REPORT

A Review of Evaluative Work of German Development Cooperation in Afghanistan

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A statement from the BMZ regarding this evaluation is available under:
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Background and Objectives of the Review

The Federal Republic of Germany is the third largest bilateral donor of development aid in Afghanistan following the USA and Japan. Up through 2014 federal funds for German development cooperation (GDC) have amounted to over 2 billion euros, of which 1.575 billion euros have been allocated through the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Afghanistan is the main receiving country of bilateral funds allocated through the BMZ. The unique position of this partner country demands continual observation of the effectiveness of the allocations provided, which implicitly suggests reviewing whether and how effectiveness has actually been observed. The Advisory Board of the German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval) has requested the Institute to provide a review of the types, scope, quality, and usefulness of all evaluations of GDC conducted under the aegis of the BMZ. Using this information, the review should also present recommendations for designing an evaluation program which can support further shaping of the BMZ-country-portfolio in Afghanistan based on robust evidence. Therefore, this study is not an evaluation of GDC interventions in Afghanistan on its own, but is rather characterized as a review of the evaluations which have already been conducted on projects and programs funded by BMZ.

2. Portfolio of GDC in Afghanistan

Parallel to the deployment of the ISAF-Mission, the Federal Republic of Germany strengthened its engagement in development cooperation in Afghanistan. With its supporting funds amounting to 80 million euros, Germany was already the largest European donor country in 2002. Up through 2010, funding commitments for development cooperation in Afghanistan have continually increased to an amount of 430 million euros annually (with BMZ proportionally directing funds up to 250 million euros and the Federal Foreign Office (AA) up to 180 million euros). Further German ministries (BMVg, BMI, BMEL) and German federal states are also actively involved in providing funds toward rebuilding Afghanistan, although to a much lesser degree. Under the condition that the Afghan government continues to implement its plans for reform, this level of development financing should remain unchanged up through 2016. Further engagement up to at least 2024 has already been held in prospect.

The priorities of GDC in Afghanistan have shifted over time: although one-fourth of the BMZ portfolio originally focused on emergency aid, this focus has moved toward more long-term development objectives and durations of projects. BMZ relies mainly on the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) and the German Development Bank (KfW), as well as a number of non-governmental organisations (NGO) for project implementation.

Since 2002 KfW has financed a total 56 projects and programs in Afghanistan on behalf of BMZ and the AA with a sum of more than one billion euros. The funds received from BMZ amounted to 80 % of the full sum and financed 38 of the 56 projects and programs. The volume of the entire project portfolio of KfW in Afghanistan jumped from around 106 million euros in 2009 to nearly 247 million euros in 2010. However, the volume sank again to just 152 million euros in 2012. The largest percentage of funding between 2007 and 2012 was granted to the area of *governance*, followed by *sustainable economic development, education*, and *water and sanitation*. The assistance provided by KfW in the area of *governance* is focused on support to public administration in the implementation of development projects in rural areas.

GIZ has implemented a total of 83 projects and programs since 2002, 60 of which are still running. As in the case of KfW, a large proportion of the GIZ-funds were received from BMZ. The total sum of funds received by GIZ between 2002 and 2013 is at about 400 million euros, funding 57 % of GIZ-projects. The remaining amount of GIZ-funds was received mainly from the AA. GIZ implemented projects and programs in the following sectors and areas of intervention: *energy, sustainable economic development, water and sanitation, education, emergency and transitional aid, health, good governance*, and *civil peace service*.

3. Questions and focus of the review

This review will address questions regarding (a) the type and scope of the evaluations available, (b) the quality of the evaluations according to OECD/DAC-standards, (c) the usage of the evaluation results, as well as (d) the future direction of an evaluation program.

It is important to mention, that in this review these questions can only be answered in terms of the evaluations related to the BMZ portfolio in Afghanistan. These presently account for 53 % of the entire civilian engagement of Germany in Afghanistan. Currently DEval is not yet mandated to conduct evaluations with other federal ministries (AA, BMVg, BMI, BMEL), which are also involved in the process of rebuilding Afghanistan. However, information provided by the implementing agencies on the AA portfolio could still be considered, which helped gain further insights on the coordination of German actors in their development work and evaluation activities.

4. Method of the review

Document analyses, interviews with staff from BMZ, GIZ and KfW, as well as interviews with external research experts were conducted for this review. Methodologically the review was completed in three steps:

According to guidelines for bilateral cooperation, the implementing agencies of the BMZ – GIZ and KfW – are required to conduct evaluations of their projects and programs on a regular basis. Therefore, in a first step of this review, requests were made directly to GIZ and KfW to provide all evaluations at the project level. Of the 127 documents provided, 38 reports were classified as an evaluation or as evaluative work. From these a sample of 11 reports was drawn to be reviewed for their quality based on a specific framework of analysis. This analytical framework considered the purpose and relevance of these evaluations, as well as the evaluation questions and focus, the applied methods, and the quality and robustness of the evaluation results. The monitoring system of GDC was also critically addressed. The existing comprehensive tracking system of all projects in Afghanistan funded with German funds is a category in itself.

In a second step, evaluative works of particular strategic significance were collected and analyzed more closely. Up to now, German involvement in Afghanistan has not been subject to any extensive and independent evaluation, which has considered all projects under the lead of BMZ and its project implementing agencies. The closest to this is an impact assessment in Northern Afghanistan, conducted every two years since 2007 by a special research team at the Freie Universität Berlin with the support of BMZ, and a strategic portfolio review, commissioned by BMZ in 2012 to a research group under the same head as for the impact analysis (Zürcher et al. 2013). These pieces of evaluative work were analyzed to show whether conclusions can be drawn in terms of the effectiveness of the BMZ portfolio, as well as whether strategic decision-making processes could be supported with robust evidence.

In a third analytical step, the recommendations drawn from the evaluation reports were reviewed. Twenty-five expert informant interviews were conducted to verify and determine whether and how these recommendations were used within BMZ and the implementing agencies for their ongoing program planning and strategic decision-making.

5. Main conclusions and recommendations

The DEval-review indicates that the available evaluation reports at the project level are of relatively good quality and that the results are used by the actors of GDC. However, these evaluations concentrate on capturing and assessing outputs and hardly consider any effects of the interventions at outcome- and impact levels. The number of studies focusing on socio-economic effects is limited, with the exception of the two evaluative works commissioned by BMZ as mentioned above. The impact assessment from Zürcher et al. (2007a, 2010) is the most comprehensive

analysis of the effects of development cooperation among the population in areas where GDC is largely active. This study observes and records the development of the economic and social situation, as well as the perceptions of the population with regard to foreign armed forces, development aid, security, and state legitimacy. With this, the research team has proven that conducting methodologically sophisticated impact analyses of development aid including extensive household surveys is also possible in Afghanistan. Together with the subsequent strategic portfolio review it is quite possible that these analyses, beyond the sole areas of interest of BMZ, can provide examples for the generation of strategic evidence not only in Afghanistan, but also in other fragile states. Up to now, there have not been any further strategic evaluations (sector, instrument, or portfolio evaluations), nor centralized GDC-program evaluations focused on socio-economic effects for assessing German involvement in Afghanistan. Thus, Germany lags behind the evaluation efforts of most other bi- and multi-lateral donors. Most of these have already commissioned external and internal evaluators to assess the effectiveness of their country programs.

Therefore, the informational value of the available project evaluations remains limited in terms of the strategic planning, decision-making, and management of the portfolio. Without the impact assessment and the additional portfolio review there would hardly be any analyses, which could provide decision-makers with points of reference for strategic decisions. Thus, for example, little can be said about whether the selection of the five BMZ-sector priorities and the projects within these sectors is effective, whether in certain circumstances they will be sustainable in the future, whether setting up trust funds as a financial instrument is successful, or whether the selected gender strategy is effective. Conclusions can hardly be made to what extent the overarching objectives of the GDC in Afghanistan have been achieved.

The reasons for the limited scope and reduced ambitions of most of the evaluations lie paradoxically within the context of the high attention drawn by the German public to the involvement of Germany in Afghanistan. In addition to the security situation within the country, the five German federal ministries active in Afghanistan follow different objectives, approaches, and operational procedures. According to actors in the field, the high attention to German involvement in Afghanistan set them under pressure to continually show progress and report quick successes. In order to meet constant informational demands of the German media, the parliament, and the government, as well as due to the undeniable difficulty in generating solid data on economic and social effects in fragile circumstances, the monitoring and evaluation system (M&E) was focused even more on the measurement of completed tasks (outputs) than is otherwise usual in the field of international development cooperation. Thus, one of the functions of evaluation is still more emphasized, than in the work in other partner countries: evaluation results serve more on proving accountability with regard to the contributions made and less on drawing insights which encourage critical learning and support portfolio management.

An example of this can be shown by the work of the M&E-Unit in Kabul. With its so-called tracking system this unit analyzes all civilian activities of German federal ministries in Afghanistan at the output-level. A collection and assessment of data at the sector- or country-level or at a higher level of effectiveness does not occur. Indeed, up to now there has been a lack of clearly set standards to ensure the consistent formulation of objectives and indicators at the country- and sector-levels, even though there are three BMZ-sector priority strategy papers available for reference. However, the new country strategy of BMZ addresses these weaknesses.

BMZ has attempted twice to obtain agreement from all active federal ministries to an evaluation of the whole of German civilian engagement in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, these attempts have not been successful.

Recommendations:

In order to show how evaluations can provide a better informational basis for supporting decision-makers in their strategic management of the portfolio, as well as staff of GDC in the implementation of their projects and programs, the following recommendations of action have been drawn from this review:

- Overcome the fragmentation of the current M&E system by incorporating an integrative evaluation approach.
- Adjust the M&E system beyond the performance-(output-) level toward a stronger focus on acquiring data on effects (outcomes and impacts) of project interventions and sector strategies.
- Draw objectives and indicators at the program and project-levels to include those at the country- to the sector-levels. This will now be substantially easier given that objectives and indicators are addressed in the new BMZ country strategy.
- Establish a more systematic collection of baseline data at the project- and sector level as a basis for robust impact analyses.
- Increase standardized data collection in order to enable the comparison between different levels/units.
- Establish centralized quality control to ensure that the decentralized implemented evaluations are more aligned with an overarching strategy of the GDC in terms of focus and data collection.
- Expand the mandate of the M&E unit in Kabul in order to organizationally support an integrated approach to evaluation. This should include overseeing the implementation of M&E at the project level and collecting additional monitoring data at the sector and country level.
- Expand the tasks and scope of the tracking system to assist the M&E unit in Kabul in collecting the appropriate data mentioned.
- Strengthen the focus on conflict sensitive and peace building measures (which is already considered a strength of the German approach) by systematically including an assessment of these measures as a test criterion.
- Institutionalize the sharing of information on evaluation results among the staff of the country program in Germany and Afghanistan, as well as with Afghan partners.
- Altogether, develop an evaluation culture, which not only points to successes, but also to failures in order to encourage institutional learning and enable corresponding adjustments in communication strategies.

For the completion of the internal M&E system it is also recommended to conduct external and independent evaluations.

Given the major significance of the partner country in GDC, the level of accountability required of implemented projects and programs, the expected gains in knowledge about taking action in fragile states, and the desire to engage in discussions with other international donors based on robust evidence, it remains worth striving for an evaluation of all ODA-interventions of Germany in Afghanistan. However, conducting this kind of country evaluation as an impact evaluation is currently not possible unconditionally. Due to the gaps in the measurement of impact at the project level, this kind of evaluation will be required to focus on assessing objective-oriented systems and intervention logics, on comparative analyses of the effectiveness of various instruments and approaches, on the inter-sectoral sequencing of various interventions, and on exemplary data collection in the field on the effects of particularly relevant and critical interventions. Nevertheless, even these analyses can provide valuable information in terms of improving the cooperation between German federal ministries and with Afghan partners, particularly in relation to their objectives, strategies, and operational approaches.

Should the decision to conduct this sort of comprehensive strategic evaluation of the entire GDC in Afghanistan continue to not be feasible politically, the German government should give solid reasons for this. These reasons will have to go beyond the known methodological limitations or specifically hindering contexts of the country, given the positive experience in conducting the strategic evaluative work commissioned by BMZ. In DEval's judgment, a country evaluation solely focused on the BMZ portfolio is also not an alternative to an overall country portfolio evaluation across the ministries. It cannot be expected that a country evaluation of the BMZ portfolio in Afghanistan will provide findings at the level of the entire program for at least a few years – perhaps not until about halfway through the implementation of the BMZ country strategy 2014-17. Only then can one expect to draw insights which go substantially beyond the impact assessment and the strategic portfolio review already commissioned by BMZ. Alternatively, conducting sector evaluations within the framework of the BMZ portfolio could and should be considered. The achievement of objectives in one of the five sector priorities could first be assessed and then validated through particularly

selected surveys or interviews in the field. The assessment could then be spread to other sectors or to other areas beyond BMZ responsibility. The results of these evaluations would gradually establish better comparability between the sectors and thereby provide valuable information for steering the entire portfolio of development cooperation.

Should meeting the demands for conducting an overarching impact analysis in Afghanistan be further limited, it could still be possible to conduct some meta-analyses despite the generally weak measurement of effects at the project level. These could focus on specific research questions (regarding certain experiences within a sector, observations of approaches or instruments, etc.) in order to increase the value of project evaluations and reports already conducted. The objective of the meta-analyses would be to compile existing knowledge on a certain topic, in order to determine overarching valid findings and issues beyond the project level.

Two themes stand out as appropriate for meta-analyses, particularly for impact-oriented evaluations. The first could address the development of political and administrative or technical capacities (capacity development; CD) since these kinds of interventions represent 40 % of the BMZ portfolio in Afghanistan. The international exchange on the available evaluations of other donors and their experiences has attested to very little sustainable effects of these kinds of programs. The BMZ portfolio review has also pointed to low interest and a small demand for CD from Afghan political elites. A second theme, gender equity, has been a continual focus of development cooperation programs and receives much attention politically. The analyzed sources have revealed that there is still little understanding about the effectiveness of projects focusing on gender or of overarching gender mainstreaming. Thus, this issue would also be appropriate for a thematic evaluation.

1.

INTRODUCTION

The entire volume of German development assistance in Afghanistan has been considerable, with over two billion euros spent since 2002. As the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and its allies prepare for an end of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) mandate and the return of the country's full national sovereignty in 2014, discussions about a future strategy for German development assistance in Afghanistan are well underway. Germany's commitment to remain active in development cooperation in Afghanistan through 2024 has raised interest about how Germany's development engagement over the past 10 years has been evaluated. This review has been undertaken at the request of members of the DEval Advisory Board. It particularly addresses the question whether efforts by the German Government in Afghanistan have been sufficiently evaluated enough to underpin the strategy for German development cooperation (GDC) in Afghanistan based on evidence and lessons learned.[1]

This review examines what kinds of evaluative works have been conducted on GDC efforts in Afghanistan under the aegis of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the perceived quality of these works, and how results have been used for planning and decision-making. This report does not review the evaluations of Germany's development assistance in Afghanistan over all, but is confined to the BMZ portfolio implemented by governmental agencies. The BMZ portfolio currently accounts for roughly 53 % of the total volume of GDC. Indeed, the Federal Foreign Office (AA), the Federal Ministry of Defense (BMVg), the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI), and the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMEL) are also working in Afghanistan.[2] The reason why this review does not consider German development assistance as a whole, lies in the fact that the mandate of DEval is currently limited to the evaluation of projects and programs of BMZ and not of other German ministries. Therefore, interviews have not been carried out with representatives of these other German ministries in the context of the study. However, for reasons of comparison, as well as for discussing the issue of coordination among German actors in Afghanistan, information provided by the implementing agencies (GIZ and KfW) on the AA portfolio in Afghanistan has been used for this report. In doing so, it needs to be explicitly mentioned that there has been no direct communication with AA staff on any aspect of this report, nor have any of the findings been verified by the AA.

Keeping this limitation in mind, this report addresses questions regarding (a) the type and scope of the evaluations, (b) the quality of the evaluations in terms of OECD/DAC-Standards, (c) the usage of the evaluation results, and (d) the future direction of an evaluation program. Seven questions have been formulated more specifically for the analytical framework of this review.[3] Along with reviewing past evaluation practices, a second purpose of this review is to identify specific information gaps and to provide recommendations for future evaluations.

The report presents its findings in three parts. The first part provides an overview of the GDC portfolio in Afghanistan since 2002 in order to place the assessment in the right context (Chapter 2). The second part presents an overview of the evaluative work that has been conducted, and assesses its quality and to some extent its utilization (Chapter 3). The final part draws conclusions regarding the results of the evaluative work and offers recommendations for possible future evaluation programs (Chapter 4).

[1] *In this report the generic term German development cooperation (GDC) refers to development assistance that has been funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) only. The term "German development assistance" refers to development efforts supported by other or all five German ministries active in Afghanistan.*
[2] *In German: Auswärtiges Amt (AA), Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg), Bundesministerium des Innern (BMI), Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft (BMEL).*
[3] *Outlined in Annex A.*

2.

GDC'S PORTFOLIO IN AFGHANISTAN

Germany has a long history of friendly relations with Afghanistan, reaching much further back than recent German development assistance efforts following the fall of the Taliban Government in 2002. Germany has repeatedly taken a leading role in supporting Afghanistan's development efforts, and is now the third largest bilateral contributor after the USA and Japan.[4]

Germany's engagement in Afghanistan has thus been extensive. Among all countries supported by GDC worldwide, Afghanistan receives the largest amount of development cooperation commitments. Up to 2012 Germany committed more than 2 billion euros in Afghanistan for development cooperation (including the BMZ contribution to the overall funding at about 1.58 billion euros) and has since committed to continue providing further funds.[5] A significant increase in development funding to Afghanistan was first announced at the London Conference in 2010, with Germany raising its contribution to 430 million euros annually (250 million euros channeled through BMZ and 180 million euros channeled through the Federal Foreign Office.) At the Tokyo Conference in 2012 Germany committed to maintaining this level of development funding through 2016 (based on the condition that reforms will be achieved by the Afghan Government as outlined in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework.)[6] However, political interest has already indicated that Germany would like to stay engaged throughout the *transformation decade* until 2024.[7] Afghanistan will also remain a priority country for GDC, meaning that the full range of development policy instruments will continue to be implemented.

As the largest provider of development funds of all European countries, Germany's financial engagement in Afghanistan started with 80 million euros annually in 2002. In 2007, this commitment was raised to 148 million euros, with another increase to 208 million euros in 2008.

These augmentations occurred parallel to an increased military presence in Afghanistan, and underpinned a *networked security* approach adopted by the involved German Federal ministries. The term *networked security* refers to the alignment and coordination of outcomes and activities among the German federal ministries. The approach of networked security is not a formal

Figure 1: Value of overall German Development Assistance in Afghanistan (2005-2011)



Source: OECD 2013

[4] *The US provides an estimated 2 billion USD annually for development cooperation in Afghanistan, while Japan's contribution stands at 600 million USD annually, compared to the current German contribution of 430 million euros annually (Bundesregierung 2012: 9).*
[5] *BMZ (2013a).*
[6] *AA (2013b).*
[7] *AA (2014), BMZ (2014) and Zürcher et al. (2013: 1).*

Figure 2. Map of Afghanistan highlighting GDC's areas of operation

policy of the German government. However, a joint document by the AA, BMVg, BMI, and BMZ (2011) outlines the approach in more detail.[8] In alignment with Germany's responsibility within the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), much, though not all, of Germany's development cooperation efforts have been focused on Northern Afghanistan, as shown in Figure 2 highlighting where the German Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) are stationed.

2.1 Evolution of the GDC Portfolio in Afghanistan since 2002

Along with the first projects for achieving structural development objectives, in the beginning overall German assistance in Afghanistan had a strong focus on "short-term measures and meeting urgent needs".[9] Thus, humanitarian and emergency assistance programs were implemented, focusing on addressing the immediate needs of the population in a post-conflict environment. A quarter of the programs concentrated on refugee relief, humanitarian aid, winter survival and basic social services, while three quarters addressed structural development objectives. Additionally, Germany agreed to relieve the Government of Afghanistan of a substantial amount of its bilateral debt and has forgiven a total amount of 78.56 million euros.[10] In addition to the measures taken in the area of humanitarian and emergency assistance BMZ selected three sectors in the fall of 2002 in which support was mainly to be provided: (i) Energy, (ii) Sustainable Economic Development, and (iii) Water and Sanitation. These three sectors remained the central focus of efforts until January

[8] *For a detailed discussion on the approach see the supplement edition of Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik from Oktober 2012.*
[9] *AA (n.d.).*
[10] *BMZ (2013a).*

of 2005, when Education was added as a fourth priority area at the request of the Afghan government. During the Government Consultation in 2012, good governance was adopted as a fifth priority area. This engagement was aimed at enhancing underlying political conditions which are apparently required for the effectiveness of sector operations.[11] While 25.2 % of BMZ's portfolio between 2007 and 2010 was committed to humanitarian and emergency aid, this percentage dropped to only 3.6 % between 2010 and 2013. This indicates a significant shift in focus towards institution building and more long-term development objectives.[12]

Germany aligns its development cooperation strategy and priorities with those of the Afghan government. Representatives of the German government, via the BMZ, conduct negotiations with the Government of Afghanistan on an annual basis to discuss and prioritize development efforts. One unique aspect of this country context is that upon request of the Afghan government the German Federal Foreign Office presented its activities as part of the government negotiations. Further rounds of consultations are convened every six months. This regular engagement ensures that focal sectors remain relevant and of priority to the Government of Afghanistan and it allows for a quick realignment of efforts when deemed necessary by both governments. While the high flexibility in (re-)aligning priorities has proven to be useful in a fast changing and volatile environment like Afghanistan, it also provides challenges to the continuity in programming and longer-term planning.[13]

The security situation in Afghanistan drives and determines the pace, direction and approach of development cooperation in each sector. BMZ and its implementing organizations have been cognizant of the threat insecurity poses to its development efforts and adopted a conflict sensitive approach in all its operations. This approach is further supported by a Risk Management Office (RMO) that provides continuous support to projects and staff.

More recently a strategic portfolio review (Zürcher et al. 2013) commissioned by the BMZ in 2012 and published in 2013 assessed the shock resistance of GDC funded projects. The review concluded that about 51 % of the GIZ and 46 % of the KfW portfolios are at risk or even at high risk of not being finalized or continued, if the security situation deteriorates. Two energy infrastructure projects and the Kunduz-Khulm road project were classified as being at high risk. The authors of the strategic portfolio review recommend to decrease the number of projects with higher risk ratings and to pay more attention to making the portfolio more shock resistance. This means reducing the number of infrastructure projects that only become operational once "the last screw has been tightened".[14] The review also categorizes each project of the GDC portfolio into three "instruments", namely flexible projects, classical projects, and multi-donor trust funds (MDTF).[15] In 2013 classical projects accounted for 31.1 % of the portfolio; projects with flexible funding accounted for 43.1 % of the portfolio; 25.8 % of funds were channeled through MDTF. The number of projects with flexible funding has decreased by approx. 10 % over the last three years. The authors of the strategic portfolio review recommend increasing projects with flexible funding again, as they judge them to be particularly suitable for areas with volatile security issues.[16]

2.2
BMZ Priority Sectors in Afghanistan

The new BMZ strategy for development cooperation in Afghanistan (2014a) aims at building an Afghan state that guarantees human rights and security and is accepted by the people of Afghanistan as the legitimate representative and service provider of basic needs. Such a state provides sound legal protection,

[11] *AA (n.d.), Bundesregierung (2012: 36); Zürcher et al. (2007c: 23).*
[12] *Zürcher et al. (2013: 6).*
[13] *Interviews October 9, 2013 and October 24, 2013. Respondents of key informant interviews were assured that the information they provided would remain confidential. Therefore, all interviews are cited only using dates, and sometimes information is given about whether the individual was providing an internal or external perspective.*
[14] *Zürcher et al. (2013: 11 – 15; 20).*
[15] *The term „classical" here refers to the perceived standard set-up of GIZ and KfW projects or programs. According to Zürcher et al. (2013) "flexible" means that funds can be allocated and spent flexibly, often based on a participatory decision-making process of a community or an administrative entity.Examples of programs with flexible funding are the RCDF and RIDF. MDTF are funds, to which international donors make financial contributions and under which their activities are coordinated (Zürcher et al. 2013: 7 – 9). DEval does not necessarily share this threefold distinction.*
[16] *Zürcher et al. (2013: 9; 22).*

fosters political voices, as well as enables social and economic participation. BMZ support helps to (i) improve the effectiveness of state institutions at the national, provincial, district and community level, (ii) promote development in rural areas, (iii) supply more reliable energy, (iv) increase access to safe drinking water, (v) enhance general conditions for employment creation, (vi) and improve education. Strengthening democracy, rule of law, human rights and the fight against corruption are also an integral part of the German-Afghan cooperation.

The aforementioned five priority sectors have been identified to achieve these objectives. The following provides an overview of the activities in these priority sectors.[17]

Energy

Within the energy sector, GDC has focused on improving the electricity supply for rural areas via renewable energies and on providing support and training to the national energy supply company. In this regard GDC has co-financed the establishment of power lines extending from Uzbekistan into Afghanistan to bring reliable electricity to selected areas of the country. Additionally, Germany has financed the (re-)construction of electricity facilities, including hydropower stations, substations, and a solar plant.[18] Germany's engagement in the energy sector has increased from 10.3 % in 2007 – 2010, to 18.8 % in 2010 – 2013.[19]

Sustainable Economic Development

GDC has contributed to fostering a market economy in Afghanistan via the promotion of a conducive economic framework and by setting up new financial institutions. GIZ and KfW have provided advisory services on investment and trade, and on the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). GDC supported the setup of the First Microfinance Bank (FMFB), which provides loans to individual borrowers and SMEs, and the establishment of a credit guarantee facility financed by the Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft (DEG). GDC also contributed to the establishment of the Afghan Investment Support Agency (AISA), a one-stop-shop for individuals and companies looking to invest in Afghanistan. Additionally, GDC supported vocational training, with an emphasis on linking such training to job placement services. Furthermore, infrastructure projects (e.g. the national road from Kunduz to Khulm) are implemented by the KfW. The BMZ commitments to the priority sector Sustainable Economic Development has increased from 4.6 % in 2007 – 2010 to 20.8 % in 2010 – 2013, the largest increase by percentage across the portfolio. However, this portfolio has also been assessed as having the largest share of "at risk" or "high risk" projects by the strategic portfolio review.[20]

Water and Sanitation

Germany is the leading international donor to urban water supply efforts in Afghanistan. Funded projects in this sector have focused on establishing the proper infrastructure for providing clean drinking water supply systems in the large cities of Kabul, Herat, and Kunduz, with ongoing projects in Balkh and smaller cities.[21] Additionally, GDC is working with local water supply companies and the Afghan Ministry of Energy and Water to reform the water sector, including legislation and regulations to improve resource management, access to water, and the planning of wastewater disposal.[22] Support within the BMZ portfolio for water and sanitation has increased from 7.9 % of the total portfolio in 2007 – 2010 to 12.8 % in 2010 – 2013.[23]

Education

GDC is providing assistance to the development of the Afghan education system with a focus on basic and vocational education. GDC assisted in establishing a national teacher training curriculum, conducting teacher training and building model schools. Germany has contributed to the construction of a teacher training college, training centers, dorms, and residence halls.[24]

[17] *More detailed and verified information on the BMZ portfolio in Afghanistan is provided in the strategic portfolio review (Zürcher et al. 2013: 4 – 15).*
[18] *Bundesregierung (2012: 40); Zürcher et al. (2007c: 23).*
[19] *Zürcher et al. (2013: 6).*
[20] *Zürcher et al. (2013: 6; 14).*
[21] *Bundesregierung (2012a: 41).*
[22] *GIZ (2013b).*
[23] *Zürcher et al. (2013: 6).*
[24] *Bundesregierung (2012: 36).*

It has also financed the (re-)construction of over 550 primary and secondary schools.[25] Additionally, GIZ advisors have worked with the Afghan Ministry of Education (MoE) at both national and provincial levels to prepare for institutional reforms in the sector. Furthermore, GDC supports the Education Quality Improvement Program, which is financed under the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). BMZ support for the education sector accounted for 18.4 % of the portfolio between 2007 and 2010, and 13.1 % of the portfolio between 2010 and 2013.[26]

Governance

Public sector reform is a priority for the Afghan Government and is therefore stipulated in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). BMZ supports the implementation of the ANDS via the Open Policy Advisory Fund (OPAF). The fund's objective is to enhance governance at the central and subnational levels in key reform areas by assisting state actors in designing and improving processes, strategies and regulations, as well as by conducting training to increase communication and enhance cooperation between government bodies.

The OPAF is complemented by two additional funds, which aim at strengthening the capacity of government officials to plan and implement development activities effectively. Activities financed by the Regional Capacity Development Fund (RCDF) and the Regional Infrastructure Development Fund (RIDF) concentrate on improving the economic and social infrastructure at the provincial and district levels. Infrastructure projects, which enhance people's quality of life, are combined with capacity development measures in order to strengthen public confidence in governmental institutions and elected representatives. The objective of the funds is to build up and consolidate efficient, legitimate and citizen-oriented governance structures at a sub-national level. By 2012, 109 infrastructure and capacity development projects were approved by the Provincial Development Councils for implementation and 182 capacity development training courses were conducted for over 11,600 civil servants. Additionally, the construction or rehabilitation of roads, bridges and irrigation canals in all five provinces continue to support local farmers and villages by increasing economic output. In Kunduz and Baghlan, 56.6 kilometers of newly constructed overhead transmission lines, which now supply electricity to people in the villages, continue to improve the quality of life and support economic growth throughout the area. 17 public administrative buildings have also been built to better enable public institutions to fulfill their tasks at both provincial and district levels.[27] These projects have been supported through the two funds, implemented by GIZ and KfW respectively.

A third area of engagement in the governance sector focuses on the rule of law. Programs aim at enhancing legal security for citizens, especially women, by providing assistance to judiciary and administrative staff at both central and provincial levels.[28]

Next to bilateral programs and projects, GDC also contributes to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), which is a multilateral trust fund supported by 33 donors and administered by the World Bank. It was established in 2002 to "provide a coordinated financing mechanism for the Government of Afghanistan's budget and its priority national investment projects."[29] The ARTF has provided 6.74 billion USD in funds, with Germany contributing 461 million USD, or just below 7 % of the total funds.[30] This trust fund offers two windows to which donors can provide funding: an investment window under which all programs are covered (including the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), and the Education Quality Improvement Program (EQUIP)) and a recurrent cost window, which pays salaries for government employees and running costs. This window is the largest single source of "on-budget" financing for the Government of Afghanistan. Germany contributes to the ARTF since 2002 with increasing amounts, running at 40 million euros in 2013.[31] The German funds support mainly the EQUIP, the NSP, and the salary

[25] *Bundesregierung (2012: 37).*
[26] *Interview August 28, 2013.*
[27] *GIZ (2013b).*
[28] *GIZ (2013b).*
[29] *World Bank (2013b).*
[30] *World Bank (2013a: 5).*
[31] *KfW (2014).*

scheme financed under the ARTF. Several internal and three external evaluations assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of the ARTF draw mainly positive conclusions.[32] Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTF) in general are currently being considered to be a viable and attractive instrument for donors in the fragile state context, particularly given that investment and implementation risks can be spread across a wider range of donors.

Although BMZ's total support to the governance sector stood at 33.7 % of the portfolio in 2007 – 2010, it has decreased to just 29.1 % of the portfolio in 2010 – 2013.[33]

Additional Areas of Focus (Gestaltungsspielraum)

Emergency and Transitional Aid has certainly been another focus area for GDC, particularly in the beginning of the German engagement in Afghanistan. However, these programs have been considerably reduced after GDC's transition towards longer-term development objectives in 2010 and the shift of main parts of this portfolio to the AA in 2012. Although these programs accounted for 25,2 % of the overall GDC funding between 2007 – 2010, only two larger emergency programs have remained part of the BMZ portfolio: the previous Development-Oriented Emergency and Transition Aid (ENÜH), which will end in 2013, is now continued in its new form as Development-Supporting and Structure-Forming Transition Aid (ESÜH).[34] Presently, emergency and transitional aid only account for 0.5 % of the portfolio in the year 2013, reflecting the change in division of labor between BMZ and AA in 2012.

Programs for Gender Mainstreaming, a disaster preparedness program in the province of Badakhshan, a fund for peace-building efforts and a food security project in Baglan are also additional efforts supported by GDC.[35]

2.3 Overview of Projects Implemented by GIZ and KfW in Afghanistan

Five German federal ministries are actively supporting development efforts in Afghanistan: the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the Federal Ministry of Defense (BMVg), the Federal Ministry of Interior (BMI), the Federal Foreign Office (AA), and the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMEL).[36] The BMZ and the AA are the two largest funding sources of German development assistance in Afghanistan, with an annual commitment of 430 million.[37] Further German ministries (BMVg, BMI, BMEL) and federal states are also involved in development assistance in Afghanistan; however, to a much lesser extent.

While there is a certain division of labor among and within the sectors in which the AA and BMZ are operating, their program rationale and rules for funding differ substantially. The AA provides funding for development projects in Afghanistan that are designed to "respond quickly, selectively, and visibly to Afghanistan's serious problems."[38] These projects are shorter-term in nature than those undertaken by the BMZ, and are grounded in foreign and security policy concerns.[39] The AA priorities in Afghanistan lie in security sector reform, stabilization projects, and capacity development within the administrative and judicial system. Additional projects are funded in areas of health, air traffic, governance (promotion of human rights and support to the election process), higher education, and the preservation of Afghan cultural heritage. The AA also supports the "Heart of Asia" process, which promotes regional cooperation with neighboring countries. The total AA portfolio – at a worth of 180 million euros annually – accounted to almost 41 % of overall German development assistance in 2013.[40]

[32] *For a more detailed discussion of the ARTF as a successful instrument for aid to Afghanistan see KfW (2013); Zürcher et al. (2013: 23); World Bank (2013b) and Sud (2013: 17).*
[33] *Zürcher et al. (2013: 6; 22 – 23).*
[34] *In German: Entwicklungsorientierte Not- und Übergangshilfe (ENÜH) and Entwicklungsfördernde und Strukturbildende Übergangshilfe (ESÜH).*
[35] *Zürcher et al. (2013: 7 – 8); GIZ (2013b).*
[36] *Coordination among the five German Ministries active in Afghanistan has not an explicit part of this review, but it was addressed as an issue during many interviews among all stakeholder groups. Therefore, the authors have chosen to include the raised issues of coordination, particularly those regarding the M&E system.*
[37] *BMZ (2014a: 11).*
[38] *AA (2013b).*
[39] *Internal Document #2.*
[40] *Internal Document #1; BMZ (2014a: 13).*

Both the BMZ and the AA rely mainly on the German implementing agencies, GIZ and KfW, as well as some non-governmental organizations for conducting activities on the ground.[41] The multi-faceted structure of actors in German development assistance in Afghanistan ensures a high standard of sector expertise and advisory services to the Afghan people. However, it also bears some challenges: several interview partners referred to a perceived lack of coordination among the German ministries, particularly regarding development objectives and approaches. The varying degrees of commitments to transparency and data-sharing of the work supported by each ministry were also cited as complicating the matter. While overviews of all development efforts supported by the German government in Afghanistan are at hand via the progress reports (Fortschrittsberichte) and other official material, these sources do not distinguish among the intervening ministries nor explain their division of labor and various modes of intervention.

The lack of coordination and alignment among German ministries regarding their specific objectives, approaches and applied instruments is particularly difficult for the implementing agencies to manage, as they implement projects to the Afghan people for all German ministries. GIZ and KfW staff stated in interviews that competing preferences on time lines and approaches have made their work more difficult and are likely to impede their effectiveness.[42]

In the following, the projects implemented by GIZ and KfW in Afghanistan are briefly outlined. As mentioned above, both organizations receive funding from the BMZ and the AA for project financing and implementation. It is this duality (if not multiplicity) of funders, objectives and approaches, which shapes the portfolio of German development assistance in Afghanistan, so that the work of both institutions is presented here together.

Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)

KfW has financed 56 projects/programs in Afghanistan since 2002, an amount worth over 1 billion euros. Funding for these projects/programs has come mainly from the BMZ and covered about two-thirds of the projects and programs.[43] The AA has funded the additional 20 % of KfW's portfolio, hence one-third of the projects.

When KfW first started working in Afghanistan in 2002, most projects focused on emergency relief, in accordance with the BMZ and the AA strategic priorities as mentioned above. This shifted in 2005, with KfW beginning to finance larger infrastructure projects, more in alignment with their work worldwide. The volume of KfW's project portfolio in Afghanistan jumped from around 106 million euros in 2009 to almost 247 million euros in 2010. Since then, the volume decreased again, with just over 152 million euros in 2012.[44] The largest percentage of financing between 2007 and 2012 occurred in the priority sector governance, followed by sustainable economic development, education, water and sanitation.

KfW's assistance in the governance sector focuses on support to the public administration in implementing development projects in rural areas. Financing occurs via a regional bilateral fund, the RIDF, and the multilateral ARTF (here in particular the NSP of the ARTF). Additionally, a conflict prevention project concentrated on the border regions of Afghanistan-Pakistan and Afghanistan-Tajikistan has been funded by the AA.

Most projects/programs are financed over a number of years, stretching between one to five years, with an average of 2.9 years. Project/program budgets range in size from around 500,000 euros to over 48 million euros.[45]

[41] *From 2011 onward the implementation through the GIZ includes services provided by CIM (Center for International Migration and Development), DED (German Development Service), GTZ (German Agency for Technical Cooperation), and InWent (Capacity Building International).*
[42] *Interviews, October 9, October 23, October 29, November 3, 2013.*
[43] *See Annex E for details.*
[44] *KfW (2013). The given numbers represent the amounts of new commitments per year.*
[45] *Data presented on project volume and duration require some reservation. Projects with larger volumes might subsume a range of smaller projects, which have not been listed as such. The duration can refer to the actual physical implementation, to building time of a project, or to the time between commitments and the final report. This is not distinguished in the Excel sheet in Annex E.*

Figure 3: KfW implemented projects funded by BMZ and AA in Afghanistan by Sector and Year (millions of Euros)



Source: based on data provided by KfW (2013: Project List Annex E)

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)

GIZ has implemented 83 projects/programs in Afghanistan since 2002, with 60 projects currently ongoing.[46] The main focus of GIZ work is on "improving living conditions, especially for the rural population" (GIZ 2013a). GIZ manages projects and programs in eight areas: Energy, Sustainable Economic Development, Water and Sanitation, Education, Emergency and Transitional Aid, Health, Good Governance, and the Civil Peace Service.[47]

As was noted for KfW, the bulk of GIZ funding stemmed from the BMZ, accounting for almost 400 million euros between 2002 and 2013 and serving 57 % of their projects. The remaining funds came mainly from the AA. In 2008, AA funding began to play a stronger role in GIZ's portfolio, rising to a height of 51.32 million euros in 2011 (47 % of the GIZ portfolio for that year). It has since decreased, accounting for 14.79 million euros in 2013 (20 % of the GIZ portfolio for 2013) as shown in Figure 4 below.

[46] *See Annex E for details; GIZ (2013a).*
[47] *GIZ (2013a).*

Figure 4: GIZ implemented projects funded by BMZ and AA in Afghanistan by Year



Source: based on data provided by GIZ (2013: Project List Annex E)

In total, AA funding accounts for 33 % of GIZ disbursements to Afghanistan since 2002.

Figure 5 presents the BMZ portfolio implemented by GIZ and reflects the allocation of funding against the five GDC priority areas.

Figure 5: GIZ projects in Afghanistan by Sector and Value (BMZ funded)



Source: based on data provided by GIZ see Project List in Annex E[48]

If one compares the GIZ program funded by BMZ with the one funded by the AA, the prevalence of sectors shift. GIZ's largest sector (by volume) under the BMZ portfolio is governance. The priority shifts to security when AA funded projects are included. The security projects include efforts to support the Afghan National Police (ANP). Governance has been supported by both ministries and receives the second highest amount of funding.

Nevertheless, in accordance with the GDC priority sectors in Afghanistan, further projects/programs have been implemented in the sectors of sustainable economic development, education, water and sanitation, and energy. Smaller amounts of money have been invested in health, peace, and agriculture, as shown in Figure 6 below.

[48] *The column „other" includes projects under the heading "Gestaltungsspielraum".*

Figure 6: GIZ projects in Afghanistan by Sector and Value (AA and BMZ funded)



Source: based on data provided by GIZ (2013: Project List Annex E)

Summary

BMZ funds to Afghanistan increased continuously over time, with two steep rises in 2007 and 2010. The jumps correspond with a stronger German military presence in Afghanistan under the ISAF mandate and reflect an alignment of military and civilian support to the country (referred to as the networked security approach.) GDC priorities in Afghanistan have also changed over time; while a quarter of the portfolio focused originally on emergency and relief efforts, this has since shifted from 2009/10 onward toward a stronger emphasis on institution building and structural change. Such a shift implies longer-term development objectives and project duration. The reallocation of funds within the portfolio benefited mainly programs and projects in the sustainable economic development sector, which grew from 4.6 % in 2010 to 20.8 % in 2013, followed by energy and water. Programs with the highest funding volume are in the governance sector. Here funding is channeled via bilateral (RCDF and RIDF) and multi-lateral funds (ARTF).

A comprehensive list of all German development projects and programs in Afghanistan was not readily available. The information upon which the analysis is based has been provided by the two implementing agencies and has not been formally validated by either BMZ or AA. Accordingly, as acknowledged by the implementing agencies themselves, the degree of validity of the information might be limited.[49]

How and to what extent evaluations have informed adjustments to the GDC portfolio or underpinned the recommendations of the strategic portfolio review in 2013 will be the subject of the following chapter. Here the report will review the kind of evaluative work that has been conducted by the BMZ, KfW and GIZ and mirror these efforts against those undertaken by other international development partners in Afghanistan (chapter 3.1). Thereafter, the utilization of evaluative works conducted by GDC actors will be discussed, before summarizing the key results (chapter 3.2).

[49] *E-mail correspondence from 20.01.2014.*

3.

DESCRIPTION AND REVIEW OF THE EVALUATIVE WORK

Collecting evaluative work by German actors in Afghanistan reveals that there is little standardization across the German federal ministries regarding monitoring and evaluation requirements.[50] While the BMZ has specific and clearly outlined monitoring and evaluation requirements for its implementing partners, the AA is focuses more on monitoring than evaluation. For example, KfW conducts ex-post evaluations for its BMZ-funded projects; however, this is not a requirement for AA-funded operations.[51] Both ministries do require some form of regular reporting on project/program progress, but even here they follow different formats for reporting. These different rules and approaches make it difficult to establish a comprehensive and complete picture of all of the evaluative work conducted for German development assistance in Afghanistan over the last 12 years. This is, next to DEval's currently limited mandate, a second reason why this review confines itself mainly to the evaluative work conducted on behalf of the BMZ.

The review of evaluative work of GDC in Afghanistan comprises the assessment of three different elements: (i) project level work, (ii) the Monitoring and Evaluation system, and (iii) strategic level work. It is based on an extensive document analysis and a set of key informant interviews.[52]

3.1 Features of GDC's Evaluative Work in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is not like any other developing country, even in a fragile state context. Since the reengagement of the international community in Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban, there has been intense political pressure for quick development results. There are not only high stakes to demonstrate success within the international political arena, but also at the national level in Afghanistan, as well as in Germany. Since the beginning of international engagement, public reaction to the military mission in Afghanistan has been controversial in Germany with strongly opposing views in the German Bundestag. The intense pressure on the German government to show quick development results has continued even after development efforts clearly began to shift in 2010.

The high political attention given to development progress in Afghanistan has influenced not only the kind of interventions selected, but also how they have been assessed. It reinforced a focus in the evaluative work on outputs (rather than on outcomes or impacts) at the project level (rather than on a more strategic sector or country level), much to the chagrin of concerned divisions within the development ministry. Monitoring and evaluation systems (M&E) have been designed in a manner that allow for these outputs to be easily extracted in order to demonstrate progress in implementing development projects. As a consequence of this emphasis very little is known about whether GDC funded projects currently achieve the intended effects, i.e. intended outcomes and impacts.[53]

Outputs generally refer to the immediate effects of a resource investment, such as the number of constructed wells or schools, the number of government officials trained, etc. Outputs are rather easily quantifiable, and therefore a popular means of reporting on development progress. However, these outputs reflect only one aspect of development achievement, which should also include progress toward second- and third-level objectives, known as outcomes and impacts. Therefore, understanding outputs only provides a limited picture of the success or failure of a development project. For example, just having built a school does not automatically mean that children attend classes and are learning. A myriad number of issues can arise which prevent the school from being able to provide quality education to the children. In an environment like Afghanistan, it is possible that security concerns prevent parents from allowing their children to attend school; there might not be an educated teacher available, etc. Therefore, only knowing how many schools have been built is only a first indicator of success for a school construction project. Understanding how this has led to specific outcomes (e.g. an increase in the number of children attending school and earning a degree) and impacts (e.g. increased contribution of former

[50] *Interviews October 9, November 3, November 8, and November 10, 2013.*
[51] *Interviews October 9, 2013.*
[52] *For more details on the applied methodology see Annex A.*
[53] *Results include all outputs, outcomes and impacts, while effects are defined as just outcomes and impacts (OECD 2010a).*

students to their households' economy) provides essential information on the success or failure of a development project.

Given this understanding, output-focused evaluations at the project level have a limited informative value in comparison to strategic and outcome- or impact-focused evaluations. However, as mentioned above, the evaluative work reviewed has a strong focus on outputs at the project level. Nevertheless, this evaluative work has been useful for project management. Indeed, BMZ, GIZ and KfW colleagues stated in interviews that the available evaluation findings have informed project/program management to a sufficient degree at the operational level.[54]

3.1.1 Project and Program Level Evaluative Work

The term evaluation is defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) as "the systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, program or policy, its design, implementation and results."[55] Evaluations in international development focus on assessing the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of an intervention. Evaluations can serve very different purposes and audiences:

- Evaluation findings can be used to serve donors' and decision makers' requirements for due diligence and control. This stresses the accountability function of evaluation.
- Evaluation findings can also focus on stimulating learning at the operational and strategic level and/or on stimulating change within a system.
- Evaluation can review achievements at the output-level or the outcome- and impact-level.
- Evaluation can focus directly on the project/program level, or it can take a more aggregated perspective, for example, by looking at the effects within a sector, a country portfolio, a strategy, or an instrument of development cooperation as applied across various sectors.
- Accordingly, evaluation findings can be used to directly improve project/program implementation or to inform strategic decisions made at the level of the donors or the government.

The different purposes of evaluation lead to different evaluation designs, implementation processes, and often to different types of results. The BMZ guidelines for technical and financial cooperation clearly outline framing conditions for all evaluations to be conducted. Agencies which implement projects on behalf of the BMZ are thereby required to conduct evaluations of finalized projects to a sufficient degree in accordance with OECD-DAC standards.[56] Thus, one could expect to find a significant number of evaluations within a large project portfolio, as in the case of Afghanistan.

Upon request, BMZ, KfW, and GIZ provided a list of their project- and program-level evaluative work to DEval. This list comprises of 127 reports; some of which are evaluations according to OECD/DAC criteria, most of which only include elements of an evaluation and are therefore considered to be evaluative work in the following. From this compilation, 37 project documents were selected as evaluative work, including ex-post evaluations, impact assessments, project progress reviews and e-VAL reports.[57] Additionally, annual reports, final reports and audits have been listed by GIZ as reports that inform their M&E system in Afghanistan. However, these reports were not considered for this review.

The full body of evaluative assessments conducted by GIZ and KfW in Afghanistan since 2002 comprises of 21 project progress reviews (GIZ), 10 e-VAL reports (GIZ), two project level impact assessments (by GIZ) and four finalized ex-post evaluations (KfW). GIZ leads the list of reports with 33 pieces of work. They cover 21 projects out of a total of 50 projects implemented for BMZ in Afghanistan since 2002, meaning that at least one element of evaluative work has been conducted on 42 % of the projects.[58]

[54] *Interviews August 28, October 9, and October 14, 2013.*
[55] *OECD (2010a: 21).*
[56] *BMZ (2008: 27).*
[57] *The e-VAL is a computer-based interview tool used to capture the opinions and feedback of various project/program stakeholders (Internal Document #3).*
[58] *This data is based on portfolio Excel sheets for GIZ's BMZ and AA portfolios. A full list of evaluations conducted was provided by the GIZ in November 2013.*

Four evaluations from KfW are included in the list, which cover 3 projects out of a total of 38 implemented for BMZ since 2002, equaling a coverage of evaluations to projects at about 8 %.[59]

From the 37 reports selected as evaluative work, a sample of 11 reports was drawn and analyzed according to specific criteria as outlined in Annex C. The limitation to 11 reports was in response to the time and budget constraints of this review. The selection criteria applied ensured that an equal number of reports per category were reviewed. Thus, three project progress reviews, two e-VAL reports, four ex-post evaluations and two impact evaluations form the sample for the analysis.[60]

Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)

KfW utilizes an internally standardized evaluation approach for all of its BMZ funded projects/programs in Afghanistan in alignment with their approach for projects and programs worldwide. Each project/program has an equal chance of being randomly selected for an ex-post evaluation.[61] The ex-post evaluations are conducted three to five years after the completion of a BMZ project, particularly in order to reappraise it. They address project identification, a needs assessment, operational experience, and outputs. Each year, KfW conducts 45 – 50 ex-post evaluations worldwide. The ex-post evaluations are conducted by either external consultants or KfW staff, who have never had any previous involvement with the respective project/program.

As of January 2014, KfW had completed four ex-post evaluations of projects/programs in Afghanistan for BMZ funded projects: two on microfinance banking, one on a multilateral trust fund, and one on water supply in Herat.[62] All four ex-post evaluations were reviewed for this research in reference to their purpose, approach, implementation, and findings.[63]

Three of the four evaluations were conducted as desk studies, in contrast to most KfW ex-post evaluations, which are usually conducted as field studies. Security concerns were considered by KfW as the main deterrent for the teams for carrying out field studies. Therefore, most Afghanistan ex-post evaluations relied entirely upon development actors' assessments of the projects/programs and reports from the Afghan government. This in turn means that the quality of these ex-post evaluations is based upon the quality of the documents which informed them. Unfortunately, these sources were not always clearly and distinctly cited, leaving the reader with questions regarding the validity of the data sources. Given that finding accurate and reliable statistics in Afghanistan is difficult, and sometimes impossible, it is even more crucial to clearly cite the sources of the statistical data provided. For example, even standard demographic data provided by a single Afghan ministry can vary across reports.[64]

The use of standardized and clearly outlined evaluation criteria allow the reader to judge the validity and strength of the findings presented. Each of the KfW ex-post evaluations provided a performance rating on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, overarching development impact, and sustainability. Generally, the performance ratings given by the ex-post evaluation team were positive, with the lowest performance rates of three (or satisfactory) for development impact in the ARTF ex-post evaluation, for sustainability in one of the FMFB ex-post evaluations, and for the overall rating of the Herat water supply project.[65]

In summary, the ex-post evaluations make an important contribution to the assessment of GDC. They provide the reader with an extended view of what occurred after the project/program was completed. The four ex-post evaluations were able to provide positive statistics and examples indicating how the

[59] *KfW applies a random sampling technique for the selection of projects subject to ex-post evaluations. 50 % (or more) of all completed projects are drawn annually for an ex-post evaluation. The low percentage of project to evaluation coverage (i.e. 8 %) reflects this random sampling process. However, in 2013 three additional KfW projects in Afghanistan have been selected for ex-post evaluation and in 2014 seven further projects have been included in the sample. This will considerably increase the coverage percentage of projects subject to evaluation.*

[60] *See Annex A for details on the methodology applied for the document review at the project level, Annex C for a detailed description of the assessment criteria, and Annex D for a presentation of the results of the assessment.*

[61] *Interview October 9, 2013.*

[62] *These evaluations looked at the First Microfinance Bank and the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF).*

[63] *See Annex D, Evaluation Reports # 1, 2, 3, and 4.*

[64] *For example the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development has provided contradictory information regarding the number of villages that exist in the country with a difference of 18,000 villages in their National Solidarity Programme reports (Wilson, M.B. 2013).*

[65] *See Annex D, Evaluation Reports # 1, p. 6; # 2, p.1; and # 4, p. 1.*

three projects helped to support the development objectives of KfW and GDC at large. For example, the ex-post evaluation on the First Microfinance Bank found that the bank's credit portfolio grew to 40.6 million USD, which exceeded the 14 million USD originally expected.[66] Additionally, the bank exceeded its target of 20,000 borrowers by August of 2009, when they recorded 36,927 borrowers.[67] KfW division heads indicated that they found the ex-post evaluations to be informative. However, they were not widely used in Afghanistan to inform decision-making. This is in part because of the low volume of evaluations that have been conducted thus far and in part due to the timing of the evaluations.[68] The KfW state that with more ex-post evaluations to refer to, they will play a stronger role in decision-making at a more strategic level. By January 2014, an additional eleven projects were drawn for an ex-post evaluation.[69]

It was further discussed that, the exclusive use of ex-post evaluations by KfW may have limits, particularly in fragile state environments such as in Afghanistan. The delayed timing of ex-post evaluations can mean that the political context or the security situation in which the project/program was implemented has changed so drastically, that lessons for future projects are hard to draw. Therefore, reconsidering the usefulness of ex-post evaluations as a core pillar of evaluative work for KfW is recommended in the context of Afghanistan. Given that the conditions for project implementation in Afghanistan will continue to change over short periods of time, projects/programs might be better served by more formative and summative evaluations conducted during or just at the end of a project/program.

KfW staff interviewed for this review found evaluations from other donor agencies (i.e. the World Bank, the UK Department for International Development/DfID) to be useful for supporting their own stance on what they will undertake in projects in Afghanistan. They also noted that they draw on other development cooperation actors' evaluations in their own ex-post evaluations, as well as use them to help inform their own decisions within projects/programs. Examples mentioned were the World Bank's country portfolio evaluation on Afghanistan and the World Bank's evaluations on the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, both of which informed KfW's own ex-post evaluation on the ARTF.[70]

Ideas for strengthening KfW's evaluative work in Afghanistan include more emphasis on primary data collection and more detailed sourcing and triangulation of the data from secondary sources. This would allow for more robustness in the conclusions and recommendations drawn. While conducting evaluative work is often seen as difficult, if not impossible due to issues of security in Afghanistan,[71] the impact assessment by Zürcher et al (2007a, 2010) provides an example that such work can indeed be conducted with local research institutions. That fieldwork has been undertaken for one of the KfW ex-post evaluations in the rather insecure province of Herat is another example of this. Greater emphasis on extracting and highlighting more general lessons learned would allow for recommendations to be shared more easily. Overall, the KfW team appeared interested in evaluation and stated that their evaluative works provided them with enough information for making decisions. Thus, KfW staff indicated that it was satisfied with the evaluative efforts that have been undertaken by GDC in Afghanistan. However, in our judgment this assessment falls short of the accountability requirements of the BMZ portfolio.

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)

GIZ submitted, upon request, a long list of 122 reports on its development cooperation efforts in Afghanistan to DEval. As of November 2013, GIZ had conducted 21 end of phase Project Progress Reviews (PPR) or *Projektfortschrittskontrollen (PFK)*,

[66] *See Annex D, Evaluation Report # 2, p. 2.*
[67] *See Annex D, Evaluation Report # 2, p. 2.*
[68] *Interview October 9, 2013.*
[69] *In January 2014 the KfW informally shared their list of projects, that was drawn by the random sampling technique described above. The selection of projects in Afghanistan has not been confirmed by KfW management and is hence not listed here.*
[70] *Interviews October 3, October 9, November 3, and November 8, 2013.*
[71] *Ahmar and Kolbe (2013).*

67 annual project progress reports or *Projektfortschrittsberichte (PFB)*, 19 audits or *Wirtschaftsprüfungen* commissioned directly by the BMZ, ten online e-VAL reports, two impact studies, and three final reports or *Schlussberichte (SB)*. Although GIZ does not classify annual project progress reports, audits, or final reports as evaluations (nor does DEval), they are instruments of the M&E system and have been actively used in Afghanistan.[72]

GIZ – Project Progress Reviews

The Project Progress Review (PPR) is considered to be the most commonly applied evaluative instrument within GIZ. The organization states that PPR reports are predominantly "used to promote systematic learning in projects and programs and throughout the GIZ".[73] Independent assessments are not seen as a core objective for PPRs, which is clearly different from external evaluations. The PPRs are conducted at the end of each phase of an ongoing project/program to monitor and evaluate the activities of the project/program up to that point. The first of these reviews generally takes place a few years into a project's/program's implementation. The objective is to inform the future strategic direction of that project/program by looking at what has already occurred. This review is often the main piece of analysis used to inform the planning and (re)orientation of the next project/program phase. Additionally, these reports are aimed at identifying lessons learned, which can be used by the project/program and more widely within GIZ.[74] These reports are conducted by external experts in collaboration with GIZ experts. The review is generally based on fieldwork, the results of the monitoring system, and the e-VAL studies (i.e. a software based assessment tool, which will be described below in more detail).

Three examples of PPRs out of the 21 conducted in Afghanistan were reviewed for this study.[75] Each PPR was led by an external consultant, although with a reduced degree of independence, as one was involved in the planning of the project evaluated and another had many years of experience with GIZ. The reviews outlined the methodologies employed and included information on the sources of data, which were quite varied. Each of the PPRs clearly laid out the purpose of the work. They all utilized primary and secondary data sources, including interviews with GIZ project/program staff, government officials of Afghanistan, and other stakeholders. Secondary sources were clearly cited and information to judge their trustworthiness was provided. While the three reports vary in terms of type and quality, one aspect remains common to them: they generally addressed the output level of a project, while reference to the outcome level was very reduced and non-systematic. As mentioned above, even though it is challenging to evaluate outcomes and impacts of interventions in a conflict-ridden environment, efforts to do so are important in order to measure if, when and how interventions are succeeding or failing in such circumstances. The reports reviewed do not show that much effort has been made in this regard. Recommendations for project implementation in the next phase were thus made at the output level; for example, in indicating which components should be focused on when moving forward. Specific suggestions for certain activities were occasionally extended to include intended outcomes.[76] Generally, limitations of the reviews were also discussed. On average, the PPRs were conducted over a period of less than four months, with the shortest evaluation lasting one and a half months and the longest eight months. These reports were seen by GIZ staff as having greatly informed projects/programs moving into the next phase. For example, the need to address gender issues with religious leaders was raised in a PPR in 2009. This proposal was integrated into the strategic plan of the Gender Mainstreaming project. The final project report of 2012 on the same project confirms that this suggestion had been adapted in practice.[77] It is thus likely that the PPR recommendations from 2009 informed the design of the new project phase and also led to new activities of other GIZ projects.

[72] It needs to be mentioned here, that KfW also issues annual project progress reports and final reports on their BMZ funded projects. Audits are also commissioned by BMZ on KfW projects. However, in response to the DEval request of all evaluative work, the organization itself did not list these reports as evaluative work.

[73] (GIZ 2013f).

[74] (GIZ 2013f).

[75] See Annex D, Evaluation Reports # 7, 9, and 11.

[76] See Annex D, Evaluation Reports # 9, p.18; and # 11, p.10.

[77] See Annex D, Evaluation Report # 11.

GIZ – e-VAL Studies

The "e-VAL" is a computer-based interview tool used to capture the opinions and feedback of various project/program stakeholders. It is used to draw a deeper understanding of how a project has been implemented and to show how successful it is considered to be. Similar to the PPR, an e-VAL study is initiated by the program manager. E-VALs have been deployed in Afghanistan and other countries "to systematically collect relevant opinions, and to make it possible to summarize and compare them within a structured data format."[78] The qualitative data gathered in an e-VAL is in turn used to provide further information for PPRs, final reports, and independent evaluations. Thus, e-VAL studies are not stand-alone reports and can only be referred to as part of evaluative work in a general sense.

Two out of ten e-VAL reports conducted in Afghanistan were reviewed for this assessment.[79] In each of these pieces of work the purpose and criteria were clearly outlined. The inclusion of different stakeholders, such as GIZ staff, GIZ partners, Afghan government representatives, recipients of services, allowed for the gathering of different perspectives. The e-VAL model, although only a survey and reporting tool, also provides some insights on outcomes and impacts. The standardized computer model and an external evaluator establish a degree of independence. E-VAL results feed new voices and perspectives into the M&E system. They enhance its diversity. Though the computerized data analysis is not always easy to follow, the quality of the work is seen as providing useful and grounded information.

GIZ – Impact Studies

GIZ also listed two reports, which were labeled impact studies.[80] However, the documentation provided does not allow for reviewing whether the work actually is impact analysis or not. Hence, the reports are mentioned in the following, although an assessment regarding the quality and relevance of the work cannot be provided.

The first document is a presentation of findings and recommendations of a survey, clearly produced for a wider public audience. The objectives of the survey are stated as "analyzing and documenting the projects' impact on women's living conditions, establishing a set of lessons learnt and gathering further knowledge on gender-relevant achievements so far."[81] The publication outlines the criteria for the assessment. However, information was not given on the evaluation questions, the methodology applied, and on how the analysis was conducted. The second document is a presentation of two case studies, again without providing any further information on how the results have been obtained.

GIZ – Summary

A substantial range of evaluative work has been conducted by GIZ on projects in Afghanistan. However, all of this work remains solely at the project level and can only be considered internal evaluative work, which is initiated and steered – although not conducted – by the project or program manager. Project Progress Review reports are not regularly shared with other stakeholders, including BMZ. The documents reviewed were of relatively good quality, with the exception of the two publications labeled as impact studies. However, the work mainly addressed the output level of interventions and did not provide insights on whether intended effects have been achieved. The low level of information available on outcomes and impacts was noted by GIZ staff as well.[82]

GIZ has taken measures to strengthen the position of evaluation within its M&E system. There are efforts to make evaluations compulsory for all BMZ funded projects at the end of a project phase, including those in Afghanistan. A revised M&E system will be introduced in 2014. This new system will aim at strengthening the analysis and understanding of development effects within the organization and will include more evaluation designs which focus on outcome and impact level analysis. While the Project Progress Reviews have remained internal documents until today,

[78] *Lüninghöner (2010).*
[79] *See Annex D, Evaluation Reports # 10 and 11.*
[80] *See Annex D, Evaluation Reports # 4 and # 5.*
[81] *GIZ (2012: 5).*
[82] *Interview October 24, 2013.*

the new system will expand their distribution and utilization to the BMZ and the public.

Evaluations which address social and economical outcomes and impacts of a project or program require more intensive data collection throughout the project cycle, starting with sound baseline data. The availability of baseline information was mentioned in some of the work reviewed, but only rarely. Some evaluation reports pointed rather to the lack of baseline studies and how this has limited their efforts.[83] Baseline studies are apparently not yet the norm in GIZ projects/programs in Afghanistan (not even for those projects which did not start as emergency projects), which hampers the wider application of outcome- and impact-level evaluations.

KfW and GIZ – Overall Summary

For KfW and GIZ, the security situation in Afghanistan has played a strong role in determining the scope and types of evaluative efforts undertaken. KfW staff, for example, stated clearly that they would not put the lives of their evaluators in danger for the sake of primary data collection.[84] Household surveys, a standard means of obtaining evaluation data, were seen as very difficult to implement in Afghanistan. It remains ultimately a judgment call of the responsible decision-makers when and to what extent data collection is feasible in a conflict-ridden environment. Security concerns have often resulted in adopting other, and less ideal, evaluation designs.

The political attention to GDC efforts in Afghanistan has also influenced the types of evaluations that have been conducted. Pressure to quickly start projects and demonstrate rapid and continuous progress, with no time for preparatory work such as baseline studies predetermined the focus on outputs, rather than results. Several interviewees stated that political expectations of what could be accomplished via development cooperation projects in Afghanistan diverged from the reality on the ground.[85] Timeframes for achieving results were seen to be determined by political expectations, rather than by a valid assessment of the local situation.[86]

3.1.2 Monitoring Systems

Although conventionally referred to as Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) systems, in practice most of the emphasis has been on monitoring (i.e. on continuous observation, oversight and data gathering). This in turn strongly influences the quality and focus of subsequent evaluations. Because of this interdependence the following section will review the set-up of monitoring within the M&E systems applied in Afghanistan and see if any suggestions can be made to strengthen the link between Monitoring and Evaluation in German development work.

M&E at the project level is considered to be the domain of the implementing agencies, and is not directly determined by the BMZ or the AA.[87] This has led to the adoption of parallel M&E systems by the implementing agencies with differing *modi operandi* and a high degree of variance on which and how monitoring data is collected among the projects. This will be outlined in more detail by reviewing KfW's and GIZ's M&E system below.

Main Features of the M&E System of the KfW in Afghanistan

The M&E-based reporting of KfW projects/programs is established individually, with each project determining its own monitoring needs in alignment with the requirements of the donor.[88] Monitoring data is collected and processed by KfW's implementing partners and not by KfW staff themselves. Implementing partners are asked to use and support existing partner systems for monitoring as much as possible, which is in correspondence with the Paris Declaration aiming at strengthening partner systems. In general, KfW finances and supervises feasibility reports and engineering assessments as projects/programs commence and are implemented. The purpose of these documents is to demonstrate due diligence in project preparation and

[83] *Evaluation Report # 8.*
[84] *Interviews October 9, 2013.*
[85] *Interviews October 14, 2013.*
[86] *Interviews, October 14, October 24, and November 10, 2013.*
[87] *Interviews October 9 and November 3, 2013.*
[88] *Interview October 9, 2013.*

implementation. The annual reports, as well as the final reports, are based on project monitoring data, occasionally supplemented with additional data collection.

The following example provides an insight on how difficult it can be for implementing agencies to obtain sufficient data in a conflict affected country and to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of their projects:

> A final assessment of a roads project was not able to employ a robust enough sample to ground its findings due to the limited population of informants. Only six individuals participated in the household survey, which was then used to extract shifts in household earnings and other variables. While the report said that improvements in the area were causally related to the roads project, there was no supportive evidence indicating that the changes discussed by the six informants were actually directly related to the road built. The use of a full household survey was considered and could have dramatically improved the credibility of the findings, but security constraints prevented the team from carrying it out.[89]

The project-focused approach to M&E and the management of monitoring data by third parties makes it difficult to see how this information can be systematically used for more aggregated issues, for example at the sector level.

Main Features of the M&E System of GIZ in Afghanistan

GIZ utilizes a results-based monitoring (RBM) system for its projects/programs in Afghanistan, as it does in all other countries. GIZ has published guidelines outlining the requirements of a RBM system and how to set up an M&E system. There are standardized general M&E guidelines and a supplement to these for fragile states, such as Afghanistan.[90] However, as was noted in key informant interviews, each project is solely responsible for creating its M&E system, which has resulted in high variance of commitment and quality. According to actors both within and outside of GIZ, some M&E systems are strong and grounded in the RBM guidelines, while others are less so.[91] One explanation given for the variance in the quality of M&E Systems in GIZ projects and programs in Afghanistan was the high rate of staff turnover. Shifts in the M&E systems often reflect the changing focus of new managers interested in setting their own standards and issues.[92]

As for KfW, a centralized M&E system does not exist at the sector level. While an M&E Unit was established in Kabul in 2010, its main tasks are managing the tracking system discussed below and providing trainings on M&E to mostly national staff. The unit is available to projects/programs seeking M&E advice, but is not mandated to coordinate and guide the projects/programs in establishing their M&E systems, nor even in reviewing them once they have been established. This is different from the mandates of M&E Units of other development actors in Afghanistan like DfID or the World Bank.

Key informants assessed the quality and usefulness of GIZ and KfW M&E systems in Afghanistan quite differently. While one group said that the M&E systems are providing the necessary data for project management and decision-making, others expressed concerns that M&E was not taken seriously enough within GDC in Afghanistan.[93] The latter noted a low level of experience of some of the individuals working on M&E and expressed concerns that greater M&E expertise would be needed in order to build stronger systems.[94] Afghanistan experts, outside but familiar with GDC, noted that the data gathered could be further standardized and at the same time provided in more detail. For example, documenting geographical coordinates to show the exact location of activities would greatly assist evaluations.[95]

[89] *JGB Gauff Ingenieure (2012).*
[90] *Additional guidelines for designing and using a RBM system were published by GIZ in 2013, GIZ (2013c).*
[91] *Interviews October 14, November 3, November 4, November 5, November 6, and November 8, 2013.*
[92] *Interviews October 14 and November 3, 2013.*
[93] *For example, Interview October 14, 2013.*
[94] *Interviews October 3 and October 14, 2013.*
[95] *Interview October 3, 2013.*

More standardized data collection was also seen as necessary groundwork which could enable more strategic evaluations.[96] More coherence among the monitoring systems across the different implementing actors would augment the comparability and validity of monitoring data and thus enhance its use among projects as well as beyond the project level.

The BMZ addresses these concerns by setting overarching goals at the country level in its new country strategy 2014 – 2017. The overarching goals enabled the selection of objectives and quantified indicators stated in the country strategy for all priority sectors.[97] The BMZ Division for Afghanistan/Pakistan explained that efforts will be made to align project/program indicators to the new country and sector indicators and objectives. Such a systematic deduction of objectives and indicators would ensure greater coherence for the collection of monitoring data, which would lead to better data comparability. Most importantly, the intervention logic between the country, sector and project levels would be made more explicit and the ground would be set for adopting a stronger impact orientation in the future.

The Tracking System of German Development Assistance

The continuous need for output data and up-to-date reporting in Germany led to the adoption of an online database to track progress in Afghanistan in 2010. The tracking system was set up when the German development offensive was getting started in Northern Afghanistan. It focused on collecting (quick) results gained for the population through the infrastructure (re-) construction and capacity development projects and programs.[98] The tracking system acts as a repository for project and program information across all five German ministries providing funding for development assistance and monitors the implementation status of projects and programs and their outputs.[99]

The database is fed with information from all agencies and their partners receiving funding from the German government. There are about 40 different organizations operating in Afghanistan which are regularly contributing to the database. This monitoring system tracks basic financial and activity data of projects at the input and output level. The GIZ office in Kabul hosts an M&E unit, which operates the tracking system. Financed by the BMZ, this M&E unit processes and analyses the data. It also generates data for the half-yearly Afghanistan Progress Report to the German Bundestag.[100] This report is prepared by all five federal ministries under the editorial direction of the Federal Foreign Office and published by the Federal Government of Germany. Its main intention is to provide a mutually agreed situational analysis to inform the Bundestag on a regular basis. The tracking system is also seen as providing the means for answering *ad hoc* requests for information from the Bundestag, the German embassy in Kabul, and other stakeholders.[101]

Several individuals interviewed for this review noted that the complicated interface of the tracking system is an impediment to data recording and its wider usage. Only a few individuals are familiar enough with the system to be able to quickly obtain results to queries. Further, capturing outputs of infrastructure projects is a lot easier than for capacity development projects, which has raised concern among GIZ staff on whether their achievements are adequately captured in the database.[102] This issue was noted by a number of interviewees, both inside and outside of GDC, and remains a major challenge for the advancement of the tracking system. Zürcher et al. (2013) advocate reforming the tracking system and state that the data in its present form, although being collected with considerable effort, is neither useable for steering the portfolio, nor for conducting impact assessments.[103] The BMZ responded to these concerns and has commissioned work to provide suggestions to improve the system.

[96] *Interview October 3, 2013.*
[97] *BMZ (2014a: 18 – 36).*
[98] *Interview November 5, 2013; Internal Document # 5.*
[99] *Internal Document # 4.*
[100] *GIZ (2013d: 16), E-Mail correspondence with BMZ, 28.10.2013; Bundesregierung (2012).*
[101] *Interviews October 3, November 5, and November 8, 2013.*
[102] *Interviews October 24, November 5, and November 10, 2013.*
[103] *Zürcher et al. (2013: 19).*

In conclusion, the tracking system is viewed as a positive effort by those involved in GDC. Its greatest benefit is that it helps to amalgamate development data from all German funders into one database. The tracking system and the Risk Management Office (see next section) provide examples that cooperation and concerted action among all German development actors in Afghanistan are feasible, despite political and institutional barriers.

Peace and Conflict Assessments

Taking a conflict-sensitive approach is formally required by BMZ in all GDC operations. In the first instance this means to "do no harm" by either intentionally or unintentionally aggravating the situation. However, a conflict- and peace-sensitive approach goes beyond this notion and actively seeks opportunities to foster peace and reduce conflict. Thus, all GDC funded projects and programs are expected to identify peace building measures at the project or program level where possible. Continuous in-depth analysis of the conflict situation and flexible adjustments during project implementation are requirements for incorporating a conflict-sensitive approach into operations.[104]

In collaboration with the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) the BMZ annually assesses the conflict and violence situation in all countries in which BMZ operates. Afghanistan is judged one of the most challenging environments for development cooperation. In response, AA and BMZ established a Risk Management Office (RMO), which they jointly and directly fund, instead of providing funding through projects, as is common in other countries. The RMO is responsible for managing risks to GDC personnel and projects during implementation. To this end, it conducts continuous context and risk analyses, passes the information on to all GDC actors in the field, issues alerts, holds regular meetings and provides guidelines to staff and projects.[105]

BMZ requires that in countries classified as critical for conflict threat, a conflict analysis[106] be carried out and results integrated into project planning and M&E systems. In Afghanistan, advising GDC projects and programs is the task of the Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA) Unit, which is hosted in the RMO. To ensure alignment of analytical approaches and assessments across projects, a PCA focal point is nominated for each project and acts as a liaison person to the PCA Unit in Kabul. Efforts to better integrate the PCA within the M&E unit of projects are currently being discussed.

In addition to these regular activities, four conflict analyses at the country level have been produced in Afghanistan by GDC since 2002. The first study was released in 2003, which was described as being similar to a post-conflict needs assessment. Such an assessment instrument is used in the UN system to identify and budget for development needs in such situations, based on an in-depth conflict analysis.[107] In 2006 and 2010 two more assessments were done. These studies informed GDC framework documents at the country level, sector strategies and finally led to the integration of conflict-sensitive measures in project/program plans, including the M&E plans.[108] In spring 2013 a report on peace building needs and their integration into the GDC portfolio was released. This study informed the BMZ country strategy for Afghanistan.

Overall, interviewees reviewed the efforts undertaken by GDC to assure conflict sensitivity in its strategies and operations as high, valid and helpful. GIZ staff mentioned that much trial and error has taken place, and that it took time to gain an in-depth understanding of the context in order to address conflict sensitivity effectively at the project level. It was also mentioned in this context that GDC's strong focus on conflict and peace enables GIZ to maintain its presence and acceptance in Afghan communities, a requirement for participatory project designs.

[104] *For further details see BMZ (2013b).*
[105] *Interview October 24 and October 29, 2013.*
[106] *A conflict analysis describes the phenomena of conflict, violence and fragility and their interdependence in a specific country context. It analyses root causes of the phenomena and describes their actual dynamics. It identifies conflict drivers; analyses power relations, institutional capacities and resource endowments. It further reviews relevant national policies and donor strategies in order to assess the inherent potential for non-violent conflict solutions. The analysis concludes with the formulation of needs for peace and security under possible scenarios (worst case/best case, most likely development etc.) and the identification of risks (context/institutional/political and personal) for development cooperation (GIZ 2008).*
[107] *UNDG (2014).*
[108] *Interview October 29, 2013.*

Interviewees stated that it is due to these efforts that they are able to operate in areas where they otherwise could not.[109] Such statements are indications that the PCA approach is not just helpful, but also effective. Future evaluations in Afghanistan should analyze in more detail how far German development assistance has incorporated a conflict-sensitive approach in the design and implementation of projects. It is assumed that conflict sensitivity has a significant effect on the effectiveness, acceptance, and sustainability of German development efforts in Afghanistan. Providing evidence that validates this assumption would underpin BMZ strategic decisions and efforts to continue this endeavor.

Considering practical matters of future impact assessments in Afghanistan, the PCA unit and the RMO should play a role in determining which evaluation designs are feasible for being implemented in Afghanistan. This holds particularly true if primary data collection is planned. The security situation in Afghanistan also demands that extra resources for safety measures be calculated into evaluation budgets.

3.1.3 Strategic Level Evaluative Work

Evaluations with a more strategic or aggregated focus, such as sector or (country) portfolio evaluations, exist to a much lesser extent and have mainly been conducted by other international donor agencies. Attempts were made by the BMZ to enhance the level of strategic evaluations, making overtures during the 16th and 17th legislative periods to conduct an evaluation of the entire German ODA contribution to Afghanistan; however, BMZ was unable to garner support for such an effort from the other involved federal ministries so that the proposal has not been forwarded.[110] This fact has been criticized by external observers, who have been blunt in noting that no systematic evaluation of Germany's entire engagement in Afghanistan has taken place[111], while at the same time "[the] political reports from the government remain general, euphemistic, and shaped by an interest in self-justification."[112] Several interviewees said that a new effort by the BMZ to rally support for conducting a country portfolio evaluation on German development assistance in Afghanistan would unlikely succeed in the near future. Only a strong political initiative at the level of the German parliament could overcome the existing resistance in some quarters.[113]

In an important gap-filling exercise the BMZ catered for the lack of evidence at strategic levels by submitting its own part of the German aid portfolio to a twofold assessment. In doing so the BMZ commissioned two pieces of overarching work that clearly stand out: an innovative longitudinal impact assessment conducted by a research team at the Freie Universität Berlin (Zürcher et al. 2007a, 2010) and a Strategic Portfolio Review undertaken by a group of researchers working with Prof. Zürcher, now at the University of Ottawa (Zürcher et al. 2013).

The Impact Assessment of Development Cooperation in North East Afghanistan

This multi-year research project has been conducted with funding from the German Research Foundation (DFG) and in cooperation with the BMZ's Evaluation Division (BMZ-E), which has published results of this work as BMZ evaluation reports. It is notable that, due to efforts on the part of BMZ-E, a connection between the original scope of the research and German development efforts has been established (e.g. via the expansion of researched districts to include more areas of GDC and through publications specifically for the BMZ). Conducted by Zürcher, Koehler, and Böhnke, the project began in 2007 and continues into the present.[114] It focuses on the question of whether development cooperation at large ("aid") has had an impact on the stabilization of a conflict zone by changing general attitudes towards the peace building mission, the legitimacy of the Afghan state, and perceived security threats.[115]

[109] *Interview October 29, 2013.*
[110] *E-mail correspondence with BMZ, November 5, 2013.*
[111] *This was mentioned in interviews for this review and by some authors, including Nachtwei (2011).*
[112] *Nachtwei (2011).*
[113] *Interviews October 1, October 3, and October 24, 2013.*
[114] *The research team has produced multiple reports, including a pre-study (Zürcher et al. 2007c), an approach and methods paper (Zürcher et al. 2007b), an interim report (Zürcher et al. 2007a), and a final report for 2005 – 2009 (Zürcher et al. 2010). It is expected that another report for the phase 2011 – 2013 will be published in the near future.*
[115] *Zürcher et al. (2010: 6); Zürcher et al (2007a).*

The research follows best practice standards for impact evaluation in its adopted methodology. Next to incorporating a robust multi-method approach, including quantitative and qualitative data collection, it adopted a longitudinal research design. So far, four large-sized surveys including a baseline survey have been conducted with local research organizations. This allows obtaining comparable information at the household level over several time periods.[116] Shifts in perceptions, attitudes, and experiences of the Afghan population within six districts have been documented.[117] Additionally, community profiles, quarterly reports from 40 village representatives, in-depth case studies at the village level, stakeholder interviews, and existing databases were used in order to capture impact.

The final report published in 2010 has twelve main findings.[118] One of the central messages is that aid positively influences attitudes towards the peace building mission, but only in a secure environment.[119] This conclusion supports the networked security approach adopted by the German Government. Another finding with significant value for GDC refers to the effect of aid on attitudes. The effect was found to be short-lived and non-cumulative, indicating that fostering positive attitudes towards peace building missions and development aid would have to be a continuous process. Such findings provide important insights on development work in Afghanistan which have not been captured by the alternative evaluative efforts.

The research results have been put to use for strategic decision making in GDC. For example, members of the research team have indicated that in ministerial discussions on the post-2014 country strategy, the BMZ carefully considered the implications of the finding that aid efforts have a positive impact on attitudes towards the peace building mission in secure locations. The research team suggested to BMZ to develop a stronger information and communication strategy in order to increase understanding among all projects/programs stakeholders, which has apparently been addressed in the new country strategy.[120] GIZ staff pointed out that the results of the study validated the chosen risk management approach in Afghanistan, which is based on strengthening acceptance by the local communities.[121] This backed the BMZ decision to enhance the geographical scope and outreach of the risk management system, which has up through today allowed GIZ to directly deliver services at the district and village levels. Further, the result that aid has a small but positive impact on how the Afghan provincial and district government is perceived provided some confirmation of the governance program (i.e. the Regional Capacity Development Fund) and led to enhance efforts via outreach activities. Additionally, KfW staff indicated that they used the findings to underpin their decisions regarding the kind of work they would take on in Afghanistan programs. The positive research findings were also taken up by German politicians, though often in an overly affirmative manner, which unfortunately risks overstating the message.[122]

The impact assessment focuses on people's perceptions of aid and security and actually does analyze the direct or indirect socio-economic impact of German assistance. However, the research does not cover all districts in which GDC operates, nor central level interventions, nor does it make a distinction between German supported efforts and those provided by other development actors in the North East, though Germany is admittedly the most important donor in that area. Hence, even this substantial work cannot be taken as an impact evaluation of GDC as a whole in Afghanistan. Further expansion of this project and the inclusion of a representative sample of GDC intervention districts would make results even more informative.

[116] *The survey was conducted in 77 villages in 2009, 79 villages in 2010, and 120 villages in 2011. Half of the villages were selected by random sample and half were chosen according to their diversity, based on five criteria. Households within the villages were randomly sampled. The surveys were conducted by an Afghan research organization.*

[117] *The surveys conducted in 2007 and 2009 only covered four districts, with two additional districts added in 2011.*

[118] *1. Development aid continues to reach communities, 2. The Afghan state is seen as contributing to the provisions of basic goods, 3. Development actors are met with more caution, 4. Foreign forces are met with more caution, 5. Threat perceptions are dramatically on the rise, 6. Households and communities still remain safe, 7. Aid positively influences attitudes towards the peace building mission, 8. … but only in a secure environment, 9. Aid has a small and positive impact on how the Afghan provincial and district government is perceived, 10. The positive effect of aid on attitudes and legitimacy of the Afghan state is short-lived and non-cumulative, 11. Aid has no impact on how foreign forces are perceived, and 12. Aid has no effect on threat perceptions.*

[119] *Zürcher et al. (2010: 5).*

[120] *BMZ (2014a: 35).*

[121] *Interviews August 28 and October 3, 2013.*

[122] *Interview October 3, 2013.*

Despite the limitations mentioned, this study provides evidence that methodologically demanding impact analyses, which also include several rounds of comprehensive household surveys, are possible to carry out, even over several years in fragile states like Afghanistan. German development cooperation would be well served by conducting more strategic evaluations of this kind. This impact analysis appears exemplary for the generation of strategic evidence in fragile states – particularly in combination with the strategic portfolio review discussed below.

The Strategic Portfolio Review

To address existing information gaps with regard to the entire GDC portfolio, the BMZ Evaluation Division, in accordance with the BMZ Division for Afghanistan and Pakistan, commissioned a strategic portfolio review in 2012. The review analyzed whether and how adjustments to the portfolio would be helpful for a post-2013 engagement of BMZ in Afghanistan, and was asked to answer a number of specific questions on the adequacy of multi-donor trust funds, approaches to further involve women, and the engagement in rural areas – all under the specific consideration of a changing security context.

This strategic portfolio review provides an overview of the different types of projects/programs implemented by GDC since 2007; it outlines the development of the portfolio over time, offers a scenario analysis, assesses the shock resistance of programs to security threats, and presents 15 recommendations for adjusting the portfolio.[123] Although this work is strictly speaking not a proper evaluation either, and the authors do not at all claim this, it provides a sound analysis of the issues raised. Zürcher et al. (2013) state that a strategic portfolio review cannot substitute for the lack of evidence. Indeed, a number of politically relevant conclusions, particularly with regard to the most precarious programs in terms of impact and overarching political objectives, are made without empirical corroboration attached, although DEval does not doubt that the investigations were actually conducted. Despite the limitations, BMZ considers the strategic portfolio review an essential piece of analysis for shaping the new BMZ country strategy for Afghanistan 2014 – 2017.

Strategic Level Evaluative Works by other Development Partners

International assistance to Afghanistan comes from over 50 development partners, and the overall amount of aid spent between 2002 and 2011 exceeded 57 billion USD. The assistance from most of the development partners has been evaluated (by internal evaluation units or by external agencies tasked to assess aid effectiveness of the support provided.) In 2012 the Asian Development Bank, Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), and the World Bank released their strategic level evaluations, which usually review entire country programs. At least another five development partners have undertaken program evaluations over the past five years, including Finland, UNDP, UK, US and Canada. The UK has even commissioned two evaluations; the first one in 2009 and a second one in 2012 which were conducted by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI). Additionally, the Government of Afghanistan issued a study on aid assistance with a special focus on the implementation of the Paris Declaration in 2010.[124]

The results and findings of these evaluations offer valuable lessons to development partners and to the Afghan government. The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank commissioned a comparative analysis synthesizing the core messages and recommendations from these evaluations and presented them for discussion to donors and the Afghan government at a workshop in Wilton Park (Great Britain, February 2013). The core findings of the synthesis paper and the workshop report are summarized in the following block.[125]

[123] *Zürcher et al. (2013: iii-iv; 4 – 5).*
[124] *The evaluation reports mentioned are listed in the list of references.*
[125] *The following summary is fully based on Sud (2013) and G. J. Wilson (2013), who presented a synthesis paper and the conference report of the Wilton Park conference in February 2013.*

What are evaluation results telling us about the effectiveness of aid in Afghanistan? (based on results of the Wilton Park Conference 2013)

*Nine development partners evaluated the aid effectiveness of their country programs in Afghanistan between 2007 – 2012. The following **results** were drawn as lessons learned:*

- *There have been significant accomplishments in delivering goods and services to the Afghan people. The output indicators in virtually every sector have improved dramatically (e.g. there are 1,500 more health clinics operable in 2011 compared to 2002; the number of teachers increased from 64,000 to 170,000 in nine years; the number of school buildings more than doubled in this time period; 30 % of the total road network has been rehabilitated).*
- *Major impediments to aid effectiveness are the high costs of operations in this fragile state context due to high administration costs, low administrative capacities, additional security costs and recurring implementation delays. These factors particularly lower efficiency rates.*
- *The sustainability of projects has been rated as low by most development partners and remains a serious issue of concern, since the public finances were assessed as being seriously inadequate to sustain the costs of current programs funded by aid.*
- *While all donor evaluations consider their respective activities to have been (highly) relevant and well aligned with GIRoA plans and priorities, the government itself contrarily considers that many donors show little commitment to aligning contributions to national plans and priorities. Particularly troublesome is the parallel existence of different models of sub-national governance, introduced by different donor agencies with no clear decision from the Afghan government which one will be taken on as the national model.*
- *The most significant results of aid are seen by the establishment and functioning of a basic civil service, the implementation of a banking and public financial management system, the achieved legitimacy of the state via a series of elections with high participation, and the slow but steady progress in gender equity.*
- *Aid has been less effective in fostering confidence of the Afghan people in the judiciary and political system, conquering corruption, and achieving sustainable economic growth (particularly regarding jobs and in reforming the agricultural sector).*
- *Evaluations have also shown that, despite extensive efforts to build the capacity of civil servants, they are disappointingly far from reaching anticipated results. The weak outcomes in developing the capacity of state employees are fueled by the fact that neither the donors nor the government have a comprehensive view on building state capacity.*
- *With regards to achieving outcomes for subnational governance, the evaluations generally conclude that there has not been much progress on building governance at the local level. Donor's efforts are uncoordinated and lack a coherent view of local governance – which can also be seen even within the Afghan government.*

Conclusions:

- *There is need for a much sharper focus on just a few overarching issues rather than on a large and scattered donor effort.*
- *Better alignment and priority setting among donors could enhance aid effectiveness.*
- *The Afghan government will have to demonstrate stronger leadership and commitment.*
- *More attention should to be given to how aid can be more sustainable in the future, particular in the context of potential declining development aid budgets.*
- *More attention to results is an uncontested demand by all parties; however, differences remain between the Afghan government and donors on how this can be achieved. For the Afghan government this means more aid "on budget", better alignment of aid to the country's priorities, and better division of labor amongst donors. On the other hand, donors point to the increased level of accountability for money spent in Afghanistan and find it is not always easy to be sure that progress is being made, especially on key issues such as corruption and justice. The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) provides a frame in which mutual accountability can be addressed.*

- *Understanding effects of aid in Afghanistan is seriously hampered by a lack of focus within existing M&E systems on outcomes and the continued lack of good quality analytical work, upon which robust evaluations can be built.*
- *In the highly politicized environment the perception of what success looks like often differs substantially among donors and the Afghan government. It needs to be acknowledged that in Afghanistan external issues drive the debate just as much as internal issues.*[126]

Source: based on G. J. Wilson (2013) and Sud (2013)

Most of the evaluations confirm a lack of focus of the M&E systems on outcomes, which significantly weakens the analysis of downstream socio-economic effects of aid. This result mirrors the constraints identified for evaluative work in German cooperation (see chapter 3.1.1 and 3.1.2). Nevertheless, three common themes are addressed by most donor programs with some consideration of outcomes: State building, citizenship and legitimacy, as well as economic growth and jobs. These themes are also given priority by GDC, as reflected in the selection of their five priority sectors. In conclusion Wilson (2013) and Sud (2013) suggest much closer cooperation between donors and the Afghan government in undertaking evaluations in the future, which could help to narrow the gap between the various political viewpoints.

3.2 Summary of Findings from the Evaluative Work Conducted Under the BMZ Portfolio

The review of evaluative material produced by GDC in Afghanistan illustrates that KfW's ex-post evaluations and GIZ's project progress reviews are building the backbone of results control at the project level. The review of the reports shows a strong project/program orientation with a focus on immediate achievements (outputs) rather than effects. However, over time most bi- and multilateral development agencies operating in Afghanistan have complemented their project level evaluations with more strategic evaluations (e.g. sector or country level evaluations). A country level evaluation has not yet been conducted by Germany on its portfolio.[127] To this day, the longitudinal impact assessment on North East Afghanistan and the strategic portfolio review are the most substantial pieces of strategic evaluative work available in the German context. One reason why so few strategic level evaluations have taken place until now is the weak coordination among the five German federal ministries providing funds to projects in Afghanistan. While a tracking system has been operational since 2010 and has captured project data at the input and output level for all German funded operations, this kind of coordination is rather the exception than the rule. For example, the AA project portfolio has not been included in the strategic portfolio review commissioned by BMZ, although the AA provides over two-fifths of German funding for development cooperation in Afghanistan. As a consequence, it does not take the support to building the police force into consideration – which is the largest sector by value for the GIZ (see Figure 6), nor major contributions to the health and air traffic sectors, nor several projects in the governance sector, all of which are AA-funded. This raises questions regarding the reasons for this sectoral division of labor, not just those regarding their effects. The availability of project monitoring data as one information source for strategic evaluations is incomplete. Baseline data were often missing, and very diverse in their quality. Again, better alignment of monitoring systems among the different actors, as well as more standardized data collection were deemed necessary if more strategic level evaluations are to take place.[128]

The fact that cooperation in Afghanistan stood constantly in the political limelight back in Germany has played an important role on how business has been done with regard to M&E systems and evaluative work. These conditions favored a set of products which serve a different purpose than the regular *modus operandi*

[126] *More specifically, G. J. Wilson state "in a heavily politicized environment there remain key differences in the perception of the GIRoA and of the donors in terms of what success looks like. These differences steer the discussion in many directions other than just development. The debate concerning aid effectiveness, donor coordination and aid modalities cannot be divorced from external issues such as the domestic political climate in donor capitals, the military campaign and upcoming withdrawal, financial crises in the west and worsening fiscal constraints, and anti-corruption issues. The relative importance of these aspects changes over time, but they drive the debate" (G. J. Wilson 2013: 1).*

[127] *Interviews October 1 and October 3, 2013.*

[128] *Zürcher et al. are even more explicit on this point and state „without a useful database for monitoring one's own work, neither steering nor impact control in possible" (Zürcher et al. 2013: 19).*

in other partner countries.[129] According to several interview sources, continuous demand for quick results from the German parliament, the funding ministries, and the media led to a pressured environment where the need for quantitative input and output level data for demonstrating progress took precedence.[130] Project level information was often used to support decisions from a German foreign or defense policy perspective, rather than using it to generate evidence for what works on the ground and what does not. Interview partners remarked that reports on GDC in Afghanistan focus on sucesses and do not provide the political space to discuss failures in comparison to other partner countries. Thus, the produced evaluative work has focused on proving the worth of efforts to an external audience, while internal learning has remained at the operational instead of the strategic level.[131] The project ratings of the reviewed reports provide indicative evidence to this argument: none of the 11 projects received the rating "less successful" or "unsuccessful" by the evaluators. Seven projects have been rated "mostly successful", two as "very successful", one as successful and one report abstained from presenting ratings.

Insecurity widely influenced the evaluation approaches selected and the usefulness of certain types of evaluations. Operating in a fragile country has impeded the gathering of robust and grounded data from the field since evaluators are often hindered in conducting larger household surveys or other fieldwork. However, some evaluators and researchers have found ways of dealing with this situation, such as working closely with local research and surveying institutes. The knowledge of the PCA Unit and the RMO in Kabul on the conflict situation in the country and on conflict sensitive project designs should be put to use when designing evaluations in the future.

Political and social fragility has also impacted the usefulness of certain types of evaluations. While ex-post evaluations often provide very valuable information for long-term learning on good project designs, their utilization in Afghanistan is impeded by the highly volatile environment. Circumstances change fast and so profoundly that findings of ex-post evaluations might not be adequate or relevant anymore to the present, providing less value for guiding decisions than in a stable setting. Complementing ex-post evaluations with more robust end-of-project (or -phase) evaluations is therefore recommended.

The set-up of the German M&E system is a final reason for the limited support to strategic decision-making. The system has a strong focus on internal, project-level monitoring (e.g. the tracking system) and evaluation (mandatory PPRs and ex-post evaluations). Further, the M&E Unit in Kabul does not have the mandate to exercise an oversight function for aligning different elements of evaluative work and supervising its quality. Given that the M&E system is also not oriented towards specific objectives above the project level, the existing work is impeded in taking a more strategic direction, which seriously limits the informative value of the analyses for strategic planning and decision-making at the sector and country level. Due to the division of labor within the German aid system, this affects BMZ potentially more than the implementing agencies.

Based on key informant interviews, this review is able to provide some anecdotal information on how results of evaluative work have guided German development work in Afghanistan. However, obtaining a more in-depth understanding of the utilization of evaluative work in GDC requires extensive research beyond the scope of this review. For example, tracing studies could provide valuable insights on how, when and why recommendations of evaluations have informed decision making.

Key informants interviewed in BMZ, GIZ, and KfW made it clear that they have actually used the evaluative material provided. The BMZ asserts that the tracking system, the strategic portfolio review, and the impact assessment in North East Afghanistan were used to analytically underpin the new BMZ country strategy for Afghanistan.[132] Project level evaluative work is said to have

[129] *Interview November 1, 2013.*
[130] *Interviews October 9, October 24, and November 3, 2013.*
[131] *Interviews October 24, October 29, November 3, 2013; comment received to draft version of this report 18.12.2013.*
[132] *Internal Document #1.*

continuously informed the steering of the project portfolio and the priority areas. Some examples of this are: (a) the decision to discontinue complex infrastructure projects in Afghanistan, (b) the revision of the value chain approach in sustainable economic development projects, and (c) BMZ's request to KfW to accelerate the approval procedures within the RIDF.[133] GIZ and KfW in Afghanistan use evaluative works for decisions all along the project cycle, including the design of new projects and project phases. However, as mentioned by one consultant, certain recommendations could not always be adopted by the projects, for political reasons.[134]

[133] *Written comment by BMZ to earlier draft of this report, December 19, 2013.*
[134] *Interview October 14, 2013.*

4.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE EVALUATIVE WORK IN AFGHANISTAN

4.1 Conclusions

Relating findings to the questions raised at the beginning of this review with regard to the volume, quality and usage of evaluation within the GDC in Afghanistan, it can be concluded that a substantial body of output-related evaluative work exists in relatively good quality for the GDC portfolio.

Nonetheless, the evaluations available today at the program and project level are of limited informative value for underpinning strategic decisions at the ministerial level with evidence. This judgment can be verified by looking at the range of questions the BMZ directed at the team that conducted the strategic portfolio review (as presented in chapter 3.1). The questions show that critical information for steering the right mix of the portfolio and for developing a country strategy was not readily available.

There are no sector level evaluations available providing insights on the effectiveness of work within the sector, or for guiding decisions on whether GDC is operating in the right sectors, whether the mix of sectors and the allocation of funds among them is the best possible option. An evaluation of the governance funds (RCDF, RIDF and OPAF) has not been commissioned so far, although such a report could help answering the question about the effects of BMZ and AA engagement in rural areas on sub-national governance. However, the ARTF has been internally and externally evaluated several times by others, which has provided robust evidence that it is a successful tool.[135] And still, issues about the absorption capacity of the Afghan government remain to be analyzed in order to decide if and to which extent the ARTF can be scaled-up.[136]

The context for German cooperation in Afghanistan is expected to change after 2014 with the withdrawal of ISAF troops. It is anticipated that there will be less political pressure for quick results. As reflected at the Wilton Park conference, this will quite possibly shift the attention of decision-makers and technical staff in international development organizations towards gaining better insights in processes and longer term results. It is further anticipated that there will be more space for learning from failures and expressing challenges and risks more clearly. It can be further expected that a new realism regarding achievements of project or program objectives in terms of scope and time will set in. All these anticipated changes are likely to provide a window of opportunity to extend and adjust evaluative work in Afghanistan.

4.2 Recommendations

The core recommendation is to address the fragmentation and incoherence of the present M&E system and to work towards an integrative evaluation approach in Afghanistan. Integrative means aligning internal project-focused evaluative work with independent evaluations which focus on effects at the program, sector, instrument or country level. A systematically deduced evaluation program would require more standardized data collection and analysis to enhance comparability among units. This requirement might entail more professional evaluative capacity on the ground. In order to facilitate the shift towards an integrative approach, the mandate of the already existing M&E unit should be expanded to supervise the set-up of M&E systems for German funded projects and to generate sector and country level monitoring data.[137]

Other donor agencies have adopted different approaches for setting up their M&E systems in Afghanistan. A comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of these systems can provide information for reforming the German M&E system. Ideas of how to proceed can be found by looking at the M&E set-up of DfID's Girls Education Challenge Fund, where an external evaluation consultancy has been hired to act as a professional M&E advisor to project/programs over the life time of the project. The external M&E specialists are helping to integrate M&E from the

[135] *G. J. Wilson (2013: 3); Sud (2013: 17).*
[136] *Zürcher et al. (2013: 22 – 23).*
[137] *The ideas for strengthening internal and external evaluation efforts presented in the following are founded on responses given during key informant interviews. One set of questions asked in all interviews referred to demands and suggestions for a future evaluation plan for GDC in Afghanistan.*

beginning of a project and ensuring high standards. The Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (HMEP) and the ARTF are good examples for combining internal and external evaluations to achieve robust evidence on effects of interventions.[138]

4.2.1 Ideas for Strengthening Internal Evaluation

A stronger orientation towards measuring effects in evaluations will provide valuable evidence for operational and strategic decision-making. In recommending that the targets and indicators retained in the new BMZ country strategy be the reference for aligning program and project level targets and indicators, this review takes up what is apparently intended by BMZ to be done since the strategy's launch in March 2014.

In support of this, it is recommended to orient the existing M&E system stronger towards assessing project and sector level outcomes and impacts. A shift towards systematically assessing effects of interventions would be in alignment with the already existing guidelines and standards for M&E systems by BMZ, GIZ and KfW.

It is recommended that more resources and attention be given toward establishing baselines (at project and sector level). They are an important requirement for applying the robust designs of impact analysis, and can include the building of ex-ante or ex-post control groups.

It is recommended that the objective of the tracking system be extended, so that monitoring data is also being collected systematically at the country and sector level. The M&E Unit managing the tracking system should obtain more resources to conduct broader data analysis with attention given to analyzing information obtained at different levels.[139]

Standardizing indicators at the project level to some degree would allow for better data comparability among projects and between sectors.

Even at the project level the right kind of evaluations can enhance the informative value for decision-making at different levels. KfW should consider complementing ex-post evaluations with robust end-of-project evaluations in order to reduce the risk of not presenting timely results in a fast-changing country context. Additionally evaluations of projects that have been identified as needing adaptations by the strategic portfolio review (i.e. TVET, the national road project from Kunduz to Khulm) could be timely and strategic.[140]

Future evaluative work should build on an existing analytical experience with peace building and conflict-sensitive interventions. Reviewing this would provide important insights to GDC's approach in fragile states and would strengthen the German position among international donors in fragile state settings.[141]

Building knowledge among GDC staff on what works, why, and under what circumstances in Afghanistan should also be approached more systematically. Key results of analyses and evaluations could be disseminated to the entire country program staff for discussion – to those at the headquarters in Germany, as well as in the field, along with Afghan partners, particularly in a country where the turnover of staff is as high as it is in Afghanistan.[142]

Altogether, building an evaluation culture within the German organizations working in Afghanistan should be pursued as the best way for institutional learning, as not only success, but also failures would be addressed. If deemed necessary, communication strategies would also be adjusted accordingly.

[138] *The Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (HMEP) is a comprehensive provincial level M&E system for all UK works in Helmand Province. Started in 2009, HMEP's focus was on the wider impact of UK projects and programs on attitudinal shifts. The HMEP also serves to centralize and standardize the information available about UK development cooperation, as multiple actors were utilizing different methodological approaches, leading to different perspectives on what should be evaluated.*

[139] *Reform of the tracking system is also recommended by Zürcher et al. (2013: 19) and its use retained in the new BMZ country strategy for Afghanistan (BMZ 2014a: 22).*

[140] *Zürcher et al. (2013: 24 – 25).*

[141] *Interview October 29, 2013. Drawing on their assessment, Zürcher et al. (2013: 20) make the point that, although GDC has no leverage on influencing the overall security situation in Afghanistan, the conflict-sensitive project implementation of GDC can quite well have a preventive effect and contribute to stabilizing peace. They recommend that bottom up peace building should be strengthened, particularly in rural development.*

[142] *Interviews November 8 and November 10, 2013. See also Zürcher et al. (2013: 19).*

4.2.2 Ideas for External and Independent Evaluation

The second prong to an approach for future evaluative works in Afghanistan would be more external and independent evaluations. Three types of evaluations and two themes are recommended to conduct in the near future:

1. Ultimately, a comprehensive evaluation of all aid interventions of the German Government in Afghanistan remains desirable. It would provide the most comprehensive assessment of achieved results and would contribute to the on-going international discussion on evaluation lessons drawn from development assistance to Afghanistan. Furthermore, a comprehensive country evaluation could delve into the appropriate sequencing of interventions directed by different German ministries, under the general headings of governance, social and economic development and security. A country program evaluation could also review the results and consequences of applying different approaches to development by different entities (e.g. hand-outs vs. self-help). Admittedly, such a country evaluation runs at present into the difficulties stemming from gaps in impact measurement at the project level. However, the strategic evaluations of several other donors have shown that principally it is feasible to accomplish such evaluations. The evaluation can examine the coherence of target systems, interventions logics, comparative impact assessment of instruments and approaches, and selective field research on particularly relevant or critical interventions. The results of such an evaluation can still provide decisive insight on how the alignment of objectives, strategies and approaches among German ministries can be improved.[143]
2. Should a comprehensive country evaluation remain nonnegotiable among the German ministries, the German government should provide good reasons for abstaining, given the mass of insight already produced by the strategic studies commissioned by the BMZ. In DEval's assessment, the alternative is not a country evaluation focusing on the BMZ portfolio alone, as essential information beyond the aforementioned studies will accrue only in a couple of years. Yet, BMZ should not abstain from commissioning strategic sector- or instrument-evaluations to support its steering function. Sector evaluations that are initially confined to BMZ-directed work can provide valuable information in particular where the need for adaptation has already been identified (e.g. sustainable economic development). The German Foreign Office and other ministries may want to follow suit and extend the examination to other sectors. The design of such an evaluation would allow for accumulating knowledge within the priority sectors on results over time, as well as enabling comparability in selected dimensions across sectors.[144]
3. Despite the deficits in outcome and impact measurement, a wealth of information exists from the work of Afghan-German projects which has been implemented for over a decade. To hoist this treasure of information for strategic planning and decision-making would require a set of meta-analyses which address pertinent cross-cutting issues based on available project documentation. The issues should be identified by BMZ together with Afghan partners and the implementing agencies (e.g. on a specific instrument like the regional funds). Such analysis can be completed by tracing how prior evaluation findings have actually been used for project design and steering. The results of these studies would provide valuable inputs for developing a specific evaluation program for GDC in Afghanistan that has a high value of usefulness for all actors involved.[145]

Next to these different types of aggregated evaluations, two themes are recommended that should be further investigated and underpinned by evaluations.

a. It is recommended that the first piece of work looks at identifying ways to better capture the results of capacity development projects/programs. Capacity development operations account for up to 40 % of the BMZ portfolio. The concern that their achievements are not sufficiently captured by the present monitoring system has been expressed during discussions on the tracking system (see section 3.1 above).

[143] *Interviews October 9 and October 21, 2013.*
[144] *Interview October 1, 2013.*
[145] *Interviews October 1 and October 24, 2013.*

Results of this study could help to capture the effects of a relatively large part of the portfolio better.[146] Demand for this work has also been expressed by donors attending the Wilton Park conference. Key questions were framed as "Capacity development – what have we learned from the evaluations?" and "How can support to capacity development be improved and institutionalized in the government?"[147]

b. The second theme to be addressed refers to evaluating gender mainstreaming approaches. Demand for this work has been expressed internationally, as well as from within GDC. Although "gender equity has been a focus of all donor programs and shows progress"[148], there is little understanding of which gender approach is showing which effect. Zürcher et al. (2013) recommend that "an evaluation of gender mainstreaming projects (or the gender components of projects) should be conducted, in order to develop a gender strategy based on its results which takes into account the specific conditions found within Afghanistan."[149]

DEval's future role in supporting an evaluation program in Afghanistan could include advising GDC country staff in Germany and Afghanistan in developing a comprehensive evaluation program, assisting in designing an integrative M&E system and conducting some of the external and independent evaluations outlined in this section.

Looking forward to at least four more years of GDC in Afghanistan means that continued efforts aiming to better understand the complex nature of development work in this country are sound investments and are being made with the ultimate objective of contributing to improving the well-being of the Afghan people.

[146] *Interviews October 24, November 5, and November 8, 2013. Zürcher et al. (2013: 21 – 22) make the point that the effectiveness of capacity development (CD) projects is hampered by the fact that it is often not a lack of capacity but political will to implement reforms. CD projects are ineffective because they are not in demand from the side of the Afghan government. The authors suggest evaluating the incentive structure of CD projects in detail to gain a better understanding of whether the CD approach has any chance to succeed in the specific context.*

[147] *Wilson (2013: 5 and 6).*

[148] *Sud (2013: 9).*

[149] *Zürcher et al. (2013: 28), English translation by DEval.*

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ANNEX A.

METHOD OF THE REVIEW

This review is based on an extensive document analysis and a set of key informant interviews. The objective of the review is to gain an understanding of the type and quality of evaluations that have been undertaken by BMZ and the two implementing agencies GIZ and KfW in Afghanistan in recent years. The review focuses on the time period between 2002 and 2013, i.e. the time frame after the fall of the Taliban government and the reengagement of the international community in development cooperation in Afghanistan in 2002.

The review appraises the following 7 research questions:

1. What is included in the GDC portfolio and how has it developed over the past decade?
2. What does the evaluation practice of GDC in Afghanistan currently look like? (How many and what types of evaluations have been conducted?)
3. How and to what extent do the evaluations measure results (i.e. outputs, outcomes, and impacts)? (What can be said about the effectiveness of German development cooperation in Afghanistan? Which evaluation designs have been applied?)
4. What is the quality of the evaluations that have been conducted? (Criteria for this assessment are outlined in Annex C)
5. How have the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the evaluations been utilized? (How have the evaluations impacted GDC planning and strategic decision-making in Afghanistan?)
6. What can be learned from other development cooperation actors' evaluation efforts in Afghanistan that would be applicable to GDC?
7. What should a future evaluation program of GDC in Afghanistan look like? (What kind of evaluations should be conducted, who should do it and how should it be done in the future?)

The review utilized both primary and secondary data collection techniques. 25 key informant interviews took place in addition to a document review. The key informant interviews were used to obtain GDC actors' general views on evaluation in Afghanistan, to consider the quality of evaluations that have taken place, and to gain an understanding on how evaluations have been utilized within the BMZ and its implementing partner organizations for the purposes of planning and decision-making.

Interviews were conducted with BMZ, GIZ, and KfW staff based in both Germany and Afghanistan. Additionally, academic researchers with extensive knowledge of Afghanistan and GDC have been interviewed to provide an external perspective. Confidentiality of information and anonymity of informants has been guaranteed by DEval to all key informants. Therefore, the list of informants is not included as an Annex in this report.

The secondary data collection included a document review of evaluative work conducted on GDC projects in Afghanistan. The framework of analysis is described in detail in Annex C, clearly showing that this review is not a meta-evaluation of project level work.

All documents were categorized into one of the following three categories: (i) evaluative work at the project and program level, (ii) work above the program or at the strategic level (iii) work that is related to the GDC's M&E system in Afghanistan.

Project or program level evaluative work:
Upon request GIZ and KfW sent their evaluative work conducted on BMZ funded projects in Afghanistan to DEval. A list with 127 documents was received. However, based on the international quality standards for development evaluation set by the OECD/DAC (2010b), many of these documents do not qualify to be considered evaluation.

In a **first step** only documents that qualify as evaluations or have several elements of evaluation were selected. These were considered to be evaluative work for the purposes of this review. The ex-post evaluations (4), impact assessments (2), project progress reviews (21) and e-VAL reports (10) were included into this category, which narrowed the list of documents down to 37 pieces of work (of these, four documents were from the KfW work and 33 documents from the GIZ). A sample of 11 documents was drawn from these 38 remaining documents. Two to three reports of each type were randomly selected. Drawing a small

sample size was a response to the time and budget constraints of this review.

In a **second step** an assessment of the quality of each of the 11 evaluative works was completed by applying a standardized set of criteria established by the authors. This step considered the evaluation approach in more detail: methods selected and applied; evaluation criteria selected and applied; triangulation of information; relevance of evaluation focus, questions and recommendations; and connections between findings, conclusions, recommendations, and project ratings. The assessment criteria are presented in detail in Annex C. The results of the assessment are presented in Annex D.

Strategic level evaluative work

Two pieces of work under the auspices of BMZ were identified as innovative and highly relevant for an overall assessment of how GDC's portfolio has been evaluated so far: the impact assessment in North East Afghanistan conducted by Zürcher et al. (2007a, 2010), and the strategic portfolio review (Zürcher et al. 2013), which was commissioned by BMZ in 2012 in support of developing the new country strategy for Afghanistan. Both of these reveal information above the project or program level and are more strategic in nature. While the portfolio review is not an evaluation per se, it provides relevant strategic level analysis which has underpinned GDC's strategic decision-making in Afghanistan. Thus, it falls within this second category of analytical work presently available. A third set of documents within this category includes country level evaluations conducted by other international donors operating in Afghanistan.

The first two documents became subject to the document analysis based on the assessment framework presented in Annex C. Results of this review are presented in chapter 3.1 of this report. The main results of strategic evaluations conducted by other international donors have been summarized. These results were also drawn at an international conference which took place in the UK in February 2012 and have been presented at more length in chapter 3.1.

In a **third step** the analysis concentrated on the usage of the evaluations within BMZ and its implementing partners operating in Afghanistan. Here project as well as strategic level work was included. The focus was to look at issues of dissemination of the evaluations and how the evaluation findings were utilized to inform project/program planning and strategic decision-making. This involved an analysis of the lessons learned and recommendations presented in the evaluations themselves to determine whether they were grounded, actionable, and feasible for use in program planning and strategic decision-making. Key informant interviews were conducted to delve more deeply into the question of how the evaluations and the results of those evaluations have been used within the BMZ and its implementing partner organizations.

The M&E System

This category includes the description of a tracking system of project activities at the output level. This database has been included because it compiles information on all German development projects in Afghanistan, not just those funded by BMZ. Thus, it can provide insights for developing the existing M&E system further.

Finally, additional secondary resources, such as operational guidelines and strategic plans were also reviewed, along with evaluative works stemming from other development cooperation actors working in Afghanistan.

ANNEX B.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS PROVIDED BY THE GIZ AND KFW

DEval has received 127 documents from the GIZ and the KfW, which encompass the evaluative work of their projects and/or programs in Afghanistan. These documents include final reports (Schlussberichte), project progress reports (Projektfortschrittsberichte), project progress reviews (Projektfortschrittskontrolle), audits (Berichte von Wirtschaftsprüfungen), ex-post evaluations, and e-VAL reports. As stated in the main text of this review, only a few of these evaluative works can be considered complete evaluations according to international standards. Along these standards, evaluations should be made available to the public. Other types of reports serve to meet internal reporting requirements. In consideration of the confidential interests of the implementing organizations, the list of all documents provided is not included here.

ANNEX C.

FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

The evaluation criteria established for this research is grounded on the OECD/DAC principles and quality standards for development evaluation.[150] Extracting from these two references, it was determined that this assessment of evaluation of German development cooperation in Afghanistan would focus on the quality of the purpose, approach, implementation, and findings. These areas are broken down below into a set of questions that was asked of each evaluative work reviewed, in addition to general descriptive questions on the evaluative work. The question, answers, and purpose/comments are included in the chart below.

Evaluation Quality

Question	Answer	Purpose/Comments
Type of data gathered	a. Qualitative b. Quantitative c. Mixed d. Unknown	To see if there is a strong lean in the type of data collected.
What data gathering approaches were used?	a. Key informant interviews b. Focus Group Discussions c. Representative Survey d. Non-representative Survey e. Observations f. Secondary Materials g. Other: specify _____ h. Unknown	This highlights the approaches used, which can help determine if other approaches should also be applied.
Over what time frame did this evaluation take place?		These questions look at the resources made available for the evaluations to determine whether more resources should be recommended. The budget can be to calculate the % marked for evalutions in comparison to an international standard of 1–5% of total funds.
How much money was dedicated to this evaluation?		
How many people worked on this evaluation?		
How independent was the evaluation team?	a. Very independent: entirely external b. Almost entirely independent: External and independent evaluation department c. Somewhat independent: independent evaluation department d. Somewhat less independent: external with project/program staff e. Less independent: independent evaluation department with project/program staff f. Not independent: project/program staff g. Not clear from the evaluation	Independence contributes to the quality of work as the more independent the evaluation is, the less biased it likely to be perceived.

[150] *OECD (1991, 2010b)*

Question	Answer	Purpose/Comments
Diversity of Informants: • diverse across implementation levels within the organization (e.g. includes field staff) • diverse across stakeholders (e.g. includes participants) • diverse across gender of participants • diverse in terms of internal vs. external • diverse across primary and secondary sources	a. M Participants b. Participants c. Local Field project/program staff d. International project/program staff e. Local Central office staff f. International Central office staff g. GIRoA officials h. Other implementers or partners i. Project/Program documents j. GIRoA reports k. Other stakeholder reports l. Unknown	This can help identify whether there are gaps in the sourcing of information that should/could be filled to enhance quality.
Is the rational or purpose of the evaluation clearly stated?	a. Yes b. No	Clarity, which is needed for quality.
How relevant is the purpose of the evaluation to the objectives or goals of the BMZ in Afghanistan? BMZ priorities: Good governance, Energy, Water, Economic development and employment promotion, Basic education and vocational training	a. Strongly relevant, directly addresses at least one BMZ priority b. Somewhat relevant, partially addresses at least one BZM priority c. Not relevant at all, does not address any BMZ priority d. Unknown	Alignment to the objectives of the BMZ to determine if this is something that is missing the in current evaluations.
How relevant is the purpose of the evaluation to the objectives or goals of the Afghan government? GIRoA NPP Priorities: Peace, Governance, Human Resources Dev., Infrastructure Dev., Private Sector Dev., and Agriculture and Rural Dev.	a. Strongly relevant, directly addresses at least one GIRoA priority b. Somewhat relevant, partially addresses at least one GIRoA priority c. Not relevant at all, does not address any GIRoA priority d. Unknown	Alignment to the objectives of the Afghan government to determine if this is something that is missing in the current evaluations.
What is the quality of the evaluation criteria? "Clearly laid out" means that they are easily identifiable	a. High quality, clearly laid out and S.M.A.R.T. b. Medium quality, clearly laid out but not all S.M.A.R.T. c. Low quality, not clearly laid out or S.M.A.R.T.	This also determines the quality of the evaluation because if the criteria are not defined and clarified then this raises questions on how reliable the results are. Criteria are seen as appropriate if they line up with the objectives and are S.M.A.R.T. (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Timebound)
Was the data collected triangulated?	a. Clear efforts to triangulate data evident b. Some, limited efforts to triangulate data evident c. No efforts to triangulate data evident d. Not clear, this was not clearly indicated in the evaluation report	Triangulation increases robustness, which increases quality.
Were the limitations of the findings, or challenges encountered in the field, provided?	a. Yes, limitations were outlined b. No, limitations were not outlined	Outlining limitations indicates the recognition of the robustness of the data, which is connected to quality.
Do the recommendations stem logically from the findings and conclusions?	a. Yes, all of them b. At least half of them c. Less than half d. No, none of them e. Not applicable, no recommendations	This provides information about the quality of the recommendations and whether or not they are grounded in the findings and conclusions stemming from the research.

Question	Answer	Purpose/Comments
How successful did the evaluation find the project/program?	a. Very successful, it accomplished all of its objectives b. Mostly successful, more positive than negative results c. Mostly unsuccessful, more negative than positive results d. Not successful, it did not accomplish any of its objectives e. Not about success per say	This will give an idea of how well GDC is viewed as doing in terms of delivery projects/programs that work.
Were best practices of lessons learned provided?	a. Yes b. No	This indicates whether the evaluation has produced actionable advice or recommendations.
If yes, what were they?		If there is time, this allows to compare recommendations to see how they differ across time, across sectors, etc., which would provide information on whether the recommendations have truly been integrated into planning.
What does the evaluation tell us about the sustainability of the project/program?	a. Very sustainable, it is, or will be, sustainable on its own at the end of project b. Sustainable in the near future, it is seen as sustainable with limited additional assistance (perhaps one more year or support) c. Sustainable with GIRoA support d. Sustainable only with GDC assistance e. Not sustainable at all f. Sustainability not seen as relevant (humanitarian effort or one time effort) g. Sustainability not mentioned in the evaluation h. Concerns about sustainability because of security situation i. Other: _____	Sustainability is highlighted in the Wilton Park report and therefore it is included in order to determine whether this is an area which needs more concentration in GDC in Afghanistan.
Were sources of data clearly cited?	a. Yes, always b. Yes, sometimes c. No, never	Allows for an assessment of the validity of data.

ANNEX D.

ASSESSMENT OF REVIEWED EVALUATION REPORTS

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
Implementing Partner Organization	**KfW**	**KfW**	**KfW**	**KfW**	**GIZ**
Project/Program Title	Unterstützung zu Vorhaben des Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF IV, V, and VI)	Aufbau einer Mikrofinanzbank/First Microfinance Bank	Aufbau einer Mikrofinanzbank/First Microfinance Bank	Northern Economic Infrastructure Development Project	Gender in Northern Afghanistan (Rural Integration fund RI)
Sector of Project a. Good governance / b. Education / c. Water or Sanitation / d. Economic Dev. / e. Education / f. Other / g. Energy	a. Good governance d. Economic dev.	d. Economic Dev	d. Economic Dev	a. Good Governance d. Economic Dev. (Infratructure)	f. Other (Gender)
Start and End of Project/ Program (if applicable)	2004 – 2006	2004 – no info provided	2004 – no info provided	no info provided	no info provided
Project/Program Budget in Euro (if applicable)	55 million	1.5 million	3.5 million	no info provided	no info provided
Date of Evaluation	Jul 2005	Jul 2005	Jul 2005	Sep 2012	Mar 2012
1. What type of evaluation is this?	c. Summative: ex-post	c. Summative: ex-post	c. Summative: ex-post	c. Summative: post impact assessment	c. Summative: classified as impact analysis, however does not qualify as such in our assessment
2. What is the scope of this evaluation?	b. Trust fund	a. Project	a. Project	a. Project	b. Regional Fund
3. What is the focus of the evaluation level?	b. Outputs c. Outcomes	b. Outputs	b. Outputs	b. Outputs c. Outcomes	c. Outcomes d. Impacts (But not well supported.)
4. Which methods were used?	h. Desk Review	h. Desk Review (Too dangerous to visit)	h. Desk Review (Too dangerous to visit)	h. Desk Review i. Other j. Key informant interviews (FGD)	l. Unknown (No details are provided on the survey, nor of what it is consisted.)
5. Type of data gathered	c. Mixed	b. Quantitative	b. Quantitative	c. Mixed	c. Mixed
6. Over what time frame did this evaluation take place?	no info provided	no info provided	no info provided	no info provided	no info provided
7. How much money was dedicated to this evaluation?	no info provided	no info provided	no info provided	no info provided	no info provided
8. How many people worked on this evaluation?	3 listed	3 listed	3 listed	no info provided	no info provided

6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.
GIZ	GIZ	GIZ	GIZ	GIZ	GIZ
Strengthening Livelihood Systems (formerly Regional Integration Fund)	Programme for Sustainable Economic Development in the North and in Kabul	Diversification of Agrculture in Baghlan (sugar factory included)	Afghanistan Water Sector Institutional Development Project	Rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and income generation in rural areas in North Afghanistan	Gender Mainstreaming in Afghanistan
a. Good Governance	d. Economic Dev. (2010.2210.2)	d. Economic Dev. (Agriculture)	c. Water/Sanitation	a. Good governance f. Other (Rural Development)	f. Other (Gender)
2008 – 2012	May 2010 – Dec 2018	May 2010 – Dec 2013	Jun 2003 – Dec 2005	Mar 2008 – Dec 2011	Nov 2004 – Dez 2009
4.75 million	24 million (through 2013)	11 million	2 million	no info provided	no info provided
Oct 2012	Jul 2011	Jun 2011	Sep 2005	Jul 2011	Jun 2009
c. Summative: classified as impact analysis, however does not qualify as such in our assessment	b. Midline	b. Midline (PFK)	b. Midline (PFK) (End of phase progress report)	b. Midline (e-VAL) (Stakeholders opinions were gathered to feed into the Project Progress Report)	b. Midline (e-VAL) (Opinions and perceptions were gathered.)
b. Program	a. Project	a. Project	a. Project	a. Project	a. Project
b. Outputs c. Outcomes	e. Process	e. Process (Setting-up process, not movement on indicators)	b. Outputs e. Process	b. Outputs e. Process	a. Inputs, b. Outputs c. Outcomes, d. Impacts
c. Partiicpatory h. Desk review	h. Desk review j. Key informant interviews K. field visit	l. Unknown	l. Unknown	j. Key informant interviews	j. Key informant interviews
c. Mixed (Quantitative data came from reports and qualitative from interviews.)	b. Quantitative	c. Mixed (Briefly addressed quantiative goals, and provided some statistics)	c. Mixed	c. Mixed	c. Mixed
3 months	1 month	no info provided	2 months	2 months	no info provided
no info provided	no info provided	no info provided	no info provided	no info provided	no info provided
2 authors cited	2 authors cited	no info provided	1	1 listed	2

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
Implementing Partner Organization	**KfW**	**KfW**	**KfW**	**KfW**	**GIZ**
9. How independent was the evaluation team?	b. Mostly independent (2 FE-Z and 1 exernal)	c. Somewhat independent (3 FE-Z)	b. Mostly independent (2 FE-Z and 1 external)	a. Very independent (JBG Gauff Ingenieure)	g. Not clear (The author of the report works for GIZ and the methodology is not clear.)
10. Diversity of sources of information	i. Proj/Prog documents k. Other stakeholder reports	i. Proj/Prog documents k. Other stakeholder reports	i. Proj/Prog documents k. Other stakeholder reports (Mentioned in the text, but not connected to all stats given)	a. M Participants (Very limited in number, 6 for household survey.) g. GoA officials	b. F Participants (This was not enitrely clear, but they did include quotes from female participants, so at least female participants)
11. Is the rational or purpose of the evaluation clearly stated?	Not sure	a. Yes (Requirement of BMZ)	b. No	b. No	a. Yes (To look at the impact of RI funds on women)
12. How relevant is the purpose of the evaluation to the objectives or goals of the BMZ in Afghanistan?	a. Strongly relevant	a. Strongly relevant	no info provided	d. Unknown	a. Strongly relevant
13. How relevant is the purpose of the evaluation to the objectives or goals of the Government of Afghanistan?	a. Strongly relevant	a. Strongly relevant	no info provided	d. Unknown	a. Strongly relevant
14. Are evaluation criteria and indicators clearly outlined and of good quality?	a. High quality (The indicators focused on large-scale changes in Afghanistan in general.)	a. High quality	a. High quality (The criteria are generic, but relevant. However, it is not clear how they came to the numbers stated.)	b. Medium	Not clarified
15. Was the data collected triangulated?	a. Clear efforts (They provided multiple sets of numbers from different reports, which were differentiated.)	d. Not clear	d. Not clear	d. Not clear	d. Not clear
16. Were the limitations of the approach and findings or challenges encountered in the field, provided?	a. Yes (Yes, it is frequently mentioned that the evaluators were unable to make judgements due to lack of data.)	a. Yes (Yes, it is frequently mentioned that the evaluators were unable to make judgements due to lack of data.)	a. Yes (Yes, it is frequently mentioned that the evaluators were unable to make judgements due to lack of data.)	a. Yes (Security and restrictions which were placed on HHS.)	b. No

6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.
GIZ	GIZ	GIZ	GIZ	GIZ	GIZ
g. Not clear	f. Not independent (One was on the Afghanistan Task Force and the other came from Af/Pak Team)	f. Not independent (conducted by GIZ staff member)	d. Somewhat less independent (This was conducted by an external consultant, but one who had been involved in the planning of the project.)	a. Very independent (External consultant.)	d. Somewhat less independent
a. M Participants b. F Participants c. Local proj/prog staff d. Int. proj/prog staff f. Int. Central Office staff i. Proj/Prog documents k. Other Stakeholder reports	e. Local Central Office staff i. Proj/Prog documents k. Other Stakeholder reports (Project managers, partners, BMZ, desk research, field visits, politicians. Local Central Office staff)	l. Unknown	f. Int. Central Office staff g. GoA Officials h. Other implementers or partners l. Proj/prog Documents j. GoA reports k. Other stakeholder reports	c., d., e., f., g., h. (Project staff, GoA, implementing partner, and other stakeholders)	f. Int. Central Office staff g. GoA Officials h. Other implementers or partners
a. Yes	a. Yes	b. No (It can assumed that this is an end-of-year summary.)	a. Yes	a. Yes (to gain stakeholder opinions)	a. Yes
a. Strongly relevant (Though this is not stated.)	a. Strongly relevant (Though this is not stated.)	no info provided	a. Strongly relevant	a. Strongly relevant (Feeds into PPR)	a. Strongly relevant (Feeds into PPR)
a. Strongly relevant (Though this is not stated.)	a. Strongly relevant (Clearly stated)	no info provided	a. Strongly relevant	d. Unknown	d. Unknown
a. High quality (It was clear)	b. Medium (Not quite clear)	no info provided	b. Medium (Not really clarified; the evaluators just looked at indicators.)	a. High quality	a. High quality
b. Some limited efforts	d. Not clear	d. Not clear	d. Not clear	a. Clear efforts	a. Clear efforts
a. Yes (Very clearly stated)	b. No (Challenges to the project are stated, but not to the research for the evaluation.)	b. No, regarding the evaluation approach. (However, limitations or challenges faced by the project were listed.)	a. Yes (Evaluators involvement in planning was clearly stated.)	b. No	a. Yes

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
Implementing Partner Organization	**KfW**	**KfW**	**KfW**	**KfW**	**GIZ**
17. Do the recommendations stem logically from the findings and conclusions?	e. Not applicable, no recommendations (However, lessons learned could be extracted from the description.)	e. Not applicable, no recommendations (However, lessons learned could be extracted from the description.)	e. Not applicable, no recommendations (However, lessons learned could be extracted from the description.)	e. Not applicable, no recommendations	d. No, none (Recommendations do not stem from presented data)
18. How was the overall performance of the project/program rated?	b. Mostly successful	b. Mostly successful	b. Mostly successful (The rating given was „2“.)	a. Very successful	a. Very successful
19. Were best practices of lessons learned provided? Recommendations?	b. No	b. No (Although these could be extracted from the text where responses to problems are given, there was no evaluation of whether these were best practice.)	b. No (Although these could be extracted from the text where responses to problems are given, there was no evaluation of whether these were best practice.)	b. No	a. Yes
20. If yes, what were they?	no info provided	no info provided	no info provided	no info provided	Agriculture/food security projects can improve women‘s social and household status.
21. What does the evaluation tell us about the sustainability of the project/program?	f. Sustainability not seen as relevant	h. Concerns about sustainability because of security situation	h. Concerns about sustainability because of security situation	g. Sustainability not mentioned	g. Security not mentioned
22. Works cited?	b. Yes, sometimes (Works are not cited, sometimes – but not often – reports are mentioned.)	b. Yes, sometimes (Works are not cited, sometimes – but not often – reports are mentioned.)	b. Yes, sometimes (Works are not cited, sometimes – but not often – reports are mentioned.)	b. Yes, sometimes	b. Yes, sometimes
Extra information/ comments	Report Number 10.130.90.44 Conducted in 2010	Report Number 1268168387 Conducted in 2009 Does not provide information on the works cited nor any citations to refer to.	Conducted 2011	The number of informants was very low and limited to only men. Causality was assumed instead of actually shown.	This report provided a few case studies of RI projects and then listed impacts without providing evidence of how they were measured. The methodology was not clear and there was no transparency on how data was obtained. Therefore, generally not of good quality.

6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.
GIZ	GIZ	GIZ	GIZ	GIZ	GIZ
a. Yes, all	b. At least half	e. No recommendations	b. At least half	a. Yes, all (The recommendations stem from stakeholders.)	a. Yes, all
b. Mostly successful	e. No rating provided	e. No rating provided (Project was still in its start up phase.)	b. Mostly successful (They had suggestions for changes, but recommended to continue the program.)	b. Mostly successful	b. Mostly successful
a. Yes	a. Yes	b. No	a. Yes	b. No	a. Yes
Various lessons learned were described for each of the 28 different case study projects observed and therefore are not listed here.	Lessons on moving forward are presented.	No	Component 3 should not be continued. The project need stronger counterparts in the ministry, etc.	no info provided	They covered specific lessons to different topics. These are good, but include too many details to capture here.
i. Other (Sustainability was discussed for each project and it varied)	i. Other (Sustainability was discussed for different aspects of the project, but not for all)	i. Other (The issue of sustainability was not focused on since the project has just begun and still has a number of years to run.)	d. Sustainable with GDC assistance (This includes a longer-term perspective with the project expected to run 10 years.)	g. Sustainability not mentioned	g. Sustainability not mentioned
a. Yes, always	b. Yes, sometimes	c. No, never	a. Yes, always	b. Yes, sometimes	c. No, never (But not needed)
A well done evaluation, which clearly states pros and cons. Unfortunately, it does not provide a final analysis or summary.	OECD/DAC is mentioned. The lack of baseline data is problematic. The Methododology is not set up for future impact analysis.	This was a simple descriptive report.	This can be considered an evaluation. (Project No. 2007.2118.3)	Clearly laid out stakeholders opinions analysis.	No baseline data for comparison has been provided. However, the approach was very informative as it provided different stakeholders' opinions and compares their impressions.

ANNEX E.

LIST OF KFW AND GIZ DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION PROJECTS IN AFGHANISTAN

Lists of all development cooperation projects funded by the Federal Foreign Office (AA) and the BMZ have been made available to DEval for this review. Due to the fact that the data has not been authorized by the AA and upon request of the BMZ, the following list includes only those projects funded by the BMZ.

a) List of KfW Development Cooperation Projects in Afghanistan (BMZ-funded)

Sector[151]	Funding Ministry	Project No.	Project Name	Committed funds in Euro
Education	BMZ	2002 65 116	Offenes Programm Bildung (AFG)	2.000.000,00
	BMZ	2003 65 791	Gesundheits- und Bildungsprogramm Badghis (Subkomponente Wiederaufbauprogramm) *Achtung: auch bei Gesundheit aufgeführt!*	2.000.000,00
	BMZ	2004 66 060	Grundbildungsprogramm	18.500.000,00
		2005 70 267	Grundbildungsprogramm II – Komponente TTCs	
		2006 66 552		
	BMZ	2004 70 443	Studien- und Fachkräftefonds II	1.653.033,56
	BMZ	2007 65 818	EQUIP – Beitrag zum National Basic Education Programme im Rahmen des ARTF	78.000.000,00
		2009 65 897		
		2010 65 317		
		2011 65 026		
		2012 65 990		
	BMZ	2009 67 455	Programm Berufliche Schulen Nordafghanistan	27.000.000,00
	BMZ	2001 66 520	Wiederaufbauprogramm Afghanistan	32.562.967,13
Emergency Assistance	BMZ	2002 66 486	Winterhilfeprogramm (AFG)	731.773,00
	BMZ	2004 65 062	Straßenrehabilitierung Kunduz	3.500.000,00
	BMZ	2008 66 160	Finanz. von Maßnahmen des World Food Programms zur Bewältigung der Nahrungskrise	16.000.000,00
	BMZ	2002 65 652	Stadtnetzrehabilitierung Kabul (Subkomponente Wiederaufbauprogramm)	6.000.000,00

[151] *This data was generously provided by KfW in an Excel Sheet format, valid as of October 2013.*

Sector[151]	Funding Ministry	Project No.	Project Name	Committed funds in Euro
Energy	BMZ	2002 65 645	Rehabilitierung Wasserkraftwerk I (Mahipar/Sarobi)	25.500.000,00
	BMZ	2005 65 093	Übertragungsleitung Heiratan – Pul-e-Khumri	24.400.000,00
	BMZ	2006 70 208	Rehabilitierung Wasserkraftwerke Mahipar und Sarobi – Training O&M (BM 2002 65 652)	1.000.000,00
	BMZ	2007 65 180	Programm Dezentrale Stromversorgung durch Erneuerbare Energien	49.622.583,76
	BMZ	2010 65 283	Netzanbindung nördlicher Städte und Gemeinden in Afghanistan	30.000.000,00
	BMZ	2011 65 042	Netzanbindung nördlicher Städte und Gemeinden II	27.000.000,00
	BMZ	2011 65 067	Provinzelektrifizierung Nordafghanistan I + II	47.000.000,00
		2012 67 343		
	BMZ	2013 65 030	Regionale Stromübertragung	32.000.000,00
	BMZ	2020 50 656	Wiederaufbauprogramm Stromversorgung Kabul	8.883.988,86
Health	BMZ	2002 65 108	Offenes Programm Gesundheit (AFG)	2.000.000,00
	BMZ	2003 65 791	Gesundheits- und Bildungsprogramm Badghis (Subkomponente Wiederaufbau-programm) *Achtung: auch bei Bildung aufgeführt!*	2.000.000,00
Governance	BMZ	2004 66 425	Unterstützung von Vorhaben des ARTF	230.000.000,00
		2005 65 820		
		2006 65 463		
		2007 65 826		
		2008 65 600		
		2009 65 913		
		2010 65 341		
		2011 65 018		
		2012 65 982		
	BMZ	2010 66 562	Regionaler Infrastrukturentwickungsfonds I	47.000.000,00
		2011 65 034		

Sector[151]	Funding Ministry	Project No.	Project Name	Committed funds in Euro
Sustainable Economic Development	BMZ	2002 65 173	Straßenrehabilitierung Kabul	5.000.000,00
		2002 66 726	(+ Aufstockung)	
	BMZ	2003 65 809	Aufbau einer Mikrofinanzbank Beteiligung (THB + BM + Inv)	12.300.000,00
		2004 70 013	First Microfinance Bank (FMFB) II	
		2004 65 047		
		2007 65 834		
	BMZ	2007 65 602	Ausbau wirtschaftlicher Infrastruktur im Norden – Phase I – IV	44.000.000,00
		2007 66 709		
		2009 66 259		
		2009 67 356		
	BMZ	2010 65 333	Aufbau einer Mirkrofinanzbank II – KMU-Kreditlinie	8.100.000,00
		2010 70 218		
	BMZ	2010 65 291	Nationalstraße Kunduz – Khulm Phase I	22.000.000,00
	BMZ	2011 66 958	Nationalstraße Kunduz – Khulm Phase II	20.000.000,00
Water and Sanitation	BMZ	2002 65 124	Offenes Programm städtische Wasserversorgung Kabul (AFG)	2.500.000,00
	BMZ	2002 65 637	Wasserversorgung Herat (West-Afghanistan)	8.000.000,00
	BMZ	2003 66 229	KV-Wasserversorgung Kunduz	4.000.000,00
	BMZ	2003 66 583	Wasserversorgung Kabul II	57.500.000,00
		2006 65 141	Phase I + II	
	BMZ	2006 70 083	KV-Wasserversorgung Kabul II (BM)	1.500.000,00
	BMZ	2007 66 683	Wasserversorgung Nördliche Klein- und Mittelstädte	36.000.000,00
	BMZ	2010 66 570	Städtische Wasserversorgung. in Nord-Afgh	15.000.000,00
		2011 66 933		
	BMZ	2012 65 651	Wasserversorgung Kabul, Phase III	39.000.000,00

b) List of GIZ Projects in Afghanistan (BMZ funded)

Sector[152]	Project No.	Project Name	Year	Committed funds in Euro
Water	2003.2018.4	Beratung der nationalen Wasserbehörde und nachgelagerter Behörden	2003	1.500.000,00
			2004	250.000,00
	2004.2105.7	KV – Förderung von Betreiberstrukturen der Trinkwasserver- und Abwasserentsorgung	2004	1.750.000,00
			2006	1.500.000,00
	2005.2152.6	Reform des Wassersektors	2006	800.000,00
	2007.2118.3	Programm zur Verbesserung der Wasserversorgung	2008	6.400.000,00
			2009	1.500.000,00
	2010.2115.3	Programm zur Verbesserung der Wasserversorgung	2010	300.000,00
			2011	5.122.000,00
			2012	6.000.000,00
			2013	6.250.000,00
Education	2004.2200.6	KV – Programm Förderung der Grundbildung	2005	2.000.000,00
	2005.2019.7	Aus- und Fortbildung/Re-Qualifizierung von Frauen	2006	1.000.000,00
			2007	-981.000,00
	2007.2092.0	Programm Förderung der Grundbildung	2007	5.000.000,00
			2009	2.500.000,00
	2008.2164.5	Förderung der beruflichen Bildung	2009	2.000.000,00
	2009.2189.0	Programm zur Förderung der Grundbildung	2010	4.000.000,00
			2011	5.237.000,00
			2012	5.500.000,00
			2013	5.000.000,00
	2010.2113.8	Förderung der beruflichen Bildung	2010	5.000.000,00
			2011	5.974.000,00
			2012	5.500.000,00

[152] *This information was generously provided by GIZ in an Excel sheet, and is valid as of November 1, 2013.*

Sector[152]	Project No.	Project Name	Year	Committed funds in Euro
Sustainable Economic Development	2003.2012.7	Programm wirtschaftlicher Wiederaufbau und berufliche Qualifizierung	2003	4.250.000,00
			2004	1.750.000,00
	2003.2016.8	Aus- und Fortbildung/Re-Qualifizierung von Frauen	2003	2.000.000,00
			2004	500.000,00
	2004.2167.7	Programm "Wirtschaftlicher Wiederaufbau und berufliche Qualifizierung"	2005	5.000.000,00
			2007	-1.142.000,00
	2004.2168.5	Förderung kleinerer und mittlerer Unternehmen in Afghanistan	2005	1.500.000,00
			2007	-279.000,00
			2009	-300.000,00
	2004.2219.6	Unterstützung internat. Programme im Bereich der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Regierungsförderung	2005	5.000.000,00
	2007.2121.7	Programm für nachhaltige Wirtschaftsentwicklung Kabuls	2007	5.500.000,00
			2010	250.000,00
	2007.2122.5	Programm zur KMU-Förderung und lokalen Wirtschaftsentwicklung im Norden Afghanistans	2007	4.000.000,00
			2009	1.867.000,00
	2010.2210.2	Programm zur Nachhaltigen Wirtschaftsentwicklung im Norden und in Kabul	2010	5.000.000,00
			2011	7.000.000,00
			2012	8.000.000,00
			2013	7.250.000,00
Energy	2003.2017.6	Unterstützung des Stromsektors und Verbreitung erneuerbarer Energien	2003	1.500.000,00
	2004.2104.0	Erneuerbare Energien und Energieeffizienz in ländlichen Gebieten	2004	1.750.000,00
			2008	-205.000,00
	2005.2014.8	Unterstützung des Stromsektors und Verbreitung erneuerbarer Energien	2005	2.000.000,00
			2008	-555.000,00
	2007.2120.9	Programm Dezentrale Stromversorgung durch Erneuerbare Energien	2008	3.760.000,00
			2009	3.500.000,00
	2009.2190.8	Programm Dezentrale Stromversorgung durch Erneuerbare Energien	2010	4.000.000,00
			2011	4.500.000,00
			2012	4.800.000,00
			2013	4.100.000,00

Sector[152]	Project No.	Project Name	Year	Committed funds in Euro
Governance	2002.2080.6	Wiederaufbau Afghanistan/Maßnahmen im Bereich Demokratieförderung	2002	4.750.000,00
			2004	511.000,00
	2003.2015.0	Rechtsberatung und Herstellung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit	2003	1.500.000,00
			2004	500.000,00
	2005.2187.2	Förderung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit	2006	1.500.000,00
			2007	2.000.000,00
			2009	1.000.000,00
	2006.2101.1	Regionale Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungsförderung Nordost	2006	2.000.000,00
			2007	-1.221.000,00
	2006.2102.9	Exportförderung und WTO-Beitritt	2006	1.800.000,00
			2007	-877.000,00
			2009	-267.000,00
			2010	1.500.000,00
	2007.2119.1	Gender Mainstreaming	2007	1.500.000,00
			2008	1.000.000,00
			2009	1.000.000,00
	2009.2002.5	Förderung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit	2009	2.500.000,00
			2010	7.000.000,00
			2012	3.000.000,00
	2009.2208.8	Politikberatungsfonds	2009	600.000,00
			2010	2.000.000,00
			2011	2.000.000,00
	2009.2003.3	Gender Mainstreaming	2010	2.000.000,00
			2011	1.000.000,00
			2012	500.000,00
	10.2191.4	Regionaler Strukturentwicklungsfonds Nordafghanistan	2010	24.000.000,00
			2011	184.000,00
			2012	13.300.000,00
			2013	8.700.000,00
	2010.2114.6	Offener Politikberatungsfonds	2012	2.000.000,00
			2013	500.000,00
	2012.2053.2	Förderung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit	2012	5.500.000,00
			2013	4.600.000,00
	2012.2254.6	Förderung Guter Regierungsführung im Rohstoffsektor	2013	4.000.000,00

Sector[152]	Project No.	Project Name	Year	Committed funds in Euro
Peace-Building	2006.1822.3	Überregionaler Kleinprojektefonds Afghanistan	2006	330.000,00
Agriculture	2010.2112.0	Sicherung der Ernährung in der Provinz Baghlan	2010	2.000.000,00
			2011	2.000.000,00
			2012	2.000.000,00
			2013	1.500.000,00
Others	1995.3522.0	Studien- und Fachkräftefonds	2003	500.000,00
			2004	500.000,00
			2005	500.000,00
			2009	1.200.000,00
			2010	2.000.000,00
	2004.2103.2	Gender Mainstreaming	2004	1.738.000,00
	2007.1806.4	Wiederaufbau Südostafghanistan	2007	1.000.000,00
	2007.2196.9	Aufbau von Basisinfrastruktur und Schaffung von Einkommen in ländlichen Regionen	2008	10.000.000,00
			2009	12.000.000,00
			2010	13.500.000,00
			2011	12.000.000,00
	2008.2097.7	Sicherheitssystem für GTZ, DED, InWent und KfW	2008	2.300.000,00
			2009	1.500.000,00
			2010	2.000.000,00
	2008.2146.2	Aufbau von Basisinfrastruktur und Schaffung von Einkommen in ländlichen Regionen Süd-Ost Afghanistans	2009	3.000.000,00
	2009.2001.7	EZ-Sicherheitssystem	2010	7.000.000,00
			2011	8.000.000,00
			2012	8.700.000,00
			2013	9.000.000,00
	2011.2170.6	Strategische Entwicklung der afg.-dt. EZ	2011	2.000.000,00
	2011.3501.1	Studien- und Fachkräftefonds	2011	2.228.000,00
			2012	1.900.000,00
			2013	1.000.000,00
	2012.2011.0	EH Naher Osten/Afghanistan	2012	231.000,00
	2012.2253.8	Stärkung von ländlichen Livelihood Systemen	2012	7.000.000,00
			2013	8.000.000,00

ABBREVIATIONS

AA
Auswärtiges Amt (Federal Foreign Office)

AIMS
Afghanistan Information Management Services

AISA
Afghanistan Investment Support Agency

ANDS
Afghanistan National Development Strategy

ANP
Afghan National Police

ARTF
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

AusAID
Australian Agency for International Development

BMI
Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Intertior)

BMVg
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Federal Ministry of Defense)

BMEL
Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft (Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture)

BMZ
Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)

BMZ-E
Evaluation of Development Cooperation Division of the BMZ

CD
Capacity Development

CIM
Centrum für Internationale Migration und Entwicklung (Center for International Migration and Development)

DANIDA
Danish International Development Agency

DED
Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst (German Development Service)

DEG
Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft

DFG
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation)

DfID
UK Department for International Development

ENÜH
Entwicklungsorientierte Not- und Übergangshilfe (Development-Oriented Emergency and Transition Aid)

EQUIP
Education Quality Improvement Program

ESÜH
Entwicklungsfördernde und strukturbildende Übergangshilfe (Development-Supporting and Structure-Forming Transition Aid)

FMFB
First Microfinance Bank

FZ-E
Evaluierungsabteilung für Finanzielle Zusammenarbeit, KfW (Financial Cooperation Evaluation Unit, KfW)

GDC
German Development Cooperation (confined to BMZ portfolio)

GIGA
German Institute of Global and Area Studies (Leibnitz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien)

GIRoA
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

GIZ
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for International Cooperation)

GTZ
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for Technical Cooperation)

HMEP
Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Program (UK)

IATI
International Aid Transparency Initiative

ICAI
Independent Commission for Aid Impact (UK)

IED
Independent Evaluation Department (Asia Development Bank)

IEG
Independent Evaluation Group (World Bank)

InWent
Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gGmbH (Capacity Building International)

ISAF
International Security Assistance Forces

KfW
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German Development Bank)

MoE
Ministry of Education, Afghanistan

MDTF
Multi Donor Trust Fund

M&E
Monitoring and Evaluation

NGO
Non-Governmental Organization

NORAD
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation

NSP
National Solidarity Program

OECD
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development

OECD/DAC
OECD Development Assistance Committee

OPAF
Open Policy Advisory Fund

PCA
Peace and Conflict Analysis (e.g. PCA Unit in RMO)

PPR
Project Progress Review (or PFK – Projektfortschrittskontrolle)

RBM
Results-Based Monitoring

RCDF
Regional Capacity Development Fund

RIDF
Regional Infrastructure Development Fund

RMO
Risk Management Office

SFB 700
Sonderforschungsbereich 700 der Freien Universität Berlin (Collaborative Research Center)

SPNA
Stabilization Program Northern Afghanistan

TMAF
Tokyo Mutual Accountability Fund

UK
United Kingdom

UNDG
United Nations Development Group

USD
United States of America Dollar

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and Development