-recorded. The informants belonged to different categories in terms of age, economic status, ethnic affiliation, sex and education. Some interviews were with those who had not been part of any program, and who still lived in a cellar or in alternative lodgings outside the village.

## Return

### Reasons for return

At the end of the war most of the population still lived in villages some 40 kilometres away from Selo.<sup>82</sup> The first returnees were the older people. During 1999, weekend excursions for members of the younger generation were organised by the village council. They came to the village to help their older relatives to clean up the ruins.<sup>83</sup>

Since Selo is one of the villages with the best return rate in Republika Srpska, it is important to pay attention to the reasons for return given by the informants. One of the most frequent reasons given was the desire to return home, often combined with pragmatic references to economic maladjustment in the place of refuge. Most had been IDP:s in neighbouring villages in Bosnia and Herzegovina. One informant describes his experience in the following way:

It was always my wish to return to what is mine. And we did not manage, no one was working there. It simply didn't matter to be here or there, but home is better, and when you choose between two poverties, again, you are better off in your home – at least then you have your land, you at least have something. If you had acquired anything, if you had succeeded, perhaps you would not have returned; if you were better off, but we were not.

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<sup>82</sup> The exception being war widows who during the war were granted an apartment in Zenica.

<sup>83</sup> It was explained to me that plan was twofold: first, to make it possible for young people who had spent eight years as refugees to get acquainted with their place of birth, as some of them remembered Selo only from the stories of the grown-ups; second, to persuade the 'international community' (i.e. the representatives of the implementers) that the inhabitants of the village really were interested in returning.

Informants often said that the fact that there was no pre-war tradition of working temporarily in Western Europe made an exile to these countries impossible. Some informants claimed that, had there been such an alternative, most people would have emigrated. In other words, the return was successful since there was no other, economically more satisfactory alternative.

That this was a collective return was often mentioned as an additional incentive – the more people returned, the greater their sense of security. The feeling of solidarity in an environment where most people are connected by blood ties is undoubtedly strong. The geographic isolation also means that the villagers to a certain extent are dependent on each other. The shared experience of war – whether as refugees in other villages, or as soldiers – strengthened this feeling of solidarity.

An important factor contributing to the successful return might be that there were no civilian war victims. Those who had fallen in the war were 28 members of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the so-called *Šehidi Selo*, or Martyrs of Selo. Three civilians who lost their lives in exile during the war were counted as martyrs.<sup>84</sup>

The general opinion was that the return of all refugees and displaced persons was the only right thing to do. People were also convinced that as time passed, return becomes less probable: either people have “managed” somehow to make a life in exile, or feel unable to return to a destroyed home, or simply do not wish to come back. A 70-year old male informant explains it in the following way:

Well, take the Serbs in Želeća; do you know why they return? They return, stay one or two months, and then sell. There are these people from Željezno Polje; they buy from the Serbs in Želeća. It is true, there are those who have already returned, they are all older people, mostly older people. I think they will all sell, remember what I tell you, even if they now seem to have returned, they will all leave, you will see... Želeća is really a good place, they have everything, water, an asphalt road...however... When half of them have left, the others will not want to stay, they will not, we are a minority, they say. The obstacle to return is an ethnically clean country, people are where they were during the war; where they formed an ethnic majority, they have stayed, and

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<sup>84</sup> After the return to Selo in 1999, a 34-year old woman stepped on a mine in her father's yard and lost her leg. The description and explanations of this tragic event tell us much about the desire for return, but also show what kind of mechanisms are mobilized to make an event like that understandable. Some of my informants described the father as a very angry man. The day before this unfortunate event he started to quarrel with the shepherds, Serbs, who were still living in the village, telling them in a loud voice that they should leave, since now the people of Selo were in control of their own destiny. They were strangers, they did not know his character, and he is always like that. According to the informants that day four mines were placed in his yard. The mine exploding was aimed at him, not the daughter. This way of individualizing and explaining the tragic event was necessary – had the inhabitants of Selo reasoned in a different way, if neither the perpetrators, nor the owner of the house had been referred to by name and character, the fear of similar incidents would have been greater, thus constituting an obstacle to return.

there they have managed. Those who were slightly richer, and could, were the first to sell everything and leave – those who are staying are paupers...only old women, when you go there and see them, only old women, working a little in the fields, but there are no young people. [...] And when you think a little more carefully, everything is divided – Serb party, Bosniak party, Croat party; Serb language, Bosniak language, Croat language; Serb telephone company, a company for the Federation; Serb television, Bosniak television, Croat television – everything that exists is divided. It is not strange that people do not return to a place where they are not a majority, when you think about it, it is not strange, that they have not returned, what is strange is that we returned (laughter).

### Perception of return – then and now

Whereas the period immediately after return was a time of a new beginning and house building, characterised by general optimism, the difficult and unchanging economic situation that followed has resulted in resignation. Even though most informants claim that the decision to return was the right one, everyday struggle for survival has resulted in a change of attitude. One 50-year old informant says:

In the village there are former camp inmates who after the war could have gone to America. Only few did so, everyone was thinking: It's far away. Why should I go to America, why should I go to Canada? But today, thinking back, many people say – Why didn't I go to America then, when I could? Now they regret it. I sometimes regret that I returned. What am I looking for here? Everywhere in the world the chances to find a job are better than here. When there is nothing here, it really means nothing. But again, I cannot say that I regret it – I know that the situation is the same all over Bosnia. It is nice to be back home – but you can not live from the walls, can you? As long as you could compare it with something worse it was all right – the war was over, that was most important. The whole village was ruined. We got houses! That is great – we could never build them on our own. Then, in the beginning, we were all so happy. We believed that this was the beginning of something, something new. After the houses would come a normal life, we thought. Nothing. It stopped at the houses. I remember clearly that time, houses were built, some had wages by the day, everyone was doing something. We were at the beginning of something. That time is over now. Now the only task is how to manage to live, pull through, survive from day to day. And – what will happen with these children, what will happen to them?

## Donations to the village

The pre-war population was 2 008, today it is 1 200.<sup>85</sup> Reconstruction of the village included reconstruction of the houses, the village road, repair of bridges and construction of a community house and a primary school. At the time of my stay the primary school was attended by 199 pupils from the village, and 52 more pupils from Selo commuted daily to secondary school in Teslić.

Twelve families still live 'in a cellar' while another 40 families live outside the village, most of them in nearby villages. The division between those who were given help to build their house, and those who did not qualify, provides an opportunity for empathy and solidarity. The beneficiaries of aid try to help their less fortunate relatives. Often one of the children of parents who did not receive help will live with grandparents who did. People who were not eligible for assistance are still regarded as full members of the village – for example, women living outside the village return to work in the fields, and are often helped by their relatives or neighbours.

### Organisation of aid

An initial selection of potential beneficiaries was made on the basis of CRI's list of criteria. In practice, the presence of a responsible CRI-architect and his judgment of the actual situation are of major importance. Good cooperation with the village council is also an important aspect of this process. The initial problems were caused by corruption and nepotism on the part of the village council and resulted in a temporary withdrawal of CRI from the village. The present council enjoys the support of most of the villagers. However, the initial setback has not been forgotten, especially not by those who were deemed not to qualify for help.

### Opinions about received help

Interviews with people, who were not eligible for a donation, reveal their dissatisfaction with the assistance. They feel that the program of aid is unjust. The main culprit is the village council, whereas the organisation of aid on the part of CRI is considered fair.<sup>86</sup>

An attempt to 'ethnicise' help concerns the help given to Serbian households. According to Bosniak informants and the CRI-architect, the Serbs pleaded for 'special privileges' - a 'turn-key' solution, on the grounds that they constituted an ethnic minority in the village. The plea was rejected, a decision considered correct and fair by the representatives of CRI and the rest of the village.

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<sup>85</sup> Of 1200 inhabitants, 252 are between 15 and 32 years of age.

<sup>86</sup> The rule which presupposes help for three of five brothers (in view of the limited resources of the donor) is regarded as a just and correct solution. Prioritizing families with several members rather than those living alone, is also regarded as a just, although cruel solution.



Informants saw CRI as ‘the only organisation aware of local conditions, and will withdraw if there is any sign of erroneous behaviour’. An informant active in the village council says:

I think that the others try to assist Serbs and Bosniaks, as well as Croats – they act according to that ethnic principle – regardless of the result. The Swedish organisation doesn’t work in that way. You cannot force someone to return. Who doesn’t want to come back, doesn’t; it is not important whether he is Croat, Bosniak or Serb. They should take into account who really wants to return, not worry about who is who. It is not their fault, you know, our whole state is divided – they cannot act contrary to reality, and, therefore they want it to be fair, in the ethnic sense. Take Slatina, they do not return, but they got a school. And there are only two of them, two schoolchildren. That was done by USAID. The project failed, and they knew it – they built a school, and only two children go there. And you know what is worst, you cannot complain, either, you know what will come out of it – We are against it because they are Croats. We are not against – let all have everything – but they should see who needs what, let them see the real situation. They apparently want that everyone, also Croats and Serbs, get something, I know that – and it is fair, let everyone have, but you know what – they are looking more to fulfilling the quotas of Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, and do not take into account the genuine interest in return, that’s what is wrong with this policy. It does not occur to them that maybe these houses will be empty. They are coming to ask questions, will you return, and everybody says he will. And they get on with constructing houses for them, these people spend some time there –then lock the doors, and return to where they have been living until now: let it be a *vikendica*... They should think a little, this international organisation, about to whom they give something, they should do a little investigating, it doesn’t matter to what religion people belong, let them just investigate at first who is really for return and who is not. After all, let all who want to come back to their homes return, people who want to return should be helped, no matter what he is, so the houses are not empty, and over there people are living as animals... [...] Well, this USAID...had they only done some investigation they would have seen that this school doesn’t pay, we need water, and we are living here – 200 households, all of them needing water. We are already here, all of us returned. When you just think about it, isn’t it better, when they realize that there is a large return, that people have really returned, isn’t it better that this village is completely rebuilt.

Five households got ready-made houses. The rest of the village received building material. This self-help method is believed to be very good since people can build a house in their own way. Comments made by those given a 'turn-key' solution by another donor (ARC built 15 houses in the village) point to the advantage of the self-help model – they had actually been unable to influence the construction of their own home.

The mere fact that CRI is often called «Šefko's organisation» indicates how important the choice of such a person is. He is, after all, «the organisation's face». His frequent visits to the village are believed to be positive — in this way he could be thoroughly updated on the real situation. Most informants perceived him as a correct, just and reliable person. With the «Swedish organisation» you could be sure the materials would be delivered on time. This is especially apparent compared with other «organisations».

The aid received from the Lutheran World Federation was a donation of tools, livestock, or farming materials to the value of 2 000 KM. Everyone granted help by CRI was entitled to this. It is interesting that many informants see these grants as 'the best credit ever given.' The aid, according to the informants, proved to be useful, but it still seems that this kind of help has not been understood as being aimed at sustainability. Instead it became part of the short-term solution – selling in order to survive. One informant, a 47-year old unemployed man says:

Well in the end you get something worth 2 000 KM. Some people were given a cow, some, for example, tools worth up to 2 000 KM. That you get, for example, power saws, that is good as well... people won't keep that for themselves, but will sell it, to pay the craftsmen. To survive...and that was very good, it really was, one would invest in something because of that...you get these 2 000 KM to survive, they were aware that people have nothing. I got a power saw and tools. And I get money for the power saw and get myself a cow, to have milk for the children. This means, you did not waste the money. You invested in something... They gave anything, worth 2 000 KM. It could be eight sheep, it could be a cow, and it could be tools, fertilizer. All is dead capital. You sell it, get money and buy something for your home. I don't know of anybody who would say it is not good. They should really be thanked. But, the first round was the best, then they were giving cows, power saw and sheep. Those who did not want to keep the cow, sold it, and paid the craftsman, bought food and whatever else they needed. For the beginning, for the house. They give people because people are in need. Everyone will not keep a power saw. Naturally, people will sell them, to survive. To be helped a little. You are in debt, you have to work, you have to pay the craftsman, children go to school, you have to live.

## Economic conditions

### Economic conditions before and shortly after the end of the war

Before the war about 200 male villagers worked in Croatia; about 30 in Slovenia and Serbia, and another 15 in the nearby towns of Tešanj and Teslić. Eight worked in Germany. Labour migration was, therefore, a significant source of income. Usually boys started work directly after school. In the mid seventies, many boys attended a technical secondary school where they were taught a trade; for example bricklayer, carpenter, welder, electrician or car mechanic.

Most households were 'mixed households', meaning that their living came from both farming and industry. Food was grown for one's own needs. The traditional division of labour was that male adults were away earning money, while the farm, household and children were run by the women.

To many informants, the former economic and political system was superior and more humane. There were plenty of work opportunities all across former Yugoslavia, and the social security system offered favourable pensions and health care.

The refugee period was a time of scarce resources and severe conditions where as many as six households might share a house. People were almost completely dependent on donations. The distribution of help (mainly food) sometimes gave rise to conflicts between refugees and the local population.

### The economy today

All my informants described their economic situation as very difficult, almost unbearable. 'We make it somehow. One lives from one day to another' were very frequent comments. Five villagers run their own business and employ 19 people. Six work as policemen in Teslić, three as foresters, five in the school, while eleven women work in the sewing factory in a neighbouring Serbian village. Only six households have moved abroad (USA, the Netherlands), so remittances as a source of income are of no consequence here.

Massive unemployment is, according to the overwhelming majority of informants, the biggest problem. Considering that income from labour migration represented the main part of economic resources, the present impossibility of working at the pre-war place of work has had severe economic effects.

About 40 villagers have managed to find a job in Croatia through their pre-war contacts. This time they are part of the black market economy and do not declare their income. They are very aware of the insecurity of their position, but the job is anyway seen as an alleviation of their economic situation.<sup>37</sup> Seasonal jobs with wages by the day or picking berries and mushrooms, or collecting snails are all a help.

In the village there are nine social cases (elderly and sick people who are not eligible for pension), taken care of by relatives.<sup>88</sup> Paradoxically, those who had pension rights before the war are almost the only people in the village with a stable income. Widows and those entitled to the *Šehit* Pension (widows or parents of a fallen soldier), and people who were injured during the war belong to this group. This pension may provide for a whole household even one including several unemployed men aged 20–50.

Unpaid farm work such as sowing, caring for and harvesting potatoes, beans, grain, corn and seasonal vegetables, as well as cattle breeding is traditionally done by the women.

Even though many male informants preferred to talk about factory jobs, rather than farm work, older villagers remember the time when land had not yet been divided and people were living exclusively from agriculture. A 70-year old informant remembers:

I remember the times when we worked the fields, when we lived from that, only from that. Earlier we were drying plums. You sell the dried plums and you can live through the winter, whatever you need you have, the money you earned during the summer is saved and you don't have to worry. That was before people started going to the factories

Expenses – medical care, or administrative fees are, according to many informants, much too high. Even though almost all my informants are willing to send their children to secondary school in the nearby town of Teslić, the expenses (schoolbooks, school equipment and the monthly bus ticket of 25 KM) are often a hindrance. Since most families have four or more children, when resources are scarce, they tend to favour the education of male children. As one parent explained: 'Costs are high. And she will soon get married anyway; in the end her life will be the same: home, children, and shovel...'

#### Market issues

It is generally held that working in agriculture is a way to survive, not to live. Households with a surplus – milk or potatoes for example sell them on a small scale within the village. Villagers offered several reasons why produce was not marketed. One reason was the geographic location of the village (being isolated by hills on four sides), another was the distance to the nearest town and the absence of functioning roads. A third reason often given was the poor prices and weak market for agricultural products. Finally an important reason was the absence of organised purchase – the only product purchased in an organised manner is milk.

<sup>87</sup> In contrast to the pre-war period the present privatization is considered as very negative – privatization as such is very often associated with criminal takeovers of firms for very small sums, insufficient working conditions and exploitation of workers, and a general feeling of insecurity and inability to change things.

<sup>88</sup> The help most often consists in providing food and bringing water.

## Attitudes towards credits

Most of those interviewed were sceptical about credits<sup>89</sup>. Firstly, to get a credit you have to prove that you have a regular income, or a guarantee. Secondly, there is a fear of being unable to repay the loan. Related to this is the lack of belief in agriculture as a major source of income.

## Social conditions

### Social identification and security

Social identification, the sense of belonging to the village, was often mentioned as a significant condition of a successful return. The villagers were often blood relatives which gave them a strong feeling of community.

People now feel safe. The fear associated with the first days of return, and explained as a consequence of ‘attempts to strike terror in village inhabitants’, has evidently disappeared. It is interesting to observe, though, that these attempts (blowing up the village bridge, shelling the bus with returnees, putting a mine in the garden of one of the returnees) are dismissed as sporadic and the actions of unidentified Serb individuals to prevent the village population from returning. Seven Serbian families living in the village (or rather in a small satellite village), according to an account by a 50-year old Serb, do not feel insecure. ‘Had I feared for my life, I would never live here. I know the people here, we were always living together, they know me.’

### Social activity

Informal social activity, like spinning together, Friday dances, or playing football, is the very nucleus of social life of the village. Besides the House of Culture in which dances are arranged on Fridays, one meeting place is the sweet shop built after return.

Work in the village council is one of the few formal activities in the village. The council has nine members and it is their duty to suggest potential beneficiaries to the implementing agencies. Two of them claim to be politically independent, one is member of SDS, one is member of SDP and the rest are members of SDA. Political activities in the village, according to the informants, are confined to visits by politicians during the run up to elections. Most villagers are SDA followers, an option which seems more ethnically than ideologically motivated. The Serbs in the village are SDS followers. Young people appear indifferent to politics. The perception of politics is perhaps best described in this comment by one of the village council:

<sup>89</sup> According to the informants about twenty people in the village have obtained credits, amounting to between 2 000 and 5 000 KM, of which 50 or 70 percent must be returned within two or three years. The credits are aimed at the development of agriculture and cattle breeding, and according to the informants, are given on the condition that there is a detailed plan for their use.

We at the council have nothing to do with politics. We try to do the best for the village, to construct a water main, to help people who still live outside the village to come back. We have left politics outside our schedule.

Politics is, accordingly, identified as party politics. This also means national party politics, which per definition has a bad reputation. The same informant, a 40 year old man, Bosniak, accounts for his opinion of politics:

Politics is a higher matter, unattainable for ordinary people. Politics is about decision-making. It takes place in government. It is up there where decisions are taken, it is there they make decisions of what I'm supposed to do, or allowed to do, or am prohibited from doing. That's politics.

Religion plays an important role in village life. Muslim identity is not only about ethnic belonging, but is also understood in moral terms. The Islamic weekend school, organised by a *hodža* is attended by all children until the age of 15. According to many of my informants the attitude towards religion has not changed during the last years. The only apparent difference being, that due to high unemployment, more male inhabitants are able to attend the prayer on Fridays (*džuma*).

### Social interaction, cooperation, and trust

People in the village are cooperating – the most frequent example is that women help each other when working in the fields. Another case of cooperation is the development of the village, for example repairing roads, or trying to construct a water main. Most men take part.

The houses were built on the principle of reciprocal help, where the assistance given a relative or neighbour today, presupposes that you will be helped tomorrow when building your own house. There is also cooperation with the Serbian inhabitants – one of the Serbs in the village owns a tractor, which is borrowed when someone starts building a house.

The village elementary school (grade 1–9) has a combined teaching program (Bosnian language, religion, and history according to the program of the Federation, but also regular teaching of the Serbian language). The school has 174 pupils, of which two are Croats from Slatina. The five Serb children of the village go to school in Teslić. All 52 pupils on the secondary level attend the school in Teslić. The collection of pensions or money, as well as visits to the doctor is done in this nearby town.

Some informants talked of the hard struggle to survive prompting envy of those who had more. For some, this might cause a sense of discord even in this community, otherwise characterised by feelings of unity and solidarity.

There is a deep-rooted perception of the village as a place of destitution and hardship, as a place with no resources. The self-perception of village inhabitants is marked by negative stereotypes, often evident in sentences like “We are not city people; we are just simple village people. We are not educated, we are not able, we don’t know how.” The concept of a villager is strongly negative, and is, among youth, sometimes used to label a person as not civilised, as someone with no manners. A young girl from the village, 19 years old, whose brother is one of the few to live abroad, makes the comment:

My brother lives in the Netherlands. He says that people over there are proud to be from a village. The village is appreciated there. Here, when I go to town, Zenica for example, and tell someone I’m from the village of Selo they look at you as if you were nothing; as if you are not worthy, do not know anything. They automatically talk and act arrogantly.

### Ethnic relations

The village is almost completely mono-ethnic: there are 231 Bosniak and 7 Serbian households. The relations between ethnic groups are perhaps best depicted in the following statement by a 70 year old Bosniak informant:

Coexistence is possible today. Who says it is not? It is possible. There is no more ‘we will not live together’. Besides, we have never lived together. We lived side by side. You see, there are Serbs in this village. One of them is in the village council. You see...they are here. They do not disturb us and we do not disturb them. They live and we live. Normally.

Serbs living in the village send their children to the primary school in Teslić, and the explanation given to me by one of the parents was that the children had already started to go there and were used to it. While most Bosniaks with whom I talked do not bring up this and do not question it, one of the Bosniak informants makes the following comment:

The Serbs are going to Teslić. I don’t know why. Everyone has the right to send his children wherever he wants; is it done for political reasons, I really don’t know. You know, in order not to spoil the relations, we are silent, and they are silent. They were going to that school, and are doing so today, it seems. And, here in the village the majority of teachers are Serbs. I don’t know...

The kind of communication and even the stage of reconciliation is perhaps best illustrated by a scene from the village café. I was having a conversation with two persons, belonging to different ethnic groups. The first one mentioned his son, tragically killed in the war. The other added the story of his brother, who became paralysed during the war. Each told their stories to me. They did not turn to address one another, and neither commented the other’s

story. This is partly understandable: a response would demand a sort of reaction – either blaming or forgiving – for which neither was ready. Any comment might undoubtedly complicate, if not spoil relations. The scene can be understood as a personification of the reconciliation process. Although very much aware of belonging to different ethnic groups and of the painful and personal consequences of the war – the two, nevertheless, were sitting at the same table and telling their stories in the presence of the other.

Since the village is almost completely mono-ethnic, contacts with members of other ethnic groups occur outside the village. The fact that Selo is a geographically isolated village affects the likelihood of such contacts. The most natural meeting places are the school and the place of work. Villagers working (illegally) in Croatia, day-labourers in nearby Serb and Croat villages, and pupils of the secondary school in Teslić, will have contacts with other ethnic groups. Apart from the eleven women of Selo working in a neighbouring Serb village, women usually do not have this opportunity. Since a large number of villagers collect their pensions, or have health insurance in Teslić, there are these other contacts of an administrative nature, usually described as correct.

The politically correct attitude is that coexistence is desirable. For example, it was pointed out that a donation to the sewing factory was given on the condition that different ethnical groups were employed. An interview with a 39 year old divorced woman working in the factory gives a picture of the complexity of relations among people who have daily contact with members of another ethnic group. She says:

In the beginning, Serbian women worked in one shift, and we in another. Until we got to know each other, eventually. The director initiated that, actually. He said ‘Why don’t you talk to each other, ask each about your life.’ And, really, we started to talk to each other, and now it is really nice to be there. We talk about everything during our breaks. Who is married, who is not, how many children you have, how old they are, how you live, do you have cattle, do you grow something...and so on. We are mainly complaining about mothers in law. Their women are also having a difficult life, as we do. Their husbands do not have a job, as ours. We joke, we laugh, it is really nice. [...] We never talk about the war. Never, no one ever mentioned it. Since it hurts, it hurts her and it hurts me. And you may say something inappropriate, you may spill the beans. Someone can be offended by something you say. We must leave it at that, it is the best thing to do. You just do not talk about it. You never know what someone else thinks about it – it is better not to get into that kind of talk.



The existence of a politically correct, positive attitude towards coexistence, and the common female experience of living under similar circumstances is something that brings these women together. At the same time there are certain subjects, such as war, that demand caution. All this exists at the same time and is equally important to these women – signifying all the complexity of ‘issues of coexistence’.

A distinct feature of the relations between people of different ethnic groups is that, when they happen to meet, conversations about the war and its consequences are avoided. A majority of the informants, however, do have a clear view of the conflicts on the local level.

The fact that people avoid discussing the war, does not mean, of course, that they do not think about it. The absence of dialogue during the post-war period is one ‘solution’, both questionable and common. But that means the issue of forgiving as a route to reconciliation is blocked; behind the silence there is the phrase of many informants ‘if we had not forgiven, we would not be able to live, but to forget – we will never forget.’

## Political conditions

It is strongly believed that politicians are opportunists getting rich (and that becoming a politician is a way to get rich). Ordinary people, however, are left to their fate. Some of the more critical informants emphasised that a politician’s interest in village life grows during election times. «They suddenly find time to visit the village, talk a lot and promise something which is never being carried out. »

Many informants underline that the situation in Republika Srpska has changed during the last few years. The disappearance of institutional discrimination on the local level (the town of Teslić) is often explained as being a result of pressure on the part of the International Community. A 40-year old informant says:

Now everything is better than in the beginning. It was dangerous too, then. Today it is different; no one can say ‘you cannot do this or that because you are Muslim,’ that is, the law has been passed. Now it is a different matter, if things will be handled quickly or slowly, but they no longer dare to obstruct because someone is a Muslim. I think they got rid of such people in Teslić. Here in the village, all manifestations are normally guarded by the police, and they come. In the municipality there are no more obstacles. Perhaps someone will look at you in a strange way, because you are a Muslim, but no more ‘you cannot get this, you are a Muslim’. Now the flag is hanging on the Teslić municipality, and a large placard of congratulation is put there for Bajram. Now it is different.

Even though the present division of the country is believed to be absurd, many people perceive it at the same time as the only possible political reality given the present conditions. This paradox is best explained by the following words:

And I tell you –the state may be called whatever you like, let a monkey be at its head, as long as I have something to live from. ‘No, you are wrong’, they say, Čović is president. No, it’s this other guy. Everyone is looking after his own interests. I will not have any of that. I don’t care what’s his name, if we can live a normal life. In no country there are three presidents, like here. Let it be one, it does not matter who, for God’s sake, as long as he is fair. Tito was there for 50 years. I don’t care who is who, if he is an honest man and leaves me alone, lets me do my job, I don’t care. But, when others care, I have to care too. I must be careful; I have to defend myself, because I don’t know what they are up to.

The ignorance of politicians on various levels (state, federal, entity, communal) of the situation in villages is also frequently brought up in the interviews.

## The international community

Since the attitude of the International Community towards the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina is often measured in terms of help received, it is believed that the International Community is correct and humane. The International Community is, further, believed to be the only possible and reliable source of economic assistance, whereas one’s own state is too impoverished by war and corruption to be able to offer any help (in addition to what was said above about the apparent lack of interest on the part of politicians and state institutions).

Another image is that of the institutions related to the International Community, which provide some security and protection, as well as legal assistance. Very often people refer to how at the time of return these institutions were a link between the returnees and the political bodies of Republika Srpska. One informant, a 58-year old Bosniak says:

Now it is like this, if you see that they try to obstruct for no reason, some document or something, you just tell them: I will turn to the International Community because of this – and immediately everything is better; at once what was impossible is possible.

Even though the humane attitude is emphasised, some of the informants point out ‘political mistakes on the state level’ made by the International Community. It is felt that the purpose of the mission is keeping status quo in Bosnia and there are references to overpaid international officials. It may be in their interest to prolong the status quo and their stay in the country.

There is also the opinion that aid provided by the International Community is a way of compensating for their not having intervened during the war.

The understanding within the International Community of people in Bosnia and problems in the country is also explained in different ways. Referring to the aid, most informants think that the International Community does understand the situation in Bosnia. There are, however, those who think this understanding is somewhat superficial. An informant, 50 year old said:

When they ask us and not our politicians what we need, then they will understand us better. Politicians are talking about what they need, and no one pays attention to us... And, the International Community, they have believed those people, those ours, who are functionaries. Not even half of it reaches you. If someone had asked me, I would have suggested to Paddy Ashdown to go directly to the place, the village, the town, and talk to ordinary people instead of going through the politicians. They have let this people down.

## Future

### Economic prospects

Very few of my informants have an optimistic view of the future. One of the problems most often referred to is the future of children and young people.<sup>90</sup> Unemployment, the fact that the young generation is unemployed and for economic reasons cannot establish a family of their own, are frequent topics in any conversation.

Most young people are extremely resigned and do not see any other solution to their situation than leaving, which is impossible. A 22-year old informant, a young man trained as a metal worker says:

This is how most young people think, they hope they will go somewhere else, here there is no, what should I say, there is no work; no one should have to think only about how to leave. But the situation is terrible; I do not think it will change in the near future, now you are hardly able to live. It could change in 50 years, when I am an old man. If the borders would be open for six months, so that people could go to work in Europe or elsewhere, how many, do you think would stay? Only some eight percent of the inhabitants. But that will never happen. People would leave, not because they do not love Bosnia or their birthplace, but simply out of interest, because of money, because of life, so you

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<sup>90</sup> While many of the inhabitants of Selo before the war had ten years work experience by the age of thirty, today's 30 year olds most often have not even a single day of work experience.

could change your life. This is deadening. Wherever you would like to go, you cannot, you don't have money. You may think of something, you want to do something, start something – you cannot. Hope died long ago. When I came here, and had spent two months, when I saw how people were living, I said to myself – nothing will come of this. To rotten here...that's all.

Most girls I talked to have a clear picture of the future: to get married, take care of children and work in the fields. A 20-year old girl who has finished elementary school sees her future very plainly – with a bitter smile her short comment was: 'My future? Children, house, shovel and field.'

The economic situation has obvious consequences for family formation. The impossibility of building one's own home means that a young couple must start their life together in a room in their parents' house. Some young people explain the decision to start their own family with the sentence: 'whatever happens to everyone, will happen to us. Parents and relatives help as they can; we (men) will try to find some job outside (Croatia) and the women will work in the fields'. Others are more cautious and do not want to establish a family without material security. A 24-year old young man gives his view of the situation: 'Those who get married, are getting married not because they think things will be better, but because they do not think at all about their future or that of their children.'

To a majority of my informants the solution to their difficult economic situation is migration to Western Europe, America, or Canada. At the same time they are aware that leaving is practically impossible. The future is uncertain and most villagers have no illusions that things will get better. A 45 year old informant sees the future in this way:

As far as young people are concerned, I doubt they will ever leave this place, there is nowhere to go. They will get used to their life, live as best they can, from what they have here. Our people is like that: when there is no other way, they will live from what they have. They will spend no more than they can, and live like that.

### Future coexistence

Views on coexistence on the local level are often described as a desirable option but not discussed in any detail. In contrast, it is interesting to note that comments on coexistence on another (abstract, not personal), i.e. state level, are always more outspoken and determined. On that level, coexistence in Bosnia and Herzegovina is defined as mutual respect and economic cooperation, regarded as a crucial condition about which it is relatively easy to talk. Marriage with members of another ethnic group is unthinkable. The explanation is simple: 'Before the war we did not marry one another, we lived side by side, not together, so why should we do that now?'

## Political future

Most informants regard the political situation as very complex, and are unable to see any solution in the near future. A possible answer is most often possible in a distant future. Or, in the words of a 43-year old informant:

It will be better, but it will take 50 or 100 years. Until the fools who are now in power die, until the generation which went through the war disappears. It is not easy; at first since the country was destroyed and plundered in the war, as it is now after the war, and people should forget all that, all they experienced during the war. A man hates another man, without knowing who he is – he just knows his name – how can that be? And there are people like that, but what could you tell them, if their whole family has been slaughtered. You cannot lecture them.

## Proposals

### Implementation of aid

Obviously the inhabitants of the village are aware that the resources of the donors are limited and that their village is not the only one in need of help. However, they are of the opinion that aid should primarily be given to those places where there exists an explicit wish to return. Some informants suggested that in villages with a clear determination to return, donors should not follow the preconceived plan of limiting reconstruction to 50%. When questioned how such places would be selected the answer was through monitoring the process of return. A middle-aged man says the following:

The Swedish humanitarian organisation has its fixed plan of what to do. Take for example the organisation Cross Roads. They say – we will reconstruct 50 percent of the housing stock in a village. No more. Then they leave the village. This is wrong, these 50 percent, – when they realize there is an interest, they should give everyone help and that's it, not stick to some rules. It must be better to do a village which really wants to return, than five villages where no one returns. Why then build houses? The Swedish humanitarian organisations have built a very small number of houses in vain, much less than others, for sure. For example, they started to build in Slatina, but when they understood that this is not it, they stopped. Still, I think it is wrong to have this limit and stick to it blindly. In my view that is wrong. We are not the kind of people who will claim that only Selo should be reconstructed. Not in any way. We think that all who want to return should be given something. Šefko often comes here, and he knows that we really do want to return. Here not a single shed was in vain, let

alone a house; everything they started was completed, everything is occupied, everything is being used.

Another comment concerns the following up of what has been done. According to one informant, a 55-year old unemployed villager, that is necessary:

They do this and then leave, usually it is like that. It is true, Šefko returns, but in order to check who has come back, and who not. I understand – they are preoccupied in other places. Still, now you have come to ask us how we are, how we live – this is the first time anybody asks me how I live, how I am getting on. We did get the houses, we really did, they should be thanked for that, but there are other things necessary for life, those basic things needed for life should exist, infrastructure, water, those basic things. They gave what they considered was needed and do not ask how we are. I am not ungrateful, I very well know all the things we were given; we would never have been able to build the houses on our own, never! It is good that you have come; they should know how we live, what happened to us after we returned. And look how we live; nobody is working, we are hardly able to make ends meet. I no longer know to whom I should turn; this state does not give a penny for us. The only help we got we got from Sweden. We would be more happy had there not been a war, so we would not have been in need of help, but this is how it is... And another thing, We know what the help meant to us. It is indeed a hard life, but what would we have done without a roof over our heads? I would like that one day a people's delegation comes, you and your people, to see what has been achieved. And they would say 'we reconstructed this village'. Well, people know that he helped me, but people do not know. People know what is in the media, which often speak about corruption, problems...there are such things, but...this village has been rebuilt. That's a fact. However difficult it is now, it would be more difficult if we did not have the houses, a shelter. But, as I said, they should see how we live, what happened to us...

## Economic priorities

It is clearly impossible to rely on existing resources in the village. Most ideas about how to resolve the economic situation are focusing on 'international organisations', 'donors', and 'foreigners'. Their investments would make it possible to open factories which are very often seen as the only alternative and most attractive solution. Only a few see farming and cattle breeding as the solution.<sup>91</sup> According to one villager, an organised and easier access to

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<sup>91</sup> The reluctance to invest in agriculture as the only source of income is described in the following way: «Agriculture is a risk. If the crop is destroyed – you have nothing. The factory is different – you know that you will get your salary».

the market, (organised purchase of fruits and vegetables as well as better communications) would probably increase the motivation of the inhabitants to work in agriculture, i.e. look at it as a source of income.<sup>92</sup>

Human resources are also a problem. One of the informants states:

Perhaps people would find a way to organise themselves. But this is difficult here. No one is thinking in that way, we do not have resources, there must be educated experts, one must know what to do and how to do it, this cannot be done by somebody with only four years of school. We are in need of agronomist, veterinarians, but look; all our young people are studying to become teachers. I think that is a mistake.

However, the most frequent comments on how life in the village should be maintained, deal with the construction of factories which would employ the inhabitants of the village. These suggestions usually take it for granted that 'someone else' (foreigners, the international community, donors) owns the factories, while the villagers would be employees. A 22 year old young man, in contrast to the majority, makes a proposal which assumes part of the responsibility:

One should invest in young people; older people have children which will take care of them. Why should they be employed, work for five years, and get a pension worth nothing. Instead, let their children have the jobs, the sons and grandsons, and they will also get something. I think the best solution would be to open some 2–3 workshops. There is space, there is everything, what is needed is a donation of some 50 000 KM, to start something, to get some basic machines, and let people work without pay for half a year, let them work for six months, and invest whatever they would earn in machines, to buy some machines. They would work for six months without pay, in order to create something, to get something started for once, you know. And after six months they could be getting paid.

### A framework for coexistence

The role of the court in The Hague, and the issue of whether it is just or unjust, was rarely brought up spontaneously. When it was, people usually commented on the injustice of the rulings (the verdicts were felt to be absurdly mild) or to the fact that they did not want to serve as witnesses (two informants) due to fear and the belief that the proceedings in the Hague were 'anyway unjust and meaningless'. There is a deeply felt conviction that rule of law does not exist, and that they would not be secure as witnesses;

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<sup>92</sup> In the context of possible solutions through agriculture, comments often referred to the former state, where market was functioning, and «the state took care of things».

bearing witness would just be a senseless act of putting oneself in serious danger.

According to a majority of the informants, establishing rule of law and creating a state where the law is respected and crimes punished (above all bringing war criminals to justice, but also punishing economic crimes) is a basic precondition for a normalisation of the country.

The distrust of politicians is also largely based on the fact that they are perceived as people who «are above the law», which makes it impossible to sanction their economic felonies

When describing the present situation, the informants often make comparisons with the pre-war period:

Nowadays nobody cares about Tito. But we were better off when he was alive, the law was respected. You had to respect the law, there was no uncertainty, if you break the law, you know what will happen. Today you may break the law as much as you like, no one cares, nor will you face the consequences. What kind of state is that?

The fact that war criminals (Karadžić and Mladić) are not brought to justice, gives rise to speculations about the reasons, which undermine the credibility of political institutions. That certain perpetrators, locally known from the war, are free and well established members of society is also a stumbling block for some informants. One of my informants, a former camp inmate says:

People wanted in The Hague are moving around freely. For example, we go to see a man who imprisoned us in the camp, to ask if we can work for him again. What does justice mean, then? There is no justice. Here almost every family has someone who was in the camps. If not in Herzegovina, then in Žepče. Not to speak about Mostar, which I visited, there the criminals are walking about as well. There are fourteen of them who are freely moving around in Žepče. A criminal is a criminal, regardless of who he is. If he has committed crimes, he is a criminal. Everyone has to bear the consequences of his actions. Therefore, there will be no life in Bosnia, until they are pointed out and told: It is you, you did it, you have to pay for it! To disappear completely from this place, I mean, regardless, there were Muslims as well who committed crimes in Mostar. I was not ashamed to say who they are. A criminal has a name and surname; I cannot say that the Croatian people are criminal. Neither the Serbian. No. A criminal has a name. People cannot believe in the state, in the system, in the rule of law, as long as these people are freely walking around.



Another informant gives his view of the situation:

What is being done here is unbelievable. For ten years, twelve years they are unable to arrest them. That is our greatest injustice. That is, we allowed them to be free; some are still working in the institutions. These criminals are still there, engaged in politics. That's the worst thing. They are obstructing justice. The state would start functioning, but they are obstructing. They are still working in those offices, these war criminals. And they don't allow justice to be done, the state to be functioning. To start working. It is not easy, because it is not in their interest, they will at first have to hide him. He does not give up. He still obstructs. He is behind it. Those who are in hiding are supported by those having functions. They do not allow the state to be revived. They do not allow the law to work. That everything starts functioning as it should.

One informant points out that an official excuse by political and religious leaders of all three peoples would be necessary for creating a better atmosphere, allowing for a possible coexistence, while a large number of the informants argue that an amelioration of the economic situation is a precondition for coexistence.

## Summary

Besides the wish to come back, a basic reason for the successful return of this village is pragmatic – it was difficult to make a living in the place of exile. The understanding of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a de facto ethnically divided country, where its inhabitants – to feel safe -left their houses during the war and remained as refugees somehow ‘managing’ economically, merits further analysis. The problem of securing economic conditions for a life in the new environment coexists with the issue of ethnic affiliation and the choice of staying where one's own group constitutes a majority. It is hard to say what aspect is more important. If one takes into account the underdevelopment of the village (infrastructure, geographical location, and non-mechanization), the generally difficult conditions of life, as well as the negative stigma of the village as backward, then, a non-return is more than understandable.

The disappearance of the customary (pre-war) mode of existence (work in a factory, work for a salary) by itself does *not* presuppose a flexible ‘reorientation’ towards agriculture, but rather, in this case, an adaptation to given conditions and the discovery of short-term solutions. Consequently, in a difficult economic situation temporary solutions (working as day-labourers, working on the black market) although unwillingly, are accepted as the only possible alternatives. In that perspective it is easier to understand how the inhabitants of the village look upon (and use) sources aimed at sustainability – for example the assistance of the Lutheran World federation. The absence of a stable

income, the insecurity and the uncertain tomorrow, as well as the impossibility of a long-term planning are the background to this attitude. Agriculture, traditionally a 'female occupation', is a way to feed one's family, but not to obtain an income. Although many are aware of unemployment and the difficult situation on the labour market, there is still the hope that in a foreseeable future, something would change. Work in a factory would mean a return to a routine, a familiar and 'normal' way of life. As long as there exists a hope that the factories will be opened, as long as there is a possibility to work as a day labourer, or illegally in Croatia, people are not thinking about agriculture as a basic source of income.

A large number of young people are thinking about leaving the country, as the only possible solution. The awareness that this option is difficult to make real, often leads to resignation.

Proportional to the lack of confidence in state institutions and the widespread conviction that politicians are corrupt is the trust in the international community as the only one interested in or «caring for the village». The absence of rule of law, the non-punishment of war criminals is frequently mentioned as major causes of the diminished credibility of state institutions. The apparent marginalisation of personal political engagement and the view of politics as «passing laws» is another deeply entrenched attitude, illustrating the inability of viewing oneself as an actor.

One of the basic suggestions concerning the organisation of assistance, in this village with a very high number of returnees, is the proposal that the limit of reconstructing 50 percent of a village is replaced by a flexible approach adapted to the local situation and a monitoring of the actual degree of return.

The geographical isolation of the village is one reason for the lack of daily communication with members of other ethnic groups (except for the Serb households in the village) and means that the only meeting grounds are the school and the workplace. The high level of unemployment will therefore affect the degree of ethnic interaction.

## The Sarajevo case study

The Naselje Settlement<sup>93</sup> built in the mid-seventies is on the outskirts of Sarajevo. Because of being well planned and for its green areas, at that time it was considered one of the most beautiful neighbourhoods in the city. There were 1 132 flats and 210 entrances.

During the war the line of demarcation between territories held by the Army of Republika Srpska and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina divided the area. The settlement was almost completely destroyed.

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<sup>93</sup> In order to protect the integrity of the respondents this is a fictitious name of the suburb.

In 1997 *Help*<sup>94</sup> started its work in Naselje. During 1999 and the beginning of 2000, the municipality of Novi Grad and the Canton of Sarajevo funded the restoration of roofs, after which Caritas Switzerland/Caritas Sweden began neighbourhood reconstruction, financed by Sida. 28 buildings or 124 flats were made habitable between 2000 and 2003.<sup>95</sup> In addition, 66 individual homes were restored.<sup>96</sup>

The ethnic structure of Naselje in 2003 was: 210 Serbs, 128 Croats, 1 536 Bosniaks, and 32 others. Of a total of 1 131 flats in 2003, 1 050 were inhabited.<sup>97</sup>

## Purpose and method

As for Selo, the aim of the study conducted in Sarajevo was to analyse the impact, relevance, and sustainability of Sida's reconstruction program.

The collection of ethnographic material on Sarajevo was done in October and November 2004. The study is based on members of 27 households. The informants belong to different categories in regard to economic status, age, educational level, and ethnic affiliation.

## Return

Even though during the war there was no common or organised strategy, most inhabitants of the neighbourhood fled to apartments in settlement C5, located 300 meters away. This was on the other side of the front, in the territory held by the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By the end of the war, many inhabitants of Naselje found themselves in flats to which they had fled during the hostilities. Although for many people this was the neighbouring area of C5 in Dobrinja, it was by no means the rule; some informants had been living as refugees in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Serbia, Croatia, or in the countries of Western Europe.<sup>98</sup>

<sup>94</sup> *Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe* – a German humanitarian organisation, whose major donors are the European Commission, the German government, and the Dutch government. The reconstruction consisted of clearing mines, reconstructing housing, building nurseries, sports arenas, street lighting, park benches and an amphitheatre for cultural activities. The method used was a combination of self-help and organised construction teams. Until 1998, when the project was completed, *Help* had built 185 apartments and 70 houses in the neighbourhood.

<sup>95</sup> According to Caritas statistics, in 2000 49 apartments had been constructed (30 Bosniaks, 11 Croats, 5 Serbs, and 3 others). In 2001 65 apartments were constructed (37 Bosniaks, 14 Croats, 13 Serbs, and 1 other). 2002 10 apartments were reconstructed (7 Bosniaks and 3 Serbs).

<sup>96</sup> Reconstruction Programmes 2000, 2001, and 2002; Caritas Switzerland.

<sup>97</sup> 06-23 sl./03 Dostava podataka; Općinski načelnik, Općinska služba za urbanizam, stambene i komunalne poslove, općina Novi Grad, Sarajevo, Grad Sarajevo, Kanton Sarajevo, Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine, Bosna i Hercegovina.

<sup>98</sup> According to the figures of Caritas Switzerland, people who returned to the Canton of Sarajevo in 2000 came from: Germany (31,5%), Serbia and Montenegro (26,9%), Croatia (23,0%), Sweden (2,8%). In 2001 the figures were: Serbia and Montenegro (43,6%), Germany (22,5%), Croatia (16,9%), and in 2002: Serbia and Montenegro (33,96%), Germany (28,30%), Croatia (18,87%), Sweden (1,89%) – Reconstruction Programmes 2000, 2001 and 2002; Statistics housing programme 1997 to 2003 Canton Sarajevo – Caritas Switzerland.

In 1996 the former residents of the almost completely destroyed neighbourhood organised a formal Association of Citizens of Naselje. On the initiative of a large number of former inhabitants, who at that time were mostly staying in the settlement C5, meetings were arranged on the 20<sup>th</sup> every month. There were organised demonstrations in the ruined areas, often in the company of the media (television and newspapers). This brought attention to the destroyed neighbourhood of the Sarajevo suburb.

By the end of 1999 and the beginning of 2000, the Canton of Sarajevo had donated money for constructing roofs of the destroyed buildings. The period preceding this assistance was not unproblematic, and the difficulties of arousing interest in helping Naselje some of my informants explained in the following way (a 44-year old nurse, Bosniak):

We were simply not a priority. A priority was always someone who had to return somewhere – from one region to another. For example, like to Srebrenica, Foča, whatever. But we, who were living in Sarajevo, were obviously regarded as ‘well, you are here, so...’ But we also had to return to what was ours. These humanitarians were mostly working for refugees from one place to another. And they tell us ‘You are not refugees! You are here, in the same area’, and we have to turn to the municipality. We are not their concern! However, the municipality has no money – they cannot do anything to help us, renovating the central part of the city was their priority.

### Reasons for return

Most of my informants regarded return as only a matter of time, and bear witness to how much the return to their own homes meant to them. ‘Your apartment is your apartment, for years you have been investing in it; it is the place where you were living. I never thought I would have to stay in somebody else’s quarters. What doesn’t belong to you is not yours’ says one of the informants, a retired Bosniak. It should be added that some people had been evicted several times, and after the law on return of property was proclaimed, many tenants had to pay rent for their temporary homes, which made an already difficult economic situation worse.

### Thinking about return – a temporal perspective

All my informants in principle agreed that the return of refugees and displaced persons is the only morally acceptable alternative. Although very positive about return, most informants accept the non-return of their Serb and Croat neighbours (as well as Bosniaks living in Western Europe) as something which is to be explained by social and economic factors. That some people do not come back is accounted for by the fact that they, after ten years, have already managed to establish themselves in the environment to which

they fled. This reasoning was most often confirmed by Serbs and Croats with whom I talked. Without exception, in their opinion a majority of Serbs and Croats living in Sarajevo today were retired people, while those of working age will stay where they are.

Some of the Bosniak informants condemn the choice of their former Serb and Croat neighbours not to return to Sarajevo. Their explanation is that Serbs and Croats wish to live within their own ethnic group; thus the motivation for non return, they believe is more ideologically than economically motivated. It is worth mentioning that there is a clear correlation between this attitude and the character of relations between former neighbours; the better the former relationship with neighbours belonging to another ethnic group, the easier it is to explain their non-return as caused by economic factors.

There is also the attitude that return in general has been greater among Bosniaks, a common explanation being that 'they do not have a reserve homeland, like Serbs and Croats'.

Speaking about the process of return, one section of my informants is of the opinion that on the state level there is no real or organised return process policy. In the interviews, return was described as successful only because of the enthusiasm and desire of individuals, and not thanks to political institutions on any level.

One of the grievances was the migration to Sarajevo of people from Eastern Bosnia. There were very negative attitudes towards the 'non-return' of these particular refugees.

Views on return are clearly related to the economic situation. This is true of all ethnic groups. Where returnees of working age did not 'manage' – that is, see how to make a living, return was often discussed in terms of 'a wish to possibly leave' for a place where there was this opportunity<sup>99</sup> rather than focusing on the story of successful or unsuccessful return. A majority of my informants realised how small the chances were to leave and make a life elsewhere.

## Reconstruction of the settlement – organisation of aid

### Conditions

Aid was provided as modified self-help: the building company protected the apartment/building from the effects of wind and weather, while the beneficiaries were responsible for most of the rest. They had to do the construction themselves but all material for kitchen and bathroom, for connecting electricity and water to the apartment, for wooden floors and for painting were

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<sup>99</sup> The countries of Western Europe are most often mentioned, but also USA, Canada, and Australia.

supplied. Caritas renovated all exterior walls, repaired windows and doors installed electricity, water and waste water systems, as well as telephone lines to the stairways. Residents installed the systems in their apartments.<sup>100</sup>

The basic principles were self-help and the condition that beneficiaries were those who had been owners or possessed tenant rights before 1992. By self-help was meant that the owners or tenants themselves had to make use of material given by Caritas. The method was flexible – retired people or single-person households who Caritas personnel judged unable to do the work themselves would be assisted. The reconstruction had to be completed within three months of receiving building material and a very important condition was that a renovated apartment could not be sold for three years.

Priority was given to those judged not able to renovate without help, people living in collective centres and people who had been forced to leave their temporary homes in accordance with PLIP (the Property Legislation Implementation Plan). The programme was open to all ethnic groups, focusing on the return of minorities and internally displaced persons (IDP). One of the initial conditions was also that the beneficiary had to be registered in Sarajevo before signing the contract. This meant de-registration at the temporary place of residence, and the presentation of documents confirming this.<sup>101</sup> The selection of beneficiaries was done in cooperation with Caritas Sweden.

If 75% of the tenants/owners returned, Caritas also reconstructed the stairways and facades. Apartments not being renovated were 'sealed' (a wooden sheet fixed over the window opening). A family of two would be provided with all material for two persons: bathroom, kitchen, and one room. However, every room would have doors and windows fitted.

#### Organisation of tenants

Information about the existence of Caritas, and the possibility that the neighbourhood might get help spread very quickly in the area. Every building had a 'contact person' responsible for contacting all tenants in a building. The meeting at Caritas during which all tenants would sign the contract, was usually preceded by informal meetings organised by the contact person.

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<sup>100</sup> According to data from Caritas, in 2000 98% of the beneficiaries themselves installed all material, while 88% of the apartments were inhabited by pre-war tenants. In 2001, 96% of the beneficiaries did the construction, and 76% of the apartments were inhabited by pre-war tenants, while in 2002, 96% did all the construction, and 87% were pre-war tenants. The tendency then seems clear: an increasing number of tenants do the installations themselves, but do not always move in to the renovated apartments.

<sup>101</sup> Some informants living in Croatia or Serbia during and after the war, wishing to return registered with friends in Sarajevo, although they were not living there.

## Influence on the tenants

### Economic aspects

In order to complete reconstruction work on time (formally three months) many informants able to do so, obtained a bank credit, while a few took loans from friends and relatives – or sometimes both. The costs of reconstruction, paying craftsmen for work tenants themselves could not do were according to the informants between 2 500 and 3 500 KM. There were of course variations; some informants were able to mobilise friends and relatives.

The situation was most difficult for retired people. Usually they were helped by friends and relatives, and most of the furniture given to them.

### Social psychological aspects

Some informants testify about their feelings of helplessness and injustice, since a donation was dependent on whether 75 percent of the tenants wished to return. Although there was a possibility of restoration of individual apartments, this alternative did not include the internal reconstruction of the building – stairways and facades. One informant says:

And now, I was dependent on them. But they did not want to return – out of four apartments we had to find three tenants. And two of them had already ‘managed’, one in Switzerland, the other in Denmark – why would they return? And I had to depend on them! Then, after some time, at first it was said that only I would be helped, however, they changed their mind...it wasn’t easy for us...It is this connection of my fate, that others should decide about my fate, this is actually a little awkward. It would be different if I live in a house – which is mine – I know that I will return! This – do this, do that! A house is a house. You make a request for your house, and then come Caritas or another organisation, it is done, and you are happy.

The renovation of the apartment, whether by the tenants themselves or with the help of craftsmen, in most cases was a new experience for people in Naselje. Reconstructing internal walls or doing installations – most informants had never been involved in anything like it. This new experience, even if it entailed only ‘overseeing’ the work gave rise to a new feeling of attachment. Now tenants really participated from the beginning, where something ruined, although it had always been looked upon as a home, was given new meaning. One informant explains it in this way:

I don’t know how to explain it. This was really a new experience to me, I don’t know, perhaps those who build their own house have the same feeling! When you are looking at how it grows out of nothing, phase after phase. Never in my life have I built any-

thing, not even a chicken house. And now, I made it, a good part of it, with my own hands, I have built this flat, but that is almost unbelievable! I have never done that before. My profession is totally different, I am a policeman. What do I know about construction! And now, when I look at this wall – I painted it myself! It is a different feeling. It was always my flat, but I never gave a thought about those walls... (laughter).

#### Comments

*Help*, the first NGO working on the reconstruction of Naselje combined self-help with organised team-work. Apart from Help and Caritas, according to my informants, in Naselje there was also the ‘Spanish Organisation’. They had a specific approach which meant the complete construction of a building in a neighbourhood. This model was frequently compared to Caritas’ way of reconstruction, which was generally regarded as superior. Most informants preferred the self-help method for the very reason that it meant that more tenants could be helped. The individual involvement in the reconstruction was also considered very important, since people did not have to think of themselves as passive recipients of aid. It is also striking that a majority of the tenants remember and positively refer to the correct behaviour of Caritas employees. From the story of one tenant:

They treated us in such a fine manner, as people, that we did not at all feel like paupers – and we were paupers – since, in fact, we were receiving help, charity. And when we got there, and talked to this Robert, and then with Fuad and Gabriela. In the beginning they did not promise us much. And we were thinking – even if we would get nothing – that they treated us as human beings.

## Economic conditions

Naselje was constructed in the mid-seventies and most inhabitants at that time were recently established families in their twenties or thirties. These people are now 60 years old or more and most have retired. This explains why a majority of my informants belong to this age category.

Only two informants have not completed secondary school, while 1/6 have university diplomas in a variety of fields. Most of my working-age informants are employed. On the other hand, this is not a wholly accurate description, since people often work in the black labour market and only temporarily, which means no health insurance or pension rights. Most say their economic situation drastically changed for the worse after the war.

Retired people describe their economic situation as very difficult. The average pension is about 200 KM, which is not enough for basic needs. The high price of drugs is a very frequent subject in discussions with this group of in-



formants. The expression 'we barely exist' very clearly characterizes the economic insecurity – especially of those who receive no help from children or relatives. The standard of living of the inhabitants of Naselje varies greatly.<sup>102</sup>

The importance of higher education is evident, when taking into account that families, whether the household has a regular income or not, prioritise sending their children to university. It is difficult to explain how these families are able to afford university fees, and what are usually referred to as very expensive textbooks, the common explanation being 'we manage somehow'. Mobilisation of a social network of relatives and friends, both in a financial and practical sense, is a key issue. Temporary solutions are one way to achieve this. One of my informants – 52 years old, an unemployed electrical technician – describes it in this manner:

I work from time to time, extra. Friends call me when they see that someone needs help with a damaged TV or washing machine. My children are students, my wife unemployed...it's not easy. A friend of my wife recently managed to employ our daughter, to interpret for some organisation...so, little by little it is dripping in.

Despite the deep-rooted idea that a university education is important, the economic conditions of the country have led to at least a partial reevaluation. Since being able to 'manage' presupposes practical skills, some young students ask themselves if it is at all economically rational to study in Bosnia today, especially if you do not have a large and influential social network. A 22-year old female student:

Why should I study for five years to become a lawyer, only to be working one day as a secretary, I often ask myself! But I continue.

The smart among the unemployed informants, by using their own skills and social network, have found ways to make money from their knowledge and crafts. One of them is a 49-year old Bosniak woman, textile engineer, who before the war was head of production in a textile factory:

When I saw that I would not be able to get my job back, I was forced to look for other solutions. I cannot sit with folded arms – after all, I had learned something from life and I know how to work. Even if I am over-qualified for the work I do – I am satisfied – because I have found a way to do business, to earn money which we need. I am cutting garments and sewing, making creations and selling them. I get orders and do them. One cannot say I earn well, but for God's sake, I earn something. In the beginning I was doing it for my friends and acquaintances. Then people

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<sup>102</sup> A few people managed to keep their economically profitable profession and describe their economic situation as very good. They are aware that they live exceptionally well (in one case a monthly income of 2 000 KM; both working) and that this is an exception. Their explanation is: 'we were lucky'.

learned about me through them. I think I am lucky, since in the difficult situation we have in Bosnia and Herzegovina today, I have found a solution for myself and my family.

Most of my employed informants make a clear distinction between the concepts 'being employed in Bosnia and Herzegovina today' and 'being employed before the war'. In pre-war Bosnia and Herzegovina employment meant economic stability, guaranteed health care, guaranteed holidays and guaranteed pension rights. To be employed today does not imply any security tomorrow, nor any of the other benefits just mentioned. According to the informants, the great number of unemployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina makes it possible for employers to let their employees know that in every possible way they are expendable. Salaries are usually referred to as ridiculously small in view of the work being done (on average 500 KM for a job requiring secondary school education, or even a university degree). Many informants are obviously overqualified for the work they are doing, but explain this as 'the reality of Bosnia and Herzegovina'.

Unemployment is regarded as the most serious problem of the country. The usual way to get a job is through contacts, and nepotism seems to be a rule, rather than an exception. The hopeless conditions are perhaps best described by a 25-year old Bosniak woman (Secondary Economic School):

I have no connections whatsoever. Everything is being done through connections. Whether you want to work for a private employer or somewhere in a state institution – connections are needed for everything. There are no new places of work, nothing is being created here – everything is just shut down, goes into bankruptcy. Besides, all are asking for experience. And you don't have experience if you haven't had a job, it is a circle. I do not have a day of work experience, nothing... Look, right now I am hunting for a connection to be employed in a boutique – but..., it's difficult. I don't think anything will come of that. That's my life, for you. We live on my mother's pension. The three of us. On 225 KM, [...] Often people go to work, go to work only that it be counted as work, they have no salary, neither social, nor pension, they do not pay social, they cannot go to a doctor... They only work, expecting, hoping that some day things will be revived again, but nothing comes out of it. We know of cases where, for example, you get a hot meal, but do not have neither social nor pension.

It is interesting to note that according to the experience and views of some informants, children from mixed marriages (most often with university education) are welcome only in foreign firms.

## Credit as a way of life

Only those in employment are eligible for a credit. Getting a credit seems to be a dominant strategy for this category. One of my informants, a 43-year old nurse, Bosniak, says:

All who are working, all people I know have taken a credit. Everyone – exactly everyone. Credits have become part of life. It is the only way to get cash. I could tell you that before the war it was very difficult to get a credit. And now – just say how much you need! But interests are high. So, to buy something, we get a credit. When we were working on the apartment – we had to do everything at once, to paint and everything... And then we had to get furniture for the apartment. Look at my daughter, she has been working for three years, she has five credits, she is really choked by credits, and has only paid back one of them after three years. The sums are high – and for three, four, or five years. They offer credits – they even come to our house, offering – when you pay back this credit, you should get a new one. Credits are a way of life – there is no other way. Whatever you need – you have to get a credit.

## Social conditions

The organisation of housing in the post-war period is directly dependent on the economic situation. Before the war it was assumed that a newly established family would move into a flat of its own. This is today almost completely impossible. Now the young couple very often live with their parents. One solution to this housing problem has been to use space in cellars or on the top floor – both owned by tenants/owners in common. In some buildings the tenants have agreed a division: those who live on the second floor can use part of the roof, while those on the first floor share the cellar.

## Social identification and security

The pre-war inhabitants of Naselje belonged to all ethnic groups. To a certain extent this is the case today but some former occupants – Serbs, Croats, but also some Bosniaks – have left the neighbourhood for good. According to figures from 2003, the percentage of pre-war and new tenants is roughly 70–30.<sup>103</sup> None of the informants claim that they feel insecure because of the presence of members of other ethnic groups. Instead, the degree of insecurity felt by certain individuals is explained as the result of criminal behaviour and a general atmosphere of insecurity. The descriptions

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<sup>103</sup> 06-23 sl./03 Dostava podataka; Općinski načelnik, Općinska služba za urbanizam, stambene i komunalne poslove, općina Novi Grad, Sarajevo, Grad Sarajevo, Kanton Sarajevo, Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine, Bosna i Hercegovina

indicate a general absence of norms. A 56-year old unemployed electrical mechanic, Bosniak, describes it in this way:

I do not at all feel any more insecure in the settlement than in other parts of the city – everywhere I feel equally insecure. Anywhere and any time someone may turn up, bring out a gun and shoot. Clashes of the underground occur all the time, this is nothing unusual. I am not paranoid but I really do not feel secure. You do not think of it constantly – if that was the case you would become insane. But, it is always there, somewhere in your head...

### Social activities

The initial form of organisation of the inhabitants, the *Association of Citizens of Naselje*, discontinued its work after the neighbourhood was resettled. One type of common activity which has survived is coming together in the ‘club of retired people’, most often in the afternoon, to play chess, cards, or just have a cup of coffee. Many informants, particularly among those retired, practise Islam, although there are no organised religious activities in the settlement. Religion belongs to the private sphere and is looked upon as a sentiment and way of life. Interestingly enough, many of those below 40 observe the Ramadan fast, but few pray daily. Most informants believe they have a tolerant attitude towards other religions, which is sometimes referred to as a specific characteristic of Sarajevo. Also interesting is the view of some informants that Islam in Bosnia is a particular form of a European Islam.

A few of my informants belong to political parties, but usually people argue that they cannot see any point in being politically active, and the general attitude is one of resignation.

### Social interaction: cooperation and trust; relations among neighbours

Although most of the inhabitants of Naselje fled to the neighbouring settlement C5, in the post-war period direct contacts with former war-time neighbours were mainly with those who had been close friends. Conversations on the phone were more frequent, and most people knew about the lives of their former neighbours. Most tenants renewed contacts with others because of the possibility of receiving donations for the whole building. Descriptions of the first meeting organised by the contact person are very striking – especially where the tenants were intimate friends who had not seen each other for years and who were of different ethnic origin.

The frequent descriptions of togetherness, solidarity and interaction in the *komšiluk* (the immediate neighbourhood) before the war, clearly indicate an atmosphere of very good and close relations between neighbours. In addition, many of my informants are of the opinion that trust between neighbours has not changed – only the priorities are different. The informants

state that today social interaction is circumscribed by the economic situation: money is used for what is by necessity needed for the family, while those in work also very often refer to an acute lack of time, that leisure time is preferably spent with members of the close family.

However, in one building interpersonal relations have deteriorated due to conflicts about the use of common space in the building (the roof and cellar). The difficult economic situation and the daily struggle to survive naturally affects relationships. When conflicts occur between members of different ethnic groups, there is a tendency to 'explain' them by pointing to ethnic factors. Although this was never mentioned in interviews, that explanation, or rather clarification, *was* being used.

Social implications – the dichotomy of urban and rural

'Changes in the structure of inhabitants' of Naselje, as well as, more generally, in Sarajevo was a frequent topic of conversation. The descriptions of new tenants (most often refugees and displaced persons from Eastern Bosnia) are not derived from an ethnic classification, but are primarily based on the earlier, rural, place of residence. Very often one could hear negative comments and imagery. An older woman describes it in this way:

I think all of them should return home! I will tell you why I think they should return! Because they have not for one moment accepted the urban way of life, they...that they would have to adapt. The way they used to live over there – they continue to do so and ...for example, concretely – culture of housing, behaviour towards people... I simply think this manner... Concretely (laughter)...instead of bringing the cow leftovers of food, they throw them in the yard, through the windows. Directly – jump! (laughter). I will tell you another reason why they do not wish to return. They say "We can only leave for abroad". They are not interested anymore in the life of the village. Simply, if Sarajevo is impossible, then abroad... What will she do in the village, by no means... In our neighbourhood today they are not a majority of people, those who have come from these places.

Even though inhabitants of Sarajevo originally from rural areas are most often negatively stigmatised and referred to as 'culturally inferior' this does not apply to people who have a strong professional identity or with whom one has a personal bond. One of my informants (born in Sarajevo) was extremely negative about the new inhabitants of the city, but when making a list (several times) of the places from which these people had arrived, he left out the name of a particular place which was otherwise mentioned as typical in all interviews concerning new inhabitants. This place was where many refugees came from. It turned out that the well-mannered medical doctor, whose patient he was, actually comes from this very place.

Another attitude often mentioned in this context is the belief that people coming from these areas are well organised and help each other, which, according to my informants, leads to an economic marginalisation of *born Sarajlije*.<sup>104</sup>

The idea, prevalent in all socio-economic classes, that people from rural areas are 'culturally inferior' is thus unrelated to ethnic classification. These characteristics of inferiority are ascribed to members of one's own groups too. The issue of 'ruralisation of cities' and the consequent marginalisation of 'urban values and norms' is looked upon as a problem affecting all urban environments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of ethnic majority.

#### Ethnic relations

Attitudes towards members of other groups must be understood in a broader social and cultural context. Before the war Sarajevo had one of the largest proportions of interethnic marriages in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of 27 interviewed households, five constituted mixed marriages, and an additional seven households counted members of other ethnic groups among their close relatives. From the interviews it is clear that confidence in other ethnic groups is far greater where there are mixed marriages than where the wider family is homogeneous.

When asked whether Sarajevo is a multiethnic city, Bosniak informants belonging to homogeneous families tend to agree that it really is, most often pointing out that in Sarajevo there *are* other ethnic groups as well. Informants who are not Bosniak, or are Bosniaks who within their larger family have members of other ethnic groups, have a more nuanced attitude. Most of this group say that Sarajevo is a multiethnic city no longer. One informant, an older Bosniak living in a mixed marriage, says:

You know, there are Serbs and Croats here – but it is very difficult for them to find a job – honestly speaking. They do live here, but as far as a job is concerned, it is difficult. Well, it is difficult for Bosniaks as well if they have no connections, but, again, your kind is a majority, so it is somehow easier along that line...perhaps one will find something. On the other hand – what can one say – you could reason in this way – in other parts of the country during the war there was ethnic cleansing, deportation, killing... Here, now, they have no jobs. Everyone has his own affairs to deal with.

In a country where unemployment is high and contacts one of the most important means to acquire a job, the probability is higher that an individual belonging to the ethnic majority will find employment. In other words, the economic situation is an important condition for return, but also for 'staying'.

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<sup>104</sup> Sarajlija, a person living (and born) in Sarajevo.

Ethnic affiliation as a basis of categorisation in some contexts will be more important, in others less, but it can never be totally ignored. A 56-year old Serbian woman, economist, says:

Take, for example, my friend in Mostar, she is Serbian. She is the best example. She was working throughout the war, and is still working. She is a high school teacher, teaching difficult subjects – she is irreplaceable! Besides that, her husband was killed in the war, he was a Muslim. I tell you – she is very important – nobody dares to tell her anything – neither the director nor anybody else. But, let us say she had incidentally been a cleaning woman – somebody would probably have told her something – this is what I want to tell you! And then it does not matter what she is. This is what I would like to say, it is important that you are someone, then nothing could be said, nothing else is important. But had she been a cleaning woman, perhaps they would not have fired her, but maybe she would not have felt at ease – something would always be hanging above her head. Take, for example, my doctor Neda. Does anybody ever tell her anything? Nothing! On the contrary! Everyone wants her! Because she is the best! Because, you know, when you need a doctor, you ask for a good doctor, national affiliation is not important.

There is, therefore, the idea that ethnicity is significant, but also, that this depends on the context and environment. All generalisations constitute a simplification: narratives of help coexist with narratives of discrimination. One of my informants, a 65-year old Bosniak, helped his son in law, a Serb, to find a job in Sarajevo:

As for my religion I am Muslim, but I am also a man. My daughter married a Serb from Republika Srpska who also served in the army over there, in that army, someone picked him up, gave him a gun – come on, shoot. His not a criminal, not him, he is not... What now? Should I hate my son in law because of that? God forbid. I love him like my own child. And, normally, I will help him the best way I can and know, and luckily, it turned out that I could... But, I think, it will take a million years before these hot-heads realise that people are people, only a line – here humans, there non-humans, or honest and thief. A thief, as we know, belongs in prison.

Another view is that tensions among ethnic groups are reinforced by the economic conditions of the country. An older informant, a retired Croat, says:

I think, that is my conviction, that 60–70 percent of the people would be normal if they could find work. Neither would anybody look to these politicians, I do not care who is what. During the

war, if you think of the fact that we were sitting together, all that is very sad, still it was a mixed society. So, I think that for most ordinary people this would not constitute a problem. However, the tensions are kept up by this unemployment. I am convinced of that, if the economy starts moving, if people go to work, if they get salaries, well, they would not listen neither to Cerić<sup>105</sup>, nor to that bishop or the cardinal.

In a few interviews a specific role is ascribed to the state and to political structures, as well as to the existence of a correlation between political aspirations and tensions between ethnic groups. A 62-year old female informant, Croat, says:

Today it is like that – everything is divided – the Bosniaks do this, the Croats do that, the Serbs do this – everything is divided – is that really normal? Or, a man kills another man and they say a Serb killed a Croat; a Bosniak killed a Croat – when what happened is that a criminal killed a criminal! And not because of his nation! What do I care about this manipulation with nationality just to keep power! [...] As far as this is concerned – if our parliament is made up of professions with no idea of politics and a diplomatic approach – and they fulfil the role of ministers, or state secretaries. But they belong to certain ethnic categories – it is being done according to the national key. Not qualified people but appropriate! Now, in the meantime things are happening as they are happening – that is – people are deported from the villages to here and there, they look for ways and settle in other areas. Unfortunately they were deported, and had to leave in masses, leave their homes. It is another thing that there were also settlements – by the parties – resettlements of the inhabitants – it depends on what year we are talking about. These people, I condemn this – that is politics! I don't approve! This resettlement of inhabitants – that was a strategy. In that way they settle, due to the situation, due to the strategy of the parties – so that there has been a change in the structure of inhabitants – whether because of departure, and then non-return, some chose to stay...

The topic of intermarriages and ethnic affiliation/non-affiliation was also relevant. This dilemma related to identities other than the socially dominant categorisation into three ethnic groups, is perhaps best described by a 24-year old young man, whose mother is Muslim and father Orthodox (his own classification):

Look at the recent football match – they came from Banja Luka to root for the team of Serbia and Montenegro. I do not under-

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<sup>105</sup> Reis ul ulema Mustafa Cerić, head of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina.



stand that... I was in Belgrade, nobody asked about my name. When I said 'from Sarajevo' they replied 'Oh, Bosnian'. Nor did they ask from which Sarajevo. They did not ask for my name and surname, but – Bosnian. I am Bosnian... You be whatever you like. Well, I don't know what you are. I don't know, I did not ask you, nor does it interest me. Therefore...we cannot go on like that. Bosnian – of Orthodox, Islamic, Catholic faith. These are religions. And we are all Bosnians. Normally, there are atheists [...] I said once, when they asked me are you Croat, Serb, Bosniak? They were filling up the social card of the Canton of Sarajevo. I wrote – Eskimo. Yes, yes – Eskimo. What or where I will sign or not, according to the constitution I have the right to say who I am, do I not? The first paragraph of the constitution. You write Eskimo – but no, do not joke, they say. I am the only Eskimo in Sarajevo. Because I am neither Croat, nor Serb, nor Bosniak, nor do I know what it means: Bosniak, Serb or Croat. Had he asked differently I would have known who I am. He should have written whether I am Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim. Religion. That's it. A Croat is from Croatia, a Serb from Serbia, And a Bosnian from Bosnia, Macedonian from Macedonia.

## Political conditions

All my informants have a very resigned attitude towards the ruling elite of the country. There is very little trust in politicians, and a common theme is the complex, expensive, and unnecessary administrative apparatus in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

One of my informants describes the aspirations of the political leaderships in the following way. He is Bosniak, 59 years old, a temporarily employed electrician:

All of them are for a multiethnic society, only it should be dominated by one people – the one they belong to and represent. And people listen to this stupefying talk day in and day out, and it all concerns money...I..., a Croat takes money, the Bosniaks will not have it, and will feel they need it – the truth is that neither Bosniaks nor Croats ever see any money...I mean ordinary people. All is demagogy – they speak about money – they speak about change, but money is only transferred from one pocket to another. Theirs, those above. Three presidents – three good for nothing! And that is not even important, the important point is that they are representing their hungry people, all three peoples are represented. Well, OK, now we are all satisfied – they will be full, happy and satisfied. For all of us.

On the one hand there is the obvious view that the political elite of the country is corrupt and consists of people claiming to represent the interests of their own ethnic group, and the consciousness of a de facto ethnic division of the country. Further, that those who live in areas where their own group is a majority are better off is taken for granted as a reality of present conditions. On the other hand it is felt that the only possible future for Bosnia and Herzegovina is a multiethnic community of all its peoples. These views are often held by the same person. It is interesting to note that the second view, that of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multiethnic community, does not have a clear connotation of being politically correct or incorrect: The idea of a multiethnic Bosnia is perceived as morally correct, whereas its political correctness is a matter of context.

### Legal aspects

The sense of insecurity, the absence of rule of law, the feeling that there is no social or existential security – none of this is being referred to in the context of political conflicts or ethnic tensions in Sarajevo, but rather as an issue of criminal behaviour, noticeable in all ethnic groups. A 43-year old informant says:

They stole my daughter's telephone, almost in front of the building. A group of five, six young men. You know what she told them: Just take it. It was given to me by Čelo<sup>106</sup>, he is a relative. You know what happened? They returned the phone. Immediately! She is 14 years old. How she managed to say this is not clear to me. I did not know whether I should laugh or cry when she told me. Here only the mafia is working as it should, not the police... This is how we are living...

### The international community

The presence of the International Community and its role is on the whole looked upon as positive, since in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, it would have been impossible to keep the peace without international forces. Often comments on the role of the International Community concentrated on its activity during the war.<sup>107</sup> In addition, very often the lack of jobs is directly

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<sup>106</sup> A well-known criminal.

<sup>107</sup> Explanations of why the International Community was late in providing help during the war varies, from those who point out that the approach of the International Community was not coordinated, to those that argue that the reason was the fear of an European Islam. In the words of one informant: 'In the beginning Europe did not understand European Islam and was silent, it was silent and standing aside when it was worst for us. If there is anything they might learn from us, it is that people are able to live together. I think we could, and I think we still can...But, you know, sometimes a lot of thoughts are on my mind – you think – they were actually standing aside, doing nothing – in order to show that a multiethnic society is impossible. Well, I say it is possible, let them help us economically, and they will see that people are able to live together. They are – when they have something to live from. Let them help us – and let them help themselves – they are going to need it! Not a single one of those states is mono-national.'

related to the role of the International Community as someone who could/should help, or who is doing nothing. In the words of an older informant, Croat:

I think the truth is that they have no interest that things are starting to move from this dead end. Why should Ashdown be interested that Bosnia is progressing? He has a salary of 75 000 KM and is interested in staying as long as possible. The same is true of every one of these people. Look at what they have been doing since Dayton. There is nothing in terms of production. All projects are related to renewal and return, this is quite understandable. Besides that most has been done for the infrastructure – roads, water, whatever belongs to the infrastructure. Why? The infrastructure will make everyone leave Bosnia, dry it out – that's why it is needed.

The high salaries of those employed by the International Community are a frequent theme of conversation, as well as their opportunistic attitude towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. A 27-year old young man has the following to say:

We gave them employment (laughter). They are having a good time, it is nice for the families, they come, they go to the sea, they... The longer they stay here – the richer they will be. At home they would never be able to earn this money – with allowances, and all that. And look only how they behave – are you walking around in Sarajevo? Listen, not even a German is acting like a civilised person here. According to the law he would have to pay fines, fines, fines. I have seen it myself in the city – what Danes or Germans are doing, and... They are parking on green areas. I was approached by someone from the Danish embassy, we saw the flag, and he forced my car to the doorway. They were dead drunk, two of them from the European Union, they were wearing white clothes, a white jeep, and they destroyed the car of my neighbour and just left. That's the European Union. In other words, since nobody can do anything to them here, just go on, do what they like. That is, their true self is discovered here. Perhaps it is like that in Sweden...? I don't know. But I do know what I have seen here. They do not respect me; they do not respect the state. Even if making a series of offences, you are welcome, pay a fine? help yourself! But, indeed, they know where they are...this is possible only here, it really is.

### A question of status or responsibility?

The role of the International Community in furthering rule of law was very often referred to, and the process was generally described as very slow. Some

informants argue that the position of the High Representative actually presupposes more authority than is being exercised, and are of the opinion that he should take more responsibility for stabilising conditions in the country. A few informants are critical of the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina, arguing that in practice it has become a protectorate; and a certain amount of frustration is expressed. One 48-year old informant put it in this way:

Look, that would be the worst option. In reality we are a protectorate, in view of everything that the High Representative is doing and has been doing until now. But on paper we are not a protectorate! It is the worst possible option – responsibility always belongs to others: at first we have three presidents who argue and quarrel like children in a nursery, and always blame someone else – then we have that unfortunate High Representative. Now, this responsibility is important – who is responsible for what – and our politicians should be responsible – but they are not – since Paddy is always deciding in the end – and they know it – because tomorrow he is able to dissolve, break up – as they say regulate (Laughter). And all this story-telling of ‘the responsibility of domestic politicians’. Well, let the fools finish it, then – in this way the ball is only thrown among them! And in the end, to whom is this Paddy sending his reports, to whom is he responsible, who can tell him – listen, this is no good, this is reasonable... The greatest problem is always if strangers are in charge. We are the ones who have to live here. If Europe had been interested in sorting out our problems – they are intelligent – they would have helped us to do what is needed, not like this, where people hardly have a life [...] who cares. That’s the way it was during the war – why should it be different now...oh God, just leave it...

## Future

Informants’ views of the future are generally optimistic, although filled with caution and hesitancy. Resignation and a feeling that 10 years have passed since the end of the war without any remarkable progress being made is characteristic of many conversations.

## Economic prospects

According to most informants, the economic situation is a basic issue – the undeveloped economy, the inadequate infrastructure, the fact that new employment opportunities are not being created, that most undertakings are uncertain. Those who are employed fear for their retirement, aware of the life they can expect. Pupils in secondary schools and students with whom I spoke, live in the hope that they personally ‘will be lucky enough to find work’, while moving abroad seems to be a popular option for almost every-

one. This alternative, depends on the possibility of getting a job in Bosnia, and is always the second choice.

### Future coexistence

Most informants believe that for a better future, peaceful coexistence is a precondition. Coexistence is understood by most people as tolerance and respect for other ethnic groups. Some informants were of the opinion that at the moment, tolerance is greater in Sarajevo than in other places – particularly smaller towns or villages. Many think that Sarajevo as an urban environment is different due to a higher general level of education, and tend to refer to rural areas as underdeveloped. In the words of a 43-year old Bosniak:

I think the situation in Sarajevo is more normal, you don't feel like a post-war...that people hate each other. But, when you go outside Sarajevo a little, there it is most noticeable, at first from peoples' standard, second by how they look, by the firms, roads. Once I went to Mostar...it looked as if the war had stopped yesterday. It seems one sees it on people as well – there they are really divided – then when you leave, when you go through the villages, I think they somehow – well they were always thinking in that way – that people are divided; here it was always different. We were always together, grew up together, played together, everything was done together, there was no difference, But in the villages I think it is a bit different – one village is Serb, one Bosniak, one Croat, it was always like that – they did not mix. Neither did they educate themselves, these are poor people – you see it when you pass...my God I feel sad when thinking of how these people live. Bosnia is very dissimilar; everything is a world by itself, every little street.

### Political future

Criticism of the Dayton Accords was very frequent in conversation; many people regard them as a major obstruction to development, both political and economic. A 58-year old informant says:

There must be a change – even if the foreigners force us to do something, to come to terms with some basic issues: political, social, economic. That must happen – above all, because of the area we live in – this must not be a point of conflict, this is bad for Europe as well. They should think about that – if nothing else. Perhaps out of self-interest – if not for any other reason, maybe because of that. But everything done until now has been very slow. Very slow. I don't know when.

Thinking about the future political situation in the country is full of caution and uncertainty. Issues like the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to the International Community, the status and importance of the entities and cantons, and the character of political institutions and structure of the state are all a big question mark. Most informants think that the future is extremely difficult to predict. It is characteristic that a large majority are very resigned and tired of speculating about a possible outcome ‘I mainly think about what my children will eat today and tomorrow – what our state will look like in ten years, to tell you the truth, does not interest me – I know that it is not worth thinking about... Whatever anyone said or thought, it does not matter’ says a 49-year old informant.

## Proposals

### Implementation of aid

When commenting on the restoration of apartments, most people express gratitude, although some feel that part of the aid might perhaps have been delivered in a different manner. One type of comment refers to the standards of reconstruction. Some informants argue that building standards applying in the 1970-s were obsolete<sup>108</sup> and that a more flexible approach would have been desirable.

One of the most important and striking comments deals with the conditions for a donation, i.e. the condition that it had to be a genuine return on the part of the beneficiary. Although the employees of Caritas were conscious of the risk that necessary documents confirming de-registration of residence in places outside Sarajevo, and registration of refugee status, might be ‘acquired’ in various ways, it was still a basic requirement to qualify for a donation. Some of my informants argued firmly that the reconstruction of apartments is not of itself a precondition for a sustainable return. A 58-year old informant, whose children are still living in a Western European country, makes the following comment:

If somebody thinks that the reconstruction of apartments means that the problem of return is solved he is gravely mistaken! Return does not mean apartment (accentuated). I said ‘Think about this: my children – will they come or not come – I don’t know. They left during puberty – some children left when they were 4–5 years old. But we elderly people, we are here – even if there had not been a war...the children grew up – all of us got married and left our parental homes. In other words, rights I am asking for concern me and my husband – not the children! The children

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<sup>108</sup> Insulating the facade was not normal practice in the 70s. Some tenants of Naselje put polystyrene on the wall and then replace the original facade.

will decide for themselves how they would like to live! One should not become attached to this – that is, in principle, a wish – but this wish...and it is clear that an apartment is a precondition, a necessity, but it is not enough. Switzerland or Sweden cannot guarantee that anyone will get a job, that they will have health insurance that their children would normally go to a normal school – that is the task of the state. Switzerland, Sweden, whoever – they help the state to create the basic conditions for return, by giving them apartments, and the state should then channel all the donations coming in to factories and other things, so people could return. But this did not happen. And it is ridiculous to think that people return when they have an apartment. That is crystal clear to everyone who finds himself in that situation. Don't get me wrong, the International Community comforted our soul, when providing us with a roof over our heads. These humanitarian organisations have done a great service to Bosnia and Herzegovina by constructing those apartments – but for life to be normal, they cannot bear the responsibility – for that is the responsibility of our government, our leadership, our politicians. To fulfil this annex 7 of Dayton, that life is normalised. On the one hand we have an ethnic division of the country, which does exist, even if there has been no census... I really do not understand why they do not organise that census – I would do it tomorrow. That everything is black on white! How we are doing – what really happened and what is happening. The state should do that – because it can no longer wait – because, forgive me, nobody is coming here! Neither can anybody forbid him to stay where he has a better life! Well, that is what seems strange to me, that condition in the Accords.

### Economic priorities

Since unemployment is regarded as one of the most serious problems, a great number of proposals are about the creation of new jobs. Other proposals are mostly related to job creation. In the words of a 27-year old young man:

The problem is that those foreigners only take over banks, banks, banks; no one is thinking of building a factory. And all these religious buildings are erected. They make a mosque for 2 millions, they make a church for 2 millions – nothing else. [...] Build a factory, employ 500 workers and say – this amount of money has to be collected, Then from the salary every month 10, 15, 20, 30 KM – everyone would give.

## A framework for coexistence

Many of my informants regard nationally oriented parties and their programs as one of the major obstacles for the construction of a multiethnic state. Again, it is in most cases obvious that my informants look upon Sarajevo as an environment where national parties have the smallest number of followers. However, they are aware that the election of national parties, the nationalist undertone and allusions to national identity, are very attractive to a certain group of people. The affinity towards national parties is, as a rule, ascribed to environments with a low level of education – in particular smaller or rural municipalities. The informants claim that national/ethnic affiliation was always important in small localities ‘They were always thinking like that – they were always divided in that way, it was known who is who and who is what – there is no other way! It was different in the cities...people were always mixed...nobody would care if anyone was called by a different name!’ Some informants also believe that nationalism has become more attractive after the war, and, in a sense, is a consequence of war.

A few informants feel that one of the most important preconditions for a future coexistence is the confrontation and acknowledgement of deeds committed by one’s own group during the war. A 64-year old Serbian woman says:

I watch TV, read the newspapers. One day I was watching ‘60’ minutes, a political program. You know, this is the worst. That young man who made the program was telling about all those manipulations related to the Srebrenica tragedy, and how this is still going on. And what happens – people call and complain – like what kind of Bosniak is he? Not to speak about that which is not mentioned at all, now it seems it started a little, in Republika Srpska – about all the things the Serbs did. People are still ignorant...However, this is wrong. It should start with these people, exactly they should start the protest. Because, if I speak as an orthodox woman, it will be received differently, you know. If I speak about somebody else – then they will say ‘Ah, you are against’. I am against, but as a human being, you know.

Questions related to legal solutions of an economic character were also a frequent topic. Most often they concerned economic crimes which were not being punished, and the ethnification of such issues. In the words of a 25-year old informant:

You see today, today it is looked upon in this way: this was stolen by a Serb, Bosniak, or Croat. But he is not a Serb, Bosniak or Croat – he is above all a thief! And you know what is worst – the worst thing is that those who are stealing thousands and thousands of KM are not being punished – we should not be concerned about them – they will find a way, don’t worry – they will never go to prison! They don’t go to prison, the small fish do. The



police might come to my house; he could knock on the door right now, because I did not pay a fee of 50KM. They will look for me; they will come ten times, as if I were the most serious criminal. And those guilty of 2–3 million marks, nothing.

## Summary

According to the results of this study, most of my informants always meant to return – it was just a question of when. As refugees, most people lived in apartments for which they were paying rent. The fact that today 30 percent of the pre-war inhabitants have not moved back to Naselje is most often explained by the fact that many who left have succeeded during the ten years of exile in making a new life elsewhere. A less frequent explanation is that for some Serbs and Croats it is a matter of ideology. Instead of referring to a successful or unsuccessful return, defined as ‘return to one’s pre-war place of living’, the emphasis was rather on the possible leave to a place with better opportunities.

Most retired people, because of their small pensions, live on the margin of existential minimum. My informants report that employment does not imply economic security as a large number of people are temporarily employed or working on the black labour market. The frequent comparison with the pre-war system, in which to ‘be employed’ meant permanent economic stability are a very clear signal that most people are not coping with, do not understand and do not accept the new economic system. Obtaining credits is often viewed as the only way of getting cash, and is understood as an unavoidable part of life. Unemployment is regarded as one of the most serious problems. A temporary and short-term solution where people cannot count on any form of institutionalised aid is the mobilisation of personal resources (often of a practical nature) with the help of an existing social network. This is how the individual finds solutions for himself and his family. A strong social network is very important. Although all ethnic groups are faced with difficulties in finding and keeping a job, it is believed that Bosniaks in Sarajevo are in a somewhat better position.

Life in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, going through a period of transition, has left its mark on interpersonal relations. The importance of a social network is still very great – the difference being that this network, in the present circumstances, is considerably smaller and limited to people belonging to the close family circle or to a narrow category of people sharing common beliefs and attitudes. The feeling of insecurity is often explained by the existence of criminals and the lack of a functioning state apparatus.

The phenomenon referred to as ‘ruralisation of cities and loss of urban values and norms’ is looked upon as a problem in all urban areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those referred to as culturally inferior refugees from rural ar-

cas may be members of one's own ethnic group, but the conviction that they are better off increases the tensions.

Confidence in other ethnic groups is greater if any of these members belong to the wider/inner family. Besides the idea, prevalent among Bosniaks from ethnically homogeneous families, that Sarajevo is a multiethnic city, since three ethnic groups live there, there is the view that Sarajevo has become a city dominated by Bosniaks, while members of other groups are fewer, and economically marginalised. Although ethnic affiliation is a socially accepted form of categorisation, it seems that ethnicity may be disregarded, if not wholly forgotten, in cases where professional identity is desirable (and necessary). Social norms and values at the working place or in one's immediate environment are also important.

There are narratives of the war and its consequences, and descriptions of the political reality of the country, in practice divided into three ethnic regions. But there are also narratives of true friendship between people belonging to different ethnic groups. The idea of a Bosnian identity, which questions the 'neat' categories of post-war and post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, is looked upon as a social anomaly rather than as a socially accepted category. This is understandable: the divided country is a consequence of war which means that a Bosnian identity becomes a stumbling block in the new order of things.

Confidence in political parties and individual politicians is very low, and politicians are regarded as opportunists. At the same time, it seems clear that there is a space for an ethnification of societal issues, and a mobilisation of ethnicity for pragmatic goals. Although often referred to as a model promoted by the ruling *nomenklatura*, this view of reality, which presupposes the use of 'a space open to interpretation', is, it seems, becoming socially accepted.

Even if it is generally regarded positively as 'keeper of peace', the International Community is very often referred to in a context where, in a milder version, its responsibility or authority is not understood, or, in a more critical version, it is held responsible for actively maintaining the status quo.

The election of nationally oriented parties is also regarded as one of the problems confronting the country. Besides the belief that national parties have their largest following in the countryside, it is argued that the election of national parties in Sarajevo is a consequence of war. An important precondition for coexistence is, according to this study, the confrontation with what one's own group did during the war, as well as the sanctioning of crimes – both those committed during the war and those being committed today.

The reconstruction of the settlement returned homes to the people who had lost them. Almost all my informants are satisfied with the result, both with the mode of reconstruction and the behaviour of Caritas representatives.

But the question often put to me remains: 'Can a return to pre-war walls be regarded as a return?'

## Facts relevant to the study

According to a World Bank report, 60 percent of all impoverished people in Bosnia and Herzegovina live in households where the head of the family has only elementary school education or less. These households are three times as likely to be categorised as impoverished.<sup>109</sup> In most studies there is a clear, negative correlation between level of education and poverty. In general, the higher the level of education, the less is the likelihood that an individual will be unemployed and end up in the category of poor. Even in the age group 25–35, half of those categorised as poor have only elementary education.<sup>110</sup>

In Bosnia and Herzegovina 23,5 percent of the women above the age of 15 had not completed elementary school. A report from the Helsinki Committee describes how, in rural areas, people increasingly decide not to educate their female children, since most often the family cannot afford the costs of textbooks, clothing, shoes or transport.<sup>111</sup>

The problem for people who spent most of their working life as employees in other parts of Yugoslavia is not a dilemma specific to Selo. That is why the Association of Citizens Dismissed Workers of the Republic of Croatia (UGOR) was formed, assembling 7 000 members. According to association estimates, there are about 100 000 inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina (without Croatian citizenship) who between 1991 and 1993 were fired from their jobs in Croatia. When a majority of the workers were dismissed, the average monthly income was about 800 KM. Often, these people had worked for 20 years. They suddenly found themselves without pension rights, sick-leave, paid holiday, or health insurance, and excluded from the process of privatisation although they owned shares in the company.<sup>112</sup>

The average pension in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina amounts to 36 percent of the average salary (513 KM)<sup>113</sup>, while the average pension in Republika Srpska amounts to 34 percent of the average salary (356 KM).<sup>114</sup> It is estimated that more than 12 percent of the population in the Federation is over 65, whereas in Republika Srpska the figure is 15 percent.<sup>115</sup> Retired people, according to calculations by IMF, are living close to the poverty line.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> World Bank (2003) *Bosnia and Herzegovina Poverty Assessment. Volume II: Data on Poverty Report*, No. 25343-BIH p. 32.

<sup>110</sup> *ibid* p. 44.

<sup>111</sup> Bećirbašić, B. (2004) *Zatvor za očeve i kućni pritvor za kćerke*, BH Dani, No 384, Sarajevo, 22.10.2004

<sup>112</sup> Alić, S (2004) "Otkaz za 100 000 Bosanaca", BH Dani, No 385, Sarajevo, 29.10.2004

<sup>113</sup> FBiH Retirement Fund, April 2003

<sup>114</sup> RS Retirement Fund, December 2002

<sup>115</sup> IMF (2004) *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – Mid-Term development Strategy*, IMF Country Report No. 04/114, p. 28.

<sup>116</sup> *ibid* p. 26.

According to official statistics from December 2002 the level of unemployment (i.e. unemployed registered by the Bureau of Employment) was 42,7 percent in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 38,2 percent in Republika Srpska.<sup>117 118</sup> Those in the Federation, who had lost their job, have the right to receive 117–240 KM for six or twelve months. The lack of money in the appropriate fund means that only 3 320 persons in the Federation received help in 2002, while the figure for the first six months of 2003 was 4 700 people, which is just 1,6 percent of the total number registered.<sup>119</sup>

Unemployed citizens in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina have the right to health care, on condition they are registered with one of the cantonal bureaus of employment. During 2002 in Republika Srpska 1 290 persons received this kind of help, on average 70 KM, whereas the figure for the first six months of 2003 was 1 530 individuals. The period of help in Republika Srpska varies from three to twelve months and depends on the length of unemployment.<sup>120</sup>

In Bosnia and Herzegovina today about 300 000 workers are employed in the informal, grey economy.<sup>121</sup>

Studies made on the state level show that many young people contemplate emigration.<sup>122</sup> According to available figures, 92 000 young people left Bosnia and Herzegovina between January 1996 and March 2001, and surveys indicate that 62 percent of the young generation would leave the country if possible.<sup>123</sup>

According to data from IMF, in rural areas, the war has significantly aggravated an already difficult situation. Even if Bosnia and Herzegovina lacks any special potential for agriculture, about half of the households in the villages do actually survive thanks to agriculture. Many villages were destroyed, the population scattered – outside or within the country, and a substantial part now lives in cities. Of people categorised as impoverished, 80 percent live in rural areas, and 20 percent in the cities. Some aspects of village life which directly affect the standard of living negatively are: insufficient infrastructure and the difficult and more expensive access to educational or health institutions.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Central Bank of BiH (2002) Bulletin 4, January – December 2002, pp. 148-149.

<sup>118</sup> This figure is not complete, since it includes those who are *waiting*. People belonging to this category of workers are without jobs, but receive a minimal salary and health insurance. That is, even though they are not working, they are not classified as unemployed. In the federation they amount to 7 percent of the working force, in Republika Srpska 12 percent. For a thorough analysis, see Kostić, Roland *Conflict Analysis – Strategy for Sweden's Development Cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Annex 3 to the Country Strategy, Sida, Stockholm, June 2003

<sup>119</sup> Working Group for Social Policy. (2002) Reform of the development of social security in FBiH, pp. 19.

<sup>120</sup> Working Group for Social Sector. (2002) Analysis of the situation in the social sector in RS with policy proposals,

<sup>121</sup> Comment by dr. Žarko Papić in Selimbegović, V (2004) “*Kako spasiti srednju klasu*”, BiH Dani, No 386, 5.11.2004

<sup>122</sup> IBHI. (2002) Qualitative Survey: ‘*Gender and Poverty*’, p. 6.

<sup>123</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>124</sup> IMF (2004) Bosnia and Herzegovina: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – Mid-Term development Strategy, IMF Country Report No. 04/114, p. 29.

One of the most important strategies of a country in transition is privatisation of state-owned enterprises. In most cases it is a privatisation on paper, with an issue of vouchers. In fact, very little fresh capital is invested in the firms. As a result, it is to be expected that many of these firms will go bankrupt, and the workers lose their jobs. By the end of the privatisation, of 1 031 firms, 765 had been sold. Every second firm was sold to citizens and investment funds without capital to renew production. In many cases citizens sell the vouchers on the black market, often for as little as 3 percent of their nominal value.<sup>125</sup>

In Bosnia and Herzegovina the process of privatisation is not accompanied by sustainable and coordinated social programs, or measures which might provide the population with basic economic security.<sup>126</sup>

## Conclusions

This anthropological study of life in two different settings does not pretend to be representative of all rural or urban areas. However, this *in depth* study does provide a view of conditions as seen by the beneficiaries themselves and in the framework of a particular socio-economic context. Life conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina before, during, and after the war, are, to a great extent, specific to a particular setting.

Although the wish to return to one's own house was obviously common to the inhabitants of both settings, conditions were different. A majority of the inhabitants of Selo argue that the wish to return would not have prevailed, had circumstances in exile been more favourable. Most returnees in Sarajevo had been refugees within the city itself. There was no dilemma – except for those Serbs and Croats, but also Bosniaks, who had been able to establish a new life elsewhere. While the reconstruction of houses brought people belonging to different ethnic groups physically closer, the economic situation in Sarajevo seems to have contributed to an increased ethnic homogenisation. The reconstruction of houses was a necessary, but not a sufficient reason for return. A very important precondition for a sustainable return – that is, for people staying – is an economy in which it is possible to make a living.

Underdevelopment and harsh conditions make villages not only unattractive, but also stigmatized. This stigma is, above all, a consequence of the difficult economic predicament of the inhabitants. Stereotypes which describe people in rural areas as uneducated, backward and uncultured exist today as they existed before the war. Tone Bringa writes: 'Being *cultured* or *noncultured* refers to a whole set of ideas associated with other sociological

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<sup>125</sup> For a thorough analysis see Kostić, R (2003) Conflict analysis – *Strategy for Sweden's Development Cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Annex 3 to the Country Strategy, Sida, Stockholm.

<sup>126</sup> Open Society Fund Bosnia and Herzegovina/Soros Foundations (2001) *International support policies to see countries – lessons (not) learned in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Sarajevo.

oppositions such as town versus village, educated versus uneducated, poor versus rich, modern and Western versus backward. In the village the concepts of *culturedness* and *nonculturedness* were clearly associated with the dichotomies of village versus town (rural versus urban), and education versus little or no education<sup>127</sup>. The factual underdevelopment of the village, as well as the negative image, might be reasons why people do not return.

The economic situation in Selo is very difficult, and most of the villagers belong to the category of poor people. Level of education is the most important factor increasing the risk of pauperisation.<sup>128</sup> Although there is an elementary school in the village in which all children are enrolled, secondary school education becomes a matter of economic priorities of the individual family: boys usually continue their education while girls may not. Poverty thus creates a vicious circle: the fact that female children are not sent to secondary school bodes ill for the future.

Short-term solutions to the difficult economic situation are seen as the only possible alternative. The men of Selo traditionally worked in industries, while women worked the land, ran the home and saw to the family. These were the roles. It is debatable to what extent it is realistic to expect that people hopes that the factories again will open, can be replaced by what might seem to be a rational solution, a shift to agriculture and cattle breeding. Such a shift is more complicated than might be anticipated, and presupposes a cognitive change. A solution deemed rational by the villagers, is replaced by another solution, rational in the eyes of experts. In the meantime the actual economy of the village might be referred to as an economy of survival.

Where the role of the state is extremely marginalised, a pattern of behaviour develops in which individuals secure their own existence through social networking and all sorts of short-term solutions. The same principles apply whether it is getting help to find a job on the black labour market in the village, or finding the same kind of temporary solutions in the town. The lack of a functioning state apparatus has led to individuals mobilising resources and, within their social networks, becoming the most important social actors.

This type of economy, which appears to be dominant, is sometimes referred to as moral economy or an economy of affection.<sup>129</sup> Usually operating outside the limits of the market, but at the same time in harmony with it, the moral economy is of great importance for the inhabitants of villages and the economically threatened parts of the urban population. The moral economy

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<sup>127</sup> Bringa, T. R. (1995) *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: identity and community in a central Bosnian village*; Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University Press. p. 58

<sup>128</sup> World Bank (2003) Bosnia and Herzegovina Poverty Assessment. Volume II: Data on PovertyReport, No. 25343-BIH, p. 46.

<sup>129</sup> Scott, J. C. (1976) *The moral economy of the peasant: rebellion and subsistence in Southeast Asia*. New Haven Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976; Hyden, G. (1980) *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: underdevelopment and an uncaptured peasantry*. Berkley: University of California Press.

is based on the principle of reciprocal exchange of goods and services, primarily among relatives, neighbours, and friends, but also among people belonging to an individual's broader social network. Regardless of the non-existence of market rules, money nevertheless plays an important role. Within its own framework the moral economy gives a feeling of economic and existential security in a social setting where an alternative source of security remains unattainable. Available services and goods are circulated and channelled by an informal, grey economy.<sup>130</sup> The role of actor and unit of production which the individual/household is forced to adopt requires the ability to cooperate with others, and social relations are guided by reciprocity, one of the most important moral principles regulating social behaviour.<sup>131</sup> This kind of economic interaction is deeply entrenched in the web of social and cultural relations and the possibility of their mobilisation exists only within the framework of existing cultural and social norms. Mobilising these relationships is one of the strategies of survival, and is most often experienced as a transitional and temporary solution, related to a specific economic reality.

The ability to make use of this type of resource varies of course, which leaves some people vulnerable. For young people, the uncertain future, the high level of unemployment, the difficult of finding a home for the newly weds – all of these combine to give them a feeling of hopelessness, resignation, both in Selo and Sarajevo. This frequently gives rise to a feeling that emigration would be a solution.

Memories are still fresh of a system in which the state was the main regulator of economic and social conditions. The experience of state institutions being powerless and incompetent in bringing about economic change also means that a great deal of hope is invested in the institutions of the international community.

The idea of the international community as a keeper of peace is common to both settings, while views on the responsibility and duties of the international community are somewhat more critical in Sarajevo: the process of genuine change is described as unbelievably slow. To some extent, this may be explained by the higher level of education, and better economic situation which together makes following daily and weekly newspapers possible. Interviews in Sarajevo also illustrate a certain confusion about the real status of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is often viewed as a protectorate.

Ethnic interaction is dependent on opportunities for communication with members of other ethnic groups. In Selo it was claimed that people lived side by side. In fact the village is almost mono-ethnic and rather isolated geo-

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<sup>130</sup> By definition, to the informal economy belong those activities which are not controlled by the state and its administrative apparatus, and which are carried on or happening without the knowledge of the state. These activities might be legal or illegal.

<sup>131</sup> Ekeh, P. (1974) *Social exchange theory: the two traditions*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

graphically; ethnic distance is greater than in Sarajevo. Even if interethnic communication takes place in both settings, the events, causes, or developments of the war, are avoided.

In Sarajevo, with three ethnic groups, tensions caused by the difficult economic situation are given an ethnic undertone. This may be a consequence of the mobilisation of ethnic categories for pragmatic goals. On the other hand, the difficult economic situation, according to Papić and his collaborators,<sup>132</sup> contributes to interethnic tensions – again exploited by the political elite.

The absence of rule of law is in both settings a reason for existential insecurity. The slow process of sentencing war criminals and the fact that various crimes (including economic crimes) occurring in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina are not being prosecuted is another source of insecurity.

That the Dayton Accords are a major obstacle to the development of the country is a view found in both settings. In both settings the lack of confidence in politicians and state institutions is equally prevalent, and the same is true of the feeling of marginalisation, of not being able to influence decisions concerning the future.

The prevailing impression is, therefore, that people seem to be forgotten by state institutions, both economically and legally, and are left to themselves, forced to mobilise their own resources. The failure of the state administration to resolve vital issues is understood as the major cause for the situation in which the population finds itself.

In the case of Selo, most villagers have returned. However, they do not live together with the local Serbs and Croats but rather, side by side. The pre-war inhabitants of Naselje were of all ethnic groups. Their homes were destroyed in the war, and they too have returned in great numbers, and again live together in the same buildings, although the ethnic structure of the neighbourhood has changed somewhat.

The question of return, because of the prevailing socio-economic conditions is now rather a question of possible emigration. Although the moral and emotional values associated with return are never trivialised, as time passes, the optimism and enthusiasm of the period of reconstruction is replaced by feelings of frustration and resignation.

In terms of *relevance* and *impact*, the assistance financed by Sida must be regarded as most adequate, both in an economic and social sense. The inhabitants of destroyed houses and apartments were not able to restore their homes on their own, nor could they count on help from public institutions. Sida's contribution is, therefore, considerable and important. Moreover, self-help

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<sup>132</sup> Open Society Fund Bosnia and Herzegovina/Soros Foundations. (2001) *International support policies to see countries – lessons (not) learned in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Sarajevo, p.16



meant that beneficiaries were given an active role in the reconstruction, which was regarded as positive and significant. Another advantage of this model, referred to as essential by most beneficiaries, is economic: a larger number of former neighbours were able to receive help. The way in which the reconstruction was undertaken is generally described as excellent, as is the attitude of the NGO's involved. In addition, those responsible for the administration of aid apparently made a conscious effort to avoid intermediaries and channel available resources directly to potential beneficiaries.

There is also a symbolic dimension to be taken into account. It is hard to assess the importance of the reconstruction of buildings, without bearing in mind the symbolic value of the house itself. A house is not only a place to live in: 'When they [displaced Bosnians] lose their house, they lose all they have worked for in the past and much of what they would have lived for in the future'<sup>133</sup> Investing in the house was a life-long project, and losing a home meant losing a considerable part of one's life, identity, and sense of meaning.

Consequently, from the point of view of the beneficiaries, the assistance provided by Sida within the framework of the Integrated Area Program, did have an impact on their lives, and was relevant in the sense that it helped them to return and start a new life.

It is more difficult to give a definite judgement of the long-term effects of the program, i.e. to answer the question of *sustainability*. The return is a first phase in a process of normalisation, which by the informants themselves is usually understood as a return to a pre-war way of life. However, the recreation of such a life – or the establishment of an alternative mode of life – is dependent on several conditions which may be outside the scope of a given aid program. Ultimately, the sustainability of aid provided by Sida will be a function of general economic, political, and social developments, among which the most important is a functioning labour market. The right to work, to provide for one's family, is a precondition for a dignified life, and will, in the end, be decisive for a sustainable future.

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<sup>133</sup> Bringa, T. R. (1995) *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: identity and community in a central Bosnian village*; Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University Press, p.86

# Aid and reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina: a sociological survey of life conditions and attitudes

By Kjell Magnusson

## Introduction

In the summer of 2004 a sociological survey was undertaken among recipients of Swedish assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The aim was to collect basic demographic and socio-economic data on households included in Sida's Integrated Area Programme, and to study certain aspects related to the goals of the programme. How did the beneficiaries view the aid programme, its purpose and implementation? What are the effects of the programme, defined as self-reported social and economic conditions? What were the attitudes towards issues of relevance for the reconstruction of Bosnian society?

The empirical investigation was carried out by the public opinion research agency PULS, with offices in Sarajevo, Split, and Zagreb, in cooperation with the Centre for Multiethnic Research of Uppsala University. After discussions in April 2004 at the Zagreb head office between Dragan Bagić, Research Director of PULS, Joakim Molander, Evaluation Officer, Sida, and Kjell Magnusson, Senior Research Fellow, Uppsala University, a model that would suit the needs of the evaluation process was agreed upon.

The survey comprised a sample of 2000 respondents, i.e. heads of households which had received assistance in the reconstruction of their homes by organisations working for Sida. The sampling frame was developed on the basis of lists of beneficiaries (approximately 11 000 households) sent by Sida to PULS, which constructed a database of beneficiaries and aid organisations. Taking into account organisational affiliation, settlements and households were chosen at random. Since the two sexes were to be equally represented, wives of male heads of households were also included in the survey.

In addition, there was a control sample of 1000 respondents, chosen randomly according to *area* (canton) and *size* of settlement, in order to match the

target sample.<sup>134</sup> The control group had not benefited from Sida's programme, but might include households that received aid from other donors.

When interpreting the results, it is important to bear in mind that the sample is not representative of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole, but only of those who received aid from Sida. When, for example, data are presented according to ethnic affiliation, they refer to Bosniaks, Croats or Serbs who were part of the programme, or belonged to the control sample.

The questionnaire consisted of 72 questions, or 98 variables. It was based on a list of questions and issues prepared by Joakim Molander, to match the goals of the evaluation, and was further developed by Kjell Magnusson. A preliminary version in English was discussed by experts and staff at Sida's headquarters in Stockholm, as well as by representatives of aid organisations and Sida personnel in Sarajevo. PULS translated the questionnaire into Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian, after which it was checked and re-translated into English by Kjell Magnusson. The final version was agreed by Dragan Bagić and Kjell Magnusson, after consultations with Joakim Molander. Interviews were made during three weeks at the end of June and beginning of July by trained interviewers belonging to the field organisation of PULS. Data were analysed in July, and further analyses took place in September/October 2004. A comprehensive report is published separately.<sup>135</sup>

## Overview of results

### Households

The average number of people living in the households which were granted aid is 3,3, compared to 3,2 in the control sample. The most common types of households, accounting for 60 percent, are those with two (25,2%), four (20,5%) or three (16,9%) members. In terms of family structure, most frequent are households with husband, wife (or unmarried partners) and their children (34%), followed by those made up of a married or unmarried couple (20,9%). Thirteen percent of the households consist of only one person, while in 11 percent the respondent is living with someone else (not parents or children). Since the mean age of heads of households is above 50, there are few three-generation households, about 5 percent, and even fewer made up of a couple and elderly parents. Altogether, in more than half of the households, the respondent lives with his/her children.

It should be emphasised that differences between the target and control samples are very small, practically non-existent. This is further illustrated when

<sup>134</sup> Due to the lack of population records, households were selected by the *random starting points* and *random walk methods*. For more details, see the report referred to in note 2.

<sup>135</sup> Dragan Bagić & Dejan Dedić: *The Impact of Aid. A Sociological Survey of Life Conditions and Attitudes towards Reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Puls/Sida 2005. Annex 3 contains tables of results.

comparing heads of households in the two samples according to age and education. The average age in the target sample is 55,6, and in the control sample 52,6, due to a somewhat larger percentage of respondents between 15–29 and 30–44. The predominant level of education is in both cases elementary school, while the proportion of completed secondary school is a little higher in the control sample.

Most of the houses/flats reconstructed as part of the aid programme are inhabited. There are certain differences according to organisation, which seems to be a result of the fact that houses built in rural areas are more often used by the original owners. Between 5 and 17 percent of the houses are not inhabited but regularly visited by their owners. Only a small number of houses are abandoned or occupied by others.

### Refugee Status and Return

During the war most respondents had lived as displaced persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina: about 71 percent of the target group, and 52 percent in the control sample. Twenty-one percent (24% in the control group) had been refugees outside Bosnia, while 8 percent (23% in the control group) did not leave their homes during the war. In other words, the percentage of refugees and displaced persons was higher among the beneficiaries of assistance from Sida than among people in general.

Of those who were refugees in other countries the largest group had stayed in Croatia. There were, however, typical differences according to ethnic affiliation, i.e. Croats found refuge in Croatia, Serbs in Serbia and Montenegro, and Bosniaks in Croatia or Macedonia.

An important issue for the evaluation team was the reason for return. It seems that 40 percent returned when they did because they were obliged to leave their temporary homes in accordance with the principles of the Dayton Accords. There is no real difference between target and control groups in this respect. Although the immediate decision to return was beyond the control of the respondents, who were, moreover, given help to rebuild their homes, most people claim they would have returned even if they had not received economic assistance. Still, as much as one fourth of the people in the target group said they would not, and one fifth claimed they would definitely or probably have gone to some other place given the opportunity. Nevertheless, a clear majority preferred to return to their own village. Since there were more refugees and displaced persons in the target sample, it seems that Sida played an important role in helping these people to return to their place of origin.

## Aid and attitudes towards aid

While the target sample by definition consisted of beneficiaries, it is noteworthy that only 17 percent in the control sample received assistance to rebuild their home, which indicates that Sida was the major international provider of aid in the region. The data suggest that resources were primarily concentrated on reconstruction of houses and infrastructure. A comparatively small number of people had received additional *agricultural aid*: 20 percent in the target group and ten percent in the control group. As for *micro-credits*, only 1 or 2 percent had received this kind of aid. These figures are somewhat misleading, though, since the programme included urban areas. When focusing on villages, a slightly different picture emerges: 30 percent received agricultural aid, but the variation between organisations is considerable, from 3 percent to 50 percent. However, the general picture remains, most say they have not received this kind of aid.

Those responsible for implementing the programme claim that everyone, whose house was rebuilt, did, in fact, receive a starting package of agricultural aid worth up to 2000 KM<sup>136</sup>. This indicates a basic misunderstanding between donors and beneficiaries: most beneficiaries obviously did not understand the 'package' given after they had moved in as 'agricultural aid'. The label might be misleading since Sida has also been engaged in agricultural aid proper on a more long-term basis.

This leads to the interesting issue of communication, and how people were *informed* about the possibility of receiving aid. Perhaps not unexpectedly, the most common channel was through friends and acquaintances, more than 40 percent, followed by the authorities (27%) and organisations (23%). However, people in rural areas were more dependent on information from authorities or organisations, probably due to a higher degree of isolation. Almost one third in the control group claim they were not informed at all, and the question arises whether some of these people might have been potential beneficiaries.

Another topic which the evaluation wanted to clarify was whether people had understood the principles behind the aid programme. It turns out that about 60 percent fully or partly understands these principles, but that almost 40 percent do not, which seems a rather high proportion. In this case education plays a role. Those with secondary or higher education have a greater understanding than those with elementary school or lower, which also means that villagers are less well informed than townspeople.

What are their views on aid? Do people think it has been fair and appropriate? Several items were used to assess these aspects. On the direct question *if the distribution of aid has been fair*, 26 percent said yes, 32 percent said no, while about 40 percent said that aid distribution was sometimes fair, sometimes not.

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<sup>136</sup> The Bosnian KM, *konvertibilna marka*, or *convertible mark* is equivalent to the DEM.

When asked in a slightly different manner *if those who needed help received it*, the answers are similar. More than a third replied positively, less than a fourth negatively, and about 40 percent gave an intermediate answer. Another way of asking was *if those who received help really needed it*. Forty percent of the respondents in the target sample thought yes. Seventeen percent felt that aid was on the whole unfair, i.e. only few of the beneficiaries needed help. In the control group twice as many of the respondents maintain this view. In general, those who benefited from aid were less critical.

It is symptomatic that when asked *how people in general* view the aid programmes, the percentage of positive replies is lower. That is, the respondents themselves have a more positive attitude towards aid than they believe other people have. The issue of whether *aid has been appropriate* prompted a similar answer. While almost half in the target sample do think it has been at least partly appropriate, about 17 percent think it has not been, and more than one third answer with some sort of reservation. In comparison, the number of people who think that aid has not been well organised is slightly larger, 24 percent, while 32 percent feels it was well or very well organised. Further, less than 40 percent feel they got the support they needed by those responsible.

Finally, it is clear that people have *not* embraced the fundamental idea of Sida's policy that the beneficiaries themselves should rebuild their destroyed houses. Only ten percent were in favour of this solution, while 50 percent would have preferred to move into a house reconstructed by the donors. This result differs from the findings of the anthropological study and the expectations behind the program, but is perhaps not surprising.<sup>137</sup>

Interestingly, only 13 percent would have chosen to receive money. This might at first glance seem strange, but probably reflects a realistic view among the respondents of the opportunities available to them. It is doubtful that the sum of money would have been enough to settle in a town or city – for example – had they preferred such an option.

The results suggest that the respondents are relatively undecided about both the goals of the programme, and the manner in which it has been conducted. They are not overly positive or outright negative, the dominant answer to these questions being a neutral or hesitant alternative. On the other hand, a significant minority among the respondents actually feels that the programme was neither appropriate, nor well organised, and generally unclear in terms of purpose. This view is more pronounced in urban than in rural areas.

The difference between the organisations is, on the whole small, and it is not possible to draw any far-reaching conclusions regarding how methods or behaviour of an individual organisation has affected the outcome. Firstly

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<sup>137</sup> In the survey, there was, unfortunately, no question concerning the reasons for this view. Neither were the respondents asked about the degree of control of the building process or the design of the house they would have preferred. It might be argued that anyone would choose a ready-made house, other things being equal.

because relevant information is lacking, and secondly because other factors like urban background or education seem to be more important in explaining differences in attitudes and opinions.

We are not familiar with how the programme was carried out in detail, or on a day-to-day basis, and there are, indeed, factors which are not in the control of aid organisations, especially in a situation involving many people and where time is a limited resource. However, there certainly seems to be a gap of understanding between the beneficiaries and the administrators of aid. One conclusion would be that in the future even more care should be taken to communicate with people in ‘their own language’.

## Economic conditions

### Economic situation of the family

The economic situation of the families is generally rather bleak. Only 17 percent of the respondents in the target group are fully or partly employed. In view of the predominantly rural context and the age structure of the households, this is hardly surprising, and it should be noted that the level of unemployment is the same in the control sample. Also, the differences between rural and urban areas are fairly large, as is the difference between men and women. While in the villages 35 percent of men aged 30–44 are employed, the figure is 62 percent for those living in towns. In the villages a majority of women occupy the traditional role of housewives. This means that very few women are entitled to pensions, since the welfare system in socialist Yugoslavia was based on employment in socially-owned enterprises or government institutions. Those living only from agriculture, whether men or women, were in an unfavourable position. As far as age is concerned there is a marked difference in employment between those younger than 54 and older generations, but not among age groups between 18 and 54, which indicates that entry into the labour market is a fundamental problem.<sup>138</sup>

Consequently, family income is rather low. Of the respondents in the target group 17 percent claim they have no income at all, and another 38 percent earn below 200 KM a month. Almost 80 per cent of the households have a monthly income of less than 400 KM, which is very low for Bosnia. If only rural areas are counted, more than 60 percent earn below 200 KM.<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> This is confirmed by macro-level data concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole, see: *Governance and Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Post-Industrial Society and the Authoritarian Temptation*. Part of the Governance Assessment of Bosnia and Herzegovina funded by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development. European Stability Initiative, Berlin & Sarajevo, 2004, p. 24.

<sup>139</sup> According to a recent statistical survey of 3000 households, about 18 percent of the Bosnian population lives below the poverty line, defined as 2200 KM a year per household. See *Dnevni avaz*, 26 May, 2005, p. 10, and *Oslobođenje*, 26 May, 2005, p.2. The report has not yet been published, but three earlier reports of this longitudinal investigation are to be found at the Agency of Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina: <http://www.bhas.ba/index2/index.htm>. Due to the character of the sample, it is to be expected that the percentage of poor is larger in our survey.

Even if there might be a tendency to underestimate one's income, it is logical that very few, less than ten percent of the respondents; describe the economic situation of their family as good or very good and 65 percent as bad or very bad.

The difficult economic situation is further reflected by answers to specific questions on how people cope with the costs of living. More than 25 percent say they can *almost never* afford healthcare. Another 30 percent *sometimes* cannot do so. The proportion of those able to pay local authority bills is larger, but still 27 percent say they sometimes cannot pay and 10 percent almost never. As far as schooling of children is concerned, only 30 percent are able to cover the costs most of the time. However, there are many non-replies, which indicate that the question may be sensitive.<sup>140</sup>

It is, therefore, no surprise that very few are able to save money: in fact, 80 percent cannot do so. Their difficult situation is further illustrated by the fact that only a very small number of people receive economic support from relatives living abroad or elsewhere in Bosnia. Differences between the target and control samples in these respects are negligible. Those who have received aid from Sida are neither better nor worse off than others. For the inhabitants of Bosnian villages life is hard.

### Views on the economic situation in general

The answers are very similar when people are asked about economic conditions in general. Most perceive economic opportunities in the area where they live as bad or very bad. Only six percent says opportunities are good/very good. Similarly, according to the respondents, it is very hard to sell agricultural products.

When asked about the general situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, compared to that of their own area, the dominant answer is that it is about the same (48%); whereas slightly more think it is worse (30%) than better (20%). The differences between cantons are not very great, with the exception that those living in Sarajevo have a more positive outlook.

As for economic trends during recent years people feel they are either the same or worse, 41 percent vs. 37 percent. Only about 20 percent are able to see an improvement. Moreover, people do not expect any immediate change for the better. Most respondents think that economic prospects are bad or very bad (57%) and they do not see a future for young people in the area where they live.

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<sup>140</sup> Education enjoys high status all over former Yugoslavia, at the same time as a family, according to fundamental norms, is expected to take care of its members, whether they are children or elderly. It should be added that, today, as in socialist Yugoslavia, parents are expected to pay for textbooks, transport, food, and other costs related to schooling.



Two questions concerned ways to improve the situation. One was through micro credits mediated by international organisations, and the other through ordinary bank loans. They were both considered to be very difficult to obtain, and as we have seen, very few utilised micro credits. It is striking that there is no real difference between the two credit systems.

Finally, in spite of the rather gloomy conditions in which they live, and although they do not see a bright future for the young generation, a large majority of the respondents say they would *not* have preferred to live anywhere else, and expect to continue to live where they are. In short, the views on economic conditions are pessimistic, and the attitudes of individuals who received aid from Sida do not differ from those of other people.

### Agricultural cooperation

The degree of cooperation between farmers is modest. This is especially true of sharing agricultural equipment, which seldom (39%) or never (20%) occurs. 23 percent say that neighbours often or very often help each other in agricultural work while 24 percent state there is often or very often cooperation in building infrastructure. The figures for the control sample are similar. At the same time, about 50 percent in both groups state that cooperation to further the interests of farmers is definitely needed.

### Social activities

Around 80–90 percent of the respondents never take part in activities like sports or cultural events, meetings of professional associations or political meetings. There is no difference between the target and control sample.

### Media exposure

TV plays an important role and a majority of the respondents spend several hours every day watching TV programs. There is, however, a difference between Serbs and Croats or Bosniaks in this respect. Markedly fewer Serbs watch TV three hours or more every day, and one fifth never watch. Reading of daily newspapers is far less common, and here Croats are more active than both Serbs and Bosniaks.

### Religion

In the countries of former Yugoslavia participation in religious service is traditionally strong in rural areas, which is confirmed by this survey. There are also typical differences. Muslim Bosniaks and Catholic Croats attend services much more frequently than do Orthodox Serbs. A third of Muslims and Catholics participate weekly, and about half at least once a month. The cor-

responding figures for the Orthodox are 9 and 24 percent. It should be added that religion is related to education, and that the figures are higher for those with elementary school or less.

## Politics

Political interest is comparatively low. For most respondents politics is not or not at all important. In addition, many people are unsure of how they would vote. The general pattern is, as we know from both empirical studies and election results, to vote for a party belonging to one's own ethnic group, and the traditional 'ruling' parties are still popular. In this investigation about 40 percent were unsure or would not vote, while of those declaring party sympathies 54 percent of the Bosniaks would vote for SDA, 51 percent of the Croats for HDZ, and 30 percent of the Serbs for SDS, and another 26 percent for SNDS.

On the whole, these results reflect the reality of life in rural Bosnia and other parts of former Yugoslavia. Institutionalised activities are weak, except for religion. Social life is focused on informal interaction with friends and relatives at home, in the local inn, or in front of the mosque or church. In recent decades television has become an important alternative.

## Ethnic relations

### Sense of security

A primary goal of international policy in post-Dayton Bosnia has been to ensure security and to promote harmonious inter-ethnic relations. The results of this survey indicate that this has been achieved to a considerable extent – at least superficially.

An overwhelming majority feels at home in the place where they live and mostly feel very secure. There are some slight differences: seventy-seven percent of the Bosniaks feel very secure while for Croats and Serbs the percentages are 63 and 64. In the same way a large majority feels they can freely express their religion.

### Inter-ethnic relations

There are distinct differences between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, regarding the degree of inter-ethnic contacts. While a great majority of the Croats and a majority of the Serbs have such contacts often or very often, this is not true of the Bosniaks. About 40 percent of the Bosniaks seldom or very seldom have contacts with members of other groups. A simple reason might be that they constitute a majority in the villages concerned, and thus do not really have an opportunity to interact with others. There are some indications that

this is the case, but education and urban/rural background also play a role.<sup>141</sup>

What is the *character* of interethnic relations? A large majority of the respondents state that they are usually treated in a friendly manner. There is a small difference in that Bosniaks and Serbs tend to perceive their contacts as somewhat less satisfactory. The proportion of those who very often, often, or sometimes, are met with hostility is: Bosniaks 17%, Croats 12%, and Serbs 19%.

When it comes to more intimate relations, such as friendship, there is again a difference between especially Croats and Bosniaks. Almost half of the Bosniaks (45%) claim they have no friend belonging to another ethnic group, compared to 10 percent of the Croats and 16 percent of the Serbs.

These tendencies are reflected by the attitudes towards mixed marriages, where the Bosniaks are more hesitant than others. This should not be a surprise: we know that mixed marriages rates in Bosnia since World War II were below the Yugoslav average. Throughout the period, Bosniaks, like other Muslim groups in Yugoslavia, had a smaller proportion of intermarriage than Serbs and Croats. This is understandable, since, traditionally, Islam does not permit a Muslim to marry a non-Muslim.<sup>142</sup>

There might be other reasons for differences concerning inter-ethnic contact, such as war experience, but we do not have data which might clarify this issue. Most of these people had been driven from their homes and we do not know what other horrors they might have experienced.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the response pattern is the same in the target and control groups. Therefore, although the results are in some respects rather positive, this is probably a function of time and general political developments rather than an outcome of the aid-programme as such. On the other hand, one could argue that the mere fact that Sida and others have actively promoted the return process, might have affected the general climate. Unfortunately, this cannot be measured directly in a survey of this kind.

### Attitudes towards others

Inter-ethnic attitudes also seem to be rather positive. When asked the question: how do you feel about Bosniaks, Croats, or Serbs, with the possible alternatives: I respect them, I have nothing against them, I do not like them, I hate them; an overwhelming majority claim they either respect or have

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<sup>141</sup> We were able to gather information on the ethnic structure of settlements for only one third of the respondents. Therefore, in annex 3 we have only presented figures concerning Bosniaks. The data show a certain difference in attitudes and behaviour between those living in settlements with a Bosniak, respectively Croat/Serb majority.

<sup>142</sup> For intermarriage in Bosnia and Yugoslavia, see Botev, Nikolai. 1994. "Where East Meets West. Ethnic Intermarriage in the Former Yugoslavia." *American Sociological Review* 59(3, June):461-79.

nothing against members of other groups. Serbs are somewhat more neutral than Croats and Bosniaks.

In general interpersonal relations are characterised by a rather high degree of distrust or lack of confidence. The dominant view among the respondents, regardless of ethnic origin, is that one cannot be too careful in contacts with other people. (Bosniaks, 61%; Croats 70%; Serbs, 58%).

This is reflected in the attitudes towards local politicians and representatives of international organisations too. The degree of confidence in both cases is low or very low, especially among Croats (50–28%, 41–23%), although attitudes towards international representatives are generally less negative than views on Bosnian politicians.

Similarly, the respondents were asked to agree or disagree with two statements, one implying that one can feel secure only in a country where one's own ethnic group constitutes a majority, the other that one should be on guard towards members of another group, even if they are neighbours or friends. A fairly large percentage agrees with both statements, especially among the Bosniaks (46%). This means that although people generally feel secure, and have a positive attitude towards members of other groups, a substantial proportion of the respondents are suspicious, and would prefer not to be a minority.

## The future of Bosnia and Herzegovina

A number of questions were asked concerning the present and future status of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They might be regarded as a measure of the extent to which people are in favour of the Dayton agreement, and to what extent there is a possibility of reconciliation.

In that context *language* is an interesting issue. This survey found that people mostly regarded Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian as the same language, or one language with certain differences. For Bosniaks or Serbs, this is more or less in agreement with other studies. However in investigations covering the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a higher percentage of Croats tend to view Croatian as a totally different language or a different language which might be similar to other languages.

Turning to *reconciliation* or rather, forgiving, only a minority feels that one should forgive *and* forget what happened during the war. Between 45–56 percent, according to ethnic affiliation, are of the opinion that one should forgive but must *not* forget. This is hardly surprising, as only ten years have passed since a brutal and devastating war. Half of the Bosniaks believe one should never forgive what happened, compared to 40 percent of the Croats, and 30 percent of the Serbs.

Views on the *Hague Tribunal* are fairly critical. Almost 60 percent of the Bosniaks, almost half of the Serbs, and almost 40 percent of the Croats think the war crimes tribunal is fair. However, more than half of the Croats, almost half of the Serbs and 40 percent of the Bosniaks do not. We do not know why people think the way they do, but it is clear that the tribunal, which is supposed to play an important role in the process of reconciliation, has a problem of legitimacy.

The respondents could agree or disagree with several statements concerning certain aspects of the political situation and the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Firstly, there is overwhelming agreement that refugees should return to where they had lived before the war. Secondly, among all groups – particularly Bosniaks – people are in favour of a unitary state. Consequently, they do not agree that the Serb or Croat areas in Bosnia should be united with the ‘motherland’. These results might seem unexpected, since in other studies there has been a noticeable difference on questions like this between on the one hand Bosniaks, and on the other hand, Croats and Serbs. There are regional differences in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but a substantial percentage of Croats and Serbs do not want to answer these questions, and with a higher response rate the results might have been different.

Thirdly, most people are in favour of a common school system, both in terms of curriculum and integration. They are much less interested in children being taught in their new standard languages (Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian). On the other hand, they would like them to know both alphabets. Perhaps one could say that in this investigation people prefer a solution to the language issue which reminds one of the situations in Bosnia before the war. It was characterised by a high degree of linguistic tolerance, vis-à-vis the two variants of what was then called Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian, and which in Bosnia during the 1980’s was often referred to as *The Bosnian-Herzegovina Standard Language Expression*.

Further, it is interesting to note that there is a fairly high degree of distrust of the international community, with no major differences between the ethnic groups. The respondents felt the international community did not understand conditions in Bosnia, and treated people as backward. Finally, a very large majority believes that the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in spite of what happened, will be able to live in peace in the future. Again, there were no substantial differences between the beneficiaries and the control sample.

## Summary

The material conditions of the respondents are very modest. People are poor, most are unemployed, and often they cannot afford health care or schooling of their children. Furthermore, they do not expect a change for the better in the near future, neither for their families nor in the area where they live, or in Bosnia as a whole.

Their social existence is largely confined to every-day life in their own community, and within their own ethnic group. There is little interaction between ethnic groups and Bosniaks in particular look mainly to their own. Most people report they feel safe, and seldom meet open hostility. Attitudes towards members of other groups are generally positive or neutral.

Their life outside work is to a large extent devoted to the family, TV and religion. Very few are involved in organised leisure-time activities, sports, clubs, or political organisations. Indeed, most people are not interested in politics.

On the whole, peoples' attitudes towards the aid programme are neutral or hesitant. They are not overwhelmingly positive, nor outright negative, but a sizable minority of the respondents feel that aid has not been altogether fair or appropriate. There is also a rather high degree of distrust of both local politicians and international organisations.

As to the future of Bosnia, the answers are largely in accordance with the hopes of the International community, allowing for some difference between Bosniaks and Croats or Serbs on certain issues.

## Discussion

Finally, we will discuss the results from the viewpoint of Sida's own goals and vocabulary. The issues Sida wanted examined were to what extent the aid programme has been characterised by social and economic *relevance*, *impact*, and *sustainability*.<sup>143</sup>

It is not altogether easy to answer these questions. The survey is an account of people's own experience and attitudes which means one has to be cautious when discussing the results in terms of cause and effect on a more general level. Whatever the results of the survey, they cannot by themselves answer the question whether the programme was successful or not. In order to judge the programme as a whole, a comprehensive socio-economic analysis would be needed, based on other types of data, and related to political and economic conditions both on the local level, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole.

Therefore, the reader will bear in mind that these results, as well as the results of the anthropological study, are based on the subjective views of respondents and informants. This does not mean that the data are suspect. There is always a 'measurement error', even when dealing with official statistics, which in the Bosnian case is unfortunately insufficient anyway. We cannot be sure that everyone has given an accurate answer, but the answers can make more or less sense, according to what is otherwise known or logical. Furthermore, there is the long tradition of valid predictions in political opinion re-

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<sup>143</sup> Annex 1 *Terms of Reference. Evaluation of Impact, Sustainability and Relevance in Integrated Area Programmes in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Sida, UTV 2004-02-16.

search. In our case there is also the possibility of checking against a control sample matching the target sample in terms of demographic and social characteristics. The important point, though, is that the results are based on views and attitudes, not on 'objective' economic figures.

In addition, there are other reasons why the results of the survey are – and have to be – only partial. In particular, our data concern a specific point in time: we do not know how people were living or thinking before, during, or immediately after the war. For example, had the survey been undertaken shortly after the return we would probably have received different answers to some of the pertinent questions. Finally, the reader should be reminded, when reflecting on the results, that those who were interviewed do *not* constitute a random sample of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but rather a representative sample of households benefiting from Sida's aid programme, and a corresponding control group.

In our case the analysis is, nevertheless, based on certain objective characteristics, primarily the dichotomy between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of assistance from Sida, as well as the four organisations engaged in the aid programme. Also, there are the usual sociological 'background variables', like education, age, sex, or rural/urban origin. This makes it possible to compare self-reported economic circumstances and other data among different categories, and indirectly draw conclusions about effects. However, with the data we have, we cannot give any definite answers.

Let us begin with the economy. It seems that the housing programme has, indeed, had an important impact, since it has obviously helped people to return to their villages and rebuild their homes. Surely, many would have found it very difficult to do this by themselves. In that sense the aid might also be characterized as relevant, especially if we turn to peoples' own views. Comparatively few would have gone anywhere else, even if they had been given the economic means to do so, and a majority clearly wanted to return home. Moreover, most of them do actually live in the reconstructed houses.

Of course, relevance might be understood in another, purely macro-economic or 'objective way'. Was the programme relevant in this sense? Would it, perhaps, have been wiser not to help people return to their villages?<sup>144</sup>

In order to give an answer one must look at possible alternatives, and in our opinion, it is doubtful whether there were any other realistic options at the time decisions were made and the programme started. Given the political framework of Dayton, the explicit commitment not to accept the outcome of ethnic cleansing, and the existing economic infrastructure, there was hardly a choice. It was impossible to disregard the humanitarian and political issues,

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<sup>144</sup> "The fact that the international community drives the return processes also raises the question of *sustainability*, i.e. the probability of continued long-term benefits of the programmes... one might thus question the very idea of encouraging economical development by repatriation to rural areas. Thus it is important to probe the question of whether the international community have been spending money on rebuilding an infrastructure of the past rather than for the future." Annex 1: Terms of Reference, p. 2-3

and it would have been rather far-fetched to make the return dependent on economic forecasts, which, by the nature of things, would have been very hard to make.

What about *social* impact or relevance? One would probably reach similar conclusions. In view of the circumstances, what else could have been done? People wanted to return to their homes, and the fact that they could do so, does have implications for the stability of social life, and to some extent mitigated the effects of the war.

Since not everyone could receive help, aid itself might have caused social conflict, and, while this seemed not the case here, there are some indications that people in general did view foreign aid programmes with a certain degree of suspicion.

Now, if impact is given a wider definition, if you ask to what extent the programme has furthered certain economic processes or types of social relations, the outcome is not as self-evident. If, for example, the programme was supposed to lead to more interaction across ethnic lines, that it would further cooperation between the beneficiaries, or that they would participate in various leisure-time activities, the results are modest. There are, indeed, no significant differences between those who were beneficiaries of Sida-aid and others.

The same is true of the economic situation. If the idea was that the housing programme, tied to a system of credits, would have a tangible impact on the economic life of the countryside, it seems this has not happened. "Hard" data would most probably confirm this.<sup>145</sup>

Speaking of sustainability, of whether aid would contribute to an improvement of the social and economic situation over the long-term, there are also questions. If we are to believe the respondents, and there are no data which contradict their views, the programme has not yet had any major effects on economic development.

In order to test some of the assumptions concerning the effect of the aid programme, a series of analyses were undertaken using *structural equation modelling*.<sup>146</sup> The purpose was to study the factorial structure of attitudes, as well as causal relationships. Although the models should be understood as ex-

<sup>145</sup> For a recent overview, see *Governance and Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Post-Industrial Society and the Authoritarian Temptation*. ESI, Berlin & Sarajevo, 2004.

<sup>146</sup> *Structural Equation Modelling* (SEM) could be described as a combination of path analysis and factor analysis, allowing for the examination of both dimensional structures and causal relationships. In contrast to other multivariate methods, a SEM-analysis is based on the formulation of a theoretically relevant model, specifying the postulated relations between variables in advance. A full SEM-model includes both *latent* and *manifest* variables. The former are theoretical constructs, or *factors*, such as ethnic identity or standard of living, measured by indicators, or manifest *variables*. The analysis thus consists of a structural model (of latent variables) and a *measurement model* (of manifest variables). By analysing covariance structures it is possible to measure the relations between latent variables. For an introduction to SEM, see Randall E. Schumacher & Richard G. Lomax, *A Beginner's Guide to Structural Equation Modelling*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers; Mahwah, New Jersey & London, 2004. The analyses were made with the software EQS, developed by Peter M. Bentler. (Multivariate Software, Inc., <http://www.mvsoft.com/>).



ploratory, the results indicate that the aid programme did not really influence the economic situation of the family or views on economic conditions in general. Nor did it have tangible effects on interethnic relations or attitudes. The latter have not improved substantially as a consequence of aid, but neither have they been aggravated by the programme.

Does this mean that the IAP has failed? Again, we think not. To someone not having had to face these difficult decisions, it seems impossible to say whether the policy was right or wrong. After all, what alternatives were there? Moreover, another point should be made. The relationship between the assistance provided and the official goals of Sida is not quite clear. If you build a house, even if you reconstruct the school and build new roads, in what way will this have a concrete, measurable impact on economic or social life?

One cannot take for granted that rebuilding homes and infrastructure will have a specific outcome in other areas of life. Something else is needed. On the one hand, a theory which would make explicit the relationship between types of input and output, or the social mechanisms involved, and, on the other hand, a certain degree of administrative and political control. This would mean specific programmes of various kinds, in addition to the IAP, and, of course, resources. It is hard to escape the feeling that, at least on some policy or political levels, too much has been expected.

Let us take, for example, the issue of micro-credits. There is nothing wrong with the idea, but it is based on certain prerequisites which might not exist in the Bosnian context. We are thinking of economic structure and processes in general, as well as the ability of the family both to use the credits in a meaningful way and above all, to pay back the loan. If economic development is slow, if integration into a monetary economy is weak, then few will be able to afford credits. We have also seen that what Sida referred to as ‘agricultural aid’ was not enough to make people with limited resources embark on farming as a way of earning their livelihood, which they had probably not been engaged in before, and which in this particular environment would have been a risky business. In Socialist Yugoslavia, notably in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a substantial part of the labour force were ‘peasants-workers’, men living in villages who commuted to their jobs, or lived as migrant workers in industrial centres, sometimes outside their republic. In that context and in this geographical area, agriculture usually meant producing food for one’s family, not for the market.<sup>147</sup>

A major issue is that there are important parameters over which Sida has no control. Sida is not responsible for macro-economic policies in Bosnia, nor does it influence the way local administration is organised. Above all, it is not able to provide employment. These factors would surely contribute to the effects of any partial aid provided by Sida.

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<sup>147</sup> Governance and Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Post-Industrial Society and the Authoritarian Temptation. ESI, Berlin & Sarajevo, 2004.

The general political framework of the Dayton agreement is important. The point is not so much that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a kind of confederation, or that the political environment is heavily ethnicised. Rather, the problem is that the International Community is highly involved in political affairs, but does not have full control, and does not take full responsibility. Something which resembles a protectorate has been established, not a protectorate proper, and, in contrast to Bosnian politicians, whose power is quite circumscribed, the representatives of the international community do not have to answer to the people of Bosnia in free elections. This state of affairs gives rise to a lack of transparency and, ultimately, to a climate of insecurity, suspicion and maybe indifference.<sup>148</sup>

To expect far-reaching change, one would have to give people reasons to trust their environment, to believe that they will be treated fairly when they turn to authorities, to hope that their views can make a difference. To achieve that one would have to have real control of factors which are presently not under control, and to provide resources on a scale which was perhaps never foreseen.

In conclusion, the programme must be considered as successful in the sense that it helped people return, which was the original objective. Obviously, the description of the purpose of the programme, and its ideological foundation, has changed over time. There is, however, no clear connection between the reconstruction of houses and the expectations later attached to the project, and it seems that the vocabulary is sometimes misleading. For example, if by 'agricultural aid' is meant a starting package that the beneficiaries do not understand as agricultural aid, and which would not give any long-term results, this seems to be a problem for the aid community, or rather the political decision-makers, not the Bosnian environment. The same is probably true of the expression 'integrated area programme'.<sup>149</sup>

The idea that rebuilding houses or schools would somehow facilitate reconciliation is questionable. If the programme had been the beginning of an extensive strategy of activating the village population as part of a comprehensive regional development plan, then one might argue that the building of a house was a first, necessary measure of a long-term commitment, which in the end would have the anticipated effects.

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<sup>148</sup> This point has been made by several analysts. See, for example, David Chandler: The Problem of 'Nation-Building': Imposing Bureaucratic 'Rule from Above'. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 17, Nr 3, October 2004, pp. 577-591; or, *Governance and Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Post-Industrial Society and the Authoritarian Temptation*. Part of the Governance Assessment of Bosnia and Herzegovina funded by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development. European Stability Initiative, Berlin & Sarajevo, 2004.

<sup>149</sup> An example of the discrepancy between the situation on the ground and the language of politics is the overly positive view of the Integrated Area Programme as a means for reducing poverty given in an official policy document issued by the Swedish Government in March 2005; see *Regeringens skrivelse 2004/05:109. Svenska utvecklingsarbetet med länderna i OSS och på Västra Balkan*. <http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/04/33/32/6bf33f90.pdf>.

What can be said after examining these data is, simply, that Sida made an enormous effort, which in itself must be regarded as both laudable and indispensable. However, for some of the expectations to be fulfilled more would have been needed. As it is now, the survey tells us that developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, apart from the effects of war, to a large extent are dependent on a) long term social processes which have affected the region for at least decades, b) a specific institutional environment, and c) an extremely difficult economic situation. Neither Sida nor other international agencies have been able to neutralize these factors, but it seems overly optimistic to expect fundamental change over a comparatively short period of time.

# Conclusions and lessons learned

By Joakim Molander

Between 1995 and 2005 SEK 1.2 billion has been disbursed to Sida's Integrated Area Programmes (IAPs) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). In accordance with the strategies of the Dayton Peace Agreement, these have aimed at establishing sustainable returns for displaced Bosnians. Through an assisted self help approach Sida and its implementing partners have contributed to the reconstruction of almost 15 000 private dwellings. Projects have also targeted the repair of schools and of local infrastructure such as electricity lines and water distribution networks. Agriculture components such as seed, fertilisers, hand tools, livestock and sometimes machinery have also been provided.<sup>150</sup>

This is an evaluation of the IAPs, aimed at assessing their relevance, impact and sustainability. During the course of the evaluation we have also been able to gather substantial information about the effectiveness and efficiency of the programmes. Our findings regarding all five of these criteria are summarised in this chapter. The conclusions are based on the three different studies enclosed in this report. These are:

1. a case study analysing the reconstruction of the village Grapska, carried out by Hans Skotte, architect and researcher at the Department of Urban Design and Planning at NTNU in Trondheim, Norway.
2. an anthropological study, made by the social anthropologist Melita Čukur at the Centre for Multiethnic Research at Uppsala University, consisting of two case studies (in a village which we call Selo and in a suburb of Sarajevo).
3. a survey of 2 000 families who received support to rebuild their houses and 1 000 families in a control group. The survey is designed and analysed by the sociologist Kjell Magnusson of the Centre for Multiethnic Research at Uppsala University, and was carried out by the Croatian opinion poll institute PULS.<sup>151</sup>

Beside these studies data has been gathered through documents, and at two workshops and two seminars in Sarajevo with IAP stakeholders. The results

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<sup>150</sup> The programme theory is elaborated in the introduction chapter to this evaluation.

<sup>151</sup> The scope, purpose and methodology of the evaluation is described in the introduction chapter. For full details, please see annex 1: the Terms of Reference for the evaluation, annex 1a.

have been rigorously examined a number of times by an evaluation reference group.

## Effectiveness

Effectiveness is ‘the extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved’<sup>152</sup>. As regards this criterion it can be concluded that the IAPs have been successful in achieving their primary objective: i.e. the sustainable return of, primarily, internally displaced persons.

Sida has financed the reconstruction of 14 806 houses in BiH. Since the average number of persons per household is 3.3 about 50 000 persons have thus been able to return to their former homes as a direct effect of the IAPs.<sup>153</sup> Depending on location, between 5 and 17 percent of the houses are not inhabited but are visited frequently by their owners. Very few houses are abandoned or occupied by others. The programmes reached their primary target group. During and after the war about 71 % of the ‘beneficiaries’ were living as displaced persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

### A rights-based approach to programming

In development cooperation today many donors apply what is called a rights-based approach to programming. Such an approach ‘translates poor people’s needs into rights, and recognises individuals as active subjects and stakeholders’<sup>154</sup>. The approach also entails ‘a process of development based on principles of participation, accountability and transparency’<sup>155</sup>. The IAPs have not explicitly used this terminology, but this evaluation shows that the strategic and tactical approach taken by Sida and its implementing partners bears the mark of a rights-based approach. We suggest that this approach has contributed to the successful achievement of the primary programme objectives, and has had positive side effects. In particular, there are two traits of programme implementation that can be regarded as success factors:

- *The transferral of agency to village committees.* In Grapska this transfer was substantial. The Village Committee formulated the selection criteria, selected ‘beneficiaries’ and themselves dealt with the local authorities. Skotte argues that ‘this not only brought symmetry to the relationship between donor/foreign NGO and the local population, it strengthened

<sup>152</sup> See Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management (OECD/DAC 2002).

<sup>153</sup> Since many of these returnees have left houses they had occupied, the programmes have also indirectly promoted substantial so-called secondary return. This means that the rightful owners of the occupied houses have also been able to return. Sometimes these people have lived in occupied houses as well, which has led to further secondary return.

<sup>154</sup> Sida, *Perspectives on Poverty* (Sida 2002), p. 34.

<sup>155</sup> Sida, *Digging Deeper* (sida 2003), p. 10.

social trust, collective powers and self-esteem among the returnees.’ At the two workshops with implementing partners the importance of transferring agency was confirmed. However, it was also pointed out that the village committees had to be closely monitored, since some of them misused their trust for personal benefit. Nonetheless all implementing organisations strived for transferring agency to village committees.

- *The assisted self-help approach.* Skotte concludes that this approach not only cut construction costs by about 40%:

But the one most significant impact of the self-help approach in Grapska was that it allowed people to infuse their new home with new meaning. It enabled them to make choices – a crucial constituent in re/building a home. And they did so in a reflexive manner. Partly to regain or recreate the symbolic content of the home they lost, partly as an act of defiance directed at their Serb neighbours.

Melita Čukur made similar observations in Selo and Sarajevo. In Sarajevo she concluded that ‘most informants preferred the self-help method for the very reason that it meant that more tenants could be helped. The individual involvement in the reconstruction was also considered very important, since people did not have to think of themselves as passive recipients of aid.’

In addition there is evidence that another significant factor has been:

- *The policy of concentration.* This means that Sida and its partners constantly and as a strategy tried to encourage the return of a sufficient number of ‘beneficiaries’ to constitute a ‘social movement of return’.

All of these factors taken together have, according to Hans Skotte, not only helped the returnees to regain *fixed and environmental capital* – housing, infrastructure and the physical environment. The programmes have also contributed to the strengthening of *human capital*, i.e. capabilities, skills, knowledge and the ability to use them, as well as to *social capital*, i.e. trust, commonly-held institutions and values, collective action – and so on.

### Conceptual confusions

Another important success factor of the programmes has been their flexibility. Sida formulated the overall strategies and goals, while they trusted the NGOs to operationalise these strategies through flexible and contextualised decisions on the ground. The flexibility and trust expressed by Sida is a strength since it allows for relevant and natural adjustments in a constantly changing context. But it has also been a weakness since overall goals and strategies have not been adequately processed. One illustration of this is that the programme theory, or intervention logic, of the IAPs has never been sufficiently articulated. There are no programme documents or memos that

provide a comprehensive view of the programme theory as a whole.<sup>156</sup> Nor has the programme theory been sufficiently reformulated, stipulated and documented.

An effect of this is that the programme stakeholders have developed different perceptions and strategies over the life of the programmes. This has led to a fragmentation or 'projectification' of assistance: the 'P in the Integrated Area Programmes has thus been at least blurred. An upshot of this is that it is difficult for the implementing partners to contribute to a comprehensive development agenda; they have not been able to utilise their knowledge and resources in a co-ordinated way. In addition, it is difficult to evaluate effectiveness of interventions when the goals are amended over time; a dilemma that we have faced in this evaluation, where different stakeholders have expressed different views on the vision and mission of the programmes.

The ambiguities around the IAPs have also led to confusion for the returnees. This may be illustrated by the fact that only 30 percent of the survey respondents living in the country side admit to having received agriculture aid; they did not perceive the food security package given after they had moved in as 'agricultural aid'. This conceptual confusion may sometimes hamper the effectiveness and sustainability of interventions. Many villagers in Selo referred to the agriculture package provided by LWF as 'the best credit ever given'. One respondent explained: 'They gave anything, worth 2 000 KM. It could be eight sheep, it could be a cow, and it could be tools, fertilizer. All is dead capital. You sell it, get money and buy something for your home.'

These findings should not be taken as evidence that the agriculture components in the IAPs have failed, but should rather be seen as an illustration of possible effects of the conceptual confusions mentioned. Nor should these findings be regarded as a general criticism of LWF's work in BiH. An evaluation by Stockholm Group for Development Studies of LWF's agriculture support carried out in 2002 concludes that:

[...] the agricultural rehabilitation assistance provided through LWF-Tuzla is successful in terms of creating conditions for sustainable production and income. There is a very high degree of satisfaction amongst the beneficiaries. The vast majority of the beneficiary households are able to earn an income through their own agricultural production. 86% of the returnees are totally or partially dependent on this income.<sup>157</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> There are proposals from implementing partners and Sida assessment memos for these proposals. But these documents concern individual organisation's particular projects. There is no shared programme document, developed by all partners and Sida in co-operation.

<sup>157</sup> Stockholm Group for Development Studies AB, *Evaluation of Lutheran World Federation's Agricultural Rehabilitation Assistance in Northeast Bosnia and Herzegovina* (2002), p. 4.

One of the reasons that conclusions from that evaluation and our findings in Selo and Grapska seem contradictory is that the Stockholm Group for Development Studies' evaluation also includes interviews with people who had participated in LWF's *commercial* agriculture projects. These projects are not to be considered as a part of the IAPs.

## Efficiency

Efficiency is 'a measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time etc.) are converted to results'<sup>158</sup>. As regards this criterion it has already been noted that the self help concept is about 40% cheaper than contracted house construction. Furthermore administration costs could be cut when village committees were engaged in e.g. beneficiary selection. On a macro level the programmes aimed at using locally produced building materials. This both cut costs and contributed to the local economy. According to Skotte about 85% of the building materials provided by SRSA in Grapska were domestically produced, whereas only about 20% of the materials used for the private houses and extensions were made in BiH.

Rather limited investments in agriculture may be an efficient way to secure a possible livelihood for returnees. But to maximise efficiency the agriculture potential of the area in question could be better utilised than in the IAPs, where all returnees received the same amount of support. For example, it would probably have been efficient to invest more resources into agriculture in Grapska, which has good conditions for farming.

## Relevance

Relevance here means 'the extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs global priorities and partners' and donors' policies'<sup>159</sup>.

The return process was initiated and financed by the international community. This is clearly expressed in §7 of the Dayton agreement and the IAPs have thus been responding to 'global priorities'. Dayton obviously also meant to respond to country needs, i.e. the need to mitigate the effects of ethnical cleansing. As concerns partners' policies, communities are formally obliged to accord with Dayton. Thus the political framework of Dayton and the humanitarian catastrophe in BiH provided the boundaries for what could and should be done by outside donors and organisations to help displaced Bosnians. The IAPs were clearly relevant.

However, this evaluation has primarily assessed to what extent the programmes have responded to the needs and aspirations of the displaced Bos-

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<sup>158</sup> Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management (OECD/DAC 2002).

<sup>159</sup> Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management (OECD/DAC 2002).



nians themselves. On this account we conclude that although the immediate decision to return was outside the control of those who were given help to rebuild their houses, most people claimed they would have returned anyway. A large majority of the returnees interviewed furthermore claim they would *not* prefer to live anywhere else today, and an overwhelming majority feel at home in their reconstructed houses. Generally they also feel secure. Furthermore both the survey and the anthropological case studies show that there is a general agreement among returnees that displaced persons should return to where they lived before the war.

The relevance of the reconstruction is also commented on by Hans Skotte, who emphasises the symbolic and moral dimensions of returning home. He writes:

The new housing has changed the overall environment. It carries a *new meaning*: most obviously that of *anticipation and hopes for future development* for the village people, but also an unambiguous shout of ‘*We’re back!*’ These signals are attuned to the ‘newness’ of the structures, which invariably will make the remaining ruins lose their horror as they are overtaken by weeds and trees.

As regards other parts of the IAPs the reconstruction of missing infrastructure and schools is clearly important, both symbolically and as a precondition for sustainable return. The agriculture components are also an important and highly relevant effort to provide the returnees with some tools for survival. Returnee programmes without such food security measures could indeed be criticised.

## Impact

The return process in BiH can be regarded as one of the greatest and most challenging social experiments of all times. The international community has more or less demanded the repatriation of displaced Bosnians, thus forcing former enemies of war back together as neighbours. They have also been the major financier of the return process put into effect by international NGOs and international companies. Since Sweden has been one of the main contributors evaluating the impact of return, i.e. its direct and indirect, intended and unintended positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects<sup>160</sup>, is of great interest. These effects can be analysed from two major perspectives: a social and an economic one.

### Social impact

If we start with the social perspective it is clear that the way the IAPs were implemented had an effect on the human and social capital of the returnees.

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<sup>160</sup> Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management (OECD/DAC 2002).

The returnees in the IAPs were generally given authority over the most important decisions – for example, who shall receive free materials. Furthermore the assisted self-help approach made the returnees the main actors in the reconstruction of their own houses. This approach was executed perfectly in Grapska, a best-practice example. ‘It would have weakened the organisation; it would have weakened the village – or the spirit, if the houses were to have been built by contractors – while the villagers stood watching’, commented the Chairman of the Village Committee, Safet Buljabasic. Instead the IAP approach, as carried out in Grapska, required interpersonal contact and entailed a certain level of social inter-dependency. All to the good for what Buljabasic called ‘*the village spirit*’. In Selo, people also talked about the village spirit that emerged during the reconstruction phase, and returnees in Sarajevo emphasised that they were treated with respect, not as recipients of charity.

All in all there is substantial evidence that the capacities, the capabilities, knowledge and skills of the people of the communities were recognised and that the programme drew benefit from them. The returnees thus became actors, rather than beneficiaries or passive recipients of aid. All of this has contributed to positive social impact, in terms of building what Skotte calls social and human capital.

The reconstruction of houses was regarded by Sida as a first, necessary phase in the process of re-integrating communities. Bringing former antagonists physically closer to each other was seen as an important beginning and precondition of coexistence. The programmes have indeed helped about 50 000 persons to move back to their homes. The question here is what happened after they returned.

Initially return was difficult in some areas. At times reconstructed houses were destroyed, and people attacked and hurt. Today people generally feel safe, and claim that those of other ethnic groups are either friendly or neutral. Hence the IAPs have contributed to coexistence in the sense that ethnic groups are living *physically* close to each other again. It is more questionable whether they have resulted in *re-integration*: there seem to be a ‘mental’ distance between people from different groups. A distance that may be illustrated by a quote made by a 70 year old Bosniak in Selo:

Coexistence is possible today. Who says it is not? It is possible. There is no more ‘we will not live together’. Besides, we have never lived together. We lived side by side. You see, there are Serbs in this village. One of them is in the village council. You see... they are here. They do not disturb us and we do not disturb them. They live and we live. Normally.

Hans Skotte makes observations that support the fact that people are not living ‘together’, but rather side by side. He writes:

The post-war relationship between the returnees and their neighbours has not been directly affected by the reconstruction. They remained firmly separated, in spite of occasional chance encounters. Although interaction is inevitable, it was not sought after. There was no social trust between the groups. The social capital within the Greater Grapska has been totally eroded because of the war. There were no signs that the housing investments, seen as replenishment of fixed capital had any rub-off effects on any of the other capital modes of Greater Grapska. Yet, as one of the members of the Village Committee mentioned in explaining these linkages, 'when *Mercator*<sup>161</sup> opens in Dobož, maybe then we'll go there'.

He also notes that inter-ethnic relations in the municipality are tense:

Tension lingers on. The scarce employment opportunities available are by and large allocated to Serbs. I was told about cases where Bosniaks have been offered jobs at salaries significantly lower than Serb co-workers were getting. The individualised hassle by Dobož authorities now (2004) experienced by Grapskanians when trying to realize livelihood initiatives is, along the local practice of allocating public land to Serb IDP settlers, indicative of the still ongoing erosion of inter-ethno-religious trust. This is further supported by the fact that external linkages from Grapska, be they social and economic, lead to the Federation side, not to the local Serb dominated area.

In the survey Kjell Magnusson concludes:

If the programme was supposed to lead to more interaction across ethnic lines, that it would further cooperation between the beneficiaries, or that they would participate in various leisure-time activities, the results are rather modest. There are, indeed, no significant differences in these cases between those who were beneficiaries of Sida-aid and others.

We can conclude that neither the returnees, nor people who stayed in the areas during the war, are interacting much across ethnic lines. Judging from both the survey and the Sarajevo case study, this is the case both in rural areas and in towns. Since interaction is so rare one could hardly speak of social reintegration, and certainly not of reconciliation<sup>162</sup>. This may be illustrated by an encounter between two men in Selo, described by Čukur in her anthropological study:

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<sup>161</sup> A Slovenian owned chain of large shopping centres with outlets throughout the Balkans.

<sup>162</sup> We do not refer to reconciliation as forgetting, forgiving or loving one another. Instead we apply the definition provided by the peace and conflict researcher Karen Brounéus in *Reconciliation – Theory and Practice for Development Cooperation* (Sida 2003). Thus 'Reconciliation is a societal process that involves mutual acknowledgement of past suffering and the changing of destructive attitudes and behaviour into constructive relationships towards sustainable peace. In other words, reconciliation mainly focuses on remembering, changing, and continuing life in peace.' (p. 20).

I was having a conversation with two persons, belonging to different ethnic groups. The first one mentioned his son, tragically killed in the war. The other added the story of his brother, who became paralysed during the war. Each told their stories to me. They did not turn to address one another, and neither commented the other's story. This is partly understandable: a response would demand a sort of reaction – either blaming or forgiving – for which neither was ready. Any comment might undoubtedly complicate, if not spoil relations. The scene can be understood as a personification of the reconciliation process. Although very much aware of belonging to different ethnic groups and of the painful and personal consequences of the war – the two, nevertheless, were sitting at the same table and telling their stories in the presence of the other.

Or, as a woman in Selo said:

We never talk about the war. Never, no one ever mentions it. Since it hurts, it hurts her and it hurts me. And you may say something inappropriate, you may spill the beans. Someone can be offended by something you say. We must leave it at that, it is the best thing to do. You just do not talk about it. You never know what someone else thinks about it – it is better not to get into that kind of talk.

The nature of interaction and communication between the ethnic groups indicates that the programmes have not, at least so far, 'contributed substantially to reconciliation at local level', as defined in the Swedish country strategy for development cooperation in BiH. Nor does the evaluation support the postulation that 'specific programmes in which former neighbours are dependent on one another for mutual help are highly effective at bringing about reconciliation', as is also claimed in the strategy. On the contrary, Hans Skotte notes that 'reconciliation is definitely beyond housing alone' and concludes that the findings of this evaluation, together with findings from other studies in other parts of the world, 'defies the popular assumption that spatial proximity causally leads to interaction and subsequent integration'. This is an important conclusion of this evaluation but it should be noted that return at least provides the opportunity for future interaction, and possibly even reconciliation. It is at least a first and crucial step in a long and challenging journey.

### Economic impact

Moving on to assessing the economic impact of the programmes it is obvious that by financing the reconstruction of houses and infrastructure the IAP's replenished a significant portion of fixed capital. By mainly using locally produced materials they have contributed to the BiH economy. But even if

the programmes evidently have had an important economic impact in this sense, they have not, as it is claimed in the country strategy, had any significant long term effects regarding the economy in these areas. In Selo a 55-year old unemployed villager illustrates the positive and negative economic impacts of the programmes:

They do this and then leave, usually it is like that. It is true, Šefko returns, but in order to check who has come back, and who not. I understand – they are preoccupied in other places. Still, now you have come to ask us how we are, how we live – this is the first time anybody asks me how I live, how I am getting on. We did get the houses, we really did, they should be thanked for that, but there are other things necessary for life, those basic things needed for life should exist, infrastructure, water, those basic things. They gave what they considered was needed and do not ask how we are. I am not ungrateful, I very well know all the things we were given; we would never have been able to build the houses on our own, never! It is good that you have come; they should know how we live, what happened to us after we returned. And look how we live; nobody is working, we are hardly able to make ends meet. I no longer know to whom I should turn; this state does not give a penny for us. [---] but...this village has been rebuilt. That's a fact. However difficult it is now, it would be more difficult if we did not have the houses, a shelter. But, as I said, they should see how we live, what happened to us...

Clearly it is very difficult for many returnees to survive in their former homes, particularly in isolated rural areas. This poses a question on whether donors should assist people to go back to such areas at all, or if they should instead direct their support to areas with a 'development potential'. It also poses the question on when it is appropriate to end humanitarian aid, and refocus towards community or institutional development. A recently published large international joint evaluation of support to internally displaced persons concludes:

There appears to be a widely held belief that assistance is only required during the period of actual displacement despite widespread evidence that many returning households may require a lengthy period of assistance before they are able to re-establish their livelihoods [...].<sup>163</sup>

It can be stated as a fact that many of the IAP returnees have not been able to re-establish appropriate livelihoods – to do so they would have needed additional support. On the other hand, the survey shows that other people in the target areas are neither better nor worse off than the returnees. Hence it

<sup>163</sup> John Borton, Margie Buchanan-Smith, Ralf Otto, Support to *Internally Displaced Persons – Learning from Evaluations*. Synthesis Report of a Joint Evaluation Programme. (Sida 2005), p. 141.

seems appropriate to direct support to everyone in the regions, rather than just to returnees. This is exactly what Sida has done through micro credit and agriculture projects. It is also in line with the recommendation of the IDP evaluation that ‘donors should only halt the use of humanitarian funds to IDPs once objective assessments have demonstrated that their vulnerability is no greater than that of the average population’<sup>164</sup>.

## Sustainability

Sustainability is ‘the continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed’<sup>165</sup>. Conclusions can be drawn from analysis of the relevance and the impact of the programmes. The evaluation shows that the IAPs have promoted the return of almost 15 000 families – about 50 000 people. The survey concludes that most really wanted to move back and wanted to stay on. Judging from the anthropological study an exception to this general rule is young people. Melita Čukur notes that most young people are extremely resigned and do not see any other solution to their situation than leaving, which is impossible. A 22-year old man said:

This is how most young people think, they hope they will go somewhere else, here there is no, what should I say, there is no work; no one should have to think only about how to leave. But the situation is terrible; I do not think it will change in the near future, now you are hardly able to live. It could change in 50 years, when I am an old man. If the borders would be open for six months, so that people could go to work in Europe or elsewhere, how many, do you think would stay? Only some 8 percent of the inhabitants. But that will never happen. People would leave, not because they do not love Bosnia or their birthplace, but simply out of interest, because of money, because of life, so you could change your life. This is deadening. Wherever you would like to go, you cannot, you don’t have money. You may think of something, you want to do something, start something – you cannot. Hope died long ago. When I came here, and had spent two months, when I saw how people were living, I said to myself – nothing will come of this. To rotten here...that’s all.

Most girls Čukur talked to had a clear picture of the future: to get married, take care of children and work in the fields. A 20-year old girl commented: ‘My future? Children, house, shovel and field.’

So, even if the IAPs have assisted 50 000 people to regain their homes and property, and the implementation strategy used has contributed to building

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<sup>164</sup> Ibid. p. 142.

<sup>165</sup> Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management (OECD/DAC 2002).

social and human capital in their communities, there are major challenges to overcome if the returnees, and in particular the children, shall stay and prosper in these homes. Lack of work and job opportunities, lack of trust in other people, in politicians and the international community, all of this has led to a feeling of hopelessness and even despair. Whether or not the communities supported by Sida and its partners will prove sustainable is a question beyond the powers of the Integrated Area Programmes alone.

## Lessons learned

One of the purposes of this evaluation has been to gather lessons learned from the ten years of work with IAPs. Workshops and seminars during the process have been a means to this end. Questioning the values the programmes represent should not stop at this point. Rather, stakeholders of the programmes and others interested will continue to mull over just what has been achieved.

However, as evaluators we put forward some reflections to serve as a starting point:

- The IAPs have been successful in promoting sustainable return mainly because of the way the programmes were implemented – assisted self help with transfer of agency to village committees. This implementing strategy, which in many ways bears the characteristics of a rights-based approach, strengthened social trust, collective confidence and self-esteem among the returnees. It involved them as actors, rather than passive recipients of aid.
- Another important success factor of the programmes has been their flexibility. Sida formulated the overall strategies and goals, while they trusted the NGOs to operationalise these strategies through flexible and contextualised decisions on the ground. What has happened is that stakeholders have developed different perceptions and strategies over the life of the programmes. These developments are obviously relevant and natural adjustments to take account of a constantly changing context, but a problem has been that they have not been adequately processed. An effect of this has been a fragmentation or ‘projectification’ of assistance: the ‘I’ in the Integrated Area Programmes has thus been at least blurred. In addition, it is difficult to evaluate effectiveness of interventions when the goals are amended over time. A lesson to learn is that programmes need to allow flexibility, but at the same time this requires that overall goals and strategies of the programmes are constantly reformulated, stipulated and documented in participatory stakeholder processes.
- The reconstruction of Bosnia and the assistance rendered to the displaced has in many ways been a game. Donors were exclusively focusing on programmes of reconstruction for return, but there were not sufficient

funds for all destroyed houses to be rebuilt. Some areas were selected ahead of others. Even in the communities selected, only some of the destroyed houses could be funded for reconstruction. Lacking any overall strategy, the international housing interventions were implemented according to presumptions, contextual perceptions and/or professional capacity (or lack thereof) on the part of the field staff of donors or INGOs. In this respect Sida stands out<sup>166</sup>. Their field perspectives were drawn up by professional planners. And this shows<sup>167</sup>.

- To increase effectiveness and sustainability, all stakeholders should be involved in decision-making. NGOs and donors need to be better at listening to their clients, the people they are there for. More importantly, they have to learn how to facilitate these clients in their own development efforts rather than imagine that they themselves are there to deliver the product. Good communication requires symmetric relations between donors and organisations and between organisations and communities. It also requires that trust be built up over long term relationships. The IAPs were often successful in these respects, and produced good results and positive side effects. But whenever stakeholders were excluded from decision making then problems such as misunderstandings and lack of co-operation arose.
- Implementing organisations have maintained that IAPs have been effective when based on credits or demanding work in return for financial inputs. Grants or 'gifts' have not been as effective. Credits or work based development challenges people to be partners rather than passive beneficiaries.
- Re-establishing people in their former homes does not mean that reconciliation will follow. This evaluation confirms findings from studies in other parts of the world: the popular assumption that living as neighbours leads inevitably to interaction and subsequent integration is false.

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<sup>166</sup> Although planner-architects were employed by some of the other agencies in BiH – GTZ, USAID and UNDP – Sida was unique in consistently employing architect-planners in strategic positions in BiH.

<sup>167</sup> Embedded in the profession of physical planner-architects is an acknowledgement of the bonded relationship between the physical, social and the economic dimensions of society. Understanding the interdependence between these elements and devising ways of handling – or even manipulating them, is what physical planning is about.



# Annex 1

## Terms of Reference

### Evaluation of Impact, Sustainability, and Relevance in Integrated Area Programmes in Bosnia and Herzegovina

#### 1 Background

Since the war in former Yugoslavia came to an end with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in the latter part of 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has been one of the major beneficiaries of Swedish development co-operation. In total, Sweden had invested some SEK 1.5 billion in the country by the end of 2003. Approximately SEK 0.9 billion has been disbursed to so-called Integrated Area Programmes (IAPs) that, in accordance with the strategies of the DPA, have worked to establish sustainable returns for displaced refugees. To achieve this, Sida, in co-operation with four implementing partners, has offered returnees construction materials for reconstruction of more than 11,000 private dwellings. In some cases, Sida has also supported reconstruction of the local infrastructure, such as roads, local electrical systems, and schools. These efforts have been supplemented by support within agriculture including grants and microcredits aimed at reviving local economies.

The programmes have addressed an urgent refugee situation by providing shelter and some means to survive economically. However, the IAPs have also been part of the international community's political strategy to ensure that the ethnic cleansing project fails. In this regard, one of the purposes of the programmes has been to enable people, who are often minorities in the area they fled from, to move back to their former homes to re-establish the multi-ethnic flavour of BiH. The physical reconstruction of houses and schools and the cultivation of land thus have as much a political and symbolic significance as they do an economic one. The upshot of this is that the reconstruction of minority communities both economically and symbolically changes the social choreography in communities. It has been argued that an overall objective of these changes is to promote a process of reconciliation.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>168</sup> For a more comprehensive overview of the situation in BiH and the purpose and content of the IAPs, see annex 1a of annex 1: the Terms of Reference.

According to the new Swedish country strategy for BiH (2003–2005), the IAPs have been vital in attaining permanent return, supporting the local economy, and establishing reconciliation.<sup>169</sup> The programmes have also, it is argued, worked better in these regards than the turnkey housing programmes of other donors that were implemented without complementary agricultural support. These conclusions are based on data supplied by Sida's implementing partners on (1) the number of homes that have been built and (2) who stays permanently (somewhat unreliable monitoring data).

Given both the size of the IAPs and the fact that Sida and its implementing partners have considered the programmes to be rather successful in establishing sustainable return, the Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit (UTV) has decided to evaluate the social and economic impact, the sustainability, and the relevance of the programmes. The evaluation shall serve to promote learning by enhancing an exchange of knowledge and experience between the primary stakeholders of the programmes (Sida staff, implementing partners, and beneficiaries) during the evaluation process. The evaluation is thus instrumental in the process of developing the programme. Furthermore, the evaluation will be conducted for the purpose of generating general knowledge about development co-operation in post-conflict situations.

## 2 The purpose and use of the evaluation

### 2.1 The purpose and scope of the evaluation

Because the IAPs have a rather long history, are unique for Swedish assistance in BiH, and are aimed at creating sustainable return, it is of interest to evaluate their *impact*<sup>170</sup>. The aim of an impact evaluation is to assess both the intended and the unintended long-term effects of an intervention. Such a study on IAPs is of particular interest since the return processes are driven and implemented by the international community. This fact raises the question of whether return driven by foreign assistance does in fact promote ethnic reconciliation or whether external resources that primarily target minorities create competition and tension among the different ethnic groups.

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<sup>169</sup> According to the Swedish country strategy for BiH "The importance of integrated area programmes (IAP) in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been immense since the war ended. Not only have they helped mitigate the physical damage left behind by making resources available for the reconstruction of housing and infrastructure, these highly specific programmes have also contributed substantially to reconciliation at local level." Country strategy for development cooperation. Bosnia and Herzegovina January 2003–December 2005, pg. 16.

<sup>170</sup> I.e. "Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended." (DAC, *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management*, pg. 24.)

The fact that the international community drives the return processes also raises the question of *sustainability*<sup>171</sup>, that is, the probability of continued long-term benefits of the programmes. Important aspects of this issue are who actually moves back and what possibilities these people have to develop socially and economically in the area that they return to. A rural life based on small-scale agriculture is clearly not a sustainable option for the future, especially for a younger generation. Although it is difficult to assess where people may get jobs in the future, one might thus question the very idea of encouraging economic development by repatriation to rural areas. Thus it is important to probe the question of whether the international community has been spending money on rebuilding an infrastructure of the past rather than of the future. In this light, it is important to raise the questions of whether the IAPs have contributed to sustainable development—and if so how—and of whether alternative strategies have been properly assessed.

Based on these issues the evaluation shall also explore the question of whether the assistance provided by Sida is considered *relevant*<sup>172</sup> by the *beneficiaries*. This means that the evaluation shall consider the extent to which the objectives of the programmes are consistent with the requirements of the beneficiaries. In effect, such a question implies questions of whether Sida and its implementers have been sensitive to cultural differences in perceptions of the situation in BiH.

To summarise, the purpose of this evaluation is to study the *impact*, the *sustainability*, and the *relevance* of the IAPs. The evaluators shall analyse in depth the perceptions of different stakeholders of how returnees are received and integrated socially in the community and to what extent they are able to survive and develop economically. The main focus should be on the perceptions of the returnees, but representatives of the majority population, representatives from the implementing agencies, and politicians should also be heard. That all parties contribute towards this evaluation with their personal experience is particularly crucial in light of the level of tension and distrust that exists, both between ethnic groups in BiH and between Bosnians and the international community.

## 2.2 The use of the evaluation

The analysis of the evaluation will contribute to a process of reflection and learning from the experiences in BiH. A well-implemented evaluation process is conducive to learning in several ways. Most important, perhaps, is that the evaluation process itself creates an opportunity for the primary users of

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<sup>171</sup> I.e. "The continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed. The probability of continued long-term benefits. The resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time." (DAC, *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management*, pg. 36.)

<sup>172</sup> I.e. "The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies." (DAC, *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management*, pg. 24.)

the evaluation (Sida's employees and implementing partners) to reflect over their experiences and to learn from hearing more about the experiences of the beneficiaries. This learning, then, takes place because of involvement in the evaluation process, and the evaluation—by promoting interaction and enhancing an exchange of knowledge and experience—becomes part of the process to develop the programme.

Given the use of the evaluation, it is important that its primary users are involved in shaping the evaluation process. The evaluators and the evaluation manager at UTV together are thus responsible for outlining participatory strategies during the evaluation. Such strategies may involve, for example, interviews, group interviews, workshops, seminars, and meetings. The evaluation manager will also create a reference group to comment on draft reports.

An analysis of experiences in BiH, moreover, contributes to more comprehensive knowledge of development assistance work in post-conflict situations. Thus another use of the evaluation is to influence thinking about these issues in a more general way. To achieve this purpose, the final evaluation report shall contain a section relating general lessons that can be learned, for example:

- What social impact extensive international interventions may have on the relations between people in BiH.
- How people subjected to the IAP interventions perceive the relevance of processes of reconciliation, reconstruction, and institutional development driven by the international community.
- To what extent international interventions of this kind are culturally sensitive, and how cultural sensitivity affects the impact, relevance, and sustainability of interventions.
- How sustainability may be affected when it is not possible to develop a partnership with the local public administration.
- What measures may be taken to promote social and economic sustainability in situations similar to the one in BiH.

The recipients of these lessons will primarily be Sida staff based in Stockholm and in the countries involved. In principle, the lessons are also of interest for the entire development assistance community, as well as for researchers within the field.

## 3 The assignment

The evaluation will consist of four parts:

1. A workshop in Sarajevo with the implementing partners and Sida staff that focuses on the question of sustainability of the IAPs.
2. A survey gathering some basic demographics such as number of persons per home and age of the returnees from a statistical sample of returnees. The survey shall also contain questions aimed at mapping out the attitudes of returnees concerning the impact, sustainability, and relevance of the IAPs.
3. An article based on the findings in a forthcoming doctoral thesis on refugee return in BiH by the Norwegian researcher Hans Skotte.
4. An in-depth qualitative case study focusing on how returnees in a village where Sida has financed an IAP perceive the impact, relevance, and sustainability of the IAPs. The case study shall also capture the attitudes of the majority population in the surroundings of the village, and of the local politicians.

The workshop will be the starting point of the evaluation. It will be documented as an UTV working paper and serve as background material for the other parts of the evaluation. The survey and Hans Skotte's article shall be written as stand-alone documents that may be included in the final report. If they are not included in the final report, they will be published either as working papers or Sida evaluations. The case study will be included in the final report. A background chapter in the final report, which will be published as a Sida Evaluation, shall introduce the programme theory and the inputs and outputs of the IAPs. The final report will also include general conclusions, lessons learned, and recommendations based on findings from all parts of the evaluation.

### 3.1 The workshop

The purpose of the workshop is to bring some important stakeholders (Sida's employees and implementing partners) of the IAPs together for a discussion about:

- What they consider to be the most pressing problems regarding sustainability of the IAPs.
- What strategies they think should be taken to promote sustainability in the IAPs.

The most important function of the workshop, perhaps, is the creation of an opportunity for the stakeholders to enhance and exchange knowledge and experience. The evaluation then becomes part of the process of development of the programmes. However, we also expect that a written synthesis of

the workshop can help the stakeholders further their analysis of the situation. Furthermore, the documentation from the workshop serves as an input to the case study that will be carried out by the Centre for Multiethnic Research (CMR) at Uppsala University. The Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) is responsible for facilitation and documentation of the workshop. Sida will assist in all practical arrangements in Sarajevo.

### 3.2 The survey

The purpose of the survey is to gather current and statistically solid data from a statistical sample of returnees in the IAPs. The survey aims to collect some basic demographics of the returnees as well as map out their attitudes regarding impact, sustainability, and relevance of the IAPs. The demographic variables shall include the return rate of the returnees, the number of persons per home, the age of the returnees, and the number of returnees who have received agricultural support, microcredits, or both. Furthermore, the survey will contain qualitative questions on how the returnees perceive the assistance they were given. Do they, for example, feel that it was the kind of assistance that served their needs best? How do they perceive their lives as far as security and economic possibilities go? Do they see a future for themselves in the area they have returned to?

The evaluation officer—in dialogue with a methodology expert at CMR—will construct a draft of the survey that shall be refined in discussions with key stakeholders. Sampling, field work, and statistical revision will most likely be carried out by Puls, a consultant company specialised in survey studies based in Zagreb, while CMR will be responsible for analysing the data and writing a survey report.

### 3.3 Hans Skotte's article

Hans Skotte, who among other things has argued that donors in BiH have prioritised their own political agendas with little consideration for community sustainability or post-war realities, will more or less be given a free hand to develop an article on the impact, sustainability, and relevance of the repatriation programmes in BiH more generally. The purpose of including such an article in the evaluation is to put the IAPs into a more comprehensive context. The article will hopefully also offer some alternative interpretations of the situation in BiH, and thus stimulate new ideas.

### 3.4 The case study

The major contribution to the evaluation is a case study in a strategically chosen village in BiH. The place for the case study has been chosen by the evaluation officer after discussions with Sida staff at the Department for Europe, the Embassy of Sweden in Sarajevo, and staff at a number of the non-

governmental organisations (NGOs) responsible for implementing the IAPs. The name of the village will not be revealed due to ethical considerations.

The case study should be of a descriptive and illustrative character. This implies that it will contribute to a deep analysis of certain specific problems that become relevant in the mapping out of:

1. The character of Sida's development assistance contributions in the village.
2. The perceptions of the returnees, implementing agencies, local politicians, and the majority population living in the surroundings of the village of the impact, sustainability, and relevance of the IAP.

The evaluation should map out what contributions Sida and its implementing partners have made, why these contributions have been chosen, and how large the contributions have been. The evaluation should also account for any changes in the character or purpose of the development assistance. This mapping out consequently serves as a premise for the analysis of the actors' respective perceptions of the impact of Sida's contributions.

Regarding different actors' perceptions of the development assistance contributions, we consider that empirical data needs to be collected inductively and with distinct qualitative techniques. The point of the case study is to document and inspire the thoughts of the respondents, not to record predetermined answers to completed questionnaires or measure specific effects.

Although the methodology should be inductive and qualitative, the evaluation must be limited to relevant issues, given that the purpose of the evaluation is to analyse different actors' perceptions of the impact, sustainability, and relevance of Sida's contributions. These questions involve the DPA's central concerns of economic and democratic development as well as ethnic reconciliation—fields that are priority objectives of the IAPs as well as of other Sida projects in BiH. These fields can be summarised under the headings 'the social situation' and 'the economic situation'. Therefore, we presuppose that the interviews are limited to these two fields. In the following section, we have formulated some of the questions that can be of interest in the *analysis* of the empirical material.

#### 3.4.1 The social situation

As already mentioned, the social situation in BiH is complex and characterised by ethnic conflicts. In this evaluation, we would like to know how the returnees perceive their return. We are also interested in knowing to what extent the returnees *wanted* to return and to what extent they felt *forced* to return. Furthermore, it would be of interest to know if their attitudes concerning their return have changed over time. We would also like to get a picture of how the Serb majority in the area feels about the return of the minority and the fact that the returnees have received international support. What are

their feelings towards the returnees? What are their feelings towards international assistance? What are their views on the future?

Considering the impact of the programme, we would furthermore need to know if people from different ethnic backgrounds in the area feel that their everyday lives are affected by, or even characterised by, conflict and if so, in what way? Are there differences in different groups regarding this issue? How do young people perceive the social situation, and what are their views on the future? How do people representing the implementing NGOs describe the social situation? Furthermore, we would like to know if the informants have experienced any improvements in their social situation and if they feel that there actually is an on-going reconciliation process? If so, in what way has the situation improved and how has the reconciliation process been brought about? Do they think that donors have a role to play in these processes?

We are especially interested in evaluating whether the return programmes have had any influence (positive or negative) on the reconciliation process and if so, how? Have any concrete activities or efforts been made to resolve conflicts? If so, how do people from different ethnic groups regard these activities? Do the local people themselves have any suggestions on how a reconciliation process could be carried out? (Do they, for example, think that legal investigations and punishments are needed?)

The informants may bring up other important aspects of the social situation, such as a deficiency of certain democratic or human rights or gender issues, and the evaluator must be sensitive to this. We want to allow the informants to bring up such issues spontaneously rather than plant certain issues in their minds in the interviews.

### 3.4.2 The economic situation

The second field for the interviews is to get a sense of the informants' perception of the present and the future economic situation. What are the hopes, incentives, economic constraints, and opportunities in these aspects, and what do people emphasise? In this respect, we would like to know more about the perceptions of the returnees and the majority population of the possibilities to develop economically by grants and microcredits for agricultural ventures and small-scale businesses. The analysis may also shed light on how they regard:

- The selection of beneficiaries and the supply of microcredits.
- Access to credit and opportunities to borrow. (I.e. are there acceptable conditions for borrowing and is there a functioning infrastructure? Are there any discriminating factors that bar people from receiving credit?)
- Their ability to borrow. (I.e. can people fill out applications and influence terms of lending so that they are realistic?)



- Possibilities for selling and buying. (I.e. do people have access to informal and formal markets of jobs, goods, and services? Are they excluded from markets by, e.g. rules, lack of advice or information, or discrimination?)
- Their ability to sell and buy. (I.e. do people have the time and resources to conduct business? Do they have any bargaining power?)

## 4 Implementation and work plan

Below is the tentative time schedule:

Sep 2003	Discussions between UTV and FOI. Signing of contract.
Oct 2003	Workshop in Sarajevo.
Dec 2003	Draft workshop report and discussion of the report between FOI and UTV. Revision of the report.
Jan 2004	Final workshop report.
Mar 2004	Inception report for the case study and discussions between UTV and CMR. Signing of contract. CMR inception report.
Mar–Apr 2004	Construction of survey in co-operation between Sida and CMR. Discussions between UTV, CMR, and Puls, the consultant carrying out the survey field work, including a meeting in Zagreb. Signing of contract. Reference group meeting.
Apr–May 2004	Discussions between Hans Skotte and UTV. Signing of contract.
May–Jun 2004	Case study field work, phase I. Survey fieldwork.
Aug 2004	Delivery of the draft case study report and the draft survey report. Discussions between UTV and CMR. Reference group meeting.
Sep 2004	Presentation of the draft case study report at the Embassy of Sweden in Sarajevo.
Sep–Nov 2004	Case study field work, phase II.
Nov 2004	Draft of Hans Skotte’s article. Reference group meeting. Revision of the article.
Dec 2004	Final version of Hans Skotte’s article.
Mar–Apr 2005	Draft of the final report including a synthesis of the entire evaluation and discussions between UTV and CMR. Reference group meeting. Revision of the report.

May 2005	Delivery of the final report.
Jun 2005	Dissemination of findings through seminars in Stockholm and BiH.

Throughout the study, the evaluation team should keep in touch with the UTV evaluation manager and the evaluation reference group. UTV will assist the evaluation team by providing documents in Sida files and archives. Where required, the UTV evaluation manager will facilitate contacts between the evaluation team and stakeholders. The evaluation manager will also arrange seminars and meetings with different stakeholders during the evaluation and at the dissemination phase.

## 4.1 Reporting

### 4.1.1 FOI's reporting

FOI is to submit the following reports to Sida:

- A *draft report* in English summarising and analysing the results from the workshop. The draft reports shall be submitted to the evaluation manager for comment no later than 1 December 2003.
- A *final report* in English. Format and outline of the report shall be agreed upon between the evaluation team and the evaluation manager. The report shall not exceed 30 pages, excluding appendices. Subject to final decision by Sida, the report will be published and distributed as a UTV working paper. The final report shall be written in Word 6.0 for Windows (or in a compatible format) and should be presented in a way that enables publication without further editing.

### 4.1.2 Hans Skotte's reporting

Hans Skotte is to submit the following reports to Sida:

- A *draft article* in English. The draft shall be submitted to the evaluation manager and the reference group for comment no later than 1 November 2004.
- A *final article* in English. Format and outline of the article shall be agreed upon between Hans Skotte and the evaluation manager. The article shall not exceed 25 pages, excluding appendices. Subject to final decision by Sida, the report will be published and distributed as a UTV working paper, a Sida evaluation, or included in the final report. The final article shall be written in Word 6.0 for Windows (or in a compatible format) and should be presented in a way that enables publication without further editing. The final article shall reach Sida no later than 15 December 2004.

#### 4.1.3 CMR's reporting

CMR is to submit the following reports to Sida:

- An *inception report* commenting and interpreting the Terms of Reference and providing details of the evaluation approach and methods for data collection and analyses. The inception report shall include a work plan specifying how and when the work is to be performed. The inception report should be submitted to the evaluation manager no later than 15 April 2004.
- A *draft case study report* in Swedish summarising the main findings and conclusions of the first phase of case study fieldwork. The draft report shall be submitted to the evaluation manager and the reference group for comment no later than 15 August 2004. The report shall furthermore be presented in English at a seminar in Sarajevo in September.
- A *draft survey report* in English summarising the main findings and conclusions of the survey in figures, tables, and comments. The draft shall be submitted to the evaluation manager and the reference group for comment no later than 15 August 2004. The report shall furthermore be presented at a seminar in Sarajevo in September.
- A *final survey report* in English summarising the main findings and conclusions of the survey in figures, tables, and comments. The report shall not exceed 20 pages, excluding appendices. Subject to final decision by Sida, the report will be published and distributed as a UTV working paper, a Sida Evaluation, or included in the final report. The final survey report shall be written in Word 6.0 for Windows (or in a compatible format) and should be presented in a way that enables publication without further editing. The final survey report shall reach Sida no later than 1 October 2004.
- A *draft final report* in English including a case study report summarising the main findings and conclusions of the first and second phases of the case study fieldwork. The draft final report shall also summarise the findings and lessons learned from all parts of the evaluation, as specified in sections 2 and 3 in the Terms of Reference, and include an executive summary and recommendations to Sida's management. The draft final report shall be submitted to the evaluation manager and the reference group for comment no later than 1 May 2005.
- A *final report* in English. Format and outline of the report shall be agreed upon between the evaluation team and the evaluation manager. The report shall contain the case study report, lessons learned, recommendations, an executive summary, and possibly, the survey report and Hans Skotte's article. It shall not exceed 100 pages, excluding appendices. Subject to final decision by Sida, the report will be published and distributed as a Sida Evaluation. The final report shall be written in Word 6.0 for

Windows (or in a compatible format) and should be presented in a way that enables publication without further editing. It shall reach Sida no later than 15 June 2005.

The CMR evaluation assignment also includes the production of a Newsletter summary according to the guidelines in the Sida Evaluation Newsletter and the completion of a Sida Evaluations Data Work Sheet. The separate summary and a completed Data Work Sheet shall be submitted to Sida with the final report.

Consultation and dissemination of emerging findings will—in accordance with the work plan outlined in this section of the Terms of Reference—be important throughout the study, and CMR is to include a budget for this in their tender. However, a separate budget and contract between CMR and Sida will cover dissemination activities following the publication of the evaluation report. A decision on dissemination activities will be taken at a later stage in the evaluation process.

# Annex 1a

## Background

Before the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was a region with an ethnically multifaceted population. During the war, however, millions of people were driven from their homes and at the same time private and public buildings, roads, bridges, and water supply and electricity systems were destroyed. This resulted in a human disaster where the refugees of the war were scattered within various parts of former Yugoslavia and abroad. At the same time the deliberate attempts at ethnic cleansing engendered regions within BiH that were increasingly uniform in their population structure.

When the war ended in December 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) marked the starting point for reconstruction in BiH. This was a huge undertaking since the objective was to completely rebuild the country in both a literal and figurative sense. In the literal sense, the infrastructure that was shattered during the war needed to be restored. Since one of the stated objectives of DPA was to reject ethnic cleansing, this task was rendered especially difficult since the rightful, often displaced, owners of private property had to be established and found before their homes could be rebuilt and the owners persuaded to return. Figuratively, the international ambition was to make BiH a modern, democratic European state. This meant the introduction of a market economy, supported by a functioning banking system as well as a modern and transparent public administration and a democratic multiparty system.

This already enormous task is rendered even more difficult since BiH lacks a national identity: it has never been a state, and thus people do not view themselves as Bosnians. In addition, many young and educated Bosnians have fled the country, and those who remain must learn to live with their war traumas and the continual post-war conflicts. Furthermore, the level of antagonism and distrust between Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks is considerable. This is particularly evident on the political plane, where parties lead regions, cantons, and municipalities with strong ethnic attributes. Since the ethnic parties tend to protect the interests of their respective groups, they experience great difficulties in agreeing on common policies for the country. On top of that, the relations between the many different political entities that were established by DPA are complex. As a result, uncertainty regarding what one has the right to decide upon prevails.

Against the backdrop of this very problematic situation, the international community has, in lack of a clear political partner, attempted to pursue de-

velopment work in co-operation with local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Thus the NGOs have to some extent taken over managerial and regulatory functions that are key responsibilities of the public administration in most countries. This has been regarded necessary, given the situation, but has concurrently undermined the potential for pursuing locally based ownership and sustainable development collaboration with politicians and administrations in BiH. Whereas many donors are currently withdrawing from BiH, these problems of local ownership and sustainability are becoming increasingly pressing.

### Sida's Integrated Area Programmes

Since the DPA, BiH has been one of the largest beneficiaries of Swedish development co-operation. From 1996 to 2003 the country received assistance of a value of approximately SEK 1.5 billion. In contrast to many other donors, Sweden is furthermore—according to the Swedish country strategy for BiH 2003–2005—continuing with undiminished development assistance to BiH. The strategy emphasises that due to the diminishing interest in BiH of other donors, it is imperative to highlight the importance of reconstruction work to facilitate the process of return.<sup>173</sup> Consequently, Sweden plans to invest a large share of its future assistance in so-called Integrated Area Programmes (IAPs), which have already been supported by about SEK 0.9 billion. Within these programmes, the building of private dwellings and local infrastructure (such as local roads and schools) for returning refugees has been supported. These efforts have been complemented by strategies within agriculture including grants and microcredits aimed at reviving local economies.

The IAPs are part of the international community's political strategy to ensure that the ethnic cleansing project fails. In this regard, the purpose of the programmes has been to enable people to move back to their former homes to re-establish the multi-ethnic flavour of BiH. The physical reconstruction of houses and schools thus has as much a political and symbolical as an economic significance, since they manifest territorial and political claims as well as prosperity. In addition, reconstruction signifies future potential and hope, outshining the impact of the old ruins which signified past suffering and humiliation. The upshot of this is that the reconstruction of minority communities both economically and symbolically changes the social choreography in communities.

Hans Skotte, who is currently completing a Ph.D. on this subject, has argued that the IAPs contribute towards the development of four modes of capital: fixed, environmental, human, and social. The fixed capital is the houses. The environmental capital is the land that is being reclaimed and cultivated and the rebuilt infrastructure, which in itself creates an image of hope and pros-

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<sup>173</sup> Pg. 16.

perity. The human capital is the return of the people who, by the self-help concept, are stimulated to take part in the reconstruction work. The social capital, finally, is the reconstruction of the social community. Strengthening these four capitals is clearly an objective of the IAPs, which, according to the Swedish country strategy for 2003–2005, has the overall objective of promoting a process of reconciliation.

Sida has collaborated with four NGOs as implementing partners of the IAPs. The Lutheran World Federation (LWF) has been stationed in Sanski Most and Tuzla. The Sanski Most office has worked both with reconstruction and agricultural support. By August 2003 they supported the construction of approximately 2,000 homes and 12 schools. The Tuzla office has been exclusively focused on agricultural support and has supported the other three construction implementers [the Swedish Rescue Service (SRS), Cross Roads International (CRI), and Swiss Caritas] in this regard.

SRS has been stationed in Tuzla and has mainly worked north and east of Tuzla. In contrast to the other implementers, who have offered assistance to selected people in villages, SRS has promoted reconstruction of whole villages. Thus their return rate is not as impressive as elsewhere, but they have, on the other hand, been able to cut construction costs per home. By August 2003 they had supported construction of 3,663 homes, 11 schools, and 5 community centres. CRI, stationed in Zenica, has worked in central Bosnia and had built almost 4,000 homes, 10 schools, and a health care centre by August 2003. Swiss Caritas is stationed in Sarajevo and had supported the reconstruction of 1,107 apartments in Sarajevo and 448 homes south-east of Sarajevo by the same date.

Sida and its implementing partners have promoted so-called self-help assistance. Self-help consists in providing material for selected returnees to rebuild their destroyed homes. The main purpose of the self-help concept is to promote sustainable return. By providing materials rather than doing the actual building, as many other donors have done, Sida has made it necessary for the returnees to come back to their old homes to prepare their houses. Thus the risk of building houses that their owners do not return to is minimised. Furthermore, it is thought that if returnees invest time and energy in rebuilding their homes, they will be more reluctant to sell them and move away. Monitoring by the implementers of the programmes has suggested that these presumptions have been right. As many as 98% of the returnees who have signed contracts with Sida's implementing partners have returned to take up permanent residence. This result is considerably better than results from projects that have been using the turnkey house concept.

Another characteristic particular to the Sida IAP concept is agricultural support. To establish a sustainable return, Sida has regarded it necessary to provide some kind of livelihood for the returnees. Since the local industry and economy has collapsed, there are very few job opportunities for people.

However, many of the returnees do have some land that they can cultivate. LWF has offered education in modern farming and has also through grants and microcredits for green houses, irrigation, seeds, plants, fertilisers, and basic machinery given returnees many opportunities to develop small-scale farming. Furthermore, LWF has established contacts with companies that buy agricultural products and is also administrating collective transport for the products. LWF is in some areas supplemented by World Vision and their micro credit organisation EKI and Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF), which are partly financed by Sida and also provide grants and microcredits. In addition to this, the IAPs have also included the Cow how project in the Maglaj area and financing of Economic Cooperation Network (ECON), which is specialised in organic farming.



# Annex 2

## Skotte's design and methods of investigation

This paper is the outcome of a qualitative investigation into the reconstruction of Grapska, one village among hundreds supported through the IAP. Circumventing a wider discourse on qualitative vs. quantitative research, the objective of my researching Grapska was *to better understand why* those involved in Grapska's reconstruction acted the way they did, and how that linked to the outcomes. I started by registering *what* has, or is been done, finding out *how* it was, or is done – and subsequently trying to come to terms with *why* things were, or are done the way they are.

Regarding the 'what' and the 'how', I studied policy papers, case documents and plans, and made thorough observations into the physical outputs and context – the 'fixed and environmental capital' as it were. I did so on the basis of having worked as an architect and project manager for almost 20 years. The 'why' emerged through numerous and extensive interviews with actors who did, or tried to, explain the reasons behind their acts and decisions. For this purpose I recorded 26 interviews ranging from senior Sida personnel, senior Sarajevo-based diplomats, contractors, building merchants, SRSA employees, – but first and foremost people from Grapska. The villagers were mostly Bosniaks, but I also talked to four Serb neighbours (one a local authority politician) known to be vocal opponents of the return. These interviews started in the late 1990s the first chance visit to Grapska in February 2000. My primary field studies took place during the Winter of 2001–2002 when I spent most of January 2002 in Grapska. I was back for an update in June 2004. My task has been to link these often varying, and even opposing explanations into a logically consistent and explanatory pattern. This paper is the result of this attempt.

# Annex 3

## Survey tables

### Age of respondents

	Target sample	Control sample	Total
15–29	2.7%	7.8%	4.3%
30–44	20.5%	24.8%	21.9%
45–54	23.4%	21.2%	22.7%
55–64	23.2%	19.2%	21.8%
65–74	23.3%	20.6%	22.4%
75 +	7.2%	6.4%	6.9%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>1000</b>	<b>3000</b>

### Type of settlement

	Target sample	Control sample	Total
Type of settlement Rural	66.6%	61.0%	64.7%
Urban	33.5%	39.0%	35.3%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>1000</b>	<b>3000</b>

### Sex of respondents

	Target sample	Control sample	Total
Sex Men	49.8%	48.2%	49.3%
Women	50.2%	51.8%	50.7%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>1000</b>	<b>3000</b>

## Household structure

Living with:	Target sample	Control sample
Spouse and children	33.9%	33.4%
Spouse	19.2%	19.8%
Alone	13.1%	16.1%
Someone else	11.2%	7.4%
Spouse, children and someone else	6.5%	7.9%
Children and someone else	5.3%	2.1%
Spouse, children and parents	3.9%	4.1%
Unmarried partner	1.7%	1.6%
Children	1.4%	3.0%
Spouse, parents, children and someone else	0.9%	0.5%
Spouse and someone else	0.9%	0.7%
Parents and someone else	0.8%	1.0%
Spouse and parents	0.7%	1.2%
Parents and children	0.4%	0.6%
Parents	0.2%	0.1%
Spouse, parents and someone else	0.2%	0.1%
Unmarried partner and children	0.1%	0.2%
Unmarried partner and parents	0.1%	0.0%
Parents, children and someone else	0.1%	0.2%
	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>1000</b>

## Education

	Target sample	Control sample	Total
Elementary school	56.9%	51.5%	55.1%
Secondary school	36.3%	40.5%	37.7%
University	6.8%	7.5%	7.0%
DK/NA	0.1%	0.5%	0.2%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>1000</b>	<b>3000</b>

**Abandoned flats/houses  
(of households approached during the survey)**

	LWF	Caritas	CRI	SRSA	Total	New Owner	Not used regularly
Participants in survey	94.59%	67.66%	93.48%	94.92%	85.99%		
Flat/house is empty but owner sometimes visit	4.40%	17.81%	6.52%	5.08%	9.26%		9.26%
Flat/house is sold	0.34%	6.89%			2.21%	2.21%	
Flat/house is let		4.04%			1.24%		
Flat/house is exchanged		0.30%			0.09%	0.09%	
Flat/house is not inhabited	0.68%	3.29%			1.20%		1.20%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>2.30%</b>	<b>10.46%</b>

**Would you have returned if you had not been given financial/economic assistance? \* Type of settlement**

Type of settlement		Target sample	Control sample	Total
Rural	Most probably not	24.4%	9.3%	19.9%
	Yes, probably	33.2%	28.9%	31.9%
	Yes, definitely	42.0%	60.0%	47.3%
	DK/NA	0.4%	1.9%	0.8%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1290</b>	<b>540</b>	<b>1830</b>
Urban	Most probably not	21.3%	7.1%	17.2%
	Yes, probably	32.0%	27.9%	30.8%
	Yes, definitely	46.3%	63.7%	51.3%
	DK/NA	0.5%	1.3%	0.8%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>560</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>786</b>

**Would you rather have gone to some other place  
if you had been offered financial/economic assistance to do so?  
\* Type of settlement**

Type of settlement		Target sample	Control sample	Total
Rural	Yes, definitely	12.2%	11.1%	11.9%
	Yes, probably	6.7%	4.6%	6.1%
	Most probably not	80.7%	83.7%	81.6%
	DK/NA	0.4%	0.6%	0.4%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>1290</b>	<b>540</b>	<b>1830</b>
Urban	Yes, definitely	13.0%	4.9%	10.7%
	Yes, probably	6.8%	8.0%	7.1%
	Most probably not	79.5%	86.7%	81.6%
	DK/NA	0.7%	0.4%	0.6%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>560</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>786</b>

**Did you return because you had to leave your temporary home?**

Sample		Domicile		Total
		Rural	Urban	
Target sample	Yes	43.6%	37.9%	41.9%
	No	55.6%	59.1%	56.6%
	DK/NA	0.8%	3.0%	1.5%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
		1290	560	1850
Control sample	Yes	44.3%	31.0%	40.3%
	No	55.2%	68.6%	59.1%
	DK/NA	0.6%	0.4%	0.5%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>540</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>766</b>

## Received Agricultural Aid in Rural Areas

Organization	Agricultural Aid		
	No	Yes	Total
LWF	500	58	558
	89.6%	10.4%	100.0%
Caritas	435	12	447
	97.3%	2.7%	100.0%
CRI	445	164	609
	73.1%	26.9%	100.0%
SRSA	111	108	219
	50.7%	49.3%	100.0%

## How did you learn about the possibility of receiving aid?

	Target sample	
	Rural	Urban
By the authorities	36.4%	11.0%
By friends or acquaintances	34.1%	61.4%
At meetings called by aid organisations	25.5%	19.2%
Through TV or newspapers	2.6%	5.3%
I was not informed at all	1.6%	2.7%
DK/NA	0.5%	0.6%
	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1241</b>	<b>625</b>

## Do you feel that you understand the principles on which aid is granted? (a) – Rural/Urban

Type of settlement	Rural		Urban	
	Target	Control	Target	Control
I fully understand the principles	20.5%	10.6%	26.7%	12.0%
I partly understand the principles	41.0%	35.0%	38.1%	34.0%
I do not understand the principles.	38.2%	52.8%	34.8%	54.0%
DK/NA	0.3%	1.6%	0.5%	
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1279</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>656</b>	<b>50</b>

a) Have your family received international aid after the war? = Yes

**Do you feel that you understand the principles on which aid is granted? (a) – Education ‘ Target sample**

	<b>Elementary school</b>	<b>Secondary school</b>	<b>University</b>
I fully understand the principles	18.5%	27.3%	31.1%
I partly understand the principles	40.3%	39.7%	38.5%
I do not understand the principles.	40.9%	32.4%	30.4%
DK/NA	0.3%	0.6%	
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1106</b>	<b>692</b>	<b>135</b>

a) Have your family received international aid after the war? = Yes

**In your opinion, has the distribution of international aid been fair? \* Type of settlement**

<b>Type of settlement</b>		<b>Target sample</b>	<b>Control sample</b>	<b>Total</b>
Rural	Mostly fair	26.6%	10.5%	21.5%
	Sometimes fair, sometimes not	42.3%	33.4%	39.5%
	Mostly unfair	30.6%	55.2%	38.3%
	DK/NA	0.5%	0.8%	0.6%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>1331</b>	<b>610</b>	<b>1941</b>
Urban	Mostly fair	23.5%	13.1%	19.6%
	Sometimes fair, sometimes not	39.3%	40.0%	39.6%
	Mostly unfair	35.3%	45.9%	39.2%
	DK/NA	1.9%	1.0%	1.6%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>669</b>	<b>390</b>	<b>1059</b>

## Did those who needed help, also receive help?

### \* Type of settlement

Type of settlement		Target sample	Control sample	Total
Rural	Yes, most of them	36.6%	18.9%	31.0%
	Yes, some of them	44.6%	43.3%	44.2%
	Only few of them	18.4%	37.4%	24.4%
	DK/NA	0.4%	0.5%	0.4%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>1331</b>	<b>610</b>	<b>1941</b>
Urban	Yes, most of them	27.1%	15.1%	22.7%
	Yes, some of them	38.4%	39.5%	38.8%
	Only few of them	33.3%	43.8%	37.2%
	DK/NA	1.2%	1.5%	1.3%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>669</b>	<b>390</b>	<b>1059</b>

## Did those who received help really need it? \* Type of settlement

Type of settlement		Target sample	Control sample	Total
Rural	Yes, most of them	43.5%	24.9%	37.7%
	Yes, some of them	42.7%	46.7%	44.0%
	Only few of them	13.4%	27.5%	17.9%
	DK/NA	0.3%	0.8%	0.5%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>1331</b>	<b>610</b>	<b>1941</b>
Urban	Yes, most of them	33.3%	22.3%	29.3%
	Yes, some of them	41.3%	40.5%	41.0%
	Only few of them	24.1%	35.1%	28.1%
	DK/NA	1.3%	2.1%	1.6%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>669</b>	<b>390</b>	<b>1059</b>



### How would you describe the general economic situation of your family?

Type of settlement	Rural		Urban	
Sample	Target	Control	Target	Control
Very bad	38.6%	39.2%	23.6%	23.8%
Bad	30.1%	23.3%	24.6%	32.0%
Neither good nor bad	24.9%	28.9%	39.5%	33.6%
Good	5.5%	7.5%	11.3%	9.9%
Very good	0.9%	1.1%	1.0%	0.7%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1331</b>	<b>610</b>	<b>390</b>	<b>669</b>

### Can you afford necessary health care? \* Type of settlement

Type of settlement		Target sample	Control sample	Total
Rural	Yes, always	7.7%	10.7%	8.7%
	Yes, most of the time	29.7%	33.0%	30.7%
	Sometimes not	33.0%	30.5%	32.2%
	Almost never	28.3%	25.6%	27.5%
	Don't know	1.3%	0.3%	1.0%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>1331</b>	<b>610</b>	<b>1941</b>
Urban	Yes, always	17.3%	17.7%	17.5%
	Yes, most of the time	31.2%	31.0%	31.2%
	Sometimes not	29.0%	28.5%	28.8%
	Almost never	21.4%	21.5%	21.4%
	Don't know	1.0%	1.3%	1.1%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>669</b>	<b>390</b>	<b>1059</b>

### Household Income \* Type of settlement \*

		Type of settlement		Total	
		Rural	Urban		
Target sample	Income	No income	21.6%	9.3%	17.5%
		-100 KM	9.1%	3.8%	7.3%
		101-200 KM	33.5%	30.0%	32.4%
		201-300 KM	15.3%	17.9%	16.1%
		301-400 KM	8.9%	9.3%	9.0%
		401-	11.6%	29.7%	17.6%
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		<b>Total</b>	<b>1285</b>	<b>636</b>	<b>1921</b>
Control sample	Income	No income	19.3%	11.8%	16.4%
		-100 KM	8.8%	3.8%	6.9%
		101-200 KM	30.2%	26.8%	28.9%
		201-300 KM	15.1%	14.8%	15.0%
		301-400 KM	10.2%	11.8%	10.8%
		401-	16.4%	31.0%	22.0%
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		<b>Total</b>	<b>590</b>	<b>365</b>	<b>955</b>

### Do you share agricultural equipment with other villagers?

Village Population	Sample	
	Target	Control
Very often	2.9%	1.8%
Often	12.8%	8.4%
Sometimes	21.3%	20.7%
Seldom	20.1%	20.5%
Never	38.8%	46.1%
DK/Cannot say	4.1%	2.6%
	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1331</b>	<b>610</b>

### Do neighbours help each other in agricultural work?

Village Population	Sample	
	Target	Control
Very often	5.0%	3.3%
Often	19.2%	14.1%
Sometimes	30.0%	24.1%
Seldom	18.8%	24.6%
Never	24.6%	32.1%
DK/Cannot say	2.4%	1.8%
	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1331</b>	<b>610</b>

### Do neighbours help each other on other occasions, e.g. in construction of infrastructure?

Village Population	Sample	
	Target	Control
Very often	8.9%	5.9%
Often	15.6%	13.8%
Sometimes	29.8%	23.3%
Seldom	18.3%	23.3%
Never	24.5%	31.6%
DK/Cannot say	2.9%	2.1%
	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1331</b>	<b>610</b>

### Is there a need for people in your villager to organize in order to further their interests?

	Village	Total
	Target	Control
Yes, definitely	46.7%	50.3%
Yes probably	34.8%	33.3%
Yes and No	15.0%	14.3%
Probably not	2.7%	1.6%
Not at all	0.3%	0.2%
DK/NA	0.6%	0.3%
	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1331</b>	<b>610</b>

### Work status \* Type of settlement

			Type of settlement		Total
			Rural	Urban	
Target sample	Work status	employed	16.5%	18.9%	17.3%
		unemployed	25.2%	17.5%	22.6%
		housework	32.9%	13.7%	26.5%
		retired	25.4%	49.8%	33.6%
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>			<b>1313</b>	<b>662</b>	<b>1975</b>
Control sample	Work status	employed	18.9%	24.6%	21.1%
		unemployed	24.5%	19.3%	22.5%
		housework	34.9%	16.9%	27.9%
		retired	21.6%	39.2%	28.5%
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>			<b>587</b>	<b>378</b>	<b>965</b>

### Work status of women – Target sample \* Age \*Type of Settlement

			Age					
Type of settlement			15–29	30–44	45–54	55–64	65–74	75 +
Rural	Work status	employed	10.0%	16.7%	13.2%	2.4%	0.5%	0.0%
		unemployed	22.5%	19.7%	8.3%	3.9%	1.1%	0.0%
		housework	67.5%	62.8%	71.2%	75.4%	67.6%	63.0%
		retired	0.0%	0.9%	7.3%	18.4%	30.8%	37.0%
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Urban	Work status	employed	29.4%	36.6%	30.5%	8.3%	0.0%	0.0%
		unemployed	47.1%	31.7%	31.3%	10.3%	0.7%	0.0%
		housework	23.5%	28.0%	24.4%	29.7%	27.1%	21.6%
		retired	0.0%	3.7%	13.7%	51.7%	72.2%	78.4%
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>			<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**Work status of men – Target sample \* Age  
\* Type of settlement**

Type of settlement		Age					
		15-29	30-44	45-54	55-64	65-74	75 +
Rural	Work status employed	41.5%	34.7%	40.7%	15.5%	9.1%	1.9%
	unemployed	58.5%	62.2%	48.9%	38.7%	6.1%	11.5%
	housework	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%	0.5%	0.0%	0.0%
	retired	0.0%	3.1%	9.5%	45.4%	84.8%	86.5%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Urban	Work status employed	62.5%	61.8%	49.0%	21.6%	5.2%	0.0%
	unemployed	37.5%	35.3%	41.2%	22.5%	2.2%	0.0%
	housework	0.0%	1.5%	0.0%	1.0%	0.0%	2.1%
	retired	0.0%	1.5%	9.8%	54.9%	92.6%	97.9%
<b>Total</b>		<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**Do you feel secure in this place?**

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Ethnicity			Ethnicity		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Very insecure	1.5%	3.0%	1.1%	1.1%	1.0%	1.7%
Rather insecure	2.0%	5.7%	1.7%	2.7%	1.0%	3.3%
Neither secure nor insecure	3.7%	9.8%	5.4%	5.1%	6.1%	9.2%
Rather secure	15.9%	18.2%	27.6%	15.6%	27.6%	20.0%
Very secure	76.9%	63.3%	64.1%	75.5%	64.3%	65.8%
DK/NA	0.1%					
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**How often do you have contacts with members of other ethnic groups?**

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Ethnicity			Ethnicity		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Very seldom	17.7%	4.2%	3.0%	16.4%	3.1%	9.2%
Seldom	21.8%	6.1%	8.4%	17.1%	20.4%	12.5%
Sometimes	20.6%	15.2%	30.5%	21.4%	9.2%	16.7%
Often	21.3%	33.3%	35.4%	25.1%	35.7%	34.2%
Very often	18.2%	41.3%	22.7%	19.7%	31.6%	27.5%
DK/NA	0.4%			0.3%		
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**Do you have any friends who belong to another ethnic group?\***

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Ethnicity			Ethnicity		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Yes, many	15.5%	41.3%	27.2%	15.8%	37.8%	28.3%
Yes, some	31.5%	42.0%	47.5%	37.8%	40.8%	47.5%
Yes, one	7.9%	6.8%	9.1%	8.0%	5.1%	6.7%
No, no one	44.7%	9.5%	15.8%	37.8%	15.3%	17.5%
DK/NA	0.5%	0.4%	0.4%	0.5%	1.0%	0.0%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**Do you have any friends who belong to another ethnic group? \***  
**Education \* Ethnicity**

Ethnicity		Education			Total
Do You have any friends who belong to another ethnic group?		Elementary school	Secondary school	University	
Bosniak	Yes, many	7.4%	24.5%	39.3%	15.6%
	Yes, some	29.0%	40.9%	40.2%	33.9%
	Yes, one	8.3%	7.9%	4.5%	7.9%
	No, no one	54.9%	26.2%	14.3%	42.1%
	DK/NA	0.4%	0.4%	1.8%	0.5%
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1136</b>	<b>717</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>1970</b>
Croat	Yes, many	21.9%	52.9%	61.7%	40.3%
	Yes, some	48.1%	37.4%	34.0%	41.7%
	Yes, one	6.9%	7.1%	2.1%	6.4%
	No, no one	21.9%	2.6%	2.1%	11.0%
	DK/NA	1.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>362</b>
Serb	Yes, many	17.7%	35.9%	63.9%	27.4%
	Yes, some	50.6%	45.7%	30.6%	47.5%
	Yes, one	9.6%	8.1%	0.0%	8.6%
	No, no one	21.4%	10.3%	5.6%	16.1%
	DK/NA	0.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>322</b>	<b>223</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>583</b>

**How often do you have contacts with members of other ethnic groups? \*Ethnic Majority**

Bosniaks	Ethnic Majority		Total
	Bosniaks	Croats/Serbs	
Very often	9.4%	11.0%	9.6%
Often	21.4%	35.4%	22.8%
Sometimes	22.2%	25.6%	22.6%
Seldom	26.0%	15.9%	25.0%
Very seldom	20.5%	12.2%	19.7%
DK/NA	0.4%	0.0%	0.4%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>711</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>793</b>

**Do you have any friends who belong to another people? \*Ethnic majority**

Bosniaks	Ethnic Majority		Total
	Bosniaks	Croats/Serbs	
Yes, many	8.0%	6.1%	7.8%
Yes, some	34.7%	53.7%	36.7%
Yes, one	5.9%	9.8%	6.3%
No, no one	50.5%	28.0%	48.2%
DK/NA	0.8%	2.4%	1.0%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>711</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>793</b>

**Degree of confidence in local politicians?**

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Ethnicity			Ethnicity		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Very low	34.5%	49.6%	30.9%	38.0%	41.8%	34.2%
Low	32.0%	28.0%	31.1%	30.6%	33.7%	32.5%
Neither high, nor low	25.9%	14.8%	27.2%	23.5%	19.4%	25.0%
High	3.5%	4.2%	2.2%	4.3%	3.1%	4.2%
Very high	0.3%	0.4%		0.5%		0.8%
DK/NA	3.8%	3.0%	8.6%	3.1%	2.0%	3.3%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>



**Degree of confidence in local representatives of international organizations?**

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Ethnicity			Ethnicity		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Very low	22.0%	41.3%	18.1%	27.5%	36.7%	18.3%
Low	27.9%	22.7%	24.2%	26.3%	31.6%	28.3%
Neither high, nor low	33.4%	23.9%	36.7%	34.8%	22.4%	37.5%
High	10.4%	6.4%	10.8%	6.1%	6.1%	9.2%
Very high	1.6%	1.5%	1.1%	0.9%		
DK/NA	4.7%	4.2%	9.1%	4.3%	3.1%	6.7%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**Do you believe that Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, will be able to live in peace, or do you think that the harm caused by the war has forever made a life together impossible? \* Ethnicity \***

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Ethnicity			Ethnicity		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
They will be able to live together in peace	85.4%	83.0%	90.1%	85.3%	94.9%	90.0%
The war made a life together impossible	11.6%	15.5%	8.2%	12.3%	4.1%	7.5%
DK/NA	2.9%	1.5%	1.7%	2.4%	1.0%	2.5%
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**Do you think that the Hague tribunal for war criminals is fair? Ethnicity**

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Ethnicity			Ethnicity		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Yes	57.0%	38.6%	47.9%	57.0%	37.8%	42.5%
No	38.5%	55.3%	47.3%	39.8%	57.1%	50.8%
DK/NA	4.5%	6.1%	4.8%	3.2%	5.1%	6.7%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**What is your opinion about the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina?  
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?**

**Refugees should return to the towns and villages where they lived before the war**

Ethnicity	Target sample			Control sample		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Strongly agree	80.4%	79.5%	72.8%	77.5%	81.6%	75.8%
Agree	15.1%	14.4%	17.7%	17.0%	10.2%	11.7%
Neither agree nor disagree	2.5%	3.8%	4.8%	3.2%	6.1%	10.0%
Disagree	0.7%		0.6%	0.1%		0.8%
Strongly disagree	0.2%	1.1%	0.2%	0.7%		
DK/NA	1.1%	1.1%	3.9%	1.5%	2.0%	1.7%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**Herceg Bosna should be a part of Croatia.**

Ethnicity	Target sample			Control sample		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Strongly agree	0.6%	2.3%	1.1%		1.0%	1.7%
Agree	1.6%	7.6%	1.5%	1.2%	3.1%	.8%
Neither agree nor disagree	6.5%	8.3%	11.9%	6.7%	9.2%	7.5%
Disagree	14.9%	17.0%	13.8%	12.8%	16.3%	15.8%
Strongly disagree	65.8%	53.0%	53.3%	69.7%	50.0%	55.8%
DK/NA	10.7%	11.7%	18.4%	9.6%	20.4%	18.3%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

### Republika Srpska should be a part of Serbia

Ethnicity	Target sample			Control sample		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Strongly agree	0.7%	1.1%	1.7%	0.4%		.8%
Agree	1.2%	2.3%	3.5%	1.5%	1.0%	5.0%
Neither agree nor disagree	7.5%	9.1%	12.5%	7.0%	11.2%	7.5%
Disagree	13.4%	20.5%	15.6%	12.0%	13.3%	18.3%
Strongly disagree	66.6%	56.8%	42.5%	69.3%	55.1%	44.2%
DK/NA	10.6%	10.2%	24.2%	9.9%	19.4%	24.2%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

### Bosnia and Herzegovina should be a unitary republic. The Federation and Republika Srpska should be abolished

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Strongly agree	52.5%	47.7%	31.3%	52.9%	39.8%	34.2%
Agree	19.4%	16.3%	13.6%	21.1%	17.3%	7.5%
Neither agree nor disagree	11.0%	13.3%	16.4%	9.0%	21.4%	10.8%
Disagree	3.2%	6.4%	6.0%	2.3%	2.0%	14.2%
Strongly disagree	3.7%	7.2%	8.2%	3.7%	3.1%	11.7%
DK/NA	10.2%	9.1%	24.4%	11.0%	16.3%	21.7%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**Bosnia and Herzegovina should be organized as it is now, that is, it should consist of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.**

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Strongly agree	2.5%	5.3%	9.1%	3.3%	4.1%	13.3%
Agree	5.1%	4.5%	7.1%	5.1%	7.1%	8.3%
Neither agree nor disagree	18.7%	16.7%	20.7%	16.4%	19.4%	15.0%
Disagree	16.7%	20.8%	11.4%	15.9%	19.4%	13.3%
Strongly disagree	44.4%	42.0%	28.7%	45.1%	32.7%	28.3%
DK/NA	12.7%	10.6%	22.9%	14.2%	17.3%	21.7%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**The International community does not understand the real conditions in our country.**

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Strongly agree	23.9%	34.5%	21.4%	23.1%	34.7%	25.0%
Agree	29.4%	26.9%	29.6%	28.3%	24.5%	29.2%
Neither agree nor disagree	22.1%	18.6%	20.3%	24.6%	23.5%	25.0%
Disagree	8.3%	8.3%	7.1%	6.0%	3.1%	4.2%
Strongly disagree	5.9%	3.4%	2.2%	4.9%	1.0%	
DK/NA	10.5%	8.3%	19.4%	13.0%	13.3%	16.7%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**The International community is treating us as backward people.**

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Strongly agree	28.5%	42.0%	25.7%	26.2%	37.8%	26.7%
Agree	25.8%	23.5%	30.9%	29.7%	31.6%	30.8%
Neither agree nor disagree	19.9%	17.0%	17.5%	21.3%	14.3%	22.5%
Disagree	9.7%	6.4%	8.0%	7.1%	4.1%	6.7%
Strongly disagree	6.5%	3.8%	1.7%	4.3%	2.0%	
DK/NA	9.7%	7.2%	16.2%	11.5%	10.2%	13.3%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

**Bosniak, Croat, and Serb children should be taught in the same classes at school.**

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Strongly agree	56.5%	64.0%	53.1%	59.6%	58.2%	49.2%
Agree	27.2%	17.0%	25.7%	24.5%	17.3%	30.8%
Neither agree nor disagree	7.3%	7.6%	9.1%	8.4%	9.2%	10.0%
Disagree	1.4%	4.5%	0.6%	0.8%	2.0%	0.8%
Strongly disagree	0.6%	3.4%	0.2%	0.4%	8.2%	
DK/NA	7.1%	3.4%	11.2%	6.3%	5.1%	9.2%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>


**Bosniak, Croat, and Serb children should be taught according to the same curriculum**

	Target sample			Control sample		
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
Strongly agree	56.1%	63.6%	51.4%	60.2%	57.1%	49.2%
Agree	26.4%	18.2%	24.2%	22.6%	17.3%	25.0%
Neither agree nor disagree	7.9%	6.8%	9.3%	9.2%	11.2%	10.0%
Disagree	1.4%	4.2%	0.6%	0.9%	2.0%	1.7%
Strongly disagree	0.3%	3.8%	0.4%	0.3%	7.1%	0.8%
DK/NA	7.9%	3.4%	14.0%	6.8%	5.1%	13.3%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1222</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>120</b>

*Structural Equation Model: Standard of living and views on economic conditions*

*Model:* It is assumed that views on the economic situation in general (F2) are influenced by the economic resources of the family (F1). These factors, each with two indicators, are, in turn, dependent on rural/urban environment (nrinhab) and participation in Sida: s aid programme (target).

*Result:* The economic situation of the family (F1) influences views on the economy (F2). Degree of urban environment is related to family economy, but not directly to views on the economic situation. There is no tangible effect of international aid.



Factor	Concept	Indicator	
F1	Household economy	Health	can afford health care
		Bills	can pay bills
F2	View of economic situation	Gensit	view of general economic situation
		Future	view of economic future
	Degree of urban environment	V13	Nr of inhabitants/domicile
	International aid	V251	beneficiaries of Sida programme – target

Note: D2, D3 = disturbance; E57 etc. = error

<b>Standardized solution</b>			<b>R-squared</b>		
	<b>Factor loadings</b>			<b>Error/Disturbance</b>	
Health	=	-0.778	F1	+0.628	E57 .605
Bills	=	-0.531	F1	+0.847	E58 .282
Gensit	=	-0.768	F2	+0.641	E78 .589
FutureE	=	-0.530	F 2	+0.848	E82 .281
Causal relations					
F1	=	.195*V13	-0.058*V251	+0.979	D1 .042
F2	=	.343*F1	+0.036*V13 +0.043*V251	+0.936	D2 .124

### **Fit indices (Robust)**


Bentler-bonett normed fit index	=	.959
Comparative fit index (CFI)	=	.963
Bollen (IFI) fit index	=	.963
Lisrel GFI fit index	=	.994
Lisrel AGFI fit index	=	.978
Root mean-square residual (RMR)	=	.044
Standardized RMR	=	.025
Root mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA)	=	.054
90% Confidence interval of RMSEA		(.042, .066)



*Structural Equation Model: Ethnic Interaction, Distrust, and Reconciliation*

*Hypothesis:* Reconciliation is believed to be affected by ethnic interaction (F1) and degree of ethnic (dis)trust (F2), as well as by rural/urban background (nrinhab) and Sida aid (target).

It turns out that a) ethnic interaction leads to trust in other ethnic groups; b) reconciliation, or forgiving, is influenced by degree of trust, but not directly by ethnic interaction; c) rural – urban background influences ethnic interaction, but only indirectly forgiving, d) international aid does not have any substantial effects.



Factor	Concept	Indicator	
F1	Ethnic Interaction	Contact	with members of other groups
		Friends	among members of other groups
F2	Nationalism	Careful	about members of other groups
		Major	live only where own group majority
	Reconciliation	Forgive	should one forgive perpetrators
	Degree of urban environment	V13	Nr of inhabitants/domicile
	International aid	V251	beneficiaries of Sida programme – target/control

**Standardized solution:**

	Factor loadings	Error	R-squared
Contact	-.788 F1	+.616 E95	.620
Friends	-.832 F1	+.555 E97	.692
Careful	-.786 F2	+.619 E102	.617
Major	-.951 F2	+.310 E103	.904

**Causal relations**


Forgive =	.020*F1	-.201*F2	-.156*V13	+.027*V251	+.975 E117	.050
F1 =	.480*V13			+.032*V251	+.877 D1	.231
F2 =	-.271*F1	-.123*V13		-.017*V251	+.938 D2	.121

**Fit indices (Robust)**

Bentler-bonett normed fit index	=	.990
Bentler-bonett non-normed fit index	=	.980
Comparative fit index (CFI)	=	.992
Bollen (IFI) fit index	=	.992
Mcdonald (MFI) fit index	=	.995
Root mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA)	=	.037
90% Confidence interval of RMSEA		(.026,.048)

*Structural Equation Model: Attitudes towards Aid*

Views of aid could be described as a three-dimensional factor structure where views on moral aspects, efficiency of aid, and knowledge about the rationale behind aid are rather highly correlated.



Factors	Concept	Variables	Subject
F1	Moral aspect	fair	aid was fair
		needgot	those who needed aid got it
		gotneed	those who got aid needed it
F2	Information	princip	aware of principles behind assistance
F3	Efficiency	approp	aid was appropriate
		organiz	aid was well organized

Standardized solution			R-squared	
		Factor loadings	Error	
Fair	= V64 =	.640 F1	+.768 E64	.410
Needgot	= V65 =	.827 F1	+.562 E65	.684
Gotneed	= V66 =	.713 F1	+.701 E66	.508
Princip	= V67 =	1.000 F2	+.000 E67	1.000
Appropri	= V74 =	.763 F3	+.646 E74	.582
Organize	= V75 =	-.500 F3	+.866 E75	.250

### Factor correlations

F1	F2	.497*
F1	F3	.534*
F2	F3	.459*

### Fit indices (Robust)

Bentler-bonett normed fit index	=	.983
Bentler-bonett non-normed fit index	=	.970
Comparative fit index (CFI)	=	.988
Bollen (IFI) fit index	=	.988
Mcdonald (MFI) fit index	=	.988
Root mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA)	=	.028
90% Confidence interval of RMSEA		(.015,.042)

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# Returning Home

## An Evaluation of Sida's Integrated Area Programmes in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Between 1995 and 2005 SEK 1,2 billion was spent on Sida's Integrated Area Programmes that, in accordance with the Dayton Peace Agreement, aimed to re-establish displaced Bosnians in their homes. Assisted by Sida and its partners, the returnees have been able to rebuild almost 15 000 houses, to which 50 000 persons have now returned.

This is an evaluation of what happened, socially and economically, after people had returned. Did, for example, the return form a starting point for social integration or reconciliation? Do returnees feel at home now that they have returned? Have they been able to survive economically? Do they intend to stay on in their rebuilt homes? Did they want to return in the first place?

Finally this evaluation assesses to what extent the actual strategy of the Sida programmes and decisions made on the ground had any effect on these questions.



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