



Evaluation of the Irish Aid (Uganda) Country Strategy Paper 2007 – 2009

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Submitted by



Team:
Nick Chapman
Charlotte Vaillant
Hope Kabuchu
Wilberforce Muhwana
Larry Adupa

Uganda Country Strategy Paper Evaluation

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Acronyms

ACTV	African Centre for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture Victims
ADP	AIDS Development Partners
AIC	AIDS Information Center
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AMREF	African Medical and Research Foundation
ART	Antiretroviral Therapy
ARV	Antiretroviral
BCC	Behavior Change Communication
CAP	Country Appeal Project
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CCM	Country Coordination Mechanism
CCT	Coordinating Centre Tutor
CEDOVIP	Centre for Domestic Violence and Prevention
CMCC	Civil Military Cooperation Centre
CORP	Community Own Resource Persons
CS	Civil Society
CSF	Civil Society Fund
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DANIDA	Danish International Development Authority
DCI	Development Cooperation Ireland
DDP	Deepening Democracy Programme
DEP	Diploma in Education Primary
DEPE	Diploma in Education Primary External
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DOL	Division of Labour
DP	Development Partner
DTE	Diploma in Teacher Education
EFA	Education for All

EFAG	Education Funding Agencies Group
EMIS	Education Management Information System
ESA	Education Standards Agency
ESC	Education Service Commission
ESCC	Education Sector Consultative Committee
ESIP	Education Strategic Investment Plan
ESSP	Education Sector Investment Plan
FAL	Functional Adult Literacy
FAWE	Forum for African Women in Education
GBS	General Budget Support
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFATM	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
HDP	Human Development Programme
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HPAC	Health Policy Advisory Committee
HQ	Headquarters
HSSP	Health Sector Strategic Plan
HTI	Health Training Institution
IA	Irish Aid
ICF	Investment Climate Facility
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IEC	Information, Education and Communication
IMR	Infant Mortality Rate
JAR	Joint AIDS Review
JBSF	Joint Budget Support Framework
JLOS	Justice, Law and Order Sector
JRM	Joint Review Mission
KOPEIN	Kotido Peace Initiative
LA	Lead Agency
LABF	Legal Aid Basket Fund
LG	Local Government

LGAB	Local Government Basket Fund
LitNet	Literacy Network
LOGSIP	Local Government Sector Investment Programme
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MACA	Multi-sectoral AIDS Control Approach
MAPS	Multi-Annual Programme Scheme
MARP	Most at Risk People
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MGLSD	Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development
MMR	Maternal Mortality Rate
MoES	Ministry of Education and Sports
MoFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoLG	Ministry of Local Government
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTCT	Mother to Child Transmission
MTEF	Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
NAC	National AIDS Conference
NALPPA	National Adult Literacy Programme Plan of Action
NCDC	National Curriculum Development Centre
NDP	National Development Plan
NER	Net Enrolment Rate
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NOP	National Operational Plan
NPAP	National Priority Action Plan
NSF	National Strategic Framework
NSP	National Strategic Plan
OVC	Orphans and Vulnerable Children
PAEG	Project Evaluation and Appraisal Group (IA)
PAF	Poverty Action Fund
PC	Partnership Committee
PDG	Partners for Democracy and Governance

PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PEPFAR	Presidential Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PERP	Primary Education Reform Programme
PGDTE	Postgraduate Diploma in Teacher Education
PHA	People Living with HIV/AIDS
PHC	Primary Health Care
PIDG	Private Infrastructure Development Group
PMDS	Performance Management and Development Systems
PMMP	Performance Measurement and Management Plan
PMTCT	Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission
PNFP	Private Not for Profit
PPET	Post-Primary Education and Training
PTC	Primary Teachers' College
PTE	Primary Teacher Education
QEI	Quality Enhancement Initiative
QUEST	Quality Education in Schools through Training Programme
RFA	Request for Application
SC	Steering Committee
SCE	Self-Coordinating Entity
SFG	Schools Facility Grant
SWAp	Sector- Wide Approach
TA	Technical Assistance
TASO	The AIDS Support Organisation
TE	Teacher Education
UHRC	Uganda Human Rights Commission
ULGA	Uganda Local Governments' Association
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	United Nations Joint Programme on AIDS
UNASO	Uganda Network of AIDS Support Organisations
UNATU	Uganda National Teachers' Union
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEB	Uganda National Examinations Board

UNFPA	United Nations Family Planning Association
UNGASS	United Nations General Assembly Special Session
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UPE	Universal Primary Education
UPPET	Universal Post-Primary Education and Training
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USE	Universal Secondary Education
VAT	Value Added Tax
VCT	Voluntary Counselling and Testing

Executive Summary

S1. Uganda has been Ireland's largest recipient of development assistance since 2000, and under the current country strategy, Irish Aid has committed some €118 million through a well-balanced mix of modalities and sectors, including education, the Poverty Action Fund, governance and HIV/AIDS. The 2007-2009 strategy was well aligned to the Government of Uganda's policies, focused on poverty reduction and reflected well the Irish Government's 2006 White Paper. Ireland has been a flexible partner and is recognised for its strong record on aid effectiveness. Irish Aid's approach to policy influence and aid effectiveness through dialogue and aid coordination work was highly relevant given Irish Aid's profile in Uganda as a neutral, medium-size aligned partner. It also had the capacity and structure (with its integrated political and development approach) in-country to contribute to the different coordination mechanisms. In terms of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, Ireland has been seen as a leader in advocating compliance and has set a strong example for others. Good results have occurred in public financial management, justice, education and HIV/AIDS. In addition, the IA team worked hard to identify where and how opportunities for mainstreaming could be found. There has been a generally good approach to risk management, particularly with regard to governance, political and fiduciary risk. In implementing this Country Strategy Paper, Irish Aid's staff has been strong in terms of technical capacity, local knowledge, and mediation from the point of view of government and aid partners. The introduction of stronger business planning and teamworking has led to improved synergy across the Irish Aid programme. Important challenges remain in Uganda which form the backdrop against which the next Irish Aid strategy is being planned: pro-poor spending on services has been inefficient, decentralisation has been slow, and serious regional inequalities persist. The next Country Strategy Paper needs to further improve Irish Aid's strategic focus, address public service delivery, improve conflict sensitivity and continue to target areas of chronic poverty such as in Karamoja.

S2. Purpose: The Evaluation and Audit Department of Irish Aid commissioned this independent evaluation in order to provide the Senior Management of Irish Aid and the Country Team in Uganda with an assessment of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and impact of the Country Strategy Paper (2007-09). The report is intended to inform future thinking around the next Country Strategy Paper.

S3. Context: In the last two decades, Uganda has been transformed from a failing state to one of Africa's fastest growing economies. Economic growth has averaged 7.5% between 2002 and 2007 and the pattern of sustained growth over 20 years has contributed to a significant reduction in income poverty. In 2005/2006, 31% of Ugandans lived below the national poverty line compared with 56% in 1992/1993. The Government led its war against poverty through the Poverty Eradication Action Plan, which has provided a comprehensive framework for partners to support the country to meet its poverty reduction targets. Uganda has made good progress in the Millennium Development Goals related to education, gender and HIV/AIDS, but is off-track in others, particularly in child and maternal mortality. There has been continued political stability under President Museveni since 1986 and the country moved to a multi-party political system in 2005. After years of conflict and loss of life, peace prospects are positive in Northern Uganda (though the peace agreement remains unsigned and instability continues in Karamoja). The forthcoming elections in 2011 are already shaping political events and are a major issue in terms of stability over the period of three years. High population growth, inadequate infrastructure and energy supplies present

significant challenges for further growth; however, the newly confirmed oil reserves in Western Uganda indicate substantial prospects for revenue generation in the medium term.

S4. Development assistance has risen sharply over the period from USD 1.2 billion to USD 1.7 billion. The aid architecture of Uganda is dominated by the budget support modality, which accounted for nearly half of total recorded in-flows in 2006/2007. Uganda has enjoyed a reputation for strong aid coordination and effective implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. A major feature of the donor architecture is the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy, which has since 2005 acted as a framework for twelve of the main donors who together account for about two thirds of official development assistance.

S5. Irish Aid has been involved in Uganda since 1994 and though it is only the country's eighth largest donor, providing 4% of official assistance, it has a strong record of engagement in aid coordination mechanisms, membership of the donor budget support group, and of effective local-level aid delivery. Uganda has been the largest recipient of Ireland's bilateral development assistance since 2000, receiving 12% of Ireland's total bilateral aid during 2005-2007. Under the current country strategy, Irish Aid has committed some €118 million through a mix of modalities and sectors. Education is the largest sector funded by Irish Aid (€41.3 million, of which €25.7 million is sector budget support); further commitments include the Poverty Action Fund (€30 million), governance (€24.5 million, of which €7.2 million is sector budget support), and HIV/AIDS (€16.2 million).

S6. Methodology: The evaluation used a matrix of questions developed in the Terms of Reference and based on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact. The matrix was adapted during the inception period, based on discussions with Irish Aid, and used as a basis for guiding interviews with a range of Development Partners, government and Non-Governmental Organisation representatives and beneficiaries. A five-person team of independent consultants then undertook a field visit to Uganda for two weeks in January 2009 and interviewed respondents in Kampala as well as in Karamoja and Rwenzori.

Main Findings

Relevance

S7. The Country Strategy Paper was well aligned with the Government of Uganda's policies and addressed Uganda's strategic priorities on poverty reduction as articulated through the third phase of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan. For the first time, Irish Aid's strategy was based upon a multi-donor Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy that reflected a joint response of 12 Development Partners to the Government of Uganda's poverty reduction strategy.

S8. While the Poverty Eradication Action Plan has been regarded overall as a 'success story', its relevance has reduced as Uganda's growth has progressed and - since the 2006 elections - the National Resistance Movement ruling party has concentrated on employment and economic growth rather than on social development. In addition, the Government's Medium-Term Expenditure Framework has evolved to reflect a greater heterogeneity of spend demands that have led to a reduced poverty focus. The relevance of the IA programme, which was closely aligned to the Poverty Eradication Action Plan, has therefore been affected, and in recognition of this IA has taken steps to support the new National Development Plan.

S9. Given the links to the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy and the Poverty Eradication Action Plan, and also the Division of Labour exercise in 2006, it is evident that the Country Strategy Paper was formulated in a collaborative manner with the Government of Uganda and with other Development Partners. Indeed, the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy was regarded as a sufficiently comprehensive and shared strategy document that the country team felt that Ireland could adopt the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy as its own country strategy with the Country Strategy Paper written as a 'cover note' to it.

S10. The strong focus on poverty reduction, governance, education, HIV/AIDS and gender were also themes that aligned the Country Strategy Paper with Irish Aid's corporate policies. The Country Strategy Paper reflected the Irish Government's 2006 White Paper principles on human development, security and justice, democracy and gender equality. The close alignment with Uganda's own development priorities reflected Ireland's foreign policy imperative to follow good partnership principles, which stress that leadership of the development process should be in the hands of partner countries and that Africa should remain a focus of support.

S11. Irish Aid recognised the need to improve the focus of its portfolio and did so by leaving the health and agriculture sectors. The move out of health was made after a careful assessment that the sector was well funded from other donors. IA was aware that key Millennium Development Goals indicators in infant and maternal mortality were off-track, but concluded that this will require a multi-sectoral response, especially from education and HIV/AIDS, areas where Irish Aid was to remain engaged. In agriculture, Irish Aid was a small donor and left other donors with more substantial commitments to continue supporting the sector. While Irish Aid increased its focus (moving from five to three pillars under the Country Strategy Paper 2007-2009) in those sectors where it stayed, the pillars had multiple components (six in education for example), while governance spanned three very different and equally complex areas. Even with fund pooling and joint management arrangements, this diversity presented a significant challenge to the advisory team.

S12. The basis for addressing HIV/AIDS through multiple channels (a programme with different interventions as well as a cross-cutting issue) was strong. Though HIV/AIDS prevalence had fallen, infection rates have recently been rising in adults and at-risk populations. The strategy to work with government at national, sectoral and local levels, with UN agencies and with civil society correctly recognised three needs. These were to mainstream, to support Government and to reach communities through innovative civil society funding.

S13. Education remained as the major sector in funding terms. Irish Aid's long involvement in the sector has brought understanding and influence, yet the ambitious mix of sector budget support, project support for national agencies - including support to four national education institutions - as well as district programmes such as school construction and bursary initiatives in Karamoja, brought implementation challenges, and somewhat contradicted earlier evaluation evidence that the focus for future Irish Aid support should be on the central level and strengthening the Sector-Wide Approach, while support at district level and through projects should be selective.

S14. All programmes that Irish Aid chose to support in Governance, including public sector reforms, decentralisation, public finance management, and justice, law and order were relevant. The choice of basket funding mechanisms and earmarked budget support through the Poverty Action Fund has enabled Irish Aid directly to support the Government of Uganda's sectoral strategies. The relevance of the Poverty Action Fund - a fund that

ringfenced government expenditure to key poverty-related sectors - has diminished in recent years however, in light of the country's improvements in public expenditure management. It is worth noting that basket funding mechanisms and forms of budget support work differently; like projects, the former support selected Ministries directly and come with their own reporting requirements, while the latter make full use of the Government of Uganda Public Financial Management systems, and in so doing, fuels central government's budgeting, planning and reporting procedures¹.

S15. Elsewhere, Ireland's use of a mix of aid channels was largely complementary and spread risk; 80% of its expenditures have passed through Government systems. However, non-Country Strategy Paper funding (from Headquarters) is almost entirely directed towards non-government (Non-Governmental Organisations, missionary organisations, the United Nations and the private sector) and represents a third of the Country Strategy Paper total allocation. The predominance of funding for government, combined with substantial support for civil society, appears to be appropriate as it reflects the difference in absorption capacity between the two - the importance Irish Aid attached to aligning with government and its poverty eradication programme - but at the same time, Irish Aid's concern to strengthen civil society and to respond to local and humanitarian needs. However, the ratio of funding between country and Headquarters resource allocations did not emerge from a conscious plan of support to Uganda. The Country Strategy Paper does not refer to the additional Headquarters funding for Uganda or state how the funds would combine to deliver broader, possibly more strategic outcomes.

S16. The Country Strategy Paper monitoring and evaluation arrangements were correctly tied to a collective Poverty Eradication Action Plan-based framework, though it placed too much reliance on national reporting systems to measure outcomes. In an effort to capture both development outcomes and aid delivery quality and processes, Irish Aid adopted an overly complex programme logic with six objectives and three pillars. As gaps in Poverty Eradication Action Plan reporting have emerged, the Irish Aid team sensibly established a separate Monitoring & Evaluation framework that better identified results due to Irish Aid funding, although many indicators still remain unquantified.

S17. The Country Strategy Paper recognised a number of important risks, including political transition, weak governance and poor recognition of human rights. But the strategy paid less attention to the risks that conflict might have on the programme (and the programme on conflict) and to the fiduciary risk that the Poverty Action Fund - though an earmarked fund - was as exposed to as other forms of budget support. The three funding scenarios (base, low and high) provided for only a modest variation in response to changing conditions ($\pm 5\%$).

S18. Irish Aid has had four mainstreaming priorities (governance, gender, HIV/AIDS and environment) in the strategy. Governance and HIV/AIDS were given most attention as they were both programme pillars and cross-cutting issues. Irish Aid was well placed to address gender given its corporate policy commitments and its previous work in Uganda. Gender-specific interventions were defined both for internal Irish Aid action and for mainstreaming in all Country Strategy Paper sectors. Environment is mentioned as a cross-cutting issue but with only the modest aim of building staff capacity to mainstream in future programmes.

¹ Further analysis is available in Tim Williamson, April 2008 (final), Putting Aid On Budget: A Case Study of Uganda, A Study for the Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI) and the Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA) Mokoro Ltd.

Effectiveness

S19. For most programmes, Irish Aid is one of several contributing partners and hence attribution is difficult. Moreover, several important programmes started recently - for example those in public financial management, public service reform and local government were all launched in 2006/2007, and the HIV/AIDS civil society fund was launched in May 2008.

S20. In terms of the overall Poverty Eradication Action Plan, which the Country Strategy Paper fully supported, pro-poor spending through the Poverty Action Fund has met the agreed targets, and funds have been channeled to local governments. However, the share of pro-poor spending as defined under the PAF has declined, and the late release of funds and low capacity has led to implementation inefficiencies at local levels. This has been compounded by the large wage component in the budget and the consequent crowding out of spending on priority areas.

S21. Recent moves to design a new instrument - the Joint Budget Support Framework (JBSF) - have sought to improve transparency and harmonisation, its main aim being to support the Government of Uganda in improving the impact of public spending. This is a sound response that recognises that the main issue with service delivery in Uganda is its poor quality and value for money and that poverty will not be reduced until basic services improve. Ireland has been fully involved in joint discussions to elaborate the principles and structures for the Joint Budget Support Framework. These include a new joint assessment framework (JAF) that is expected to track results over a spectrum of financial, governance and sector indicators and provide a more rigorous, budget-aligned and transparent tool for fund releases.

S22. In public sector reforms, Ireland and its partners share solid achievements in their support to Uganda's public finance management through support to the Financial Management and Accountability Programme (FINMAP). Financial assessments indicate that basic budgeting and audit systems are in place, though there are concerns over poor compliance. In public service reform there has been mixed performance, with gains in use of client charters, results-oriented management and payroll cleaning, but limited progress on pay reform or restructuring of central government, though better progress has occurred in local government.

S23. Good results have occurred in the justice, law and order sector. In civic and legal education campaigns, services and coordination have improved, and police and state attorneys have increased deployment. While new legislation has been drafted in critical areas such as gender-based violence, the enactment of these laws has been slow. There have been reductions in time on remand, increased provision of legal aid and improved security in Northern Uganda. While public confidence in the justice system is reported to have increased, surveys show that there are still concerns over corruption, especially in relation to the police. Important gains have been registered in human rights, including the capacity of the Uganda Human Rights Commission and the African Centre for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture Victims to investigate cases and undertake advocacy.

S24. In local government, while major strides have been made in streamlining systems for decentralisation and strengthening structures, dependency on central government funding remains high. Local government reforms supported by Irish Aid have been facilitated by a more comprehensive policy framework and increased transfers from the Poverty Action Fund; however, local governments have been given only limited financial autonomy and have been hampered by the abolition of the graduated tax. Decentralisation has long been

subject to political interference - including the sharp rise in the number of districts - especially ahead of the elections. The role of the Local Government Associations is not sufficiently felt at the local level, yet they should be at the forefront of advocating for efficient service delivery.

S25. Ireland's exit from the health sector was generally well managed. Irish Aid agreed that UK Department for International Development (DFID) would continue to represent Irish Aid interests in the health donor group following its departure from the sector, and Irish Aid completed its financial commitments to the health sector support. However, delays and difficulties in completing the final phase of the national primary health care programme have affected government's ownership.

S26. Recent education trends show growing net enrolment rates and gender equality; however, persistent regional inequalities continue and access is worse for the poor. Irish Aid has been effective in piloting education quality improvement programmes, but improving school conditions is tough when 90% of Poverty Action Fund monies are devoted towards mandatory costs, such as teachers' wages, which crowd out spending on education quality. At the regional level, Irish Aid support in the Rwenzori region has greatly improved teaching and learning and the Core Primary Teachers' College has evolved into a model for producing high-quality teachers that have influenced the national curriculum. In Karamoja, the bursary scheme has increased access for 850 local students in eight schools across five districts, though an independent evaluation would help to decide if the scheme should be extended. The €13 million construction programme for 13 secondary schools and teacher colleges is not yet complete, and impact will depend on commensurate improvements in software (teachers, equipment, students).

S27. Irish Aid's HIV/AIDS programmes have been effective in terms of service delivery, coordination, technical support and policy dialogue. The Civil Society Fund (CSF) has supported 120 civil society organisations with grants totalling US\$12.8 million and through these efforts, over 88,000 people were reached with prevention information, 40,000 were counselled and tested, 9,000 benefited from palliative care and 33,000 orphans and vulnerable children received community services. With Irish Aid's support, large and less-aligned funders like USAID have been brought into the Civil Society Fund mechanism so improving coordination. HIV/AIDS has been mainstreamed in national and decentralised policies and plans; for example, in education.

S28. Irish Aid's compliance with the Paris principles of aid effectiveness is stronger than most other partners, as recent Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee reviews indicate, particularly in the use of local financial and procurement systems, avoidance of project implementation units, untying of aid and predictability.

S29. Evidence for mainstreaming of governance and environment in different sectors is limited. However, progress on gender and HIV/AIDS mainstreaming is more positive, especially in education. Local government and public sector reform have been assisted to promote gender concerns and advocacy work has been effective on gender-based violence. Some progress has occurred in engendering the budgeting process, and Irish Aid-financed studies on gender aspects in economic growth for the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development are expected to be influential.

Efficiency

S30. The narrowing of the portfolio and the use of basket funds has increased the efficiency of Irish Aid's spending. However, aid management mechanisms continue to be complex and exert high transaction costs for the Government of Uganda and Development Partners; moreover, with considerable resources flowing to the Poverty Action Fund, Irish Aid reliance on coordination and efficiency within central Government of Uganda organs has grown. The efficiency of government machinery has been affected by the unequal capacities and performance of the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Planning (MoFPED), Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and the National Planning Authority. While the Office of the Prime Minister has the mandate for aid coordination, it has yet to be seen as effective, and the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development has reasserted its role as the senior planning as well as finance ministry.

S31. Irish Aid's own efficiency in terms of predictability has been good, with close to 100% disbursement against budget over the Country Strategy Paper period. Irish Aid's staff also has a good profile from the point of view of government and aid partners in terms of technical capacity, local knowledge and mediation. Staffing levels have been as planned for 2007 and 2008, but there have been advisor gaps in late 2008 and 2009 that have increased workload. Competency gaps exist in two areas: conflict sensitivity and environment. New teamworking approaches have been effective, but learning across teams could be improved. The staff survey conducted by our evaluation placed priority on the need for greater field exposure and stronger policy analysis and influencing skills.

S32. Outside of the bilateral country programme, links with Multi-Annual Programme Scheme (MAPS) partners has improved with more open and shared dialogue. In relation to the private sector, the Embassy has played a supportive though limited role so far in the rapidly growing area of oil exploration. Nevertheless, the substantial economic and governance implications arising from the embryonic but reportedly huge potential of the oil industry in Uganda are concerns that Irish Aid needs to understand and respond to. Irish Aid's support from Headquarters to Traidlinks has yet to produce substantial results in terms of assisting businesses to grow, while the overall future strategy of Traidlinks has yet to emerge. Traidlinks needs to be clearer about its niche role and also the rationale for providing subsidised support to a small number of firms.

S33. Conflict and humanitarian assistance has been managed by Irish Aid Headquarters although the Embassy has been active in the Partners for Democracy and Governance donor group and has played a coordinating role in the humanitarian response to N. Uganda. Support for peace talks and de-mining are also Headquarters-managed initiatives. There is room for greater understanding and use of conflict analysis approaches to Irish Aid's development work, building on experiences in Karamoja and, given the planned greater engagement in the post-conflict setting of N. Uganda, recent conflict sensitivity training has started to address this gap.

Impact

S34. Uganda is on track to reach the national poverty headcount target of 10% by 2017, provided that Gross Domestic Product growth does not slow, population growth is reduced and inequalities do not increase. These caveats are critical. While poverty has lowered in the central and western regions, there has been no significant change in the northern and eastern regions. Recent evidence also suggests that the Poverty Eradication Action Plan could have had greater effect on reducing poverty than it did if it had not neglected key areas such as agricultural research and family planning.

S35. Irish Aid's main contribution has been its support to the Poverty Action Fund within the national poverty reduction framework, its associated public sector reform programmes, and sectoral support in education and justice, law and order. But Ireland's contribution (the majority of which goes to the Government of Uganda and over half on budget support) is just 4% of all assistance and this assistance in turn provided some 36-40% of total government revenue over the period.

Lessons

The main lessons that emerge from the evaluation are set out below.

1. In a country like Uganda, where public expenditure management has become significantly stronger, using a virtual fund mechanism like the Poverty Action Fund comes with important drawbacks: the selection of Poverty Action Fund expenditure lines has been largely ad hoc and out of phase with sector budget planning, and their protection from in-year budget cuts has led to underinvestment elsewhere. Overspending in public administration, in particular, remains a matter of concern. Recent Poverty Action Fund reforms by the Government of Uganda will help resolve the Poverty Action Fund's static definition, but fiscal slippage, and more widely, cases of financial mismanagement, are likely to continue. This calls for a fuller acknowledgement, as well as continued monitoring, of the country's fiduciary risk by Irish Aid.
2. Irish Aid's direct support to line ministries through joint donor basket funding has shown evident benefits but has also come with some drawbacks. Because they use the same mechanisms as, and/or are in effect, projects, basket funds - like Local Government Sector Investment Programme and Public Service Reform Programme - can weaken the relationships between the beneficiary line ministries which receive money directly from donors and the ministries they respond to, notably the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. They also require separate reporting procedures. On the positive side, the use of donor basket funding tends to secure more immediate results as a result of a close monitoring of activities.
3. Focusing or narrowing down a country strategy means more than reducing the number of pillars, but also making choices within sectors and within programmes. This requires sound analysis of how such choices fit with Irish Aid's overall strategy, Irish Aid's own comparative strengths and country experience.
4. Withdrawing from sectors in the interests of aid harmonisation can be successfully done provided there is good consultation, a phased withdrawal and an understanding that relevant Millennium Development Goals can be addressed in a multi-sectoral way.
5. Financial aid alone is not sufficient for effective policy dialogue. A donor also needs to bring sound technical engagement and willingness to dialogue and, when necessary, take a lead on coordination. Irish Aid's use of national and international consultants, continuation of strategic projects and pilot and targeted studies has enabled Irish Aid to become an active and trusted participant in various structures, notably in education, justice and decentralisation.
6. Mainstreaming of areas such as gender and HIV/AIDS can be successful if it; (i) is set as a strategic objective; (ii) has commitment within the programme team; (iii) uses innovative team approaches; and (iv) is backed by technical and financial resources.

7. Sector budget support can be an effective approach even in a complex multi-stakeholder sector such as justice, law and order where 13 institutions are involved with strong, independent mandates.
8. Local government reform is a broad, complex and politicised arena that stretches donor ability to influence as a sector. On the other hand, donors can expect good results if they focus on specific results, or on specific interventions such as HIV/AIDS.
9. Elections usually bring on board new politicians and leaders who may not be competent in cross-cutting issues such as HIV/AIDS, governance or gender and therefore repeating interventions may be required. The creation of new administrative units also has similar implications in decentralisation. Continuous sensitisation and capacity building in mainstreaming at different levels is needed.
10. Remaining involved for some years in a sector (such as education) and working at local as well as national level can bring a deeper understanding, a recognition of technical competence and, ultimately, greater policy influence.
11. Due to its special cultural heritage and different resource endowment, Karamoja needs a long-term development perspective and better coordination in order to address the complex and chronic poverty challenges. Ireland's range of experience there provides it with a platform to deepen engagement.
12. Well integrated political and development teamwork and programme approaches provides Ireland with a comparative advantage over other development partners in areas of governance (justice, human rights), though not necessarily areas concerning military or security matters where others have greater resources.
13. Where large and less well-aligned development partners are present, Irish Aid can play a useful strategic role, and enhance its reputation through providing neutral, flexible and appropriate advice.
14. It is risky to rely on joint donor-government poverty monitoring mechanisms to show the contribution of and results due to Irish Aid, especially when the Government's commitment and incentives to operationalise broad mechanisms - such as the National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy - appear weak.

Recommendations for next Country Strategy Paper

1. As part of the upcoming strategy process, Irish Aid will need to undertake a careful analysis of the Ugandan context (2011 elections, continued economic and demographic growth and inequality, prospective growth in oil revenues, uncertain peace agreement) and also gain clarity over government priorities (under the National Development Plan).
2. Reduce further the range of interventions within the two pillars in the current Country Strategy Paper (human development and governance with growth). Within these pillars, ensure a better prioritisation in terms of sectors, sub-sectors and programmes, as well as appropriate exit strategies where disengagement is planned.
3. Based on past performance and current opportunities, Irish Aid's priorities should be on addressing chronic poverty and inequality, improving quality in education in

specific strategic areas such as Karamoja, improving governance and mainstreaming gender and HIV/AIDS.

4. Use the opportunity of Joint Budget Support Framework to adopt a more effective approach to general and sector budget support. The analysis around Joint Assessment Framework indicators, as reported annually, should be made more robust. This will include Irish Aid's analysis of fiduciary risk, scrutiny over local governments' ability to absorb conditional grants, and focus on results in priority sectors.
5. Maintain a balance in modalities in order to manage risk, provide resources for civil society and strengthen selected government agencies. But careful attention should be placed on the choice and combination of aid instruments, and how their respective channels of delivery will support rather than undermine government ownership under the National Development Plan. Where basket funds are likely to remain the main modality of support for line ministries, Irish Aid should justify their choice in terms of results, innovation, and access to technical capacity. They should also set the conditions for any possible transition to more general budget support.
6. It may be wise to devise a Country Strategy Paper with greater flexibility and which includes more contrasting investment plans that reflect a wider range of possible national scenarios based on comprehensive risk assessment and mitigation.
7. Structure the Country Strategy Paper objectives and supporting pillars to help improve Monitoring & Evaluation: aim for a clearer logic between sub-programmes' objectives, programmes' outcomes and overall goal.
8. Conflict sensitivity should be mainstreamed across the programme to ensure that all interventions at least do no harm and at best mitigate conflict. As part of the preparation for a new country strategy, a strategic conflict assessment should also be conducted (preferably jointly with others). Conflict mitigation/peacebuilding could take precedence over Irish Aid's environmental mainstreaming, given Ireland's comparative advantage in the former.
9. In Karamoja, Irish Aid can consider building on their existing diverse platform (in education; Justice, Law and Order Sector; human rights and conflict resolution) and supporting a more coordinated conflict-sensitive approach that brings local government, the new Minister for Karamoja², other donors, Multi-Annual Programme Scheme partners and humanitarian actors more effectively together.
10. In education, streamline different initiatives and only fund agencies such as the Education Service Commission, Uganda National Examinations Board, National Curriculum Development Centre and Education Standards Agency where justification exists for specific activities while encouraging the Ministry of Education to take over their funding through the sector budget support. Seek ways to move the Quality Enhancement Initiative from its current off-budget status to an on-budget position. Uganda National Teachers' Union (UNATU), as an NGO, merits support in order to broaden policy dialogue and highlighting the plight of teachers.

² The President's wife, Janet Museveni, was recently appointed as the new Minister for Karamoja.

11. Irish Aid should continue to support HIV/AIDS through a mix of interventions by civil society and the public sector (Uganda AIDS Commission and Ministry of Local Government), but should endeavour to build government commitment to fund and lead.
12. Decentralisation is a key but challenging sector. IA may need to focus either geographically or in terms of priority areas within the decentralisation basket such as building capacity to operationalise the tax system in order to enhance results.
13. In public sector reforms, Irish Aid may consider it wise to focus on financial reforms rather than other areas such as public service reform (an area which it is leaving, according to the Aid Mapping exercise). Irish Aid's participation in various working groups could help ensure key issues such as human resources remain high on the agenda.
14. Irish Aid should continue active engagement in the justice, law and order sector, but should address the negative perception of its institutions among the public through awareness creation and outreach, and help Justice, Law and Order Sector institutions to streamline systems, especially at the front-line level in delivering services to the people, and develop scenarios for changes in strategies given the coming elections in 2011.
15. On gender, Irish Aid should earmark a specific budget in the programme to support gender initiatives. There is also a need more fully to involve the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development in gender mainstreaming. Irish Aid could also assist this Ministry in the renewal of the Social Development Sector Investment Plan in order to more effectively coordinate strategies for addressing inequality and social protection.
16. The substantial economic and governance implications arising from the future oil industry in Uganda raise potential development concerns that Irish Aid needs to understand and respond to in terms of both local and national issues, particularly around accountability, corporate governance and anti-corruption.
17. To improve Irish Aid staffing efficiency, share lessons and expertise across teams, increase field exposure, upgrade influencing skills and fill staff gaps. The increase in budget support and basket funding has meant that there are fewer visible projects or 'concrete' examples of Ireland's assistance on poverty reduction. While Irish Aid's reputation is strong, especially amongst its like-minded partners, it would be valuable to continue regional or local programmes that focus on service delivery to the poor, and also to develop further Irish Aid's press and media skills.

1. Introduction and Context

1.1 Introduction

1. Irish Aid (IA) has been engaged in Uganda since 1994, and support has grown from IRE700,000 to IRE7.5 million in 1999 and €41 million in 2008. IA's support has been guided by strategies covering the periods 1997-1999, 2000-2003, 2004-2006, 2007-2009; and from a largely project-based approach in the nineties, the IA programme grew from 2000 into a predominantly budget support modality (rising to 70% of spend by 2003). The sector coverage expanded to include macro-economic support; agriculture; health; education; HIV/AIDS; governance; decentralisation; justice, law and order; humanitarian; and conflict. The 2007-2009 strategy then narrowed the strategic focus to three main pillars (economic management, governance and human development), in line with the donor division of labour under the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS), and in order to address internal concerns that the programme was too spread. Spend increased to €124 million over three years, making Uganda IA's largest country programme over the period.

2. The Evaluation and Audit Department of IA commissioned this evaluation with a purpose: "to provide Irish Aid and its partners with an evaluation of the IA (Uganda) Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 2007-2009 which will inform future strategic decision making, with particular reference to the formulation of the next CSP covering the period 2010-2014". (See Annex 1 for Terms of Reference)

3. This report is structured as follows: first, the context of the programme in terms of the political events in Uganda and the socio-economic conditions are described. Chapter Two then outlines the strategies and interventions of IA's programme over the period 2007-2009. Chapter Three presents the findings of the evaluation. These include the relevance of IA's strategic approach and its programme, how Ireland worked with partners and government, how it approached cross-cutting issues such as gender, and how it tackled risk. The chapter also explores how effectively IA delivered its programme, what results have been achieved, and how well it has operated in the context of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness principles. The chapter concludes by looking at broader impact in terms of governance and development outcomes, and sustainability. Chapter Four finally puts forward a series of lessons and recommendations for IA as it prepares to draft a five-year new country strategy for 2010-2014.

1.2 Country Background

4. The government of President Museveni has been in power since 1986 and has overseen the transition of a country from political turmoil and economic decline to one of relative political stability and sustained economic growth. The forthcoming elections due in 2011, consolidation of peace in the northern and eastern region, the National Development Plan (NDP) and oil revenue prospects will shape Uganda's political and economic outlook in the years to come. The country's reliance on development assistance is set to decline further.

Political situation

5. Uganda's first multi-party elections were held in 2006 and were regarded as broadly free and fair, though there were some reservations over the treatment of the opposition

party leader, Kiiza Besigye. A constitutional limit on presidential terms was abolished in 2005 and in 2006 President Museveni won a third elected term in office, with 59% of the national vote. His party, the National Resistance Movement, retained 205 seats out of 319 seats in parliament.

6. Local council elections were conducted in the weeks following the 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections. Decentralisation has been a key feature of Uganda's domestic politics, and the devolution of power and functions to local governments is enshrined in the Constitution. However, in 2006, the number of districts was raised from 56 to 80, mostly for political reasons. The creation of new districts, combined with the abolition of the local (graduated) tax in 2006, has undermined the viability of the districts as administrative entities and increased their reliance on funding from central government.

7. The international community has called on the GoU to pursue electoral reforms in advance of the 2011 elections. Human rights are generally respected and freedom of speech and in the media is recognised, but slippage remains likely. The Press Freedom survey rates Uganda as "partly free", and new cases of extra-judiciary killings, illegal detention and torture by Ugandan security forces are reported every year³.

8. Importantly, a cessation of hostilities in the northern region was signed in August 2006. The significance of this conflict pitting government troops against the rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) should not be underestimated; the war, lasting for almost 20 years, has seen nearly two million people driven from their homes and the abduction of 25,000 children. Though a final peace agreement has yet to be signed, security has improved, after LRA troops were forced to flee to neighbouring countries in 2008⁴. In the northeast of Uganda, conflict and insecurity arising from traditional cattle raiding has combined with vulnerability and semi-arid conditions to cause what has been termed 'pastoral destitution'. A Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP) and subsequently a Peace Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) for Northern Uganda were prepared in 2006-2007 by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), but funding support from the Government and from donors has been delayed.

Policy trends

9. The GoU has made significant headway with policy reforms and has generally pursued a prudent macro-economic policy (barring selected years). In December 2006, the IMF approved Uganda's request for a three-year Policy Support Instrument (PSI), with the programme goals including macro-economic stability, sustainable economic growth, poverty reduction, financial sector deepening, and improved public sector financial management. The GoU also qualifies for yearly World Bank Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSC).

10. Fiscal consolidation continued over the evaluation period, with the government gradually improving revenue collection and restraining expansion in public expenditure. In 2007/2008, the government fiscal deficit (including and excluding grants) amounted to 2.4%

³ The number of reported torture clients treated by the African Centre for Torture Victims (ACTV) has risen from 752 in 2005 to 1,145 in 2006 and 1,400 in 2007.

⁴ In recent months a renewed regional pursuit of LRA forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan has taken place. Killings in December 2008 in the neighbouring countries are reported in the press to be up to 1,000 civilians and combatants. Meanwhile, the peace process has stalled after repeated attempts to get the peace agreement signed by the LRA leader, Joseph Kony. Uganda has been involved in a joint military operation (now concluded) with Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to rout the LRA out of Garamba forest in DRC.

and 7.7% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) respectively. Although the GoU met its fiscal target in that year, adjustment was required to compensate for greater than budgeted spending related to Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) and the purchase of a new presidential jet. Domestic arrears have also continued to pile up.

11. Corruption remains a serious problem in Uganda. According to Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2008, Uganda scored 2.6 out of 10, placing it in the 60 countries below a score of 3 and regarded as the most corrupt. The country, however, has scored better than its immediate neighbours. While the country has strong procedures, rules and regulations, sanctioning and enforcement practices are weak. A number of high-profile corruption cases came to light over the evaluation period, including the misuse of CHOGM monies and the case involving the misuse of funds from the Global Fund. Cases of corruption in local governments have been related to procurement, financial management and human capacity.

12. At the same time, the GoU has shown strong commitment to the fight against poverty, as formulated in successive Poverty Eradication Action Plans (PEAPs) since 1997. The PEAP is a comprehensive and poverty-focused programme built around five pillars: economic management; enhancing competitiveness, production and incomes; security, conflict resolution and disaster management; governance; human resources development. The current PEAP covers the period 2005/2006 and 2008/2009, and is to be replaced by the NDP. Poor value for money and inequality of access to services remain major issues. According to IA, frameworks for the promotion and safeguarding of economic and social rights are in place, but need to be translated into action and adequately funded⁵.

Economic growth and poverty reduction

13. The country has experienced higher economic growth than most other countries in the Sub-Saharan African region. The restoration of relative stability, strong leadership for reforms and increased donor support fuelled economic recovery in the 1990s, albeit from a very low base. Sustained economic growth continued in the ensuing years, with annual real GDP growth hovering between 5 and 10%. Over the 2005/2006-2007/2008 period, annual real GDP growth averaged 9.5% using newly revised national accounts estimates (6.2% using old definition), and the economy has trebled in size since 1988. Uganda's economy is relatively well diversified. Agriculture's share of GDP has fallen from 54% in the early to mid-1980s to 32% currently, while that of services has risen from 35% to 47% and that of industry almost doubled from 11% to 21% over the same period⁶. The relatively stable macro-economic environment has encouraged private investment, which has increased to 19% of GDP - significantly above the African average. Power and transport infrastructure are the main binding constraints to future growth (according to the World Bank 2007

Box 1 Uganda's Oil Potential

According to one of the major oil explorers operating in the country, Uganda has a potential of 100-150,000 bbls oil production per day, which equates to potential 5 billion USD revenue p.a. to Govt. This is 10 times tourism revenue, double current total revenue and provides a basis for economic self-sufficiency. It also has the potential to be an important multiplier for the industry sector and could provide employment for 5-10,000 employed directly and 10,000 indirectly. Oil and gas could provide important alternative sources of energy to complement hydropower for national & East African region. (Presentation by Tullow Oil, February 2009)

⁵ CSP Scoping Paper, Political Analysis, Irish Aid, 2008

⁶ CSP Scoping Paper, Economic Development, Irish Aid, 2008

Country Economic Referendum). Recently, oil prospects have emerged that if correct will have a major impact on Uganda's self-sufficiency in the next 10-15 years (see Box 1).

14. With donor support, spending on social sectors in Uganda has increased significantly over the last two decades. The combined social investment and economic growth have contributed to a fall in the population living below the national poverty line from 56% in 1990 to 39% in 2000 and 31% in 2005. But rising inequality and high population growth have undermined these positive trends.

15. Over the last decade, inequality has increased among and within regions as well as between rural and urban populations. The PEAP Annual Policy Implementation Review (APIR) 2007-2008 confirms that income inequality between regions seems to have been increasing between 1992/1993 and 2005/2006. There is also significant inequality in access to basic services.

16. Chronic poverty affects 20% of the population and poverty in Northern and Eastern Uganda is particularly severe. In the Karamoja region, the population of around 1 million faces severe consumption poverty, social exclusion and insecurity that ranks them below the LRA-affected districts in the North. Development interventions have in the past failed to address the complex nature of Karamoja, and presents a special case for donors interested in contributing to poverty eradication in this region⁷.

17. Progress in achieving Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) mostly took place in the 1990s, but has since slowed down. Some MDGs, such as infant and maternal mortality and school completion rates are off-track (Annex 2), and with a population growing at 3.3% a year, even maintaining the existing level of service delivery poses a formidable challenge. Totalling 30m, the population has doubled in the last two decades, and the fast-growing population has kept per capita real GDP growth low.

18. In education, Uganda made strong progress in net primary enrolment following the introduction of Universal Primary Education (UPE) in 1997, but this has stagnated in recent years. As a result, the country is unlikely to meet the 100% net enrolment and completion ratio by 2015. At the same time, the gender ratio target in primary education has been reached.

19. In health, results of the 2006 Uganda Demographic and Health Survey (UDHS) show some improvements in access to health care services and quality of life indicators. Uganda is on track to achieve MDG sub-goals of increasing the population access to safe water and halting the spread of HIV/AIDS. But progress in increasing the population access to sanitation has not been fast enough, and the country is seriously off-track when it comes to reducing child, infant, and maternal mortality and increasing the use of bed nets to fight malaria. Although there was a significant decline in the prevalence of HIV in Uganda from 18% to 6.2% between 1992 and 2002, the Uganda Aids Commission (UAC) has noted that, "Overall, the current HIV prevalence of 6.4% in the general population is unacceptably high... a stabilisation is becoming more apparent. Current trends in HIV prevalence are showing a

⁷ Understanding Chronic Poverty and Vulnerability Issues in Karamoja Region, A Desk Study for Irish Aid, Development Research and Training Ltd., June 2008.


rise among some populations, such as married people. There is an apparent shift of the peak of the epidemic from young people to adults 30-39 years.”⁸

Development assistance

20. The domestic revenue share of the national budget has been gradually rising. From 58% average over the period 2004/2005 to 2006/2007, the share reached 66% for the financial year 2007/2008, and is currently estimated at 72% for the current financial year⁹.

21. Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), as recorded by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development - Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), has also risen sharply over the period from USD1.2 to 1.7 billion. The aid architecture of Uganda is dominated by the budget support modality, which accounted for 46.8% of total inflows in 2006/2007. This is followed by investment project assistance (23%) and project technical assistance (at 16%). A major feature of this aid architecture is the 12 Partners to the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS) who together account for about two-thirds of ODA. The lead sources of assistance are the World Bank, USA and UK, which together account for 50% of inflows. Ireland, as the eighth largest donor, has remained fairly constant at around 4% of all official assistance (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Development Assistance to Uganda 2004-2007



⁸ Accelerating HIV Prevention in Uganda: The Road towards Universal Access. Drivers of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic and Effectiveness of Prevention Interventions in Uganda.” A Synthesis Report. September 2006. Uganda AIDS Commission (2006).

⁹ Although due to exchange rate fluctuations this may fall to 70% by end of the year (Interview with K. Muhakanizi, Deputy Secretary to Treasury).

1.3 Methodology

22. This country programme evaluation was conducted in three phases. An inception stage reviewed the TOR and, in the light of views from meetings in Dublin and relevant literature, revised the initial evaluation methodology. An evaluation matrix (Annex 3) was the key tool used to provide a structure for the evaluation team's approach to evidence gathering. The second stage comprised a two-week field visit to Uganda (8th-22nd January 2009). The five person team divided the work according to the main pillars of IA's programme and interviewed respondents in Kampala as well as in Karamoja and Rwenzori (see Annex 4 for the schedule of interviews). The third stage was the analysis and report drafting; team members providing a completed matrix which the team leader then used to draft a synthesised report of findings.

23. The methodology focuses on standard OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, and impact. The evaluation matrix includes 20 questions covering sub-headings under these areas of evaluation. During the inception stage, key issues underlined for attention by the evaluation team included: how IA should align its programme as the Government's poverty eradication plan is replaced by the NDP; how the IA country team should address the new CSP guidelines produced by IA; and how the next CSP should respond to the political context and issues of conflict sensitivity.

24. IA assisted to the fullest extent in terms of access to documentation, support during the fieldwork and in individual responses to evaluation questions. To address issues of staffing efficiency a separate web-based survey of the country team was conducted. In terms of limitations, the evaluation is hindered in judging IA performance by the absence of any corporate ratings or assessment system as is used by other aid agencies, such as DFID or the World Bank¹⁰.

¹⁰ DFID for example operates a Performance Reporting Information System for Management (PRISM) that periodically scores all projects over £1million in value in terms of outputs and purpose achieved, as well as the level of risk. A more comprehensive system - Activities Reporting Information E-System, or ARIES - is being introduced to replace PRISM. Details of the World Bank's approach can be found in their Results Measurement System, which uses data from their Quality Assurance Group and their Independent Evaluation Group.

2. Irish Aid Country Strategy

25. This section outlines the evolution of IA's strategies over the evaluation period, and describes the interventions supported and the budget versus actual spend. It also describes the wider donor environment in Uganda. This sets the scene for our assessment of relevance, efficiency and effectiveness given in Chapter 3.

2.1 Strategy

26. The CSP 2007-2009 forms the framework for IA's programme in Uganda over the period under evaluation. It replaced a previous strategy from 2004-2006 which covered five sectors: agriculture, governance (including decentralisation and justice, law and order), health, education and HIV/AIDS.

27. The current strategy was formulated in 2006 through an extensive process of internal workshops and consultations with Government and DPs. It confirmed plans to narrow IA's focus, based on the UJAS and IA's comparative advantage. Ireland joined the UJAS in 2006, and it was the principles underlying this joint strategy that guided IA's thinking in determining its new strategy. The UJAS aimed for greater donor harmonisation and specialisation. It also reflected the GoU's earlier Partnership Principles (2003), which emphasised predictability, transparency and a preference for budget support over project aid.

28. As well as narrowing the sectors of engagement, IA also worked towards a more balanced approach between Government and civil society, given the need for a greater local civic voice in challenging the national budget, promoting service delivery and championing human rights.

29. The picture that emerged from the consultations in 2006 was that IA had a basis to concentrate on macro-economic support and on three specific sectors: Justice, Education and HIV/AIDS¹¹. These reflected three pillars of the PEAP: Pillar 1 - Economic Management (strengthening the budget process and supporting pro-poor economic policy reform); Pillar 2 - Governance: focusing on justice reform, public sector management and democratic accountability; and Pillar 5 - Human Development: focusing on education and HIV/AIDS.

30. The basis for the choices is articulated in the relevant Project Appraisal and Evaluation Group (PAEG) documents. In economic management, under earlier CSPs, IA had provided unearmarked budget support together with other donors, and this had proved a flexible tool to allocate budgets to pro-poor sectors. In governance, IA already had a proven record of engagement in justice and decentralisation, and was to assume the chair of the Partners for Democracy and Governance (PDG) in 2007, an important platform for Heads of Missions (HoM) to address political and governance issues. IA was also drafting a Civil Society Strategy to outline its approach to this area. In education, the primary sector remained the major focus, with the priority on using past district engagement to inform best practice and reforms at national level. The sector would nevertheless have five components: sector budget support, curriculum reform, post-primary support in Karamoja,

¹¹ See Table 1, Agreed Ranking of Sectors in Specialisation and Comparative Advantage in the Context of UJAS, Final Report on DCI-Uganda Retreat, Premier Consult, Feb 2006.

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adult literacy and mainstreaming (see Table 1). In HIV/AIDS, IA supported three thematic areas: prevention, home-based care and treatment, and Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVCs). This was to meet what is described as 'the matured epidemic' in Uganda, and to build on IA's existing set partners and activities.

31. Mainstreaming was treated as a further area of strategic engagement in the CSP, and IA highlighted that it would mainstream three areas: gender equality, HIV/AIDS and governance in the planning, implementation and evaluation of all of their interventions across the programme.

32. In publishing a separate donor strategy, it is notable that IA separated itself from some other donor partners who felt that the UJAS represented their strategy and that no separate, substantive strategy need be prepared. However, a strategy could itself indicate how a donor would aim to better align itself to the national strategy rather than reflect a parallel approach.

Table 1: Summary of Irish Aid Budget by Programme for CSPs 2004-2006 and 2007-2009

Programme Area	CSP 2004-2006 ^{/1}	CSP 2007-2009
1. Macro-Economic Support	PAF GBS €28m	PAF €30m (Base scenario)
2. Security, Conflict Resolution and Disaster Management	Peace initiatives Emergency and Recovery Assistance (HQ) €5m	Peace initiatives Emergency and Recovery Assistance (HQ) €5m
3. Governance	JLOS LGDP/PAF Juvenile Justice Civil Society – ICMPS District support Governance (Various) €24m	JLOS Legal Aid Fund Uganda Human Rights Commission Public Sector Management Deepening Democracy Programme Civil Society Fund €28m
4. Human Development	Education PAF Education ESIP Primary Education Reform Programme Karamoja Post-Primary Education Adult Literacy/NGO Health HSSP/PAF AMREF Health Training HIV/AIDS Country Programme €39m	Education Budget Support Curriculum Reform Teacher Devt. Prog. Karamoja PPET Programme Adult Literacy Mainstreaming HIV in Ministry of Education Health Training Institutions Primary Health Care Training HIV/AIDS (including Uganda AIDS Commission, Local Govt. and Civil Society Basket Fund) €63m
5. Enhancing Production and Competitiveness	NAADS €3m	N/A
Total Budget	€96.5m	€120m
HQ Spend	No details	Civil Society €3m Emergency €4m

		MAPS €11m Missionaries €1m Regional €8m Private Sector €13m (shared with Zambia) Total €41m
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⁷¹ CSP 2004-2006, page 38

2.2 Interventions

33. The CSP deliberately included a mix of aid modalities, partnerships and national and local interventions. This it argued would bring experience from the field and ground the programme in reality as well as inform national policy engagement. It would also help to manage risks by spreading commitments across different instruments and with different partners.

34. The **Poverty Action Fund (PAF)** was the single largest budget line, and the only one that reflected flexibility in relation to Uganda's governance performance: with a base, high and low case scenario (from €10m per year at base, to €12m per year if GoU performance was good, or down to €6m if GoU performance was poor). The PAF is a 'ringfenced fund which targets social sectors and excludes defence and public administration expenditure'. The Government guarantees that budgetary allocations within these sectors will be protected and that actual disbursement will be at least 95% of budgeted amounts. This promise has been honoured since the fund was established in 1997. The bulk of PAF funds are channelled to districts as conditional grants for priority sectors, including health, education, rural roads and agriculture. By the time the CSP was drafted, PAF included other sectors, such as justice and decentralisation through the Local Government Development Programme (LGDP), as well as new items related to improving productivity, competitiveness and income. Financing the PAF in effect allowed IA to support all five pillars of the PEAP, as well as to engage in policy dialogue. In the CSP, PAF was specifically assigned to Pillar I 'Economic Management'. Complementary actions included analytical work and in addition from direct HQ funding, IA also funds Traidlinks, a non-profit Irish organisation that builds links between Irish and Ugandan business, as well as broader private sector initiatives such as the Investment Climate Facility (ICF) and the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG).


35. In **Governance**, the CSP covers three areas: public sector reform (PSR), including decentralisation; justice, law and order; and democratic accountability. Under PSR, IA moved from its district support partnership programme (in Kibaale, Kumi and Kiboga) to contribution to the World Bank-led LGDP. A separate basket fund was subsequently negotiated between the Ministry of Local Government and bilateral donors (Irish Aid, Denmark, Austria, and the Netherlands) following completion of the Local Government Sector Investment Programme (LoGSIP). This was complemented by support to two reform baskets: the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP) and the Financial Management and Accountability Programme (FINMAP). Support is also provided for an important actor in decentralisation, the Uganda Local Governments' Association (ULGA). In the area of justice, IA principally co-funds the justice, law and order (JLOS) sector-wide approach (SWAp), which provides financial support to 13 separate institutions, including the police, the prisons, various legal agencies and relevant ministries. Thirdly, the accountability area is supported through the promotion of democracy, political parties and civic education in the lead-up to presidential and parliamentary elections in 2011. This includes the Deepening Democracy Programme (DDP), which is a basket fund to contribute to democratisation by increasing

public participation in decision making through civic education, media, parliament, the Electoral Commission, and political parties.

36. **Education** is IA's largest single sector of support, even excluding education expenditures supported through the PAF. Funding comprises sector budget support in support of the Ministry of Education and Sport's (MoES) Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) (€25m), as well as curriculum and teacher development, ICT and adult literacy. Some €12m is also being provided to post-primary education, bursaries and training in Karamoja.

37. In **Health** and **HIV/AIDS**, IA ended its direct involvement with the health sector during the CSP period, making a final payment to the Sector Budget Support in 2007, and finalising its commitment to primary health care training managed by the African Medical and Research Foundation (AMREF) in 2009. HIV/AIDS has been a major area of support on the other hand, with some €16m earmarked for government, UN and civil society interventions. The largest commitment has been to a civil society fund, managed by the Uganda Aids Commission, which was started in 2008 to make grants for community level advocacy and training.

2.3 Spend and Non-Spend Activities



38. Irish Aid expenditure has grown substantially over the past few years in Uganda, from €29 million in 2005 to €41 million in both 2008 and 2009. Out of a total revised commitment of €118 million, a quarter of the allocations in the past two years have been to the PAF General Budget Support. This, combined with PAF Sector Budget Support in education and justice law and order, has consumed over 50% of total allocations. Project support, which constituted about 36% of total expenditure, was also delivered by Non-Governmental Organisations, donor baskets and a multilateral organisation (UN agencies), mainly in support of HIV programmes.

39. According to the 2008 IA Uganda Annual Report, about 82% of IA support was channelled through the GoU's financial systems. This was mainly in support of PAF and a major post-primary education project in North-Eastern Uganda (Karamoja Region). Uganda also receives significant funding from IA through civil society, humanitarian and private sector channels from HQ. In 2007, the breakdown was as follows: country bilateral aid €35,501,327; emergency and recovery €1,200,000; civil society (MAPS¹²) €8,138,621; administration €1,880,217¹³. Detailed programme budget and expenditure details over the past three years are given in Annex 5.

40. Besides the financing activities summarised above, IA also engaged in non-spend work that was intended to ensure its programmes were effective and influential in terms of policy reforms and improving aid coordination and effectiveness. To this end, IA staff have participated in a large number of donor and sector (donor plus government) working groups related to the PEAP pillars and in line with the UJAS. IA has sought opportunities to chair such groups in relevant sectors (such as education, justice, local government, HIV/AIDS and budget support), and also sought and played an active role in the overarching Local Development Partners' Group (LDPG) which comprises all the main DPs in Uganda and is chaired by the World Bank and the PDG.

41. An important aspect of IA non-spend activities over the evaluation period was its participation in the formulation of the Joint Budget Support Framework (JBSF). While not mentioned in the CSP, IA's involvement was confirmed as part of UJAS. JBSF is a tool that will enable DPs to be more harmonised and aligned with the government's policy-making and budget cycle and will aim at improving the impact of public spending. IA has sought a co-design role working on coordination mechanisms.

2.4 Programme Management

42. The Irish Embassy in Kampala manages the IA programme as well as providing visa and consular services for Irish citizens and visitors to Ireland, political and diplomatic functions for Uganda and Rwanda, promoting Irish economic interests in Uganda, and trade and investment.


43. The Embassy operates in a straightforward and clearly structured way (Figure 2) with a senior management team responsible for budget, staffing and policy; a corporate team responsible for administration, human resources, consular and procurement; and a programme team that covers the delivery of aid programme. There are also a number of task teams that handle matters such as HIV/AIDS workplace policy, training, procurement and social matters. The Embassy has in the past three years introduced a range of new procedures and frameworks that has 'codified' the way its staff do business, including the introduction of an office procedures manual in April 2008. Of particular interest has been the use of a cascading management system that interprets the CSP plans into annual business plans, team plans and individual performance management and development systems (PMDS). Extensive training is provided to staff in various areas, including management, mainstreaming, procurement and IT. Improved communications include an Embassy website <http://www.embassyofireland.ug/> and other media.

Figure 2: Irish Embassy Team Structure

¹² Multi Annual Programme Scheme

¹³ Annual Report 2007, Irish Aid, p.86.

44. There has been a staff complement over the period comprising five HQ staff (from 2007-2008) and 13-14 programme advisors and executive staff (Ugandan nationals), but in 2009 these reduced to four HQ staff and nine national staff. Corporate staff total some 28 staff and include accounts, procurement, administration and security staff.



45. Staff continuity has been good over the first two years (2007-2008) but there have been advisory staffing gaps recently in the areas of education, economics and governance. The HQ-based Head of Development left in July 2008 and his position was taken by the former governance specialist, and the vacant HQ-based development specialist position has not been filled. The locally-based education adviser left in September 2008 and has also not been replaced. The locally-based economics adviser left in July 2008 and was replaced in December 2008. A new position of internal auditor was created and successfully filled in December 2007, and this position has strengthened IA's capacity to manage financial risks through pre-funding assessments and post-funding audit, to link with IA's HQ Evaluation and Audit Unit and to strengthen local partners' accounting and reporting.

3. Findings

3.1 Relevance

46. This section examines the question of how relevant the IA 2007-2009 CSP was to the needs of Uganda in terms of poverty focus, choice of sectors, balance between government and non-government, and results focus.

Relevance to Ugandan needs and priorities

47. The CSP was well aligned and addressed Uganda's expressed priorities, as articulated through the PEAP. For the first time, IA's strategy was based upon a multi-donor joint assistance strategy (UJAS) that reflects a joint response to the GoU's poverty reduction strategy. The UJAS covers the period 2005-2009, coinciding with the third version of the PEAP, running from 2005/2006 - 2008/2009, and a fifth PRSC with the World Bank (WB).

48. Within the three PEAP pillars of economic management, governance and human development, IA selected sub-sectors and programmes that closely reflected the Government's stated priorities, while through the PAF, IA also aimed to continue to support key sectors that were beyond the scope of its own programmes, such as health, infrastructure and agriculture. The PEAP seeks to combine economic growth with investment in governance and social sectors as a way to reduce poverty, and the CSP was in line with this mix of policy. In the CSP, PAF was designated as the main tool to support the PEAP pillar on **economic management**. This pillar sets out the objectives for a strong, private sector-led economic growth that contributes to economic development and poverty reduction.

49. It was expected that PAF - and with it complementary actions through analytical work and policy dialogue - would allow IA to support social spending as well as "*economic growth policies that are pro-poor*". IA noted that "15% of PAF expenditures was allocated to improving productivity, competitiveness and incomes" as an indication of the mix which the GoU intended between social and economic policies. Supporting pro-poor and sustainable economic growth was - and still is - highly relevant to the context of Uganda. At the time of finalising the design of the CSP, new evidence had emerged that growth in Uganda was not pro-poor¹⁴. The PEAP supports a similar diagnosis and further notes that both income poverty and inequality increased between 2000 and 2003.

50. Education and HIV/AIDS were the main focus of IA support to the PEAP Pillar on **human development**. Education challenges revolve around dramatic increases in enrolment following the introduction of UPE in 1997. While inequality of access has reduced and girls' enrolment increased, there are still economic and regional disparities, high drop-out and repetition rates and quality of education remains low, especially in literacy and numeracy. With the introduction of Universal Post-Primary Education and Training (UPPET) in 2005 and its phased implementation from 2007, the challenge facing the MoES is to expand access to post-primary education whilst ensuring that issues of equity and quality at all levels are

¹⁴ Uganda was a country case study in the joint donor analysis "Operationalising Pro-Poor Growth" - October 2004. It concluded that in Uganda high economic growth in the 1990s had come with widening inequality

addressed. The CSP, through its budget support for the ESSP and its curriculum development and teacher training support, was adequately designed to meet these challenges.

51. In **education**, by supporting the MoES ESSP, through sector budget support, and the Primary Education Reform Programme (PERP), IA was closely aligned to Uganda's sector goals and lagging MDG indicators. Beyond the budget support, IA's decision to support education in Karamoja allowed a focus on a specific region suffering the worst education and poverty indicators in Uganda.

52. By targeting the Karamoja region, an area with the highest illiteracy rates and lowest enrolment in the country¹⁵, inappropriate curricula and systems for meeting the needs of pastoralists' children and lacking teachers and infrastructure, IA also addressed the needs of a population in chronic poverty. It also aligns with IA's own education corporate strategy paper, which emphasises access to education for vulnerable and marginalised children¹⁶.

53. Uganda showed a positive trend in many areas of **governance** at the time of drafting the CSP, and in terms of corruption compared well to its neighbours in terms of international benchmarks¹⁷. While progress occurred in multi-party elections, public expenditure reform, macro-economic management, and some areas of justice and human rights, important challenges remain.

54. The CSP chose to focus on three important areas: public sector management, justice reform and democratic accountability. While IA had a solid record of engagement in local government through the Support to District Partnership under the previous CSP, it had no prior financial engagement in public service reform and financial management. Ireland had nonetheless worked closely with the WB and others, particularly on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit (PRSC) process, which linked to public sector management, and IA took part in joint donor missions and co-financed diagnostic studies. In the justice sector there was good experience under JLOS since 2003 which could be built further on.

55. It was nevertheless quite an ambitious agenda to include three substantial sub-sectors: justice, public sector reform (including local government) and democratic accountability through a fairly complex mix of budget support, basket funds and projects. While the wide use of joint funding arrangements provided a broader base for Ireland than through sole funding, there was insufficient consideration of silent partnerships. Even though these were seen as a valuable approach in the 2006 retreat¹⁸, the Governance PAEG document does not consider the use of this option, even though they could have facilitated IA's engagement.

56. The CSP sought to address several Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), particularly in education, HIV/AIDS, gender and income poverty. By strongly supporting the PAF, IA was linking its strategy to the ability of that fund to address poverty and lagging MDGs. In the 2005/2006 budget, education received the lion's share of PAF funding, with 44.6% of total allocation¹⁹, followed by primary health care with 22.5%, agriculture

¹⁵ Understanding Chronic Poverty and Vulnerability Issues in Karamoja Region, Desk Study, Development Research and Training, Kampala, 2008.

¹⁶ Education Policy and Strategy, Irish Aid, 2008, p.13.

¹⁷ Transparency International in 2006 rated Uganda low though improving on its corruption index (2.7 out of 10) and slightly better than Kenya, Congo, Burundi and Rwanda.

¹⁸ See discussion on p.9 and p.14-15 in the IA retreat report, June 2006, op.cit.

¹⁹ Although the PAF concentrated resources on primary education, the education budget has still been insufficient for addressing the demands of the UPE programme and associated reforms.

extension 6.8%, water and sanitation 5%, and rural roads 4.5%. A reallocation of PAF funding away from primary education and in favour of primary health - and to a lesser extent water and sanitation - might have helped better address the financing gaps and, in turn, the lagging MDGs. It was expected that the opportunity for policy dialogue brought by IA's contribution to budget support through PAF would allow IA to address issues of allocation.

57. In withdrawing from **the health sector**, IA agreed to leave the direct health sector response to the lagging infant and maternal mortality MDGs to other actors who indicated that they would continue funding. IA argued that by supporting education, HIV/AIDS and governance, it would continue to effectively address these indicators given their multi-sectoral linkages.

'By strengthening our support to JLOS, HIV/AIDS, education and gender, we are indeed continuing to focus on and tackle the important issues of infant and maternal mortality. The latest Demographic and Health Survey (UDHS 2006) makes the very clear link with education - higher education levels translate into lower fertility rates, better spacing, reduced teenage pregnancies, improved ante-natal care - all resulting in improved maternal and child health. Through our HIV programme, the promotion of prevention methods, HIV testing, access to Anti-Retrovirals (ARVs) and Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission (PMTCT) all have a direct impact on maternal and child health. And tackling GBV is another direct link that is a focus of our programme.'²⁰

58. For **HIV/AIDS**, IA's decision to continue to address the disease through multiple channels (a programme with different interventions as well as a cross-cutting issue) was strong. Though HIV/AIDS prevalence had fallen, infection rates have recently been rising in adults and at-risk populations, and the consequences for economic growth of not addressing the disease are significant²¹. The strategy to work with government at national (Uganda Aids Commission), sectoral (education) and local levels (local government), and with UN agencies and civil society correctly recognised three needs. These were to mainstream, to support Government (which had not been a traditional partner of the largest HIV/AIDS funding sources from the US), and to reach to community levels through innovative civil society funding.

59. While CSP funding is aligned with PEAP, the balance of priorities is not always the same. For example, IA is stronger on the importance of HIV/AIDS than PEAP is. IA treats HIV/AIDS as a cross-cutting programme and as a sector programme, but PEAP treats it as a sub-sector of health.

Choice and complementarity of interventions

60. Irish Aid's lessons from the previous CSP was the need to be more focused and reduce the areas covered, and make more effective use of resources through contributing to common modalities and basket funds geared at developing national ownership and accountability and reducing standalone projects. The Division of Labour exercise which started in mid-2006 provided a basis for harmonisation of aid with other donors, and allowed IA to position its CSP within the programmes and intentions of other actors. IA committed to withdrawing from two sectors: agriculture and health. In agriculture, IA had a

²⁰ Written response to the evaluation mission's initial debriefing, Irish Aid Embassy, 2009.

²¹ Recent evidence indicates that the rate of GDP growth may fall from a projected 6.5% a year to an estimated 5.3% under a scenario where anti-retroviral provision for HIV/AIDS treatment is not available, and by 2025 the economy would be 39% smaller than it would have been without AIDS. Refer to 'Assessing the Macro-economic Impact of HIV/AIDS in Uganda. Summary Report', MoFPED, UAC and UNDP (2008).

limited presence, as one of six funders of the National Agricultural Advisory Services programme. In 2006, IA held extensive discussions with HQ and partners in the health sector. These were to better understand the consequences of IA leaving the sector on continued donor funding, and on IA's corporate commitment to health outcomes. A ranking exercise in 2006 placed health as fourth in terms of IA's comparative advantage. Health (and HIV/AIDS) was identified as the most congested sector, with 20 donors, by a study in 2006²². Moreover, 'the sectors which attracted the most aid relate to health, humanitarian aid, roads and energy. Sectors such as security, lands, human rights, and justice, law and order do not attract significant levels of donor funding'.

61. In **economic management**, providing budget support through the PAF and supporting PFM are seen as highly complementary actions: budget support makes full use of (and hence helps to strengthen) the country's PFM system.

62. In **governance**, Ireland's long-standing work in decentralisation in the area-based Support to District Partnership (SDP) and the WB-led Local Government Development Project (LGDP) evolved into support for LoGSIP under the CSP 2007-2009. Despite enormous challenges and continued political interference, supporting decentralisation in Uganda remained essential since the responsibility for delivering most of the basic services resides with local governments. By concentrating on all aspects of decentralisation (political, administrative, technical), LoGSIP was seen as a comprehensive programme.

63. By contrast, IA had no prior engagement in public service reform (PSR) and public financial management (PFM). But as a budget support provider, Ireland had worked closely with the World Bank and others in these areas. Through the PRSC process and associated dialogue structures, including the Public Expenditure Review (PER) group, IA regularly took part in joint donor missions and co-financed diagnostic studies. Irish Aid's decision to engage in PFM and to a lesser extent PSR, seemed therefore appropriate as well as timely, given the plans to start FINMAP and the PSRP. In addition, UJAS and the subsequent Division of Labour (DoL) exercise did not mention any donor congestion in relation to PFM and PSR²³.

64. This, combined with IA's participation in the PDG group on anti-corruption, meant that IA supported all four sub-components of PEAP Public Sector Management strategy, namely PFM, reduced corruption, improved public sector performance, and strengthened local government systems for service delivery.

65. Irish Aid also already had a platform of engagement in **justice, law and order** under earlier CSPs, through the JLOS Sector Investment Plan (SIP) I. Under the new CSP, JLOS SIP II aimed at strengthening four priority justice areas. First, criminal and commercial justice reforms would promote safety of persons, address the huge case backlog, and tackle corruption and inefficiencies in the delivery of justice. Land justice reforms would protect land rights of the poor and ensure security of tenure. Family justice reforms would improve protection of the family and respect for the family rights and women, especially the reduction of sexual and domestic violence, which has continued to be at its highest in Uganda²⁴.

²² First draft of Uganda DP Division of Labour Exercise Interim Report, ODI, 2006

²³ UJAS was discussed as part of PRSC 5 (2006).

²⁴ Uganda police reported 70 cases of wife murders in 2008 alone from domestic violence (New Vision, January 2009). Amnesty International Report 2008, The State of the World's Human Rights reports, "a high prevalence of violence against women, including rape and domestic violence and a weak and ineffective justice system" that "left female victims of sexual and gender-based violence traumatised and without any recourse to justice, legal, medical and psychological support".

66. In **human development**, the basis for leaving the health sector is discussed in paragraph 57 above, and the latest Aid Information Map shows that the health sector still has the most active DPs (16 in 2008/2009) although three are leaving (EC, Denmark, Ireland)²⁵. In **HIV/AIDS**, while prevalence rates had fallen (from 18 to 6.2% between 1992 and 2002), the concerns over stabilisation and shifting of infection to the adult population²⁶ and of rising incidence amongst mobile populations, especially following the peace talks and opening up of commercial traffic in the north and to Sudan²⁷, meant that there were solid grounds for IA to continue in the sector as set out in paragraph 58.

67. While IA recognised that its main focus should be on primary **education**, it argued that other aspects of the education system should be supported primarily to ensure that the gains made in UPE would not be undermined²⁸. However, the basis for the mix of sector budget support and projects (including support to four national education institutions) is not very clear. The justification is based on an evaluation of earlier support to PERP Rwenzori that stated there was an urgent need for 'extensive capacity-building support'²⁹. IA was right to adopt the evaluation's recommendation that the focus for future Irish Aid support should be on the central level with a view to further strengthening a sector-wide approach, while support at district level should be selective and focused on education reforms. Yet the rationale for supporting a number of supplementary programmes such as the Exam Board, National Curriculum Development Centre (NCDC) and the Education Standards Agency (ESA) is not obvious, given the principle that IA should move 'upstream', have at least 70% of funds in budget support and only use projects for 'specific purposes'.

68. The PERP document makes no mention of support to Karamoja, an initiative that was inherited from the previous CSP. The school construction and equipment programme for secondary schools started in 2006 but met delays. With the arrival of Universal Post-Primary Education and Training (UPPET) in 2005, the relevance of Ireland's support in Karamoja has increased, as the rise in primary school leavers with UPE has placed pressure on secondary schools, particularly in a region with already poor coverage (only 22 secondary schools in 5 districts). The bursaries scheme and equipment support also continued into the CSP 2007-2009 but the existing programme office in Moroto was closed.

69. In conclusion, while IA increased its focus (moving from five to three pillars under the CSP 2007-2009), in those sectors where it stayed, the pillars had multiple components (six in education for example, while governance spanned three very different and equally complex areas, including two sub-sectors where it had limited experience in PSR and PFM). Even with fund pooling and joint management arrangements, this diversity presented a significant challenge to the IA team of advisors.

Choice of partners

70. The balance between government and civil society support in the CSP is strongly biased towards Government, which is allocated some 80% of commitments, an increase

²⁵ Aid Information Map, Financial Year 2008/2009, submitted by LPDG to MoFPED.

²⁶ Accelerating HIV Prevention in Uganda: The Road towards Universal Access. Drivers of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic and Effectiveness of Prevention Interventions in Uganda. A Synthesis Report, Uganda AIDS Commission, September 2006.

²⁷ Hot Spot Mapping Along the Kampala-Juba Transport Route. International Organization for Migration. Nairobi, Ferguson A, Kriitmaa, K., (2008).

²⁸ Irish Aid (Uganda) In-House Education Planning Meeting, 2006

²⁹ Primary Education Reform Programme Document 2007-2009, Irish Aid, June 2007, p.6.

from the previous CSP which allocated 70% to Government. However, this excludes the MAPS and humanitarian funding that reaches Uganda from IA programmes managed from HQ. Non-CSP funding is almost entirely directed towards non-government (NGOs, missionary organisations, the UN and the private sector) and, as shown in Table 1, accounts for €41m over three years, which represents a third of the CSP total allocation.

71. The predominance of funding for government, combined with substantial support for civil society appears to be appropriate at sector level. It reflects the difference in absorption capacity between government and civil society, the importance IA attached to aligning with government and its poverty eradication programme, but at the same time its concern to strengthen the voice of civil society and to respond to local and humanitarian needs. However, the ratio of funding between country and HQ resource allocations did not emerge from a conscious plan of support to Uganda – since the CSP does not refer to the additional HQ funding for Uganda or state how the funds would combine to deliver broader, possibly more strategic outcomes.

72. In Governance, for example, there was a deliberate attempt to counterbalance support to government in public sector management, justice and democracy, with basket funds to promote civil society advocacy. For example, IA complemented the JLOS budget support with basket funding for the Legal Aid Basket Fund (LABF), Deepening Democracy Programme (DDP), Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) Basket and the Local Government (LGA) Basket Fund.


73. Another example is in the HIV/AIDS sector. Here Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) were allocated the majority of funds in both the current and previous CSP (rising from 73% under CSP 2003-2006 to 80% in the current CSP - based on the €12.75 million budgeted). This balance was appropriate because the government institutions were provided resources primarily for coordination, enhancing mainstreaming of HIV/AIDS in the sector while the CSOs were supported for delivery of services to the targeted population.

Choice of aid modalities

74. With close to half of resources flowing through the PAF as 'poverty-earmarked budget support', just under a fifth on sector budget support, and the remainder on a mix of basket modalities and projects (Figure 3), Irish Aid is seen as deliberately 'balanced':

Figure 3: Irish Aid Funding by Aid Modality in 2008

'There is no consensus on the extent to which donors should rely on general budget support, as opposed to other approaches, especially in the wake of weak administrative and political governance which heightens the risk of abuse of the ownership principle to misappropriate the resources. Hence a DP like Ireland prefers a "balanced approach to development"'.³⁰



³⁰ First Phase of the Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration, UGANDA, Final Report

75. There are several issues around the relevance of choosing the PAF as the main mechanism to provide budget support in Uganda. PAF was set up in 1998 as a Virtual Poverty Fund (VPF) to track resources for priority programmes with direct poverty benefits. The use of VPFs is deemed relevant in countries where public expenditure management is weak and the underlying principle is that they should be temporary mechanisms tagging poverty reducing expenditures within the budget whilst budget-wide systems are being built. Over the years, budget classification, planning and reporting have improved significantly in Uganda³¹ and in addition, there are now concerns that the PAF's static and top-down definitions may undermine the allocative efficiency of PFM systems in Uganda (see 3.2.1). A broader and more flexible budget support delivery framework would therefore seem more appropriate.

76. In PSM, supporting GoU-designed programmes (FINMAP, LoGSIP, and PSRP) through different basket funds also comes with specific challenges, as this tends to isolate programmes that should be strongly inter-connected. There were, however, good attempts to link up the programmes in their design (for example, fiscal decentralisation under LoGSIP has strong links with FINMAP). In addition, at the time of completing the CSP, the Ministries of Local Government (MoLG), Public Service Reforms, and for FINMAP, MoFPED, had all established investment plans. But the Public Sector Management (PSM) Working Group, which is led by OPM and became effective in 2006/2007, had yet to finalise its own strategy, with OPM playing a coordinating role.

77. Supporting government programmes through basket funding and providing general budget support entail different mechanisms. Budget support (including PAF) uses the PFM system fully; other forms of sector support (LoGSIP, PSRP and maybe soon QEI) do not. They are similar to projects in that they provide line ministries with direct access to joint donor funding to support their sector-wide strategic plans (SWAPs). The accounting, reporting, and release procedures are also very different.

78. The same contradiction is apparent at local government (LG) level: providing direct support to districts bypasses the inter-governmental fiscal relationships. PAF, on the contrary, uses the inter-governmental grant transfer system fully, with 70% of its funding going to local governments through the use of conditional grants. Direct support to LGs may be more appropriate, given the huge needs at higher and lower local government levels. For example, in education, Irish Aid has continued to provide a small amount directly to two districts (Kabarole and Kasese) in support of the national curriculum development strategy. The small amount of money to Kasese and Kabarole is for the piloting of the new thematic curriculum in a few targeted schools so that it can be finalised and then rolled out nationally. It is not something that interferes with inter-government transfers. There is therefore an inherent tension between providing PAF on one hand and direct support to LGs on the other.

79. Support for the move from area-based programme to LGDP with regard to decentralisation was seen as a positive move³² as the bulk of donor funding is disbursed as earmarked GBS, and using PAF mechanisms, is directly transferred to districts. By contrast, the basket funding mechanism which IA, alongside other like-minded donors, subsequently

By M Chisvo, N Ofwono, for OPML, May 2008, p.12

³¹ As highlighted in Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Assessment (2005)

³² Putting Aid On Budget: A Case Study of Uganda - A Study for the Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI) and the Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA), Tim Williamson, April 2008

designed to support LoGSIP (until recently) did not draw from the GoU inter-governmental fiscal relationships to support the capacity of LGs.

80. Elsewhere, IA has combined basket funding modalities with direct support to key institutions. While the bulk of IA's PFM funding goes to FINMAP (€1.2m), some institutions have received direct funding from IA in the past. For example, IA gave two grants to the Inspector General of Government (IGG) to support its civil litigation activities and the National Integrity Survey. This approach balances short-term with long-term aid modalities in an appropriate manner.

Policy dialogue

81. Irish Aid's approach to policy influence and aid effectiveness through dialogue and aid coordination work was highly relevant given IA's profile in Uganda as a neutral, medium-sized aligned partner. It also had the capacity and structure (with its integrated political and development approach) in-country to contribute to the different coordination mechanisms.

82. For example, IA's approach to the education sector involves a mixed approach: financial aid, policy dialogue and technical input at a number of levels. The design allows for clear linkages and rationale between the policy and on-the-ground results (e.g. support for curriculum reform at district level feeds into policy dialogue at national level, while engagement in the secondary infrastructure project in Karamoja likewise provides a sound basis for engagement in policy dialogue in secondary education).

83. In governance, Irish Aid's participation in the Partners for Democracy and Governance (PDG) was seen as the main platform to influence policy in favour of good governance in the country. More specifically, IA's participation in the PDG Anti-Corruption Working Group was intended to complement its support to FINMAP and "help secure the effectiveness of budget support".

Alignment

84. As noted on p.13, the design of the CSP in 2006 was structured around the PEAP pillars and the accompanying joint aid framework, the UJAS. Earlier in 2003, the GoU published a set of Partnership Principles between GoU and its DPs³³, which, amongst other areas, set out general principles for Government's preferred modalities of support from DPs, undertakings by the GoU, reflecting development assistance in the budget, working more effectively at the sectoral level and joint sector reviews/missions. The key intention of the principles was to link aid to budgetary processes and to the PEAP.

85. The PEAP emphasised certain aspects of aid partnership:

- ~ SWAs will be strengthened and extended to all areas of the budget, implying the need for partners and government comprehensively to provide or develop sector frameworks and strategies (p. xxv and 202).
- ~ All projects will be incorporated into the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) so that all externally funded projects will be subject to "hard budget constraints", further encouraging the shift from project to programme support (p. 204). Standalone donor projects "will be avoided" (p. 204).

³³ Partnership Principles between Government of Uganda and its Development Partners, September 2003, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development

- ~ GoU continues to urge donors to provide aid as general budget support, confirming the principle that donors have a right to contribute to the general debate about resource allocation (p. xxvi).
- ~ GoU does not intend to accept any tied aid over the PEAP period (p. 42).
- ~ Multiple monitoring and evaluation arrangements have developed which it is implied are contrary to the partnership principles. The NIMES is established to provide a framework for streamlining M&E and harmonising existing systems (p. 216-217).

86. Given the links to the UJAS and the PEAP, and also the DoL exercise in 2006, it is evident that the CSP was strongly formulated in close collaboration with GoU and other DPs. While the UJAS was regarded as a sufficiently comprehensive and shared strategy document by the country team and that Ireland could have adopted the UJAS as its own country strategy, for accountability reasons, IA HQ required that a separate CSP be published.

87. The strong focus on poverty reduction, governance, education, HIV/AIDS and gender were also themes that aligned the CSP with IA's corporate policy direction. The CSP reflects also the IA White Paper principles that: 'Ireland will support the promotion of human development, human security and justice, the building and strengthening of democracy, the promotion of gender equality and the promotion and protection of human rights'. The close alignment with Uganda's own development priorities reflects Ireland's foreign policy imperative to follow good partnership principles, which stress the use of a mix of aid modalities; leadership of the development process should be in the hands of the partner countries and Africa should remain a focus of support.

Monitoring and Evaluation

88. M&E under the PEAP Performance Measurement Framework had evolved and improved over the three planning cycles (1997, 2000, 2004); it was considered to be comprehensive with sound baseline and target indicators by the PEAP evaluation³⁴, but quality varied among the different sectors. For example, health and education were more advanced, with better established data systems and MDG-related indicators; others had some weaknesses around data collection (such as in agriculture and environment); and new areas such as good governance faced challenges as indicators and collection systems were not always established.


89. Irish Aid benefited from working in well-established sector programmes with their own M&E frameworks (such as in education, public finance reform and justice, law and order). At the same time, IA's M&E arrangements were tied to the PEAP Policy and Results Matrix, which though it had the advantage of being a harmonised approach that would avoid parallel monitoring systems, as a collective tool made it difficult to distinguish IA's particular results. For governance outcomes, the PDG governance matrix provided relevant indicators in democratisation, anti-corruption and human rights but targets were missing and who would report on the indicators and when were not clearly stated.

90. The CSP itself sets out an ambitious group of six objectives to be delivered through three pillars (economic management, governance and human development) (Figure 4). The logic is rather complex as it expects all of the six strategic objectives to be delivered by the three pillars. This made the task of designing an M&E system *prima facie* hard. Although the CSP states that the six objectives will 'focus IA engagement', these objectives moreover contrast markedly in their scale of ambition and complexity. The first objective covers the

³⁴ Results and Performance Theme Paper, Independent Evaluation of Uganda's Poverty Eradication Action Plan, OPM, May 2008

main development objectives: human development and governance, and most of the CSP spend. Two more focus on gender and HIV/AIDS. While two others refer to aid effectiveness and embassy capacity, both of which could be related more to quality and process of delivery that contribute to and ensure that the first three objectives are achieved in the right way. In themselves, they do not directly contribute to the stated goal.

Figure 4: Goal, Objectives and Pillars of the CSP



Cross-cutting issues

91. The CSP devotes considerable space to mainstreaming, and two of the issues (HIV/AIDS and governance) are identified as both programme pillars/objectives and as mainstreaming issues. The IA team worked hard to identify where and how opportunities for mainstreaming could be found³⁵. IA's approach to gender mainstreaming was to define specific interventions in the CSP, both for internal IA action and for mainstreaming into sectors (JLOS, decentralisation, education, HIV/AIDS), and within various aid coordination initiatives. CSP interventions for gender mainstreaming were mainly issues focused and designed to make strategic interventions within various aid architecture and through coordinated initiatives with other donors and stakeholders. A lesson from the previous CSP was that governance should be a cross-cutting issue across the programme. HIV/AIDS was also approached, both directly through government and non-government support, and to be mainstreamed across different sectors. Environmental mainstreaming has lagged behind due to limited experience and so was addressed only to the extent of building embassy capacity to mainstream the environment into future programmes.

Approach to Risk

92. The CSP did identify a series of risks that related to a UJAS joint risk register. These included political transition, poor governance, inadequate human rights and justice, conflict

³⁵ For example, in the CSP Launch Workshop Report, March 2007: see Matrix on p.9

in Northern Uganda, weak public sector capacity and uncurbed population growth. These were all appropriate concerns given the Ugandan context at the time.

93. One area where risk was not adequately recognised in the CSP was in the use of budget support and associated fiduciary risk. The CSP moved away from IA's previous general budget support engagement to a notionally earmarked poverty fund (PAF) with the aim of managing risk better. However, the CSP, and the supporting PAEG document³⁶, could have recognised that the fund has the same fiduciary risk as other forms of budget support, as in fact was acknowledged in 2003:

"Simple earmarking of donor support to specific expenditures is purely presentational; it will have no effect on the pattern of spending. The potential influence on how resources are used depends not on the restrictions on how the aid can be allocated, but on the policy dialogue, technical support and conditionality which is associated with the aid."³⁷

94. In terms of mitigating risk, the CSP introduced different funding scenarios for the first time - they were not included in the previous two CSPs - with high, low and base cases that allowed for IA to be flexible in response to more or less positive trends in key areas of governance. The scenarios only suggested a modest response to improving or deteriorating circumstances, with a difference of just $\pm 5\%$ around the base case, and limited to the PAF instrument.

95. Irish Aid have also explored more explicitly how its various *non-spend* activities - from political dialogue to policy working groups - could have been used and combined with its financial aid to mitigate risk. While IA recognised the need for lobbying to ensure political risks were minimised, this is mostly at project or technical level in the risk analysis sections of the CSP and PAEG papers, and there is less consideration of how the PDG or even direct ministerial level dialogue, for example, might be used in combination with financial support to gain further traction on the GoU buy-in of IA's governance agenda.

96. Insufficient attention was also paid to the risk of conflict (in spite of the CSP noting that a lesson from the previous 2003-06 CSP was that 'conflict responses should not be left to standalone plans... there is a need to ensure that such responses are mainstreamed in sectoral approaches'³⁸). Even though the strategy was written at a point when the Juba peace talks had brought a cessation of hostilities, the underlying causes of the conflict - including the political and economic disenfranchisement of northern areas and the marked poverty inequality compared to the south of the country - were (and still are) largely unaddressed. Equally the likely effects of the IA programme on conflict and the question of whether IA support would in some areas exacerbate tensions or restrain capacities for peace were not sufficiently considered.

3.2 Effectiveness

97. This section examines how effective the delivery of the IA 2007-2009 CSP has been in terms of its objectives, results and risk management. It also looks at how well the IA programme complied with the principles of the Paris Declaration and how the intended mainstreaming issues were delivered.

³⁶ Support to the Poverty Action Fund (PAF), 2007-2009, PAEG, 2007

³⁷ CSP evaluation, 2000-2003, Mokoro Ltd, 2003, p.5 referring to the earlier PAEG document for GBS

³⁸ CSP, p.9

98. For most programmes, IA is one of several contributing partners and it is difficult to point to the difference that one particular partner has made, although we try to assess what added value IA has brought. Moreover, several of IA's programmes started quite recently - for example, FINMAP, PSRP and LoGSIP were all launched in 2006/2007, while the HIV/AIDS Civil Society Fund (CSF) was launched in May 2008. Some of these were being developed during the CSP formulation and so there are few reports of effectiveness over the 2007-2009 evaluation period.

Evaluation of the PEAP

99. The overall objective of the CSP was to reduce poverty and promote sustainable development by supporting the GoU's **PEAP**. The success or failure of IA's support therefore to a large extent is linked to the PEAP's fortunes. In fact, the PEAP has been regarded overall as a 'success story' over its 10-year timeframe³⁹, and as having made a 'remarkable contribution' to the strategic prioritisation of public policy, and the creation of an environment of confidence for development cooperation. Its salience, however, has reduced as the trajectory of Uganda's growth has moved forward and as the NRM ruling party concentrated more on its election manifesto from 2006⁴⁰. In addition, the MTEF that guided resources for delivering the PEAP has over recent years reflected a greater heterogeneity of spend demands that have distanced it from the overarching poverty focus of the PEAP. Over the period 2007-2009, the relevance of PEAP has therefore declined as its closing date has approached, and the Government began work on its replacement, the National Development Plan.

100. Moreover, while the PEAP provided a sound poverty reduction policy framework, its translation into action has been less effective. The comprehensive evaluation by Oxford Policy Management Ltd. (OPML) concluded that: 'from the perspective of the strategic management of government in Uganda, there has been an imbalance of attention amongst the three main components of the public management system (policy making, financing and implementation). The major investment of attention and resources in the development and refinement of policy making and policy review has produced little improvement in public action because of important weaknesses in the interstices between plan and budget, budget and action, and action and review'⁴¹. Prioritisation has weakened over time as political ownership has declined and competing budget demands have watered down the PEAP focus. The strategic focus has become blurred due to 'the growing bottom-up policy pressures from sectors, and the horizontal influence of the development partners'. Also, PEAP M&E that should have allowed close tracking of how policy was delivering poverty reduction in practice has been relatively ineffective compared to sector M&E, as the central agencies responsible for M&E have, according to the same OPML study, not found the incentives to stimulate effective reporting.

³⁹ Independent Evaluation of Uganda's PEAP, Final Synthesis Report, Oxford Policy Management, 2008, p.iii

⁴⁰ 'The effect of the country's shift to a multi-party electoral system was seen by some as bringing with it a focus on producing tangible, rapid results, such as infrastructure construction, that the ruling party will be able to present as fulfilment of the election manifesto focused on "Prosperity for All". This, it is argued, makes more "complex" issues such as gender equality and wider social change unappealing, as it is difficult to demonstrate results, especially in the short time between elections.' Aid Effectiveness and Cross-Cutting Social Issues: Evidence From Experience, SDD Ltd. and OPM Ltd., April 2008, p.8

⁴¹ Ibid, p.iv

PAF Effectiveness

101. On the effectiveness of the PAF, GoU has met its targets on PAF spend; for example, in 2007/2008, the GoU released 100.5% and executed 100.3% of the original PAF budget, against a benchmark of 95%. This discipline was also maintained in preceding years. In addition, as reported by IA in its 2008 annual report, PAF expenditures (as a share of the government discretionary budget) steadily increased from 17% to 34.4% between 1998 and 2007. Finally, the bulk of PAF resources have been channelled to districts as conditional grants, and in 2007/2008, 71% of PAF spending was earmarked to districts, with 95.8% released.

102. Despite this positive record, the MoFPED itself recognises that PAF has some limitations. Firstly, the increase of PAF year on year has not been tantamount to an increase in government spending in priority sectors, as originally intended.⁴² Over the years, the PAF has moved away from its initial focus on primary health, primary education, rural roads and agriculture extension. Instead, the number of PAF programmes has increased to include 'implementation of the land act, restocking and resettlement, poverty alleviation, sub-county development grant, local government development, functional adult literacy programme, community rehabilitation, reduction of the case backlog in the JLO sector, equalisation grant and statistics'⁴³.

103. The inclusion of new budget lines was partly justified in the early years as the GoU reoriented its budget towards the PEAP priorities. But this has also meant that the increase in PAF spending has been driven by definitional changes rather than increased allocations to the original 1997/1998 PAF programmes. Using the 2007/2008 definition, PAF's share to the government discretionary budget only increased from 18% in 1997/1998 to 21% in 2006/2007 and has been falling since its peak in FY 2003/2004. The MoFPED Review concludes that the inclusion of individual expenditure items under the PAF has been driven by the Government's need to fulfil its commitment with DPs to gradually and continuously increase the proportion of the PAF in the national budget; therefore, tracking pro-poor spending year on year through PAF analysis has been misleading and the poverty focus of the national budget has been inflated over the years.

104. Secondly, PAF has created rigidities in public expenditure allocation. Because PAF items are protected, in-year budget adjustments have principally taken place in non-PAF priority sectors and sub-sectors, while overspend in public administration and defence has been allowed to continue. This was confirmed in the OECD-DAC country case study, which concludes that 'the domination of the social service-driven agenda early on in the evolution of Partnership General Budget Support has limited the room for promoting public sector action which promotes income generation and growth'⁴⁴. Sectors which over the years have received less than their budgeted allocation include health, roads, agriculture, water, economic functions and social services. At the same time, because of the PAF static definition, the social sector has continued to take the lion's share of PAF spending. As a result, IA's attempts to support economic management - and with it, broad-based economic growth - through the PAF, while highly relevant, have been less effective. Elsewhere,

⁴² Pro-poor budgeting and the Poverty Action Fund (PAF): A critical evaluation of the effectiveness of the PAF in delivering pro-poor budgeting in Uganda, MoFPED, 2008

⁴³ Ibid p.6

⁴⁴ OECD-DAC Joint Evaluation of GBS (1994-2004), p.57. Also see "Pro-Poor Public Spending Reform - Lessons from Uganda's Virtual Poverty Fund", WB, March 2008. A similar analysis is provided in the Independent Evaluation of Uganda's PEAP (2008), which concludes that over the ten-year period, PAF has put pressure on sectors outside PAF when there were budget cuts.

opportunities for dialogue with MoFPED on pro-poor growth policy have been restricted: the main dialogue structure, such as the Economist Group, has principally focused on monitoring the budget and preparing the JBSF.

105. Finally, while the bulk of PAF resources are earmarked to districts, evidence shows that absorption capacity (outside wages) has remained low. Many LGs find it difficult to access capital funding through conditional grants and because of the large wage component of PAF spending, developmental priorities identified in the various sector investment plans, including in primary education, have not been addressed. The budget monitoring report (January 2009) by MoFPED also confirms continued delays in releasing PAF non-wage recurrent and development funds: the late receipt of funds in capitation grants for primary schools has continued to present huge implementation challenges to the districts. This, combined with long procurement procedures, also explains delayed construction of schools under the School Facilitation Grant⁴⁵.

106. The conclusion is that while resource flows have increased and broad service delivery has expanded over the years, the use of notional budget earmarking through PAF has suffered from its own limitations and has not been able to drive social services in Uganda in an efficient and developmental way. The MoFPED 2008 Review has since made some recommendations which the GoU has taken on. This includes reverting back to the PAF old definition (where it received a 20% share of the government discretionary budget), and moving away from the top-down and fragmented approach of selecting PAF individual budget items. Instead, PAF planning and budgeting powers will be transferred to sector ministries, with PAF incorporated directly in their strategic investment plans and annual budget framework papers.

107. PAF will continue to be used as a proxy indicator for the GoU's commitment to pro-poor spending as part of the JBSF. As a result, IA was able to use the JBSF Joint Assessment Framework (JAF 1 – 06/07) as a basis to release PAF GBS and PAF Education funds in 2008/2009. The rationale and status of the JBSF is described in Box 2.

⁴⁵ This lack of realization was also confirmed during our field visit. In Kabarole, for example, the budget performance in education programmes (outside wages) for 2007/2008 showed:

Programme	Budget	Realised as per Dec 2008
UPE (PAF)	468,231,000	165,438,533
SFG (PAF)	897,025,000	439,542,000
School Inspection	20,080,499	3,645,032

Box 2: Uganda's Joint Budget Support Framework

Under the UJAS, all DPs recognised that there was still *"substantial scope for harmonizing approaches to the provision of budget support"* and made *"aligning budget support timetables and the framework for decisions"* an important objective for the early stages of the implementation of the UJAS. This triggered plans for developing joint budget support arrangements (beyond PRSC), with the involvement of Ireland and other budget support DPs.

An interim Joint Budget Support Framework (JBSF) has now been developed and JBSF was piloted for the first time in early 2008, when seven partners (Denmark, EC, DFID, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden, and Ireland) used the interim framework to inform their disbursement decisions for FY 2008/2009. The purpose of JBSF is two-fold:

"The JBSO is a tool that will enable DPs to become more harmonised and aligned with the government's policy-making and budget cycle.

Its purpose is to improve the impact of public spending, while maintaining macro-economic stability and supporting economic growth." (Draft for consultation, January 2009)

The first goal of JBSF – *"towards a more harmonised approach to budget support"* - is highly relevant to the context of Uganda. According to 2008 PEFA, the predictability of direct budget support scored D, against C+ in 2006. The report notes a real deterioration in the predictability of amount and timing of budget support.

Narrowing down the JBSF objective to *"improving the impact of public spending"* rather than the general goal of poverty reduction also seems appropriate: the main issue with service delivery in Uganda is its poor quality and value for money. The focus on economic growth and macro-economic stability reflects national objectives as set in the PEAP and PRSC documents. The JBSF has been drafted to avoid the pitfall of turning the joint performance assessment framework into a "shopping list" of progress and outcome indicators, as seen in other countries. Extensive consultation was required to reach common consensus over the scope of JBSF and the choice of sectors.

As one of the budget donor DPs, IA was active in the discussion when co-chairing the Donor Economist Group (the main forum for JBSF) in 2007/2008. Both the governance and human development teams have also been drawn into the process. For example, the governance team was involved in the joint missions that identified indicators for decentralisation and public service reforms under JAF 0 (2007/2008) and now JAF 1 (2008/2009).

Elsewhere, Irish Aid and its head of mission have taken the lead in submitting proposals for JBSF structures. The JBSF will comprise (1) Policy Advisory Committees (Government and DPs); (2) a joint GoU/DP Technical Taskforce; and (3) Technical and Administrative Support Unit, which will be established under a WB MDTF.

There are also plans to hold an annual High-Level Forum that brings the two policy advisory committees together to discuss overall policy and programme coordination issues. The HLF will have senior representation from both the GoU and DPs and will act as the moment of review of general progress.

Although the JBSF structures will make the decision-making process on budget support more transparent, predictability will not be guaranteed until DPs agree to common disbursement procedures.

Public Sector Management

108. **FINMAP** has progressed reasonably well over 2006/2007 and 2007/2008, although the main component of the programme, provision of a financial management information system (IFMIS), did not reach its targets because of delays in finalising arrangements with the WB (the main funder for IFMIS) . The most notable achievements under FINMAP so far are:

- ~ Continued improvement in budget transparency⁴⁶.
- ~ The continued rollout and deepening of IFMIS to central government and semi-autonomous agencies⁴⁷.
- ~ The enactment of the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) Act 2008 in 2008, giving the OAG full autonomy. Before the law was passed, OAG had to resort to WB TA to clear its backlog of external audits with LGs.
- ~ Parliamentary committees have continued to make progress to reduce the backlog of audit reports.
- ~ Both DPs and the FINMAP Technical Committee have shown flexibility and innovation in FINMAP planning, with new developments being introduced year-on-year⁴⁸.

109. It is also worth noting that FINMAP is implemented through government structures, with each component coming under the responsibility of component and task managers, who are all civil servants. The programme is therefore well embedded but at the same time limited by weak capacity in the public sector. The FINMAP team is now working towards a platform approach that aims to increase financial and accountability competence with improved outcomes introduced in a staged manner. This approach has been supported by donors and discussed as part of JBSF.

110. On **PSRP**, key informants broadly agree with the independent evaluation of the recent PSRP⁴⁹. The main achievements and limitations of the programme in its first year and second year of operation are as follows:

- ~ Performance and Accountability: Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and LGs have welcomed the use of client charters. These charters seek to capture the level of satisfaction of service recipients. However, the feedback mechanisms to link client charters to the MDAs' plans and budgets do not exist yet. The Ministry of Public Service (MoPS) has piloted ROM (Result-Oriented Management) within its own ministry successfully. A recent review highlights key outcomes in strengthening the focus on delivery. It has also continued to support six MDAs and 12 LGs in integrating ROM in their budget process and as a tool for performance planning and staff appraisal.
- ~ Efficiency and Restructuring: No large-scale restructuring has taken place yet⁵⁰. The restructuring of the UPDF (Uganda People's Defence Force) is ongoing.
- ~ Human Capital: The performance of a number of District Service Commissions has been audited; 80% of the recommendations of the report on the payroll cleaning exercise had been implemented by June 2008. This helped the Treasury save US\$20m.
- ~ Pay reforms: This is where progress has been the slowest. Little has been done with regard to pay reforms after a study was carried out in the early 2000s. There is little

⁴⁶ For example, the FINMAP 2007/2008 annual report shows that monthly releases to LG and budget out-turn performance reports for 2007/2008 are published; that the interface between MTEF and IFMIS has been reinforced; and that a national domestic arrears clearance strategy was drafted.

⁴⁷ The 2007/2008 FINMAP annual report confirms that all MDAs connected to the IFMS presented the financial statements for 2006/2007 in time and with reasonable accuracy.

⁴⁸ For example, in late 2008, a new sub-component focusing on improvements in public procurement became part of the FINMAP. The new sub-component will cover selected activities of Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority, and the Institute of Public Procurement.

⁴⁹ Independent Review of the Public Service Reform Programme, IFE Consultants, Jan 2009.

⁵⁰ Under PSRP, restructuring has in principle been carried out with all the HLGs. But the problem is the lack of funds to pay to all the retrenched staff to go home (LOGSIP has provided part of this funding though) and failure to get appropriate replacements. This is in addition to the inadequate salary budget (covering only 65% of the establishment now). Restructuring has been slower at CG level, again due to lack of funding.

synchronisation between the practice of targeted pay increments (to attract and retain staff in hard-to-reach areas), the growth in numbers of public servants (from 233,081 in 2006/2007 to 241,364 in 2007/2008, as a result of an increase in the number of teachers, police), and the government pay reform policy position.

111. The main challenge to PSRP is political interference and weak ownership. For example, the government has no clear position on improving public service delivery in the context of the increasing number of LGs. As highlighted in the 2009 review, 'the process of granting various entities district status slows down gains made in public service reform in a manner that increases in the numbers of structures for services delivery but is not matched with resources'⁵¹.

112. In addition, the MoPS and OPM are seen as relatively weak compared to the larger sector ministries and the LGs, and this makes it difficult to push ahead with reforms, and so makes their technical leadership and coordination role difficult. In addition, decisions are often made without prior consultation with key ministries such as MoFPED. For example, in February 2009, the MoPS announced an increase in allowances for public servants and political leaders (in part to compensate for the lack of a 5% pay rise pledged by the MoFPED).

113. Measuring progress in other areas of PSM is difficult because activities are fragmented and lack a unifying PSM strategy. The OPM is currently developing a PSM SWAp (and with it a consolidated investment plan). This is a difficult exercise, compounded by the fact that the various ministries involved in PSM are coordinating rather than implementing and deal principally with cross-cutting sector issues rather than sector issues. For example, the role of MoPS is to provide technical leadership and coordination of the PSRP initiatives in close partnership with the Public Service Commission, while the MDAs and LGs are key implementers of the interventions. Plans to develop a SWAp for PSM should address lack of linkages between the various sub-groups and lack of coordination between the MoLG and sectors. Coordination efforts under PSM and with sector LMs will then be driven mainly by OPM, with support by both MoPS and MoLG⁵².

Decentralisation

114. While major strides have been made in streamlining systems for **decentralisation** and establishing and strengthening governance structures, Uganda's challenges in decentralisation are still apparent⁵³. Abolition of the graduated tax and creation of new districts⁵⁴ - ostensibly to improve services and bring them nearer to the people, but in reality linked to electoral pressures and political patronage - created acute shortages of resources in LGs and high dependence on central government remittances. Many LGs are plagued by inadequate physical infrastructure, high transaction costs and administrative overheads resulting in a financial burden on central government which ranges between 20-25% of public expenditure. The rapid pace of decentralisation has led to severe constraints to LG

⁵¹ Op.cit, p.37

⁵² It should be noted that for reforms to be successful adequate funding has to be available and therefore requires the participation of MoFPED.

⁵³ See Uganda Case Report, March 2008, Local Level Service Delivery, Decentralisation and Governance, A Comparative Study of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania Education, Health and Agricultural Sectors, by Institute for International Cooperation, JICA, 2008.

⁵⁴ Uganda had 56 Higher Local Governments in 2004. These were increased to 69 in 2005/2007, and to 80 in 2007/2008.

operations and low staffing levels of 35%, with acute staff shortages in new districts and conflict-affected districts.

115. Decentralisation has not yet resulted in better services for the poor. Effective service delivery is on the decline following a reduction in central government direct transfers and discretionary funding to LGs, as well as from a decline in LG revenue due to abolition of local taxes. According to recent IA annual reports, LG transfers by Government as a percentage of all public expenditure reduced from 47% in 2001/2002 to 22% in 2008/2009 and real per capita transfers declined from US\$26,000 in 2002/2003 to US\$22,700 in 2007/2008. LG revenue declined from US\$80.1bn in 2003/2004 to US\$39.8bn in 2006/2007, and as a percentage of central government transfers, declined from 10% in 2002 to 4% in 2006/2007, resulting in over-dependency by LGs on central government transfers and a loss of fiscal autonomy. Other challenges cited include the reduction or complete erosion of the unconditional grant with a wage component of 65% and near collapse of the local development fund, both of which provided leeway for LGs to invest in service delivery.

116. Government recognises that decentralisation is an expensive programme to implement and acknowledges that central government financing to local service delivery is inadequate. However, efforts have been made to address the challenges of decentralisation that include:

- ~ Cabinet approval of alternative sources of income through local services tax and hotel tax in April 2008.
- ~ LG inspections by MoLG for adherence to the laws, regulations and government policies; in 2007, 70 Higher Level LGs and 140 Lower Level LGs were inspected.
- ~ An increase in Higher LGs submitting final accounts to the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) (from 74 out of 80 HLGs compared to only 25 in 2002).
- ~ Government approved graduated tax compensation to districts of US\$45 billion for 2 years.
- ~ The National Assessment of Local Governments (NALG) was also carried out. According to MoLG, the findings indicated a general decline in performance of LGs compared to 2006.

117. It is worth noting, however, that overall performance under the LoGSIP basket fund was disappointing in its first two years of operation (2006-2007 and 2007-2008). Largely activity-driven, a disproportionately large share of donor money was spent at central level, and when money was finally transferred to LGs, donors, including Irish Aid, were 'not informed of and/or clear about the method and processes used to effect this top-up'⁵⁵. The MoLG was also slow in providing the necessary documents, including an audit report for 2006/2007. This explains why IA made no payment in 2007/2008. The Decentralisation Donor Partner Group (DDPG) consequently recommended to reallocate funding away from the centre and resume their co-financing of the LDG⁵⁶.

118. The Local Government Association Basket fund (LGAB) is jointly supported by Ireland and Denmark, with €3.5 million for 2007 and 2008. The fund has facilitated capacity building of the two institutions and their membership and support to advocacy initiatives on frameworks for fiscal decentralisation, tax compensation and slowing the re-centralisation

⁵⁵ Letter from Co-Chair of DDPG to Permanent Secretary, MoLG, 13th Feb 2009

⁵⁶ This was in order to increase the involvement of LGs in LoGSIP implementation and to improve on the basket fund's absorption capacity. Decisions of this nature are undertaken in the Donor Sector Working Group chaired by the PS MoLG. This move is appreciated by all, but MoFPED could not allow funds to go to LGs as part of the normal grants system as this would be beyond the approved ceiling and for this to happen needs parliamentary approval. It is planned to go this way as from FY 2009/2010.

by central government. ULGA participates in the annual JARDS and has developed an independent M&E framework for decentralisation, which is expected to give an independent assessment of local government performance.

Justice, Law and Order

119. In **Justice, Law and Order**, good results over the 2007-2009 period can be observed, and Ireland as a key member of the funding group can take a share of the credit. The JLOS Annual Review⁵⁷ cites positive results for the JLOS SIP II underlying areas⁵⁸ and five key results areas⁵⁹. Successes are said to be “impressive” given the human and financial resource constraints faced by JLOS institutions. In civic and legal education campaigns, services have improved, with better coordination within the sector. Regarding criminal justice reforms, there was reported improvement in efficiency and effectiveness across the criminal justice system (police, prisons, courts and lawyers). Police numbers have increased through the recruitment of 4,200 constables deployed throughout the country and especially in northern Uganda. Training of state attorneys has led to increased deployment in 48 out of the 81 districts of Uganda. However, the law reform process is said to be slow, with several outstanding bills drafted but not passed into law. But the review also noted that ‘the biggest challenge for the sector institutions is to start identifying themselves as part of a sector. Currently there is a sense that JLOS is more important to the sector institutions as a means of accessing funds than as a conceptual framework for planning’⁶⁰.

120. The results of these reforms on the public and those agencies within the JLOS system include:

- ~ A reduction in average time on remand from 30 months in 2006 to 14 months in 2007, and an increased police-to-population ration of 1:875 in 2007 from 1:1,400 in 2006.
- ~ Increased provision of legal aid through Paralegal Advisory Services, with 7,702 people attended to during half of 2008.
- ~ A 30% increase in budget allocation from JLOS to conflict areas, and increased security in northern Uganda, especially Karamoja. This was verified by the IA evaluators during interviews with stakeholders in Karamoja. There is increased safety and security of persons and travellers in Karamoja, and reduction in cattle raids.
- ~ Improvements in decongesting prisons and handling case backlog. However, specific prisons still face congestion due to inadequate facilities and case backlog⁶¹.
- ~ The Commercial Court established under JLOS SIP I has now been integrated in the GoU JLOS system so that its sustainability is assured.

⁵⁷ Uganda: Justice Sector Assessment, World Bank, June 2007 Update

⁵⁸ Underlying areas are: Legislative reform; Reduction of human rights violations; Reduction of case backlog; improved processes so as to minimise the cost of doing business; faster disposal of cases and matters; reduction of crime prevalence; reduction in the remand period; integration of cross-cutting issues such as gender, HIV/AIDS; rehabilitation of offenders and diversion of juveniles from the justice system; strengthening of JLOS institutions and inter-sectoral linkages; and enhancing legal and civic awareness. See JLOS SIP II, (p xii) 2006/2007 – 2010/2011.

⁵⁹ Rule of law and due process promoted; human rights culture fostered across JLOS institutions; access to justice enhanced for all, particularly the poor and marginalised; incidence of crime reduced; and safety of the person and security of property promoted; and JLOS contribution to economic development enhanced

⁶⁰ Uganda: Justice Sector Assessment, World Bank, June 2007, p.12

⁶¹ An example in Moroto Prison, visited by the evaluators, where 171 inmates were occupying space formerly built for 60. Close to 21 prisoners had overstayed and gone beyond the 180 or 120 maximum days for remand, depending on the case. The IA and Netherlands support for JLOS earmarked for Karamoja is addressing congestion through construction of extra wards and facilities.

- ~ Positive strides have been to support the drafting of the Sexual Offences Bill, Domestic Violence Bill, the Domestic Relations Bill and HIV/AIDS Bill, in order to address challenges of the vulnerable groups in justice provision.
- ~ In order to facilitate access to justice by the poor, construction of nine⁶² courts were completed in nine districts, while three were still under construction. Construction of three DPP offices had been completed and eight had been opened⁶³.
- ~ Case backlog is still a major challenge, with the higher courts having more challenges with case disposal and overall court performance of 42.1% for case disposal by the different levels of court.⁶⁴ For example, case disposal for Court of Appeal was at 8.4%, High Court 21.1%, Chief Magistrate 40.6%, Grade 1, 58% and Grade 2 at 61.7%. The total thematic disposal of cases was 41.8%.
- ~ Provision of and access to justice by the poor however remains a challenge, especially access to justice for women and children. The capacity of the Family and Children's Courts (FCC), local council courts and probation and welfare services is said to be low. Family justice reforms under JLOS SIP II are expected to address these challenges.

121. While public confidence in the justice system was reported to have increased from 34% to 67%⁶⁵, there are still public concerns over corruption and bribery: 85% of the general public perceive JLOS institutions as "corrupt", especially police and related institutions⁶⁶; 41% of the public acknowledge the existence of bribery in their locality; and 12% have encountered bribery in the previous year; and 93% of the legal profession having encountered bribery. Most frequent sources of bribery are the police (43%) and LGs (37%).

122. On access to JLOS institutions by the poor, the police were rated as most accessible by 81% and local council officers at 72%. Human rights violations were reported among 18% of the public surveyed and among them, 44% of the unlawful violations (torture, ill-treatment, unlawful detention were reported among the police). Northern Uganda was leading with 26% (of which rape constituted 23%), central 21% and eastern 11%. There was increased perception of increased crime and low reporting to police. The African Centre for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture Victims (ACTV) report a rise in the number of torture cases as noted earlier (Section 1.2).

123. Irish Aid is a key player in working with other partners in LABF, DDP, UHRC and LGA basket funds. Stakeholders interviewed⁶⁷ gave a consistent response about the crucial role played by IA in ensuring success of donor engagements with government and in promoting pertinent issues. The funds provide a window for supporting CSOs in direct service provision for human rights, such as the legal aid service provision for the poor, women's advocacy organisations such as the Centre for Domestic Violence and Prevention (CEDOVIP) and involving men in promoting gender rights. The LGA basket and the UHRC give people a platform to raise their voices and promote accountability. The baskets also offer alternative means of strengthening democracy institutions such as the Electoral Commission, Parliament, the media and civil society. Interviews suggest that through a coordinated effort

⁶² Courts completed at Moyo, Yumbe, Pader, Kaberamaido, Entebbe, Kisoro, Bushenyi, Pallisa and Kapchorwa. Construction of courts is on-going at Dokolo, Oyam and Sironko.

⁶³ Under construction are Kasese, Iganga and Nebbi, and opened in Amolatar, Budaka, Kaberamaido, Nakaseke, Yumbe, Kalangala, Katakwi and Matuga

⁶⁴ JLOS Report 2007/2008

⁶⁵ Irish Aid, Uganda, Annual Report 2007

⁶⁶ Results from Steadman Group, 2008: National Integrated Household Baseline Study on Demand, Use and Access to JLOS services in Uganda for Ministry of Justice & Constitutions Affairs. P 6/7

⁶⁷ Denmark, LABF, DDP, Austria, JLOS, MoLG, MGLSD & UHRC and Prison Service in Karamoja.

with other development partners, IA has been able to collectively strengthen the voice and policy dialogue capacity on human rights and pro-poor issues⁶⁸.

Education

124. Irish Aid's sector budget support funding means that overall progress in the education sector is an important indicator of IA's own effectiveness. National statistics show growing net enrolment rates and gender equality; however, inequalities by region and welfare status persist. MoFPED analysis has shown that 90% of PAF funds in education go on wages and only 8.6% goes towards the sector priorities, as identified in the Ministry's Poverty Status Report of 2005. 'Wage expenditure is recognised as mandatory expenditure that takes a first call on government resources, and it seems unnecessary to continue protecting it under the PAF. The inclusion of wages under the PAF crowds out spending on the identified priority areas, and negatively affects the ability of the sector to improve the quality of education under the auspices of the PEAP and the PAF'⁶⁹.

125. The most recent year-on-year results in the education sector show generally positive trends⁷⁰:

- ~ Enrolment in post-primary increased by 17% between 2006/2007 and 2007/2008; net enrolment rate improved from 18.6 to 21.3%; and female enrolment increased from 45.5% to 45.8%
- ~ The retention of children in schools improved, with the rate for boys and girls increasing from 59.8% in 2006/2007 to 65.8% in 2007/2008
- ~ Pupils in P6 attaining desired level of competency in literacy and numeracy improved from 33.5% to 49.6% and 30.5% to 41.4% respectively in 2006/2007 and 2007/2008
- ~ The student:classroom ratio in post-primary improved from 48:1 in 2006/2007 to 46:1 in 2007/2008, while the student:teacher ratio remained constant at 19 over the same period

126. Irish Aid's support in **Rwenzori** for the Quality Education in Schools through Training Programme (QUEST) generated good lessons and practices for enhancing quality teaching and learning in primary schools⁷¹. The QUEST model has been adopted by MoES in piloting the Quality Enhancement Initiative (QEI) in the 12 worst performing districts⁷². The QEI is geared towards improving the quality of primary education in the country, and is hinged on four pillars, namely Pupil, Teacher, Management and the Community. (Figure 5, Figure 6)

127. Irish Aid's support to UPPET in the **Karamoja** region consists of school construction and a bursary scheme to poor but academically able students. The former consists of building rehabilitation and provision of instructional materials and science equipment to 13 UPPET institutions, as well as vehicles and motorcycles to education officials and refresher training for teachers. Though construction is not yet complete, the evaluation mission's field trip to Moroto and Kangole witnessed the contribution of these initiatives to an area suffering very poor educational standards and the strong appreciation by the schools and local officials. The quality of construction appeared generally sound (based on assessments by the accompanying MoES engineer), and though work was delayed and the costs high due

⁶⁸ Interview with UHRC, CEDOVIP, Trócaire, Urban Authorities Association of Uganda and Uganda Local Government Association

⁶⁹ MoFPED, op.cit. 2007, p.38

⁷⁰ Final ESSAPR, 2008

⁷¹ QUEST M&E Draft Report 2007

⁷² Programme Implementation Document, Comprehensive Programme For Enhancing the Quality of Primary Education In Uganda, May 2008.

to the remoteness of the sites and insecurity, and because contractors mobilised slowly, the new facilities should strengthen the schools and primary teacher training colleges when finished (Figure 7).

128. The bursary scheme covering fees, meals and uniforms has been provided to 850 secondary school students resident in Karamoja since 2005-2006, and is managed by the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWEU). Sixty-five per cent of those assisted are girls in eight schools across five districts in Karamoja (Figure 8). A well-conducted independent evaluation in 2007⁷³ found that the scheme had been largely effective in its targeting and in improving school access. While the selection process has reportedly improved in response to concerns raised in the evaluation in order to bring greater transparency and outreach, on the basis of our visit to two schools⁷⁴, the selection process still needs improved monitoring as does the scheme's coverage and financial efficiency⁷⁵. The monitoring of the scheme, managed from Kampala on the basis of periodic visits, could be improved by establishing a local sub-office. The impact on the girls and boys who benefit also needs to be evaluated in terms of educational performance and in tracking where the students go after graduation.

129. Finally, IA's support to a number of education agencies has produced various positive results that are summarised in Box 3. Overall, the mix of aid modalities in the education sector has been instrumental in achieving the CSP objectives. It has enabled IA to feed from practice into policy, to complement macro engagement with practical experience, and to balance the risk associated with an over-concentration on any one modality. However, there are concerns as noted over the range of initiatives (p.15) and on effective policy engagement (p.38).

Figure 5: Kamaiba Primary School, Kasese District



⁷³ Review of the Irish Bursary Scheme in Karamoja Implemented through the Forum for African Women Educationalists of Uganda (FAWEU), January 2007

⁷⁴ Moroto SS and Kangole GSS

⁷⁵ Interviews with a small sample of students indicated some inconsistencies in the range and use of bursary payments, in terms of uniforms provided, books and other items.

Figure 6: Primary Two Class at Kamaiba Primary School, Kasese District



Figure 7: New Classroom Block at Kangole Girls' Secondary School, Karamoja



Figure 8: Bursary Students at Moroto Secondary School, Karamoja



Box 3: Key results in Irish Aid's direct support to education

- ~ Education Standards Agency (ESA): 960 Associate Assessors were selected countrywide and trained/equipped with skills to conduct school inspection.
- ~ Uganda National Examinations Board (UNEB): Assessment Guidelines were reviewed in line with the thematic curriculum; and a total 8,477 PI teachers in 31 districts, 11 PTCs and 258 CCTs were oriented on using the assessment guidelines.
- ~ Uganda National Teachers' Union (UNATU): promoted the popularisation of thematic curriculum through sensitisation of teachers, parents and political leaders; supported teachers in disadvantaged districts like Karamoja to develop instructional materials; published and disseminated the *Education Sector HIV and Aids Workplace Policy*; collaborated with National Union of Education Institutions (for non-teaching staff) on the Partnership on Workplace Policy; and conducts campaigns against gender-based violence to partly address the problem of high school dropout among girls.
- ~ Education Service Commission (ESC): disseminated the scheme of service to all districts and the MoES mobilised UGX 1bn/= for its implementation; collected data from all teachers countrywide to be stored in the data bank that is being established; and conducted training needs assessment for teaching personnel.
- ~ Kabarole and Kasese (pilot districts for Irish Aid Support), scaling up and consolidation of QUEST achievements; enhancement of thematic curriculum through additional training of P1, P2 and P3 teachers and provision of instructional materials; and construction of administration block for Kasese Education Department.
- ~ Canon Apollo Core PTC: established an ICT facility to enhance teaching by equipping teacher trainees and primary teachers with computer skills.
- ~ National Curriculum Development Centre (NCDC): produced teaching materials in three local languages (Ateso, Runyoro-Rutoro and Rukonzo); conducted cluster meetings; monitoring the pilot of P3 curriculum in 90 schools in 10 districts; and provision of a vehicle and office furniture.
- ~ Teacher Education Department (MoES), Teacher Assistance to the department to develop and implement the revised Teacher Education Curricula, especially the PTE pre-service and in-service and other curricula. Monitoring of evaluation of pilot is due in 2009 and rollout in 2010.
- ~ Literacy Network for Uganda (LitNet): jointly working with MGLSD to develop a National Adult Literacy Programme Plan of Action (NALPPA); supports adult literacy instructors' economic incentive schemes in sub-counties and districts; establishing a National Literacy Training Institute for FAL instructors at Rural Training Centre, Wairaka; supports local people, especially women, in informed participation in local development projects; and supports CBOs to influence districts in government FAL policies.

Source: Progress reports from the Agencies, and IA's Annual Reports.

HIV/AIDS

130. During the evaluation period, IA has been successful in scaling up its support to **HIV/AIDS**. IA increased funding for service delivery and coordination, provided technical support and actively participated in policy dialogue with government, development partners and civil society at national and decentralised levels in support of achieving the National HIV and AIDS Strategic Plan targets.

- ~ In coordination and dialogue, the National Strategic Plan (NSP) for HIV/AIDS was launched in October 2008, with accompanying handbooks and monitoring guides. IA was an active member of the National Taskforce that provided oversight in the

- development of the NSP, whose overall goal is to achieve universal access targets for HIV/AIDS prevention, care, treatment and social support by 2012. At the national level in 2008, a Joint AIDS Review (JAR) was also carried out while MoLG, with IA support, started to hold regional AIDS reviews in which neighbouring districts deliberate on their HIV/AIDS activities. Through the Partnership Fund, the role of the Self-Coordinating Entity Decentralized Response was particularly important in the development of the MoLG Mainstreaming Project funded solely by IA.
- ~ UAC was able to ensure that MoFPED requested sectors, for the first time, to incorporate HIV/AIDS in their budgets and plans, though only MoES has so far achieved this in 2007-2008.
 - ~ Irish Aid (the joint lead donor with DFID) funded the establishment of the Joint UN AIDS Programme which coordinates the UN agencies' response to HIV/AIDS. The Joint UN team in Uganda represents 13 agencies and programmes; and has developed a five-year joint programme with UNAIDS as the Secretariat. In 2008, some of the activities included supporting behaviour change interventions for sex workers and youth, conducting HIV risks & vulnerability assessments of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees, of truck drivers on the Kampala-Juba route and in prisons.


131. Civil society organisations were instrumental to improve service delivery for HIV/AIDS. The CSF was established and launched in May 2008. The steering committee developed the policies and procedures for the fund and three firms were recruited to provide technical, financial and M&E services. For the first time, multiple donors⁷⁶ contributed resources to a single fund from which grants were awarded to a wide range of civil society partners working to support the government's long-term policies, strategic plans and frameworks addressing HIV/AIDS. This was an important achievement that is bringing a focus of effort in a sector where in the past huge funds have tended to be administered outside of government-led programmes.

132. The CSF has provided funds to nine national NGOs in 2007, and in 2008 to 120⁷⁷ civil society organisations (CSOs) covering prevention, orphans and vulnerable children at district level with grants totalling US\$12.8 million. Through these efforts, over 88,000 people were reached with prevention information, more than 40,000 were counselled and tested, 9,000 became new beneficiaries of palliative care and 33,000 orphans and vulnerable children received target community services. Figure 9 shows the distribution of successful applicants for provision of OVC's services. Such coverage would have been impossible for IA using direct funding methods, as was the case before the CSF was established. Further discussion is given in Annex 7.

⁷⁶ Currently Irish Aid, UK, Denmark and USA, with Sweden, Italy and the Global Fund set to join.

⁷⁷ There have been concerns over the capacity of smaller CSOs to access CSF funds: the total non-compliance rate is so far 88%, due to capacity problems.

Figure 9: Zonal Distribution of Approved Sub-Grant Recipients for Provision of OVC Services through Civil Society Fund in 2008.



Source: CSF Technical Management Agency, 2009

Policy engagement with Government

133. The UJAS has been a successful mechanism in terms of coordinating donor support around the GoU PEAP, and mobilising financial resources. It provided a framework for donors to align around, adopt collaborative modalities and work out a division of labour across sectors. However, the overall conclusion of the PEAP evaluation is that:

“as the PEAP has aged so the sense of shared interest between the GoU and development partners has weakened... While at its inception UJAS was at the forefront of efforts to redraw the development financing relationship in Uganda, by the time it was signed it was already becoming a casualty of these wider trends.”⁷⁸

134. The most effective areas besides the PEAP as a whole have been on financial reform work (through FINMAP), supporting education reforms in areas such as curriculum development and improving teaching quality through pilot work. IA has also been recognised for its contribution to policy analysis around the role of gender on economic policy, through its support to supplementary gender analysis of household surveys and the budget.

135. In other areas the quality of policy dialogue has been noted at times as weak, as DPs tend to focus on operational issues and processes rather than more complex policy issues⁷⁹. Equally, there is currently no structure within the LDPG and PDG that allows regular consultation between Heads of Missions (HoM) and members of the Cabinet. Discussion takes place at technical level between HoM and Permanent Secretaries rather than at ministerial level.

⁷⁸ UJAS Review, ODI, op cit., p.11.

⁷⁹ For example, during the quarterly stakeholders meetings and joint annual reviews, DPs have failed to demonstrate “clarity... with regard to their specific positions and rationale from a policy rather than operational perspective” (2009 PSRP Review).

136. The use of prior actions with JBSF may reinforce this trend to focus on operational issues. For example, in setting targets for public service reform in the JBSF Joint Assessment Framework 1 (2008/2009), the issues less likely to get political traction - such as pay reform and structural reorganisation - were left out and a technical (and proxy) benchmark (on the Integrated Personnel and Payroll System) was chosen instead. At the same time, the High-Level Forum envisaged under the JBSF could potentially fill the gap that remains for engagement around more sensitive political issues. The JBSF could give donors leverage through agreeing to underlying principles around commitment to the rule of law, human rights, peace, stability and democracy. Concerned DPs such as Ireland may be in a better position to negotiate with the GoU in case of slippage ahead of the 2011 elections.

137. At sectoral level there is a rather more positive story. In the education sector, the budget support experience is at a mature stage where donors have an effective relationship with GoU. IA has been the chair of the sector in 2008 and during its tenure, the primary sub-sector policy focus shifted from increasing access to improving quality in education services. EFAG is regarded as one of the most effective donor-government coordination mechanisms: in MoES, technical working groups formulated policy agenda for sharing and consensus building by management and funding partners jointly. IA engaged in the process vertically through MoES's structures (technical working groups and ESCC) and horizontally with relevant development partners (EFAG) to influence policy agenda (IA staff, MoES staff).

138. Yet there are still unresolved pressures between budget support and project approaches in education. While sector agencies such as the National Examinations Board and the Education Standards Agency understandably press for separate funding from IA, the MoES's own Planning Department - while acknowledging that budget support should be the preferred modality - also stated that IA should also continue to fund projects, both on- and off-budget, because of their urgency and they would not receive priority under the MoFPED budget approvals and ceilings⁸⁰.

139. Ireland is currently the lead donor for the JLOS DPs and was the chair in 2007 at the start of the CSP. As chair, IA has played a valuable and visible leadership role in information gathering, communication and policy engagement with government on behalf of all other partners. Ireland continues to make an effective contribution also to the Decentralisation Development Partners Group (DDPG), and its role was described during interviews with government staff, development partners and LG associations as facilitative and technically competent.

Donor coordination

140. The PDG and the LPDG are the two most important structures for donor-donor coordination. These two bodies are for HoM and heads of development respectively, and contain a complex set of sector and other sub-groups. Ireland has supported efforts to avoid duplication and to specialise in certain sectors and has participated fully in the Division of Labour exercise since 2005. IA's work in chairing the various working groups other than the PDG and LPDG has been reported as generally effective and strategic - including in the JLOS, decentralisation and HIV/AIDS groups.

141. While some members view the PDG as essentially an information-sharing forum with limited decision-making ability, it has proved effective in certain areas and at certain

⁸⁰ Interview with Director of Planning

times, including during the elections in 2006 when certain donors cut support following concerns over the fairness of the election process, and then with the use of the governance matrix that allows DPs to focus on progress with areas such as anti-corruption, human rights and political governance. Ireland chaired the PDG in 2007 in this role, and played a central role in the Juba peace talks in April 2007.

142. During 2007, the PRDP was developed to focus efforts on recovery in Northern Uganda, and followed on from earlier KIDDP⁸¹. Both have been slow to attract sufficient donor support, and several donors have instigated other initiatives (such as the USAID NUDEAL⁸²), so that there appears to be a number of rather uncoordinated initiatives taking place to address the most chronically poor areas in Uganda⁸³. Given Ireland's on-the-ground involvement in Karamoja (see Table 1 and Section 3.3.3) as well other engagement in the north (including de-mining and humanitarian work), there was a case for it to play a more proactive role in steering the PRDP towards implementation; and an opportunity in the future to play a role in building coordination under the leadership of the Government (whether under the PRDP or another umbrella).

143. While Ireland has mainly engaged with like-minded partners, particularly in the Nordic plus group⁸⁴, it has had less involvement with others (such as China, Japan, and the African Development Bank⁸⁵). Ireland has, though, been able to achieve some collaboration with the largest bilateral donor, USAID, in the education sector. IA and USAID collaborated on coordination mechanisms, particularly with the EFAG, where Ireland handed over the co-chair role to USAID in 2005. The two agencies have also collaborated well around primary sector reforms, working jointly on the development of the diploma course for Competency in Primary Teacher Education which is now accredited by Kyambogo University.

144. Working with USAID on HIV/AIDS has been a more mixed experience – collaboration around the Presidential Initiative on AIDS Strategy for Communication to the Youth has been successful but the establishment of the Civil Society Fund has been less straightforward, with problems over the harmonisation of donor approaches. While USAID brings enormous resources to the HIV/AIDS sector, it has tended to work independently and outside of government structures⁸⁶. The CSF has been established under the National Aids Commission to stimulate local CBOs and NGOs to work on HIV/AIDS advocacy and treatment. USAID has agreed to participate by way of funding the fund-managing agents (financial, technical and M&E) while the other partners (Ireland, DFID and Denmark) fund the basket. While the other funds that USAID puts into the CSF are earmarked for OVC, Paediatric AIDS and Local Government Performance, resources from the other partners are not earmarked; in other words, the funds of partners are fungible, USAID's are not.

⁸¹ Introduced by OPM in 2005/2006 to address conflict resolution but suspended in 2006, and subsumed under the Peace, Recovery and Development Programme (PRDP) launched in 2007.

⁸² This is a new livelihoods programme incorporating infrastructure, disaster relief, security and local government to a value of \$65m: Interview with N.Eslick, Programme Officer, USAID.

⁸³ During the mission's visit to Moroto, a large USAID mission was met in the field conducting reconnaissance for the USAID NUDEAL programme in Karamoja region.

⁸⁴ Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands and Ireland.

⁸⁵ Although there has been collaboration with the latter two in education, and with AfDB under the Office of Auditor General.

⁸⁶ Because of the role that the US Congress plays in determining priorities and funding rules, USAID is constrained in the extent to which it can support joint donor mechanisms.

Results and performance monitoring systems

145. The CSP did not have a dedicated M&E framework, relying on the UJAS joint reporting system and the Prior Actions of the PRSC. Sector monitoring frameworks in governance, and in education in addition, were jointly established by DPs and the Government. But even in 2006 the need to support a stronger outcome monitoring and reporting system was recognised. While the UJAS Results Matrix recognised the harmonisation of monitoring indicators, 'the issue of reporting is not sufficiently addressed and DCI-Uganda could enhance the UJAS processes by bringing this important issue on the table and stressing it once it joins the Group. The development of a reporting system that would better account for all the different forms/modalities of aid expenditure under UJAS is essential in this respect'⁸⁷.

146. The Annual PEAP Implementation Review (APIR) was intended to provide the overarching framework for measuring PEAP progress, but only two reviews have been completed: one in 2005/2006 and one in 2007/2008. The '07/'08 Review was renamed so that "PEAP" was replaced by "Policy" in the title to reflect the new direction of the GoU, and the review concentrated on outputs in selected sectors only, because of the concern that resource flows needed to demonstrate better service delivery results⁸⁸.

147. Underpinning the GoU's PEAP monitoring was the National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy (NIMES), but it was noted that 'the existing levers for improved PEAP implementation are not sufficiently "joined up". The central agencies influential on government performance do not coordinate in creating top-down demand for PEAP-related performance from MDAs. Decentralisation in Uganda has stalled leaving many local government bodies weak agents for the public interest'.

148. Despite this, monitoring of PAF utilisation has been more effective. Government has put in place a number of procedures, including: quarterly visits by districts to service facilities, quarterly visits by Treasury Inspectorate and the Inspector General of Government, as well as the newly-formed Budget Monitoring and Accountability Unit in MoFPED which has produced value-for-money audits and expenditure tracking studies⁸⁹. Also, in some districts, there are PAF monitoring meetings coordinated by a civil society organisation, the Uganda Debt Network (UDN), and results are conveyed to national budget and public expenditure review meetings. At the sector level, monitoring happens in the context of the joint annual sector reviews.

149. At sector level the review procedures are stronger. In education, the MoES and the Education Funding Agencies' Group (EFAG) jointly set annual targets and indicators, and review sector performance during planning and review meetings. For basket funding mechanisms, such as PSRP, FINMAP, and LoGSIP, funds from donors go to the holding account in Bank of Uganda on the strength of approved annual workplans. Funds from the holding account then go to the respective Ministries' operational accounts after a "no objection" from donors financing the basket and in line with the approved budgets. Subsequent releases to the operational accounts depend on provision of the progress and financial reports on a quarterly and/or annual basis.

⁸⁷ Irish Aid Retreat, Final Report, O. Saasa, Feb 2006, p.12

⁸⁸ APIR 2007/8, p.2

⁸⁹ Evidence was provided by the Head of the BMAU, Mrs. M. Kakande

150. IA has responded to the lack of progress with the PEAP monitoring system by introducing its own M&E framework in 2007. This might seem to be a reversal of IA's commitments to support national systems under the aid effectiveness agenda, but the general picture was of reducing support for the PEAP by GoU, delays in annual reporting through the APIR and a lack of commitment by key ministries to make the NIMES effective.

151. Work on the development of the new Joint Assessment Framework (JAF) is expected to provide a stronger tool to assess performance under the Joint Budget Support Framework (JBSF) for those donors providing budget support (See Box 2). The structure provides for a shortlist of indicators that include both sector and macro-economic aspects. These cover four areas:

- ~ Underlying principles: commitment to the rule of law, human rights, peace, stability and democracy.
- ~ Section 1a: the precondition for implementing government policy, which include PFM, macroeconomic and fiscal policies, commitment to fighting corruption, political commitment to poverty reduction, and sufficient opportunities for effective dialogue.
- ~ Section 1b: progress in cross-cutting system reform, with prior actions defined in budget execution, PFM, procurement, anti-corruption, public service reform, and decentralisation.
- ~ Section 2: performance in the education, health (especially primary level and on quality targets) and water and sanitation sectors. There are also plans to include agriculture and roads.

152. Meanwhile, the renewal of the more comprehensive NIMES so that it becomes an effective national monitoring system that can be supported and used by DPs will be a critical issue under the forthcoming NDP. The PEAP evaluation had a specific annex on the M&E arrangements for the PEAP, but apart from recommending a more limited use of a central M&E model, and providing better incentives under the NDP, the way forward is still left rather unclear⁹⁰.

153. IA's own M&E system, though newly established, has been a detailed and comprehensive attempt to provide improved internal tracking of CSP progress. The framework bravely attempts to capture the results achieved under the three pillars and across six priority policy areas. It also separates out results attributable to IA from broader national outcomes. For the IA specific indicators, the list is comprehensive and the quality dimension good but there are no specific targets. The broader outcomes have baselines and targets for many of the indicators, particularly under Governance and Human Development, but some of the targets run beyond the end of the CSP period as they are based on national plans. Nevertheless, though the framework is not perfect, IA are correct to state that it provides a good basis for planning the next CSP and helping the whole team to integrate its political, humanitarian and developmental roles⁹¹.

154. Based on the Accra Agenda for Action⁹², increased attention on 'mutual accountability reviews' is expected by 2010 that will 'involve stronger parliamentary and citizen engagement and will be complemented with credible independent evidence'. This

⁹⁰ Independent Evaluation of Uganda's (PEAP), Results and Performance Theme Paper, Matheson, A., Shall, A., and Ogeda, M., May 2008

⁹¹ Lessons Learning Paper, Irish Aid, 2009, p.9

⁹² This statement arose from the 3rd High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Accra, Ghana on 4th Sept. 2008 to assess implementation of the Paris Declaration. Uganda co-chaired the roundtable on aid harmonisation.

means that IA would need to seek opportunities to support joint evaluation processes in the next CSP as well as ensuring that it can also improve its accountability for using its resources towards the CSP objectives, including building on its existing work with civil society.

Risk Management

155. There has been a generally good approach to risk management, particularly with regard to governance, political and fiduciary risk. Annual reports for 2007 and 2008 contain a summary of risks and mitigation measures as required by IA central guidance. Externally, the main risk management mechanisms are the various donor groups that review risks in the different areas, whether political (in the PDG) or in governance (in the Decentralisation WG, Anti-Corruption Working Group).

156. Fiduciary risk is monitored on a regular basis through various joint assessments conducted by partners, especially the World Bank and DFID. Irish Aid advisers also monitor budget planning and execution through various donor working groups (Economists Group, PFM group and the Accountability Sector Working Group). Fiduciary risk is also monitored in the education sector through annual sector reviews and tracking studies. In principle, fiduciary risk is lower when using basket funding mechanisms. Under FINMAP/PSRP, etc., funds are earmarked to activities and disbursed on the basis of last year's satisfactory performance. A quarterly review of planned and actual expenditures and regular audits allows DPs to act upon any irregularities⁹³.

157. For PAF and sector budget support, the close monitoring of fiduciary risk appears satisfactory. Importantly, country PFM systems are being strengthened, and more information from the OAG as well as forthcoming value-for-money audit reports are expected to be submitted to Parliament in future. But not all sectors face the same level of fiduciary risk: for example, spending overruns are more frequent in the justice sector and this might justify more scrutiny from donors, given higher fiduciary risk in this sector.

158. Furthermore, while close budget monitoring helps to track financial misuse, it does not reduce, as such, the level of fiduciary risk. In particular, fund recovery mechanisms hardly exist. In the case of the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, only US\$720m – out of the total US\$3bn – have been recovered so far. A key main issue is that "Effective action to eliminate corruption is patchy. There is some evidence that government agencies are held to account for mismanagement. But the recommendations by auditors are only occasionally followed up with administrative action and criminal prosecution"⁹⁴.

159. Internally, the close integration of the Embassy team has enabled more effective linking of political and programme risks. The hiring of an internal auditor has complemented IA's accounting systems and helped reduce financial risks. Staff support and training measures have ameliorated the increased pressure placed on the team from more rigorous procedures, innovative working approaches and heavier policy work.

Compliance with Paris Declaration

160. Ireland has been seen as a leader in advocating compliance and has set a strong example for others. The evidence from the DAC Peer Review in 2008 and from reviews conducted by the Office of the Prime Minister in 2006 and 2008 is that IA has performed

⁹³ This partly explains, for example, why no money was disbursed under LoGSIP last year.

⁹⁴ Uganda: Joint Budget Support Partner Assessment, February 2008, Page 3, paragraph 13.


strongly with regard to indicators measuring progress against the Paris Declaration principles.

161. According to the Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey 2008 preliminary data, the results for Ireland (2007) in Uganda were as follows⁹⁵:

- ~ Indicator 3: A large share of the budget was reported in the national budget, although the final statistics are not yet available.
- ~ Indicator 4: 100% of technical cooperation (€200,000 in 2007) was disbursed through coordinated programmes in support of capacity building.
- ~ Indicator 5: 75% of aid for government sectors used national budget execution systems, 82% of aid used national financial reporting procedures, 89% of aid used national auditing procedures, and 75% of aid used all three of the national procedures.
- ~ Indicator 6: Ireland had no PIUs, out of a total of 30 in Uganda.
- ~ Indicator 7: 100% of aid from Ireland was predictable.
- ~ Indicator 8: IA was 100% untied.
- ~ Indicator 9: 92% of IA was programme based.
- ~ Indicator 10a: No donor missions were recorded.
- ~ Indicator 10b: 100% of country analysis was coordinated.

162. Ireland had the lowest proportion of its aid passing through project modalities and the largest percentage in either full (PAF) or sector budget support (see Figure 10 and also Section 3.3).

Figure 10: Proportion of Total Aid by Donor by Aid Modality⁹⁶



163. Irish Aid also came out well from the DoL Interim Report⁹⁷ in terms of having taken seriously the need to streamline operations and leave some sectors while concentrating on

⁹⁵ Based on an Irish Aid Briefing Note on Aid Effectiveness, IA Embassy, 2009.

⁹⁶ First draft of Uganda DP Division of Labour Exercise Interim Report, ODI, 2007.

⁹⁷ Op. cit.

others. Prior to the CSP 2007-2009, IA chose to exit from agriculture and health, and to concentrate on education, HIV/AIDS, JLOS and public sector management (PSM). Ireland could still move further towards meeting the OECD-DAC recommendation of being engaged in a maximum of just three sectors.

164. Coordination efforts of IA have been seen as effective in the various working groups by those interviewed, and in the formulation of the JBSF IA has been active, particularly in working on the structures to operate the new fund. However, in general, it has been noted that harmonisation of donor interaction has a mixed record. While DPs have agreed on limiting their sector engagement through the DoL, transaction costs seem to be higher in some sectors than before, due to the continuing proliferation of working groups and other coordination mechanisms. As noted by a recent study: "There is no evidence that harmonisation efforts have yet lowered transactions costs. If anything ... coordination mechanisms at sector level have increased in recent years."⁹⁸

165. For Uganda, progress towards aid effectiveness has reached a plateau in the past three years. The most recent assessment indicates that up to 2005, Uganda was in a good position compared to its neighbours in terms of meeting PD principles, and indeed was a pioneer. Since then progress has been mixed. Good progress occurred in alignment of aid flows with national priorities, coordinated technical assistance and the use of common arrangements for aid delivery (such as PBAs). Modest progress was noted towards aid untying, joint analytical work and the implementation of a good practice results framework. Serious undershooting or a reversal of progress are in the apparent fall in the share of aid using national procurement systems, a worsening of aid predictability and an increase in the number of PIUs⁹⁹. Under PAF, while IA itself disbursed as was originally budgeted, budget support in general has, however, remained highly unpredictable, as recently illustrated in the PEFA 2008 and the annual budget performance report for 2007/2008. JBSO seeks to address this issue in the long-term, and the JAF is expected to have significant impact on predictability, accountability and on the coordination of HRM requirements and other issues within sectors¹⁰⁰.

Effectiveness in mainstreaming cross-cutting issues

166. In **HIV/AIDS**, IA has been particularly effective in both mainstreaming and in coordinating donor responses. It held the chair of the AIDS Development Partners (ADPs) in 2008 and helped ensure a more strategic engagement of partners. Key achievements during the year included the implementation of the division of labour that saw various donors take on lead roles in line with their areas of comparative advantage; the finalisation of the HIV/AIDS Civil Society Fund (CSF); a refocus on prevention to respond to changes in the epidemic; and a strengthened Uganda AIDS Commission, resulting in an effective joint AIDS review.

167. Gender was also mainstreamed in HIV/AIDS activities; for instance, the CSF Steering Committee with the backing of IA ensured that (a) fund applications were engendered and that (b) the members of the committee and management were sensitised on gender

⁹⁸ UJAS Review, ODI, Nov 2008, p.15, and also supported by interviews by this evaluation with several donors.

⁹⁹ UJAS Review, ODI, Nov 2008, p.16.

¹⁰⁰ Currently the donors under PRSP, together with MoH and MoE (pilots), are identifying specific activities and indicators to achieve this objective under JBSF/JAF.

mainstreaming during a retreat in February 2008. The school construction programme in Karamoja has also mainstreamed HIV/AIDS and gender into programme activities¹⁰¹.

168. In order to provide in-house capacity for **gender** mainstreaming, IA recruited a Gender and Equity Advisor, a move that has helped to effectively establish clear processes and strategies for mainstreaming in IA. An internal gender assessment¹⁰² in June 2007 noted a positive attitude of IA staff to gender mainstreaming, however, with limited capacity and skills to mainstream gender in their programmes. Among the recommended strategies was a gender mainstreaming training for staff, which was carried out in 2008, with the support of IA Headquarters.

169. Externally, IA supported policy dialogue to include gender responsive legislative reform, as noted in section 3.2.1. JLOS is also working on promotion of women's rights and has established the Family and Child Protection Unit of Uganda Police Force, the Human Rights Desk in Prisons, and the Directorate of Human Rights in Uganda People's Defence Force, with a specialised unit for handling cases of women and children¹⁰³. However, there are still challenges with providing access to justice for women, especially in the local council courts. In a recent survey, only 1.4% of interviewees felt that such courts were gender sensitive in effecting justice¹⁰⁴.

170. Gender mainstreaming support from IA with national significance also included funding the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development to mainstream gender in the National Land Policy, and supporting the MoES to finalise and disseminate the Gender in Education Policy. The policy is expected to address drop-out rates of girls in primary and secondary schools. IA also provided technical input into addressing equity issues; for example, funding strategic gender studies that would enrich government planning and policy development processes. This includes the recently launched Gender and Growth Study by MoFPED, whose findings may put gender and growth issues at the centre of the NDP, and a statistical analysis of the National Household Survey to disaggregate national gender data to facilitate socio-economic planning.

171. CSOs funded by IA have played a key role in advocating for gender equity in Uganda. IA has funded CEDOVIP to implement violence prevention initiatives in Kawempe Division in Kampala. Engagement in gender policy dialogue has also been a key aspect of CSP implementation by IA. Irish Aid and Norway, in conjunction with the Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa and the Club of Madrid, facilitated the visit of the former Irish President, Mary Robinson, and former Norwegian Premier Bondevick to Uganda in 2008, where they met with the President to address issues of gender inequality and gender-based violence.

172. A gender evaluation of PEAP noted that while the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MGLSD) had worked with MoFPED to mainstream gender in the PEAP, its national position was unsatisfactory. MGLSD remains dependent on external resources and "beyond hiring the few officers and paying salaries, there is little gender mainstreaming in real terms. Even the revision of the National Gender Policy had to be externally

¹⁰¹ Although these activities were reportedly perceived as an afterthought because (a) no clause was included in the contract of the constructors to work on HIV/AIDS, and (b) the advertisement and contracting of Concern was after the construction company had already recruited the labourers and started work.

¹⁰² Report of Irish Aid Uganda Gender Assessment May/June 2007, Irish Aid Uganda.

¹⁰³ Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Combined 4th, 5th, 6th & 7th Periodic Report on the Implementation of CEDAW in Uganda, MoGLSD, 2009, p.15.

¹⁰⁴ CEDAW on Joint Survey on Legal Aid Providers and Local Council Courts, UNDP/UNCDF, LABF, 2006.

resourced!"¹⁰⁵ The evaluation also noted that the national machinery had not achieved sufficient coordination to engender poverty eradication and that "the various efforts often come out in a fragmented manner with a constant risk of duplication"¹⁰⁶. They also note that sector budget allocations to MGLSD for the last 10 years are consistently low.

173. For governance mainstreaming, IA used basket funds such as DDP, LABF, UHRC and LGA baskets to mainstream governance in initiatives of civil society, democracy and human rights institutions. This included support to democratic accountability through the DDP, anticorruption initiatives such as policy dialogue on the Global Fund corruption follow-up. On environmental issues, though IA has had limited influence, it did support a number of useful local activities: addressing environmental governance such as the Kalangala Island Study, an Energy Study by Advocates' Coalition on Development and Environment, and the World Resources Institute legislation on policing wetlands in JLOS and an environmental impact assessment for the construction of schools in Karamoja. IA has also developed office guidelines on the environment and adopted the IA Global Governance Guidelines on Corruption.

3.3 Efficiency

174. This section examines how different aid instruments used in the IA programme have helped with efficiency. It then looks at the use of resources and staffing and also assesses IA's comparative advantage. Finally, it then comments on the programme coherence and the quality of IA policy engagement.

Efficiency gains through aid modalities

175. The predominant use of budget support (whether PAF or sector budget support) has allowed Ireland to deliver substantial volumes of assistance through joint government-led modalities that align with jointly-agreed policy frameworks and monitored through shared reporting arrangements. While PAF has been seen as largely effective in mobilising donor and GoU funds, there are concerns that the pendulum has swung too far towards driving funding for PAF rather than ensuring that funds obtained were well utilised and targeted. MoFPED feels that the efficiency issues were not sufficiently addressed in terms of value for money¹⁰⁷.

176. With considerable resources flowing to PAF and budget support, IA reliance on central GoU organs to coordinate and manage is greater than it would be with other programme scenarios. The efficiency of government machinery has been affected by the unequal capacities and hence performance of MoFPED, OPM and the NPA. OPM was given the mandate to coordinate but has yet to succeed to do this effectively according to various commentators (in and outside GoU)¹⁰⁸. MoFPED has reasserted its role as the senior planning as well as finance ministry, and is recognised by donors and sector ministries in this capacity.

177. While the mix of aid modalities used by IA appears balanced and risk-minimising, this approach can also be seen to have limited progress towards a more fully aligned,

¹⁰⁵ Evaluation of Gender Outcomes in the Poverty Evaluation Action Plan (PEAP), Nordic Consulting Group, Dec.2008, p.50.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. p.51.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with K. Muhakanizi, Dep. Secretary to the Treasury, MoFPED.

¹⁰⁸ See, for example, General Budget Support Evaluation, Uganda, Jan 2006, paragraph C3.12.

government-led development process. This is because, as noted by IA's own recent corporate guidance¹⁰⁹, the continued use of projects and intermediate budget support modalities such as basket funds, while they may appear on budget, do not fully use government systems. In the case of Uganda, basket funds tend to bypass inter-governmental fiscal relationships and in so doing weaken the domestic accountability systems. .

178. Nevertheless, the basket funds supported under the CSP (rather than sole-funded of partners through projects) have reduced the number of partners IA would have worked with and enabled IA to disburse considerable funds to a wide range of beneficiaries (as with the LoGSIP and JLOS). The basket funds have also improved efficiency by setting up shared systems for accountability and results. This is seen in JLOS, FINMAP and LoGSIP through the annual reviews and the common results matrix.

179. With regard to direct funding of CSOs, IA developed a CSO strategy that has streamlined support to CSOs and increased effectiveness in managing the relationships. IA has made a comprehensive assessment of CSOs and developed systems and modalities for tracking each grant in terms of disbursement, monitoring and follow-up on CSO obligations. The IA partners (such as Uganda Association of Women Judges, CEDOVIP and KOPEIN) mentioned that IA had built their capacity for management, improving their financial management and reporting on results. For some organisations, such as KOPEIN, IA had to hold back the finances for a period of time (2008) until they were able to streamline their systems for financial management. IA also reduced direct support to the CSOs by reducing the numbers of CSOs funded to 12-15 and investing in the basket fund, where a greater number of CSOs and individual institutions would be reached.

Irish Aid Comparative Advantage

180. During this evaluation, stakeholders provided feedback on IA's comparative advantage. Internally, the result of a staff survey¹¹⁰ conducted by the evaluation showed that staff rated the following aspects of IA strongly: neutrality (9 responses), compliance with the Paris Declaration, technical capacity, and locally empowered staff (7 responses each). After these, flexibility was seen on a par with policy engagement and Ireland's economic history. Few staff indicated that IA had an advantage in terms of results-based programming, responsiveness and staff continuity (Annex 6).

181. Externally, based on interviews with partners, IA's profile was slightly different. Ireland is known above all as a flexible, active and open partner, with a willingness to adjust to partner needs (for example in making annual payments rather than quarterly to ease the administrative burden on partners). IA was mentioned by MoFPED as the "easiest donor to work with". It was also regarded as willing to lead on coordination and having the capacity to do so, to being committed to aid effectiveness, to being neutral, and as having a niche in the areas of HIV/AIDS, justice and gender. IA is seen as well integrated in terms of political and development engagement, and with better links between HQ and country than others, with more delegated authority. Staff are seen as qualified, well recruited and trained. Field presence (Rwenzori and Karamoja) is seen as important and useful for bringing Embassy staff in touch with reality on the ground. IA are seen as less strong, however, on environment and conflict management.

¹⁰⁹ Discussion on Aid Modalities, Irish Aid Paper, CSP guidance material.

¹¹⁰ The evaluation conducted a web survey of all Irish Aid programme staff (excluding administration). Of 20 staff contacted, 16 responses were received.

182. Ireland is noted for its relatively strong integration and complementarity between its political and development aims. This is largely due to the structure and leadership within the Embassy (see section on programme synergy below). Good linkages have occurred between political work on issues such as human rights and democratic reforms, through the PDG and senior government contacts, and the governance pillar in the development programme that has provided financial underpinning in areas such as JLOS, UHRC, ACTV and the Kotido Peace Initiative (KOPEIN).

Staffing

183. Irish Aid's staff are strong in terms of technical capacity, local knowledge, mediation from the point of view of government and aid partners. The narrowing of programme focus compared to the previous CSP, and the continued use of programme aid and associated policy dialogue work rather than on project management has contributed to a more efficient use of staff time. That said, the time staff devote to aid coordination and in donor working groups is not always easy to assess in terms of results achieved (although positive examples are given in paragraph 185 below) .

184. The staffing levels have been as planned for 2007 and 2008, but there have been some critical gaps appearing in late 2008 and 2009. Following the departure of the Development Specialist in July 2008, the Governance Adviser took over as acting Development Specialist and no substantive replacement has been identified for the Development Specialist position by the time of the drafting of this report. The Education Adviser left in September 2008 and no replacement has been successfully found to date, which is a concern given the broad scope of IA's activity in this sector, involving policy dialogue, sector programming and project management. A programme executive position has also been vacant since September 2008.

185. The findings of our staff survey produced several interesting findings with regard to use of time, IA's staff support and policy engagement (further details are in Annex 6):

- ~ In terms of time spent by work task¹¹¹, the majority of time was spent on office work and meetings (internal and external) and only 3% on field trips outside Kampala. 46% thought the balance could be improved, and several commented on the need to increase time for reading/writing and to reduce time on internal processes (meetings) and routine work. 83% felt they needed more time to visit the field and 64% needed more time to analyse and discuss strategy.
- ~ There was a very positive response to the quality of management support, training and other means of facilitating work. Personal performance targets were generally seen as very relevant and very or fairly realistic.
- ~ In terms of professional skills, some staff felt these could be improved in areas of policy analysis, influencing and networking.
- ~ Staff believed that the most effective areas of IA programme were in addressing HIV/AIDS and gender, and the less effective areas were in environment, conflict and M&E.
- ~ When asked to give examples of IA's policy engagement effectiveness, staff mentioned JBSF formulation, gender studies for budgeting and gender influencing in governance, participation in joint reviews, amongst other things.

¹¹¹ Caution needs to be exercised in interpreting the results given here and in Annex 6 on use of staff time, as the question was misinterpreted by some respondents. The figure of 20% on personal issues is not correct as a result. As the new CSP was in preparation at the time of the survey, increased time on internal processes was reported.

Wider programme efficiency

186. The evaluation team believes that programme efficiency could be improved in several areas:

- ~ Conflict sensitivity skills are needed: the Embassy has recently started training in this area, though there has been limited use of conflict analysis in the programme so far. If IA increases its future work in the north and east of Uganda, then peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity will be a priority, but the entire programme would benefit from applying a conflict lens and “do no harm” principles¹¹².
- ~ Stronger branding of IA: the increase in budget support and basket funding has meant that there are fewer visible projects or “concrete” examples of Ireland’s development assistance on poverty reduction. While IA’s reputation is strong, especially amongst its like-minded partners, it would be valuable to continue regional or local programmes that focus on service delivery to the poor, and also to develop further IA’s press and media skills.
- ~ While the CSP represents an increased focus on fewer pillars, there is still a high workload given the large number of interventions still conducted within the pillars. Further programme streamlining and reducing the number of partners will help in terms of a better balanced workload and provide more time for more analytical and creative work (as noted in the staff survey).
- ~ More field exposure is needed to ensure staff have regular contact with local partners (district authorities and local NGOs) that can inform their policy work. Karamoja represents several facets of the IA programme, yet relatively few staff have visited.
- ~ As noted by an internal review, the balance of staff time in the education team is weighted heavily in favour of projects. “There appears to be an inverse relationship between staff time on projects and the overall level of IA funding to the sector.”¹¹³ Appropriate exit strategies from projects of less strategic priority may need to be identified in the future CSP so that greater emphasis can be placed on policy work.

187. In terms of IA’s own **financial** efficiency, their disbursement ratios - at close to 100% for the past two financial years - have been good (see Annex 5), predictable (with limited adjustment between programme areas), and timely (releases have mostly been on schedule). The appointment of an internal auditor has helped to control IA’s financial risk and safeguard its reputation.

188. Administration costs have remained constant at around 5-6% of the total CSP (Annex 5). Staff costs have fallen as a proportion of total administration spend from two-thirds to less than half in 2009; however, this is mainly due to a new HQ accounting policy that requires programme staff to be captured under the programme budget rather than the administration budget.

Programme synergy

189. The introduction of stronger business planning and teamworking has led to improved synergy across the IA programme. The teamworking arrangements within and between pillars has also improved since 2007¹¹⁴, and new operational guidance and procedures have been put in place in line with IA’s new strategic approach¹¹⁵. The Embassy

¹¹² In line with the OECD Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, OECD, April 2007.

¹¹³ Review of the Human Development Programme, Country Visit by Máire Matthews & Nuala O’ Brien, Irish Aid, February 2008.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Department of Foreign Affairs Statement of Strategy 2008 – 2010.

management aims to cascade the CSP M&E framework down to an annual business plan, then to team plans and finally to individual targets through the Performance Management and Development System (PMDS). This has improved the linkage between strategic outcomes, regular activities and individual staff roles.

190. Other improvements instituted over the period cover the introduction of tools such as individual role profiles, mid- and end-year reviews with the line manager, an office procedures manual launched in April 2008, policies for locally recruited staff, and office notices for new policies such as maternity leave, pension policy, overtime and environment protection.

191. Further synergies could be obtained however in terms of cross-team working within the IA programme team and also in regional engagement. According to the IA HQ GBS guidelines, it is envisaged that "the Head of Mission, supported by the Head of Development and local economist will play the main operational role in the day-to-day management and oversight of General Budget Support. Given its cross-cutting nature, it will also involve the other members of the country team in a coordinated approach to programme reviews, sectoral assessments and risk mitigation". In Uganda, the HoM, Head of Development and economist have been involved in the various budget support structures and in the development of the new JBSF. At the same time, plans for sharing common approaches and analysis to PAF mechanisms and other aid delivery mechanisms across clusters have not fully materialised, and the link between sector discussions (led by the human development team) with macro-level policy discussion could have been stronger.

192. Donors have responded to the needs of the **Karamoja** region through a number of relevant interventions. From what has been observed during the visit to the region by the evaluation team, there is scope for greater coordination both within the IA programme (which has activities in human rights, local courts, prisons, education, peacebuilding, gender and HIV/AIDS mainstreaming) and amongst the different donors and government and non-government implementers. For example, the new MoES Programme for Enhancing the Quality of Primary Education, which has selected four districts in Karamoja to be in the pilot phase¹¹⁶, could provide an opportunity for IA to link its national support for education quality with its existing initiatives in Karamoja.

193. **IA HQ:** As noted earlier (2.3 and in Annex 5), IA spends a considerable sum outside of the main aid programme as noted. In 2008 over €10m was spent through HQ for Irish-based NGOs, civil society organisations, missionaries, emergency interventions and Traidlinks. There is a scope to strengthen the strategic and practical ties between these initiatives and the bilateral country programme to ensure further complementarity. For example, IA's emergency work and de-mining support (see paragraph 200 below) could provide lessons for the country programme as it considers greater support for the transition from relief to development in the north. At the local level, the Irish missionary teacher stationed in Kangole School in Karamoja could be a practical source of feedback on IA's infrastructure and bursary support there.

194. **NGOs:** The relationship with the four main NGOs funded under the MAPS (Goal, Trócaire, Concern and Self-Help Development International) has evolved in the past two years. While the MAPS partners pursue their own programmes that are not part of the CSP, in two instances they have also acted as implementers for certain CSP programmes (in

¹¹⁶ Comprehensive Programme for Enhancing the Quality of Primary Education in Uganda, Programme Implementation Document, MoES, May 2008

HIV/AIDS mainstreaming and gender-based violence research). There has been a move to improve understanding and to share views between the MAPS and IA in-country through quarterly meetings, and these are held on a more equal basis, with a two-way exchange of views than in the past. From interviews with several NGOs, the IA Embassy team is generally viewed by these partners as open, engaged and effective in providing support.

195. Private sector: The substantial economic and governance implications arising from the future oil industry in Uganda (see Box 1) are central development concerns that IA needs to understand and, commensurate with a more focused programme, respond to. IA has continued to monitor the early stages of the development of the oil industry, with IA HQ support for NGO research on revenue sharing and environmental impacts. In addition, IA is working closely with other development partners, (including Norway and the UK) and engages, where appropriate, with Tullow Oil¹¹⁷, the Government of Uganda, and other stakeholders.

196. Traidlinks is a not-for-profit body representing a group of Irish private companies that has been working since 2005 to improve business prospects for medium-sized firms through research, branding and mentoring. IA has provided €4 million between 2006-2008 to support this endeavour, supporting a three-year pilot that has identified six firms so far - all based in Kampala - assisting them with part-time business expertise from Ireland and more recently an export promotion initiative. Tullow Oil have also provided funds to Traidlinks (\$200,000) to assist with support to local businesses in the oil exploration areas.

197. So far the results of the initiative are not clear in terms of how the small number of assisted firms have grown; while the future of Traidlinks has yet to emerge from its pilot phase. A recent independent evaluation¹¹⁸ concluded that while Traidlinks is an important and innovative concept, there were concerns that its direction had moved away from the original concept of commercial linkages between Uganda and Ireland to one of providing free technical assistance to Uganda companies. It recommended that Traidlinks should be extended for a year but it should clarify its strategy, and that the Embassy should be more closely involved in the programme. Certainly, given the continuing strong economic growth in Uganda and the strong private sector growth, particularly in Kampala¹¹⁹, Traidlinks needs to be very clear as to what its niche is and the rationale for providing subsidised support to a very small number of firms, and it should start to draw experience from other agencies supporting business development.

198. Irish Aid also has been providing support to Africa-wide private sector initiatives through the (i) Investment Climate Facility (ICF) (€2m over two years) and (ii) joined other donors in 2007 in the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG) (providing €8m over four years). The ICF is working to improve the legal, regulatory and administrative environment for African businesses¹²⁰, while the PIDG¹²¹ undertakes public-private partnership investments and has, for example, invested in water, electricity and ferry services on Kalangala Island, a hydropower plant in Bugoye, W.Uganda and assessing a

¹¹⁷ Tullow Oil is an Irish and UK registered oil company with interests in 23 countries, including Uganda (www.tulloil.com). With 18 successful wells so far, Tullow expects to go into production in late 2009. Sanction of a 4000 bbls/day capacity oil facility with associated topping unit and 57MW gross power generation is expected by year end, with first oil targeted Q4 2009/Q1 2010.

¹¹⁸ Evaluation of Traidlinks, Final Report, Fitzpatrick Associates, Oct 2008.

¹¹⁹ The private sector reached 23.3% of GDP in 2007/2008. This represents a doubling of its share of domestic output from 1997.

¹²⁰ www.investmentclimatefacility.org/

¹²¹ www.pidg.org

biomass-fired power plant in N.Uganda. DFID has provided the main funding but a recent evaluation commented that the seven-donor cluster for PIDG is a unique and expanding model bringing coherence and powerfully leveraging funding for private sector development with "substantial and robust pipelines of potential Interventions"¹²².

199. Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance is managed by the Emergency and Recovery Unit in IA HQ, and assistance has been: 2006, €2.5 million; 2007, €1.8 million; and 2008, €2.1 million, mainly for assistance to northern IDPs. The Unit liaises with the 2nd Secretary in the Irish Embassy, but often operates independently through UN agencies such as UNICEF and UNHCR. In 2007 emergency flood assistance was provided through the Red Cross, Oxfam and Concern. The Embassy, though, does play a proactive role in identifying partners, assessing projects and monitoring performance.

200. Ireland has also contributed €250,000 to the second phase of the Juba Initiative Plan from the Conflict Resolution Unit in HQ - via UNOCHA, Geneva. IA has also, through HQ funding, supported a UNDP de-mining programme in 2007 in the LRA areas of N. Uganda that has been effective in assisting IDP returnees to resettle, as well as six UN Volunteers who worked for the Amnesty Commission on demobilisation, assisting with 22,000 ex-combatants. This work has been regarded as very effective by UNDP. However, programme staff had concerns that IA had more resources and was more committed to these conflict-related issues on a global level rather than in-country, and that there needed to be better synchronisation between HQ and in-country arms of IA¹²³.

201. IA in Uganda has at times played a useful coordinating role in peacebuilding. In 2004 it was chair of the Donor Group on Northern Uganda, and it was at the forefront in advocating for a coherent response to the humanitarian situation in Uganda. Finally, an interesting local initiative in Karamoja has been IA's support for the KOPEIN. This small inter-faith organisation specialises in conflict resolution and peacebuilding through, for example, training local women, youth, soothsayers and kraal leaders on ways to resolve conflicts arising from cattle raids or other sources of injustice¹²⁴. In general, however, the conclusion is that IA has been effective in specific peacebuilding activities, often led by HQ, but that the bilateral programme could address conflict sensitivity more thoroughly across the portfolio as a whole.

3.4 Impact and Sustainability

Evidence of impact and attribution to Irish Aid

202. In terms of overall poverty reduction, available national data suggests that the trend has been positive and in line with the longer term PEAP target:

"The highest level target of the PEAP was the reduction of the national poverty headcount to 10% by 2017. On the basis of the progress at this, the half-way point, ... this target is achievable provided that annual GDP growth does not fall below 7%; population growth is reduced; and inequality does not increase... However, securing these three policy outcomes simultaneously will prove a major challenge."¹²⁵

¹²² Desk Review of DFID's private sector infrastructure investment facilities, WSP Int. Mgt. Consulting, March 2008, p.vii.

¹²³ Interview with Manzano, J., Programme Specialist and Ssebatindira, R., Asst. Resident Representative, UNDP.

¹²⁴ Interview with Jean Mark Aporu, KOPEIN.

¹²⁵ Op. cit. Oxford Policy Management Ltd. (OPML) Report, p.70 -71.

203. The caveats mentioned above are critical – and while the economy continues to grow vigorously, population growth and inequalities are also increasing. The judgment of the PEAP evaluation is also that the PEAP could have had a greater effect on reducing poverty than it did, if it had not neglected key areas such as agricultural research and family planning¹²⁶. Furthermore, at the sub-national level, while the incidence of poverty has significantly lowered in the central and western regions between 1999/2000 and 2005/2006, there was no significant change in the poverty headcount ratio in the northern and eastern regions over this period.

204. A recent review of the UJAS also concluded that:

“The main driver of this growth has been private rather than public investment, the contribution of the PEAP to the GDP growth achieved has been through its continuation of reforms and policy settings introduced prior to the PEAP, such as the reduction in political violence, the establishment and maintenance of a stable macro-economic environment (low inflation, competitive exchange rate), fiscal prudence and market liberalisation.”¹²⁷

205. Irish Aid's main contribution has been through PAF, which has continued to support the national poverty reduction framework; its associated public sector reform programmes; and sector-based support in education and justice, law and order. But Ireland's contribution (the majority of which goes to GoU and over half on budget support) is just 4% of total donor assistance, and this assistance in turn provided some 36-40% of total government revenue over the period. This indicates that, in financial terms at least, IA's influence on poverty outcomes must be recognised as limited.

206. **Education:** Improvements of key education indicators at the national level can be attributed to the collective efforts of donors, including Ireland, and to continued sector budget support. Since 1997, the primary sub-sector has registered increases in enrolment, with total enrolment rising by 2.4% from 2006-2007 to 2007-2008 and net enrolment from 92% to 93.3%. There has also been increased enrolment of children from poor households and among girls. Since 2005, both pupil:classroom ratio and pupil:teacher ratio have improved, from 74:1 to 72:1 and from 50:1 to 48:1 respectively. This is despite a steady increase in the number of pupils over the same period.

207. Despite these achievements, the sub-sector is still faced with high drop-outs, especially among girls, and low and declining completion rates (Table 2), teacher absenteeism and inequity in education provision across the country.

Table 2: Completion rates for Primary Seven Year Ugandan children¹²⁸

Indicator	FY 2006/07	FY 2007/08
Completion rate for P7	48%	47%
Boys	55%	50%
Girls	42%	44%

208. Following the launch of Universal Secondary Education (USE) in February 2007, enrolment has grown rapidly, with lower secondary enrolment rising by 17.2% between 2006 and 2007 and the transition rate from primary to secondary has risen from 46.9% to 68.6%. Adult literacy rates have also risen and the gap between boys and girls has fallen. Notwithstanding progress in reducing gender gaps in primary education, inequities by

¹²⁶ Op. cit. OPML, p. iv.

¹²⁷ Review of the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy – Current and Future Prospects, ODI, Nov. 2008.

¹²⁸ Education Management Information System, 2008.

welfare status and geographic location persist. While the net enrolment rate for children from the poorest welfare decile stands at 73.6%, its equivalent for children from the wealthiest decile is close to 90%¹²⁹. This evidence casts doubt on the sector's ability to implement pro-poor programmes under the auspices of the PAF.

209. The impact of IA support is clearer in primary education in the Rwenzori region, where teaching and learning has greatly improved. The Core PTC has steadily evolved into a model in the country for producing high-quality tutors and teachers. The drop-out rate in the region is declining and literacy competencies in lower primary have improved.

210. **Governance:** In a basket funding arrangement with many actors, the success in JLOS and decentralisation, DDP, LABF or UHRC can not easily be attributed to one development partner such as IA. These programmes have created impact in justice reforms, especially in provision of legal aid to the indigent and the poor, supporting gender-based initiatives and advocacy for law reform, facilitating effective service delivery in local government and in strengthening democratic and human rights institutions.

211. **HIV:** Apart from the strong initial outreach achieved by the CSF (as described in paragraph 118), the first year of implementation of the National HIV & AIDS Strategic Plan 2007/2008 has also seen progress in educational and behavioural programmes for youth, increase in condom promotion (131 million condoms distributed), the number of people with advanced HIV infection receiving antiretroviral treatment increase from 91,500 in 2006/2007 to 141,416, the number of facilities providing ART increasing from 220 to 328 and the uptake of antiretroviral prophylaxis by HIV-infected women increase to 80%. Nevertheless, Uganda is at a crossroads in its fight against the disease, and the challenge is now to implement the NSP, and build on the improved funding arrangements, mainstreaming and coherence that IA has contributed to.

Sustainability

212. In terms of sustainability, an important indicator of capacity is the rise in Government revenues to finance the budget. Indications are that the GoU will increasingly meet its financing of the budget from domestic sources (see section 1.2). Government policy is to reduce the percentage contribution of external funds in the national budget and to introduce reforms for more prudent, results-based management and to continue reforms in financial management and accountability.

213. Since most of IA's programme (in areas such as justice, education and public sector reform) supports Government and is integrated into the budget and planning cycles, prospects for sustainability are good, providing matching capacity and ownership exists. In addition, lobbying by DPs, including IA, has encouraged the Government to institutionalise new ventures into their sector budgets and plans. For example, commercial courts and justice centres (under LABF) have been "adopted" or "hosted" by government structures, until the GoU is able to fully integrate them into the budget. Legislative reforms, such as the Domestic Violence Bill under JLOS, once passed will institutionalise and ensure sustainability of gender-responsive legislation.

214. Where other initiatives - whether projects or basket funds - are dependent on donor support (such as UHRC, ACTV, LABF), they need to develop capacity for continued resource mobilisation, as well as policy dialogue with government to meet its funding obligations or

¹²⁹ Such inequality has remained stagnant for 15 years according to Uganda statistical surveys (see Footnote 42).

permit space to operate. Sustainability may be at most risk in sensitive areas, such as compensation to victims of torture and issues of human rights violation¹³⁰.

215. Education funding by central government has continued to rise, but the huge demands arising from universal education policies have been met by additional support through projects by donors and by the GoU. CSP support to local governments operates within established structures and supplementing local government budgets, setting a foundation for sustainability. Greater sustainability calls for influencing central government and MoES to maintain or increase capitation grants, and local governments to prioritise the education reforms which focus on improving quality in service provision.

Challenges

216. Six challenges are of significance and are relevant to IA due to its comparative advantage and future role in Uganda: peace, good governance (decentralisation and future elections), continuing inequality and poverty, the role of civil society, resources for mainstreaming and oil revenues.

217. The unsecured **peace** agreement with the LRA presents a continuing source of uncertainty in a region of Uganda that (as a base for the opposition parties) is a key arena in the forthcoming elections and a source of regional instability. Ireland's neutrality, experience in the Juba peace process and its integrated political/development profile may give it an advantage in supporting further progress towards a secure peace.

218. **Decentralisation** is a major challenge to ensure that local authorities have the capacity and means to deliver the improved services that have been supported by IA in education, justice, HIV/AIDS and elsewhere. At district level, the local resources are grossly inadequate, and spent mostly on wages and government buildings, and while IA is helping to support new tax measures and build capacity, there is a need to assist with reforms in the MoLG and to reduce the impact of politicisation of local government, particularly in the run-up to the next elections.

219. Uganda is due to hold national (presidential, parliamentary) and local (local councillors) **elections** in 2010 and 2011. Based on past experience, these elections bring concerns for human rights and fair application of rules of democratic governance. IA, along with other like-minded donors, will need to ensure that appropriate support and dialogue takes place through such mechanisms as the PDG. As elections usually bring on board new politicians and leaders who may not be as sensitised to issues such as gender and HIV/AIDS, IA will require continuous attention to advocacy and capacity-building at different levels. The creation of new administrative units, though the prerogative of Parliament as provided for in the Constitution, also has similar implications.

220. While Uganda overall shows strong growth, **inequality** is deepening. Yet the new NDP may have a weaker focus on poverty reduction and greater emphasis on economic growth. The continued impact of reforms achieved so far in education, governance and the public sector could be reduced if public services are not able to reach the hard-to-reach and

¹³⁰ A case in point is the UHRC-established multi-stakeholder Civil Military Cooperation Centres (CMCC) in conflict areas, including Karamoja. The CMCCs are comprised of representatives from the army, police, CSOs, and UHRC. CMCCs were used as information centres and points of contact for reporting human rights violations, leading to investigations by UHRC. However, the evaluation mission found that in 2008 the army had established its own CMCC in Karamoja, with parallel functions to the UHRC CMCCs, rendering them ineffective.

chronic poor. Donors such as Ireland could seek to use their leverage to introduce mechanisms to protect these groups and built safety nets where needed. Achieving sustainable development in the **Karamoja** region embodies the challenges of high poverty levels, inaccessibility and continuing low-level conflict. IA will need to invest more deeply and comprehensively in the region and carefully manage the underlying social dynamics and resource limitations.

221. **Civil society** organisations in Uganda are largely non-profit making and depend on donor support. The sector has been characterised as extensive yet fragmented, donor-dependent and competitive¹³¹. GoU has sought to introduce a legal framework for NGOs, but there are concerns of unnecessary restrictions. As a result, the financial sustainability, legitimacy, as well as sustainability of results of CSOs are often in question. IA has set out in its Civil Society Strategy¹³² how it will meet this challenge through dialogue with the Government over a supportive and transparent environment, and by funding and working with civil society directly. Many CSOs already supported by IA have managed to diversify their sources of funding (such as ACTV, KOPEIN), and there is potential to build better linkages with Irish-based NGOs through the MAPS and the civil society fund administered at HQ.

222. **Resources for mainstreaming.** Even at the central government level, despite instructions from the MoFPED that sectors should integrate gender and HIV/AIDS into their plans and budgets, other competing needs make it difficult to allocate resources. There is a medium-term basis then for IA to continue to provide earmarked funding for HIV/AIDS and gender mainstreaming.

223. If the **oil revenue** predictions are correct¹³³, and the necessary political and business agreements come to fruition to extract and export the known resources, then development aid has a window of relevance for perhaps 10-15 years before Uganda's own revenues dominate the budget. Managing oil exploration and production presents challenges in the western oil-bearing areas since they are co-located with some of Uganda's primary tourist assets, and the potentially rapid growth in government revenues could provide irresistible temptations for corruption and misappropriation of earnings. The role of development partners is most likely to revolve around helping to further build sound and democratic institutions of government and the judiciary, in order that they become resilient enough to manage the burgeoning wealth and its redistribution amongst the growing population.

¹³¹ DENIVA (2006) Civil Society in Uganda: At the Crossroads? The CIVICUS Civil Society Index Project.

¹³² Irish Aid (Uganda) Civil Society Strategy, June 2007.

¹³³ Recent forecasts estimate that Uganda oil revenues could equal 50% of its GDP by 2015.

4. Lessons and Recommendations

4.1 Lessons

The main lessons that emerge from the evaluation are set out below.

Programming and aid modalities

1. In a country like Uganda, where public expenditure management has become significantly stronger, using a virtual fund mechanism like PAF comes with important drawbacks: the selection of PAF items has been largely ad hoc and out of phase with sector budget planning, and their protection from in-year budget cuts has led to underinvestment elsewhere. As well as creating rigidities in public expenditure allocation, earmarking budget support has not prevented fiscal slippage elsewhere. Recent PAF reforms will help resolve PAF static definition, but fiscal slippage, and more widely, cases of financial mismanagement, are likely to continue.
2. IA's direct support to line ministries through joint donor basket funding has shown evident benefits but has also come with some important drawbacks. As projects, basket funds tend to weaken accountability and transparency within government. They also require separate reporting procedures. Whereas the use of projects tend to secure more immediate results, government ownership is in effect weakened.
3. Focusing or narrowing down a country strategy means more than reducing the number of pillars, but also making choices within sectors and within programmes. This requires sound analysis of how such choices fit with IA's overall strategy, IA's own comparative strengths and country experience.
4. Withdrawing from sectors in the interests of aid harmonisation can be successfully done provided there is good consultation, a phased withdrawal and an understanding that relevant MDGs can be addressed in a multi-sectoral way.
5. In a context where there is a well-established joint assistance strategy with budget support but also significant regional inequalities and concerns about governance, a balanced portfolio is a sound approach that allows IA to remain aligned while also supporting issues better addressed by non-government actors.
6. Financial aid alone is not sufficient for effective policy dialogue. A donor also needs to bring sound technical engagement and a willingness to dialogue and when necessary take a lead on coordination - "Money alone won't buy you reforms." IA's use of national consultants – and continuation of strategic projects – has enabled IA to become an active and trusted participant in various structures, notably in education, justice and decentralisation.
7. Pilots and targeted studies through bilateral aid (such as those on gender budgeting and baskets such as the Legal Aid Basket Fund) can effectively complement support provided through multilateral initiatives.
8. Where substantial IA funds flow direct from headquarters to Uganda (in areas such as civil society, humanitarian, peace and private sector), stronger efforts to plan

together and build complementarity with the country programme would help maximise IA's impact and avoid the potential for disconnected initiatives.

9. Mainstreaming of areas such as gender and HIV/AIDS can be successful if it (i) is set as a strategic objective, (ii) has commitment within the programme team, (iii) uses innovative team approaches and (iv) provides technical and financial resources.
10. Tackling gender requires supporting national institutions as well as providing technical and project support.

Sectoral

11. Sector budget support can be an effective approach even in the complex multi-stakeholder justice and law sector where 13 institutions are involved, with strongly independent mandates.
12. Local government reform is a broad, complex and politicised arena that stretches donor ability to influence as a sector. On the other hand, donors can expect good results if they focus geographically or on specific interventions such as HIV/AIDS.
13. Elections usually bring on board new politicians and leaders who may not be competent in cross-cutting issues such as HIV/AIDS, governance or gender and therefore often requires repeating interventions. The creation of new administrative units also has similar implications and impacts on plans and budgets for supporting MoLG and specific initiatives such as those supported under the decentralisation basket and that of HIV/AIDS. Continuous sensitisation and capacity building in mainstreaming at different levels is needed.
14. Remaining involved for some years in a sector (such as education) and working at local as well as national level can bring a deeper understanding, a recognition of technical competence and, ultimately, greater policy influence.
15. While time consuming in its design, the pilot education project in Rwenzori is an example of best practice in informing national (curriculum) development policy from project aid. Policy piloting needs the full involvement of authorities and a strong focus on evidence gathering.
16. Due to its special cultural heritage and different resource endowment, Karamoja needs a long-term development perspective and better coordination in order to address the complex and chronic poverty challenges. Ireland's range of experience there provides it with a platform to deepen engagement.

Efficiency

17. Professional and technical input from IA's HQ-based as well as national staff into development partner meetings can enrich donor coordination processes and ensure that IA strategic priorities become part of the wider development agenda.
18. Well-integrated political and development teamwork and programme approaches provides Ireland with a comparative advantage over other development partners in areas of governance (justice, human rights), though not necessarily areas concerning military or security matters, where others have greater resources.

19. Where large and more politically-driven development partners are present, IA can play a useful strategic role, and enhance its reputation through providing neutral, flexible and appropriate advice.

Monitoring

20. It is risky to rely on joint donor-government poverty-monitoring mechanisms to show the contribution of and results due to IA, especially when the Government's commitment and incentives to operationalise the mechanisms appear weak.
21. Where an M&E system is jointly formulated and owned and is functional, as in the education and HIV/AIDS sectors, IA is in a better position to regularly assess the performance of its interventions than it is in more sensitive and harder to measure areas such as governance.

4.2 Recommendations for next CSP

1. As part of the upcoming strategy process, IA will need to undertake a careful analysis of the Ugandan context (2011 elections, continued economic and demographic growth and inequality, prospective growth in oil revenues, uncertain peace agreement) and also gain clarity over government priorities (NDP).
2. Reduce further the range of interventions within the two current CSP pillars plus JBSF budget support. These could be human development and governance. Within these pillars, though, ensure a better prioritisation in terms of sectors, sub-sectors and programmes, as well as appropriate exit strategies where disengagement is planned.
3. IA should use the opportunity of JBSF to adopt a more effective approach to budget support. The analysis around PAF indicators, as reported annually, should be made more robust. This will include IA's analysis of fiduciary risk, scrutiny over local governments' ability to absorb conditional grants, and focus on results in key priority sectors.
4. Maintain a balance in modalities in order to manage risk, provide resources for civil society and strengthen selected government agencies. But careful attention should be placed on the choice and combination of aid instruments, and how their respective channels of delivery will support rather than undermine government ownership under the NDP. Where basket funds are likely to remain the main modality of support for line ministries, IA should justify their choice in terms of results, innovation, and access to technical capacity. They should also set the conditions for a possible transition to general budget support.
5. Based on past performance and current opportunities, IA's priorities should be on addressing chronic poverty and inequality, improving quality in education in specific strategic areas such as Karamoja, improving governance and mainstreaming gender and HIV/AIDS.
6. It may be wise to devise a CSP with greater flexibility and which includes more contrasting investment plans that reflect a wider range of possible national scenarios based on comprehensive risk assessment and mitigation.

7. Structure the CSP objectives and supporting pillars to help improve M&E: aim for a clearer logic between sub-programmes' objectives, programmes' outcomes and overall goal.
8. Seek opportunities to support joint evaluation processes (as part of Ireland's commitment to the Accra Agenda for Action), as well as ensuring that it can also improve its accountability for using its resources towards the CSP objectives.
9. Conflict sensitivity/peacebuilding should be mainstreamed across the programme, including the conduct of a strategic conflict assessment (preferably jointly with others). Conflict mitigation/peacebuilding could take precedence over IA's environmental mainstreaming, given Ireland's comparative advantage in the former.
10. In Karamoja, IA can consider building on their existing diverse platform (in education, JLOS, human rights and conflict) and supporting a more coordinated conflict-sensitive approach that brings local government, the new Minister for Karamoja¹³⁴, other donors, MAPS partners and humanitarian actors more effectively together.
11. Education: streamline different initiatives and only fund specific agencies (such as ESC, UNEB, NCDC and ESA) where justification exists for specific activities identified in work plans (such as short-term support for critical initiatives) while encouraging the Ministry of Education to take over their funding through the sector budget. Seek ways to move the Quality Enhancement Initiative from its current off-budget status to an on-budget position. UNATU as an NGO merits support in order to broaden policy dialogue and highlighting the plight of teachers.
12. Graduate from the PAF to the JBSF modality and aim to ensure strong poverty monitoring is included in the JAF. If necessary, extend support for poverty monitoring analysis and surveys.
13. Irish Aid should continue to support HIV/AIDS through a mix of interventions by civil society and the public sector (Uganda AIDS Commission and MoLG), but should endeavour to build government commitment to fund and lead.
14. Decentralisation is a key sector for support and the decentralisation basket is focused on the priorities in the LOGSIP. However, there is a need for IA and the donors to focus their support either geographically or in terms of priority areas in order to enhance efficiency. Five options are described:
 - (i) Rethink the strategic focus of the decentralisation basket to single out fewer priority undertakings each year and concentrate resources, closely monitor them and, based on the annual review, consolidate or take on new undertakings.
 - (ii) Continue the support to LOGSIP priorities, strengthening compliance measures and closely monitoring MoLG to ensure that undertakings are delivered and aligned with GoU planning, budgeting and reporting standards.

¹³⁴ The President's wife, Janet Museveni, was recently appointed as the new Minister for Karamoja.

- (iii) LGs will need to build capacity and systems for operationalisation of the new tax system, so outreach interventions are needed to help the population understand the rationale for paying taxes.
 - (iv) Decentralisation sector decisions have been highly influenced from the supply side of government and to complement the annual assessments, specific cost benefit analysis for selected LGs is needed to assess best practice and use the lessons for other districts. Areas of assessment should include implementation of cross-cutting issues such as gender, HIV/AIDS and environment, quality of service delivery and how this is matched with the LOGSIP priorities.
 - (v) Government could be asked to reconsider its blanket approach to LGs and address the uneven distribution of resources by developing an affirmative action system for financing LGs that are poorly resourced (such as districts in conflict areas that also have high levels of poverty, and those new districts that have acute shortage of resources and local revenue). For example, the LG fixed minimum salary should be revised for these districts, such as Karamoja, to provide incentives for professionals to serve in the area. Another intervention should be for increased policy dialogue with government to prioritise provision of the development fund to poor LGs rather than waiting for the overall national intervention to reinstate the fund.
15. In public sector reforms, IA may consider it wise to focus on financial reforms rather than other areas such as public service reform (an area which it is leaving according to the Aid Mapping exercise).
 16. IA should continue active engagement in justice, law and order sector, but should address the negative perception of its institutions among the public through awareness creation and outreach, and help JLOS institutions to streamline systems, especially at the front-line level in delivering services to the people, and develop scenarios for changes in strategies given the coming elections in 2011.
 17. Increase pressure on JLOS institutions to hold the courts more accountable on case-backlog and holding the police accountable on corruption and human rights violations and establishing safe public mechanisms for addressing corruption.
 18. Increase shared learning across the main two programme clusters in the IA team. For example, the economist could help the human development team in monitoring sector budget support, sharing experience of various aid delivery mechanisms and their implications for new programmes such as the QEI.
 19. IA should earmark a specific budget in the programme to support gender initiatives. There is also a need to involve the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development in gender mainstreaming more fully. IA could also assist this Ministry in the renewal of the Social Development Sector Investment Plan in order to more effectively coordinate strategies for addressing inequality and social protection.
 20. Revive the gender coordination initiatives by donors; for example, by reinstating the Donor Working Group on Gender, as well as revitalising the JLOS Gender Working Group. Donor coordination for gender mainstreaming should be reinstated and M&E systems in the different sectors and issues made to reflect gender-sensitive indicators.

21. IA can work to streamline the currently complex set of donor coordination mechanisms and seeks way to merge donor-only groups and sector working groups, and to measure IA's contribution to coordination better.
22. The substantial economic and governance implications arising from the future oil industry in Uganda raise development concerns that IA needs to understand and respond to in terms of both local and national issues, particularly around accountability, corporate governance and anti-corruption.
23. IA Staffing :
 - a. Sharing lessons and expertise across teams on the pros and cons of various aid delivery mechanisms – e.g. budget support vs. basket funding
 - b. Increase field time – possibly setting a minimum target of 2 days per month of travel to the field for all programme staff.
 - c. Upgrade skills in influencing and networking, policy analysis research, conflict analysis/sensitivity.
 - d. Fill current staff gaps by promoting from within where possible.

Annex 1: Draft Terms of Reference

Evaluation of the Irish Aid (Uganda) Country Strategy Paper, 2007 – 2009

1. Background

The Irish Aid (Uganda) Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 2007-09 was developed in the context of Uganda's Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS), and the Ugandan Division of Labour exercise which was designed to streamline donor support for the PEAP. The Irish Aid CSP significantly focused on support for the Poverty Action Fund (PAF) within the national budget, and for three sectors – Education, HIV and AIDS and Governance. (A decision had been made to withdraw support from the agriculture and health sectors). Within the three chosen sectors for support, efforts were made to reduce the number of interventions and the number of partners with whom Irish Aid engages.

Within the overall goal of Irish Aid (Uganda) of *supporting the Government of Uganda in its efforts to reduce poverty and promote sustainable development for Ugandan men and women*, a number of strategic objectives were elaborated and further developed in business plans. Those objectives are:

- To support the delivery of quality basic services to the poor;
- To promote good governance, including transparency, accountability, equity and efficiency;
- To promote HIV/AIDS reduction, gender equality and environmental sustainability;
- To promote increased aid effectiveness;
- To encourage synergies across Irish Aid's development interventions in Uganda.

An internal mid-term review (MTR) of the CSP was undertaken in June 2008. This was an opportunity to analyse the development context in which the CSP has been implemented, reflect on the CSP objectives, assess performance using the Irish Aid (Uganda) monitoring and evaluation framework, and work out a road map for preparing a new CSP for the period 2010-14. The main findings of the MTR exercise were:

- The context for development in Uganda presents a mixed picture with some positive factors balanced by some areas of concern. However, significant opportunities exist to engage with country processes in a constructive manner and to support the country's political, economic and social development.
- The CSP is an example of how modalities can be mixed in a complementary way. One of the strong points of the Irish Aid programme is the mixture of support to the national budget through the Poverty Action Fund and sectors, pooled-funded programmes, and support for selected projects, including with civil society for which an Irish Aid (Uganda) civil society strategy was developed. More needs to be done to improve the linkage between practice and policy.
- The Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS) in general, and the PEAP monitoring and evaluation system in particular, did not take off as expected

and this affected the overall Irish Aid response in the first period of the CSP's implementation.

- Nevertheless, there has been an increasing push towards a focus on results, as part of the Management for Development Results agenda, in Uganda. This is borne out in the Joint Budget Support Framework which Ireland and others have been developing, and closer to home Irish Aid (Uganda) has developed an internal M&E framework for the remainder of the CSP, which together with increased inter-team linkage and coherence, and a renewed effort with regard to chronic poverty and vulnerability and gender-based violence, is laying a strong foundation for the CSP which commences in 2010.

2. Purpose of the Evaluation

The purpose of the evaluation is to provide Irish Aid and its partners with an evaluation of the Irish Aid (Uganda) CSP 2007-09 which will inform future strategic decision making, with particular reference to the formulation of the next CSP covering the period 2010-2014.

3. Scope of the Evaluation

The evaluation will primarily assess the strategic direction and focus of the Irish Aid (Uganda) CSP, keeping very much in mind the context from which the CSP emerged and the current reality on the ground.

It should be noted that there are other important evaluations and reviews ongoing which will be important in helping answer questions with regard to the PEAP, the UJAS, and the sectors Irish Aid is engaged in, especially the PEAP evaluation, the review of UJAS, and various sector-specific reviews and evaluations (in education, HIV/AIDS, justice sector, public sector management). This evaluation of Irish Aid's CSP (2007-2009) will therefore ask specific questions relating to Irish Aid (Uganda), while bearing in mind the outcomes of these other reviews and evaluations.

The evaluation will assess the Irish Aid (Uganda) CSP using the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Sustainability.

In terms of **Relevance**, key questions for consideration:

- To what extent does the CSP address the developmental challenges and priorities of Uganda and to the needs of target groups?
- Has the CSP focused on issues of poverty reduction, and is it addressing these?
- Has the choice of sectors been appropriate given the political and development contexts within which the CSP is implemented, and in light of the donor Division of Labour exercise?
- Is the balance between support for government institutions and civil society, and between the different aid modalities (PAF, sector support, pooled programmes, and projects) appropriate?
- Has the programme been designed in a collaborative manner with national and local authorities and in alignment with Government of Uganda and Irish Aid policies, as well as in a harmonised way with other development partners?

In terms of **Effectiveness**, key questions for consideration:

- How effective has the CSP been in terms of achieving its stated objectives?
- How effective are the results and performance measurement/monitoring systems, including annual review and business planning processes?
- How are risks identified within the CSP, are they most appropriate in terms of greatest risk to the programme, and how are they managed on an ongoing basis?
- To what extent has the CSP been compliant with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness?
- Has the mainstreaming of Irish Aid's four cross-cutting issues been dealt with effectively (HIV and AIDS, Governance, Gender and Environment)?

In terms of **Efficiency**, key questions for consideration:

- Has efficiency been maximised in the choice of the various financial instruments/modalities of support?
- Has the programme been efficiently managed given existing staffing and resources?
- Is there sufficient coherence, interlinking, complementarity and synergy across the country programme and between its component parts (including between the political and development functions of the Embassy)?
- Has policy engagement with government been sufficiently strategic and at the appropriate levels?

In terms of **Sustainability**, key questions for consideration:

- How sustainable, in terms of continuing benefit, are the CSP programme interventions in Uganda?
- What are the particular challenges, at central and local government levels, and in civil society, in terms of ensuring sustainability on investments made, and how are these being managed?

While the primary focus of the evaluation is not on the impact of the programme it is expected that where evidence of programme impact is available (positive or negative) that this will be documented.

4. Methodology

It is envisaged that the evaluation will consist of three phases:

- 1) The first phase will consist of two parts. First the consultants will carry out a desk review of relevant programme and related documentation and some initial consultation with relevant Irish Aid officers who have been involved in the design, implementation and monitoring of the CSP. At the conclusion of this first phase the key issues and a refined programme of work for the second phase (in-country visit) will be agreed in consultation with Irish Aid. This will be set out in a short inception report that will identify key issues to be examined in the remainder of the evaluation exercise. After acceptance of the

inception report the consultants will engage in a wider consultation process with Irish Aid and continue the document review process.

- 2) The second phase of the evaluation will involve an in-country visit to Uganda where relevant field work will be carried out. The nature and extent of this field work will be identified in the IR. The in-country phase will consist of about 10 days' work.
- 3) The third phase of the evaluation will consist of any follow-up work with Irish Aid prompted by the in-country visit and final report writing.

Consultants should propose a detailed methodology as part of their tender proposals setting out:

- (a) Their understanding of the ToR
- (b) A short methodology showing how they plan to approach the assignment
- (c) Allocation of consultant days across team members
- (d) Indicative timetable for completion of the assignment

5. Outputs

The outputs of the assignment are as follows:

- 1) A short inception report (5-10 pages maximum) summarising key issues to be addressed during the evaluation and setting out a refined work plan for the remainder of the assignment.
- 2) A final report (maximum 40 pages excluding appendices) that will include findings, analyses, key lessons and recommendations. This final report will also outline key challenges and emerging opportunities for Irish Aid, and should be structured in such a way that it clearly informs and gives direction to the planning of a new CSP.

The report should demonstrate familiarity with the OECD-DAC *Evaluation Quality Standards* and be written to high standard, ready for publication.

6. Expertise Required and Selection Criteria

Expertise required: A small balanced team is envisaged that will have relevant and demonstrable experience in the following areas:

- Programme evaluation
- Development contexts
- Macro economy and budget support
- Human development
- Governance and political economy
- Mainstreaming (gender, HIV/AIDS, environment, governance)
- Engagement with the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness

The evaluation team will have a clearly identified Team Leader with relevant experience. He/she should have demonstrable experience of carrying out evaluations of country programmes covering a number of sectors. The Team Leader will be responsible for the overall management of the assignment and the production of the final report and thus should have experience in managing multi-disciplinary teams, producing high quality reports and working to demanding deadlines.

Consultants will be selected according to the following criteria:

- Understanding of the Terms of Reference
- Proposed methodology and planning of the assignment
- Experience of the team in evaluation of such programmes
- Overall balance and complementarity of team
- Experience and suitability of the Team Leader
- Regional Experience
- Cost

The service provider must be able to demonstrate how it can assure quality control of both the process and the outputs described above.

7. Timeframe

The evaluation will ideally commence before the end of November 2008, with the field visit completed in December. A maximum of 95 consultant days are available for this assignment.

8. Management Arrangements

The evaluation will be managed by the Evaluation and Audit Unit of Irish Aid. A steering committee will oversee the overall exercise and have responsibility for approval of all reports. Irish Aid (Uganda) will assist with all arrangements and logistics for the field visit.

Annex 2: MDG Status in Uganda¹³⁵

Indicator	1990	2000	Current	Year	Status
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. Target: Halve 1990 \$1 a day poverty and malnutrition rates.					
Population below national poverty line (%)	56	39	31	2005/06	On track
Prevalence of child malnutrition (% under 5)	n/a	22.8	20.1	2006	Off track
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education. Target: 100% enrolment and completion of cycle.					
Net primary enrolment ratio (% of relevant age group)	62	84	84	2005/06	Off track
Completion rate.	-	-	47	2007/2008	Seriously off track
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women. Target: eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary by 2005 and at all levels by 2015.					
Ratio of girls to boys in primary education.	0.79	0.93	0.99	2007	On track
Ratio of girls to boys in secondary education.	0.59	0.77	0.81	2005	Off track
Ratio of girls to boys in tertiary education.					
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality. Target: Reduce by two-thirds 1990 under-5 mortality rate.					
Under-5 mortality rate (per 1,000)	156	158	137	2006	Seriously off track
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	85	89	75	2006	Seriously off track
% of 1 year olds immunised against measles	60	57	68	2006	Off track
Goal 5: Improve maternal health. Target: Reduce by three-fourths 1990 maternal mortality rate.					
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)	527	505	435	2006	Seriously off track
% of births attended by skilled health personnel	38	39	42	2006	Off track
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. Target: Halt, and begin to reverse, AIDS, malaria and other major diseases.					
Prevalence of HIV (% aged 15-49 years old)	20	6.1	6.4	2006	On track
Contraceptive prevalence rate (% of married women 15-49)	8.1	14	18.5	2006	Off track
Proportion of children usually sleeping under a mosquito net			9.7	2006	Seriously off track
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability. Target: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes, reverse the loss of environmental resources, halve number of people without access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation, improve lives of slum dwellers.					
Access to an improved water source (% of households)	50	63	68	2005/06	On track
Access to improved sanitation (% of households)	77	87	89	2005/06	Off track
Reverse degradation of natural resources					Off track
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development. Target: Various regarding ODA, market access, debt sustainability, access to essential drugs and technologies.					
Aid (% of GNI)		11.1	9.8	2006/07	No specific target
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)		10	12.5	2006/07	No specific target
Debt service (% exports of goods and services)		12	6.35	2006/07	No specific target
Fixed line and mobile telephones (per 1,000 people)		23	186	2007	No specific target

¹³⁵ Drawn from the Irish Aid Scoping Paper, Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Uganda, 2008.

Annex 3: Evaluation Matrix for Uganda CSP Evaluation

	Evaluation questions (based on ToR and inception discussions)	Source of Information
Chapter I - Context		
Chapter II – Relevance		
	1. To what extent does the CSP address the developmental challenges and priorities of Uganda and the needs of target groups?	PEAP, needs assessments and poverty surveys
	2. Has the CSP focused on issues of poverty reduction and lagging MDG indicators?	As above
	3. Has the choice of sectors been appropriate given the changing political and development contexts within which the CSP is implemented, and in light of the donor Division of Labour exercise?	Review of UJAS, PEAP
	4. Was the balance between support for (a) government institutions and civil society, (b) the different aid modalities (PAF, sector support, pooled programmes, and projects) appropriate and (c) policy dialogue and output delivery appropriate?	Analysis by delivery channel / modality; evidence from interviews, IA policies, UJAS
	5. Has the programme been designed in a collaborative manner with (i) national and local authorities and in alignment with Government of Uganda policies and (ii) Irish Aid policies, as well as (iii) in a harmonised way with other development partners?	Relevant policy (GoU and IA) documents, UJA0053
	6. Has the CSP been results-focused with indicators for performance? To what extent has each cluster been designed to reflect CSP objectives?	CSP
	7. Has the CSP and programme interventions been designed to include mainstreaming issues (HIV and AIDS, Governance, Gender and Environment)?	CSP and programme design documents; interviews with IA staff, GoU and others
	8. How are risks identified within the CSP, and are they most appropriate in terms of greatest risk to the programme?	CSP
Chapter III – Effectiveness		
	9. How effective has the CSP been in terms of achieving its stated objectives?	Views of IA staff, GoU, other partners, beneficiaries, evaluations, reviews
	10. How effective are the results and performance measurement/monitoring systems, including annual review and business planning processes?	IA reviews and progress reports
	11. How have risks been managed on an ongoing basis?	Risk monitoring tables, wider context
	12. To what extent has the CSP been compliant with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness?	Paris principles, IA reports and interviews
	13. How well has the mainstreaming of Irish Aid's four cross-cutting issues been achieved (HIV and AIDS, governance, gender and environment)?	Evaluations, programme designs
	14. What evidence of impact (positive or negative) is available from the IA programme and how attributable are these development changes to IA directly?	Evaluation studies, implementers and beneficiaries

Chapter IV – Efficiency		
	15. Has efficiency been maximised in the choice of the various financial instruments/modalities of support?	Analysis of programme funding channels/modalities versus costs of delivery
	16. Has the programme been efficiently managed given existing staffing and resources?	Staff views, PDMS reports
	17. Is there sufficient coherence, interlinking, complementarity and synergy across the country programme and between its component parts (including between the political and development functions of the Embassy) as well as humanitarian assistance?	Views of DFA political staff, Conflict Unit, IA's E&R Unit
	18. Has policy engagement with government and other development partners been sufficiently strategic and at the appropriate levels?	Views of GoU officials, donors; key documents, including PEAP, UJAS reviews
Chapter V – Sustainability		
	19. How sustainable, in terms of continuing benefit, are the CSP programme interventions in Uganda?	Views of implementing partners and GoU, beneficiaries
	20. What are the particular challenges, at central and local government levels, and in civil society, in terms of ensuring sustainability on investments made, and how are these being managed?	as above
Chapter VI – Lessons		
	Recommendations for next CSP	New CSP Guidelines
	Recommendations for IA globally	

Annex 4: Persons Met

Irish Embassy

Kevin Kelly	Ambassador
Justine Katebarirwe	PA to the Ambassador
Patricia Among	Internal Auditor
Zainabu Opito	Office Manager
Donal Cronin	Ag. Head of Development
Mary O'Connor	Second Secretary
Susan Fraser	Development Specialist
Cate Najjuma	Programme Executive
Daniel Muwolobi	Programme Advisor - Governance
Daniel Iga	Programme Advisor - Public Sector Management
Peter Oumo	Programme Advisor - Economist
Sarah Callaghan	Programme Officer - Governance
Caroline Laker	Programme Advisor - Social Development
Jessica Ilomu	Programme Manager - Primary Education Reform Prog.
Mary Oduka	Programme Advisor - HIV/AIDS
Ashenut Okille	Team CSP Facilitator
Donal Keneally	Emergency and Recovery Unit
Damien Cole	Counsellor with overall responsibility for the programme in Uganda
Marcella Smyth	First Secretary - Desk Responsibility for Uganda
Seamus O'Grady	Evaluation and Audit Unit
Fintan Farrelly	Ag. Head of E&A Unit and former Head of Development in Uganda

Development Partners

Ainsworth, S	Conflict and Humanitarian Adviser, DFID
Dalston, K	Donor Coordination, World Bank
De Lange, J	Netherlands Embassy, Chair of the Donor Economists' Group
Dyrbak, J-P	DFID, Governance Adviser
Eslick, N	Program Officer, USAID
Feinberg, N	Ambassador, Royal Danish Embassy
Grieser, D	Deputy Mission Director, USAID
Holm, H	First Secretary, Embassy of Sweden
Jantscher C.A.	Deputy Head Office, Programme Officer for Governance, Austrian Embassy, Development Cooperation
Johnson, A,	Ambassador, Embassy of Sweden
Kalweo, Jane	UNAIDS
Larsen, H	Dep. Head of Mission, Royal Danish Embassy
Leite, B	Ambassador, Royal Norwegian Embassy
Magala Charles	Programme Officer, Public Sector Management, DANIDA
Magezi, B	Governance Adviser, World Bank
Manzano, J	Programme Specialist, UNDP
Mayebo, M	DFID
Modoi Musa,	Programme Coordinator, Access to Justice, DANIDA/HUGGO
Ngaiza, J	Netherlands Embassy, Anti-Corruption PDG Working Group Chair
Osborn, Simon	Programme Manager, Deepening Democracy Programme (DDP)
Raijmakers, F	European Commission, Chair - Decentralisation Development Partners' Group (DPPG)
Rentenaar, M	Dep. Head Mission, Royal Netherlands Embassy
Saether, G	Dep. Head Mission, Royal Norwegian Embassy

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Soler, J	First Counsellor, Head of Cooperation, European Union
Ssebatindira, R	Asst. Resident Representative, UNDP
Verheul, J	Ambassador, Royal Netherlands Embassy
Walakira Winfred	Programme Officer, Legal Aid Basket Fund (LABF), DANIDA/HUGGO Programme

Government

Justice, Law and Order Secretariat

Akora, M	Financial Mgt. Specialist
Beinomugisha, C	Senior Technical Adviser

Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development

Byaruhanga, C	Budget Adviser
Kakande, M	Head, Budget Monitoring and Accountability Unit
Kasimbazi, B	Undersecretary, Finance & Adm. Accounting Officer
Mugambe, K	Commissioner, Budget Policy and Evaluation Dept.
Muhakanizi, K	Dep. Secretary to the Treasury
Mutesigensi, J	FINMAP Coordinator
Ocailap, P	Director, Budget

Office of the Prime Minister

Waduwa, F	Undersecretary, Pacification and Development
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Ministry of Gender, Labour & Social Development

Mabuta, Mubarak	Principal Gender Officer & Programme Component Manager (Gender), GOU-UNFPA, National Coordinator, GBV
Mabweijano, Maggie	Assistant Commissioner, Gender

Ministry of Local Government

Benjamin Kumumanya	National Programme Facilitator, Ag. Secretary, Decentralisation Sector Working Group
Bernard Ogwang Okutta	Director, Central Grants & Local Revenues, Local Government Finance Commission

Ministry of Public Service

Katuramu, D	Director of Research & Development
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Office of Auditor General

Katorega, S	Director, Central Government Audit
Muwanga, John F.S	Auditor General

Inspectorate General of Government

Waiswa Bageya	Secretary to the Inspectorate
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Uganda Human Rights Commission

George Ufoyuru	Director of Regional Services
Androa Anthony	Regional Head, Moroto

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Ministry of Education and Sports

Agaba, J	Ag. Commissioner, Secondary Education
Aguti, F	Principal Education Officer, Teacher Education Dept.
Akankwasa, J	Asst. Commissioner, Construction Management Unit
Dhatemwa, G	Commissioner, Education Planning Department
Eilor, J	Principal Education Planner, RME
Kakuba, D	Senior Assistant Secretary, Finance and Administration
Kibenge, A	Public Relations Officer and HIV/AIDS Coordinator
Kibenge, D	Principal Assistant Secretary
Mwongyere, M	Undersecretary, Finance and Administration
Nsereko, M	Commissioner, Teacher Education Dept.
Nsubuga, Y	Director, Education (Basic & Secondary Education)
O'Sullivan, M	PTE Curricula Technical Adviser, Teacher Education Dept.

Ministry of Local Government

Amule, S	Commissioner, Local Administration
Emonet-Erongot, S	Assistant Commissioner, Planning
Matte, T	Ag. Permanent Secretary
Mutabwire, P	Commissioner and HIV/AIDS CSF Steering Committee Member

Ministry of Health

Claus, B	Senior Health Advisor, Ministry of Health
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Uganda AIDS Commission

Okullo, J	Chairman, Steering Committee, Civil Society Fund
Apuuli, D	Director General

Education Service Commission

Kabwa, B	Assistant Commissioner
Mabangi, S	Principal Policy Analyst
Okot, M	Deputy Chairperson
Omwonya, S	Undersecretary

Uganda National Education Board

Bukenya, M	Executive Secretary
Kiyemba, F	Deputy Secretary
Weerhe, D	Principal Examinations Officer

National Curriculum Development Centre

Baguma, G	Deputy Director
Bakehena, E	Head of Department (Primary)
Mugisha, P	Finance and Administration

Kabarole District

Busingye, V	District Education Officer
Karamagi, S	District Inspector of Schools
Mugume, S	District Planner
N'Kojjo, R	Chief Finance Officer

Kasese District

Kateemba, D	District Education Officer
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Sunday, E Head Teacher, Kamaiba Primary School

Canon Apollo Core PTC

Byesigwa, B Principal
 Timbigamba, M Deputy Principal - Pre-Service
 Tibendezana, F Deputy Principal - Outreach
 Mukama David Head, ICT Unit
 Ochwo, J Centre Coordinating Tutor, Bukuuku
 Rwamwenge, E Registrar

Moroto District

Abdul, P District Education Officer
 Anthony, A Human Rights Commission, Regional Office
 Apo-Oroma, Felix Counsel for Legal Assistance, Karamoja
 Aporu, J.M. Kotido Peace Initiative
 Asiiimwe, Julius (SSP) Regional Commander, North-Eastern Region, Uganda Prisons
 Francis, J Head Teacher, Kangole GSS
 Gimuguni, J Head Teacher, Moroto SS
 Koryang, Timothy Assistant Chief Administration Officer
 Lokeris, Teko Magistrate Grade 1, Moroto
 Muhumure, D Programme Manager, Forum for African Women Educationalists
 Nangiyo, S Karamoja Agro-Pastoral Development Programme

Northern Uganda Rehabilitation & Reconstruction Programme

Kluge, Stefan Programme Manager
 Ochien, Jimmy Programme Planner/Administrator
 Oyoo, Frederick Programme Engineer
 Wabwire, Martin Programme Officer

NGOs and others

Adams, M GOAL
 Barasa, C Former HIV/AIDS Technical Assistant to MoES by Irish Aid
 Behangaana, M. John Urban Authorities Association of Uganda (UAAU)
 Bonabaana, R Ag. CEO, African Centre for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture Victims

 Byrne, S Corporate Social Responsibility Manager, Tullow Oil
 Carvalho, S Oxfam GB
 Damalie, N. Mbega Accountant, ULGA
 Darlington, Kaswala Economist, UAAU
 Gamwera, Rose Deputy Secretary General, Uganda Local Governments' Association
 Henri Nzeyimana Technical Manager, Child Protection, SCiU
 Henrietta Wolayo Registrar, Supreme Court of Uganda, Uganda Association of Women Judges

 James Kiiza Programme Officer, UAAU.
 Jolly Nkore Magistrate Grade 1, Mengo, Member UAWJ
 Mclver, H Client Manager, Traidlinks
 Morgan, C Concern Worldwide
 Mugyezi, Raphael Secretary General, ULGA
 Mulhall, J Dep. General Manager, Traidlinks
 Musuya TinaKyallo, J AMREF, Country Director
 Namagga, I Uganda Debt Network, Programme Officer

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Ochai, R	Executive Director, CEDOVIP TASO
Okullo, J	Chairman, Steering Committee, Civil Society Fund
Richard Talagwa	Regional Manager – Central, Save the Children in Uganda (SCiU)
Rugyendo, M	Uganda Debt Network, CSO Capacity-Building Programme
Sean Farrell	Trócaire Uganda
Williamson, T	Director, Praxis Development

Uganda National Teachers' Union

Bbaale, P	Deputy General Secretary, Administration
Birungi, T	General Secretary
Wajega, J	Programme Coordinator, EFA/HIV & AIDS

Literacy Network for Uganda

Bazira, M	National Coordinator
Kiirya, P	Director

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Annex 5: Ireland Aid Uganda Programme Budget and Expenditure 2007-2009

DCO - UGANDA

EXPENDITURE STATEMENT

For the Period Ending 31st December 2007

PROGRAM AND ACTIVITIES	Revised Budget	Expenditure Y-T-D
1. GOVERNANCE		
(a) Democratisation and Accountability		
- Justice Law and Order Sector	3,750,000	2,811,844
- Legal Aid basket Fund	250,000	250,000
- Uganda Human Rights Commission	150,000	150,000
(b) Public Sector Management		
- Local Government SIP	2,790,000	2,790,000
- Local Government Associations	60,000	60,000
- Finalisation of Support to District Partnership	90,000	84,930
- Public Service reform Programme	800,000	800,000
- Financial Management and Accountability Program	1,000,000	1,000,000
(c) Democratic Accountability		
- Deepening Democracy Program	250,000	394,895
- Civil Society		
1. National district N/work	100,000	0
2. ACTV	25,000	25,000
3. KOPEIN	14,000	0
4. Unallocated	111,000	85,176

PROGRAM EXPENDITURE STATEMENT

For the Period Ending 31st December 2008

PROGRAM AND ACTIVITIES	Revised Budget	Expenditure Y-T-D
1. GOVERNANCE		
(a) Justice Reform		
- Justice, Law and Order Sector (JLOS)	3,150,000	3,750,000
- Legal Aid basket Fund	250,000	250,000
- Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC)	150,000	150,000
Sub-total Justice reform	4,150,000	4,150,000
(b) Public Sector Management		
- Local Government Sector Investment Plan (LoGSIP)	0	0
- Local Government Associations	150,000	150,000
- Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP)	1,000,000	1,000,000
- Financial Management and Accountability Programme	1,250,000	1,250,000
(c) Democratic Accountability		
- Deepening Democracy Programme (DDP)	315,338	302,888
- Civil Society Fund	184,662	196,746

Program Budget 2009

PROGRAM AND ACTIVITIES	IDC Approved Budget
1. GOVERNANCE	
(a) Justice Reform	
- Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS)	3,055,359
- Legal Aid Basket Fund	250,000
- Uganda Human Rights Commission	150,000
(b) Public Sector Management	
- Local Government SIP	1,784,206
- Local Government Associations	150,000
- Public Service Reform Programme	1,000,000
- FINMAP	2,000,000
(c) Democratic Accountability	
- Deepening Democracy Programme	250,000
- Civil Society	250,000
(d) Program Management	110,435

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TOTAL GOVERNANCE	8,450,000	8,451,844
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TOTAL GOVERNANCE	7,050,000	7,049,634
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TOTAL GOVERNANCE	9,000,000
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2. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

(a) Education Sector Budget Support	6,000,000	6,000,000
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2. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

(a) Education Sector Budget Support	9,750,000	9,750,000
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2. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

(a) Education Sector Budget Support	10,000,000
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(b) Curriculum Reform Teacher Devt Prog.

- Support Teacher Education - TA	130,000	147,286
- support Teacher Education - Road Map	270,000	243,348
- National Curriculum Devt. Centre	100,000	100,000
- Education Standard Agency	100,000	87,054
- Information and Advocacy	50,000	91,000
- District Engagement	60,000	76,517
- ICT	40,000	34,299
- Program Coordination	50,000	31,563

(b) Curriculum Reform Teacher Devt Prog.

- Support Teacher Education - TA	150,000	162,621
- support Teacher Education - Road Map	200,000	204,457
- National Curriculum Devt. Centre	100,000	100,000
- Education Standard Agency	40,000	38,222
- Information and Advocacy(UNATU and ERTV)	0	40,000
- District Engagement	40,000	57,940
- Uganda National Examination Board (UNEB)	120,000	79,316
- Education Service Commission	120,000	120,000
- ICT	30,000	33,642

(b) Curriculum Reform Teacher Devt Prog.

- Support Teacher Education - TA	155,000
- Support Teacher Education - Road Map	200,000
- National Curriculum Devt. Centre	20,000
- Education Standard Agency	95,000
- Information and Advocacy	50,000
- District Engagement	40,000
- ICT	-
- UNEB	140,000
- Education Service Commission	100,000

(c) Karamoja PPET program

- Construction supervision	25,000	1,595,742
	1,578,000	0
- Equipment	265,000	250,151
- Northern Uganda Basaries	45,000	56,807
- Karamoja Basaries	120,000	147,689
- Program Coordination	10,000	4,191

(c) Karamoja PPET program

- Construction supervision	48,000	60,682
- Construction	5,910,000	5,863,662
- Northern Uganda Basaries	75,000	75,138
- Karamoja Basaries	167,000	163,626
Sub-total Karamoja	6,200,000	6,163,108

(c) Karamoja PPET program

- Construction	3,670,000
- Construction supervision	48,000
- Northern Uganda Basaries	75,000
- Karamoja Basaries	165,000

(d) Adult Literacy

(d) Adult Literacy	50,000	50,000
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(d) Adult Literacy

(d) Adult Literacy	50,000	50,000
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(d) Adult Literacy

(d) Adult Literacy	50,000
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(e) Mainstreaming HIV (MOES)

(e) Mainstreaming HIV (MOES)	150,000	143,695
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(e) Mainstreaming HIV (MOES)

(e) Mainstreaming HIV (MOES)	150,000	141,940
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(e) Mainstreaming HIV (MOES)

(e) Mainstreaming HIV (MOES)	75,272
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(f) Health Training Institutions (Basket)

(f) Health Training Institutions (Basket)	0	0
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(f) Health Training Institutions (Basket)

(f) Health Training Institutions (Basket)	300,000	0
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(g) Program management

(g) Program management	74,728
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TOTAL EDUCATION PROJECTS	4,958,000
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TOTAL EDUCATION	9,043,000	9,059,343
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TOTAL EDUCATION	17,250,000	16,941,245
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TOTAL EDUCATION	14,958,000
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(g) HIV/AIDS

- Partnership Fund (UAC)	200,000	200,000
- Ministry of Local Government	100,000	100,000
- UN Agencies	400,000	400,000
- Support to Civil Societies (Basket)	2,472,513	2,371,705
- Research Program	0	0
- Support to Civil Societies	1,000,000	1,115,808
- Capacity of Irish Aid	50,000	21,783
TOTAL HIV/AIDS	4,222,513	4,209,296

(g) HIV/AIDS

- Partnership Fund (UAC)	400,000	400,000
- Ministry of Local Government	600,000	600,000
- UN Agencies	900,000	900,000
- Support to Civil Societies (Basket)	3,360,000	3,430,000
- Capacity of Irish Aid	100,000	6,490

(g) HIV/AIDS

- Partnership Fund (UAC)	500,000
- Ministry of Local Government	505,000
- UN Agencies	1,000,000
- Support to Civil Societies (Basket)	4,500,000
- Program management	110,000

TOTAL HIV/AIDS	5,360,000	5,336,490
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TOTAL HIV/AIDS	6,615,000
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(h) Health

- Health Sector Support	3,000,000	3,000,000
- PHC Training (AMREF)	512,487	512,487
TOTAL HEALTH	3,512,487	3,512,487

(h) Health

- PHC Training (AMREF)	1,590,000	1,894,491
TOTAL HEALTH	1,590,000	1,894,491

(h) Health

- PHC Training (AMREF)	77,000
TOTAL HEALTH	77,000

POVERTY ACTION FUND	10,000,000	10,000,000
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POVERTY ACTION FUND	10,000,000	10,000,000
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POVERTY ACTION FUND	
- PAF	9,950,000
- Program Management	50,000
TOTAL PAF	10,000,000

PROCESS ACTION FUND

- Education	90,000	87,769
- HIV/AIDS	100,000	438
- Hom Fund	20,000	20,011
- Governance	100,000	181,089

PROCESS ACTION FUND

- Head of Mission	550,000	31,370
- General Consultancy		49,794
- Education		81,921
- HIV/AIDS		26,069

PROCESS ACTION FUND

- Governance	350,000
- Gender	
- Education	
- HIV/AIDS	

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- Health	40,000	0
TOTAL PROCESS FUND	350,000	289,307

- Health	0
- Environment	0
- Governance	59,256
- Gender	266,981
TOTAL PROCESS FUND	550,000
	515,391.71

- Health	
- Environment	
- Head of Mission	
TOTAL PROCESS FUND	350,000

COUNTRY PROGRAM TOTAL	35,578,000	35,501,548
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	-71,034
COUNTRY PROGRAM TOTAL	41,800,000
	41,666,218

COUNTRY PROGRAM TOTAL	41,000,000
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Irish Funding to Uganda outside of the bilateral Country Programme

<i>Civil Society Fund</i>		2007	2008	2009	Total
UCC, Dept. of Applied Psychology	Gender	19,407	0	0	19,407
Friends of Hospice Jinja	HIV / AIDS	20,000	0	0	20,000
Childfund Ireland	HIV / AIDS	197,043	199,987	199,663	596,693
Realta Global AIDS Found.	HIV / AIDS	19,425	0	0	19,425
Sightsavers	Education	200,000	200,000	200,000	600,000
Aidlink	Water/Sanitation	181,289	172,815	0	354,084
Aidlink	Water/Sanitation	121,167	80,823	0	201,990
The Rose Project	HIV / AIDS	151,868	127,910	131,331	411,109
The Rose Project	HIV / AIDS	60,000	0	0	60,000
Link Community Dev.	Education	79,806	0	0	79,806
International Rescue Com	Gender		150,000	150,000	300,000
Leprosy Mission Ireland	Primary Healthcare		150,000	145,000	295,000
Special Olympics Uganda	Disability		30,000	33,750	63,750
Hospice Africa Ireland	HIV / AIDS		240,000	150,000	390,000
UL School Building Project	Education		20,000	0	20,000
Total		1,049,985	1,371,535	1,009,744	3,431,264

<i>Emergency and Recovery</i>		2007	2008	2009	Total
Oxfam	Integrated Public Health Assistance Prog	244,000			244,000
Concern	Flood Relief	100,000			100,000
IFRC	Flood Relief and Rehabilitation	300,000			300,000
Oxfam	Flood Relief	141,428			141,428
World Vision	Water and Sanitation Response	185,000			185,000
Oxfam	Disaster Preparedness and Contingency Planning	20,000		25,000	45,000
Concern	Livelihoods Recovery Padar District	546,275			546,275
Trocaire	Emergency food relief	95,436			95,436
UNOCHA	CAP Appeal		400,000		400,000
UNHCR	CAP Appeal		600,000		600,000
UN FAO	Karamoja Livestock Vaccinations		116,035		116,035
Concern	Water and Sanitation Response		243,673		243,673
Oxfam	Water and Sanitation Response		288,400	275,000	543,400
World Vision	Resettlement of IDPs		230,000		230,000
MSF Holland	Karamoja Emergency Nutrition		133,965		133,965
GOAL	Water and Sanitation Response			300,000	300,000
Total		1,536,701	1,992,073	600,000	4,128,774

<i>Multi-Annual Programme Scheme</i>		2007	2008	2009	Total
Concern	HIV/AIDS, Livelihood Security	859,536	1,000,000		1,859,536
GOAL	Education, Health, Livelihoods, Prog. Admin.	2,600,528	3,200,000		5,800,528
SHDI	Livelihoods, Rural Dev., Mainstreaming, Social Services	423,424	594,882		1,018,106
Trocaire	Justice, Livelihoods	875,857	1,030,000		1,905,857
Total		4,759,345	5,824,682		10,584,027

<i>Missionary Development Fund</i>		2007	2008	2009	Total
Daughters of Mary and Joseph		41,200	40,000		81,200
Franciscan Missionary Sisters		182,125	88,050		270,175
Medical Missionaries of Mary (MMM)		107,257	60,000		167,257
Volunteer Missionary Movement (VMM)		240,899	325,553		566,452
Jesuit Missions		26,395			26,395
Mill Hill Missionaries		20,000	20,000		40,000
Order of St. Camillus		30,000	30,000		60,000
Sisters of Sacred Heart		72,800	76,400		149,200
Society of Sacred Heart		15,000	11,000		26,000
Missionaries of Africa			49,500		49,500
Total		735,676	700,503		1,436,179

<i>Regional Programmes</i>		2007	2008	2009	Total
Aidlink	Kenya, Uganda, Ghana		1,200,000	1,260,000	2,460,000
Fairtrade	Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia		2,000,000	3,050,000	5,050,000
VIVA	Livelihoods (Uganda, Tanzania)		57,275	32,340	89,615
Royal College of Surgeons	East, Central and Southern Africa		200,000		200,000
Camara Education	Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Lesotho		200,000	200,000	400,000
Total			3,657,275	4,542,340	8,199,615




<i>Private Sector</i>		2007	2008	2009	Total
Traidlinks	Uganda	1,000,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	4,000,000
PS Infrastructure Group	Zambia and Uganda	2,000,000	3,000,000	3,000,000	8,000,000
AMSCO		500,000	500,000		1,000,000
Total		3,500,000	5,000,000	4,500,000	13,000,000

<i>Conflict Resolution Unit</i>		2007	2008	2009	Total
UNOCHA	Juba Peace Process	350,000	100,000		450,000
Total		350,000	100,000		450,000

	2007	2008	2009	
Total	11,931,707	18,646,068	10,652,084	41,229,859

Annex 6: Staff Survey Results¹³⁶

Staff Survey Irish Aid Uganda





¹³⁶ Caution needs to be exercised in interpreting the results given here and in paragraph 185 on use of staff time, as the question was misinterpreted by some respondents. The figure of 20% on personal issues is not correct as a result. As the new CSP was in preparation at the time of the survey, increased time on internal processes was reported.

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4. What % of your time is spent over the last month on each the following activities? (Your total must add to 100)

	Response Average	Response Total	Response Count
routine desk work (inc. emails, calls)	30.38	395	13
internal meetings	16.31	212	13
external meetings – donors	13.73	181	11
external meetings – govt.	9.64	108	11
external meetings – NGOs, others	8.92	118	13
travel to and from meetings	2.30	23	10
field visits outside Kampala	3.18	36	11
reading, creative thinking, writing	6.17	98	12
relaxing, socializing, personal matters	10.80	108	10
leave / other	5.60	66	10
	<i>answered question</i>		13
	<i>skipped question</i>		3

5. Is this balance about right?

	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes 	53.8%	7
No 	46.2%	6
<i>if not why not?</i>		6
	<i>answered question</i>	13
	<i>skipped question</i>	3

5. Is this balance about right? If not why not?

1. There seem to be too many internal process, which increases number of meetings and reduces time to read and think analytically/creatively. But too many external meetings are a result of the way aid delivery mechanisms happen in the country.
2. I think I should spend less time on routine desk work, e-mails and more on creative thinking, writing, but I can't because administrative and consular / visa work usually can't wait. You have to handle asap.
3. Only because we are very busy internally at the moment with the development of our new CSP. I would also like to have more time to read, especially documents that our outside of my direct area of responsibility, particularly macro level.
4. The last month was different because of preparation for the CSP evaluation.
5. It is about right although there has been a lot of internal focussed meetings and work due to the CSP and various HQ visits. Hopefully after June 09 this will return to a more acceptable level. I would prefer to have more time in the field so that the policy dialogue is more grounded in experience.
6. Should do less desk work and more field work.
7. Would wish to have more time for reading and creative thinking and for monitoring field visits.
8. There is need to have more time to think through work, a need for more time to socialise.

6. How could the balance be improved?

	Response Count
	6
answered question	6
skipped question	10

6. How could the balance be improved?

1. Reduce internal processes - but these are standard H/Q reporting requirements.
2. By delegating effectively I suppose.
3. This will happen once the CSP planning period is over.
4. Making more time to travel in the field.
5. Strengthen the division of labour among the donors. Reduce the number of internal meetings. For example, the SMT meetings could be reduced monthly to quarterly meetings and discuss strategic issues instead of repeating issues already discussed at other internal fora.
6. Review of the PMDS

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7. Do you have enough time in your work to...			
	Enough time	Not enough time	Response Count
Analyse and discuss programme strategy / policy	36.4% (4)	63.6% (7)	11
Visit the field	16.7% (2)	83.3% (10)	12
Prepare reports of good quality	61.5% (8)	38.5% (5)	13
Understand Irish Aid's policies and corporate rules	69.2% (9)	30.8% (4)	13
Follow staff safety / security rules correctly	92.3% (12)	7.7% (1)	13
Maintain a balance between work and family	69.2% (9)	30.8% (4)	13
		<i>answered question</i>	13
		<i>skipped question</i>	3

8. How would rate the quality of the following factors in terms of facilitating your work?						
	1 (low quality)	2	3	4	5 (high quality)	Response Count
Staff development and training	0.0% (0)	7.7% (1)	23.1% (3)	38.5% (5)	30.8% (4)	13
Management support and guidance	0.0% (0)	7.7% (1)	23.1% (3)	38.5% (5)	30.8% (4)	13
Clear rules and procedures	0.0% (0)	7.7% (1)	15.4% (2)	46.2% (6)	30.8% (4)	13
Office space/ facilities	0.0% (0)	7.7% (1)	30.8% (4)	46.2% (6)	15.4% (2)	13
Retreats	0.0% (0)	7.7% (1)	38.5% (5)	30.8% (4)	23.1% (3)	13
Team meetings	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	30.8% (4)	38.5% (5)	30.8% (4)	13
					<i>answered question</i>	13
					<i>skipped question</i>	3

9. Are your personal performance targets (such as in the PDMS):						
	Very	Fairly	Poorly	Not	Response Count	
Realistic	54.5% (6)	45.5% (5)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	11	
Relevant	91.7% (11)	8.3% (1)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	12	
					<i>answered question</i>	12
					<i>skipped question</i>	4

Independent Evaluation of Irish Aid's Uganda Country Strategy Paper 2007-2009

10. How do you rate your level of ability in the following skill areas?						
	Very Good	Good	Adequate	Poor	Very Poor	Response Count
Facilitation and Presentation	23.1% (3)	46.2% (5)	30.8% (4)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	13
Budgeting	23.1% (3)	38.5% (5)	30.5% (4)	7.7% (1)	0.0% (0)	13
Influencing and networking	38.5% (5)	15.4% (2)	46.2% (6)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	13
Policy analysis and research	30.8% (4)	38.5% (5)	15.4% (2)	15.4% (2)	0.0% (0)	13
					answered question	13
					skipped question	3

11. In what areas could IA improve your ability to work more effectively?		Response Count
		10
	answered question	10
	skipped question	6

11. In what areas could IA improve your ability to work more effectively?
- Influencing & networking Policy analysis and research.
 - Corporate Service sections (administrative unit) in programme countries should also be given the same opportunities for meetings with colleagues in HQ and other programme countries the same way it happens in Development / programme section. In corporate services (administrative, consular & visa) no training is organized to help out mission staff in understanding the policies, requirements of HQ Corporate services unit etc. Some sort of induction and continuous training in our area would be of help in staff development.
 - Improvement needed in Financial analysis and Planning, Project management and public expenditure.
 - More time to focus on wider and macro level issues.
 - Influencing and Networking Policy Analysis and Research.
 - By interaction with the supervisor, proper flow of information, empowering all staff members and encouraging them in their grey areas.
 - If some of the more 'junior' staff took on greater levels of responsibility, and look more initiative in problem solving.
 - More delegated authority to the field office.
 - Training in policy analysis, M&E.
 - Influencing and policy advocacy are important areas for improvement.

Independent Evaluation of Irish Aid's Uganda Country Strategy Paper 2007-2009

12. Purpose						
	1 (agree)	2	3	4	5 (disagree)	Response Count
Objectives are clear, challenging and relevant to purpose	66.7% (8)	25.0% (3)	8.3% (1)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	12
Strategies for achieving the objectives are clear	50.0% (6)	33.3% (4)	16.7% (2)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	12
My roles are clear (regarding attainment of objectives)	75.0% (9)	16.7% (2)	8.3% (1)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	12
	answered question					12
	skipped question					4

13. Empowerment						
	1 (agree)	2	3	4	5 (disagree)	Response Count
I feel a personal and collective sense of power to influence key decisions	41.7% (5)	41.7% (5)	16.7% (2)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	12
Policies and practices in the organization support team objectives	33.3% (4)	50.0% (6)	16.7% (2)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	12
Mutual respect and willingness to help each other is evident	33.3% (4)	33.3% (4)	33.3% (4)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	12
	answered question					12
	skipped question					4

14. Relationships and communication						
	1 (agree)	2	3	4	5 (disagree)	Response Count
I express myself openly and honestly	66.7% (8)	25.0% (3)	8.3% (1)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	12
Members listen actively to each other / differences of opinion are valued	41.7% (5)	25.0% (3)	33.3% (4)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	12
Members share information willingly	50.0% (6)	25.0% (3)	8.3% (1)	16.7% (2)	0.0% (0)	12
	answered question					12
	skipped question					4

Independent Evaluation of Irish Aid's Uganda Country Strategy Paper 2007-2009

15. Recognition						
	1 (agree)	2	3	4	5 (disagree)	Response Count
My contributions are appreciated by the team leader and other members of the team	66.7% (8)	8.3% (1)	25.0% (3)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	12
My contributions are valued and recognized by the organization	33.3% (4)	41.7% (5)	16.7% (2)	8.3% (1)	0.0% (0)	12
<i>answered question</i>						12
<i>skipped question</i>						4

16. Morale						
	1 (agree)	2	3	4	5 (disagree)	Response Count
I am confident and motivated	58.3% (7)	41.7% (5)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	12
I have a sense of pride and satisfaction about my work	58.3% (7)	41.7% (5)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	12
There is a strong sense of cohesion and team spirit	25.0% (3)	58.3% (7)	8.2% (1)	0.0% (0)	8.3% (1)	12
<i>answered question</i>						12
<i>skipped question</i>						4

Independent Evaluation of Irish Aid's Uganda Country Strategy Paper 2007-2009

17. To what extent would you agree or disagree with the following statements about Irish Aid Uganda:

	1 (Not Effective)	2	3	4	5 (Very effective)	Response Count
The strategy to strengthen skills of national staff is effective	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	45.5% (5)	27.3% (3)	27.3% (3)	11
Staff knowledge of conflict and post-conflict issues is adequate	9.1% (1)	27.3% (3)	63.6% (7)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	11
Monitoring and evaluation of programme performance is effective	0.0% (0)	27.3% (3)	36.4% (4)	36.4% (4)	0.0% (0)	11
Gender issues are effectively mainstreamed into IA's programme	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	18.2% (2)	54.5% (6)	27.3% (3)	11
HIV/AIDS is effectively addressed in Irish Aid's programme	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	9.1% (1)	54.5% (6)	36.4% (4)	11
Environmental issues are effectively addressed	18.2% (2)	54.5% (6)	27.3% (3)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	11
<i>answered question</i>						11
<i>skipped question</i>						5

18. What would you say are the comparative advantages of Irish Aid as an aid organization compared to other development partners in Uganda? (Tick up to five choices)

	Strong comparative advantage	Some comparative advantage	No comparative advantage	Response Count
Flexibility	83.3% (5)	16.7% (1)	0.0% (0)	6
Neutrality	100.0% (9)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	9
Coordination skills	42.9% (3)	57.1% (4)	0.0% (0)	7
Strong policy engagement	50.0% (5)	50.0% (5)	0.0% (0)	10
Compliance with Paris Declaration principles	77.8% (7)	22.2% (2)	0.0% (0)	9
Strong technical capacity	87.5% (7)	12.5% (1)	0.0% (0)	8
Results based programming	16.7% (1)	66.7% (4)	16.7% (1)	6
Clear strategic direction	44.4% (4)	55.6% (5)	0.0% (0)	9
Empowered local staff	63.6% (7)	36.4% (4)	0.0% (0)	11
Integrated approach (Political & development)	62.5% (5)	37.5% (3)	0.0% (0)	8
Responsiveness	28.6% (2)	57.1% (4)	14.3% (1)	7
Staff continuity	0.0% (0)	83.3% (5)	16.7% (1)	6
Ireland's economic history	71.4% (5)	28.6% (2)	0.0% (0)	7
Ireland's history of conflict resolution	50.0% (3)	50.0% (3)	0.0% (0)	6
Missionary links	66.7% (4)	33.3% (2)	0.0% (0)	6
<i>Other (please specify)</i>				1
<i>answered question</i>				11

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19. Which of the following six strategic objectives of IA's 2007-09 Country Strategy have been the most effective? Rank in order of effectiveness:

Rank	1	2	3	4	5	6	Response Count
Quality basic services	20.0% (2)	20.0% (2)	20.0% (2)	10.0% (1)	20.0% (2)	10.0% (1)	10
HIV/AIDS reduction	0.0% (0)	20.0% (2)	50.0% (5)	20.0% (2)	10.0% (1)	0.0% (0)	10
Increased Aid Effectiveness	20.0% (2)	40.0% (4)	10.0% (1)	10.0% (1)	20.0% (2)	0.0% (0)	10
Gender equality	10.0% (1)	10.0% (1)	30.0% (3)	30.0% (3)	20.0% (2)	0.0% (0)	10
Environment sustainability	0.0% (0)	10.0% (1)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	90.0% (9)	10
Synergies across IA's programme	30.0% (3)	10.0% (1)	0.0% (0)	30.0% (3)	20.0% (2)	10.0% (1)	10
<i>answered question</i>							10
<i>skipped question</i>							0

20. Has policy engagement with government and other partners been sufficiently strategic and sustained? If yes what are the best examples can you give?

Response Count
8
<i>answered question</i> 8
<i>skipped question</i> 8

20. Has policy engagement with government and other partners been sufficiently strategic and sustained? If yes what are the best examples can you give?

1. Yes, to a large extent: examples: 1. aligning behind and supporting the Joint Budget Support Framework; 2. conducting gender studies at a time when government was struggling with introduction of gender based budgeting; 3. jointly funding the country economic memorandum when government policy direction was increasing coming under criticism.
2. Yes - national roll out of ambitious reforms in primary education Establishing CSF for HIV/AIDS Developing joint UN Programme
3. Holding of joint reviews between government (Sectors) and donors and the dialogue on the JBSF/ JBAF
4. Yes. Within JLOS we have ensured that service delivery (through legal aid) has been consistently raised as a priority and helped link the LABF and JLOS to work on these issues together. We have consistently raised gender issues with the sector and both of these have been taken on by the sector as priorities for 2008/09.
5. Yes, good cooperation and communication with other 'like minded donors', little contact with other missions, good relations with government in sectors but less interaction at other levels.
6. Ireland has played very effective role in pushing forward donor coordination and harmonisation agenda - Our role in the development of the JBSF is a good example of the positive impact of our influencing on the structures and architecture of the framework. The continuity of our staff and the fact that we have had a very high profile engagement in governance programming and political dialogue has raised the profile of Ireland as a partner of Uganda.
7. Having crosscutting issues as a strategic objective has assisted in ensuring that each programme team allocate some its time and resources to these issues.
8. Yes, though we need to use the chairing role more strategically across the programme.

Independent Evaluation of Irish Aid's Uganda Country Strategy Paper 2007-2009

21. Finally, do you have any general comments about the way the CSP Evaluation work has been conducted, and how such exercises could be improved in future?	
	Response Count
	0
answered question	0
skipped question	0

21. Finally, do you have any general comments about the way the CSP Evaluation work has been conducted, and how such exercises could be improved in future?	
1. None	
2. Seems like it was difficult for all members of the evaluation team to understand the programme in depth and hit the ground running from the word go. Perhaps more briefing prior to meeting with partners.	
3. We did not have adequate discussions with the evaluation team on the relevance of the evaluation programme.	
4. Evaluations, although necessary and important, take considerable time of both the Irish Aid team and its partners. It is unfortunate that the evaluation had to be planned during a period in which there is significant other internal meetings. The team might have been a bit better prepared and asked more specific questions during their time with Irish Aid members which would have decreased the amount of time staff engaged with the team.	
5. No comments yet - seems to be working out very well - will know more when see the final report!	
6. The evaluation has posed significant transaction costs on our partners. There must be a 'lighter' way to do this.	
7. Meetings should be arranged much earlier. Should explore the possibility of joint evaluation missions with other development partners.	
8. Was there a baseline done before this CSP?	

Annex 7: Detailed Review of the Irish HIV/AIDS programme

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CHAPTER I - CONTEXT

Uganda has been affected by a HIV/AIDS epidemic since the early 1980s. Since 2000, HIV prevalence has stabilised at 6.4% among adults; about 0.7% of children are infected with HIV. Against this background, there are indications from the national surveillance system of an apparent increase in prevalence trends among certain population groups. Ministry of Health data also shows a fall in condom use and an increase in reported sexually transmitted infections in the past year.¹³⁷ The main sources of new infection are sex among discordant¹³⁸, cohabiting, married and widowed (42%), commercial sex workers (22%), mother-to-child transmission (21%), and casual sex (14%), with medical injections being the lowest at 1%. Other key causes of high infection are poverty, early marriage, multiple concurrent sexual partners, stigma and discrimination and sexually transmitted infections (STIs)¹³⁹.

In responding to the epidemic, Uganda AIDS Commission was established in 1992; it developed the country's Multi-sectoral AIDS Control Approach (MACA) in the response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic.

Table 1: Major Events in the National Response to HIV&AIDS Epidemic

Year	Event	Significance
1998	The President of Uganda announces the existence of HIV&AIDS in the country	Silence about the epidemic was broken and political commitment and openness created conducive environment for national response
1987	AIDS Control Programme established in MoH	HIV&AIDS viewed as a health problem
1992	Uganda AIDS Commission was established through an Act of Parliament and Government adopted the MACA	Multi-sectoral approach used as a policy and strategy for responding to the epidemic and UAC started to provide leadership in coordinating the multi-sectoral response
1993	National Operational Plan (NOP) developed by UAC	Basis for medium-term planning and resource allocation established; major projects were based on NOP
1997	National Strategic Framework (NSF) for HIV&AIDS 1998-2002 activities developed	HIV&AIDS integrated as a cross-cutting issue in the national Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) and NSF approved as a basis for addressing HIV&AIDS
2001	NSF revised to cover 2000/2001-2005/2006	Uganda signed the UNGASS Declaration of Commitment; partnership mechanism established for coordination at national level; the "three ones" principle adopted and revised NSF was the basis for implementation
2002	Partnership mechanisms adopted	Uganda AIDS Partnership mechanism ensures that all stakeholders maintain a strategic focus on the national strategy for the response
2004	Declaration of commitment to "three ones" principle	Principle of "three ones," namely one national AIDS coordinating authority, one national strategic framework for AIDS action and one national monitoring and evaluation framework was endorsed
2007	National Strategic Plan (NSP) Developed 2007/2008-2011/2012	Strategy for enhancing universal access to treatment, care and support
2008	National Priority Action Plan 2007/2008-2011/2012	First annualised NSP developed with clear outputs to be achieved based on a costed set of priority activities

Source: Adupa R L (2009). *Regional Situational Analysis Study on Education Sector Responses to HIV&AIDS Pandemic in the East African Community Partner States – Uganda Report, January 2009, East African Community.*

¹³⁷"Drivers of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and effectiveness of prevention interventions in Uganda – a synthesis report," May 2007

¹³⁸ Discordance is when one partner in a relationship is HIV positive and the other is not.

¹³⁹Uganda AIDS Commission (2007). *Accelerating HIV Prevention, The Road Map towards Universal Access to HIV Prevention in Uganda.* April 2007. Kampala.

MACA formed the basis for the development of periodic national programme priorities and implementation mechanisms, including the National Operational Plan (NOP) for STI and HIV&AIDS-related activities during 1994-1998 and the National Strategic Framework (NSF) for HIV&AIDS-related activities during 1998-2000, which was revised to the NSF 2000/2001-2005/2006. Recently, the country developed the National Strategic Plan 2007/2008 - 2011/2012¹⁴⁰ that has three thematic priority service areas, namely prevention, care and treatment and social support. These areas will be supported by a strengthened service delivery system and structure that ensures quality, equity and timely service provision.

At the national level, Uganda AIDS Commission established the partnership mechanism for coordination. The partnership mechanism consists of the Partnership Forum¹⁴¹, the Partnership Committee (PC)¹⁴², the Partnership Fund¹⁴³ and the Self-Coordinating Entities (SCE)¹⁴⁴. At the sector level, UAC advocated for the designation of an AIDS focal point person in each line ministry and each ministry also established AIDS coordination committees. At the district local government level, the District Task Team chaired by the Chairman, Local Council, provides political leadership in the fight against HIV/AIDS; the Chief Administrative Officers have been required to appoint AIDS focal point persons to head the District AIDS Coordination Committees that are committees of the District Technical Planning Committees. The establishment of similar coordination structures have also been advocated for by UAC at the sub-county and lower levels.

Against the foregoing background, Uganda is at the crossroads in responding to the epidemic, requiring bold but strategic decisions to be made in planning and resource allocations while focusing on reducing the number of new infections, the number of people in need of treatment and social support. Thus, the cornerstone of the NSP is anchored on interventions to reduce HIV incidence by 40%.

¹⁴⁰ Uganda AIDS Commission (2008). National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 2007/2008 - 2011/2012, Kampala.

¹⁴¹ The Partnership Forum meets once a year and it brings together all members of Uganda AIDS Commission and the SCEs as well as district representatives to review progress and set priorities for the next year.

¹⁴² PC which brings together representatives of the SCEs and members of Uganda AIDS Commission.

¹⁴³ The Partnership Fund since its establishment in 2002 has been funded by Irish Aid, DFID, DANIDA and UNAIDS; some development partners, including USAID, do not provide direct funding to the Fund but provide support to identified coordinators and management priorities.

¹⁴⁴ An SCE is a cluster of stakeholders with similar areas of interest; it shares information, plans and coordinates issues within its constituency. The 12 SCEs include Ministries of Government; Parliament; United Nations (UN) and bilateral funding agencies; national NGOs; international NGOs; private sector; FBOs; PHA networks; decentralised response; research, academia and science; young people; and media.

CHAPTER II – RELEVANCE

2.1 To what extent does the CSP address the developmental challenges and priorities of Uganda and the needs of target groups?

One of the strategic objective of the CSP was on HIV/AIDS; it states that the CSP was to “contribute to the reduction of HIV/AIDS in Uganda and mitigate the disease’s effects.” To the extent that HIV/AIDS is one of the developmental priorities identified in (a) the country’s Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) as a cross-cutting issue to be addressed in all the five pillars of PEAP and (b) the National Vision for 2025, the CSP, in having one of its pillars focusing on human development, and particularly on HIV/AIDS and education, did indeed address a pertinent developmental challenge and priority of Uganda. In this regard, while there was considerable debate between government and stakeholders involved in the national response to HIV/AIDS about the macro-economic impact of HIV/AIDS in Uganda at the time the CSP was being designed, a recent study¹⁴⁵ has indicated, among others, two important findings. First, it showed that AIDS will have a negative impact on the rate of economic growth in Uganda; if investment is strongly negatively affected, the rate of GDP growth will fall from a projected 6.5% a year without AIDS to an estimated 5.3% under the AIDS-without-ART scenario, and by 2025 the economy will be 39% smaller than it would have been without AIDS. Secondly, the study also showed that the impact of AIDS on the growth of average real incomes (per capita GDP) is also negative - if investment is strongly affected, averaging 1.7% a year under the AIDS-without-ART scenario, compared to 2.7% a year without AIDS - and would be 33% lower by 2025. Hence, it is appropriate to state that the CSP was indeed very relevant in focusing on HIV/AIDS that has empirically verified impact on the developmental aspirations of Uganda.

Regarding the priorities and target groups addressed, the CSP indicated that it would support three thematic areas, namely prevention (including MTCT), home-based care and treatment, and OVCs. Again, it is appropriate to note that these were also identified as priority areas in (a) the National Strategic Framework (2000/2001-2005/2006) which was in place at the time of the CSP design; (b) the National Strategic Plan that was launched in 2008 for guiding national response to HIV & AIDS; and (c) the HSSP-II. Thus, to date, the CSP is still aligned with the priorities and targets groups in the major policy documents of government for HIV/AIDS.

2.2 Has the CSP focused on issues of poverty reduction and lagging MDG indicators?

By the CSP addressing HIV/AIDS as a cross-cutting issue and as a significant component of the HDP, it was indeed focusing on issues of poverty because it is perceived that chronic poverty (i.e. poverty where individuals, households or regions are trapped in severe and multi-dimensional poverty for an extended period of time - several years or a lifetime) in Uganda disproportionately affects those affected by HIV/AIDS and that chronically poor people are especially vulnerable to shocks related to the consequences of HIV/AIDS impact at individual, family and community level. In this regard, it was estimated that over 25% of the population of Uganda lives in chronic poverty¹⁴⁶. Therefore, CSP interventions that relate to the drivers of the epidemic, mitigation of the impact of HIV/AIDS epidemic as well as mainstreaming of gender in the CSP both directly and indirectly focus on issues of poverty reduction from the HIV/AIDS perspective.

The health policy of Irish Aid states that Irish Aid has a vision for health with the characteristic that “the improvement of health outcome is a central development objective” and hence Irish Aid will, among other things, “emphasise the need for a multi-sectoral approach to health, addressing

¹⁴⁵ Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Uganda AIDS Commission and United Nations Development Programme (2008). Assessing the Macroeconomic Impact of HIV/AIDS in Uganda. Summary Report. Kampala.

¹⁴⁶ Irish Aid (2008). Review of the Human Development Programme, Irish Aid, Uganda, February 18-20, 2008, Kampala.

determinants of health". Against this policy, it is of value to note for Uganda's health sector that the UNDP report¹⁴⁷ indicated that if the country is to remain on course to meet the MDG target of 31 deaths per 1000 live births by 2015, the IMR must reduce by more than half in six years (2009 – 2015), but it was concluded that this target was unattainable. The GoU earlier had to shift its own medium-term target for this MDG indicator of 68 deaths per 1000 live births from 2005 to 2009. Similarly, it was noted that to meet the MDG for MMR, Uganda has to reduce its MMR from 435 to 131 deaths per 100,000 live births by 2015. However, considering that all the process indicators on health fell short of their targets in the period 1999/2000 to 2004/2005, it was concluded that the goal of MMR by 2005 is doubtful. Despite the above statistics and the fact that (i) health outcomes are critical to poverty reduction and (ii) the health sector response is key in the fight against HIV/AIDS, Irish Aid - upon extensive internal and external consultations with key stakeholders (including HQ health advisor) and like-minded donors in Uganda - chose to withdraw from direct support to the health sector. The rationale for this was that (a) about half of improvements in health can be attributed to interventions outside the health sector because the challenges of health required a multi-sectoral response; (b) there are too many DPs in the sector and Irish Aid's withdrawal would be a positive move in sending a strong message about commitment to harmonisation; (c) it was perceived that despite playing a strong role, the sector would not be adversely affected if IA withdrew because a considerable number of strong donors would remain. Consequently, Irish Aid withdrew its direct funding support to the health sector but with an agreement with DFID to provide a link to the policy dialogue relating to HIV/AIDS in the health sector. While this decision might raise concerns given that the infant and maternal mortality rates were seriously falling off-track from the MDG targets, it should be noted that the Irish Aid support to HIV/AIDS, education, JLOS and governance were indeed, in some way, addressing these appalling mortality rates. For instance, by supporting prevention of new HIV infection, HIV testing, increased access to ARVs and PMTCT etc., there would be direct and indirect impact on maternal and child health in the country. Similarly, by preventing gender-based violence and early pregnancy, particularly among young girls in schools, as well as mainstreaming HIV/AIDS and gender in school curricula, the rates of infant and maternal mortality would be reduced. In any case, the support on primary health care training through AMREF was to contribute to building the necessary capacity for provision of health services to the mothers and children in the health centres.

2.3 Has the choice of sectors been appropriate given the changing political and development contexts within which the CSP is implemented, and in light of the donor division of labour exercise?


Between 1992 and 2002 there was a significant decline in the prevalence of HIV in Uganda from 18% to 6.2% and for this Uganda was credited. However, as identified by a study¹⁴⁸ of UAC, "Overall, the current HIV prevalence of 6.4% in the general population is unacceptably high... a stabilisation is becoming more apparent. Current trends in HIV prevalence are showing a rise among some populations such as married people. There is an apparent shift from the peak of the epidemic from young people to adults 30-39 years. Against this background, improved security and stability have come in northern Uganda and southern Sudan in recent years as a result of both the peace talks and military interventions. Consequently, the Kampala-Juba transport route was opened as a response to trade and employment opportunities between Uganda and Sudan. Thus, the number of hotspots where truck drivers, traders and other travellers sleep overnight as they move through Kampala-Juba route from Uganda, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda or other neighbouring countries is increasing; these hotspots are rampant with commercial sex workers or sex for

¹⁴⁷ UNDP (2007). Millennium Development Goals: Uganda's Progress Report 2007, Kampala.

¹⁴⁸ Uganda AIDS Commission (2006). Accelerating HIV Prevention in Uganda: The Road towards Universal Access. Drivers of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic and Effectiveness of Prevention Interventions in Uganda - A Synthesis Report, September 2006, Kampala.

survival¹⁴⁹ as is shown in the map below. Yet an earlier study on hotspots on the Mombasa-Kampala highway showed that “there are more than 6,000 truck drivers staying overnight along the Mombasa-Kampala highway corridor and approximately 8,000 sex workers having sex with multiple concurrent partners, with clientele occupations and demographic groups varying widely. Rates of self-reported STIs were annually up to 15% in both truck drivers and sex workers, and reported condom use was only 50-80%. Access to treatment for HIV and STIs was limited, and there were no targeted VCT services for these at-risk and vulnerable populations.”

¹⁴⁹ Ferguson, A. and Kriitmaa, K. (2008). Hotspot Mapping along the Kampala-Juba Transport Route, International Organization for Migration, Nairobi.



Map 1: Estimated Number of Commercial Sex-workers on Kampala-Juba Route, 2008.

Thus, the NSP identified truck drivers, sex workers, and other mobile populations as priority high-risk groups, calling for an immediate response in order to reduce risky behaviour and elicit behaviour change. In view of this, the CSP identified that HIV and AIDS was to be mainstreamed in sector strategic plans, policies and budget process; this was an appropriate choice. In this regard, under the HDP, Irish Aid chose to support UAC, MoLG and MoES. The choice of UAC in this regard was appropriate because UAC is perceived as the “one” national AIDS authority (as set out in the “three ones” principles) that is mandated by law to coordinate the national response to HIV/AIDS and provide strategic leadership, yet it did not have the required capacity to plan, coordinate and manage the response.

The choice of MoLG was also strategic because the planning and implementation of activities on HIV/AIDS at the local level was decentralised yet the district, higher and lower level local governments did not have the capacity to plan their respective response to the epidemic. Consequently, it was necessary for Irish Aid to provide the Ministry of Local Government, which is also the Secretariat of the Self-Coordinating Entity for Decentralised Response to HIV/AIDS, with the necessary resources for building the capacity of the Ministry of Local Government to carry out these tasks.

In order to allow for a smooth exit from the health sector, IA carried out the following; (a) provided the last tranche of the budget support component to the health sector in 2007; (b) made an informal arrangement with DFID to follow up progress of HSSP implementation because IA would no longer engage with the health SWAp structures (e.g. HPAC, JRM from 2007 onwards); (c) provided funds for the national primary health care training programme implemented by AMREF up to 2008; (d) conducted a mid-term review of the AMREF project in 2008 in order to prepare for concluding the project.

However, because of (a) delays in starting the implementation of programme activities for close to eight months (due to delay in ending Phase III of the PHC programme) which had the ripple effect of delaying a number of other activities; (b) failure by AMREF to come up promptly with a realistic budget that was cognizant of variations in costs across the country; (c) failure to obtain a VAT refund from government which locked up nearly 300 million shillings, the review recommended a no-cost extension period of six months ending in June 2009¹⁵⁰. The review also found that there had been low involvement of key stakeholders such as the Ministry of Education and Sports, and the Ministry of Health in the project. This meant that they were not seeing themselves at the centre of the programme activities. For instance, some Ministry of Education officials complained that AMREF only went to them when they needed the VAT refunds. Both the MoH and MoES wanted their involvement at institutional level, although they were aware that individuals from these ministries were involved in the programme in their individual capacity.

2.4 Was the balance between support for (a) government institutions and civil society; (b) the different aid modalities (PAF, sector support, pooled programmes, and projects) appropriate and (c) policy dialogue and output delivery appropriate?

Government institutions and civil society

In the previous CSP it was noted¹⁵¹ that the CSOs were allocated 73% of the overall €6,710,000 budget for HIV/AIDS for the period 2002-2005, while government got the balance of the budget. In the current CSP the percentage allocation¹⁵² for CS was 80% based on the total of €12,750,000 budgeted for HIV/AIDS for both government and CSF covering the period 2007/2009. These figures show that there has been an increase (a) in the overall allocation of funds for HIV/AIDS for government and CSOs between the two CSPs and (b) in the percentage of the funds allocated to the CSOs compared to government. This balance was appropriate because the government-related institutions were provided resources primarily for coordination, enhancing mainstreaming of HIV/AIDS in the sector, while the CSOs were supported for delivery of services to the targeted population.

¹⁵⁰ Oonyu, J C (2008). Human Resources Development for Increased Access to Primary Health Care Programme in Uganda, Mid-term Review Report, Development Cooperation Ireland (Uganda), Kampala.

¹⁵¹ Butcher, K; Erickson, S; and Mworeko, L (2005). Evaluation of DCI Uganda's HIV and AIDS Programme 2002-2005, Irish Aid, Kampala.

¹⁵² Irish Aid (2006). Uganda Country Strategy Programme 2007-2009: Human Development Programme 2007-2009. Kampala, December 2006.

Different aid modalities (PAF, sector support, pooled programmes, and projects)

In the provision of funds for HIV/AIDS under the CSP, a variety of aid modalities was used to deliver the programme, including pooling of funds to support UAC through the Partnership Fund, basket funding for civil society, basket support to the UN agencies, and earmarked support to MoLG through the Local Government Strategic Investment Plan (LOGSIP) and project support for HIV/AIDS mainstreaming through MoES. These different modalities were appropriate because they served different purposes and solved different funding challenges. For instance, in January 2005 MoFPED issued a circular informing all accounting officers that with effect from FY 2005/06 all government project aid will be integrated into the medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF). Because UAC's funds are provided under MoH resources, this policy statement meant that resources mobilised for national HIV/AIDS responses, particularly for the generally very expensive ARV drugs and non-health facility-based interventions (usually implemented by the CSOs) channelled through the central government, would undoubtedly increase the burden on the already overloaded MoH sector ceiling; this would not only be unfair but would also not be accepted by the MoH-SWG¹⁵³. Besides, channelling the resources for HIV/AIDS through the President's Office, which is the line ministry of UAC, was untenable as it would not only inflate the cost of government administration but would also affect the ceiling of the President's Office. Hence, the channelling of resources for CSOs through the basket fund was most appropriate. It was also against this background that Uganda AIDS Commission was provided resources outside both Ministry of Health and the President's Office through the Partnership Fund.

The provision of resources to MoES and MoLG through their respective line ministries in the form of projects was to facilitate an early integration of their HIV/AIDS plans and budget within the sector investment plans for sustainability.

Policy dialogue and output delivery

The government-related institutions were provided resources primarily for coordination and enhancing mainstreaming of HIV/AIDS in the sector while the CSOs were supported for delivery of services to the targeted population. This was on the understanding that with both types of support, policy dialogue would be enriched in that (a) the stakeholders in government would have been facilitated to carry out the necessary consultations and studies necessary for policy formulation and (b) the CSOs would be able to deliver services to the beneficiaries while at the same time being able to gather appropriate information and statistics through their service delivery points for informing policy debates and also for empowering them to discuss with government partners competently. It is pertinent to note the CS representatives are not only members of the PC and CSF steering committees but are also members on various committees and taskforces established by UAC.

As Irish Aid and DFID facilitated the process of establishing a basket fund for supporting CSOs to carry out HIV/AIDS-related activities, it was realised that USAID and GFATM were very key partners in the provision of resources for HIV/AIDS. Consequently, USAID was brought on board in the very early discussions of Irish Aid and DFID on the design of the basket fund; when the PC approved the establishment of the CSF, these discussions continued and Irish Aid and DFID agreed to the offer of USAID to (i) provide the Technical Management Agency at no cost to the CSF, (ii) prepare the RFA and also to fund and manage the contract of the Financial Management Agency on behalf of the ADPs. Irish Aid also used its position among the ADPs to ensure that consensus was generated whenever there were divergent views among the partners (including USAID).

¹⁵³ Uganda AIDS Commission (2007). Establishment of the Civil Society Fund for National Response to HIV/AIDS: Draft Report - Documentation of the Process, Experiences and Lessons Learnt in Uganda. Kampala

2.5 Has the programme been designed in a collaborative manner with (i) national and local authorities and in alignment with Government of Uganda policies and (ii) Irish Aid policies, as well as (iii) in a harmonised way with other development partners?

The HIV/AIDS interventions under the Human Development Programme (HDP) have been developed in a collaborative manner. For instance, the Partnership Fund through which UAC has continued to be funded since the previous CSP was established following a discussion among like-minded partners including Irish Aid, DANIDA, DFID and Norway. The findings of the consultant who was contracted by Irish Aid were presented to the AIDS Development Partners (ADPs) and government for further discussions before the Partnership Committee at Uganda AIDS Commission approved the idea of establishing the CSF. Collaboration and participation of key stakeholders continued in the actual design of the CSF structures, policies and programmes which lasted well over one year. Thus, the steering committee of the CSF has four civil society representatives, four line ministry representatives, two development partners, one UAC Commissioner (Chair) and UAC Director General; UNAIDS is an ex officio member. On the other hand, the MoLG project on deepening mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in local governance was developed with a lot of internal consultations between MoLG and district local government staff; the self-coordinating entity decentralised response, which includes government staff, CSOs and development partners, was also actively involved in discussing the draft proposals which was finally approved by the PC and MoLG.

In developing the HDP, government policies for the respective sectors provided guidance which was backed up with studies and relevant statistics on the sector as alluded to under Question 1. On the other hand, a key policy priority across all programmes has been 'to promote HIV/AIDS reduction, gender equality and environmental sustainability as fundamental requirements for poverty reduction'¹⁵⁴. This was anchored in the overall Irish Aid policies¹⁵⁵ on health and HIV/AIDS which recognises HIV/AIDS as essential for development and achieving the MDGs hence the strategy is 'the mainstreaming of HIV/AIDS in all programmes' with focus, among others, on (a) promoting harmonisation and coordination among all stakeholders, following the 'Three Ones' principles and (b) promoting coordination between government, private and civil society actors, including a greater role for civil society organisations in care and support at community level.

In developing the CSF, which is a key component of the HDP, Irish Aid worked very closely with DFID and USAID. It was felt that including USAID in the Fund was essential if there was to be a coherent national response by the civil society. This collaborative effort has resulted in (a) Irish Aid, DFID, USAID and DANIDA putting funds into the basket with that from USAID earmarked (to date for OVC, Paediatric AIDS and Local Government Performance); USAID has also provided the technical management agencies at no cost to the Fund, (b) a commitment of up to \$22m for the operations of the Fund in its first year, (c) new development partners coming on board e.g. GFATM (Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria) and more recently Italy, and with the possibility of SIDA joining the basket, (d) the stakeholders know what each partner is planning to do and even reasons justifying their action or inaction are shared, unlike when the CSF was not yet established before the CSP.

Irish Aid provided financial support through DANIDA in establishing a basket fund for private not-for-profit (PNFP) health training institutions (HTI) in order to improve staffing levels in underserved areas through health worker training, increasing predictable and equitable funding to PNFP and by increasing access to study at PNFP institutions for poor students from underserved areas. This was on the realisation that funding of GoU and DPs to PNFP HTIs suffers from poor coordination and lack of transparency resulting in highly unequitable fund distribution whereby some PNFP institutions

¹⁵⁴ DCA Brief: Mainstreaming Gender in Irish Aid Programmes, Pg. 1

¹⁵⁵ Irish Aid. Health Policy – Improving Health to Reduce Poverty

receive 10 times more GoU funds and up to 30 times more DPs' funding per student/year than other schools. Under this proposed scheme, a student would sign a bonding contract with MoH pledging to be posted after graduation to a vacancy in a GoU or PNFP facility in an underserved district/area to be determined by MoH. For the period 2008/2009-2010/2011, a total of Ug Shs 7.6b= were budgeted, with Irish Aid and DANIDA providing 28% and 47% of the resources respectively; GoU would provide the remaining 25%. Against this background, however, there were considerable delays in the consultations for finalising the scheme. But as of now, an MOU (between DPs, the medical bureau and MoH), a bonding agreement (between student and GoU/MoH) and other tools have been concluded and are just awaiting clearance by the Ministry of Justice. In this regard, the contribution of Irish Aid to the pooled funding was part of its exit strategy from the health sector that will be completed by the end of 2009, although the partners in the GoU/DP pooled funding perceive that Irish Aid should at least symbolically remain in the pool in order to support the process because this would not only support the project but would also give additional momentum with the possibility of attracting other partners in future.

The training programme by AMREF which was supported by Irish Aid is also ending. Yet it should be noted that (a) 60% of the health centres are not manned by qualified staff, (b) government is discouraging traditional birth attendants, (c) community own resource persons (CORPs) - who operate within the village health teams - need to be trained and supervised by HC-II nurses, who are inadequate. Against this background, many question how the National Minimum Health Care Package can be implemented in underserved and remote areas, especially the north where facilities are poor.

2.6 Has the CSP been results-focused with indicators for performance? To what extent has each cluster been designed to reflect CSP objectives?

The CSP recognised the prevalence of HIV/AIDS as having settled between 6% and 7% in the past five years. However, the HDP did not identify indicators for performance that could be attributed to Irish Aid support. Instead they incorporated the national indicators for monitoring the overall national response. In an effort to close this gap, when Irish Aid developed its monitoring framework¹⁵⁶ for Irish Aid Uganda, results and indicators were identified under each of the strategic objectives of the CSF. In this regard, the process indicators were appropriate but neither their baselines nor their targets were set thus making it difficult to assess the performance of the Irish support within the period of the CSP implementation.

2.7 Have the CSP and programme interventions been designed to include mainstreaming issues (HIV and AIDS, governance, gender and environment)?

In the CSP, one of the strategic objectives is on HIV/AIDS; it states that the CSP is "to contribute to the reduction of HIV and AIDS in Uganda and mitigate its effects'. Hence one of its pillars was on human development which focused on HIV and AIDS and education. Secondly, HIV/AIDS in the CSP was noted as a cross-cutting issue that is essential to sustainable poverty reduction. Thirdly, the CSP stated that Irish Aid was committed to mainstreaming HIV and AIDS by ensuring HIV/AIDS is mainstreamed in sector strategic plans, policies and budget process. Thus, Irish Aid has been very successful in mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in the CSP and its programmes. To illustrate this point further, apart from having supported a TA in MoES for the purpose of mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in the current CSP, the education programme in Karamoja had HIV/AIDS mainstreaming interventions contracted

¹⁵⁶ Irish Aid (2009). Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 2007-09. Lessons-Learning Report. January 2009. Kampala

out to an NGO in order to ensure its implementation. On the other hand, a programme¹⁵⁷ was specifically designed for deepening the mainstreaming of HIV/AIDS in the local government.

Gender was also mainstreamed in HIV/AIDS activities; for instance, the CSF steering committee, with the backing of Irish Aid and UNFPA, ensured that (a) the RFAs were engendered and that (b) the members of the committee and management were sensitised on gender mainstreaming during the retreat held in February 2008. The construction programme in Karamoja had Concern Worldwide ensuring that HIV/AIDS and gender mainstreamed into the programme activities, although these mainstreaming activities were reportedly perceived as an afterthought because (i) no clause was included in the contract of the constructors to work on HIV/AIDS, (ii) the advertisement and contracting of Concern Worldwide was after the construction company had already recruited the laborers and started work.

2.8 How are risks identified within the CSP, and are they most appropriate in terms of greatest risk to the programme?

The CSP did not identify the issue of funding resources for HIV/AIDS during the period of its implementation. In this regard, the NSP¹⁵⁸, as shown in the table below, clearly indicated that 'while a high level of funding has been secured for the first two years of the new NSP, resource commitments in the latter years of the plan (years 3-5) fall far below what is needed in both the medium and high funding scenarios'. This was itself a risk in the implementation of the NSP to which Irish Aid was to contribute.

Table 2: Anticipated HIV-related resources by source by financial year¹⁵⁹

Source of funds	Financial year (amounts in millions of US\$)					Total
	2007/8	2008/9	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	
Government of Uganda	53.3	59.8	61.2	62.3	62.3	299
PEPFAR	236	283 (planned)	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD
Global Fund – Round 3 Phase II	35.5	-	-	-	-	35.5
Global Fund – Round 7 application	-	31.9	52.5	59.9	60.3	204.6
Civil Society Fund (Danida, Irish Aid) (DFID – TBD)	6.8	10.5	11.7	-	-	29.0
Partnership Fund (Danida, Irish Aid) (DFID & ACE – TBD)	1.8	2.5	2.8	-	-	7.1
Support to MoLG for decentralised coordination (Irish Aid)	0.6	0.9	0.5	-	-	2.0
Total	334	388.6	398.1 (est.)	405 (est.)	406 (est.)	1934.7(est.)

Note: TBD means "to be determined".

Another observation from the table and also from the experience of running the CSF is that USAID through PEPFAR (\$140m in 2008)¹⁶⁰ has been and continues to be the major source of funds for the national response to HIV/AIDS. This reliance on one major donor could also be a risk in (a) planning when its committed resources are not known up-front, as in the table above, and (b) more importantly, when it does not, for unforeseen reasons, release the funds.

¹⁵⁷ Ministry of Local Government (2007). Deepening Mainstreaming of HIV/AIDS in Local Governments. Proposal Submitted to Irish Aid. September 2007. Kampala.

¹⁵⁸ Uganda AIDS Commission (2008). National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 2007/8-2011/12. Kampala

¹⁵⁹ GFATM Round 7 approved for two years, additional years pending performance. PEPFAR funds after 2007 pending annual approval of country operational plan and Congressional allocations. GoU funds are requested but not yet approved.

¹⁶⁰ Interview with Nancy Eslick, USAID

CHAPTER III – EFFECTIVENESS

3.1 How effective has the CSP been in terms of achieving its stated objectives?

During the period 2007-2009, Irish Aid achieved its stated objectives in the context of HIV/AIDS. This is based on evidence that in broad terms Irish Aid scaled up funding for service delivery and coordination, provided technical support and actively participated in policy dialogue with government, development partners and civil society at the national and decentralised levels in support of achieving the National HIV and AIDS Strategic Plan targets.

Coordination and Policy Dialogue

UAC, with funding provided by Irish Aid and other development partners through the Partnership Fund, was able to develop the National Strategic Plan for HIV & AIDS 2007/2008 – 2011/2012 and launch it in October 2008. Irish Aid was an active member of the national taskforce that provided oversight in the development of the NSP whose overall goal is to achieve universal access targets for HIV and AIDS prevention, care, treatment and social support by 2012. In support and guidance for the NSP implementation, a guide on monitoring the national response and an implementation handbook were developed; a National Priority Annual Plan (NPAP) was also developed for coordinating the various HIV/AIDS initiatives and ensuring their alignment to the national strategy. UAC was also able to ensure that MoFPED requested sectors, for the first time, to incorporate HIV/AIDS in their BFPs.

UAC also successfully organised the 5th National AIDS Conference (NAC) in which the various stakeholders shared information on their activities. At the national level in 2008, a Joint AIDS Review (JAR) was also carried out while MoLG, with Irish Aid support, started to hold regional AIDS reviews in which neighbouring districts deliberate on their HIV/AIDS activities before the JAR; it is planned that regional reviews will be preceded by district reviews in subsequent years. The JAR was followed by the National AIDS Partnership Forum which brings together all HIV/AIDS stakeholders at national level on an annual basis. Through the Partnership Fund, the various self-coordinating entities of the partnership structure at UAC were able to operate and hold various meetings that supported among others, the NSP, JAR, NAC process; the role of the self-coordinating entity decentralised response was particularly important in the development of the MoLG mainstreaming project funded solely by Irish Aid.

The CSF was established and launched in May 2008. Accordingly, the CSF steering committee was able to develop/approve the necessary policies, procedures and tools for operations, management and grants processing by the CSF; three firms were recruited to provide technical, financial and monitoring and evaluation services to the fund. Thus, for the first time ever, multiple donors contributed resources to a single fund from which grants were awarded to a wide range of civil society partners working to support the government's long-term policies, strategic plans and frameworks addressing HIV/AIDS. Besides, Irish Aid, in partnership with DFID, funded the establishment of the Joint UN AIDS Programme which coordinates the UN agencies' response to HIV/AIDS in the country.

The Joint UN Team on AIDS in Uganda consists of 22 full-time HIV focal points and 39 part-time staff members from 13 agencies/funds/programmes; the team developed a five-year joint programme of support for AIDS covering the period 2007-2012 with prevention¹⁶¹ as the cornerstone, as is the case in the NSP. In the programme, each UN agency has its roles and responsibilities assigned in order to

¹⁶¹ Reduction of HIV incidence by 40% during the period of the NSP with a strategic focus on addressing the social, cultural, and economic causes of vulnerability and better targeting of high-risk groups.


avoid duplication of efforts. UNAIDS is the secretariat for the joint programme and is supported by Irish Aid. In 2008, for instance, some of the activities planned include:

- Providing technical assistance to finalise national HIV/ AIDS comprehensive communications strategy based on outcome of 2007 IEC/BCC assessment
- Recruiting national HIV expert to lead efforts on mobile populations and migrants
- Developing standards and monitoring tools for BCC/IEC interventions on HIV/AIDS
- Supporting implementation of BCC/IEC interventions for SW and youth in 16 CAP districts
- Supporting MoH and UAC to compile data and information on MARPS to inform policy and programming
- Conducting assessment of HIV risks & vulnerabilities of IDPs and returnees, publication & dissemination of the findings
- Conducting a behavioural surveillance survey linked with biomedical markers in Palorinya, Moyo
- Implementing recommendations for truck drivers on the Kampala-Juba route in line with outcomes of hotspot mapping exercise
- Conducting national assessment of HIV situation in prison setting
- Participating and supporting functioning of PMTCT Technical Working Group (TWG) and support supervision at regional/district level
- Supporting finalisation and operationalisation of national HMIS that integrates PMTCT indicators and printing of revised registers

Service Delivery

In 2007, the CSF provided funds to nine national NGOs that are strategic and leaders in provision of priority HIV/AIDS interventions; these included TASO, AIC, UNASO and Straight Talk that Irish Aid had been supporting in the previous CSP. In 2008, the CSF was able to solicit applications for grants from CSOs through four rounds of RFAs, namely HIV prevention round 1 for district-based NGOs; OVC service delivery round 1 for lead agencies; HIV prevention round 2 for lead agencies and CBOs; and paediatric AIDS linkages for district-based NGOs. Consequently, the CSF supported 120 civil society organisations during the year with grants totalling US\$12.8 million. Through these efforts, over 88,000 people were reached with prevention information, more than 40,000 were counselled and tested, 9,000 became new beneficiaries of palliative care and 33,000 orphans and vulnerable children received target community services¹⁶². The map below shows how successful applicants under the Request for Applications (RFA) for provision of OVC's services (RFA OVC Round 1) in 2008 were distributed. It would have been impossible for Irish Aid to reach the 3,686 CSOs in 28 out of 80 districts in the country for implementing OVC activities using its CS direct funding method as was the case before the CSF was established.

¹⁶² Core (TMA) and Deloitte (FMA), Dec 2008: Work plan for July 2008-June 2009 for the grants and financial management services to a multi-donor funded civil society fund, Kampala, Uganda



Source: CSF Technical Management Agency, 2009

Map 2: Zonal Distribution of Approved Sub-grant Recipients for Provision of OVC Services through CSF in 2008

The CSF also concluded administrative compliance reviews as well as technical and cost reviews for 54 organisations that were recommended to the CSF-SC for approval of awards to be made in the first quarter of 2009; two organisations were also similarly recommended for provision of paediatric AIDS Linkages.

Given that the major impact of HIV continues to be felt at community level, an intensified approach at this level would be most appropriate. In this regard, it was expected that the CSF would be able to channel resources to community-based organisations (CBOS), who in the past had been able to utilise about \$3,000 per annum under the MAP project. However, when the RFA was put for Prevention Round 2, it targeted organisations that could absorb 50m/= per annum; this has to date excluded the majority of the CBOs. In any case, some of the national NGOs that used to be funded by Irish Aid before the CSF was established have complained that the Fund does not give flexibility to the grantees in case of an emergency situation arising requiring re-allocation of funds/additional funds because it has to wait for the CSF-SC meeting for approval.

During the first year of the CSF, a lot of concerns were noted about capacity of the CSOs. In this regard, 54.7% of the applicants that responded to all three RFAs failed the administrative compliance review (ACR) test while 85.6% failed both ACR and technical and cost review (TCR) tests; the total failure rate increased to 87.9% when the results of ACR, TCR and pre-award assessment were combined. It was not difficult to recognise that the main cause of these failures was capacity problems which were emerging as a significant gap among the CSOs at all levels.

In terms of implementation of activities, the box below shows the challenges that were found on the ground.

Box 1: Challenges faced by the national and district-based CSOs funded by CSF

Although most CSOs were involved in various strategies for communicating HIV messages that embraced the broad ABC (Abstinence, Be Faithful and Correct and consistent condom use) strategy using approaches such as public awareness meetings, mass media activities like community drama, radio talk shows, life skills education, peer education, print and video materials, most of their effort was focused on awareness raising and sensitisation on basic HIV information with limited provision of the actual skills needed to change risky behaviour. Besides, the messages were not disseminated as part of a broader communication strategy; indeed, the communication objectives for many of the CSOs were either non-existent or not SMART. In addition to this, the majority of the CSOs that promote the ABC model of HIV prevention had problems with condom promotion, supplies management, and distribution.

The CSOs that provided HCT services used mostly community outreaches and static HCT while a few used innovative approaches like home-based (door to door) HCT, on-site testing during training programmes and community camping in hard to reach areas. However, ineffective joint planning and facilitation for districts to conduct outreaches was reported in almost all CSOs while integration of HCT with other prevention, care and support services was limited. Similarly, the quality of counselling during outreaches was generally poor and HCT data collection and referral mechanism was weak, particularly among CSOs providing 'on-site testing'. Indeed, it was found that generally, linkages and partnership with other CSOs in the delivery of comprehensive HIV/AIDS prevention services was almost non-existent.

Many CSOs were not tapping into the support provided by district monitoring and evaluation focal persons to train their staff in data collection and reporting; CSOs' activities did not feed into the districts' monitoring and evaluation of AIDS activities framework; CSOs' operations had not been formally aligned to the district work plans and were therefore not subjected to the host district HIV/AIDS data collection and reporting guidelines. Besides, the relationship between some district-based CSOs and their Lead Agencies (LAs) was not clear, with some in Kampala working through regional lead agencies, making the linkages for resource flow even longer and more expensive. In general, too, a large proportion of the organisations did not have a functional arrangement in place for managing partnerships in order to share information, skills, referral activities, plans, reports, and to avoid duplication of effort within a district. Modalities to evaluate partnership performance were not incorporated in most CSOs yet.

In the majority of the CSOs staffing was found to be very inadequate both in number and technical skills. For instance, it was evident that staffing levels of lead agency offices at their head office did not match with the needs and responsibilities of the teams in the various districts level; consequently, the bulk of the work was being implemented by community resource persons and peer educators on a voluntary basis; these cadre of people in most cases were paid an unreasonable stipend, had inadequate training and lacked both follow-up and regular supervision by the technical staff.

Source: Uganda AIDS Commission (2009). Support Supervision to Civil Society Organizations Report. January 2009

The above findings require that the CSF-SC needs to work harder in giving strategic direction to the management agencies, viz. Technical Management Agency, Finance Management Agency and M&E Agency, in order that they are able to carry out activities which will make the CSF realise its objectives and principles.

3.2 How effective are the results and performance measurement/monitoring systems, including annual review and business planning processes?

In the context of HIV/AIDS, UAC, with support from Irish Aid and other development partners, have been able to (a) put in place a **Performance Measurement and Management Plan (PMMP)**¹⁶³ for the NSP and an accompanying operations manual, (b) hold periodic reviews such as JAR in 2008, and (c) hold national conferences (e.g., NAC) in which the stakeholders present and share their results and programmatic concerns nationally. The CSF (a) has recently contracted an international firm for carrying out continuous monitoring and evaluation of all the CSF activities, (b) is currently in the process of contracting an external team of consultants to review the performance of the CSF since its establishment. An annual audit of the Fund was successfully carried out at the end of the financial year 2007/2008.

Irish Aid has also conducted targeted reviews of its HIV/AIDS activities such as the review of the HDP¹⁶⁴ and the mid-term review of the PHC programme¹⁶⁵. The CSF also provides period reports to the CSF-SC; recent ones include the support supervision report¹⁶⁶ to civil society organisations that have been funded and a report on finances¹⁶⁷. It is also of value to note that provision of funds to respective recipients under HDP, viz. UAC Partnership Fund, CSF, MoLG and AMREF are triggered by accountability of previous disbursements that are closely scrutinised to ensure consistency with the agreed/approved work plan.

3.3 How have risks been managed on an ongoing basis?

Risks have been managed in the context of HIV/AIDS through periodic meetings by the (a) HDP team at Irish Aid, (b) Partnership Committee, and (c) CSF steering committee, where relevant issues are discussed. From time to time, Irish Aid's internal auditor has also been able to visit the projects.

Because of the large number of grantees, the CSF has developed Civil Society Fund Acceptable Risk Guidelines which assist the Fund in assessing capacity and systems of a CSO in areas of governance, financial management, programme planning and implementation, and monitoring & evaluation, in order to ensure value for money through efficient and effective utilisation of resources availed by the Fund.

The concerns mentioned under Q8 on funds have persisted. For instance, funds were not released by GFATM for carrying out activities in 2008 for varying reasons, including delays in submission of audited report and on initiation of the court process regarding the organisations that had been alleged to have misappropriated funds by the time GFATM suspended its grants to Uganda in 2006. Consequently, the activities were not carried out at all.

¹⁶³ Uganda AIDS Commission (2007). The National Performance Measurement and Management Plan for the National Strategic Plan for HIV/AIDS Uganda, 2007/2008 - 2011/2012. Kampala

¹⁶⁴ Irish Aid (2008). Review of the Human Development Programme, Irish Aid Uganda, February 18th – 20th, 2008, Kampala.

¹⁶⁵ Development Cooperation Ireland (2008). Mid-Term Human Resources Development for Increased Access to Primary Health Care Programme in Uganda. Mid-Term Review Report. August 2008. Kampala

¹⁶⁶ Uganda AIDS Commission (2009). Support Supervision to Civil Society Organizations Report. January 2009.

¹⁶⁷ Uganda AIDS Commission (2008). Civil Society Fund FY08 Annual Report (May 01, 2007 – June 30, 2008). Kampala.

Although the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Government of Uganda and Irish Aid/Irish Government is clear on the VAT refund, it has not been easy to negotiate a refund from the Ministry of Education/Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development with regard to the PHC training programme funded through AMREF. Currently, nearly 300 million shillings are held as VAT and this could be used to finance some activities of the programme and pay the contractors¹⁶⁸.

3.4 To what extent has the CSP been compliant with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness?

In the context of HIV/AIDS, the CSP has been compliant with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.

Ownership

The CSP provided support to UAC, which is the body mandated by an Act of Parliament as the national coordinating body for all activities on HIV/AIDS; it also provided funds to MoLG for mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in the decentralised governance structures. These two interventions in the CSP recognised the need for strong leadership at national and decentralised levels for guiding the response to the HIV/AIDS in the country, which is consistent with the PD requirement for government to own assistance provided by ADPs.

Alignment

It was noted that in the design of the CSP, the HIV/AIDS components were found to be embedded in PEAP, NSF/NSP, HSSP-II; the MoLG support was part of the sector investment plan. Secondly, the funding for HIV/AIDS was by design envisaged to go through a variety of modalities, including (a) pooling of funds to support UAC (through the Partnership Fund), CS (through CSF) and UN agencies (through the Joint UN Programme for AIDS) in Uganda; (b) ear marked funds for support to MoLG through the Local Government Strategic Investment Plan (LOGSIP). A clear indication of the CSP being in compliance with the alignment principles is demonstrated by the Partnership Fund that used UAC financial, procurement and monitoring and evaluation procedures and that deepening of mainstreaming in local governance projects in MoLG that used the government systems in the Ministry for all its activities.

Harmonisation

Harmonisation is envisaged to enhance complementarity and synergy among donors so that resources are used more efficiently and effectively with reduced duplications of efforts and wastage of resources. In this regard, the CSP in the context of HIV/AIDS was compliant with the harmonisation principle because development partners through (a) division of labour were able to rationalise the engagement of each partner in Uganda, (b) pooling of funds were able to streamline funding to civil society and UN agencies. Thus, as a result of DOL, Irish Aid led the ADPs in the operationalisation of the Civil Society Fund and represented ADPs in the Joint UNAIDS programme in Uganda and it supported the development of the gender strategy for the Global Fund. In this regard, it was noted that¹⁶⁹ in the UN Division of Labour, '*... most agencies now understand and appreciate their mandate as the DoL has assisted the UN to clarify their roles and responsibilities. This has resulted in institutional review and subsequent strengthening of the capacity of agencies to execute their mandate. For example, UNICEF changed from service delivery on OVC to strengthening the MGLSD capacity to manage, coordinate and plan for OVC. Also, development partners have recognised the role of UNAIDS and are supporting the positions of Prevention and CSO Coordinator*

¹⁶⁸ Oonyu, J C (2008). Human Resources Development for Increased Access to Primary Health Care Programme in Uganda. Mid-term Review Report. Development Cooperation Ireland (Uganda). Kampala.

¹⁶⁹ Irish Aid (2009). Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 2007-09. Lessons-Learning Report. January 2009. Kampala

within the Secretariat. Enhanced collaboration can also be seen between agencies at the technical level and enhanced accountability within the UN'. Within the Joint UN programme for HIV/AIDS, UNFPA supported the mainstreaming of gender within the National Priority Action Plan¹⁷⁰.

In 2007, Irish Aid was also involved in the development of a joint donor basket to support health training institutions under MoES; this is not yet operational, but significant progress has been made and a draft MoU is in place. In 2008, Irish Aid was the Chair of the AIDS Development Partners Group; this year it has rotated to USAID.

Managing for Results

The PD suggests that the country's performance assessment frameworks should be used while relying on the partners' results-oriented reporting and monitoring frameworks. In this regard, the CSP indicated that it would use existing local systems. In the context of HIV/AIDS, the systems put in place by UAC (as discussed under Question 10) were implied. To date, however, the Performance Measurement and Management Plan (PMMP) has not yet been disseminated and operationalised at the sector, district and lower levels. Quote from APRI 07-8: 'The PMMP that was designed by UAC as a monitoring and evaluation system aimed at generating uniform information has a challenge of implementation given the fact that different stakeholders have different donor information needs.'

Mutual Accountability

The CSP recognised the importance of joint monitoring activities with other development partners and government because it enhances mutual accountability. In this regard, the HDP, through support using CSF and PF, held the development partners and the various key stakeholders accountable to their constituencies, CSF Steering and Partnership Committee. Thus, mutual accountability was made at forums that include the Uganda AIDS Commission (that has members appointed by the President and includes a Member of Parliament), self-coordinating entities and ADPs' Group. Thus, there was timely, transparent and comprehensive information on resource flow for AIDS. Besides, by using the JAR, there was adherence to the PD on mutual accountability; currently a CSF review is underway.

3.5 How well has the mainstreaming of Irish Aid's four cross-cutting issues been achieved (HIV and AIDS, governance, gender and environment)?

HIV/AIDS has been mainstreamed¹⁷¹ in the major interventions of the Irish support as described below.

Governance Programme: The IA Programme HDP team in collaboration with the IA Governance team worked on different aspects of the GFATM. Thus, while the governance team focused on the investigation, recovery of funds and possible investigations, the human development team concentrated on the management aspect such as the long-term institutional arrangement that made it possible for the GFATM to restore funding to Uganda.

Mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in Laws of Uganda: One component of the key result areas of the JLOS Strategic Investment Plan which forms the basis upon which Irish Aid supports the sector is law enactment and reform. In line with this mandate, JLOS has been spearheading the process of developing the HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Bill in collaboration with the HDP team. The latter has provided comments on the draft bill from the ADPs and highlights from deliberations at the Mexico International AIDS Conference on criminalisation of AIDS. Similarly, regarding land issue, Irish Aid is supporting the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development to include gender and

¹⁷⁰ NPAP is the annualised NSP. The current NPAP covers a two-year period: 2008/2009-2009/2010

¹⁷¹ Irish Aid (Undated). Examples of HIV Mainstreaming – IA Support in Uganda.

HIV/AIDS policy options in the draft land policy. The main purpose is to ensure that interests of women and men, including those affected by HIV, are taken care of in the land policy.

Deepening the Mainstreaming of HIV/AIDS in Local Government: Irish Aid is providing €1.35 million to MoLG to strengthen its capacity and that of local governments and associated institutions in (a) coordination of HIV/AIDS in the sector, (b) ensuring that HIV/AIDS is integrated into the local government budgeting frameworks through a participatory planning process. Currently, 60 districts have been reached by the programme.

Mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in Education Sector: Irish Aid has provided technical support for HIV/AIDS mainstreaming in the education sector 2003-2008; the TA in collaboration with the departmental focal points within the Ministry have (a) developed a HIV/AIDS mainstreaming strategy for the sector, (b) developed materials for mainstreaming HIV/AIDS at primary and post-primary levels. In the construction component of the Post-Primary Education and Training Programme supported by Irish Aid in Karamoja, Irish Aid supported MoES to mainstream HIV/AIDS, gender and environment in the construction work. This has been carried out through a strategic partnership with Concern Worldwide which has to ensure the reduction of the risk to HIV infection and gender-related inequalities among the construction people and the school population.

Workplace: Irish Aid has an HIV/AIDS workplace policy which covers the protection of employees from HIV infection and provision of support and services, including access to treatment to employees and their immediate families infected with HIV. Irish Aid provides antiretroviral treatment and condoms for the staff. The capacity of staff and their families have also been built and necessary skills imparted through workshops on HIV/AIDS conducted from time to time. Irish Aid staff also participate in outreach programmes in collaboration with NGOs and government partners by providing financial and material support to the communities.

3.6 What evidence of impact (positive or negative) is available from the IA programme and how attributable are these development changes to IA directly?

In the context of HIV/AIDS, it was found that there are many results that can be attributed directly/singly to the IA support or indirectly through joint support between IA and other development partners. However, because the national system for capturing data on key outcome indicators in the PMMP has not yet been operationalised, it is not possible to state the levels of the impact resulting from activities between 2007 and 2008.

It is, however, appropriate to recognise that HIV/AIDS has been mainstreamed in national and decentralised level policies and plans; in the education sector, the TA provided by Irish Aid was instrumental in developing the Presidential Initiative on AIDS Strategy for Communication to the Youth PIASCY materials that has formed the bedrock of mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in primary and post-primary schools. Irish Aid has also been the only development partner that has supported MoLG, which has resulted in more effective response to HIV/AIDS at the local level. Thus, district HIV/AIDS Committees have been able to establish district level coordination structures in 60 district local governments that have developed district HIV/AIDS strategic plans; it is envisaged that the strategic plans will be integrated into the district and sub-county plans and budgets with a view to strengthening coordination, and attracting more attention and resources for HIV/AIDS. The national HIV/AIDS Joint Annual Review 2008 was enriched with inputs from the regional meetings organised by the local governments for sharing experiences and challenges.

While in the previous CSP Irish Aid only supported 14 NGOs¹⁷², during this CSP nine national strategic NGOs and many lead agencies, district-based CSOs as well as CBOs have been able to provide HIV/AIDS-related services to the population using resources provided by Irish Aid and other development partners through the CSF. Thus, the first year of implementation of the National HIV and AIDS Strategic Plan (NSP) 2007/2008 revealed some progress in a number of areas such as an increase in the number of educational and behavioural programmes for in and out of school youth, increase in condom promotion in the public and private sector (with 131 million condoms procured and distributed), the number of people with advanced HIV infection receiving antiretroviral treatment (ART) increasing from 91,500 in 2006/2007 to 141,416 by June 2008, and the number of facilities providing ART increasing from 220 to 328 by June 2008. Uptake of antiretroviral (ARV) prophylaxis by HIV-infected women increased to approximately 80%, while uptake among HIV exposed infants was 42%.

Through pooling of resources for HIV/AIDS, it has been possible for the donors to commit themselves to common planning, funding, disbursement, monitoring, evaluating and reporting procedures that are transparent because they are based on agreed principles¹⁷³ and procedures. Funds for HIV/AIDS have become predictable, at least in the short and medium term. Besides, communication and sharing of information among the ADPs have considerably improved as ADPs receive joint reports and accountability, including joint audit reports. In this regard, the JAR noted that there have been improved partnerships, collaboration and synergy for joint mobilisation and accountability brought about by the CSF, PF and the Joint UN Programme, among others, to support implementation of integrated plans and activities of the CSF, UAC and UN. It has also been recognised that UAC has re-positioned itself for effective coordinating of the implementation of the 'Three Ones' principle in the country as a result of support from Irish Aid and other development partners.

Regarding the UN Joint HIV/AIDS Programme, a mid-term review¹⁷⁴ noted that as a result of the UN Division of Labour and UNAIDS providing the Secretariat for the Joint UN HIV/AIDS Programme, 'Most agencies understand and appreciate their mandate within the UN Division of Labour (DoL). The DoL has assisted the UN to clarify their roles and responsibilities. This has resulted in institutional review and subsequent strengthening of the capacity of agencies to execute their mandate. For example, UNICEF changed from service delivery on OVC to strengthening the MGLSD capacity to manage, coordinate and plan for OVC. IOM, after recognizing the need for meaningful engagement on HIV, have now in place a full-time staff dedicated to HIV. UNFPA refined their engagement in HIV prevention and have recruited for HIV prevention in the agency. FAO, in appreciation of their role in supporting response on livelihood and social protection, have increased their capacity to enable them to participate fully in the joint team and joint programme. UNIFEM, in the same light, has increased its capacity. Finally, development partners have recognised the role of UNAIDS and are supporting the positions of Prevention and CSO Coordinator within the Secretariat, enhanced collaboration between agencies at the technical level and enhanced accountability within the UN.'

¹⁷² Irish Aid (2008). Draft Report on Evaluation of Irish Support to CSO in Uganda 2002-2007. Kampala

¹⁷³ Uganda AIDS Commission (2008). Increasing Civil Society Participation in the National Response to HIV/AIDS, OVC, TB and Malaria in Uganda: Governance, Management and Operations Manual for Civil Society Fund. Kampala.

¹⁷⁴ UNAIDS (2008), The Joint UN Programme and Joint UN Team on AIDS in Uganda: Mid-Year Review Report. July 2008. Kampala

CHAPTER IV – EFFICIENCY

4.1 Has efficiency been maximised in the choice of the various financial instruments/modalities of support?

Before the Joint UN HIV/AIDS programmes, the different UN agencies were engaged in different HIV/AIDS activities with limited coordination. This resulted in duplication and inefficient use of resources. However, with the establishment of the programme, engagement of the individual agencies has been rationalised and this has reduced duplication of activities tremendously. Equally the CSF will have helped streamline support to CS, reducing duplication and transaction costs for Government.

4.2 Has the programme been efficiently managed given existing staffing and resources?

The HDP recognised the commonalities of the challenges affecting the social sectors that the programme was addressing; these included capacity building, improving quality of services and mainstreaming cross-cutting issues. So, the programme adopted a teamwork approach in which the team met together regularly to plan, share information and identify opportunities for linkages and shared initiatives in addition to the sector advisers largely working individually within their respective sectors. This led to better synergies and linkages between the programme sub-components¹⁷⁵.

Within the HIV/AIDS sub-component, the senior adviser (HIV/AIDS) from time to time invited the (i) social development adviser to attend the PC and/or CSF Steering Committee meeting, (ii) the programme assistant to attend CSF Steering Committee meetings at UAC and the self-coordinating entities (decentralised response) meetings at the MoLG. This helped to improve the knowledge of these key people about the activities on HIV/AIDS funded by Irish Aid.

The HDP has been privileged to have a senior HIV/AIDS adviser who is a Ugandan national that joined Irish Aid in 2003 and hence has a lot of technical and local experience, appreciation and institutional memory from a broad perspective. Herein lies the value of long-term engagement of local staff that have respect among the development partners, including donors, government officials and the civil society. Against this background, however, the workload of the senior HIV/AIDS adviser increased considerably because (a) the programme assistant that used to take some of the work and hence give the adviser relatively more time to focus on strategic issues left Irish Aid employment, (b) when Irish Aid was requested by the respective donor groups to chair both the Education Funding Agencies Group and the Aids Development Partners in 2008, it was found that chairing these groups represents a significant additional workload, and (c) the HQ also brought more work to the HIV/AIDS adviser who in 2008 was not only the chair for the ADP group but also the representative of the donors on the CSF Steering Committee. In this regard the staff¹⁷⁶ had earlier observed that the CSP was written in the expectation that it could be delivered with existing staff members hence they expressed concern about the HQ giving additional work load through 'parachute projects'.

4.3 Is there sufficient coherence, interlinking, complementarity and synergy across the country programme and between its component parts (including between the political and development functions of the Embassy) as well as humanitarian assistance?

¹⁷⁵ Review of the Human Development Programme, Irish Aid Uganda. February 18-20, 2008

¹⁷⁶ Irish Aid (2007). Launch of CSP Workshop Report. Humura Resort, Kampala, March 20-21, 2007. Pg 10.

In the context of HIV/AIDS there is complementarity. Entry points for mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in the different programmes of Irish Aid have been identified. This has been ably illustrated in (a) the activities under each strategic objective and (b) the M&E Framework for Irish Aid Uganda 2007-2009 in which HIV/AIDS results and indicators are once again shown under each strategic objective of the CSP.

4.4 Has policy engagement with Government and other development partners been sufficiently strategic and at the appropriate levels?

In 2008, Irish Aid was the chair of the AIDS Development Partners (ADPs); this position was instrumental in ensuring a more strategic engagement of ADPs in the HIV and AIDS national response. In particular, key achievements during the period included the implementation of the division of labour that saw various donors take on lead agency roles in line with their areas of comparative advantage; the finalisation and operationalisation of the HIV/AIDS Civil Society Fund (CSF); the formulation of the NSP which is refocusing on prevention to respond to changes in the epidemic; and a strengthened Uganda AIDS Commission, resulting in an effective Joint Annual AIDS Review¹⁷⁷. Irish Aid was also a member of the Country Coordination Mechanism (CCM) for Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; in the country, the CCM is an organ constituted jointly by the Partnership Committee and the Health Policy Advisory Committee (HPAC) in the Ministry of Health. Through the CCM, Uganda received approval from the Global Fund for its (i) Round 7 proposal for HIV and AIDS (\$84m), (ii) malaria (\$51m), and (iii) the HIV and AIDS Round 3, phase 2, \$35m for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC) and procurement of antiretrovirals (ARVs).

On the CSF Steering Committee, Irish Aid was also a representative of the donors that contributed the funds. Thus, it played an active role in the development of the fund, viz. formulation of policies and procedures for awarding grants, procurement of goods and services as well as operations and management of the Fund. Accordingly, as stated in Question 9, the CSF was able to put out three RFAs on prevention for national NGOs, OVCs and prevention for CBOs in 2008 as a move by ADPs in support of the NSP implementation.

In the MoES, where Irish Aid was also the chair of the Education Funding Agencies Group (EFAG), it was instrumental in increasing policy dialogue and efficiency in education and HIV/AIDS. Thus, the Education Sector Strategic Plan is being revised to incorporate new policy orientations and developments.

Irish Aid has also been the lead donor in partnership with DFID in support and building of the Joint UN HIV/AIDS Programme in Uganda 2007-2012. As a result of this, there has been better harmonisation of UN approaches and interventions in response to HIV/AIDS.

Despite the successes made by the Joint UN Programme and Joint UN Team on AIDS in Uganda arising from implementation of the DoL, many in the government, the civil society and indeed even some members of the Joint Team in the UN (e.g. new heads of agencies) are still not fully oriented in the UN DoL. Thus, while many of them are usually effective in planning the programme jointly, collaboration and joint efforts have been minimal or limited during implementation of the programme.

¹⁷⁷ Irish Aid (2008). 2008 Annual Report. Embassy of Ireland – Uganda.

CHAPTER V – SUSTAINABILITY

5.1 How sustainable, in terms of continuing benefit, are the CSP programme interventions in Uganda?

While policy, coordination and understanding about HIV/AIDS has grown at national and local levels, the challenge of HIV/AIDS remains considerable. Government's own estimates state that HIV prevalence has risen in the past 2 years, and new groups are at increasing risk (particularly sex workers, urban populations, IDPs and truckers).

The approach of having HIV/AIDS integrated into the sector and district plans so that an appropriate budget can be allocated to it was an attempt to have interventions funded by Irish Aid sustained. This was in addition to the capacity built through training. At the national level, the HIV/AIDS mainstreaming policy and guidelines developed by the Uganda AIDS Commission¹⁷⁸, with support from UNDP, is expected to significantly contribute towards enabling government sectors to have a budget line for HIV. So far it seems that only MoES has a budget line but elsewhere not yet¹⁷⁹.

In the context of mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in the sectors, it was noted by one MoES official that 'MoES is committed to the SWAPs but internally we have not appreciated the risk posed by HIV/AIDS and hence HIV/AIDS matters were not treated with the attention they deserve in terms of planning and resource allocation. The country to date, and in particular MoES, has reached where it is today because there has been considerable investment in the sector regarding HIV/AIDS from development partners; this is not because of money budgeted by GoU on mainstreaming. Yet, (A) perception of HIV/AIDS is that it is taken as added work/responsibility for individuals at all levels (trained teachers ask if they will be remunerated or given additional allowances!). It needs commitment on the parts of individuals. (B) Resources required through the budgets do not come out clearly; this requires political and technical commitment. (C) Capacity at different levels is weak, requiring trained people and leaders at Headquarters and MoES-affiliated autonomous institutions, districts, education institutions and schools.'

5.2 What are the particular challenges, at central and local government levels, and in civil society, in terms of ensuring sustainability on investments made, and how are these being managed?

At the district level, the resources that they used to collect through local poll taxes were abandoned yet the contribution by government to compensate for this loss is grossly inadequate. This seriously affects the ability of the districts to provide resources for HIV/AIDS through their own budgets outside resources from the central government.

Even at the central government level, despite instructions from the MoFPED that sectors should integrate HIV/AIDS in their BFP, it was noted that there are usually too many competing needs making it difficult for the sector to allocate resources for HIV/AIDS.

Nationally, the UAC Director General indicated that in general estimated lifetime cost of treatment for a HIV/AIDS patient is \$14,000. If only 1,000 persons living with HIV and AIDS PHAs are on drugs, Uganda has to have \$14 million. This is a tall order when chronic poverty is at 25% of the population.

¹⁷⁸ Uganda AIDS Commission (2008). National Policy on Mainstreaming HIV and AIDS in Uganda. Kampala.

¹⁷⁹ Annual Policy Implementation Review 2007-08, OPM, Ch 5.7 p.200

CS organisations in Uganda depend almost 100% on donor funds. The culture of philanthropists is still uncultivated in the country. Hence, without these external resources, the CSOs such as TASO may not be able to function as well as expected.

Because the MoES and MoH had not been involved in the programme implementation at institutional level, the officials interviewed during the mid-term review¹⁸⁰ stated that they were unhappy with their level of involvement in the project and as such they were unable to say for sure how they would mainstream these activities into the Ministry plans and budgets as envisaged in the exit strategy of the PHCT programme. Although this concern might have been of value at the time of MTR, to date, this may not be the case because once the programme ends there will be no additional costs that need to be taken on by MoH or MoES. For instance, student fees have already been paid up-front while costs involved for the institutions will be recurring maintenance costs and staff costs, which have been covered by the MoES throughout the duration of the programme.

Uganda is due to hold national (presidential, parliamentary) and local (local councillors) elections in 2010. In this regard, during the interview with MoLG officials it was noted that elections - which are an important component of democratic governance - usually bring on board new politicians and leaders (who constitute about 70% of the positions) who may not be HIV/AIDS competent; this requires continuous sensitisation and capacity building at different levels. The creation of new administrative units, which is the prerogative of the Parliament as provided for in the Constitution, also has similar implications and hence impact on plans and budgets for HIV/AIDS.

¹⁸⁰ Oonyu, J C (2008). Human Resources Development for Increased Access to Primary Health Care Programme in Uganda. Mid-term Review Report. Development Cooperation Ireland (Uganda). Kampala.

CHAPTER VI – LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Lessons Learnt

- When designing a pro-poor programme it is important to involve the local institutions in government, development partners and civil society, including the local community. This ensures ownership, participation, contribution and sustainability while at the same time minimising areas of conflict or discontent.
- Political commitment and understanding is absolutely essential in order for sectors and districts to include HIV/AIDS in their investment plans and budgets; this is partly the reason why budgets haven't been earmarked.
- The establishment of functional basket funding is time consuming but when up and running it has numerous advantages that are consistent with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.
- A critical analysis of service gaps in the national response to HIV/AIDS can guide where limited funds from various sources can be channelled for effective and efficient use.
- Government can sometimes be constrained and fail to meet its funding obligations; this requires that development partners should always have contingency plans to overcome this risk as was demonstrated in the case of VAT refunds.
- Monitoring of results in the context of Irish Aid contribution when resources have been pooled in compliance with the Paris Declaration is difficult.
- The challenge of HIV/AIDS will remain formidable and a developing country like Uganda cannot meet it single-handedly.

Recommendations

- Irish Aid should continue to support HIV/AIDS interventions by civil society and public sector (Uganda AIDS Commission and MoLG) but should endeavour to build government commitment to fund and lead the response.
- The CSF should aim to be strategic in filling gaps in service delivery in context of thematic and geographic areas covered rather than being broad; this requires mapping of the national coverage by resources and interventions before RFAs are developed to address the gaps noted.
- Irish Aid Headquarters and Kampala Office need to agree the extent to which attribution of results to Irish Aid can be monitored in a situation of joint funding where results are attributable to all that contributed to funds and not only Irish Aid.

Irish Aid

Department of Foreign Affairs
Irish Aid Volunteering and Information Centre
27-31 Upper O'Connell St
Dublin 1

Irish Aid

Department of Foreign Affairs
Riverstone House, 23 - 27 Henry Street
Limerick

t +353 (1) 408 2000 **e** irishaid@dfa.ie **www.irisaid.gov.ie**