# EVALUATION

Finland's Development Policy
Programmes from a Results-Based
Management Point of View 2003–2013

2015/1

EVALUATION

FINLAND'S DEVELOPMENT POLICY PROGRAMMES FROM A RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT POINT OF VIEW 2003-2013

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACP	Asia-Caribbean-Pacific Working Party
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AFD	Agence Française de Développement
AfT	Aid for Trade
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AHA-KYT	MFA development cooperation intervention administrative database system
ARRI	Annual Reports on Results and Impact
BAR	Bilateral Aid Review
CREAM	Clear, Relevant, Economic, Adequate, Monitorable
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
CSO	Civil society organisations
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency (brand)
DDG	Deputy Director General
DFI	Development finance institution
DFID	Department for International Development, UK
DPC	Development Policy Committee
DoDP	Department for Development Policy
DPP	Development Policy Program
DPS	Development Policy Statement
DPSG	Development Policy Steering Group
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Development Fund
EK	Elinkeinoelämän keskusliitto (Confederation of Finnish Industries)
EU	European Union
EVA-11	MFA Development Evaluation Unit
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FLEGT	Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade
GDP	Gross domestic product
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GNI	Gross national income
GP	Finnish government programme
HIV	Human immunodeficiency virus
HRBA	Human-rights based approach
ICAI	Independent Commission for Aid Impact
ICI	Institutional Cooperation Instrument
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDS	International Development Statistics
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IfDS	Institute for Development Strategy
IKI	Finland's Institutional Cooperation Instrument (in Finnish)
KEPA	Kehitysyhteistyön palvelukeskus (umbrella organisation for Finnish civil society organisations who work with development cooperation)
KEPO	Kehityspolitiikka (Development Policy)

KPT	Kehityspoliittinen toimikunta
LCF/PYM	Local Cooperation Fund/paikallisen yhteistyön määräraha
LDC	Least Developed Country
LFA	Logical Framework Approach
MAR	Multilateral Aid Review
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MEA	Multilateral environmental agreement
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
MINEFI	Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances
MOPAN	Multilateral Organisations' Performance Assessment Network
NAO	National Audit Office
NAP	National Action Plan
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NZAID	New Zealand Aid Programme
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PCD	High-Level Network for Policy Coherence for Development
QAB	Quality Assurance Board
RBM	Results-based Management
RB-COSOP	Results-Based Country Strategic Opportunities Programme
REDD	Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
RIDE	Reports on IFAD's Development Effectiveness
RIMS	Results and Impact Measurement System
SD	Sustainable Development
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SRF	Strategic Results Framework
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Assignable, Realistic, Time-related
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
TTS	Operating and financial plan
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation
UNFCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFF	United Nations Forum on Forests
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

TIIVISTELMÄ

Tässä evaluoinnissa selvitetään, miten Suomen kehityspoliittiset toimenpide-
ohjelmat vuosilta 2004, 2007 ja 2012 ovat onnistuneet määrittelemään pohjan
tulosperustaiselle kehityspolitiikalle ja -yhteistyölle. Evaluoinnissa todetaan,
että Suomen ulkoasiainministeriön ylimmän hallinnon tasolta puuttuu edel-
leen kattava lähestymistapa tulosperustaiselle johtamiselle, ja että tulevaa
politiikan toteutusta tulisi ohjata pitkän aikavälin strateginen suunnitelma
yhdistettynä kattavaan strategisten tulosten viitekehykseen. Tulevien hallitus-
ten tulisi jatkossa määrittää politiikan suunta ytimekkäillä poliittisilla ohja-
uspapereilla, jotka täydentäisivät ja ohjaisivat uudelleen tätä pitkän aikavälin
suunnitelmaa.

*Avainsanat: tulosperustainen johtaminen, kehityspoliittinen toimenpideohjelma,
tulosvastuullisuus, oppiminen, Suomi*

REFERAT

Denna utvärdering granskar hur de finska utvecklingspolitiska programmen från 2004, 2007 och 2012 har lyckats med att definiera grunderna för resultatstyrning i utvecklingspolitik och -samarbete. Den konstaterar att utrikesministeriet (UM) saknar fortfarande en tydlig strategi för resultatstyrning på organisatorisk nivå, och att den framtida politiken borde vägledas av en långsiktig strategisk plan som understöds av omfattande strategiska resultatramar. Den framtida politiska riktningen av inträdande regeringar borde sammanfattas i ett koncist policyuttalande som ger underlag för den långsiktiga planen.

Nyckelord: resultatstyrning, utvecklingspolitiskt program, ansvarsutkrävande, lärande, Finland

ABSTRACT

This evaluation investigates how the Finnish Development Policy Programmes of 2004, 2007 and 2012 have succeeded in defining the foundation for results-based development policy and cooperation. It finds that the MFA still lacks a comprehensive approach to Result-based Management (RBM) at the corporate level and that future policy implementation should be guided by a long-term strategic plan that is underpinned by a comprehensive Strategic Results Framework. Future policy direction by incoming governments should be in the form of concise policy statements that provide input into this long-term plan.

Keywords: results-based management, development policy program, accountability, learning, Finland

YHTEENVETO

Tulosperustainen johtaminen (RBM) on johtamisstrategia, joka pyrkii parantamaan päätöksentekoa, oppimista ja tulosvastuullisuutta.

Johdanto

Tulosperustainen johtaminen (RBM) on johtamisstrategia, joka keskittyy tuloksiin (ei talousarvioon, eikä toimintaan) ja pyrkii sitä kautta parantamaan päätöksentekoa, oppimista ja tulosvastuullisuutta. Tuloksiin keskittyminen on olennainen osa avun tuloksellisuutta edistävää toimintaa. Viime aikoina Suomen eduskunta on vaatinut Suomen ulkoasiainministeriöltä (UM) kattavampaa tietoa kehityspoliittisen toimenpideohjelman (KEPO) toteutuksen kehitysvaikutuksista.

UM on hyödyntänyt tulossuuntautuneita työkaluja jo 1990-luvulta lähtien. RBM-toimintasuunnitelmaa on toteutettu vuodesta 2012 lähtien. Sitä ohjaavat sekä RBM-evaluoinnin suositukset vuodelta 2011 että viimeisimmän kehityspoliittisen ohjelman vaatimus keskittyä enemmän tuloksiin. Kaikki pitkäaikaisten kumppanimaiden tuoreet maaohjelmat sisältävät tulosviitekehyksen. Äskettäin myös monenkeskisen yhteistyön vaikuttamissuunnitelmat on otettu käyttöön; ne sisältävät myös tulosindikaattoreita. Huolimatta näistä merkittävistä edistysaskeleista, UM:ltä puuttuu edelleen kattava ylimmän hallinnon tason lähestymistapa tulosjohtamiseen.

Tämän evaluoinnin johtopäätösten ja suositusten on tarkoitus palvella tulevien hallitusten ja UM:n strategista suunnittelua ja päätöksentekotarpeita, sekä auttaa UM:ä kehittämään lähestymistapaansa tulosjohtamiseen.

Evaluoinnilla on vahva kehityspoliittinen ote. Neljän vuoden välein valittavat hallitukset hyväksyvät uuden kehityspoliittisen toimenpideohjelman (KEPO), joka tiivistää Suomen kehityspolitiikan ja -yhteistyön suunnan. Evaluoinnissa keskitytään kolmeen kehityspoliittiseen ohjelmaan vuosilta 2004, 2007 ja 2012. Evaluointi antaa vastauksen siihen keskeiseen evaluointikysymykseen, miten nämä ohjelmat ovat onnistuneet määrittelemään pohjan tulosperustaiselle kehityspolitiikalle ja -yhteistyölle. Tämä kysymys on jaoteltu neljään alakysymykseen, joihin tämän selvityksen rakenne perustuu:

1. Minkälaista ohjeistusta KEPO:t tarjoavat liittyen vahvuuteen, spesifisyyteen, laajuuteen ja toimintamalleihin? (Luku 4)
2. Miten hyvin KEPO:issa ja niihin liittyvissä kehityspoliittisissa linjauksissa ja toimenpideohjeissa on osattu hyödyntää oppia aiemmista tuloksista? (Luku 4)
3. Miten johdonmukaisesti ja täsmällisesti KEPO:n ohjeistus on toteutettu? (Luku 5)
4. Missä määrin tulosvastuullisuutta on toteutettu "ylöspäin", ja kuinka johdonmukaista ja relevanttia se on ollut eri tasoilla konkreettisesta kehitysyhteistyön ohjelmoinnista raportointiin eduskunnalle? (Luku 6)

Tulosjohtaminen Suomen kehityspolitiikassa

KEPO:t välittävät onnistuneesti ja vakuuttavasti Suomen kehityspolitiikan arvot ja yleiset johtavat periaatteet, mutta antavat hyvin vähän oleellista ohjeistusta tulosperustaiseen johtamiseen ja kehityspolitiikan toteuttamiseen. Kehityspolitiikan ohjauksesta puuttuu selkeä priorisointi. Peräkkäiset politiikat lisäävät uusia, mutta eivät poista aiempia tavoitteita. KEPO:t ja muut yksityiskohtaisemmat "alemman tason" poliittisen ohjauksen asiakirjat ovat epäselviä ja niistä puuttuu tavoitteenasettelu. Sen lisäksi, että UM talousarvion ja tuotosten tasolla selkeitä tavoitteita on rajallisesti, KEPO:issa ei yleensä sitouduta tarkasti määriteltyihin, mielekkäisiin tavoitteisiin, joita voidaan seurata. Alemman tason politiikkalinjauksia ja toimintaohjeita on paljon, ja niistä puuttuu selkeä asemaa ja tavoitteenasettelua, on paljon.

Kehityspoliittisten toimenpideohjelmien laadinta ja tuloksista oppiminen

KEPO, joka julkaistaan yleensä 6-8 kuukauden kuluttua uuden hallituksen nimittämisestä, pyrkii määrittelemään koko Suomen kehityspolitiikan uudelleen kullekin hallituskaudelle. Tämä vaikuttaa hieman tarpeettomalta, kun ottaa huomioon sen, että kehityspolitiikan kokonaistavoitteet ja periaatteet, sekä sektoreiden, kanavien ja välineiden kattavuus ovat pysyneet huomattavan vakaina pitkällä aikavälillä. Tämä Suomen kehityspolitiikan vakaus ei ole ilmeistä ensi silmäyksellä; KEPO:t eroavat rakenteiltaan toisistaan merkittävästi. Ohjelmat myös painottavat erilaisia poikkileikkaavia teemoja/tavoitteita (politiikan johdonmukaisuus vuonna 2004, kestävä kehitys vuonna 2007 ja ihmisoikeuksiin perustuva lähestymistapa vuonna 2012), joihin muu ohjeistus perustuu.

KEPO:n rajattu voimassaoloaika (4 vuotta) on ristiriidassa sen kanssa, minkälaisella aikahorisontilla kehityspolitiikkaa tyypillisesti toteutetaan kansainvälisesti. Tällä hetkellä KEPO:t määrittävät huomattavan osan tulevan hallituksen toimista, mutta tuloksia raportoi lähinnä vasta seuraava hallitus tai hallitukset. KEPO:t ja muu poliittinen ohjeistus eivät huomioi näitä aikatauluja tai eri hallitusten vaihdoksista aiheutuvaa "perintöä". Tämä voi myös pakottaa UM:n henkilöstöä ja kumppaneita muokkaaman edellisen hallituskauden aikana alkaneiden hankkeiden ja ohjelmien kieltä ja tavoitteita vastaamaan paremmin nykyistä politiikkaa.

KEPO:issa on nähtävissä vain vähän viittauksia aiemmista tuloksista oppimiseen. Alemman tason politiikkalinjaukset ja ohjeet viittaavat vain harvoin evaluoinneista saatuihin johtopäätöksiin ja opetuksiin. KEPO:n laadintaprosessissa kuitenkin pitäisi kiinnittää huomiota aiempien toteutuskokemusten kerämiseen ja muiden toimijoiden tuottamien evaluointien tuloksiin. Näyttää siltä, että tuloksista opittiin enemmän ja UM:n henkilöstön panos näkyi KEPO:ssa vahvemmin silloin, kun vastaava ministeri oli vähemmän henkilökohtaisesti mukana politiikan laadintaprosessissa. Jokaisen KEPO:n laadintaprosessi oli erilainen ja kullekin niistä oppimisprosessi suunniteltiin ohjelmakohtaisesti. Kaiken kaikkiaan näyttää siltä, että UM:ltä puuttuu standardoitu, järjestelmällinen prosessi, jolla suodattaa tuloksista saatu kokemus ja varmistaa saatujen johtopäätösten ja näkemysten sisällyttäminen uuden politiikan laadintaan.

Tulosjohtaminen politiikan toteuttamisessa

On vaikea arvioida, kuinka johdonmukaisesti ja täsmällisesti KEPO:n ohjeistusta on toteutettu, koska kehityspoliittinen tavoitteenasettelu on itsessään niin heikkoa. Tavoitteiden noudattamisen lisäksi evaluoinnissa on arvioitu tulosjohtamiseen liittyvien prosessien integrointia muuhun politiikkaohjaukseen ja resurssien allokointiin.

Talousarviotavoitteet edustavat suurta osaa hyvin määritellyistä tavoitteista KEPO:issa. Noin kaksi kolmasosaa talousarviotavoitteista ja UM:n tulostavoitteista KEPO:issa täyttyivät. Useita tavoiteindikaattoreita ei kuitenkaan ole systemaattisesti seurattu ja raportoitu. On epäselvää, miten näiden tavoitteiden tulossuuntautunut toteuttaminen voi todella tapahtua. Jos päättäjät eivät kykene määrittämään vallitsevaa tilaa (status quo) ja seuraamaan edistymistä suhteessa tuloksiin, järjestelmällinen tulosjohtaminen on vaikeaa.

Politiikan laadinta- ja budjetointiprosessit ovat UM:ssä edelleen suurelta osin erillään, eikä talousarviosuunnittelu itsessään ole tulossuuntautunutta. Tämä aiheuttaa ongelmia tulosperustaiselle johtamiselle ja toiminnalle, koska on vaikea sitoutua tuloksiin tietämättä, mitä resursseja on käytettävissä.

Merkittävää edistystä on saavutettu viime vuosina RBM:n integroimisessa suunnitteluun, toteutukseen ja raportointiin. Kattavilla tulossuuntautuneilla maastrategioilla sekä monenkeskisillä vaikuttamissuunnitelmilla ja niiden tulosviitekehyksillä on mahdollisuus edistää tulosperustaista toimintaa osana Suomen kehityspolitiikkaa ja -yhteistyötä. Huomionarvoista on se, että maastrategioiden tulosviitekehyksellä on laaja tuki UM:n henkilöstön keskuudessa. Nykyinen "kauppa ja kehitys (Aid for Trade) -toimintasuunnitelma", puutteineenkin, on hyvä esimerkki pyrkimyksestä siirtyä tulosperustaiseen ohjelmalliseen lähestymistapaan. Vaikka UM on toiminut aktiivisesti kehityspolitiikan johdonmukaisuuden edistämisessä kansainvälisellä tasolla, kotimaan politiikan johdonmukaisuus kärsii liian alhaisesta profiilista. Ministeriön edustajilla ei ole selkeitä valtuuksia tehdä asiaan liittyviä päätöksiä, joten strateginen lähestymistapa konkreettisine tavoitteineen ja resursseineen jää uupumaan.

UM ei ole vielä pystynyt luomaan RBM:ä edistävää organisaatioympäristöä. Organisaatiokulttuuri on edelleen suurelta osin riskejä välttelevä, ja se priorisoi ohjeiden täsmällistä noudattamista ja tulosvastuullisuutta kokeilun ja oppimisen sijaan. Tällainen julkiselle sektorille yleinen organisaatiokulttuuri on vakava este tehokkaalle tulosperustaiselle toiminnalle.

Tulossuuntautunut raportointi ja tulosvastuullisuus

Aiempi tulosten raportointi Suomen eduskunnalle on ollut hyvälaatuista, mutta pääosin sattumanvaraista, eikä se ole kattanut kaikkia avun kanavia. Vuosittainen raportointi KEPO:n sisältämistä harvoista määrällisistä tavoitteista ei ole ollut systemaattista eikä siinä ole viitattu alkuperäisiin tavoitteisiin. Monien määrällisten tai laadullisten tavoitteiden osalta ei käydä keskustelua siitä, miksi tavoitteita ei ole saavutettu, ja jotkut KEPO:n määrittelemät tavoitteet on "hiljaa" unohdettu. Kaiken kaikkiaan tämä jättää eduskunnan ja suomalaisen yhteiskunnan vaille ymmärrystä siitä, onko alun perin asetetut

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Politiikan laadinta- ja budjetointiprosessit ovat UM:ssä edelleen suurelta osin erillään toisistaan.

Merkittävää edistystä on saavutettu viime vuosina RBM:n integroimisessa suunnitteluun, toteutukseen ja raportointiin.

Aiempi tulosten raportointi Suomen eduskunnalle on ollut hyvälaatuista, mutta pääosin sattumanvaraista, eikä se ole kattanut kaikkia avun kanavia.

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tavoitteet saavutettu (tai saavutetaanko ne todennäköisesti tulevaisuudessa), ja edustaako koko tehty työ hyvää sosiaalista investointia.

UM:n sisällä ei ole käytössä kattavaa ylimmän hallinnon tason raportointia, joka kattaisi kaikki apukanavat ja instrumentit ja sisältäisi myös politiikan johdonmukaisuuden arviointia. Useiden avun kanavien osalta edes perusport-foliotietoja ei raportoida säännöllisesti. Kattavien tulossuuntautuneiden raporttien puute selittää vaikeudet, joita ilmenee, kun kehitysyhteistyön vai-kutuksista pitäisi raportoida eduskunnalle.

Kaikesta huolimatta viimeisen kahden vuoden aikana tulossuuntautunut raportointi on ottanut tärkeitä edistysaskeleita; on otettu käyttöön pitkäaikais-ten kumppanimaiden maastrategioita vastaavat raportit ja monenkeskiset vai-kuttamissuunnitelmat. Nämä molemmat sisältävät tärkeitä RBM-elementtejä.

Tällä hetkellä UM:n tietojärjestelmät eivät ole riittäviä kaikki kehitysyhteis-työn apukanavat ja instrumentit kattavaan tulosten seurantaan ja raportoin-tiin. Vastuuyksiköiden keräämät tiedot eivät välity eteen- eivätkä ylöspäin UM:ssä.

Politiikan ohjauskeinot
UM:ssä on neljä ohjaavaa ja neuvoa-antavaa kehityspolitiikan ja kehitysyhteis-työn elintä, jotka ovat merkityksellisiä RBM:n kannalta.

Kehityspoliittisella ohjausryhmällä on vahva rooli politiikan ohjauksessa, määrärahojen jaossa, monenkeskisten vaikuttamissuunnitelmien ja maaohjel-mien seurannassa, sekä näihin liittyvien suositusten antamisessa. Kehityspo-liittisen ohjausryhmän valtuuksien osittainen laajentaminen vuonna 2014 on tervetullut muutos, sillä se selventää ja vahvistaa ohjausryhmän roolia strate-gisessa ohjauksessa.

Laaturyhmällä on tärkeä rooli hankkeiden ja ohjelmien laadunvalvontaproses-sissa. Se pyrkii varmistamaan johdonmukaisuutta kaikkien kehityshanke-, ja -ohjelmaehdotusten, KEPO:n ja muun poliittisen ohjauksen välillä; se ei kata kuitenkaan kaikkea monenkeskistä kehitysyhteistyötä. Siltä puuttuu nyt val-miuksia arvioida hankkeiden mahdollisuuksia tuottaa tehokkaasti kehitys-tuloksia. Laaturyhmän toiminta keskittyy yksittäisiin hankkeisiin; laajempi näkökulma puuttuu vielä.

Kehityspoliittinen toimikunta (KPT) on periaatteessa ainoa elin, joka seuraa KEPO:n toteutusta vuosittain ja raportoi siitä hallitukselle. Sillä on myös mer-kittävä rooli keskustelun herättäjänä orastavista kehityspoliittisista aiheista. Siltä kuitenkin puuttuu henkilö- ja taloudellisia resursseja arvioida järjestel-mällisesti kaikkien apukanavien saavutuksia. KPT:n vaikutusvalta politii-kan johdonmukaisuustyössä on heikko, mikä johtuu myös sen rajoitetuista valtuuksista.

Korkean tason (kehitys)politiikan johdonmukaisuusverkostolla on tärkeä roo-li tietoisuuden lisäämisessä politiikan johdonmukaisuudesta. Sillä ei kuiten-

UM:ssä ei ole ylimmän hallinnon tason raportointia, joka kattaisi kaikki apukanavat ja instrumentit.

UM:n tietojärjestelmät eivät ole riittäviä kaikki kehitys-yhteistyön apukanavat ja instrumentit kattavaan tulosten seurantaan ja raportointiin.

kaan ole valtuuksia ja tarvittavaa valtaa ohjata tehokkaasti kehityspolitiikan johdonmukaisuuden toteuttamista.

Pääasialliset heikkoudet nykyisessä ohjausrakenteessa ovat puuttuvat linkit tulossuuntautuneen suunnittelun (strategisella ja ohjelmatasolla) ja talous-arviosuunnittelun välillä. Epäselvistä KEPO-tavoitteista johtuen on olemassa harmaa alue, jolla politiikan teko jatkuu KEPO:n ilmestymisen jälkeenkin.

Kansainväliset kokemukset tulosperustaisesta johtamisesta

Julkisella sektorilla on laaja kokemus tulosperustaisesta johtamisesta (RBM) viimeisen parin vuosikymmenen ajalta. Useimmissa tapauksissa RBM:n toteutus on ollut odotettua vaikeampaa ja havaitut positiiviset vaikutukset ovat usein olleet heikkoja. Aliarvioitujen organisatoristen ja teknisten toteutusongelmien lisäksi keskeinen haaste on tasapainottaa mahdollisesti kilpailevia tavoitteita liittyen oppimiseen ja tulosvastuullisuuden edistämiseen. Epäonnistuneet kokemukset RBM:stä liittyvät usein siihen, että tuloksia on hyödynnetty vain tulosvastuullisuuteen liittyviin tarkoituksiin. Tämä kaikki on johtanut jäykkään sääntöjen ja määrällisten tavoitteiden noudattamista korostavaan johtamisjärjestelmään, joka ei pysty tehokkaasti ottamaan huomioon dynaamisia ja monimutkaisia mekanismeja, vaihtelevia olosuhteita, eikä kehityskumppaneiden omia tavoitteita. Aiemmista kokemuksista on kuitenkin koottu kattavia hyviä kokemuksia, ja tieto hyvistä käytännöistä on yleisesti saatavilla.

Yli puolessa OECD DAC-jäsenmaista on voimassaoleva kehitysyhteistyölaki tai paikallisen parlamentin vahvistama politiikka. Nämä mahdollistavat pitkän aikavälin tavoitteiden laatimisen ja luovat odotuksia tuloksista. Vertailumaissa ja -järjestöissä käytössä olevat pitkän aikavälin politiikka- ja strategiset suunnitelmat, tarjoavat hyödyllisiä malleja Suomelle, kuinka ottaa paremmin huomioon kehitysyhteistyöhön liittyvä pitkä suunnittelu- ja toteutusaikahorisontti.

Strategisesta tulosviitekehyksestä on tulossa "standardi" kansainvälisessä kehitysyhteistyössä, ja se täydentää laadullista tietoa työn suunnittelun ja raportoinnin tuloksista. Kuitenkin suuri määrä indikaattoreita näissä viitekehyksissä (70 tai enemmän) vaikeuttaa tiedon käyttämistä tulosvastuullistarkoituksiin, ja on mahdollista, että tasapaino oppimisen ja tulosvastuullisuuden täyttämisen välillä saattaa kallistua jälkimmäisen hyväksi.

Tarvitaan kattava muutosteoria (Theory of Change) yhdistämään ylimmän hallinnon taso hanke- ja ohjelmatason kanssa. Näin myös mahdollistetaan mielekkäiden suorituskyky- ja tulosindikaattoreiden tunnistaminen.

Suositukset

1. Vahvistetaan Suomen kehityspolitiikan pitkän aikavälin tavoitteet ja periaatteet;
2. Korvataan tulevaisuudessa KEPO tiiviillä 3-5 sivua pitkällä kehityspoliittisella lausunnolla, jonka ydin on tuloslähtöisyys;
3. Kehitetään Suomen kehityspolitiikan toteutuksen pitkän aikavälin-strateginen suunnitelma;

4. Kehitetään muutosteoria ja strateginen tulosviitekehys UM:n ylimmän hallinnon tasolle;
5. Kehitetään ja sitoudutaan realistiseen RBM-strategiaan;
6. Jatketaan politiikan kanavointistrategioiden ja tulosviitekehyksen kehittämistä;
7. Otetaan systemaattisesti opiksi tuloksista;
8. Rakennetaan saumaton raportointihierarkia vastaamaan politiikan toteutuksen kanavia ja ylimmän hallinnon tason raportointitarpeita eduskunnalle;
9. Integroidaan ja kehitetään nykyisiä informaatiojärjestelmiä käyttäjäystävällisiksi johdon tietojärjestelmiksi, joista saadaan sekä taloudellinen että tulosperustainen tieto;
10. Vahvistetaan laadunvarmistusta; ja
11. Vahvistetaan politiikan johdonmukaisuuden tavoitetta.

SAMMANFATTNING

Resultatstyrning är en strategi som förbättrar och förstärker beslutstagande, lärande och ansvarsutkrävande.

Introduktion

Resultatstyrning är en strategi som fokuserar på resultat (i motsats till budget och aktiviteter) som förbättrar och förstärker beslutstagande, lärande och ansvarsutkrävande. Fokus i resultaten är en integrerad del av biståndseffektivitet och under den senaste tiden har den finska riksdagen börjat kräva ut mer omfattande information av utrikesministeriet (UM) om det utvecklingspolitiska programmets resultat och påverkan.

UM har använt sig av resultatstyrning sedan 1990-talet, men främst på projektnivå. Sedan 2012, driven av en tidigare utvärdering av resultatstyrning med fokus på den senaste utvecklingspolitiken, har en handlingsplan för resultatstyrning formulerats och implementerats. De långvariga partnerländerna har försetts med landstrategier med tillhörande resultatramar, och man har utfärdat inflytandeplaner för multilateralt samarbete. Trots dessa viktiga framsteg saknar UM en tydlig strategi för resultatstyrning.

Resultaten och rekommendationerna av denna utvärdering är avsedda för att användas av framtida regeringar och UM i deras strategiska planering och beslutstagande, samt att hjälpa UM vidareutveckla dess tillvägagångssätt i resultatstyrning.

Denna utvärdering har en stark utvecklingspolitisk inriktning. Vart fjärde år utfärdar den nya regeringen ett nytt utvecklingspolitiskt program som sammanfattar den framtida finska utvecklingspolitiken och -samarbetet. Denna utvärdering fokuserar på de tre utvecklingspolitiska programmen från 2004, 2007 och 2012. Den besvarar den centrala utvärderingsfrågan: Hur har utvecklingspolitiken lyckats med att lägga grunderna för resultatbaserad utvecklingspolitik och -samarbete?

Den centrala utvärderingsfrågan är uppdelad i fyra frågor som avspeglas i rapportens struktur:

1. Vilken väglednings typ tillhandahåller de utvecklingspolitiska programmen med avseende på styrka, specificitet och omfattning av mål och strategier (kapitel 4)?
2. Hur responsiva har de utvecklingspolitiska programmen varit i att lära av tidigare resultat (kapitel 4)?
3. Hur systematiskt och effektivt har det utvecklingspolitiska programmet implementerats (kapitel 5)?
4. Till vilken grad har ansvarsutkrävande utövats, är konsekvent och relevant för den finska riksdagen (kapitel 6)?

Resultatfokus i finsk utvecklingspolitik

Det utvecklingspolitiska programmet förmedlar på ett tydligt och övertygande

sätt finska utvecklingspolitikens värderingar och de övergripande principerna, men tillhandahåller mycket lite vägledning i resultatstyrning. Utrikespolitiska riktlinjer saknar prioritering och efterföljande utrikespolitik har lagt till nya mål utan att radera tidigare mål. Utvecklingspolitiska program och andra mer detaljerade policyvägledningsdokument uppvisar svag målsättningsförmåga. Förutom ett begränsat antal väldefinierade kvalitetsmål på UM budgeter och resultat har de utvecklingspolitiska programmen vanligtvis inte bundit sig till väldefinierade och meningsfulla mål som går att övervaka. De talrika vägledningsdokumenten är utan tydlig status och uppvisar liknande målsättningsproblem som de utvecklingspolitiska programmen, även om vissa undantag finns.

Policyformulering och lärande av resultaten

Varje gång efter att en ny regering blivit tillsatt, omformuleras hela det finska utvecklingspolitiska programmet 6-8 månader senare. Detta kan ses som en överdrift eftersom de översiktliga målen och principerna, samt sektorerna man har fokuserat i och kanalerna och instrumenten som används i utvecklingspolitik, har bestått relativt oförändrade över tid. Denna oföränderlighet av utvecklingspolitik är inte synbar vid första ögonkastet eftersom de utvecklingspolitiska programmen skiljer sig åt väsentligt i struktur och använder sig av olika övergripande teman (samstämmighet 2004, hållbar utveckling 2007 och mänskliga rättigheter 2012).

Den begränsade giltighetstiden av de utvecklingspolitiska programmen står i strid med de typiska tidshorisonterna som gäller inom utvecklingssamarbetet. Utvecklingspolitiska programmet fastställer en betydande del av den kommande regeringens aktiviteter och dess resultat kommer att rapporteras och redovisas först av de efterföljande regeringarna. Utvecklingspolitiska program och annan policyvägledning tar varken upp dessa tidsramar eller överlåter sakfrågor till efterträdande regeringar. Detta kan tvinga UMs anställda och samarbetspartners att omforma ("window dress") projekt och program påbörjade under tidigare regeringar att anpassas till den sittande regeringens politik.

Det finns lite uttryckligt bevis i de utvecklingspolitiska programmen på att man tagit lärdom av tidigare resultat. Man hänvisar sällan till resultat funna i utvärderingar eller övervakning av projekt och program. Utvecklingspolitiska programmets formuleringsprocess däremot samlar in information om tidigare implementeringserfarenheter och granskar utvärderat resultat. Det verkar som att under ministrar som haft färre personliga åsikter i formuleringen av det utvecklingspolitiska programmet, har man i högre grad utnyttjat resultat funna i utvärderingar, samt att UM anställdas erfarenheter syns tydligare i dessa program. Formuleringsprocesserna för de utvecklingspolitiska programmen skilde sig åt och de var ad hoc designade. Allting tyder på att det finns inga standardiserade och systematiska processer för att överföra användbara resultat från tidigare erfarenheter och använda dem i den nya policyformuleringen.

Resultatstyrning i policyimplementering

På grund av den svaga målsättningsförmågan är det svårt att besvara frågan om huruvida vägledningen och instruktionerna för implementering av de

utvecklingspolitiska programmen har varit systematiska och effektiva. Cirka två tredjedelar av budgeter och UM mål i de utvecklingspolitiska programmen uppfylldes. Dessa representerar de flesta goda kvalitetsmål i programmen. Flera indikatorer är om hur som helst inte systematiskt övervakade och rapporterade och det förblir därför obesvarat hur resultatbaserad implementering av dessa mål kan äga rum. Om beslutsfattarna är oförmögna att kvantifiera status quo och mäta stegen mot resultaten, blir systematisk resultatstyrning svårt.

Policyformulering och budgetprocesser är åtskilda på UM och själva budgetplaneringen är inte resultatdriven. Detta ställer till med problem för resultatstyrning eftersom det är svårt att binda sig till resultat när man inte vet vilka resurser är tillgängliga.

Längs några policy-implementerings-kanaler har man lyckats med att integrera resultat-styrning i planering, implementering och rapportering.

Längs några policyimplementeringskanaler har man lyckats med att integrera resultatstyrning i planering, implementering och rapportering. De omfattande resultatorienterade landstrategierna och multilaterala inflytandeplanerna med tillhörande resultatramar som är i fortsatt utveckling, kan hjälpa UM i implementering av resultatstyrning i finsk utvecklingspolitik och -samarbete. Landsstrategiernas resultatramar åtnjuter omfattande stöd bland personalen. Trots några brister är den nuvarande 'Aid for Trade' handlingsplanen ett gott praktiskt försök att tillämpa och adoptera resultatstyrning i programnivå. Samtidigt som UM har blivit mer samstämmig i sin politik på en internationell nivå, är enigheten i inrikespolitiken mindre prioriterad och saknar ministeröverskridande mandat. Därför finns det inget strategiskt tillvägagångssätt med konkreta mål och resurser.

UM har ännu inte lyckats med att skapa förutsättningar för effektiv resultatstyrning.

UM har ännu inte lyckats med att skapa förutsättningar för effektiv resultatstyrning. Organisationskulturen är riskaversiv och prioriterar samtycke och ansvarsutkrävande istället för aktsam experimentering och lärande. Detta är inte ovanligt i offentliga organisationer men utgör en barriär för framgångsrik implementering av resultatstyrning.

Resultatbaserad rapportering och ansvarsutkrävande

Rapportering av resultat till riksdagen har varit kvalitativt sett omfattande men främst anekdotisk och har inte omfattat alla utvecklings-samarbetskanaler.

Tidigare rapportering av resultat till riksdagen har varit kvalitativt sett omfattande men främst anekdotisk och har inte omfattat alla utvecklingssamarbetskanaler. Den årliga rapporteringen av det begränsade antalet kvantitativa mål av god kvalitet som finns i de utvecklingspolitiska programmen är inte systematisk och hänvisningar till dessa mål görs sällan. För många kvantitativa och kvalitativa mål har det inte funnits några diskussioner kring varför man inte nått målen, och vissa utvecklingspolitiska mål, både nådda och icke-nådda mål, har man bestämt sig för att lämna bort helt. Detta innebär att riksdagen och allmänheten förblir utan lämplig information och förståelse om huruvida har man nått de planerade målen (eller kommer att nå dem i framtiden) och hur utvecklingssamarbetet i sin helhet varit en god investering för samhället.

På UM finns det varken heltäckande rapportering på organisatorisk nivå som täcker alla utvecklingssamarbetskanaler och -instrument eller politisk samstämmighet. För de flesta utvecklingssamarbetskanaler inte ens den grund-

läggande portföljinformationen är regelbundet rapporterad. Avsaknaden av genomtäckande organisatoriska rapporter förklarar svårigheterna i rapporteringen för riksdagen.

Under de senaste två år har resultatorienterad rapportering tagit viktiga steg framåt tack vare rapporterna för landsstrategierna för de långsiktiga partnerländerna och multilaterala inflytandeplanerna, som båda innehåller resultatstyrningselement.

För närvarande är UM informationssystem inte lämpad för övervakning och rapportering av resultat i dess policyimplementeringskanaler. Mycket utav informationen samlad in av enskilda enheter är varken vidareförmedlad eller utnyttjade av högre instanser.

Styrningsmekanismer

Fyra styrnings- och rådgivningsenheter är relevanta för resultatstyrning i utvecklingssamarbete och -politik. "Styrningsgrupp för utvecklingspolitik" har en viktig ställning i politisk styrning, inflytande över budgetallokering, granskning av multilaterala inflytandeplan och landstrategier, samt att ge ut relaterade rekommendationer. Förstärkning av gruppens mandat under 2014 var en välkommen utveckling eftersom den förtydligade dess roll i strategisk planering.

"Kvalitetskontroll grupp" är viktig för kvalitetsövervakningsprocesserna för projekt och program. Den säkerställer förenligheten av projekt och program med det utvecklingspolitiska programmet och andra policyverktyg. Den täcker dock inte allt multilateralt samarbete. Den saknar ändå personal och finansiellkapacitet till att systematiskt kunna bedöma och utvärdera resultat av utvecklingssamarbetskanaler. Dess inflytande över politisk samstämmighet har varit begränsad vilket dels hänger ihop med dess begränsade mandat.

"Högnivå nätverk för konsekvent politik för utveckling" har en viktig roll i att öka medvetenheten av politisk samstämmighet i agendan. Den saknar ändå mandat och auktoritet som behövs för att effektivt styra implementeringen av politisk samstämmighet för utveckling.

Den principiella svagheten i nuvarande styrningsstrukturen ligger i avsaknaden av länkar mellan resultatorienterad planering i strategi- och programnivå, samt i budgetplanering. På grund av otydliga mål i utvecklingspolitiska programmet finns det en gråzon där policyarbetet pågår även efter att det utvecklingspolitiska programmet har publicerats.

Internationella erfarenheter av resultatstyrning

Det finns gott om internationella erfarenheter av resultatstyrning inom den offentliga sektorn. I de flesta fall har implementeringen av resultatstyrning varit svårare än förväntat och de observerade resultaten från implementering har inte sällan varit svaga. Förutom organisatoriska och tekniska underskattningar har en central utmaning varit att balansera potentiella konkurrerande syften av resultatstyrning: lärande och ansvarsutkrävande. De misslyckade

försöken att implementera resultatstyrning är oftast relaterade till att man använt resultaten endast för ansvarsutkrävande i bekostnad av lärande och förbättrad beslutsfattande. Detta har lett till ett stelt ledningssystem som lägger vikten på efterlevnad och som är för ineffektiv för att hantera dynamiska och komplexa mekanismer, samt till ett starkt beroende av partnerorganisationer och deras karakteristik. Det finns omfattande syntetiserad och tillgänglig god praxis från tidigare erfarenheter i implementering av resultatstyrning på ett sätt som tillför mervärde.

DAC medlemsstaterna har fastställt utvecklingslagstiftning eller statlig policy godkänd av riksdagen. Dessa möjliggör formulering av långsiktiga mål och hjälper att tillgodose riksdagens förväntningar på resultatinformation.

Långsiktig politik och strategiska planer som de flesta jämförelseländer och organisationer använder, representerar användbara verktyg för att införliva de typiska tidsskalorna i internationellt utvecklingsarbete i policyimplementering.

Strategiska resultatramar, som mäter effekterna av utvecklingsprojekten, resultaten av utvecklingsprojekten länkade till organisationens aktiviteter, samt organisationens prestationer, håller på att bli en standard inom internationell utveckling och komplimenterar kvalitativ information om resultaten i planering och rapportering av utvecklingsarbete. Det stora antalet av indikatorer i dessa resultatramar (70 eller flera) kan leda till en risk att inte se skogen för alla träd när de används för ansvarsutkrävande, samt till att balansen mellan lärande och ansvarsutkrävande för resultatsyrningssyften tippar över till förmån för den senare.

En omfattande 'Theory of Change' behövs för att koppla det organisatoriska med projekt och programnivåer, samt att tillåta identifiering av betydelsefulla indikatorer.

Rekommendationer
1. Fastställa långsiktiga mål och principer för finsk utvecklingspolitik;
2. Ersätta framtida utvecklingspolitiska program med en koncist 3–5 sidor långt utvecklingspolitiskt uttalande som omfattar dess agenda;
3. Ta fram en långsiktig strategisk plan för implementering av finskt utvecklingssamarbete;
4. Ta fram en 'Theory of Change' och strategiska resultatramar för UM på organisationsnivå;
5. Ta fram och förbinda sig till en realistisk resultatstyrningsstrategi;
6. Fortsätta med utvecklandet av strategier för policykanaler och med resultatramar;
7. Systematisera lärandet av resultaten;
8. Bygga en sammanhållande rapporteringshierarki längs policy-implementeringskanalerna samt för organisationsrapportering;
9. Integrera och vidareutveckla de nuvarande informationssystemen till ett användarvänligt ledningssystem för finansiell information och resultatinformation;

10. Förstärka kvalitetssäkring;
11. Förstärka mandatet för politisk samstämmighet.

SUMMARY

Introduction

Results-based management (RBM) is a management strategy that focuses on results (as opposed to budget and activities) to improve decision-making, learning, and accountability. A focus on results is an integral part of the aid effectiveness agenda and, recently, the Finnish Parliament has demanded more comprehensive information on results achieved through implementing Development Policy Programmes (DPPs) from the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA).

The MFA has utilised results-oriented tools since the 1990s. Since 2012, driven by an earlier RBM evaluation and an explicit focus on results in its most recent development policy, a RBM Action Plan has been formulated and is being implemented. Country strategies for long-term partner countries have been equipped with results frameworks and recently, influencing plans for multilateral cooperation with varying coverage of results indicators have been introduced. In spite of these important advances, the MFA still lacks a comprehensive corporate approach to RBM.

The findings and recommendations of the present evaluation are intended to serve strategic planning and decision-making needs of future governments and the MFA and to help the MFA to further develop its approach to RBM.

The evaluation has a strong development policy orientation. Incoming governments, every four years, issue a new Development Policy Programme (DPP) that summarises future Finnish development policy and cooperation. The evaluation focuses on the three DPPs of 2004, 2007 and 2012. It answers the central evaluation question of how these policies have succeeded in defining the foundation for results-based development policy and cooperation.

The central evaluation question is broken down into four questions that are reflected in the structure of this report:
1. What is the nature of guidance provided in DPPs with respect to strength, specificity and scope of objectives and approaches? (Chapter 4)
2. How responsive have DPPs and accompanying guidance been to learning from earlier results? (Chapter 4)
3. How consequently and diligently has DPP guidance been implemented? (Chapter 5)
4. To what degree is upwards accountability exercised, consistent and relevant from concrete programming to the Finnish Parliament? (Chapter 6).

Results-focus in Finnish Development Policy

DPPs successfully and convincingly convey the values and overall guiding principles of Finnish development policy but provide very little guidance with

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RBM focuses on results to improve decision-making, learning, and accountability.

DPPs convincingly convey the values and overall guiding principles of Finnish development policy but provide little guidance with relevance for RBM.

relevance for RBM. Development policy guidance lacks prioritisation and successive policies add additional but do not remove earlier objectives. DPPs and other, more detailed "downstream" policy guidance documents exhibit poor target-setting qualities. Apart from a limited number of good quality targets on the MFA budget and output level, DPPs usually do not commit to well-defined and meaningful targets that can be monitored. Downstream guidance documents are numerous and often without clear status. They exhibit similar target-setting issues as the DPPs although some exceptions exist.

Policy Formulation and Learning from Results
Published between 6–8 months after each incoming government takes office, DPPs attempt to reformulate the entire Finnish development policy for each government cycle. This seems exaggerated as overall goals and principles, as well as coverage of standard sectors, channels and instruments have remained remarkably stable over time. This stability of Finnish development policy is not apparent at first sight; DPPs differ quite substantially in terms of their structure and choose different overarching cross-cutting themes/objectives (policy coherence in 2004, sustainable development in 2007 and the human rights-based approach in 2012) under which other guidance is placed and interpreted.

The limited validity periods of DPPs stand at odds with typical implementation timescales in international development. Currently, DPPs determine a substantial share of the next government's activities, the results of which will only be reported by the government(s) after that. DPPs and other policy guidance do not address these timescales or handover issues between different governments. This can also force MFA staff and partners to window-dress projects and programmes started in previous government cycles into a language more fitting with present policies.

Little explicit evidence for learning from results is visible in DPPs. Most downstream policies also make little reference to evaluative findings or monitored performance. DPP formulation processes however pay attention to collecting earlier implementing experiences and reviewing evaluative findings by others. It appears that more learning from results and MFA staff input materialised in DPPs under Ministers with less personal input into the policy formulation process. Formulation processes between DPPs differed and for each of them the learning process was designed ad-hoc. Overall, there seems to be no standardised, systematic process of distilling results experience and incorporating insights into policy formulation.

Managing for Results in Policy Implementation
Due to overall poor target-setting qualities, the question on how consequently and diligently DPP guidance has been implemented is difficult to analyse and integration of RBM processes has been assessed in addition to target compliance.

About two thirds of the budget and MFA output targets in DPPs were met. These represent most of the good quality targets of DPPs. Several target indicators are however not systematically monitored and reported and it remains unclear

The limited validity periods of DPPs stand at odds with typical implementation timescales in international development.

Little explicit evidence for learning from results is visible in DPPs.

how results-oriented implementation towards those targets can actually take place. If decision-makers are unable to quantify the status quo and track progress against results, systematic managing for results is difficult.

Policy formulation and budgeting processes at the MFA remain largely separate and budget planning itself is not results-driven. This poses inherent problems for RBM since it is difficult to commit to results without knowing what resources will be available.

Along policy implementation channels, some important progress has been made towards integrating RBM in planning, implementation and reporting. Comprehensive result-oriented country strategies and multilateral influencing plans with results frameworks that continue to be developed have the potential to make significant contributions to establishing RBM in Finnish development policy and cooperation. Importantly, the country strategy approach enjoys staff support. The current Aid for Trade Action Plan, despite some shortcomings, also represents a good practice attempt for adopting a programmatic approach based on RBM. While the MFA has made progress with policy coherence for development at the international level, domestic policy coherence suffers from a lack of trans-ministerial mandate, and remains without a strategic approach with concrete targets and resources.

The MFA has not yet been able to create an organisational environment conducive to RBM. The organisational culture remains largely risk-averse and prioritises diligent compliance and accountability over careful experimentation and learning. While not uncommon in public service agencies, this represents a serious barrier for successful implementation of RBM.

Results–focused Reporting and Accountability

Past results reporting to Parliament has been qualitatively rich but primarily anecdotal and has not covered all aid channels. The annual reporting on the limited number of good quality quantitative targets contained in DPPs is not systematic and seldom done with reference to original targets. For many quantitative or qualitative targets, no discussion takes place on why objectives have not been met and some DPP targets, both reached and not reached, are silently dropped. Overall, this leaves Parliament and the society at large without an adequate understanding of whether originally intended objectives have been reached (or are likely to be reached in the future), and whether the overall work delivered represents a good social investment.

Within the MFA, there is no comprehensive corporate level reporting that covers entire aid channels or aid instruments, or policy coherence work. For most aid channels, not even basic portfolio information is reported regularly. The absence of comprehensive corporate reports explains the difficulties with gathering results information for reports to Parliament. During the last two years, however, results-oriented reporting has taken important steps forward through the introduction of reports against country strategies for long-term partner countries and multilateral influencing plans, both of which contain important RBM elements.

At present, the MFA's intervention information systems are not adequate for monitoring and reporting results across policy implementation channels. Much information gathered by individual units is neither transmitted nor used upwards.

Policy Steering Mechanisms

Four steering and advisory bodies are relevant for RBM in development policy and cooperation. The Development Policy Steering Group (DPSG) plays a strong role in policy steering, influencing budget allocations, reviewing multilateral influencing plans and country strategies, and in issuing related recommendations. The partial expansion of the mandate of the DPSG in 2014 is a welcome development since it clarifies and strengthens DPSG's role in strategic steering.

The Quality Assurance Board (QAB) plays an important role in the project and programme quality control process. It verifies consistency of all development project and programme proposals, including multilateral cooperation projects, with DPP and other policy guidance. It does not cover all multilateral cooperation. The QAB currently lacks capabilities to fully appraise the potential for future results and is restricted too much to looking at individual interventions.

The Development Policy Committee (DPC) is in principle the only body that follows DPP implementation annually and reports on performance to the Government. It also plays a major role in initiating discussion on emerging development policy topics. It however lacks the human and financial resources to systematically assess performance across all aid channels. The DPC's influence on policy coherence work has been limited which is also due to its limited mandate.

The High-Level Network for Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) plays an important role in raising awareness of the policy coherence agenda. It does however not have the mandate and authority required for effectively steering implementation of policy coherence for development.

The principal weakness in the current steering structure is the missing link between result-oriented planning at a strategic and programme level, and budget planning. Due to unclear DPP targets, a grey area exists where policy making continues beyond and after DPPs have been issued.

International Experience with RBM

The body of experience with RBM in the public sector is rich and covers decades of implementation efforts. In most cases, implementing RBM has been more difficult than expected and observed positive effects from RBM implementation have often been weak. Apart from underestimated organisational and technical implementation difficulties, a central challenge is to balance the potentially competing learning and accountability purposes of RBM. Failed attempts of RBM integration are often related to using results for accountability purposes only. This can suffocate learning and improved decision-making and often lead to a rigid compliance-oriented management regime ineffective for dealing with dynamic and complex mechanisms, and the greatly varying

Intervention information systems are not adequate for monitoring and reporting results across policy implementation channels.

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Failed attempts of RBM integration are often related to using results for accountability purposes only.

conditions and needs of development practitioners and beneficiaries on the ground. From past experience, comprehensive good practices for implementing RBM in a value-adding way have been synthesised and are available.

More than half of the countries organised in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) have established a development law or Parliament-endorsed government policies. These allow the formulation of long-term objectives and parliamentary expectations on results information.

Long-term policies and strategic plans used by most benchmarking countries and organisations represent a useful tool to incorporate typical timescales in international development into policy implementation.

Strategic Results Frameworks tracking development impacts, development results linked to agency activities and agency performance are becoming a standard in international development and complement qualitative information on results in planning and reporting of development work. However, the high number of 70 or more indicators in these frameworks entails the risk of losing sight of the forest for the trees when used for accountability purposes and of tipping the balance between learning and accountability purposes of RBM to the latter.

A comprehensive Theory of Change is required to link the corporate with project and programme levels and to allow identification of meaningful performance and results indicators.

Recommendations
1. Establish long-term goals and principles of Finnish development policy;
2. Replace future DPPs by concise 3–5 page Development Policy Statements that fully embrace the results agenda;
3. Develop a long-term strategic plan for Finnish development policy implementation;
4. Develop a Theory of Change and a Strategic Results Framework at the MFA corporate level;
5. Develop and commit to a realistic RBM strategy;
6. Continue the development of policy channel strategies and results frameworks;
7. Systematise learning from results;
8. Build a seamless reporting hierarchy along policy implementation channels and for corporate reporting to Parliament;
9. Integrate and further develop present systems into a user-friendly management system for financial and results information;
10. Strengthen quality assurance; and
11. Strengthen the policy coherence mandate.

KEY FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The numbering of findings refers to the key findings provided at the end of Chapters 3 through 7, and the numbering of conclusions and recommendations refers to Chapters 8 and 9. Only those findings and conclusions directly related to recommendations are listed.

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
Development Policy Programmes (DPPs) have been useful in conveying the values and overall guiding principles of Finnish development policy and provide the rationale for supporting sectors, themes, channels, instruments and countries (4a). However, with great effort and participation, DPPs define Finland's entire development policy every 4 years again. This includes goals and principles that have, even if not easily visible across DPPs, in fact remained remarkably stable (4b). Other countries have established long-term development policies, either as law or as Parliament-endorsed government policy (7a) and have driven the introduction of Result-Based Management (RBM) through forceful and explicit policy commitment to a results agenda (7f).	Past DPPs have been useful for providing guidance on various aspects of Finnish development policy but it would be more effective if the focus of policy statements issued by incoming governments would lie on changes relative to longer-term development policies rather than on redeveloping the entire policy. This would allow issuing policy statements earlier in the government cycle and more focused stakeholder participation (8a).	**Recommendation 1:** Establish long-term goals and principles of Finnish development policy. **Recommendation 2:** Replace future DPPs by concise 3–5 page Development Policy Statements that fully embrace the results agenda.
DPPs have been valid for 3 years and 4–6 months, i.e. from publication 6–8 month after a new government is appointed until the appointment of the subsequent government. Their validity under the subsequent government until a new DPP is issued is unclear. This severely limits the ability of DPPs to set and ensure commitment to long-term targets (4e). Time-lags in Finnish development policy implementation usually exceed DPP validity periods. DPPs do not reflect these timescales and provide little guidance on work started under previous governments or for work that is likely to be implemented under future governments. Development results can be expected to occur one or more government cycles later (4g). Other countries and organisations have introduced long-term development strategies that allow the formulation of long-term objectives and commitment to plans to reach them (7a).	The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA)/Finland need to operate according to a longer-time strategic plan which reflects realistic development time-scales (8b).	**Recommendation 3:** Develop a long-term strategic plan for Finnish development policy implementation.

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
Overall, DPPs provide very little guidance relevant to RBM. DPPs fail to establish relative priorities and usually do not commit to well-defined, meaningful targets that can be monitored. Between DPPs, guidance is inflationary (4c). Most benchmarking countries and both international organisations reviewed have introduced indicator-driven corporate results frameworks that cover global development impacts, development outcomes, and institutional and organizational performance. The number of indicators in those frameworks is rather high (70 or more) and may pose accountability- and learning-related challenges (7g). A comprehensive Theory of Change (ToC) is required as a basis for selecting meaningful indicators and for linking results across the different results framework levels. A sound Theory of Change also renders transparent inherent difficulties in attributing development outcomes to the activities and the funding of individual donors (7h).	Corporate–level target-setting at the MFA is inadequate and current development policy and cooperation work operates without clear goal-posts, apart from a limited number of targets on the budget and MFA output level. A comprehensive RBM framework – encompassing both qualitative objectives and quantitative results targets – is required (8c). When determining the number of indicators driving a corporate results framework, benefits and risks for both accountability and learning should be balanced (8v).	**Recommendation 4:** Develop a Theory of Change and a Strategic Results Framework at the MFA corporate level.
RBM implementation is not easy and the time and resource efforts, as well as the degree to which a results-oriented approach requires fundamental cultural and procedural changes in organisations is often underestimated, leading to unsatisfactory overall results (7d). Strong senior commitment and policy support is required for success (7f). Sufficient attention to RBM as a learning approach needs to be paid and the approach must be applied sensibly to where it provides most benefit and justifies costs (7e). Definitions of RBM vary in their emphasis on learning and accountability (7b). The MFA has not yet been able to create an organisational environment conducive to RBM and has not yet developed a results culture (5h).	A realistic understanding of the effort related to introducing RBM at the MFA needs to be established and strong and explicit policy and senior leadership commitment to RBM is required (8n). Substantial change in organisational culture, staff incentives, and management style is necessary to successfully and sustainably integrate results-oriented management, learning and reporting at the MFA (8m). The introduction of RBM at the MFA needs to emphasise the learning aspects of RBM by encouraging staff initiative, risk-taking and learning from failure as well as from success, and by avoiding a regime dominated by compliance. Overall, a strong results culture needs to be established (8o).	**Recommendation 5:** Develop and commit to a realistic RBM strategy.

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
Result-oriented country strategies and multilateral influencing plans, complemented with a result-oriented reporting system, have the potential to make a significant contribution to establishing RBM in the Finnish development policy and cooperation (5c). Most other aid channels, however, have not yet moved towards integrated RBM and reporting (5d). The current Aid for Trade Action Plan, despite its shortcomings, provides an example for adopting a programmatic approach based on RBM with relevance for results-oriented thematic and sector cross-cutting cooperation (5d).	For bilateral cooperation with long-term partner countries and influencing plans for multilateral organisations, promising integration of RBM is under way. Policy coherence work and other development cooperation channels still lack results-oriented frameworks (8h).	**Recommendation 6:** Continue development of policy channel strategies and results frameworks.
DPPs do not reference evaluative findings or other learning processes but learning from results has taken place. DPP content is however dominated by other influences such as ministerial input. Learning from results happens in an ad hoc fashion rather than in a regular and systematic process (4h). All benchmarking partners utilise reviews, evaluations and other analysis, both to complement and to enrich the information provided by indicator-based results frameworks and for learning purposes. The UK has demonstrated strong follow-up on such evaluative findings and has adjusted its bilateral and multilateral development scope drastically after two influential aid reviews (7j).	The MFA has been able to incorporate some learning from results into policy formulation in the past. The extent of learning is difficult to establish and the process can be systematised and rendered more transparent. Evaluation represents an integral element of results-oriented learning (8f).	**Recommendation 7:** Systematise learning from results.
At present, there is no comprehensive reporting that covers all aid channels and instruments and corporate-level information is gathered ad hoc. This also explains observed difficulties with reporting to Parliament (6a). Within the MFA, reporting varies along the policy implementation channels both in terms of aggregation level and synthesis of information gathered, however never reaching channel-wide comprehensive reporting (6b). Much information gathered by individual units is neither transmitted nor used further upwards (6c). Several DPP target indicators are not systematically monitored and reported which raises the question how results-oriented implementation towards those targets can actually take place (5b).	There is no systematic reporting on results along policy implementation channels. For some channels, not even basic portfolio data is available in aggregated form. This lack of corporate results information is also visible in reports to Parliament (8i)	**Recommendation 8:** Build a seamless reporting hierarchy along policy implementation channels and for corporate reporting to Parliament.

Findings	Conclusions	Recommendations
The processes of setting DPP objectives is separated from budget planning; total aid budget and its allocation e.g. between departments or units are not driven by results-based planning (5a). The intervention information system(s) are not adequate at present to be used to monitor and report results across the MFA aid channels (6c).	The MFA does currently not possess a functional results-oriented, corporate-level information and financial management system. The existing project intervention systems and databases as well as available data would enable, with some integration and further development, monitoring and reporting of basic results information. From international experience with RBM implementation, user-friendly information systems on the corporate level represent a key requirement for success (8l).	**Recommendation 9:** Integrate and further develop present systems into a user-friendly management systems for financial and results information.
The Quality Assurance Board reviews consistency of bilateral aid proposals with policy guidance but does not fully appraise the potential for future results. At present, there is also no joint mechanism with a view of the entire portfolio that would allow results-oriented portfolio management vis-à-vis DPP objectives (6e).	For RBM, the Quality Assurance Board has more potential than presently realised in terms of thorough quality appraisals of proposals, generating ex-ante quality scoring information, issuing regular opinions on portfolio evolution, and possibly extending its coverage of policy implementation channels further (8k).	**Recommendation 10:** Strengthen quality assurance.
The MFA has made a lot of progress in policy coherence work, especially internationally, and more recently with the food security pilot. However, policy coherence work suffers from low status – it is being driven too much by the MFA alone – and lack of a strategic approach, including lack of concrete targets and allocation of mandates as well as resources (5f). The possibilities of the Development Policy Committee and the High-Level Network for Policy Coherence for Development to influence the policy coherence agenda (including setting objectives and overseeing implementation) are limited. There is also no concrete programme or action plan related to policy coherence and, hence, reporting also remains descriptive and activity-oriented (6f).	Policy coherence for development, a central topic in all three DPPs, requires a strengthened mandate of the High-Level Network for Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) or the Development Policy Committee and cabinet-level leadership to be implemented as envisaged in development policies of the last 12 years. Alternatively, the underlying Theory of Change should be adapted to the MFA's mandate, i.e. reflect ways to influence rather than implement changes in other policy sectors (8e).	**Recommendation 11:** Strengthen the policy coherence mandate.

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Context

The political vision for the Finnish development policy and cooperation is set every four years in a new Finnish Government Programme (GP). The GP is concretised in a Development Policy Programme (DPP) that is to provide the general policy directions concerning how Finland's development policy and development cooperation should be implemented in practice, including planning, implementation and reporting. DPPs are to prioritise development actions and provide strategic guidance for allocating financial and human resources to deliver development results consistent with the set political vision. DPPs are often complemented with special guidelines explaining the approaches and commitments of the Finnish government to reach these results.

The aid effectiveness agenda has driven an increasing focus on results in Finnish development policy. In a period of slow economic growth after the global financial crisis, pressure has increased on those implementing aid to convincingly demonstrate aid effectiveness by reporting on concrete development results. At the same time, the importance of managing for and learning from results has been exacerbated as a tool for increasing the value for money of aid and the efficiency of development policy implementation. Aid effectiveness, results-based management (RBM) and accountability in development cooperation have been at the core of the international development discourse between developing countries and the donor community in the past ten years, as evidenced by a series of high-level meetings on these themes in Rome, Accra, Paris, Busan and Mexico.

Results-Based Management (RBM) is a management strategy that focuses on results (as opposed to budget and activities) to improve decision-making, learning, and accountability. RBM in international development is closely linked to the evolving aid effectiveness agenda that is most visibly marked by eight broad development impact objectives – the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs and their 21 targets and 60 indicators represent a global results framework. From the late 1990s to date the international focus on development results was set and remains strong as is evidenced by the post 2015 agenda and Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) process.

The 2012 Development Policy Programme (DPP) explicitly addressed the objective of improving the results-based management of development cooperation and, together with the findings of other evaluations (Poate et al 2011, OECD 2012), gave rise to a RBM Action Plan for 2013–14 for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA).

RBM focuses on results to improve decision–making, learning, and accountability.

In Finnish bilateral cooperation, logical frameworks have been widely used at a project and programme level and, in recent years, results frameworks have become a standard in bilateral country strategies and multilateral influencing plans. The MFA however still lacks a comprehensive approach to RBM on the corporate level that integrates management for results, learning from results, and accountability through reporting of results within and across all policy implementation channels. The development and use of a Strategic Results Framework (SRF) also represents a central recommendation in an earlier evaluation of project-level RBM in Finnish development cooperation (Poate et al 2011).

The MFA has reported annually to Parliament on its activities, the use of funds and, increasingly, on results. Recent MFA reports, however, have been criticised by the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee (Foreign Affairs Committee 2014), the National Audit Office (NAO 2013) and the OECD DAC Peer Review (OECD 2012) for their weak quality of results reporting.

This evaluation responds to these challenges. By analysing how the last three DPPs have succeeded in defining the foundation for results-based development policy and cooperation, it charts a way forward towards integrated RBM at the MFA for improved learning and decision-making, to improve delivery of development results on the ground and, ultimately to better meet beneficiary needs. The evaluation should also contribute to improving reporting on development results and accountability within the MFA and towards Parliament.

1.2 Purpose and Scope

This section summarises the purpose and scope of the planned evaluation as provided in the Terms of Reference (ToR) (Annex 1).

Purpose and Objective

The purpose of the evaluation is to serve strategic planning and decision-making needs of oncoming governments and the MFA. This information is also intended to help the ministry to further develop DPPs and results-based management, especially the policy steering processes of the development policy and cooperation of Finland.

The objective of the evaluation is to assess the previous three DPPs and related policy steering process as well as the formulation processes of DPPs and strategic accountability structures from the results-based management point of view. Evaluation itself is also a major tool for accountability. Thus, the evaluation will also inform the general public, parliamentarians, academia, and development professionals outside the immediate sphere of the decision-makers in development policy of what has been achieved by the use of public funds.

Scope of Work

The evaluation is to cover the following areas:
1. The formulation processes of the three latest DPPs from accountability, ownership and continuity points of view;
2. The overall structure of the three latest DPPs from the results-based

The purpose of the evaluation is to serve strategic planning and decision-making at MFA.

management point of view;

3. The key policy steering processes and structures ensuring that policy priorities are reflected in resource allocations, working modalities and division of the work within the MFA and embassies; and

4. The accountability structures at the strategic level such as annual reporting of the MFA to the Parliament.

In this evaluation, using the results chain logic, the programming documents, policy influencing plans and funding decisions are seen as outputs of the system, and therefore reflecting how the expected outcomes and policy priorities of DPPs have been considered at this level of the result chain. The policy content and priorities of DPPs will be assessed only from the results-based management point of view. This means that the main principles and priorities mentioned in the DPPs (such as human rights, equality and sustainable development) will be used only as examples to describe how successful these principles and priorities have been transformed into practical programmes and influencing processes.

Period Covered

The temporal scope of the evaluation is 2003-2013, covering the latest three Government Programmes (Finnish Government 2003, 2007, 2011) and the last three DPPs (MFA 2004d, 2007d, 2012e). Due to the recent developments in developing the RBM agenda at MFA, relevant documents from 2014 are also reviewed.

Focus of Work

The focus of the evaluation will be at system wide strategic level processes, programming and reporting levels, not at the implementation of individual programmes or instruments. The relevant strategic level decision making bodies include the following: DPSG, QAB, DPC and the PCD Network.

The evaluation covers regional and country programming as well as the European Union (EU) and multilateral programming, civil society organisations (CSO) cooperation, humanitarian assistance and policy influencing processes. All major instruments are covered, but only at normative, guideline, instruction and overall funding allocation levels, not at the individual programme level. However, samples of programme documents, funding decisions as well as reports will be used to demonstrate the programmatic links from policy priorities and principles to results-based programmes.

1.3 Organisation of Work and Quality Assurance

Evaluation Team

The evaluation was conducted by a team of 6 professionals of which 4 were senior evaluators. The team was led by Markus Palenberg from the Institute for Development Strategy with a focus on methodology and by Marko Katila from Indufor with a focus on managing the evaluation operations. The other two senior evaluators were Pirkko Poutiainen and Bernadeta Killian. Other team mem-

The focus of the evaluation is at system wide strategic level processes, programming and reporting.

bers were Diane Bombart and Mariia Kaikkonen. In addition, Juho Penttilä, Indufor trainee, provided valuable technical and logistical support. The work was organised along 16 work packages for which team-internal responsibilities and end products were defined (Section 2.3.2).

Evaluation Phases
The evaluation was conducted in three phases from June 2014 to January 2015 (Inception Phase until September 2014, main inquiry phase until November 2014, synthesis phase until January, 2015). Due to the short overall timeframe, the phases had some overlap and no separate desk study phase was included although a desk study report was delivered in October 2014.

Quality Assurance
Direct quality assurance was provided through the MFA's Development Evaluation Unit (EVA-11) on the various interim products and the draft final report as well as at various decision-making stages throughout the evaluation, for example during the selection of benchmarking countries. A Reference Group was established (Table 1) that provided feedback to the Evaluation Team at the kick-off in June 2014, and on the Inception, Desk Study and Draft Final Report. The Final Report also underwent a broader feedback process at the MFA.

Table 1   Evaluation Reference Group members.

Name	Title/Position
Max von Bonsdorff	Senior Adviser on Economic and Results Management, Department of Development Policy (DoDP)
Ulla Järvelä-Seppinen	Senior Adviser, Unit for General Development Policy, DoDP
Gunilla Kullberg	Senior Adviser, Department for the Americas and Asia
Hanna Rinkineva	Desk Officer, Deputy Director of the Unit for General Development Policy and Planning, DoDP
Katariina Sario	Senior Adviser, Unit for Sectoral Policy, DoDP
Arto Valjas	Senior Adviser, Department for Africa and Middle East
Suvi Virkkunen	Senior Adviser, DoDP

1.4 Structure of this Report

After this introductory chapter, the evaluation approach and methodology is described in Chapter 2 and the context for the evaluation at the MFA is summarised in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 analyses Finnish development policy with a focus on learning from results and usefulness for providing downstream guidance. Chapter 5 assesses the diligence of policy implementation and integration of RBM at the MFA. Chapter 6 is devoted to reporting and accountability. International experience with RBM is summarised in Chapter 7. Overall conclusions are drawn in Chapter 8 and recommendations are listed and explained in Chapter 9.

2 EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

Definition of RBM

The terminology around Results-Based Management (RBM) is multifaceted and not always applied consistently (Section 7.1). For this report, a recent definition by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is employed that covers management, learning and accountability dimensions and reflects the understanding of RBM in the ToR:

> "RBM is a management strategy by which all actors, contributing directly or indirectly to achieving a set of results, ensure that their processes, products and services contribute to the achievement of desired results (outputs, outcomes and higher level goals or impact). The actors in turn use information and evidence on actual results to inform decision making on the design, resourcing and delivery of programmes and activities as well as for accountability and reporting." United Nations Development Group (UNDG 2011, p. 2)

Other definitions are, for example, "A management strategy focusing on performance and achievement of outputs, outcomes and impacts" (OECD 2002, p. 34) or "Results-Based Management (RBM) is a management strategy aimed at achieving important changes in the way organisations operate, with improving performance in terms of results as the central orientation. RBM provides the management framework and tools for strategic planning, risk management, performance monitoring and evaluation. Its primary purpose is to improve efficiency and effectiveness through organisational learning, and secondly to fulfil accountability obligations through performance reporting" (Meier 2003, p. 6).

2.1 Evaluation Questions

The Terms of Reference for this evaluation provided a single overarching evaluation question:

> "How have the last three Development Policy Programmes succeeded in defining the foundation for results-based development policy and cooperation?" (MFA 2014r, p. 5)

During the inception phase of this evaluation, an evaluation question hierarchy has been developed that breaks this overall evaluation question down into four main evaluation questions, each of which looks at different and mutually exclusive aspects (Figure 1). These questions are broken down further into 18 specific evaluation questions in the Inception Report to this evaluation (MFA 2014t, p. 9).

The terminology around RBM is multifaceted and not always applied consistently.

How have the last three DPPs succeeded in defining the foundation for results–based development policy and cooperation?

Figure 1   Main evaluation questions.

Main evaluation question:
How have the last three DPPs succeeded in defining the foundation for results-based development policy and co-operation?

Evaluation question 2:
How responsive have DPPs and accompanying guidance been to learning from earlier results?

Evaluation question 3:
How consequently and diligently has DPP guidance been implemented?

Evaluation question 4:
To what degree is upwards accountability exercised, consistent and relevant from concrete programming to the Finnish Parliament?

Evaluation question 1:
What is the nature of guidance provided in DPPs with respect to strength, specificity and scope of objectives and approaches?

Source: MFA (MFA 2014t, p. 8)

Evaluation questions 2, 3 and 4 reflect the main aspects of RBM at the level of the DPPs and, together, answer the overarching question of this evaluation. Evaluation question 1 was added as it became obvious that the characteristics of policy guidance themselves merit and necessitate thorough analysis. The analyses for answering question 1 then inform questions 2–4.

Question 1 assesses the guidance elements contained in DPPs and GPs (with development relevance). It looks at the strengths, specificity and value-added over the status quo, as well as the thematic, regional and institutional scope of guidance.

Question 2 is focused on the degree to which DPPs and accompanying guidance reflect learning from earlier results. It looks at the main influences that have shaped the last three DPPs, including the role of various steering and consultative bodies (DPSG, PCD, DPC, and QAB) and specifically at the degree to which ex-ante appraisals towards results and ex-post learning from achieved results have shaped DPP guidance. It also investigates the degree to which learning was internal (i.e. based on evaluations, reviews, and studies of MFA's development policy implementation) or external (i.e. based on insights gained by partner countries themselves and by the development community).

Question 3 assesses to what degree the relative role, weight, and importance of DPP objectives and further guidance was conserved when it was translated into decisions, fund and work allocations towards downstream MFA units/processes, and towards various steering and consultative bodies involved. It then looks at the degree to which DPP guidance ultimately has influenced policy directions, policy implementation and monitoring and work done in the MFA's country, regional, thematic and multilateral work.

Question 4 asks what type of information is currently reported upwards into the MFA, within the MFA, and towards Parliament and the Finnish society and how this information compares to DPP guidance. It also looks at the roles various steering and consultative bodies play in ensuring accountability.

Each question is researched in general terms as well as specifically for two exemplary theme studies and one country study (Annex 4). In addition, each question is also researched beyond the Finnish context as part of the overall desk study and six benchmarking analyses (Chapter 7).

Finally, for all questions, this report aims at identifying realistic improvement potential over the past and current status quo.

2.2 Evaluation Framework

This section describes the evaluation framework. First, the analytical framework is discussed, i.e. the Evaluation Team's conceptual understanding of RBM at the MFA (Section 2.2.1). Then the operational framework is presented, describing how the actual evaluation work was broken down into manageable and coherent work packages (Section 2.2.2). Finally, some remarks are made on the different information sources and data collection methods used, and on triangulation of findings between those (Section 2.2.3).

2.2.1 Analytical Framework

The Terms of Reference for this evaluation contain a useful analytic framework summarising policy formulation and implementation at the MFA in the context of RBM (Figure 2 on next page). This framework has been adopted, with some generalisations described in the text below, for this evaluation.

This initial framework exhibits a number of features of importance for the analytical approach of this evaluation. The Evaluation Team finds that it correctly reflects:

- The different dimensions of RBM: management and learning, and accountability. It also depicts that learning and accountability take place along the entire results chain;
- The logical flow of governmental, ministerial, and DPP guidance to resource allocations, programming and, ultimately, to development results along an overall results chain for Finnish development policy formulation and implementation;
- The fact that the MFA itself is removed, sometimes by several implementation layers, from actual development work on the ground, which is implemented by others. This is important for results attribution, learning and accountability;
- The MFA's inner structure, i.e. that policy implementation can successively involve several departments or units within the MFA, each with its own role and contributions;
- The position of the four principal steering and oversight bodies along this results chain, revealing their respective roles in policy formulation, implementation, monitoring and reporting; and

- The upstream scope of the present evaluation with focus on the early stages of the MFA's results chain.

Figure 2   Policy formulation and implementation, and learning in the context of DPPs.

Source: MFA (MFA 2014r, p. 10)

This evaluation uses the above analytical framework but clarifies a number of features that may be less obvious from Figure 2 alone.

Implementation Pathways for Different Policy Channels Differ Fundamentally

Policy implementation follows quite different pathways that can only be approximated but not adequately summarised in a single framework. These pathways differ both by the involvement of departments and units within the MFA as well as through implementation mechanisms outside of the MFA. Within the MFA, the partition of labour is somewhat more complex than suggested in the above framework. While Department for Development Policy (DoDP) units are leading the development of downstream policies, they also manage the implementation of selected aid instruments and of development policy beyond cooperation (e.g. policy coherence). Beyond the MFA, implementation pathways differ substantially and involve various partners. In many instances, the MFA itself is removed by several intermediary organisations from actual development work. For RBM, this is of critical importance as it determines the degree to which results – along the entire causal chain – can be attributed or otherwise linked to MFA activities.

Policy implementation follows quite different pathways.

Important Nonlinear Influences Bypass the Framework's Sequential Steps

Along the entire results chains, multiple influences are present. The DPPs themselves are subject to many influences (Section 5.3) and work along implementation pathways within and beyond the MFA is driven by many other factors beyond the DPP. Hence, the linear succession of Government Programme, DPP, resource and work allocation, intervention implementation and progress to results should not be understood as ignoring other important influences.

Importance of Downstream Guidance

While mentioned in the framework, the importance of intermediary guidance requires further highlighting. Downstream policies, strategies, and guidelines play an important role in policy implementation and RBM. Often, this intermediary guidance exerts more direct implementation influence than DPP guidance and plays a key role in target setting, reporting, learning and accountability.

The Perspective and Influence of Partners Is Not Sufficiently Reflected

The framework can be misunderstood as the MFA being entirely in "command and control." This clearly does not reflect the realities of development policy implementation in which the degree of control the MFA has over results diminishes along the results chain. Usually, the MFA itself does not exert the strongest influence on ultimate development outcomes and impacts and, in many cases, even establishing a direct causal link proves difficult or altogether impossible. It needs hence to be understood that development partners all operate – explicitly or implicitly – according to similar frameworks but with a different perspective that places their organisation – and not the MFA – at the centre. From that perspective, the MFA is often one partner among many and those partners are therefore primarily influenced by and accountable to other entities than the MFA. For example, bilateral cooperation partner countries are intended to operate within their own governmental and societal frameworks (the Paris Declaration's country ownership principle) and multilateral agencies and large non-governmental organisations (NGOs) receive directions from and report to their own governing bodies. The recognition of differing primary influences and accountabilities is vitally important in a RBM context (Section 7.1).

Together with these clarifications, the framework in Figure 2 is used as analytical framework for this evaluation.

2.2.2 Operational Framework

The evaluation activities were organised into 16 "work packages" that are described in detail in the Inception Report to this evaluation (MFA 2014t, p. 11 and p. 24). While evaluation questions indicate what findings and conclusions the evaluation aims for, work packages define actual evaluation activities such as data collection, analysis and evaluation support activities. At this level, concrete analysis is planned and conducted.

In addition to five work packages related to evaluation support and report writing that are not detailed here, the principal work packages were as follows (the evaluation questions the work packages contribute to, are indicated in brackets):

Downstream policies, strategies, and guidelines play an important role in policy implementation and RBM.

The degree of control the MFA has over results diminishes along the results chain.

- **DPP Characterisation (all evaluation questions).** The English versions of the three DPPs underwent word count and qualitative content analysis and guidance elements were identified and categorised. Data was collected through document analysis, interviews and an online survey.
- **Process Analysis (evaluation questions 2, 3, and 4).** A process analysis was conducted covering policy formulation, implementation and reporting and findings were synthesised in several flow charts (Annex 6). Data was collected through document analysis and interviews.
- **Influences during DPP Formulation (evaluations question 2).** The main factors influencing DPP content and their relative strengths were identified. In addition, development policy guidance in GPs and DPPs was correlated and meeting minutes of several steering and advisory bodies (QAB, DPSG, DPC and PCD) were screened. Data was collected through document analysis, interviews, and a survey.
- **Financial analysis (evaluation question 3).** Budget and expenditure data was collected for financial years 2003 to 2013 for the key aid channels. Portfolio aging was assessed and correlations between pertinent budget changes and DPP guidance were sought and then confirmed in interviews. Data was collected through financial database and document analysis and interviews.
- **DPP Outcomes (evaluation question 3).** Implementation of DPP guidance was analysed by searching implementation evidence for well-defined DPP targets and by identifying plausible outputs and outcomes in three exemplary studies conducted in this evaluation. In addition, the inter-activity between policy formulation and implementation and the MFA's budgeting process was assessed. Since the 2012 DPP aims to strengthen the results-based approach of Finnish development policy implementation, the degree to which RBM has been integrated along all policy implementation channels is investigated in detail as well. The meeting minutes of the DPSG and the QAB were also screened. Data was collected through document analysis and interviews.
- **Multi–Attribute Decision–Making Tools (evaluation questions 2 and 3).** DPP formulation and implementation was screened for use of tools for multi-attribute decision-making, such as comparative rating frameworks and scoring models. Data was collected through interviews and document analysis.
- **Theme Studies: Gender and Sustainable Development (all evaluation questions).** Two case-based analyses of the main evaluation questions with a strict focus on a) gender and b) sustainable development were conducted. Data was collected through document analysis and interviews. Study themes were selected from the main cross-cutting objectives in the DPPs and based on Evaluation Team members' prior work experience and professional networks.
- **Country Study: Tanzania (all evaluation questions).** A country-based analysis of the main evaluation questions with a strict focus on Tanzania was conducted. Data was collected through document analysis and interviews. The country was selected from Finland's long-term partner countries and based on prior work experience and the professional network of one Evaluation Team member.

- **RBM Collaborative Benchmarking (all evaluation questions).** Recent analyses of approaches to RBM in international development were reviewed and the results-based approaches in the international development activities of France, New Zealand, Sweden, UK, and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) were studied. Data was collected through document analysis and interviews. Countries and institutions for benchmarking were selected in a two-step process. First, an outside-in desk review was conducted for 28 countries and 20 international organisations. Candidates were scored along 8 RBM-related criteria. In a second step, four countries and one international organisation were selected for benchmarking based on further analysis and the input received from the Evaluation Reference Group (MFA 2014t, p. 14). Due to an interview opportunity, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) was also added, albeit analysed with less intensity.
- **Reporting and Accountability Analysis (evaluation question 4).** Organisational reporting layers and reported content were reviewed along policy implementation channels and matched with information needs to determine successful DPP implementation. The role and contribution to overall accountability of steering and consultative bodies (QAB, DPSG, DPC and PCD) was assessed. Data was collected through the process work package, document analysis and interviews.

Findings from individual work packages were then combined and aggregated towards answering the main evaluation questions.

2.2.3 Data Gathering and Triangulation

Evidence was gathered from different sources and by different means. Within and across information sources and between data collection methods, triangulation was used to verify the robustness and generalizability of information obtained. In this report, whenever possible, evidence from different sources (or different groups within one source) is presented separately, potential biases and over- or underrepresentation of some interest groups are considered, and congruency or discrepancy is commented on before conclusions are drawn by the Evaluation Team.

During data collection, care was taken to minimise time required from MFA staff and other persons consulted through a frontloaded desk review and through collection of relevant questions to be asked from all work package owners prior to interviews.

Document Analysis

A large number of about 1800 documents was collected on a shared (secure hard disk) drive and reviewed for this evaluation. The documents consisted of DPPs and GPs, sector and thematic policies, country strategies, influencing plans, action plans, guidance documents on RBM, relevant evaluations, assessments and studies external and internal to the MFA, documentation on benchmarking countries and institutions, documentation on and from steering and advisory bodies, documentation on upwards reporting, and MFA organisational documents such as norms and mandates. Documents in some categories – for

example 616 meeting minutes of the four steering and consultative bodies QAB, DPSG, DPC and PCD – were too numerous for manual review and underwent partial, keyword-guided review and word count analysis. Pertinent literature is referenced throughout this report and listed in references and Annex 8 of the Annex Report. To facilitate access to documents to all Evaluation Team members, an annotated shared disk drive document repository was created and maintained throughout the evaluation process. The document review provided input for all evaluation questions.

Interviews

A total of 51 interviews with 64 people were conducted for this evaluation (Annex 2). 47 people, predominantly MFA staff, were interviewed face to face, the remaining 17 remotely. Early interviews were exploratory but structured around the key evaluation questions, identifying and framing issues and pointing the team to additional people and documents. Later interviews, also structured, filled in remaining information gaps, and increasingly over time, were used to validate emerging findings. 17 people (included above) were interviewed for the collaborative benchmarking. Interviews provided input for all evaluation questions and most work packages.

Online Survey

An online survey was conducted with senior MFA staff (Annex 3). Overall, 216 senior MFA staff with a visible development orientation were targeted, covering MFA DoDP, MFA regional departments, and embassies. Only staff with a visible development orientation in their present or past job profiles were selected. 99 responses were received of which 90 were sufficiently complete to be included in the survey analysis, representing a response rate of 42 percent. The survey was designed and administered in the final phase of the evaluation to allow for targeted questions.

Database Analysis

The evaluation made use of both public and internal (to MFA) databases. The key MFA databases which were used are:
- Development cooperation expenditures (by aid channel) 1988–2013;
- Development cooperation expenditures as a share of gross national income 2003–2013;
- Development cooperation expenditures by organization 2006–2013;
- Development cooperation commitments and expenditures by country;
- Development cooperation budget by country 2013–2017; and
- Development cooperation budget by sector 2013–2017.

This data was complemented by the International Development Statistics (IDS) online database (http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline.htm). In addition, use was made of MFA's internal databases on annual aid intervention financing decisions and intervention payments, Rio marker and environment databases, as well as the gender marker reporting system.

3 INTRODUCTION TO RBM AT THE MFA

This chapter describes the development of Results-Based Management (RBM) at the MFA (Section 3.1) and summarises evaluations and reviews of the Finnish approach to RBM with relevance to development policy planning, implementation, monitoring and reporting (Section 3.2). Section 3.3 summarises the key points of this chapter.

3.1 Results–Oriented Developments at the MFA to Date

Results-orientation is apparent at the MFA in tools and approaches since more than 20 years. In many respects, Finland is following the international developments in RBM. In the past, RBM has focused a lot on the project and programme level; RBM at the development policy level is a more recent development.

The logical framework approach (LFA) has been used since the 1990s. LFA is a tool that links inputs and activities to expected outputs and results and therefore builds on an understanding of the underlying cause-and effect relationships. At MFA, it has been used mostly in bilateral development cooperation in planning and monitoring of project and programme interventions, but also as a framework for evaluations.

The LFA features strongly in the Guidelines for Program Design, Monitoring and Evaluation (MFA 1999) and also in the new manual for Bilateral Programmes (MFA 2012l). These documents provide detailed guidance for planning a programme or a project to improve both the quality of design and implementation and provide information on performance using output and outcome indicators. The review of these guidelines demonstrates that they focus on project-type interventions only. They include no guidance on how to adopt indicators that would facilitate aggregation of results, linking individual interventions to overall development outcomes, or how to develop and operate corporate-level results frameworks. Also, there are no guidelines on reporting beyond the project reports.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the MFA embraced the programme-oriented approach, including general budget and sector support, both of which feature results-oriented monitoring frameworks. The 2004 DPP stated that the Government will increase programme-based cooperation and introduce new modalities of bilateral cooperation including budget support and joint financing that are supported by a monitoring systems for the use of funds. There was no explicit reference to results-management or reporting in the 2004 and 2007 DPPs.

Results–orientation is apparent at the MFA in tools and approaches since more than 20 years.

The budget support guidelines (MFA 2004f) and sector support guidelines (MFA 2006g), as well as joint budget and sector principles (MFA 2010c), have brought explicit attention to results-oriented management, most prominently in the context of contributing to MDGs and related national development objectives. These guidelines emphasise national ownership and reliance on national development indicators that are derived from poverty reduction strategies and sector development programmes, as well as country systems. They also highlight the need to collect information and provide information on the use of funds and delivery of development outcomes to provide a basis for results-based public financial management.

In these guidelines and principles, the MFA has committed to not introducing its own reporting systems but, instead, to rely on the quality of national reporting systems and annual progress reports in countries such as Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique where Finland has provided general budget support. The guidelines do not, however, provide concrete guidance on how to report and synthesise results information from annual country reports, or on how to report the Finnish outcomes and impacts, for example in terms of policy influence consistent with DPP guidance.

In an internal DoDP document on budget support "Ohjelmayhteistyön laadun kehittäminen Suomen kehitysyhteistyössä" (HEL-5756-11) in 2006 (MFA 2006h) it was agreed that a quality control and results monitoring system for budget and sector support would be adopted. This system would have resulted in stronger results-orientation through the planned programming framework for programme support and monitoring of the proposed budget support "influencing strategies". The related pilot projects were implemented. However, the related programming documents were not institutionalized during the DPP 2007 validity period, possibly due to reduced interest in the budget support aid modality by the new incoming Minister for Foreign Trade and International Development.

Also in 2006, in the context of those, the idea of country strategies similar to the ones introduced in 2012 was floated but wasn't picked up in the 2007 DPP or in bilateral programming. The Evaluation Team was not able to unearth evidence as to why full country strategies were not developed. In 2007, the Minister for Foreign Trade and International Development required that country assistance plans ("osallistumisuunnitelmat") had to be prepared for the long-term partner countries. The related guidelines introduced in 2008 (MFA 2008g) do not refer to results management and reporting and three of those plans (Tanzania, Nepal and Vietnam) that were reviewed were not results-oriented with clear objectives, targets and results indicators and upwards results reporting.

Interviews with desk officers and ambassadors involved with country programming indicate that there was some awareness about results-orientation but RBM as such did not feature strongly at MFA during those years. It also appears that the guidelines as well as the country assistance plans were produced quickly, in about 40 days, which did not give time to consider RBM issues

in any depth. There was no requirement on systematic results reporting and the quality of reporting in that respect depended on individuals.

The 2004 DDP embraced the Millennium Declaration and brought for the first time attention to the emerging aid effectiveness agenda in Finnish development policy. The series of related meetings in Rome, Accra, Paris, Busan and Mexico strongly influenced Finnish development policy, country programming and multilateral work. From the meeting minutes of the Aid Effectiveness Team in 2006-2012 and senior MFA staff interviews, central results were apparently defined on a "macro" level, for example enhancement of national ownership, better alignment of aid with national priorities, and harmonizing and improving the coordination of donor interventions. Hence, the focus has been on how to implement development cooperation with other donors and national governments rather than on introducing results-oriented management an integral part of MFA's development policy implementation, monitoring and reporting. Similarly, the emerging MDGs set global and national development objectives to which Finland aimed to contribute.

Current Status

The 2012 DPP mentions for the first time explicitly the objective of improving results-based management in Finnish development policy and cooperation. The 2012 bilateral programme guidelines are broader and cover also other aid modalities beyond projects. These new guidelines refer to the country programming framework and the need to link individual interventions better to the country development objectives and related country indicators (MFA 2012l, pp. 31–33).

Towards the end of 2012 an action plan for developing RBM in 2013–2014 was prepared (MFA 2012h). An adviser in RBM was recruited for two years, starting in 2012. In September 2014 a new position for a senior adviser responsible for RBM was created.

These actions represent a definite shift towards adopting integrated RBM that links the policy level to the country and agency level and then further downstream to the programme and project level. The word count analysis of the QAB, DPSG, and DPC minutes demonstrates how RBM has started to receive much more attention in the policy steering mechanisms during the last 2-3 years. During 2005–2013, references to RBM-related terminology increase about tenfold in the QAB and DPSG. The change is most visible during the last 2 years (Figure 3 on next page).

The 2012 DPP mentions explicitly the objective of improving RBM in Finnish development policy and cooperation.

An action plan for developing RBM at MFA has been prepared.

Figure 3 Average frequency of mentioning RBM-related terminology in meeting minutes (in number of mentions per meeting).

Source: (QAB 2005–14), (DPSG 2003–2014), (DPC Plenary Sessions 2003–13), team analysis

The RBM Action Plan 2013-14 (MFA 2012i) emphasises strategic planning and guidance, results monitoring combined with evaluation, learning from results, and communication of results. The plan covers nine elements, which are partly based on aid modalities: bilateral project support (guidelines), country programming, developing multilateral influencing plans, improving effectiveness of EU cooperation, improving effectiveness of NGOs cooperation, improving development policy steering mechanisms, quality control, managing learning, and capacity building.

New bilateral programme guidelines, have been prepared already in 2012 (MFA 2012l), which may explain why these guidelines do not address RBM comparatively little. The Evaluation Team learned from interviews that these guidelines will be updated in 2015.

As the preparation of country strategies and related results frameworks as well the development of influencing plans for 28 multilateral organisations represent major steps forward in adopting RBM at the MFA. Clearly, the current efforts are work in progress – experiences in the first round of reporting are still to be properly processed – but it is already possible to make observations about them and identify areas for improvement. A working group guiding the analysis of lessons learned and further developing the country-strategy approach has been established at MFA.

3.2 RBM-Related Evaluations and Reviews

Several earlier evaluations and reviews with relevance to RBM at the MFA have been carried out and have acted as drivers for change at the MFA in the past years. Overall, these evaluations reiterated the importance for RBM and consistently identified inadequacies in applying a results-oriented approach at the MFA. Several highlight the need of creating an organisational enabling environment for RBM. In what follows, key findings and recommendations of several evaluations and reviews with direct relevance for the present evaluation are summarised. The evaluation desk study report contains summaries of addi-

Country strategies and results frameworks as well as the influencing plans for multilateral organisations represent major steps tforward in adopting RBM.

FINLAND'S DEVELOPMENT POLICY PROGRAMMES FROM A RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT POINT OF VIEW 2003-2013

tional reviews and evaluations with less pronounced relevance for this evaluation (MFA 2014u).

Most importantly, in 2011, an evaluation of the **"Results-Based Approach in Finnish Development Cooperation"** was conducted (Poate et al 2011). While having a strong focus on project-level RBM and some orientation towards bilateral cooperation, this evaluation provided a series of important findings and issued a number of recommendations that are in line with the findings and reiterated in the recommendations of the present evaluation. The evaluation also conducted a survey that some survey results of the present evaluation are benchmarked against in order to identify organisational development trends (Section 5.3).

The evaluation found that the DPPs of 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2007 had maintained great coherence and had consistently focused, albeit with changes in emphasis, on poverty alleviation, sustainable development, and the promotion of equality, democracy and human rights. However, the 2004 and 2007 DPPs were found, upon closer examination, to not contain a results orientation that provided a strategic framework for country or regional programmes. A similar conclusion was reached for regional policy frameworks up to 2009. Sector guidelines provided mixed quality with regards to guidance on results orientation but some exhibited potential to develop outcome objectives from existing statements of activities. The International Strategy for Finland's Water Sector was highlighted as a good practice example.

In 2010, at the time the evaluation was conducted, the 17 reviewed projects had serious design issues with respect to a results orientation, in spite of good guidelines. For some instruments, no project documentation other than proposals was associated. The country-level planning processes in bilateral cooperation were found to be methodological and systematic but did not allow setting outcome statements at the country level. Reporting favoured information about individual projects and did not provide country or sector aggregation or summaries. Similarly, monitoring the effects of various aspects of cross-cutting themes and objectives using indicators was found to be inadequate. Annual comprehensive reports to Parliament were noted but found to not utilise findings from monitoring and evaluation reports and to not provide sufficient information for the public to assess the nature and achievements of the contribution being made by Finland.

Meta-analysis of evaluations commissioned by EVA-11 every second year attempted to take stock of analysis across a wide range of operations and consolidate findings onto a comparable basis using a rating system. But weaknesses in the sampling of projects and rating methodology limited the usefulness of the findings.

The evaluation highlighted important findings about the organisational culture with respect to RBM. It found that development results were treated in a superficial way at the MFA. Senior managers had clear views about the importance of results information but this did not affect how MFA staff worked. It voiced concerns about the management culture at the MFA, for example inflex-

ible working methods, the burden of administrative work and a risk-averse working culture. Little efforts were observed to inform future policy through learning from past experience. A divide between advisers with development experience and desk officers, team leaders and directors dealing also with non-development related issues at the MFA that exhibited a generalist skill profiles. The evaluation recommended a thorough organisational and technical overhaul of the MFA's approach to results-oriented management. Specific recommendations were to i) establish a formal approach for adopting results-based management; ii) develop a strategic results framework; iii) reorganise country-level planning; iv) improve the quality of project design from results perspective; v) re-design reporting; vi) improve comparative analysis from evaluations; vii) improve the institutional culture; viii) train managers for RBM; and ix) improve information management.

In the period of interest, Finland underwent **OECD DAC peer reviews in 2003, 2007 and 2012** (OECD 2003a, OECD 2007b, OECD 2012). The 2007 and, most importantly, the 2012 reviews address several points with relevance for the present evaluation. They found that the 2007 and 2012 DPPs did not identify priorities for implementation with clear objectives and expected results. The reports repeat one of the main findings of the 2011 MFA RBM evaluation: that a key challenge for reporting on results is the lack of a coherent system for setting targets and reporting on results above the level of specific interventions, for example at country programme level. The 2012 review also found that Finland needs clear and harmonised guidance on priorities, processes and implementation to ensure its assistance is more focused and effective. The 2012 review found that, since the 2007 review, Finland had developed policy guidance for several policy issues but had still fallen short of providing staff with specific objectives and priority areas of focus to guide implementation. For example, it still remained a challenge to determine concrete objectives for cross-cutting themes at policy dialogue and programme level, combined with adequate allocation of resources to meet the objectives and to report on progress. Finland also did not have an overarching vision related to policy coherence with measurable objectives that could be monitored.

The 2012 review recommended that Finland should translate its development policy into a set of clear and operational objectives, including the results to be expected compounded by verifiable indicators. It should also focus, specify and operationalise its development policy through guidance on bilateral, multilateral and civil society cooperation. The MFA should consider how the Quality Assurance Board (QAB) and the Development Policy Steering Group (DPSG) could provide more effective guidance for implementing development policy, and build upon and simplify earlier efforts to develop results-based management systems.

The **2013 National Audit Office (NAO) report** (NAO 2013) highlighted that proper monitoring and reporting of achievements are difficult because there are no indicators and the large number of targets set out in the planning documents makes it difficult to prioritise operations and monitor the implementation of the targets. A results-based approach in development cooperation would

require more target-oriented management and planning, supported by information and results-monitoring systems.

The 2012 **"Meta-Evaluation of Decentralised Evaluations in 2010 and 2011"** (Sørensen and Thulstrup 2012) found that results-based management and reporting were either inadequately applied or not used and no evidence was found of overall progress towards increased use of results-based management practices. Projects had weak results frameworks, defined inadequately result targets at outcome and output levels, indicators were often not measurable and baseline studies were not being conducted. The study concluded that MFA should strive to create an enabling environment for a results-oriented approach among staff for planning, implementation and measurement of results and that the quality assurance work should focus more on the results-based approach.

3.3 Key Points

3a. The MFA has been using RBM-related approaches or tools for 20 years primary at the project level, for example through project-level logical frameworks that imply a cause-and-effect understanding of a project's results chain.

3b. Increased budget and sector support 10–15 years ago implied the adoption and reliance on national results frameworks and jointly agreed national development indicators.

3c. The Millennium Declaration and the aid effectiveness agenda featured strongly in the DPPs under consideration and implied an increased policy focus on global and national MDG targets, and on aid effectiveness principles.

3d. Various evaluations and reviews have found that, while consistently maintaining overall goals, Finnish development policy exhibited little results orientation that could guide programming. Little information on results was available and was not used in aggregated reporting. Monitoring performance and reporting of results was hindered by the lack of coherent system for setting targets and reporting on results at above the level of specific interventions. The MFA had not yet developed a results culture. As a consequence, the ministries' organisational culture was found to be risk-averse and inflexible and hence not conducive for implementing a results-based approach.

3e. However, since 2012 concrete steps have been taken forward to move towards more integrated and hierarchical RBM at the MFA with the introduction of country strategies with a results framework system and multilateral influencing plans. Both approaches now involve reporting on results.

4 RESULTS FOCUS AND LEARNING FROM RESULTS IN FINNISH DEVELOPMENT POLICY

This chapter assesses Finnish development policy from an RBM perspective. Section 4.1 characterises the type and quality of guidance in DPPs and in downstream guidance. Section 4.2 comments on the validity and timing of DPP guidance. Section 4.3 is dedicated to learning from results and Section 4.4 summarises key points.

4.1 Quality of Guidance in DPPs and in Downstream Policies

4.1.1 Quality of Guidance in DPPs

The three DPPs under consideration are electronic documents freely available in Finnish and English, and between 40 and 48 pages long. The 2004 DPP contains most text, slightly more than 1.5 times the number of words of the 2007 and 2012 DPPs. All three DPPs provide guidance in various forms: as overall goals and principles of Finnish development policy, as more focused guidance elements organised along sectors, cross-cutting themes and objectives, aid channels and aid instruments, or as lists of priority measures.

DPP Structure

The chapter structure differs considerably across the three DPPs. These differences in structure render direct comparison of policy guidance across DPPs difficult. Substantive guidance in the DPP 2004 is structured largely along aid themes and sectors and along aid channels, all under the overall umbrella of policy coherence. The 2007 DPP, instead, employs sustainable development as overarching concept and provides guidance along the three principles of coherence, complementarity and effectiveness and along similar aid channels as in 2004, with some detail provided along aid instruments as well. The 2012 DPP is not structured along aid themes and sectors or aid channels and instruments but along three cross-cutting topics and, substantially, along four priority areas. The overarching concept in the 2012 DPP is Finland's human rights-based approach.

Overall Goals

All three DPPs consistently promote eradication of poverty as main develop-

ment policy goal (Table 2). While the 2004 DPP restricts itself to the main goal of eradication of extreme poverty, the 2007 and 2012 DPPs add a reference to the MDGs. In addition, the 2007 DPP adds sustainable development (and omits the word "extreme") and the 2012 DPP adds human rights as additional main goals.

Table 2   Main development policy goals as stated in DPPs.

2004 DPP	2007 DPP	2012 DPP
The main goal of Finland's development policy is to contribute to the eradication of extreme poverty from the world.	The main goal of [Finland's] development policy is to eradicate poverty and to promote sustainable development in accordance with the UN Millennium Development Goals which were set in 2000.	The overarching goal of Finland's development policy is the eradication of extreme poverty and securing a life of human dignity for all people in accordance with the UN Millennium Development Goals.

Source: DPPs (MFA 2004d, p. 7), (MFA 2007d, p. 15), (MFA 2012e, p. 27)

The close alignment of Finnish development policy with the Millennium Declaration and the ensuing MDGs is strong in all DPPs – actually strongest in the 2004 DPP that was written only 2 years after the MDGs had been finalised – and also reflected in a keyword frequency analysis (Figure 4).

Figure 4   Keyword frequency analysis across DPPs (in per mille of words in each DPP).

Source: DPPs (MFA 2004d, 2007d, 2012e), team analysis

Principles

The term "principle" is employed in DPPs with somewhat varying meaning when describing development policies. The 2004 DPP, for example, introduces a list of budgetary targets as "main principles" (MFA 2004d, p. 27) whereas one 2012 DPP chapter is organised along the three "guiding principles" coherence, complementarity, and effectiveness. The main principles of Finnish development policy – in the sense of fundamental underlying propositions – also vary

across DPPs and are sometimes interchanged with cross-cutting themes or objectives.

Main principles of the 2004 DPP
1. Commitment to the values and goals of the UN Millennium Declaration;
2. Broad national commitment and coherence in all policy areas;
3. Commitment to a [human] rights-based approach [including further human rights-related principles];
4. The principle of sustainable development;
5. The concept of comprehensive financing for development [likely referring to the 2002 Monterrey Consensus on financing for development];
6. Partnerships for development [referring to the eight MDG];
7. Respect for the integrity and responsibility of the developing countries and their people [referring to the later concept of country ownership]; and
8. Long-term commitment and transparency [also long-term commitment and predictability].

The 2004 DPP introduced eight main development policy principles (see text box) and elevates the concept and objective of policy coherence for development (2nd point in the above list) as guiding principle.

The 2007 DPP employs sustainable development as overarching concept (principle number 4 in the list above) and provides a set of criteria for concurrent economic, social and ecological sustainable development. It also stresses the importance of poverty eradication in accordance with the Millennium Development Goals (number 1) and emphasises policy coherence (number 2). It commits to a human rights-based approach that is interpreted as one element of sustainable development. The 2007 DPP promotes two additional guiding principles: complementarity, which was mentioned but not particularly highlighted in the 2004 DPP, and effectiveness (in the context of the evolving aid effectiveness agenda). Apart from the principle on comprehensive financing for development (number 5), these indirectly cover the remaining principles of the 2004 DPP (numbers 6, 7 and 8).

The 2012 DPP is anchored in human rights as core principle as part of which key characteristic attributes of Finnish development policy are interpreted: democratic ownership and accountability, effectiveness and impact, openness [and transparency], and policy coherence for development. In addition, a focus on the least developed countries (LDCs) is highlighted and the continued commitment to the MDGs is expressed. Sustainable development is referred to throughout the document. Principles of earlier DPPs are directly or indirectly covered with exception of comprehensive financing for development (number 5 in the text box) of the 2004 DPP and the complementarity principle of the 2007 DPP. In reverse, the 2004 and 2007 DPPs also stress the importance of LDCs but highlight that principle comparatively less.

Overall, the three DPPs display consistency in adhering to the principles of human rights, policy coherence, the MDGs, the aid effectiveness agenda, and the sustainable development agenda but vary in wording and highlight some aspects more than others.

Guidance along Cross-cutting Themes and Objectives

The 2004 and 2007 DPPs each indicate three cross-cutting themes, two of which remain virtually identical, with only minor changes in wording (MFA 2007d, p. 16):

- Promotion of the rights and the status of women and girls, and promotion of gender and social equality; and
- Promotion of the rights of groups that are easily excluded, particularly children, persons with disabilities, indigenous people and ethnic minorities, and the promotion of equal opportunities for participation.

The 2004 DPP adds "consideration of environmental issues" as third cross-cutting theme whereas the 2007 DPP lists "combating Human immunodeficiency virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS); HIV/AIDS as a health problem and as a social problem." The 2012 DPP instead defines cross-cutting objectives (i.e. not themes), two of which mirror the gender and equality-related cross-cutting themes of the earlier DPPs. The third cross-cutting objective in the 2012 DPP is "climate sustainability." Overall, the three DPPs consistently promote two cross-cutting themes and objectives (gender and equality) but vary in the third (from environment to HIV/AIDS to climate sustainability).

Guidance along Sectors and Aid Channels

DPP guidance elements along sectors vary considerably, reflecting the differing structure of the DPP documents: some sectors are reflected by dedicated sections in some DPPs but not in others. Overall, the 2004 DPP's structure shows greatest coverage of sectors and instruments in dedicated sections and also employs sector-related language most frequently but the other DPPs also address most sectors throughout their text as illustrated by keyword frequency analysis (Figure 5).

A similar observation can be made for aid channels and aid instruments. Once more, the 2004 DPP is most visibly structured along aid channels and aid instruments but all DPPs cover most channels and instruments, albeit with varying intensity and with unrelated ordering structure.

Figure 5 DPP keyword frequency analysis for selected sectors (in per mille of words in each DPP).

Source: DPPs (MFA 2004d, 2007d, 2012e), team analysis

DPP Priority Measures

The 2004 and 2012 DPPs explicitly list priority commitments. The 2004 DPP lists 12 points, most of which describe intended activities such as to "encourage people in Finland to support the values and goals of the Millennium Declaration and the fulfilment of Finland's obligations", "work to strengthen the multilateral system and to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations (UN)", "support endeavours to help the poorest developing countries gain influence in international forums [...]", or "urge Finnish companies to participate in achieving the Millennium Development Goals [...]." Two points concern quantitative budgetary targets. While the 2007 DPP does not contain a list of priority commitments, the 2012 DPP lists 16 most important "specific measures" (Table 3).

Table 3 Priority "specific measures "listed in the 2012 DPP

1. Inclusion of the human rights-based approach in all activities.
2. Enhancement of aid effectiveness.
3. Strengthening of development policy dialogue and its strategic orientation.
4. Improving of policy coherence for development.
5. Development of methods and reforming of tools to attain cross-cutting objectives.
6. Result-oriented country programming for long-term partner countries.
7. Strategic focusing of multilateral cooperation and increased funding.
8. Increased funding through civil society organisations and improving effectiveness of their development cooperation activities.
9. Reform of the procedure through which international civil society organisations can apply for development financing.
10. Planning and implementation of new cooperation modalities with the private sector, including an increase in Finnfund's capital and the introduction of a special risk financing instrument.

11. Revision of the principles for and approaches to promoting democracy and human rights in development cooperation.
12. Revision of Finland's Aid for Trade Action Plan.
13. Updating of the humanitarian assistance policy.
14. Human resource development within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in accordance with the objectives and new priorities.
15. Development of the information management systems for development cooperation in order to enhance effectiveness, openness and predictability.
16. Assessment of the special needs of fragile states.

Source: MFA (MFA 2012e, p. 8)

According to interviews conducted by the Evaluation Team, these 16 points come closest to a prioritised list of commitments for the 2012 DPP and also provide the basis for MFA-internal follow-up on DPP implementation. In addition, each of the four priority areas of the 2012 DPP concludes with lists of activities in support of that priority area (50 measures in total).

Relative Priority Setting in DPPs
DPPs, quite generally, make many positive guidance statements in the sense of describing activities and objectives to be pursued. DPPs largely fail to provide guidance on what activities and objectives should not be implemented. In interviews, MFA staff was hard pressed to come up with examples of DPP priority-setting that would explicitly exclude certain development activities; only support for large power plants and new concessional credits were cited as activities excluded in DPP guidance. In contrast, interviewees could usually cite many examples for additional activities and objectives for each DPP.

In addition, DPP guidance elements are not prioritised vis-à-vis each other. Essentially, this leads to many things to do and objectives to reach without any clear indication of their relative importance. For example, in the 2012 DPP, a total of 66 measures are singled out in dedicated lists alone, and many more are described throughout the text. This finding was mirrored by surveyed MFA staff: more than four in five strongly or somewhat agreed with the statement that DPPs list a lot of important goals and principles but fail to establish clear priorities between them.

Together, the absence of exclusionary guidance and the abundance of non-prioritised guidance elements lead to overall weak operational guidance in DPPs. In realistic implementation scenarios, human and financial resources are unlikely to allow addressing all intended activities and objectives with optimal intensity.

DPPs also make very little explicit reference to earlier DPPs and to the priorities and guidance elements contained in them. Over time, DPPs therefore add guidance elements rather than removing them. This inflation of guidance elements without indication of relative importance further reduces the usefulness

DPPs are good in describing activities and objectives to be pursued but not in providing guidance on what activities and objectives should not be implemented.

DPP guidance elements are not prioritised vis-à-vis each other.

The absence of exclusionary guidance and abundance of non-prioritised guidance elements lead to weak operational guidance.

of DPP guidance for guiding implementation. Surveyed MFA staff had mixed but somewhat less critical perceptions on this. Slightly less than half felt that DPPs logically build on previous DPPs and the related "inherited" portfolio and slightly more than half perceived DPPs to clearly identify changes compared to previous DPPs.

In interviews, MFA staff also expressed some confusion as to the degree to which priorities of earlier DPPs still need to be pursued if not addressed in subsequent DPPs. 90 percent of surveyed staff agreed that DPPs do not provide clear guidance on the implementation of activities commenced under the previous DPP and that it is not clear what the new government and minister wants to do with work started in the previous governmental period.

Quality of Target-setting in DPPs

From a RBM perspective, it is of interest to what degree guidance provided in DPPs and other documents is setting concrete targets along the MFA's results chain, and how good the quality of those targets is. It should however be noted that, *a priori*, there is no established requirement that DPPs themselves should set such targets at all and other countries and institutions often set concrete results targets separate from their development policies, for example in separate policies, strategies or results frameworks (Chapter 7).

Quality of target-setting in DPPs is assessed with the following five criteria in mind:

- The **degree to which targets are well-defined**, i.e. clear about what is intended by when and how achievement is defined;
- The **degree to which targets are relevant and meaningful**, i.e. provide significant direction in the context of the development policy;
- The **degree to which targets are clearly committed to**, i.e. ownership of and responsibility for achieving the target is unambiguous; and
- The **degree to which achievement of targets can be verified straight-forwardly**, i.e. targets can be monitored without requiring too many resources.

In addition, **the location of targets along the MFA's results chain** is assessed with an expanded focus on results, i.e. whether the target concerns: allocation of MFA resources, MFA activities and outputs, behaviour change, activities or outputs of MFA boundary partners, behaviour change, activities or outputs of other partners and/or subsequent intermediaries, or development outcomes or impacts. The first four criteria measure the quality of target-setting while the results-chain location represents additional information without implying a judgement on quality. It should be noted, however, that many RBM definitions focus on development outcomes, i.e. on results information towards the end of the MFA's results chain.

This quality assessment framework is derived from existing frameworks for indicator quality[1] but expanded to also cover qualitative targets, the degree of commitment, and to indicate the location of targets along the MFA's results chain. Employing these criteria across the many guidance elements contained

in DPPs, overall target-setting quality is found to be quite low as explained below.

Quantitative Indicators

Good quality target setting exists almost exclusively for MFA budget targets that are largely focused on the build-up towards and the 0.7 percent target of Official Development Assistance (ODA) expressed as share of Gross National Income (GNI) to be reached by 2010 (2004 DPP) and 2015 (2007 and 2012 DPPs), respectively. In addition, the 2004 DPP also provides several additional funding targets: a 0.15 percent proportion of funding to the poorest countries by 2010, an increase of the funding share to NGOs to 14 percent by 2007, humanitarian assistance at a constant level of 10–15 percent of funding, and building up of funding to long-term partner countries (with exception of Nepal) to exceed 10 million Euros annually. These targets fulfil all of the above quality criteria: they are well-defined, meaningful, clearly committed to, and can be monitored with reasonable effort.

Several quantitative trends or boundaries are also defined. For example, the 2004 DPP commits to increasing funds for cooperation with Sub-Saharan African countries, to reducing the minimum co-funding share of NGOs to 15 percent, and to reducing the number of countries and projects and the amount of funding in bilateral grant-based development cooperation. Both the 2004 and the 2007 DPP reserve up to 5 percent of the increase in appropriations for development cooperation to strengthen MFA administration. In addition, the 2007 DPP commits to increasing the percentage of Finnish official development assistance going to Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The 2012 DPP commits to an increase in Finnfund's capital, to increasing the size and reducing the number of programmes and projects in both bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The 2012 DPP also sets a maximum number of three sectors for country programming in bilateral cooperation.

The quality of these trend or boundary targets is often good, but especially trend targets sometimes grapple with precision of definition and relevance. For

1 Many indicator quality frameworks exist, often abbreviated as mnemonic acronyms. For example, one version of the "SMART" criteria for setting objectives is summarised as follows: Specific (target a specific area for improvement), Measurable (quantify or at least suggest an indicator of progress), Assignable (specify who will do it), Realistic (state what results can realistically be achieved, given available resources), and Time-related (specify when the result(s) can be achieved).
Another example are the "CREAM" indicators of good public sector performance: Clear (precise and unambiguous (not necessarily quantitative)), Relevant (appropriate to the objective at hand (not used simply because it is readily available)), Economic (the data required should be available at reasonable cost), Adequate (by itself or in combination with others, the measure must provide a sufficient basis for the assessment of performance), Monitorable (in addition to clarity and availability of information, the indicator must be amenable to independent scrutiny).
Sources: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMART_criteria (visited in December 2014) and (Schiavo-Campo 1999, p. 85).

Good quality target setting exists for MFA budget targets.

Trend targets grapple with precision of definition and relevance.

example, targets to increase funds or percentages without any indication of the magnitude of the increase are, formally, already satisfied by token increases. Precision and relevance could be improved by indicating the magnitude of increase, including keeping funding stable if that is underlying intention. In addition, timing for these targets is not always clear.

Across DPPs, the 2004 and 2012 DPPs exhibited most quantitative targets. Quite generally, quantitative targets are only found on the level of inputs (resources) and activities and the above examples already reflect most quantitative guidance elements contained in all three DPPs.

An important exception is the reference, across all three DPPs, to the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). MDGs themselves are well-defined, meaningful and based on an indicator framework that allows their tracking on a global and national scale. DPPs express clear commitment to making some contributing to MDGs but do not set well-defined targets for that contribution.

Qualitative Targets
All other direct guidance is qualitative in nature and usually exhibits target-setting quality issues with two or more of the criteria used for this assessment.

In some instances, targets themselves refer to broad concepts. This leaves open both the exact definition of the target and the criteria for achievement. For example, the 2012 DPP's central and relevant commitment of "inclusion of the human rights-based approach in all activities" does not specify how that approach is defined in concrete terms and what the criteria for determining achievement are. It also remains unclear to what extent this overarching target applies to development partners and what the time-frame for compliance is.

Similarly, the 2007 DPP's central commitment to sustainable development remains vague. The concept itself is evolving and nebulous in some aspects and the criteria provided in the DPP itself are very broad, covering natural resource management, poverty reduction, education, health, technology, international economy, environmental protection, security, human rights, social equality, democracy and rule of law (MFA 2007d, p. 15). While the central importance of this concept is stressed in sentences such as "The principles of sustainable development must be followed throughout the world" and "All action affecting development and the environment must follow the principles of sustainable development in a consistent manner" (MFA 2007d, p. 11 and p. 16), as well as in its main policy goal (Table 2) the target-setting quality of this otherwise strong general guidance remains poor. While commitment and relevance is strong, the concept itself is not well-defined, no time for achievement is set and monitoring is likely to be challenging (see Annex 4b for more detailed analysis on sustainable development and DPPs).

The 2004 DPP promotes policy coherence for development as overarching concept and defines a related target as "improve cooperation between public institutions in Finland to increase the coherence and effectiveness of Finland's

development policy" (MFA 2004d, p. 7). Again, relevance and commitment are high but it remains unclear how the guidance is to be operationalised in terms of target definition and verification.

In all three DPPs, overarching concepts that also serve to define targets remain, while clearly relevant and committed to, too vaguely defined and their achievement hard to verify.

In summary, across the three DPP's great many guidance elements, target setting remains weak:

- **Degree to which targets are well-defined.** Most guidance elements clearly describe an intention but do not provide indicators or other criteria for determining achievement. In most instances, the time component is not explicitly specified.
- **Degree to which targets are relevant and meaningful.** Many target statements cover this point well. Most common exceptions are statements involving change language without providing an indication of the size or the quality of intended change.
- **Degree to which targets are clearly committed to.** For many guidance elements, commitment is explicit and clear. For numerous other statements, it remains however unclear whether the intention is to provide actual guidance or to describe a situation or a mechanism, or to make an observation. With regard to ownership, it often remains unclear to what degree the MFA or others carry primary responsibility for achievement.
- **Degree to which achievement of targets can be verified straightforwardly.** Partly as a consequence of often not well-defined targets, but also because of methodological, data-managerial and data-availability challenges, the monitoring and verification of target achievement remains unresolved for most guidance elements.
- **Location of targets along the MFA's results chain.** Most target statements that fulfil two or more of the above quality criteria are situated at the earliest stages of the MFA results chain and concern resource allocation and MFA activities. For example, of the 16 priority measures of the 2012 DPP, only 3 can be interpreted to (also) commit to changes beyond the MFA (number 2, 4 and 8 in Table 3), all exhibiting definition and verification issues, whereas 13 concern MFA resources, activities and outputs. The 50 additional action items provided along the four priority areas of the same DPP exhibit the same weaknesses with regard to their target-setting.

In many instances, with intended or unintended linguistic finesse, accountability for targets is effectively reduced to cover only activities and not the intended results of those activities. For example, to "encourage people in Finland to support the values and goals of the Millennium Declaration [...]" (MFA 2004d, p. 7) shies away from committing to increase that support and the "Revision of Finland's Aid for Trade Action Plan" (number 12 in Table 3) does not make any commitment anywhere in the DPP to what that improvement entails and, more importantly, to what the intended results with such an improved plan are.

Overarching concepts that also serve to define targets remain too vaguely defined.

The Evaluation Team's own assessment as to overall weak target-setting qualities of DPP guidance is mirrored by the MFA staff's own impressions. In interviews with MFA staff, there was broad agreement as to weak target-setting and prioritisation in DPPs, although the 16 priority measures of the 2012 DPP (Table 3) were repeatedly singled out as a concrete and useful list of commitments that is regularly followed up. MFA staff survey results are also generally in line with these findings (Annex 3).

4.1.2 Quality of Downstream Guidance

In addition to DPPs, downstream guidance in various forms plays an important role for development policy implementation at the MFA. The Evaluation Team identified 30 relevant documents issued between 2003 and mid-2014 of which most (21) were reviewed: 15 sector and thematic policies and guidelines, 6 policies and guidelines related to aid channels and instruments, and 9 action plans, programmes, and strategies.

General Observations

A first general observation is that there are many guidance documents. It should be noted that the identified documents do not include bilateral country strategies and multilateral influencing plans of which another 7 and 28, respectively, exist. Due to the overall upstream focus of this evaluation, these are not considered here but are dealt with in Chapter 5 on policy implementation. Even when taking into account that some documents are updates of earlier documents also contained in the sample, the Evaluation Team finds that there is a confusingly large overall amount of guidance; many interviewees stated the same problem.

A second general observation is that the validity of downstream guidance is often unclear, as well as the degree to which compliance is compulsory or voluntary. Some guidance is more than two government cycles old and has not been updated. MFA staff indicated that the status of many of the older guidelines was not well known, and that some of them were more or less ignored. The Evaluation Team was also not able to identify any documentation that would explicitly define the validity and status of downstream guidance documents in the hierarchy of policy, administrative, technical, and procedural guidance. 78 percent of the respondents to the online survey had difficulties in understanding the status of the downstream guidance documents in terms of how mandatory and binding it is. The following comment made in the online survey summarises the challenge: "Too many guidelines, policies! Which ones are valid for the DDP period and which ones longer? How to keep track on these?" From interviews it appears as if those policies and guidelines dealing with high-profile themes emphasised in the current DPP are actively followed and have influence; an example being the policies on cross-cutting objectives that guide planning and evaluation of interventions and quality control mechanisms (e.g. processing by QAB and monitoring of projects by the Unit for Civil Society).

Type of Guidance

Guidance elements in downstream guidance documents were analysed as part

There are many downstream guidance documents and their validity is often unclear.

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of the exemplary studies (Annex 4) and are summarised here. The focus lies on policies but action plans and strategies are also considered.

Most downstream guidance documents contain a mixture of describing the general context and development challenges, and principles and best practices to be followed, and listing general policy statements. Most state general objectives, e.g. indicate support to specific themes, or identify countries and regions which will be prioritised. The documents also pay a lot of attention to explaining why the sector or theme is important and what its role in Finnish and international development policy is.

In interviews development policy guidelines were regarded as useful as such, e.g. for identifying general principles to be followed. It was also recognised that they provide useful guidance for specifying important topics or areas needing support. Over time, downstream guidance also appears to have gained in terms of its usefulness although great variations remain.

For example, the 2009 development policy for environment (MFA 2009d) uses firm language and contains several statements indicating strength of guidance, e.g. that support for climate change mitigation will be increased. Some more recent development policy guidelines such as the 2012 Finland's Humanitarian Policy (MFA 2012b), and the 2013 development policy on the forest sector (MFA 2013a) provide clear guiding statements in terms of identifying priority themes, target countries, international agreements and processes to be supported, key aid channels and even indicative budget allocation.

The various strategy and programme documents as well as action plans provide stronger and more detailed guidance because of the inherent nature of these documents. They are more concrete in setting objectives, identifying time bound action, and in listing projects or project ideas and even budgets (e.g. the Wider Europe Initiative framework programme).

The International Strategy for Finland's Water Sector (MFA 2009f) represents a good practice example of dealing with the policy coherence issue; the Evaluation Team was not able to identify another strategy explicitly addressing this important topic. Its starting point is the recognition that water is linked to several other sectors and areas in cross-cutting ways. It is a joint strategy prepared by the MFA, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of the Environment. It identifies specific goals and presents also an action plan albeit without monitorable indicators.

Two forestry guidelines (MFA 2009c, MFA 2013a) revealed concrete guidance e.g. in terms of identifying thematic areas and topics, organisations, processes, and priority regions and countries to be targeted as well as link planned action to specific aid channels and implementation partners.

Quality of Target-Setting
Apart from several encouraging exceptions, the overall quality of target-setting in downstream guidance documents is low. Employing the 5 quality dimensions

used in the previous section, the following summary observations can be made:

· **Degree to which targets are well-defined.** Downstream policy guidance documents seldom provide quantitative targets and indicators that would enable assessment of performance. Only three of more the 21 documents reviewed contained clearly defined targets and provided criteria for determining achievement. For example, the development policy for the health sector (MFA 2007b, p. 7) commits to promoting health and to reducing inequalities in health but lacks a time and criteria for target achievement.

The Evaluation Team's own assessment is consistent with the survey-findings and interviews. 72 percent of survey respondents found that downstream guidance does not define tangible results to be attained and 95 percent of the respondents working or having worked in embassies agreed (58 percent of them "strongly") that sector and thematic policies, guidelines and action plans must be further developed to include also results frameworks with targets and indicators. Interviews mirrored this. These observations are especially pronounced for guidance related to cross-cutting objectives: 86 percent of surveyed MFA staff disagreed with the statement that policies and guidelines for cross-cutting objectives provide clear objectives and measurable targets. This result is supposedly driven by the lack of practicable guidance often brought up in interviews and open comments in the survey (Section 4.2).

· **Degree to which targets are relevant and meaningful.** Guidance elements were found to often address relevant issues but to seldom set meaningful targets for them. Often, lists of statements indicate that the MFA will support something or will do something. Sometimes these statements refer to support that has been ongoing since before the guidance was issued. Similar to observations made to the meaningfulness of DPP targets, these targets do not set expectations regarding the quality and quantity of these budget commitments and activities. For example, the policy for environmental cooperation (MFA 2009d) mentions increasing financial support to mitigate climate change and also lists important international environmental agreements which must be supported but remains silent on the amount or the order of magnitude of the envisaged increase.

· **Degree to which targets are clearly committed to.** Most of the reviewed documents express strong commitment of Finland and the MFA to various international agreements, processes and principles relevant for the sector or theme. With some exceptions, this is however seldom translated into commitment to targets, i.e. clearly defined responsibilities and ownership. Most guidelines have sections on key aid channels to be used and related key actions, which can be interpreted to imply allocation of responsibilities to various departments and units, albeit without explicit commitment and responsibilities. In many instances, the language itself leaves open if commitment is intended or not, for example in statements of something being important for Finland.

· **Degree to which achievement of targets can be verified straightforward-ly.** Overall, little attention seems to be paid to how target indicators can actually be monitored. For several guidance elements, their very broad

definitions (e.g. strengthening of health care system, or supporting sustainable development) exclude monitoring as long as indicators remain undefined.

· **Location of targets along the MFA's results chain.** Similar to the observations made for DPP guidance, most downstream guidance elements that fulfil two or more of the above criteria for quality targets remain at the budget or activity/output level of the MFA results chain.

However, several exceptions of downstream guidance with good quality targets exist and may serve as example on how to make other guidance more relevant for RBM. The Aid for Trade – Finland's Action Plan 2012-2015 (MFA 2012a) is such an important exception. It has one objective, four goals and eight sub-goals (called focus themes) both with related indicators. The plan attempts to link, directly and indirectly, programme and project-specific indicators with higher level sub-goal and goal indicators, all of which together contribute to the main objective of the private sector creating decent employment and opportunities for entrepreneurship for all. All Aid for Trade (AFT) related projects are to have two to three results indicators. The current set of indicators may prove difficult to causally link to MFA activities. Since AFT projects are not planned within the AFT results framework, the availability and quality of indicator monitoring data is limited; in one country no suitable indicator data was available. In spite of this, the plan represents an important step forward in introducing RBM-approach to thematic cooperation at MFA. The AfT Action Plan is further discussed in Section 5.7.3.

As early as 2003, the MFA 2003 Strategy and Action Plan for Promoting Gender Equality in Finland's Policy for Developing Countries 2003–2007 provided another good practice attempt for concrete target-setting and a timeframe for delivery. This document is reviewed in more detail in Annex 4a.

4.2 Validity and Timing of DPP Guidance

In the absence of a law on international development, the three DPPs under consideration, together with relevant parts of the corresponding Government Programs represent Finland's top-level development policies since 2003.

DPP Validity Periods

The validity period of DPPs is not explicitly stated. Since each DPP is written as the Finnish development policy rather than an adjustment of a previous policy and since DPPs represent Government decisions in principle, the Evaluation Team assumes that DPPs become valid from their publication date and remain valid until a new government is appointed. The last three DPPs were published between 6 and 8 months after the formation of the government and publication of the GP,[2] giving DPP guidance an effective lifetime of 3 years and 4-6

> **There is also downstream guidance with good quality targets which may serve as example.**

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2 The 2004 DPP was published 5.2.2004, 7.5 months after the GP (published on 24.06.2003); the 2007 DPP was published 18.10.2007, 6 months after the GP (19.4.2007); and the 2012 DPP was published 16.2.12, 8 months after the GP (22.6.2011).

months. Validity during the 6–8 month period between the formation of a new government and the issuing of a new DPP remains somewhat unclear. Some DPP targets, for example on ODA/GNI shares (Section 5.2) are set beyond the validity period of its DPP, implying that future governments will carry the main responsibility for compliance.

Validity Periods of Downstream Guidance

Downstream policy guidance is produced throughout government cycles. Although not necessarily related to specific DPPs, MFA staff expressed confusion as to the continued validity of downstream policies during a subsequent government period (Section 4.1.2). Some downstream guidance with clear reference to a particular DPP was produced so late in that government cycle that it had no guaranteed validity period. For example, guidelines for the 2012 DPPs overarching principle of a Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) were published in February 2013 but they were found too general by MFA staff for operationalising the overall concept. Currently, about half a year before the appointment of a new government in summer of 2015, a more detailed HRBA work plan is under preparation.

Similarly, a policy on fragile states was issued in May 2014 (MFA 2014v), i.e. 10 months before the next elections. The 2012 DPP is the only one of the three DPPs addressing the issue of fragile states. Neither the implementation plan nor the DPP itself mention the production of a policy as specific measure but solely the "assessment of the special needs" of these countries. Clarity on the validity of this guidance document is affected by both the fact that it is not based on a specific requirement formulated in the 2012 DPP and the risk that it becomes irrelevant under subsequent governments.

Time Scales in Development Policy Implementation

DPPs are written as the Finnish development policy and make little reference to when, over time, policy implementation and development results are to be expected. This stands at odds with the limited validity period of DPPs: once policy implementation in the framework of a DPP is fully under way, a new DPP is issued. Moreover, development results are likely to require additional years to materialise, adding to the overall time-lag between policy guidance and tangible development results.

MFA staff feedback strongly supports this finding: 90 percent of surveyed staff feels that new DPPs every four years represent too short a timescale for development work (62 percent agreed strongly, 28 percent somewhat).

Depending on the policy and aid implementation channel and the instruments employed, the time from publishing policy direction to realising tangible development effects is likely to range between a few and many years. To understand this, it is useful to look at individual process steps that contribute to the overall time-lag.

- First, policy guidance sometimes needs to be translated into more specific guidance in the form of specific policies, action plans and strategies.

There is a significant time lag between the time from publishing policy direction to realising tangible development effects.

As described above, this step alone can involve time-lags of several years.
- Second, policy guidance then needs to be applied in the form of resource allocations and adapted priorities modalities for development work. Mismatches between DPP cycles and several other cycles, e.g. the MFA budget cycle, the renewal cycles of bilateral country strategies and the multi-year replenishment and strategy update cycles of multilateral organisations and large NGOs represent limits as to how fast concrete policy priorities can be translated into operational priorities. Along most policy implementation channels and also including the implementation of policy coherence work, the operationalisation speed for policy direction is also limited by the fact that the MFA is attempting to influence processes it does not control.
- Third, development projects and programs themselves require time for planning and appraisal which may amount to several years in bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
- Fourth, after resources have been deployed and implementation is under way, development projects and programmes require time to reach development results. Outputs, the immediate results of development activities, are obtained quickly but development outcomes require years to materialise, even after the project itself has already been terminated. Especially those tangible development outcomes in the form of poverty reduction, health and environmental improvements, or the effects of improved education are of special interest to donor governments.

The second and third points are illustrated by an analysis conducted by the Evaluation Team and with substantial support from MFA staff responsible for development statistics. This analysis and underlying assumptions is explained in more detail in Annex 7.

Figure 6 shows the time-lag between the commitment and disbursement of funding, over DPP periods. Actual annual MFA expenditures are depicted and attributed to the years in which the funds were committed. The analysis covers about 80 percent of the overall Finnish ODA expenditures and excludes MFA administrative costs, Finnfund capital increases and expenditures of NGO partner organisation and some other expenditure for which no clear attribution to fund commitments could be made. Apart from the bilateral aid channel, the annual expenses are linked to actual financing decisions which does not take into account appraisal and other preparation times after the funds have principally been committed. For the bilateral aid channel, a blanket delay of 2 years was assumed to approximate the considerable project and program negotiation, preparation and appraisal times in bilateral cooperation projects and programs.

Figure 6 Time-lag between project and programme decision-making and disbursement for DPP validity periods.

	2004 DPP		2007 DPP				2012 DPP	
2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013

Legend: Decision before 2004 · Decision 2004–2007 · Decision 2008–2011 · Decision 2012–2013

Source: financial databases, MFA and team analysis

Clearly, the time-lag between the principal decision to commit funds and actual disbursements is substantial and extends over several years. Annex 7 demonstrates in more detail the different "vintages" of financing decision-making during each DPP period – e.g. 11 different years in 2012 – and shows how expenditures can be linked even to four earlier DPP periods.

Expenditures in any year are dominated by decisions made in previous years and MFA staff sometimes expressed that they are implementing the previous DPP in the early year of a new DPP period. On average for all years covered, 29 percent of expenditures can be attributed to decision-making in the same year, 42 percent to the present and previous year, 64 percent to the last three and 76 percent to the last four years. While expenses under the 2007 DPP largely followed this average behaviour, expenditures under the 2012 DPP appear to lag behind this average which can possibly be explained by the broken growth trend in overall ODA expenditures in that period (Annex 7) and the fact that in recent years there have been more multi-year commitments.

Numerous interviewees highlighted the point that especially during the early years of a new DPP, most activities, in some countries up to 80-90 percent of total expenditures, were linked to the decisions of earlier governments, as for example in Tanzania (Annex 4c).

The analysis summarised in Figure 6 indicates when disbursements occur. Actual development results can only be expected to occur after that. Depending on the aid channel, development activities and outputs may lag substantially behind these disbursements, for example in the case of replenishment of multilateral funds, and development outcomes usually require additional years to materialise (point 4 above). Conservatively, an overall time-lag of one or more DPP period can be expected between the initial policy guidance and related development results.

In some countries up to 80–90 percent of total expenditures were linked to the decisions of earlier governments.

Hence, during the initial years of a new DPP, most development activities still relate to the previous DPP. Actual development results can be expected to lag even further. In summary, this can be described as a DPP determining a substantial share of the next government's activities, the results of which will only be reported by the government after that.

4.3 Learning from Results

The three DPPs under consideration make very little direct reference to learning from results and contain no literature references. In many instances, DPPs make strong statements but leave open whether the importance of a principle, activity or approach is simply advocated or the result of evidence-based research and analysis.

Since direct reference to learning from results is scarce in DPPs, indirect methods are used to infer the degree to which DPP content reflects learning from results. First, MFA staff perceptions on influences shaping DPP content are summarised.

MFA Staff Perceptions on Learning from Results in DPPs

In interviews, a wide range of actors, opinions and findings surfaced that influence the DPP formulation process and, ultimately, determine the DPP content. In interviews, MFA staff expressed that ministerial influence had been very strong, especially for the 2007 and, to some extent, also for the 2012 DPP. The 2007 DPP content – as well as many subsequent implementation decisions – were apparently directly and dominantly influenced by the Minister for Foreign Trade and International Development himself. Due to his influence the concept of Finnish value-added, ecologically sustainable development (with focus on forestry and climate change) and also a renewed focus on project-level bilateral cooperation gained substantial weight (see Annex 4b for more detail on sustainable development aspects, and Annex 4c for Tanzania country programming). During the formulation of that DPP, MFA staff felt its influence had waned compared to the formulation phases of earlier DPPs. The Minister for International Development strongly contributed personally to establishing the Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) as overarching principle for the 2012 Finnish development policy. In addition, she strongly influenced the formulation process, opening it up to broad and intense consultation. Complementarily, MFA staff felt to have had relatively more influence on the content of the 2012 and also on the 2004 DPPs.

Across all three DPPs, the feedback was that Finnish development policy oriented itself very much towards the international agreements and discourses, a fact clearly visible in the DPPs themselves with clear commitment and integration of the Millennium Declaration and related MDGs, and to the aid effectiveness agenda, as well as in overarching subjects such as policy coherence, sustainable development, and the HRBA.

The Government Programme (GP) was said to provide some important but overall not much guidance when writing the DPP. It was felt to posit several key

Direct reference to learning from results is scarce in DPPs.

issues that a DPP would have to incorporate, but to leave open much else. The relationship between DPP content and the GP is analysed in more detail in the thematic exemplary studies (Annex 4b).

Figure 7   Perceived strengths of influences on DPP content (composite scores,[3] N2004= 18, N2007=42, N2012=76).

Source: online survey, team analysis

Asked about the degree to which DPP content exhibited learning from earlier results, interviews highlighted especially for the 2012 DPP that a thorough review of earlier experiences, studies and evaluations had been conducted. The evaluation department EVA-11, for example, had been asked to summarise earlier experience and also other international experience was reviewed. OECD DAC peer reviews of Finland were cited as important sources for learning from results by several interviewees.

3 A composite score of 100 percent implies that all respondents perceived that that influence as dominant. If all respondents felt that influence was not dominant but significant, a score of 50 percent would ensue. A score of 0 percent means no respondent felt that influence was either dominant or significant. Composite scores are calculated as follows: (2 * percentage dominant influence + percentage significant influence) / 2.

Based on the feedback received in interviews, the Evaluation Team tested the relative strength of different influences more systematically in a survey (Figure 7).

Clearly, perceptions across the 2004, 2007 and 2012 DPPs vary considerably but largely confirm the interview findings.

Overall, the 2004 DPP content seems to have been least dominated by direct ministerial input (only 2 of 10 influences are ranked lower) and to have strongly benefited from international agreements and discourses, MFA staff input, the Government Program, and from stakeholder negotiations.

Interestingly, and with relevance to this evaluation, the 2004 DPP was perceived by MFA staff to be the DPP that was most strongly influenced by learning from the past. In all four categories (experiences of other countries and agencies, evaluations of Finnish development cooperation, OECD DAC peer reviews, and DPP implementation experience) this DPP was ranked higher than both the 2007 and the 2012 DPP. This relative importance of learning from results had not been apparent in the interviews conducted by the Evaluation Team.

The 2007 DPP content was perceived to be dominated by the Minister's own background and ideas. Almost all MFA staff that responded to that question indicated that this was a dominant influence. All other influence categories present in the 2004 DPP also contributed, but to a significantly lower extent.

The content of the 2012 DPP was perceived to be driven by similar influences as the 2004 DPP, but with more pronounced influence by the Minister and from negotiating stakeholder interests, and with less influence from different learning channels.

Further Evidence – Process Analysis

In addition to harvesting the perceptions from MFA staff through interviews and surveys, the Evaluation Team also analysed the DPP formulation processes and the role of steering and advisory bodies involved. The process analysis was largely based on documentation available in the MFA's internal information systems and both the type and quantity of documentation varied for the three formulation processes (Annex 6).

Overall, the entire DPP formulation processes have extended over periods of one to two years. Preparation work within the MFA, for example background analysis of the implementation of the previous DPP, thematic discussions and planning of the formulation process, usually began before the elections and hence before the publication of the Government Programme and the appointment of the Minister for International Development. Apart from the government decision-in-principle, there is no formally defined process for formulating and approving DPPs and the three policies under consideration differed according to the degree of participation and the sequencing of their formulation processes.

The 2004 DPP was perceived to be the DPP that was most strongly influenced by learning from the past.

The 2004 DPP was drafted while consultation meetings were held with NGOs, other ministries and state officials. In addition, a webpage was used to harvest external comments. Overall, relatively little information about the formulation process could be obtained apart from the fact that the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development emphasised the importance of the quality of the DPP and maintained a flexible schedule.

In 2006, early preparations for the 2007 DPP started with discussions on harmonisation and effectiveness of development aid. A draft DPP had already been prepared before the new Minister for Foreign Trade and International Development was appointed. That draft was almost entirely rewritten under the new Minister. The umbrella organisation for Finnish civil society organisations (KEPA) and the Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK) were consulted and comments on the new draft were gathered from NGOs and MFA embassies and units.

The 2012 DPP formulation process was more formally and linearly planned. Some preparations, such as a request to MFA units and embassies for feedback on the implementation of the 2007 DPP, began before the government was formed. Contrary to the 2007 process, the incoming Minister for International Development supported and built on these preparations. Before policy drafting had begun, input was gathered from embassies and MFA units. As in 2004, a webpage was used to collect external comments. A DPP formulation "roadmap" then included a series of internal and external consultation events (Development policy "KEPO Open process") on different development policy topics. The DPP itself was written by a drafting group that also took into account input of the DPSG, of comments on an early draft from MFA units and embassies, other ministries and external stakeholders (Annex 6).

Further Evidence – Feedback on 2007 DPP Implementation
To understand the degree to which learning from results influenced DPPs better, the Evaluation Team has reviewed – as one example – the summary experiences gathered from regional departments and embassies during the formulation of the 2012 DPP. The synthesis of the feedback was discussed at the DPSG. The feedback was structured around eight main questions on lessons learned during the 2007 DPP implementation, one of them dealing with the DPP planning process itself, and three additional questions related to enhancing aid effectiveness. Most of the feedback was related to operational aspects which, though important, did not provide much guidance on drafting the new DPP. However, some of the comments that were collected were relevant and correlate – to varying degrees – with actual 2012 DPP content.

The implementation of the 2007 DPP and introduction of new aid instruments had resulted in increased fragmentation. Strong recommendations were made to reduce fragmentation, increase the average size of interventions and concentrate on fewer thematic areas. The objective of reducing fragmentation is explicit in the 2012 DPP but, at the same time, new areas of emphasis were added.

The concept of Finnish value that featured strongly in the 2007 DPP implementation was not fully clear for many but it was recognised that the principle of concentrating on areas where Finland has a comparative advantage is good. In the 2012 DPP explicit reference to Finnish value added was dropped.

Country Assistance Plans ("osallistumisuunnitelmat") were in general considered useful and the continuation of that type of country programming framework were strongly recommended although according to general interviews and the Tanzania case study (Annex 4c) these plans were not results-oriented and in fact, not very participatory. The 2012 DPP put more emphasis on systematic country programming with results-orientation and introduced the country strategy concept.

Sector policies and guidelines were seen as too general to providing practical guidance. The preparation of new policies and guidelines has also been time-consuming and some had only been finalised towards the end of the 2007 DPP period. Processes for guideline implementation had not been in place in the beginning and thus implementation was delayed and had required a lot more work than planned. This is consistent with the interviews of regional department staff as part of this evaluation; a request was often made of having shorter, concrete guidance of different aspects of DPP implementation, concerning e.g. cross-cutting objectives, and much quicker after a new DPP has been issued.

Use of Evaluation Results
The 2007 evaluation guidelines set processes of dissemination, feedback and follow up on evaluation results (MFA 2007i, p. 65). Upon clearance of final reports by the DoDP, an ad hoc group led by a MFA unit (mostly the Unit for Sectoral Policy) and composed of relevant staff from units, departments or embassies proposes a management response with clear instructions on "accurate, operational, and functional" measures to be taken and a work plan including the timing and responsibility of all MFA units involved. Concerned units are instructed on measures to implement and report yearly to the DoDP on the implementation progress which is monitored and compiled by the Unit for Evaluation and Internal Auditing.

Despite the formally defined process for the use of evaluation results, the majority of MFA staff surveyed (54 percent) feels that there is no effective follow-up and actions on management response to evaluation. This is especially true for headquarter staff (62 percent).

Furthermore, the processes described above stop at the level of compiled reporting on the progress of implementation. No guidance is provided on how and whether the compiled information is used further upwards or within the MFA units for accountability or learning, nor on how non-implemented measures are to be addressed and by whom.

Sector policies and guidelines were seen as too general to provide practical guidance.

4.4 Key Points

DPPs successfully and convincingly convey the values and overall guiding principles of Finnish development policy.

4a. DPPs successfully and convincingly convey the values and overall guiding principles of Finnish development policy and provide the rationale for supporting sectors, themes, channels, instruments and countries.

4b. Overall goals and principles have remained remarkably stable across the three DPPs. This is obscured by the fact that each DPP emphasises a different overarching principle under which all other guidance is interpreted. DPPs also exhibit very different structures that make a systematic comparison of guidance along sectors and policy/aid channels difficult. Even if not apparent at first sight, all three DPPs cover similar sectors and channels.

The DPPs however provide very little guidance relevant to RBM.

4c. DPPs however provide very little guidance relevant to RBM:
  o DPPs highlight a great many principles, topics, sectors, aid channels, aid instruments, and describe a large number of guidance elements for budgets, activities, or intended development results. However, DPPs fail to establish relative priorities for this guidance. DPPs usually indicate what to do but not what not to do.
  o Over time, DPP guidance is inflationary: new DPPs usually add but don't remove guidance elements.
  o With the exception of a number of budget and MFA output targets, DPPs usually do not commit to well-defined, meaningful targets that can be monitored. The introduction of 16 priority measures and 50 further action points in the 2012 DPP has not improved target-setting quality.

Over time, DPP guidance is inflationary.

4d. Downstream guidance documents are numerous and without clear status. Apart from several promising exceptions, e.g. AfT (Aid for Trade Action Plan), downstream guidance exhibits similar quality issues as DPP guidance.

4e. DPPs have been valid for 3 years and 4-6 months, i.e. from publication 6-8 month after a new government is appointed until the appointment of the subsequent government. Their validity under the subsequent government until a new DPP is issued is unclear. This severely limits the ability of DPPs to set and ensure commitment to long-term targets.

4f. Downstream guidance is produced with some time-lag to DPPs, sometimes late in the government cycle, and its status under subsequent DPPs is also unclear.

4g. Time-lags in Finnish development policy implementation usually exceed DPP validity periods. DPPs do not reflect these timescales and provide little guidance on work started under previous governments or for work that is likely to be implemented under future governments. The time-lags between committed and disbursed funding are substantial and development results can be expected to occur one or more government cycles later.

4h. DPPs do not reference evaluative findings or other learning processes but learning from results has taken place and is evident in MFA staff perceptions on influences shaping DPP content, as process step during the DPP formulation processes, and in some correlations between evaluative findings and DPP content. DPP content is dominated by other influences, such as ministerial input, and learning from results happens in an ad hoc fashion rather than in a regular and systematic process.

5 MANAGING FOR RESULTS IN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

This chapter assesses how diligently DPP guidance has been implemented (Sections 5.1–5.6) and the degree to which RBM has been integrated into MFA operations (Section 5.7). Organisational conditions for implementing RBM at the MFA are analysed in Section 5.8.

Chapter 4 concluded that DPPs do not provide much concrete policy guidance, which makes the assessment of DPP compliance a challenge. Policy implementation is viewed from the perspective of RBM focusing on programming, budgeting and reporting levels across the results chain by main aid channel - not at the level of practical implementation of individual programmes or instruments. The assessment also pays attention to policy coherence from a RBM perspective.

Since the 2012 DPP (MFA 2012l, p. 13) states that the results-based approach of the Finnish development cooperation will be strengthened, special attention is paid to recent developments.

5.1 The Budget Allocation Process

DPPs themselves exhibit only limited budgetary guidance that mostly concern overall Official Development Assistance (ODA) targets or relative budget increases or decreases, the latter often remaining without meaningful quantification (Section 4.1). Clearly, DPPs are intended as general policy documents only, with largely qualitative guidance, and not to also fulfil the function of strategic plans that also cover indicative budget projections. Many interviewees however felt that guidance for example for thematic areas or for cross-cutting objectives was not really meaningful because it was not backed with any budget.

Within the overall budget envelope, the MFA development budget is determined as part of the Operating and Financial Plan (TTS) action and budget planning. The TTS is the MFA's four-year rolling planning system. Currently, it represents the main tool that attempts to cover objectives and results, and budget planning at the same time. The TTS is based on the Government Programme and government-agreed strategic priorities. It provides the framework for planning next year's use of government funds allocated to the budget for development cooperation, covering all aid channels.

The TTS for 2015-2018 (MFA 2014x) has a results matrix with 12 medium-term and 10 short-term (current year) result areas, which draw on the 16 specific measures highlighted in the 2012 DPP (Table 3) but also differ from them. It is not clear how some of the results present in the TTS were identified.

The policy formulation and budget planning processes appear to be quite independent from each other.

The main mode of management is management by input.

The policy formulation and budget planning processes at the MFA appear to be quite independent from each other. It is difficult to see how the TTS results targets are linked to specific budgets and many of the TTS results targets would even be hard to correlate to any budgets at all. This relates to the discussion of the quality of the 2012 DPP's 16 measures (Section 4.1) that were found to exhibit low target-setting qualities. A National Audit Office report also pointed out problems with the quality of target setting and lack of indicators in the TTS (NAO 2013, pp. 26–27). For example, for 2014, the following TTS target was set: "Bilateral and regional cooperation has become more effective producing more measurable development results than before, taking into account the risks." This said, the TTS framework can be used to monitor whether absolute or relative budget targets in DPPs are met.

The separation of processes for setting policy objectives from budget planning represents a serious issue for RBM. A very common claim made by the interviewees was that there is no results management at the MFA; the main mode of management is management by input. The Evaluation Team could not find any documentation indicating that the total aid budget and its allocation, e.g. between departments or units, would have been based on a results-based planning. It was stated in several interviews that budget allocation has in the past been driven more by negotiations and "politics" than by results-orientation.

5.2 Evidence on Compliance with Quantitative Targets

Quantitative indicator targets represent most of the – overall few – good quality targets in DPPs. They can be divided into target values for quantitative indicators, trend and boundary targets (Section 4.1). Across DPPs, the Evaluation Team has selected 16 such targets that – in principle – allow simple verification. For these targets, compliance was assessed based on information in annual reports and the MFA's development cooperation financial statistics (Annex 7) to confirm reported performance (Table 4 through Table 6).

Overall, about two thirds of all targets were met. In some cases, work is ongoing or targets are half-met. In other cases, no progress information was available to the Evaluation Team and an educated guess was made.

Table 4   2004 DPP quantitative target compliance.

Target type	Target statement	Compliance	Reporting
Value	Increase funds for development cooperation, 0.44% of GNI in 2007 and 0.7% in 2010.	Target partly met. Reached 0.41% but not 0.7%	Reported in 2007 but no referral to 2004 DPP. In 2010, a substantial increase from 0.39% in 2007 to 0.55% in 2010 was reported but no reference to the 2004 DPP target was made.
Value	Increase the proportion of funding to the LCDs, to 0.15% of GNI as total aid rises towards 0.7% [by 2010].	Target met	Reported using a detailed table and trend 2000-2007
Value	Increase the share of NGO cooperation gradually by 2007 to 14 % of operational development cooperation as NGOs increase their own capacity.	Target not met (12%)	Achievement reported but without reference to the target
Value	Humanitarian aid will remain at the level of 10-15% of operational development cooperation funds.	Target (met (12% in 2007, and quite stable before that)	Reported to Parliament in 2007
Trend	Government-to-government grant aid will be increased with the long-term partner countries. Annual disbursements will be increased so that a minimum level of 10 million euros will be gradually achieved in all countries.	Target partly met. Increase from 47% in 2004 to 59%. The minimum level target not met	Data to cover both indicators presented in a table, but no discussions and reference to not having met the average intervention size target.
Boundary	5% per year of the increase in operational development cooperation funds to administrative expense appropriations.	No information but likely met	Not reported
Trend	Finland will reduce its bilateral grant-based development cooperation except for long-term partner countries and countries selected for cooperation of limited duration The number of countries and projects and the amount of funding will diminish.	Not met in absolute terms but in relative terms. Number of countries not reduced. No info on the number of projects	No information on change in the number of countries and projects.

Source: 2004 DPP (MFA 2004d)

Table 5   2007 DPP quantitative target compliance

Target type	Target statement	Compliance	Reporting
Value	Finland is committed to reach the 0.51% minimum figure set by the European Council (EC) in 2005 for the EU-15 by 2010, and to reach 0.7% by 2015.	Target met, 0.52%	Reported in 2011
Value	The percentage of Finnish official development assistance going to the least developed countries will be increased.	Target not met, remained stable.	Not reported

Source: 2007 DPP (MFA 2007d)

Table 6   2012 DPP quantitative target compliance.

Target type	Target statement	Compliance	Reporting
Value	The Government aims to ensure a steady trend in appropriations that would enable Finland to reach the international commitment of 0.7 per cent of gross national income. In the EU, Finland is committed to achieving this target by 2015.	A small increase in 2012 to 0.53%	Reported
Boundary	Government will allocate up to 5 per cent of the increase in appropria-tions for development cooperation to strengthen administration.	No information but likely met	Not reported
Trend	Funding to civil society cooperation will be increased.	Increased	Reported
Trend	Funding to multilateral cooperation will be increased.	Increased	Reported
Trend	Increase Finnfund's capital and introduce of a special risk financing instrument.	Increased and instru-ment introduced	Reported
Trend	Planning and implementation of new cooperation modalities with the private sector.	Ongoing work	Not yet
Trend	The size of programmes and projects will be increased and the number reduced in both bilateral and multilat-eral cooperation.	No information available, ongoing process	Not yet

Source: 2012 DPP (MFA 2012e)

Progress towards and achievement of targets is not systematically followed up in reporting to Parliament which is discussed in the next chapter on reporting and accountability (Section 6.1).

With relevance for results-oriented implementation, the fact that several target indicators are not systematically monitored and reported raises the question of how results-oriented implementation towards those targets can actually take place. If decision-makers are unable to quantify the status quo and track progress against results, systematic managing for results becomes difficult. The 2012 DPP, for example, has a target of increasing the average size of programmes and projects and reducing their number in both bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The Evaluation Team could however not find evidence that this target is being monitored. The 2007 DPP had a similar but less clear objective not included in Table 5, i.e. "To improve effectiveness, efforts are being made to organise Finnish development cooperation into larger entities focusing on specific countries, regions and themes"(MFA 2007d, p. 25). However, during its implementation, fragmentation was not monitored and during the preparation of the 2012 DPP it was then recognised that fragmentation had actually increased.

5.3 Correlations between DPP Guidance and Financing Trends

ODA financing and budget trends (Annex 7) were screened for developments that cannot be explained by DPP guidance, and to verify consistency against selected key development priorities in 2004–2014, for example increasing support to sustainable development (environment/climate/forestry), to least developed countries (LDCs), and to civil society and multi-lateral cooperation. The targets are not result-related but still provide policy directions that can be monitored.

Between 2003 and 2012, support to civil society cooperation has been steadily increasing both in absolute and relative terms. The same applies to support for multilateral cooperation. These trends are in agreement with policy guidance (Section 5.2). MFA staff perceived these trends to be actually driven by DPP guidance, complemented by ministerial follow-up directions. Similarly, climate change-related financing has increased along with strong DPP guidance on addressing climate change issues and supporting implementation of multilateral environmental agreements. The drastic increase in funding for environment during the recent years is fully consistent with DPP guidance (see Annex 4b on both points). It is of course difficult to infer causality from these correlations. For example, the increased environmental funding can also be explained by international commitments on financing climate change adaptation and mitigation.

Given the scarce resources, it would be logical to focus RBM development work, including adoption of indicators, on those aid modalities that represent the main portion of the aid budget. From financial data, bi-lateral, multilateral (including EU) and civil society support as well as humanitarian aid channels

The achievement of targets is not systematically followed up in reporting to Parliament.

should be such areas of focus. When the MFA moves towards the adoption of results indicators it may be relevant to develop specific development result indicators initially for sectors which have remained in a key role over time. Humanitarian support, forestry and agriculture, education, and water supply and sanitation are such sectors.

5.4 Implementation Evidence: Gender

Gender is an integral cross-cutting theme or objective in all three DPPs. The quality and strength of target setting are however quite weak; concrete targets are generally missing and the quite general guidance is not easy to monitor. Concepts such as "gender equality", "women's rights" and the link to the human rights-based approach are complex and difficult to mainstream and operationalise in downstream documents and practical implementation. Interviewees felt that the combination of limited DPP guidance and a budget that does not correspond to the DPP guidance pose major challenges for implementation.

The 2012 DPP contains three complementary strategies – mainstreaming, targeted actions and policy dialogue – which has enabled better inclusion of gender objectives in the implementing tools and guidelines such as multilateral influencing plans, QAB formats and country strategy guidelines (Annex 4c).

Currently, there is no gender-specific guidance to support implementation and, hence, DPP implementation at a policy and strategic level has been weak with exception of the United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1325 national action plans (NAPs) linked to security. This situation represents a step backwards. The earlier Gender Strategy and Action Plan 2003-2007 (MFA 2003) provided a relatively strong framework from a RBM perspective, including concrete targets and a time-frame for implementation (Annex 4a). This plan was however never updated.

Sector and thematic guidelines vary in quality but targets and indicators are generally missing.

Sector and thematic guidelines vary in quality but targets and indicators are generally missing. Most of them include gender but usually it is mentioned either as a cross-cutting issue or in opportunities/challenges but not followed up by concrete guidance. The recent shift from "consideration" to "binding" has however enabled better inclusion of gender objectives in implementing guidelines and tools such as the multilateral influencing plans, country strategies and QAB formats.

Gender can be found in a few results frameworks.

All seven country strategies were reviewed from a gender perspective. The integration of gender in these strategies varies from vague statements to having specific support and objectives in the logical framework model. Gender can also be found in a few results frameworks, which exhibit gender-specific indicators sometimes backed with a budget.

Influencing plans mention gender either as a thematic priority, or as a priority related to the organisation's modus operandi. Gender-related targets are set but often depend on actions beyond Finland's direct influence. UNWomen provides a post-2012 DPP example where an attempt has been made to maximise influence

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by becoming the largest individual donor, and seconding a senior gender adviser to the organisation. For more detail on the gender exemplary study, see Annex 4a.

5.5 Implementation Evidence: Sustainable Development

Sustainable development (SD) is identified in all three Government Programmes (GPs) and DPPs as one of the key development policy objectives and underlying implementation principle. The quality and strength of guidance are however quite weak; concrete targets are generally missing and language is non-committal. Guidance is almost without exception qualitative in nature, expressing general support and intentions, as well as adherence to certain principles (see Annex 4b). The SD concept in the GPs and DPPs is very broad, and leaves much room for interpretation, e.g. by the incoming Minister. In case of the 2007 DPP the ecological dimension of the SD concept was emphasised. Interviewees criticised the DPPs for containing vague or unclear concepts such as "sustainable development" itself or "inclusive green economy", and expressing too many general policy statements principles (Annex 4b). The DPPs differ in terms of quality of guidance. The 2012 DPP is the strongest in terms of providing guidance; it identifies 12 measures that are to be supported to promote sustainable management of natural resources. These measures, however, themselves exhibit poor target setting qualities (Section 4.1).

Regarding DPP compliant implementation, interviews and documents reviews demonstrate that DPPs clearly influence the drafting of downstream policy guidance and programming itself. The influence on downstream policy guidance is stronger in the case of forestry (MFA 2009c, MFA 2013a) and environment (MFA 2009d) and somewhat less expressed in the 2009 international strategy for water sector (MFA 2009f). The review of the 2013 forest sector policy demonstrates a strong correlation with the 2012 DPP. Concepts such as HRBA and all cross-cutting objectives are integrated into the principles of the forest sector policy, albeit without any objective-setting. It is too early to conclude how this guidance has been reflected in the new portfolio. However, according to the interviews the design of new interventions has incorporated new guidance. In the case of Tanzania, an already prepared forestry project was redesigned to address the priorities of the 2012 DPP concerning HRBA and equality (Annex 4b).

Other strong influences come from multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and various environmental negotiations and processes such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) including reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD), the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) and, in case of forestry, also EU policy instruments such as the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan and the United Nations Forum on Forests' (UNFF) objectives and processes. According to interviews, these negotiations and processes have influenced forest sector policies, together with EU forest policy objectives and international best practices, more than DPP guidance. For more detail on the sustainable development exemplary study, see Annex 4b.

DPPs clearly influence the drafting of downstream policy guidance and programming.

5.6 Implementation Evidence: Tanzania

Interviewed MFA staff perceived DPPs as providing general guidance for country programming in Tanzania. This included an emphasis on poverty reduction, cross-cutting objectives (e.g. gender equality), Finnish value-added during the 2007 DPP and the human rights-based approach during the 2012 DPP period. This type of guidance was considered generally useful but not concrete enough to inform operations. Concepts such as "Finnish value added" and "HRBA" have been difficult to operationalise in Tanzania country programming, project design and implementation according to several interviews and a MFA-financed study (Koponen et al 2012).

The 2012 DPP provides more guidance regarding the importance of baseline assessments, clear target-setting as well as systematic monitoring and reporting. The new DPP also sets an objective of preparing country strategies for long-term partner countries. This guidance has provided a framework for Tanzania cooperation planning and reporting in a form of results-oriented country strategies. In interviews, the country strategies were greatly valued, and it was expressed that this approach and related tools should be further developed and institutionalised at the MFA (Annex 4c).

For Tanzania, there is evidence that DPPs have strongly influenced development cooperation implementation. The Country Strategy for Development Cooperation (2013–2016) and the 2012 DPP show strong correlations of objectives and themes such as HRBA, vulnerable groups, political rights, and cross-cutting objectives including gender equality and climate sustainability. The 2012 DPP has an objective of reducing the fragmentation of the Finnish support (Table 6). For Tanzania, this objective was translated into the target to halve the number of projects by the end of the current government period (Annex 4c).

Interviewees commonly stated that DPPs represent only one among several influences. Country development objectives and programs, and donor coordination and harmonisation add important influences for country programming and the setting of objectives. It appears that the implementation after the 2007 DPP was influenced more by the direct input from the Finnish Minister for Foreign Trade and International Development than by the DPP itself. National objective setting is also a major source of influence. The Country Strategy for Development Cooperation (2013-2016) states development results, derived from Tanzania's development plans and they are in line with the 2012 DPP priorities (Annex 4c). However, it has been somewhat difficult to start implementing new DPP priorities because most funds had already been committed and are tied for years even beyond the DPP period. Based on the information provided up to 80 percent of the total budget of EUR 120 million in 2012-2015 may have been committed pre-2012 DPP. For more detail on the Tanzania exemplary study, see Annex 4c.

DPPs have strongly influenced development cooperation implementation in Tanzania.

However, PPs represent only one among several influences.

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5.7 DPP Implementation and Results Orientation in MFA Development Cooperation

Sections 3.1 and 5.1 have provided information on recent important developments in moving the MFA towards more results-oriented management. While the RBM Action Plan for 2013–14 (MFA 2012o) covers all aid channels, the Evaluation Team found that most progress has been made in bilateral cooperation through country strategies and related results frameworks, and in multilateral cooperation through influencing plans and related results matrices.

Bilateral and multilateral cooperation represented half of the total aid expenditure in 2013 (Annex 7); the extent to which aid delivers results and how the results are reported under these aid channels is therefore of central importance (Subsections 5.7.1 and 5.7.2). In additional subsections, other aid channels and instruments (5.7.3) and policy coherence work (5.7.4) are assessed from a RBM perspective.

5.7.1 Bilateral Cooperation: Country Strategies

Pre-2012 status of DPP Implementation and Results-Orientation in Bilateral Cooperation
During the 2007 DPP period, country assistance plans were prepared for long-term partner countries. The country assistance plans for Vietnam (MFA 2008h) and Nepal (MFA 2008i) and for Tanzania (Annex 4c) contained strong references to the 2007 DPP, including the three pillars of sustainable development and Finnish value added. They however neither set concrete objectives, nor identify intended results, nor did they define development or performance indicators or establish a results reporting system. This is not surprising since the instructions for the preparation of the plans (MFA 2008g) did not contain any guidance on RBM.

DPP Implementation and the Country Strategy Approach
The 2012 DPP called for result-oriented country programing (MFA 2012e p. 9). Already in May 2012, only three months after the adoption of the new DPP, concrete instructions were issued by DoDP leadership to all long-term partner teams to prepare country strategies (MFA 2012p). The instructions included a detailed annotated report structure and instructions on process; the instructions were updated in 2014 (MFA 2014z). This structure "forces" the preparation process to consider DPP objectives and cross-cutting objectives, and to summarise past lessons learned. The instructions also include sections dealing with goal and objective setting paying due attention to national needs and ownership, the identification of development results, indicators of Finland's performance, description of how to deliver the results and to reach higher level objectives consistent with national development priorities, implementation strategy and modalities, strategic steering, tentative budget, as well as templates for logic models for results-based programming, results frameworks and bi-annual and annual reporting (MFA 2012p, MFA 2014z).

Most progress has been made in bilateral cooperation through country strategies, and in multilateral cooperation through influencing plans.

Interviews and the review of guidance and operational instructions, country strategies, country reports and regional synthesis reports available to date demonstrated that:

- Basic elements for RBM are in place in terms of objective setting and results indicators and related reporting systems for long-term partner countries; the system is greatly appreciated by MFA staff involved. It provides a framework for reconciling the development needs of national stakeholders with Finnish development policy objectives and principles.
- The strategies and related result frameworks and reporting systems are still work-in-progress, which explains the variation in the quality of strategies and progress reports. However, these are of more uniform quality than the multilateral influencing plans and more advanced in terms of setting objectives, result indicators and reporting. Overall, the reports still contain a lot of descriptive activity type reporting relative to results reporting.
- Possibly the biggest challenge is related to linking more concrete policy objectives to country development results; it is often difficult to see how the different levels are linked. The challenge is to find adequate indicators at that level that are in Finland's "control" and which then could be logically linked to the higher level results to demonstrate contribution. Actual attribution would be a challenge for many indicators such as reduced poverty levels or improved democracy indicators, because there are many other factors influencing the development. Anyhow, according to interviews, attribution is not seen as a priority if Finland is to act consistently with the Paris Declaration principles.
- Traffic light systems used in the annual reports to assess performance against the identified result areas allow a quick overview of the progress made. However, they are based on subjective assessments. The Evaluation Team could not find any instructions on how the traffic light system should really be used to ensure more uniform application of performance rating over time in the country and also across the countries.

The two regional synthesis reports (MFA 2014v, 2014w) and the Tanzania exemplary study (Annex 4c) are consistent with these findings. The synthesis reports highlight the good progress made but also identify problems concerning the availability of information for some indicators, the balance between activity and result reporting, and the variation in terms of the quality of adopted indicators and reporting between countries. The synthesis reports did not attempt to aggregate results.

The Evaluation Team agrees with the recommendations made in the synthesis reports concerning the need for more capacity building in RBM and country strategy implementation, and improving the results-orientation of project and programme design, implementation and monitoring. The need to improve the quality of project and programme design to strengthen results-orientation was also highlighted in the 2011 RBM evaluation (Poate et al 2011).

5.7.2 Multilateral Cooperation: Influencing Plans

The 2007 DPP and the 2008 Development Policy Paper on Multilateral Cooperation
After the 2007 DPP, a decision was made to prepare a development policy paper on multilateral cooperation. The "Multilateral Cooperation in Finland's Development Policy" document is based on the 2007 Government Programme and DPP, and provides a broad framework and principles for multilateral cooperation with strong emphasis on sustainable development (MFA 2008b). This policy does not aim at providing guidance on selecting multilateral organisations to be supported but highlights those organisations with which cooperation should be broadened to attain the goals of the DPP. It emphasises the Government Programme decision that the United Nations (UN) remain Finland's most fundamental multilateral cooperation instrument and refers to the 2007 DPP that listed 11 most important UN organisations including many environment-oriented organisations such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), 8 development finance institutions (DFI) and many other organisations to be supported.

The policy also includes the principle of directing support especially to those multilateral organisations who have been assessed internationally (e.g. by Multilateral Organisation's Performance Assessment Network MOPAN) to be effective. The policy guidelines do not make references to these assessments, to discontinuing funding or engaging with agencies as a consequence of the new DPP and the assessment of effectiveness of the various multilateral organisations. In fact, the review of MFA statistics on the annual allocation of funds to multilateral organisations indicates that all organisations funded during that period were also supported in the past.

The "Multilateral Cooperation in Finland's Development Policy" is strong in identifying key principles and thematic priorities by the three dimensions of sustainable development and linking these to those multilateral organisations with whom Finland would cooperate. The document neither includes concrete objectives, nor does it set priorities e.g. for thematic intention or agencies. There are a total of 30 priority areas and most of them are stated so broadly (e.g. promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance) that the resultant guidance becomes quite weak in application. The document states explicitly that no separate system is to be established for monitoring implementation of the multilateral cooperation policy but routine MFA systems would be used including TTS, evaluations, and MOPAN. Reporting would be done e.g. during the annual reporting to Parliament and no reference is made to results reporting.

Multilateral Cooperation and Influencing Plans
The 2012 DPP contains a specific measure related to multilateral cooperation: strategic focusing of multilateral cooperation and increased funding (Table 3; MFA 2012e p. 9). As a follow up to this DPP decision, a strategic analysis of multilateral cooperation was carried out to improve the effectiveness and

efficiency of Finnish multilateral cooperation (MFA 2013t). The Finnish ODA expenditure statistics for 2006-13 and the budget for 2014 show that 2007 and 2012 DPP guidance correlates with additional resources for multilateral cooperation. It is however not possible to identify an improved strategic focus: no organisations have been dropped and in general funding has remained at level or increased for various organisations. Moreover, some UN organisations that did not perform well in the strategic assessment of multilateral organisations have received more funding.

To follow up the DPP guidance and the RBM Action Plan, a decision was made in 2013 to prepare "multilateral influencing plans" for all multilateral organisations that receive more than EUR 1 million of support from Finland annually. Instructions issued by the DoDP (MFA 2013u) have guided the preparation of those plans. The instructions are quite general explaining the scope for the plans, the logic for stating objectives, indicators, time frame, monitoring and reporting, and results matrices. The plans are prepared jointly by the responsible DoDP unit and the diplomatic mission responsible for the organisation. They are reviewed by the DPSG and approved by the DG of the DoDP after consulting the Minister. Influencing targets are driven by the DPP, HRBA, cross-cutting objectives, the MFA policy on humanitarian aid and other development policies, as well as the organisation's own priorities and substance areas. The review of these plans also shows that use has been made of MOPAN and MFA assessments of the organisations' development needs concerning results-orientation and effectiveness.

Twenty eight of such plans have been prepared to date, twenty of which were reviewed by the Evaluation Team in addition to available annual influencing reports. The influencing plans, while still being further developed, represent a concrete step towards RBM in multilateral cooperation through the introduction of influencing objectives and related results-framework and reporting system. They provide a framework for influencing and monitoring effectiveness and for adopting a more strategic approach to working with multilateral organisations. Importantly, most of these plans also include actions aimed at improving results-based management and reporting of the organisations themselves (Section 6.1.2).

The plans are of varying quality in terms of scope and depth of the underlying analysis linked to target setting. It is not always easy to see how targets were selected. The DoDP instructions do not provide any guidance on the use of indicators, which may explain the significant variation in terms of indicator use. Small and large issues are often mixed and activity and input type indicators dominate. Most indicators are linked to activities such as attending meetings and presenting Finland's position papers on a number of issues including organisational and operational matters. This type of indicators represent useful precursor and lead indicators but must be complemented by adoption indicators that map subsequent causal steps in the multilateral Theory of Change. At present, the MFA is not making systematic use of the organisations' own result indicators and reporting. The question is not about attribution, but demonstrating to what activities and results Finland has been contributing. At the

The influencing plans represent a concrete step towards RBM in multilateral cooperation.

same time, in a number of cases (e.g. FAO), Finland aims at supporting the partner countries in developing its own results monitoring and reporting systems. The fact that there are twenty eight influencing plans poses an issue in itself. Although they have been prepared as a response to the 2012 DPP guidance on improving effectiveness of multilateral cooperation, it is not apparent how this will address the DPP guidance on becoming more strategically focused in multilateral cooperation as an integrated portfolio perspective is missing.

5.7.3 Other Aid Channels and Instruments

European Union (EU) and European Development Fund (EDF)

The MFA has actively tried to influence the aid effectiveness agenda of the EU in the past, however without referring to RBM. Finland provides support to the EU budget and can influence the use of funding, results-management and reporting of these organisations through influencing the EU development policy. As of now, influencing targets are prepared semi-annually concerning the agendas of the Working Party on Development Cooperation (CODEV) and the Asia-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) Working Party. CODEV is responsible for policy issues in the area of development. At the end of each 6-month EU presidency, a summary of achievements is prepared. These influencing targets are similar to those in the multilateral influencing plans; they are useful for assessing performance regarding qualitative influencing objectives but they do not provide information on development results.

Civil Society Cooperation

The work of the MFA CSO unit is guided by the 2012 DPP and "Guidelines for Civil Society in Development Policy" (MFA 2010d). Earlier 2007 guidelines were prepared with a focus on how to apply for support; there was no reference to the DPP itself. The 2010 guidelines draw considerably on the 2007 DPP but are weak in terms of setting objectives for civil society cooperation and for providing guidance on how to improve effectiveness at an aggregate and project level; the word result is barely mentioned. At the project level RBM has however been applied for years using logical frameworks in project design and monitoring as in the case of bilateral cooperation projects.

In the past, monitoring of NGO/CSO cooperation was based mainly on monitoring the activities and the use of funds. The latest CSO unit templates for project proposals and implementation reports are more results-oriented and address also the cross-cutting objectives of the DPP (see MFA CSO web site).

Aid for Trade Action Plan

Interviewed staff often referred to "Aid for Trade – Finland's Action Plan 2012-2015" (MFA 2012a) as the only current thematic programme that is aimed at implementing a DPP objective through a results framework. The action plan represents a follow-up programme to the action plan for 2008-2011 adopted in 2008 (MFA 2008a). It can be described as a framework programme for AfT-related activities under bilateral and regional cooperation, multilateral and EU cooperation, and private-sector related instruments.

The action plan has one high level objective: "The private sector creates decent employment and opportunities for entrepreneurship for all." There are four goals such as "Developing countries benefit from international trade and investment." Each goal is divided into two focus themes. For example, under the example goal above there is a theme dealing with regional cross-border trade and a second one dealing with strengthening the capacity of the poorest countries to benefit from the international trading and investment system. Each level of objective hierarchy is supported by indicators. At the highest level the indicator is the total number of jobs created, disaggregated by sex, and for the above-mentioned goal the indicators are net export revenue and foreign direct investment. Each AfT project, programme or partnership reports to the MFA at least once a year on one common indicator at the objective level and one or two indicators, depending on the goal and focus theme of the intervention (MFA 2012a, p. 22).

The programmatic approach and the results framework of the AfT Action Plan are commendable. In principle, this type of approach could serve as model in other thematic or sector programmes. However, the review of the results framework highlights also some challenges. The highest objective level indicator is clear cut but of such nature that it will be difficult to condense all results from the lower level hierarchy into similar numbers. Attribution, or even contribution, and measurement pose challenges at this level and also at the level of the focus themes contributing to the goals. The results chain and Theory of Change, e.g. between goal 4 indicator "Number of new enterprises in non-traditional sectors" and focus theme indicators "Number of young people (under 24 years) who have received vocational" training remains unclear.

The experiences with AfT Action Plan reporting have been summarised in an internal memorandum (MFA 2014s) and show limited compliance. More than 50 percent of projects could not report performance using the developed indicator with underlying issues not being entirely clear. Likely, the indicator data was simply not tracked or not available, and there may have been challenges in translating the key intervention objectives into a single results indicator. There were also major problems with the quality of the MFA's development cooperation intervention administrative database system (AHA-KYT) that could not automatically provide information on results related to AfT projects.

5.7.4 Policy Coherence, DPPs and RBM

DPPs and Policy Coherence for Development
The 2004 DPP brought policy coherence into the core of Finnish development policy. The policy explicitly acknowledged that achieving the aims of development policy requires improved policy coherence in national policies, multilateral cooperation and EU policies (MFA 2004d, p. 11). It gave equal weight for achieving the goals by increasing coherence in development policy as through development cooperation. It also argued for a common development policy extending beyond the MFA across different sectors and the entire Finnish society. The document did not set any concrete objectives for policy coherence but identified better cooperation among various sector authorities as a way of advancing the policy coherence agenda. Influencing policy coherence within

the EU was given high priority. The DPC was given an important role in promoting policy coherence and also in monitoring implementation of the policy and reporting on it to the government. However, since there were no targets for policy coherence, there was no monitoring and reporting framework.

In 2004-2007, there was a considerable push to improve development policy coherence within the MFA and beyond. Based on interviews and OECD peer reviews (OECD 2007b, OECD 2012), this work helped to elevate policy coherence in the MFA agenda and also make other sectors more aware of policy coherence issues related to development challenges. However, most of the attention was on the international policy coherence agenda where Finland played an active role, and has continued to do.

The 2007 DPP still emphasised promoting policy coherence and identified areas of focus for policy coherence work: trade and development, rural areas and rural development, and the relationship between poverty and the environment (MFA 2007d, p. 22). The strong commitment to policy coherence was reiterated in the 2011 Government Programme and 2012 DPP. However, no concrete objectives were set and no systematic reporting on policy coherence results beyond the comprehensive but descriptive government communication "Towards a More Just World Free of Poverty" (DPC 2014a) ensued. The Government Programmes and DPPs have not established any concrete mechanisms or allocated mandates to bodies that can actually make decisions to enhance policy coherence. According to interviews and a OECD DAC Peer Review (OECD 2012), the DPC and, after 2008, the informal inter-ministerial PCD Network have been important forums for awareness-raising and exchange of information but not for target-oriented decision-making to improve policy coherence in Finland.

Finland has recently adopted a more issue and objective oriented approach. The OECD food security pilot is such a positive achievement; it contains concrete objectives and a framework for monitoring achievements (MFA 2013q).

Challenges in Implementing Policy Coherence Guidance

According to interviews with MFA staff, political support for policy coherence work ebbed during the 2007 DPP period. Especially at the national policy level, little progress was made between 2007 and 2012 beyond enhancing awareness about policy coherence. In several interviews, it was stated that one of the key problems was that the DPP was commonly being interpreted as a "MFA-only" policy document in Finland. Setting policy coherence-related priorities in DPPs is therefore not likely to contribute to the delivery of concrete results if other concerned ministries do not have the same interest or commitment regarding development policy coherence. The MFA has no mandate over other Ministries to assess the impacts of their policies on development issues (see also Section 6.2 on the role of the PCD Network and DPSG in policy coherence work). The restricted perceived authority of DPPs and the lack of clear targets, decision-making mandates of steering bodies, and dedicated budget have resulted in an environment that does not support results-orientation in development policy coherence.

The environment does not support results–orientation in development policy coherence.

5.8 Organisational Culture and Management

Staff Feedback on Organisational Culture

As will be detailed throughout Chapter 7, the implementation of RBM in public service agencies has often presented a substantial organisational challenge in the past. In interviews and a survey, MFA staff depicted an organisational culture at the MFA that, overall, does not yet support the implementation of a results-based approach to management (Figure 8). Compared to 2010, the situation however seems to have somewhat improved.

Figure 8 MFA staff feedback on organisational conditions for RBM in 2010 and 2014 (N=80 to 82 depending on question).[4]

Source: Survey annex of (Poate at al 2011), online survey, team analysis

Clearly, current incentive systems are felt to stand in the way of a results culture, risk taking is not encouraged, and staffing is felt to be inadequate. Occasion and time for learning from implementation results and from evaluations appear to lack and performance and evaluation information is not yet used to an adequate extent. Compared to answers to the same survey questions in 2010, the situation however seems to have improved slightly.

As positive exceptions, the situation in long-term partner country embassies was highlighted in interviews. Here, the feedback received described a begin-

4 A composite score of 100 percent implies that all respondents strongly agreed with that statement (-100 percent if all strongly disagreed). If all respondents somewhat agreed, a score of 50 percent would ensue (-50 percent if all somewhat disagreed). Composite scores are calculated as follows: (2 * percentage strongly agree + percentage somewhat agree – percentage somewhat disagree – 2 * percentage strongly disagree) / 2.

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ning trend towards considering useful and using country-level results frameworks as part of country strategies. This is compounded by the long term use of logical frameworks on the level of projects and, since 2012, the use of results frameworks and log frames as part of country strategies.

When analysing the survey feedback separately for staff with and without embassy experience, the feedback for both groups continues to be more positive than the all-staff answers in the 2010 survey. MFA staff with embassy experience feels more strongly (composite score of 40 percent, not visible in Figure 8) than their headquarter colleagues (17 percent) that the need to achieve development results is clearly stated as a priority by senior managers and are significantly more worried about staff shortcomings for following an RBM approach (-38 and -13 percent, respectively). No significant difference in the feedback of both groups exists for other survey questions in Figure 8.

Overall, in the Evaluation Team's own observation, the MFA has not yet been able to create an environment conducive to RBM. The organisational culture remains risk-averse and prioritises compliance and accountability over experimentation and learning. While not uncommon in public service agencies (Chapter 7), this represents a serious barrier for successful implementation of RBM.

MFA Structure

The MFA is an integrated Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and International Development that steers the implementation of Finnish development policy through its departmental units and through its embassies. Compared to a stand-alone development agency, this setup brings about important advantages but also challenges.

On the positive side, an integrated ministry allows that development-related coherence issues with respect to trade can be addressed within the same organisation. MFA staff strongly feels that this represents a key advantage. 84 percent of surveyed staff sees great advantages in the fact that the MFA is responsible for foreign policy and trade, in addition to development policy. At the same time, the integration with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs facilitates access to Finnish embassies that play a central role in implementing bilateral development cooperation.

In the past, the fact that MFA staff is composed of diplomats and advisors, each with different career paths, has posed a problem but may have been successfully addressed by a reform of the career system.

Several challenges continue to exist. Diplomatic staff involved in development appears sometimes challenged by required know-how and experience. This was a consistent message across interviews and 78 percent of survey respondents saw this as an issue. In some cases, the leadership of some units appeared to be entirely new to the development subject at hand. This is likely related to both the job rotation scheme for career diplomats (perceived by 70 percent of surveyed staff) as well as the fact that their job responsibilities go beyond development work. Overall job continuity – for both advisers and diplomats – is lim-

The MFA has not yet been able to create an environment conducive to RBM.

ited. On average, MFA staff that answered the survey had remained 2.5 years in the same position during their time at the MFA. Several advisers also felt that their impact was limited since their services were usually provided "on demand" rather than as integral part of planning and implementation processes. The Evaluation Team concurs that more attention needs to be paid to including proper advice into planning and implementation activities but, at the same time, also notices that there appears to be a natural tendency for advisors to act as advocates more for their own area of expertise than for other areas.

MFA staff also made several strong statements about the effectiveness of management processes at the MFA and some interviewees felt that sometimes, issues remained entirely without management attention. 70 percent of survey respondents did not see a clear and unbroken chain of command at the MFA with clear distribution of mandates and responsibilities for the implementation of DPPs. Perceptions about management differ significantly between embassies and MFA headquarters, with embassies providing relatively more positive feedback on managerial ownership for results and results reporting lines (Figure 9).

Figure 9   Embassy and HQ staff feedback on the organisational setup of the MFA towards RBM (N=13, 40 and 29)

Source: online survey, team analysis

Two DoDP units (the Unit for General Development Policy and the Unit for Sectoral Policy) prepare policy guidance and instructions. As found earlier in this report (Chapter 4), the status of these policies in terms of their validity and authority is not always clear. In the MFA's flat departmental structure, compliance to policies issued by units in one department by other departments is not automatic and the present process of informal review of by the DPSG may not be sufficient. Formal approval by the DPSG or the Minister for International Development with a clear indication on application scope and validity may be needed.

The review of the official mandates of the MFA departments and units and steering bodies identified problems concerning provision of policy guidance and RBM. None of the reviewed mandate documents relevant for development policy and cooperation identify a body/unit responsible explicitly for results-based management and reporting. This may change in 2015 as a result of the review of the DoDP mandate; the Unit for Development Policy is to have an explicit and clear lead mandate on RBM according to an unpublished draft.

5.9 Key Points

- **Budgeting and RBM.** The processes of setting DPP objectives is separated from budget planning; total aid budget and its allocation e.g. between departments or units are not driven by results-based planning. Management and reporting is primarily based on inputs, i.e. the use of funds. This orientation starts already at the DPP level, where quantitative target setting is based on inputs rather than on results.
- **Compliance with quantitative DPP targets.** About two thirds of budget and outcome targets in DPPs were met. These represent most of the good quality DPP targets (Section 4.1). Several target indicators are however not systematically monitored and reported (Section 6.1.1) which raises the question how results-oriented implementation towards those targets can actually take place. If decision-makers are unable to quantify the status quo and track progress against results, systematic managing for results becomes difficult.
- **Bilateral and multilateral cooperation.** For the first time there are comprehensive result-oriented country strategies and multilateral influencing plans complemented with a result-oriented reporting system. These approaches and tools have the potential to make a significant contribution to establishing RBM in Finnish development policy and cooperation. Interviews and the Tanzania case study demonstrate strong satisfaction and support for this approach while acknowledging the need to further develop it.
- **Other aid channels.** Most aid channels, CSO cooperation included, have not yet moved towards integrated RBM and reporting. One reason for this has been lack of guidance and no "push" from above to prepare corporate level, results-oriented annual reports.
- **AfT.** The current AfT Action Plan, despite its shortcomings, provides an example for adopting a programmatic approach based on RBM, with relevance for results-oriented thematic and sector cross-cutting cooperation.
- **Policy coherence.** MFA has made a lot of progress in policy coherence work, especially internationally, and more recently with the food security pilot. However, policy coherence work suffers from low status - it is being driven too much by the MFA alone - and lack of a strategic approach, including lack of concrete targets and allocation of mandates as well as resources.
- **The exemplary studies on gender and sustainable development** confirm the general findings that RBM-based implementation is hampered by unclear policy guidance, the lack of a strategic approach including concrete objectives, budget and inadequate MFA information systems.

Result–oriented country strategies and multilateral influencing plans can make a significant contribution to establishing RBM in MFA.

Most aid channels have not yet moved towards integrated RBM and reporting.

- The MFA has not yet been able to create an organisational environment conducive to RBM and has not yet developed a results culture. As a consequence, the organisational culture remains largely risk-averse and prioritises compliance and accountability over experimentation and learning. While not uncommon in public service agencies (Chapter 7), this represents a serious barrier for successful implementation of RBM.
- The MFA's integrated nature as Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and International Development and its flat departmental hierarchy bring about challenges and benefits. Policy coherence and access to embassies is facilitated but ensuring sufficient development know-how of diplomat staff and a 2.5 year average position stability are challenges that need to be managed as part of an efficient RBM system.
- Several structural management issues such as the "on-demand" integration of advisers in planning and implementation, unclear chains of command with respect to DPP implementation, and informal policy approval and execution processes also require increased attention.

6 REPORTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

6.1 Reporting of Results

6.1.1 Reporting to Parliament

Until 2013, the Minister for International Development and the Under-Secretary of State submitted an annual report on Finnish development cooperation to the Parliament (Kehitysyhteistyökertomus). This reporting was based on the 1985 Act on submitting development cooperation reports to Parliament (Act 964/1985). The 1985 Act stipulates that "each year, the concerned Ministry shall give a report on development cooperation describing the previous calendar year. The report will be used as a supplement to the government's action report." On February 1, 2014, the "Act to invalidate the Act on submitting development cooperation reports to Parliament" (Suomen säädöskokoelma 19/2014) came into force, removing the legal requirement to prepare an annual report on development cooperation to the Parliament and no such report was transmitted to Parliament in 2014 for the year 2013.

The size and content of these annual reports to Parliament have changed from 2003 through 2013. Until 2006, reports were long, sometimes reaching 200 pages and contained detailed discussion on general development policy principles. They covered all aid channels and provided very detailed, descriptive information on activities and the use of funds. After 2007, reports to the Parliament became shorter (between 75 and 90 pages) and provided similar but overall reduced content: an overview of the allocation and use of funds for the previous year, a description of the work and projects carried out by aid channel and instrument, a summary of evaluations and audits and several annexes covering, for example, disbursement breakdowns along countries, regions, and organisations.

Results-related reporting has primarily been anecdotal and has not covered all aid channels. Evidence on results is presented as examples. For example, the report for the calendar year 2011 contains, for some bilateral cooperation projects, the number of water supply points constructed, of additional people with access to water in Ethiopia, and kilometres of road maintained as part of an Asian Development Bank (ADB) project (MFA 2012d, pp. 5, and 12). For some countries, concrete achievements are listed but for others only qualitative descriptions are provided. Overall, the presentation of evidence on results has remained non-systematic.

The annual reporting on the limited number of good quality quantitative targets (Section 5.1.2) is not satisfactory (Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6). Annual reporting to the Parliament is seldom against DPP targets, with an exception

Results–related reporting has primarily been anecdotal and has not covered all aid channels.

Annual reporting to the Parliament is seldom against DPP targets.

of the ODA/GNI share target. This finding applies equally to targets reached and not reached. In most cases, reasons for not reaching targets are not discussed and often it remains altogether unclear whether targets have actually been reached or not. Either the non-achievement is simply not reported or the achievement is reported but there is no mention that there was a target. This fragmented and unsystematic reporting against the (few) good quality quantitative targets in DPPs yields unsatisfactory accountability results and misses an opportunity to learn from successes and failures.

The example of the 0.7 percent ODA/GNI targets is illustrative. It was set for the first time (in the period covered by this evaluation) by the 2004 DPP for 2010, i.e. effectively to be implemented by the subsequent government. The 2007 DPP then, without referral to the earlier target, moved the achievement year to 2015 and the 2010 annual report makes no mention of the target set in the 2004 DPP.

Reporting on other results, for example on development outputs and outcomes, suffers from the absence of good quality targets in DPPs beyond the budget and MFA output level (Section 4.1). Even in the absence of well-defined targets, annual reports display a lack of agreed-upon results categories for reporting. This explains the focus on expenditure reporting and on ad-hoc project level results figures.

The annual reports have systematically covered policy coherence, usually in own sections (e.g. in MFA 2011b p. 15–16, MFA 2009g p. 15). The reporting has not been result-oriented but primarily qualitative description of policy coherence related activities.

In 2014, following Government Programme and DPP guidance, a special report on development policy coherence and impact "Towards a more just world free of poverty" was issued. This report was criticized by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament for providing only anecdotal evidence on results, for not really answering the key question about the lasting development results achieved through Finnish support, and for a lack of self-criticism. Some of this criticism may have been due to different expectations; the government report focused on explaining the approaches and methodologies developed as well as actions taken to improve development results reporting in future whereas the committee apparently expected hard facts. Beyond this, the Parliament asked for more constructive assessment of positive and negative lessons learned, including analyses of causes of failure (Foreign Affairs Committee 2014). Instead of the yearly reports, the Parliament now expects:

- In the beginning of the next government term, a one-time report on the effectiveness of the current development cooperation work and possible alternatives to support developing countries and reduce poverty (Foreign Affairs Committee 2014); and
- In the future, systematic reporting on development cooperation to the Parliament should take place every four years, i.e. once per government term. This exercise should be focuses on the effectiveness, results and long-term impacts of development cooperation (Foreign Affairs Committee 2014).

Independently of this reporting requirement to the Parliament, the MFA is currently discussing the internal need for more systematic portfolio- and results-oriented annual reporting on development policy implementation. A pilot project to develop the ministry's capacity to produce corporate portfolio and results report(s) has been formulated and will start in 2015.

6.1.2 MFA–Internal Reporting by Policy Implementation Channel

Within the MFA, reporting varies along the policy implementation channels both in terms of aggregation level and synthesis of information gathered.

Bilateral Cooperation

Before country strategies were introduced in 2013, no systematic effort to report on results and no result framework to guide reporting existed. Also in the context of the country assistance plans during the 2007 DPP validity period, no systematic reporting on results was undertaken.

The country strategy approach has now brought a results-oriented structure into reporting. Indicators are defined for each country, targets are set, and progress is monitored. Reporting progress towards the achievement of planned outcomes is done annually by country teams to regional MFA departments. Full reports are interjected with "lighter" semi-annual reports (MFA 2014y). An updated matrix of indicators, introduced in 2013 and derived from the country strategies is annexed to each full annual report, together with the logic model and a financial report (MFA 2012l, p. 67). The regional department management provides management responses to these reports. The Deputy Director General (DDG) then presents the annual report, together with the management response to the DPSG where it is discussed. The Minister sometimes provides feedback which is then followed up. In this way, country strategies represent an important management tool. Interviewed staff clearly valued the importance of the country strategy approach for improving the management of development cooperation for results. Hence, improved accountability is only one perceived benefit of this approach.

Many of the reviewed annual results reports however lack information on indicators (e.g. Zambia, Nepal, and Vietnam). This reflects the realities on the ground. Finland depends on the indicators provided for example through national programmes. The requested information is often simply not available or unreliable. The quality of indicator-based reported information varies for example with the quality and capacity of national statistical systems. Aggregating indicator-based reports further, for example for reporting to Parliament, will therefore constitute a challenge.

Country reports have fed into two regional synthesis reports to date (MFA 2014v and MFA 2014w). These reports, despite their name, are descriptive summary reports – with no attempt to aggregate results – but they do address lessons learned and provide a regional overview of performance.

Multilateral Cooperation

Reporting on multilateral cooperation is based on the newly issued influencing

The country strategy approach has brought a results-oriented structure into reporting.

plans and their results matrices. Reporting takes place annually and the first reporting process is ongoing, to be finalised in March, 2015. The influencing plans and annual reports focus on monitoring achievements concerning Finland's influencing objectives and provide useful information for management.

The influencing plans and annual reports focus on monitoring achievements concerning Finland's influencing objectives. This provides useful information for management. The reports however lack information on actual development results delivered by the organisations themselves and the Evaluation Team could not identify such information in MFA reports. At present, no systematic use is made of the sometimes quite elaborate results reporting frameworks of those organisations, but the situation may improve. The recently published (first) reporting guideline for multilateral influencing plans asks units to collect agency results information (MFA 2014z).

The influences exerted by Finland on the overall strategic direction and the operating principles of multilateral agencies represent an important aspect of results reporting. However, information on the actual performance and development effectiveness of multilaterals would provide a more complete picture of Finland's engagement with individual multilaterals and could provide the basis for decision-making on future core funding.

EU/EDF

The annual reports to Parliament contain general information on EU cooperation and Finland's involvement in policy work as well as examples of concrete cooperation and also provide limited information on the EDF. Similar to multilateral reporting, only very limited use of the EU's own results information has been made.

The reports link to EC annual reports on EU development cooperation implementation. However, the review of the two most recent reports shows little results-orientation. The same applies to the EDF annual reports which are focused on financial information and termed "final accounts)." The EU has begun developing its own development cooperation results framework during the last two years. This framework aims to be operational in 2015, giving the MFA better access to information on results to which it has contributed in the EU cooperation channel.

Improved reporting by these organisations is important as these aid channels, together, represented about 14 percent of the total aid expenditures in 2013.

CSO Cooperation

The reporting system linked to the CSO cooperation has remained project-based. Individual CSOs report annually to the MFA's Unit for Civil Society on the implementation of their programme at output and objective levels, and on the use of funds along a MFA report template.

There is no corporate level synthesis reporting of civil society cooperation of any kind from the unit to the DoDP, and at present there is no such require-

The reporting system linked to the CSO cooperation is still project–based.

ment. Internally, no synthesis is made of individual organisations' reports which lead to a lack of overview and control of the present project portfolio.

In principle, the unit's own quality control and reporting systems allows access to information on delivery of some results and the obstacle to implement such synthesis is of technical nature: the unit's own system and the MFA's AHA-KYT do not allow storing and accessing related information and, hence, any unit-level reporting would have to be aggregated manually. The Evaluation Team found it difficult to obtain any CSO portfolio data at all.

The absence of regular synthesis reporting on CSO cooperation and results represents an important shortcoming since CSO cooperation accounts for about 10 percent of total aid expenditure in 2013, and more funds are being allocated to this aid modality.

Humanitarian Aid
There is no aggregate annual report on humanitarian operations. UN organisations receiving funds for humanitarian aid are responsible for monitoring operations and reporting on the results of activities according to their own practices. NGOs prepare a final report along a MFA template containing several open questions and a budget table template. The Unit for Humanitarian Assistance monitors the effectiveness of organizations and the use of funds (MFA 2013b, p. 15).

Private Sector Instruments
Finnfund issues annual reports including financial and administrative information and examples of projects and their results. The achievements of Finnpartnership are included in Finnfund's annual report. More aggregate indicators such as the number of jobs expected to be created or the amount of programmes approved in low-income countries are reported annually to the Ownership Steering Department under the Prime Minister.

There is no annual synthesis reporting on concessional credits. The individual projects report annually to the embassies. Embassies are further responsible for issuing project-by-project progress reports on concessional credits as well as a final evaluation two to five years after project completion for the Unit for Development Financing Institutions. The results in these reports remain at the budget and output levels and are not further aggregated.

ICI
As far as the Evaluation Team could determine, no systematic aggregate reporting exists of the results of Institutional Cooperation Instrument (ICI) projects. The related administrative order (MFA 2010g) refers to results-orientation at a project level and does not require aggregate reporting on development results. The status of the project portfolio is reported quarter-yearly by a support consultant to the Unit for Sectoral Policy. Information is gathered at the budget and activity level only. A case study on the ICI in the context of the 2014 evaluation of Complementarity in Finland's Development Policy and Cooperation (Bäck et al 2014b, p. 54) concluded "Reporting on programme results and impact

There is no aggregate annual report on humanitarian operations.

at an aggregate level was limited. The absence of such aggregated reporting, along with more external evaluation practices, prevented the MFA from gaining valuable insights into what could be learned from the IKI projects, in order to improve their design and implementation." Although mentioned in most country strategies, the ICI instrument is also not systematically addressed in annual country reports.

LCF

Local Cooperation Funds (LCFs) are country-based, demand-driven instruments managed by MFA embassies. Multi-annual and annual LCF plans are developed by embassies as part of their general strategies and plans of actions (TTS). General objectives, thematic priorities, and principles are identified by the DoDP to guide fund allocation. Embassies report yearly on the implementation of their LCF plan to regional MFA departments, and also to the DoDP, in their operating and financial plan (TTS). In the long-term partner countries, LCF activities are supposed to be fully integrated in the country strategies and results frameworks, and into related reporting. In general, LCF reports mainly include information on budgets, activities and outputs. Annual reports often refer to results but in most cases only concrete project outputs are reported, e.g. how many people have been trained. There is no corporate level reporting on LCF operations and results.

6.2 Accountability Functions of Steering and Advisory Bodies

The main steering and advisory bodies relevant for RBM in development policy and cooperation are: the Development Policy Steering Group (DPSG), the Quality Assurance Board (QAB), the Development Policy Committee (DPC), and the Government high-level network of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), each of which has different functions and mandates with relevance to development policy implementation and RBM.

6.2.1 The Development Policy Steering Group (DPSG)

The DPSG is responsible for working on general and principally significant issues related to development policy and development cooperation (MFA 2014j). Since June 2014, it can also give strategic recommendations for policy objectives (Finlex 2014).

Since DPPs do not provide quality guidance on results, policy implementation-related decision-making remains focused on budget decisions such as allocation of funds between regional departments and aid channels, which is guided by the DPSG. Although the DPSG has no formal decision-making authority, it can also fill DPP policy guidance gaps through its recommendations. Recently, DPSG authority was strengthened as the Minister for International Development began to chair the meetings and attended about 40 percent of all meetings in person in 2014. Ministers attended between 10 and 20 percent of meetings in 2007-2013 and did not attend earlier meetings since 2003 with the exception of a 5 percent attendance in 2004.

DPSG meeting minutes show that the DPSG has played an important role in policy steering in the past, influencing budget allocations (or cuts), reviewing multilateral influencing plans and country strategies and related progress reports, and making related recommendations. The partial expansion of the mandate of the DPSG in 2014 (MFA 2014j) strengthens its role in strategic steering although the scope has not been explicitly defined. It remains also unclear to what extent the bodies responsible for financial planning are formally involved in the work of the DPSG. According to the National Audit Office (NAO 2013) there is a need to strengthen the results-orientation of the MFA's operation and financial planning; the DPSG would be a natural forum for achieving this. This would also be consistent with the OECD 2012 DAC Peer review recommendation concerning the need for the DPSG to provide more effective guidance for implementing the development policy (OECD 2012, p. 18).

6.2.2 The Quality Assurance Board (QAB)

The QAB is responsible for reviewing the quality of the development cooperation projects and programme proposals before submitting them for financing decision-making (MFA 2014j). The QAB verifies the coherence with the latest DPP and various other policy guidelines (Finlex 2014).

The QAB plays an important role in the project and programme quality control process but, according to numerous interviews, it is not providing an in-depth quality assessment and has not paid sufficient attention to results-orientation until recently. This represents a challenge for RBM since project/programme designs suffer from weak results frameworks, inadequately defined result targets, shortage of measurable indicators and baseline studies (Poate at al 2011; Sørensen and Thulstrup 2012).

The QAB currently verifies the consistency of all development programme and project proposals, including cooperation projects with multilateral organisations, with the DPP and downstream policy guidance documents and crosscutting objectives. According to the new instructions and templates issued in 2014, the project proposals as well as the statements from advisors must also explicitly deal with results (MFA 2014å). It was not possible for the Evaluation Team to assess how these recent developments have been reflected in the work of the QAB.

In interviews, it was stated that the QAB remains at the level of individual interventions and therefore lacks the "big picture", i.e. a portfolio-level view. In the absence of a more programmatic approach this is a reality; the work of the QAB is as fragmented as the project portfolio. Several interviewees voiced the concern that the scope of the QAB is too limited because not all multilateral cooperation and humanitarian support are included. At present, there is no joint mechanism that would allow results-oriented portfolio management vis-à-vis DPP objectives in addition to the management of individual interventions.

There is no joint mechanism that would allow results-oriented portfolio management vis-à-vis DPP objectives.

6.2.3 The Development Policy Committee (DPC)

The DPC is an advisory body appointed by the Government, and reports to the government. The DPC mandate and members are defined by incoming Govern-

ments for each governmental period. Over time, one key DPC mandate has been to monitor the implementation of development cooperation and report annually on the state of the Finnish development policy.

The DPC does not have decision-making authority but influences policy discussion on various topics and organises discussions or commissions studies on relevant issues. It issues recommendations and statements on development policy initiatives and reports with special focus on policy coherence. In terms of DPP implementation, the DPC plays a major role in monitoring progress towards the ODA/GNI share target of 0.7 percent. A recent evaluation of the DPC also concluded that it has been influential in raising awareness about development policy issues, including the need for improved policy coherence. Its actual policy coherence influence has however remained limited partly because the DPC is seen as lacking the necessary mandate and means (Uusikylä 2014, p. 28). Despite the broad membership and relatively senior position of its present members, the DPC is not directly influencing decision-making and cannot set concrete targets for policy coherence work. Its influence in terms of initiating proposals and promoting thinking on policy coherence is however reported to be strong (OECD 2012).

The DPC is in principle the only body that annually follows DPP implementation and reports on the performance to the Government through its annual State of Finland's Development Policy documents. Interviews, these annual reports were seen as trying to assess the quality and effectiveness of development cooperation, but failing to do it comprehensively because of lacking human and financial DPC resources and insufficient aggregate information on results. As a consequence the DPC annual reports do not attempt to systematically assess performance but follow and report on DPP implementation in general terms, paying attention especially to those themes that have been elevated on the agenda during the concerned DPP period.

6.2.4 The Government High-Level Network of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD)

The PCD Network, meeting twice per year, plays an important role in raising awareness of the policy coherence agenda with a focus on policy coherence in the EU. Similar to the DPC, it however lacks the mandate and authority to effectively steer implementation of policy coherence for development, and its members often cannot take decisions on behalf of the organisations they represent.

A 2012 OECD DAC peer review) found that the PCD Network did not have a formal mandate to screen policies for potential impact on development and that it had so far mainly served to raise awareness. It concluded that "Finland still lacks a unified approach and a clear and systematic co-ordination set-up and process with clarified mandates." The review recommended to ensure policy coherence for development across the entire administration and to enhance coordination mechanism for more effectiveness. (OECD 2012)

At present, the PCD Network is not empowered to set concrete objectives and identify a plan of action for implementation. Denmark's Action Plan for Policy

Coherence for Development (DANIDA 2014) serves as an example of a programmatic, results-oriented approach of relevance to the PCD. Following the roadmap suggested by the OCED (OECD 2009), the PCD Network should move Finland's policy coherence agenda forward beyond "political commitment and policy statements" (the first building block) towards effective policy coordination mechanisms (second building block) and efficient systems for monitoring, analysis and reporting (third building block). The status and challenges going forward along these three building blocks have been analysed in 2012 (OECD 2012).

6.3 Information Systems for RBM

The analysis in Chapter 5, the exemplary case studies on gender and sustainable development (Annexes 4a and 4b), and interview and survey feedback consistently pointed to insufficient capacity and performance of the present information systems regarding information on results.

The AHA-KYT system is improving access to broader intervention information across the intervention cycle (work path by channel) with focus on monitoring the allocation and use of intervention specific funds. It covers currently bilateral projects, CSO cooperation, LCFs and evaluation support. It however cannot provide easy access to basic project portfolio data nor to results information and struggles with information on thematic and cross-cutting objectives, as for example for gender-related information.

In an online survey, 87 percent of respondents found that solid financial and operational databases capable of tracking results need to be established. Many interviewees expressed their discontent with the current system, while some warned about the danger of introducing yet another complex data system tracking too many indicators. The current information system was not seen to serve RBM-based reporting and the information systems for budgeting and expenditure tracking were considered too inflexible. For example, according to the interviews of staff working in sustainable development and environment, concepts without Rio markers or DAC codes are difficult to monitor. The AHA-KYT and the budgeting system cannot deal with concepts such as "inclusive green economy", or climate sustainability as cross-cutting objectives (see Annex 4b).

These problems have been recognised and there is an ongoing effort to further develop the AHA-KYT system to make better use of already existing systems such as information produced by the Quality Assurance Board and project/programme design documents. MFA staff in various departments and units felt that a lot of information is already available and could be used, such as project completion reports or portfolio information in the CSO system.

6.4 Key Points

6a. At present, there is no comprehensive reporting that covers all aid channels and instruments. The absence of comprehensive corporate reports explains the difficulties with reporting to Parliament. Corporate level

Solid financial and operational databases capable of tracking results need to be established.

information is gathered ad hoc, i.e. based on arising needs such as specific Parliament questions or (until 2013) annual report to Parliament, rather than based on synthesised information readily available.

6b. Within the MFA, reporting varies along policy implementation channels both in terms of aggregation level and synthesis of information gathered, however never reaching channel-wide comprehensive reporting. The cooperation with long-term bilateral countries represents the most aggregated and synthetized reporting system with outcome-level results aggregated at the country level and synthesized at the regional level. Reporting in other channels and aid instruments remains at the level of inputs and outputs on a project-by-project basis.

6c. The intervention information system(s) are not adequate at present to be used to monitor and report results across the MFA aid channels. Much information gathered by individual units is neither transmitted nor used further upwards.

6d. There are weaknesses in the current steering structure especially regarding strengthening the links between result-oriented planning at a strategic or programme level linked to budget planning. With recently increased ministerial attention, the DPSG has the potential to guide policy setting and implementation beyond the DPPs.

6e. The QAB reviews consistency of bilateral aid proposals with policy guidance but does not fully appraise the potential for future results. At present, there is also no joint mechanism with a view of the entire portfolio that would allow results-oriented portfolio management vis-à-vis DPP objectives.

6f. The possibilities of the DPC and the PCD Network to influence the policy coherence agenda (including setting objectives and overseeing implementation) are limited. There is also no concrete programme or action plan related to policy coherence and, hence, reporting also remains descriptive and activity-oriented.

FINLAND'S DEVELOPMENT POLICY PROGRAMMES FROM A RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT POINT OF VIEW 2003-2013

7 LEARNING FROM INTERNATIONAL PEERS

This section summarises international experiences with RBM. Section 7.1 describes general international experience as reflected in meta-studies and the experience of RBM experts that were interviewed. Section 7.2 summarises the results of a benchmarking analysis of RBM approaches of four countries and two multilateral organisations. Section 7.3 synthesizes the chapter and adds several cross-cutting observations.

7.1 International Experiences with Results-Based Management

The term "Results-Based Management" had been coined already in the early 1990s and the general concept of results-oriented management in international development predates this further; the earliest logical framework approaches have, for example, been developed in the 1970s. Results-oriented management approaches without a particular focus on international development are likely to have grown throughout the 20th century. Some authors cite Drucker's "Management by Objectives" approach, coined in the 1950s, as a visible starting point (Vähämäki et al 2011, p. 11).

The body of experience with RBM in the public sector is large and covers decades of implementation efforts. While an attempt is made to cover the most relevant findings in this short summary, no claim for complete coverage is made. The Evaluation Team found a number of general reviews, handbooks and guidelines particularly helpful (Vähämäki 2011, Binnendijk 2000, Mayne 2007a, Mayne 2007b, Kusek and Rist 2004, Vähämäki 2013, DCD/DAC 2014).

From the review of this literature, several pertinent points can be made.

Variable Scope of RBM
The scope of RBM varies across definitions and their interpretations. The OECD DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management simply defines RBM simply as "A management strategy focusing on performance and achievement of outputs, outcomes and impacts" (OECD 2002, p. 34) and relates it to logical frameworks. Other definitions additionally emphasise learning from results, using results for decision-making, and the accountability function of results reporting (see the UNDP definition of RBM in Section 2.1).

In discussions with authors of studies and assessments on RBM, opinions also differed as to how far RBM should cover the donors' institutional and organisational performance in addition to development results. Some experts felt that a

> **The body of experience with RBM in the public sector is large and covers decades of implementation efforts.**

heavy focus on corporate performance would detract focus from development results. In practice, most results frameworks built to support RBM in donor agencies also cover institutional and organisational performance (Section 7.2) and experts highlighted difficulties in linking institutional performance aspects with development results.

Finally, the extent to which RBM can and should be applied beyond the primary bilateral and multilateral aid channels, and also beyond development cooperation, e.g. in the implementation of development policy issues such as policy coherence, is largely unaddressed and remains unclear.

Competing Purposes of RBM

With nuances, RBM appears driven by two principal forces (e.g. Binnendijk 2000 p. 119). On the one hand, increasing pressures on governments for more transparency and accountability towards taxpayers of how effectively and efficiently aid funding is spent drive aggregated results reporting. These pressures have been exacerbated by the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent lag in economic growth in many donor countries. On the other hand, RBM is considered to potentially increase overall performance and value for money of development policy implementation.

In theory, these two motivations for RBM can be synergetic: greater transparency and accountability can foster performance and value for money, and vice versa, and demonstrated learning from results can directly increase accountability. In actual implementation, however, several reviewers observe a trade-off situation in which each driver encourages different behaviours (Annex 5).

In practice, balancing these two principal uses of RBM seems difficult. Often, the purpose of satisfying accountability requirements has become the dominant use, effectively crowding out learning purposes. Long-term public sector adviser Mayne describes this in personal communication as "many RBM systems deteriorate into just an accountability regime which managers have to feed." Other researchers consistently made similar observations, elevating the issues related to these two often competing purposes of RBM to represent one of the most challenging barriers to successful implementation of RBM (Annex 5).

Other researchers highlight the partner perspective in the tension between accountability and managing for results. They conclude that donor country governments often justify RBM by arguing that it improves accountability and learning/planning in partner countries but find that claim not supported by evidence: demand for using RBM for those purposes in partner countries is low. The authors frame this as a principle-agent problem: "The funder provides support and demands something back from the recipient (e.g. results/reporting), and one frequent critique of aid is that the accountability of partners towards the donor is simply stronger than their accountability to their domestic citizens" (Vähämäki et al 2011, p. 9).

This line of thought can also be extended to other aid channels. A donor-centric application of RBM is likely to create alignment tension with the mandates and

RBM appears driven by the increasing pressures on governments for more transparency and accountability.

John Mayne: "Many RBM systems deteriorate into just an accountability regime which managers have to feed."

The accountability of partners towards the donor is often stronger than accountability to their own citizens.

long-term strategic objectives of multilateral organisations and large NGOs (see for example: Bäck and Bartholomew 2014, p. 17).

Other authors identify an inherent tension within the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of ownership, harmonisation and alignment on the one hand versus a focus on results and accountability, if the latter principles are interpreted in a donor-centric way (Sjösted 2013).

Mixed Overall Experiences with RBM Implementation

The introduction and integration of RBM into public sector management in general and the international development management in particular have been difficult, although variations occur. In 2011, a review of reports on experience with introducing RBM at the corporate level of international development agencies – a focus similar to the one taken in this evaluation – found that "In general, the literature implies very weak positive effects from the application and implementation of RBM" and that challenges and lessons faced in RBM implementation were quite similar for donor organisations irrespective of whether they were bilateral or multilateral (Vähämäki et al 2011, p. 20). Four groups of challenges were identified:

· Shortcomings in the original design of the model, covering issues with multi-level results frameworks in causally connecting these levels, in coming up with appropriate, objective indicators, in avoiding overly complex results frameworks with an excessive number of indicators, difficulties in monitoring outcome indicators annually and perverse incentives that may gear development work towards the easily measurable;

· Difficulties with non-usage for original purposes, mostly about non-usage of results information for improved decision-making but sometimes used for no apparent purpose at all;

· Difficulties in application in development cooperation, highlighting specific additional challenges of RBM in a development context compared to agencies targeting the domestic public sector such as the multi-country context international development operates in, exceptionally long and complex results chains, and the reliance on partner countries with sometimes low capacity for data collection; and

· Conflicting purposes of RBM, as outlined above.

In 2007, Mayne stressed that the shifted focus to outcomes, the often underestimated fundamental organisational and technical changes for integrating performance information into management and budgeting, the implementation time of minimally four to five years, and the additional burden in terms of management time and money, all contribute to explaining the halting progress made with mainstreaming RBM. From these observations a comprehensive list of 12 typical challenges with RBM implementation was derived (Annex 5). He concluded that "The general point is that if the challenge is seen mainly as one of measuring, or as an initiative that can be completed in a year of hard work, or that it can be carried out using existing resources – since after all, it is just part of good management! – then progress will likely be slow, spotty and not lasting."

Attribution of Results versus Contribution to Results

Differing approaches exist as to how to link development results to the interventions causing them. *Attribution* attempts to determine what results are caused by one particular intervention whereas *contribution* links observed results to the ensemble of interventions and conditions causing them. The choice between these approaches often represents a dilemma.

From a methods point of view, explicit attribution stands on shaky grounds for complex interventions in which several donors are complementarily involved. For such interventions, attributing results is comparable to determining what share of a cake can be claimed by the person providing the eggs; and the answer is determined by distributional convention and negotiation as much as by measurement. As a natural consequence, the sum of claimed results between involved donors often exceeds total measured results considerably. In contrast, contribution analysis avoids merit allocation issues by simply assigning observed results to the bulk of all interventions and conditions contributing to them.

From a donor perspective, however, attribution claims are inherently more attractive for justifying development spending and sustaining support for international development. Rather than describing a contribution by saying that "with this project, Finland has helped others to saving 100 lives", an attribution claim could be expressed more forcefully as "Finland has saved 100 lives with this project." This dilemma remains unresolved and different donors have chosen different approaches (see for example, Holzapfel 2014, p. 82).

A Concept Challenged by Some

Most critical voices with regard to RBM (see above) do not question RBM per se but highlight implementation-related risks and difficulties such as a lack of balance between RBM purposes, excessive application of quantitative indicators vis-à-vis other means for learning and accountability, or taking RBM implementation not seriously enough.

Other researchers and practitioners however challenge RBM – and the theoretical paradigms underpinning it – on a conceptual level. A recent review (Vähämäki et al 2011, p. 30) provides an overview of several alternative concepts and paradigms, including complexity theory, relational thinking, social change theory, cultural theory. It concludes that, in contrast to these alternative paradigms, RBM is commonly based on linear theories of change and results chains connecting activities with outputs, outcomes and impacts.

In a similar vein, the authors of the 2001 book that introduced Outcome Mapping (Earl et al 2001, p. 7) warn that "Linear, 'cause and effect' thinking contradicts the understanding of development as a complex process that occurs in open systems" and that "Bureaucratized programming contradicts the relationships, vision, and values of socially sustainable development." Outcome Mapping itself builds on the insight that attribution of development impacts (including many effects termed "outcomes" in the current development discourse) to donors represents an unrealistic and overly simplistic causal claim

that effectively hinders learning: "While the push to measure, demonstrate, and be accountable for development impact is most obvious within the donor community, it has also made its way into recipient agencies and communities through requirements such as "logical framework analysis" (LFA) or "results-based management" (RBM) for planning and reporting on activities to donors. Consequently, the search for impact has become an accepted and dominant part of the development discourse. Nonetheless when donors and recipients try to be accountable for achieving impact, they are severely limiting their potential for understanding how and why impact occurs. The drive to claim credit interferes with the creation of knowledge. […]."While planning and understanding pathways to impact are acknowledged as important, Outcome Mapping makes a strong call to restrict monitoring of results to behaviour changes that are direct consequences of development interventions.

Emerging Best Practices for Implementing RBM and the Way Forward
Several sets of best practices have been researched and published. Mayne developed the following seven best practice principles that are further detailed in Annex 5 (personal communication, an earlier version can be found in (Mayne 2007a, p. 3)):

1. Foster senior-level leadership in results-based management;
2. Promote and support a results-oriented culture;
3. Build results-based strategic frameworks with ownership at all levels;
4. Measure results sensibly;
5. Develop user-friendly information systems for handling results information;
6. Use results information for learning and managing, as well as for reporting and accountability; and
7. Build an adaptive RBM regime through regular review and update.

Vähämäki et al (2011, p. 46) summarise several typical recommendations from reviewed literature. They are similar to the above but add an explicit partner country focus:

- Strong leadership and "buy-in" throughout the organization;
- Base the donors system on national priorities and ownership;
- Clarity and simplicity in the results reporting systems; and
- Ensure usage and foster a culture of results.

Regarding the future of RBM, the latter researchers conclude that RBM stands at a crossroads. They highlight the challenges of the approach: the complex handling of RBM at the organizational and human level, the different purposes that create conflicts in application, results management going against management practices centred on control and process, and the systemic and cultural demands RBM put on partners. They see that the results agenda has been questioned to the point of suggesting that the entire idea is flawed, or that basic notions lead to misuse on a level surpassing any potential benefits. RBM focusing primarily on accountability can suffocate learning and improved decision-making and leads often to a rigid compliance-oriented management regime that ineffective for dealing with greatly varying conditions and needs of development practitioners and beneficiaries on the ground.

Several sets of best practices for RBM have been researched and published.

The suggested way forward is to avoid applying RBM dominantly for control and command purposes (which would lead to diminishing marginal utility) and to use it for learning and analytic purposes, as a foundation for policy and decision making This way forward could materialise within a balanced RBM framework, where impact evaluation and tools for systematic institutional learning would play an important role, or be grounded on other theoretical foundations, probably requiring more process-oriented approaches to learning and decision-making.

In a similar but more applied vein, recent empirical research of large samples of development projects (14,000 and 4,700) indicates that RBM may best be applied selectively, depending on the context. On a project level, a higher degree of organisational autonomy of aid agents has fostered development project success, especially in fragile states and in situations where outcomes are hard to observe (Honig 2014) and rigid management incentives have reduced the project success rate when applied to complex interventions (Rasul and Rogger 2013). On the project level, this emerging evidence on the value-add of RBM calls for a balanced approach with less rigid and more short-term adaptive use when applied to complex interventions.

7.2 Collaborative Benchmarking

This section summarises findings from a benchmarking exercise conducted as part of this evaluation. It synthesises document reviews and interviews conducted with France, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom (UK), IFAD, and to a lesser extent, also with the Asian Development Bank. The rich experiences of these countries and organisations with introducing and using RBM cannot be fully surfaced in this short benchmarking. Instead, this section aims at highlighting a series of observations that provide context or relevant guidance for the integration of RBM into the planning and implementation of Finnish development policy. Findings are structured by country and by organisation since the analysis depth and thematic focus varied due to the amount of information available and the feedback received.

Table 7 summarises two features of the different approaches to RBM explained in more detail in the subsequent sections.

Table 7 Key policy documents and indicator-based results frameworks of benchmarking partners.

Benchmarking partner	Top-level development policy documents	Indicator-based results framework
ADB	Long-term strategy (2008-2020)	Corporate 4-level framework with 87 indicators
France	Parliament-approved development law	Two-tier (bilateral and multilateral) table with 31 indicators as annex to development law
IFAD	Strategy (2011-2015)	Corporate 5-level framework with 70 indicators
New Zealand	Development policy (latest in 2011)	Corporate 3-level framework with 85 indicators
Sweden	Parliament-approved development policy (2002)	No corporate results framework
United Kingdom	Parliament-approved development acts (2002, 2006 and 2014) White papers (1997, 1998, 2006 and 2009) presented to Parliament	Corporate 4-level framework with 99 indicators on levels 1 and 2 and ongoing indicator development for levels 3 and 4

Source: team analysis

7.2.1 Asian Development Bank

In 2008, ADB prepared its 2020 Strategy (ADB 2008b), a concise 43 page strategic framework for ADBs development work in the Asia and Pacific region. The strategy derived the key challenges of the region and put forward a vision and strategic agenda. It defined future core areas of operations, described operational and institutional goals, and outlined future budget requirements. The strategy was reviewed in 2014 (ADB 2014a) and while generally validated, was adapted to ongoing changes in the region which through an action plan (ADB 2014b). In contrast to the situation in Finland, two observations regarding ADB's 2020 Strategy seem of particular relevance.

- First, the 2020 Strategy adopts a long-term time horizon of 12 years, in line with time-to-impact timescales of development work. In interviews, this was perceived as crucial in order to provide consistency and stability of strategy and operations beyond the ADB's 4-year replenishment cycle periods. The absence of such a long-term strategic element in Finnish development policy was noted.
- Second, the strategy sets several long-term targets and introduced a results framework to monitor progress towards the 2020 and intermediate targets. Compared to the degree results-orientation is emphasised in Finland's 2012 DPP, the ADB strategy is considerably more forceful and explicit and introduces RBM as an integral central part of ADB's approach rather than as an additional feature.

An initial results framework was developed in 2008 (ADB 2008a) and revised in 2012 (ADB 2012). The present results framework covers the period 2013-2016 and a subsequent framework is planned for 2017-2020. It is organised in two sections along 4-level structure (Figure 10) and contains 87 quantitative indicators for which annual or 4-year targets are set.

Figure 10 ADB's Results Framework 2013-16.

Source: ADB (ADB 2013, p. 5)

Section 1 (covering level 1) tracks the region's development. No attempt of directly attributing level 1 results to ADB's activities is made and, hence, that section and its indicators are not used for assessing ADB's performance. Section 2, instead, intends to reflect ADB's performance in executing its 2020 Strategy. The four levels can be described as follows (ADB 2013, p. 9):

· **Level 1:** 22 indicators tracking the regions development with indicators such as population share living below 1.25 USD per day, the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth rate or the electrification rate.

· **Level 2:** 30 indicators measuring the success of ADB's completed operations and quantify the results delivered. Examples are the number of completed country strategies and assistance programs rated successful and first-year road use (in average daily ton-kilometres).

· **Level 3:** 26 indicators tracking ADB's performance in managing its operations, for example satisfaction ratings, project quality at entry ratings, co-financing ratios, or percentage of operations supporting environmental sustainability.

· **Level 4:** 9 indicators assessing ADB's organisational performance, for example budgeted international and national staff percentages, share of women, administrative expenses, or operative processing times.

ADB monitors its progress against the results framework targets in annual Development Effectiveness Reviews (e.g., ADB 2014c) that also provide explanatory background information.

The 2008 and 2012 results frameworks have been influential beyond ADB and seem to have informed, for example, a similar framework in New Zealand.

Operating the results frameworks draws on considerable measurement, assessment and scoring, and information management capabilities of ADB that may not be present in the Finnish MFA. Nevertheless, it was felt to be of importance to have a robust framework and a set of key indicators that would remain stable across subsequent governmental development policies in Finland.

7.2.2 France

A rather unique feature of France's approach to RBM is its explicit development law. The "orientation and programming law on development policy and international solidarity" issued in July 2014 constitutes the main and highest-level guidance for French development policy (Journal Officiel de la République française 2014). It applies for a period of five years after which it will be revised. The law text consists of 15 articles that:

- Set the general objective of the French development policy to foster sustainable development, in its economic, social, environmental and cultural aspects;
- Establish the principles of the French development policy such as coherence, complementarity and efficacy; and
- Outline general settings and requirements for implementation, evaluation and reporting.

To guide implementation, a "Rapport" annexed to Article 2 and approved with the law operationalises the policy by listing sectors and describing concrete measures to fulfil commitments to coherence, efficacy and transparency (Journal Officiel de la République française 2014, Annex to Article 2). It determines the geographic scope of the French development cooperation by introducing the concept of "partenariats différenciés", i.e. approaches adapted to individual partners, with developing countries, Africa and the Mediterranean region, fragile states and the rest of the world. Apart from a fixed share of 85 percent of the French development effort intended for Sub-Saharan and neighbouring countries of South- and East-Mediterranean Africa, the Rapport does not commit France to verifiable targets.

A mandatory reporting matrix with 17 bilateral and 14 multilateral indicators is attached to the Rapport (Annex 5). These indicators are to be reported– whenever possible disaggregated by sex – in the biennial government report to Parliament. Most indicators remain at the activity and output level but exceptions exist. A measurement methodology is currently being developed by the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and concerned ministries.

Beyond development policy, the French finance law was reformed for the government "to switch from a culture of means to a culture of results" (MINEFI 2012, p. 23). For each budget programme, including programmes 110 and 209 related to development aid and international solidarity, performance is annually assessed reported covering strategy, objectives and quantitative indicators with a middle-term target and indicative value for the project year. The annual

The ADB results frameworks draws on measurement, assessment and scoring, and information management capabilities that may not be present in MFA.

A rather unique feature of France's approach to RBM is its explicit development law.

reports gathered are supposed to feed into the debate on the orientation of public finances. Also for these reports, targets and indicators remain mostly at the input and output level (MINEFI 2014a and b).

The move of France towards more ex-post accountability and a greater involvement of Parliament in development policy are quite recent. According to interviews, the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) – the main operator of the French bilateral cooperation – is not yet managing based on results and remains overall cautious about the results agenda.

7.2.3 IFAD

IFAD currently operates under its fourth Strategic Framework document, covering the period 2011-15 (IFAD 2011a). This 49 page document sets the context for IFAD's work and the challenges to which the organisation responds. It further defines IFAD's overarching goal, strategic objectives, areas of thematic focus and key engagement principles. The framework does not set quantitative targets but relates and commits to a results-based measurement framework.

IFAD Medium-Term Plans, covering 3 year periods in sync with its replenishment cycles, provide more operational guidance (IFAD 2011b). They feed from IFAD's 5-level Results Measurement Frameworks, the current one covering the period 2013–15 with a total of 70 indicators. The framework is explained in more detail in Annex 5. Results reporting against this framework is done in annual Reports on IFAD's Development Effectiveness (RIDE) and complemented by Annual Reports on Results and Impact of IFAD Operations (ARRI) that synthesise findings of IFAD's Independent Office of Evaluation.

Overall, IFADs approach to managing for development results is well advanced but still evolving. Data quality issues were mentioned as well as the fact that data management is still too fragmented.

In discussions, two advantages of IFAD compared to the Finnish MFA were surfaced: an exclusive focus on a single sector and a (somewhat) higher multi-year stability of strategy and operations due to IFAD's multilateral governance structure. IFAD interviewees also highlighted an inherent tension between centrally orchestrated country targets and the need to ensure country ownership of development targets. Hence, it was felt, that IFAD's corporate strategies and plans represented one important influence among several when Results-Based Country Strategic Opportunities Programmes (RB-COSOPs) were developed. It was pointed out that these opportunities were usually not predictable.

IFAD's Independent Office of Evaluation has not yet evaluated any of the Results Measurement Frameworks but has recently provided comments as part of the 10th replenishment consultations (IFAD 2014a). While most comments were positive, several challenges were also highlighted:
- The complexity of the results system, with an additional layer compared to peers, and the lack of an explicit theory of change to support it in the past;
- Availability and quality of baseline surveys and variable project completion review quality;

IFADs approach to managing for development results is well advanced but still evolving.

- An output focus of project-level monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and weak country-level M&E; and
- The usage of the results measurement framework largely for reporting and not sufficiently for managing for results.

7.2.4 New Zealand

New Zealand's "International Development Group" represents the formerly independent New Zealand Aid Programme (NZAid) that is now being reintegrated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The most general development policy guidance is the 16 page International Development Policy Statement (NZAID 2011) of 2011 that may possibly be updated under the incoming new government. It defines the mission of the New Zealand Aid Programme, its geographic and thematic focus, and describes its themes. While not setting any verifiable targets, the policy statement very clearly commits to aid effectiveness, efficiency and value for money, and to enhanced accountability for results.

The entire ministry also issues statements of intent that cover the all ministerial tasks, also covering international development. The Statement of Intent 2014-2018 (NZAID 2014) summarises New Zealand's Aid Programme goals and activities and defines three indicators for success, two aggregate indicators representing "percentage of indicators on track" in the Strategic Results Framework (see below) and one progress indicator against common standards.

Development policy implementation is guided by the 26 page International Development Group Strategic Plan 2012-2015 (NZAID 2012b) that elaborates on vision, context and future focus. It introduces the 3-level Strategic Results Framework of the New Zealand Aid Programme, its outcomes and indicators and describes geographic focus and budget allocations. Work on a subsequent strategic plan is in progress. The results framework is explained in more detail in Annex 5.

The framework and related reporting are still being developed and some indicators may still be reworked based on experiences with monitoring. Until now, no targets for indicators have been set apart from pre-defined global indicator targets on the top level. The intention is to start in 2015 with producing an annual results-based report against the strategic results framework.

A 2010 OECD DAC peer review remarked that the International Development Group "is aware that reinforcing domestic support for aid calls for increased efforts to communicate the results and impacts of the aid programme"(OECD 2010b, p. 29).

Over the last five years, staff has begun to increasingly buy into the results agenda which was described as moving from compliance to understanding the importance of the results agenda. Over the last years, important advances have been made in setting up a workable results management information system.

7.2.5 Sweden

Sweden's Policy for Global Development (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency SIDA 2007b) provides the umbrella for Sweden's development policy. The 80-page comprehensive policy document, partly based on an earlier report of a parliamentary committee (SOU 2002), was adopted by the Swedish Riksdag in 2003. It represents an interesting middle way between a law on development and governmental policy. Prepared and adopted by Parliament, it exerts influence beyond governmental cycles and was recently highlighted as an important base to guide future Swedish development policy. The policy spearheaded and applies the principle of policy coherence for development and hence explicitly encompasses and addresses all Swedish policy areas, in addition to development cooperation. The policy highlights the importance of a results-oriented and results-based approach in similar ways as the 2012 DPP of the Finnish MFA without making many concrete or explicit commitments.

Subsequently, about ten specific policies were developed to provide more concrete guidance, for example on humanitarian assistance, security and development, environmental and climate issues, research for development, civil society support, gender, democratic development and human rights, economic growth, and HIV and AIDS. In addition, a large number of strategies for bilateral cooperation countries, aid channels and instruments were developed. The 2013 OECD DAC peer review of Sweden noted "that a large number of additional priorities – each with their own policies and strategic documents – make for a complex overall picture. Sweden has recognised this weakness and is striving to replace its 'forest of policies' with an eagerly-awaited aid policy framework [...]". In 2014, after a change of government, this aid policy framework (Swedish Government 2014) now replaces all previous policies but is, at the same time, itself under review.

Sweden's path towards more results-orientation in its development policy implementation has not been smooth and was marked by repeated attempts to introduce results agenda elements and tools into the work of Sida, Sweden's development cooperation government agency that administers about half of the Swedish development aid budget.

Until now, Sweden has chosen to not develop a corporate-level results framework, reflecting the understanding that meaningful and solid indicators are difficult to identify at that level and are likely to only map a part of the overall development portfolio. On a country level, several indicators are tracked in a number of pilot countries, for example the number of people that gain access to electricity or become employed (e.g., Sida 2013). Targets for these indicators are set and are carefully formulated to highlight the fact that Sweden is contributing to rather than entirely causing these developments. Mostly, however, country strategies set qualitative objectives.

An excellently detailed review of reform attempts towards more results-based management from an organisational change perspective is forthcoming and will only be briefly summarised here (Vähämäki 2013). Among other, in 2007, as part of the introduction of a performance management model, Sida was to pro-

Sweden's path towards more results-orientation in its development policy implementation has not been smooth.

duce a separate annual results report and annex a results matrix to all country strategies. In 2010, new country strategy guidelines required additional aggregation of performance information from projects to sectors, countries, and to the corporate agency level. Controversy about these and other results-related reforms erupted and worries were voiced about the degree to which proof of causation was possible at all for outcomes of development work and that reporting-related workload would crowd out time for proper development work. Unrelated, in 2010, Sida fell into an internal economic crisis and emerged thoroughly reformed by 2012. In 2011, the 2007 performance model was evaluated by the Swedish Treasury and severely criticised for the fact that is was so difficult to understand that government priorities might fail to make an impact at all. In 2012 a new contribution management process was introduced that, among other, required filling in a results summary with information on baselines and annual targets on the output and outcome levels. This was understood by many Sida staff as an obligation to quantify this information and met staff resistance. Compliance rates for earlier introduced results-based tools had generally remained moderate to low.

Overall, interviewees felt that, while the overall focus on results has remained strong, the particular attention to quantitative and highly aggregated results indicators has recently lessened somewhat in favour of qualitative narratives explaining the underlying mechanisms.

7.2.6 United Kingdom

The UK benchmarking exercise has been the most intense, driven by the UK's strong results agenda and good access to senior professionals.

The UK's most fundamental development policy consists of several "Acts" and "White Papers". White Papers are comprehensive policy documents presented by the government (the Secretary of State for International Development) to Parliament, whereas Acts are legal documents, discussed and endorsed in the two UK Parliament houses.

The 1997 White Paper "Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century" – the first in British international development for 22 years – firmly established poverty elimination as the primary purpose of British international development. It described the UK Government's vision and new policies for the elimination of international poverty, explained the new objectives and strategy for the Department for International Development (DFID) and detailed the new objective of ensuring that all UK Government policies take account of their impact on sustainable development (Secretary of State 1997). Subsequent White Papers were issued in 2000, 2006, and 2009 (Secretary of State 2000, 2006 and 2009), complementing and updating the 1997 document.

The White Papers express clear commitment towards a range of principles, policy choices, and policy implementation. The overall language towards the degree of commitment is explicit. Quantitative targets are set for several relative and absolute financial commitments (notably the 0.7 percent target for British ODA as share of gross national income) and are reflected in the develop-

ment targets of various international commitments to which the White Papers pledge compliance. Most guidance remains qualitative in nature and is not backed up by clearly defined indicators. Apart from describing planned activities, in many instances, intended results are projected as relative increases or improvements over the current status quo.

The 2002 "International Development Act" (Elisabeth II 2002), partly replacing the 1980 Overseas Development and Cooperation Act (Elisabeth II 1980), legally established poverty reduction as the focus of development assistance and, implicitly, unties British aid. In 2006, the "International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act" (Elisabeth II 2006a and b) defined annual reporting requirements towards Parliament on international aid, including progress towards the spending target of 0.7 percent of gross national income. In 2014, the "International Development (Gender Equality) Act" (Elisabeth II 2014) focused on gender equality in British development and humanitarian assistance.

International development acts are legal documents making provisions for development assistance and international financial institutions. They define terminology and lay out modalities, rules and regulations. From an RBM perspective, the ODA target and detailed reporting requirements enshrined in the 2006 Act are relevant. Apart from prescribing in detail the financial statistics to be included in annual reports to Parliament, the Act also establishes annual reporting requirements towards the United Nations' 0.7 percent expenditure target and on aid effectiveness and progress made towards achieving the MDGs, as explained in Annex 5.

In the UK, the strong emphasis and move towards results measurement, results reporting, and also to performance-based allocation of resources over the last years has been controversy discussed by researchers and politicians. The ODA/GNI target of 0.7 percent has been criticised because of its overall volume and because it represents a spending rather than a results target, possibly endangering the degree to which aid responds to actual needs and the quality of aid delivery. Others have warned that the strong emphasis on RBM can lead, if applied for accountability purposes only, to pursuing rigid targets with rigid implementation mechanics as a "blueprint approach" rather than allowing for an adaptive, learning-oriented approach. It was felt that the former would imply lower and the latter higher aid effectiveness.

The UK government has pre-empted and countered these and other concerns with connecting the 0.7 spending target with measures for quality control and learning, i.e. for securing the value for money of British Aid:

- In 2011, an Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) was launched to scrutinise UK aid. ICAI reports to Parliament through the House of Commons Select Committee on International Development. It conducts 10-15 evaluations annually that are published on its website and advises DFID and other government departments on the effectiveness of their spending.
- In 2011, two influential aid reviews were published by DFID. A Bilat-

eral Aid Review (BAR) collected country "results offers," assessed them and issued recommendations for future focus of UK bilateral aid (DFID 2011a). A parallel Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) assessed the value for money for UK aid through 43 multilateral organisations and has been updated in 2013 (DFID 2013).

Without having assessed the quality of the aid reviews, it is remarkable that they did not shy away from making difficult comparative value for money judgements and from issuing recommendations that would effectively end aid to countries or organisations in favour of increased focus on others. This stands in contrast to the widespread habit of restricting assessments to individual interventions or organisations which helps individual performance improvements but does not support aid portfolio optimisation. For example, the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) as a principle does not rank the performance of multilateral organisations. Instead, the 2011 MAR conducted a comparative assessment of multilateral organisations along two principal dimensions: organisational strengths and contribution to UK development objectives (Annex 5).

After the 2011 reviews, a strong follow-up on these evaluative results occurred. Overall, bilateral aid was ended to 16 countries and focused on the remaining 28, and support to 4 multilateral organisations was ended and reprioritised among the remaining 39.

Similar to other benchmarking countries and multilateral organisations, DFID has introduced a 4 level results framework with 99 indictors on levels 1 and 2 and additional indicators on other levels, as described in more detail in Annex 5. A particular feature of this results framework is the elaborate methodology provided for each indicator. As for other benchmarking partners, interviewees stressed that the results framework serves important accountability purposes but does only reflect a share of British development work.

7.3 Synthesis

This section summarises findings from the literature review of international experience with RBM (Section 7.1), synthesises observations made from the review of the RBM-approaches of benchmarking partners (Section 7.2), and adds several cross-cutting observations.

7a. **Long-term development policy.** Several countries and organisations have established long-term development policies, either as law or as Parliament-endorsed government policy. A 2005 report counted 11 of 23 DAC members having a development law, not counting the EU (for which the Treaties of Maastricht also cover development) and Sweden and Norway that have Parliament-endorsed government documents (Ashoff 2005, p. 90). Table 7 shows that 4 of 6 benchmarking partners operate under long-term policies or strategies that exceed governmental (or replenishment) cycles. This has the advantage that development policy remains valid and influential for more than a single government (or replenishment) cycle.

Laws or Parliament-endorsed development policies allow the formulation of long-term objectives and commitment to strategies to reach them and to clearly define parliamentary expectations on results information.

7b. **Definition and scope of RBM.** Various competing definitions for RBM exist and, within definitions, ample room remains for interpreting what the exact purposes, objectives and characteristics of RBM are. Differing expert opinions where encountered as to the relative importance of institutional performance measures in addition to development results or to the balance between accountability and learning purposes of RBM and on whether a heavy focus on organisational performance can detract from a focus on development results.

7c. **Competing purposes.** There is no automatic alignment between the accountability and learning purposes of RBM. Instead, these purposes often compete and a strong focus on using RBM for managerial control and accountability has been found to drive behaviour that effectively reduces opportunities for learning and improved decision-making. A further tension exists between a donor-centric application of RBM and principles of country ownership and alignment in bilateral cooperation, and with regard to the mandates and long-term strategies of multilateral organisations and large NGOs.

7d. **RBM implementation** is not easy and the time and resource efforts, as well as the degree to which a results-oriented approach requires fundamental cultural and procedural changes in organisations is often underestimated, leading to unsatisfactory overall results.

7e. **Good RBM practice.** A considerable body of experience with implementing RBM has been built over past decades and several sets of best practices are available, even if often not applied.
   o From international implementation experience, it is quite important to pay sufficient attention to RBM as a learning approach and to apply the approach sensibly – both in terms of coverage and detail – where it provides most benefit.
   o Key elements for successful RBM implementation are: senior RBM leadership, a RBM culture, results-based frameworks with broad ownership, credible measurement and realistic attribution of results, user-friendly results information systems, use of results for learning as well as for accountability, and building an RBM regime that can evolve through review and learning.

7f. **Policy commitment to RBM.** Several benchmarking countries and organisations have driven the introduction of RBM through forceful and explicit policy commitment to a results agenda that went considerably beyond what can be found in the 2012 DPP. In several cases, explicit commitment to use of RBM frameworks was made. In the UK, the results agenda, while not prominent in foundational White Papers and Acts, has been at the forefront of policy discussions over the last years.

7g. **Results frameworks.** Most benchmarking countries and both international organisations reviewed have introduced similar indicator-driven results frameworks that are primarily utilized for accountability purposes. These frameworks cover several principal levels:
   o **Global and national "MDG-type" development outcomes and impacts**,

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measured with quantitative indicators which are tracked for information but to which no quantitative attribution claim is made;

o **Development outcomes**, either attributed to the agency' development activities or to which those activities have contributed; and

o **Institutional and organisational performance**, measured by a wide range of indicators and fully attributed to the agency.

7h. **Theory of Change.** Linking results across the different results framework levels can be challenging and a comprehensive Theory of Change is required as a basis for selecting meaningful organisational and institutional performance measures that enable development results, as well as a relevant hierarchy of development results measures. A sound Theory of Change also renders transparent inherent difficulties in attributing development outcomes to the activities and the funding of individual donors.

7i. **Number of indicators.** The benchmarked corporate results frameworks tracked 70 or more indicators (Table 7). The Evaluation Team finds this number surprisingly large because of two reasons. First, such a large set of indicators may lead to losing sight of the forest for the trees and actually serve accountability purposes towards parliamentarians and the societies-at-large in donor and developing countries less than a smaller set of meaningful indicators, accompanied by evaluative and other information. Second, a larger number of indicators, together with the methodological machinery for their regular determination, increases the risk of tipping the balance between learning and accountability purposes of RBM towards the latter which, in turn, decreases the chances of RBM being successfully implemented (Section 7.1).

7j. **Learning from results.** Results frameworks reflect a substantial share but not all development achievements and reviews, evaluations and other research are required to complement and explain observed performance. Without having been assessed in detail or discussed in Section 7.2, all benchmarking partners utilised reviews, evaluations and other analysis both to complement and to enrich the information provided by indicator-based results frameworks. The UK has demonstrated strong follow-up on such evaluative findings and has adjusted its bilateral and multilateral development scope drastically after two influential aid reviews. While the quality of the reviews has not been assessed, the Evaluation Team highlights the importance of attempting such comparative assessments in order to assist priority-setting within aid channels.

8 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter synthesises and draws conclusions from the various findings in this report. Overall, despite some improvements in terms of results-orientation, the DPPs do not provide an adequate foundation for results-based development policy and cooperation. Country strategies, multilateral influencing plans, and related results frameworks represent important steps towards results management but the MFA still lacks a comprehensive approach to RBM at the corporate level, including a long-term plan with adequate provisions for target-setting, learning and reporting. The present DPPs do not represent such a plan.

DPP Guidance

DPPs provide strong guidance on overall goals and principles, and on rationalising sectors, themes, channels, instruments and countries to be supported. However, DPPs, with great effort and participation, define Finland's entire development policy – every 4 years again. This includes redeveloping overall goals and principles in varying forms that, analysed closely, have remained remarkably stable across the last three DPPs. DPPs usually chose one overarching theme (e.g. policy coherence, sustainable development, and the HRBA) into which other guidance is interpreted. Together with strongly varying DPP structures, this makes it difficult to compare DPPs. Only upon closer examination it becomes evident that guidance in all three DPPs has covered quite similar sectors, aid channels and instruments.

8a. The Evaluation Team concludes that past DPPs have been useful for providing guidance on various aspects of Finnish development policy but that it would be more effective if the focus of policy statements issued by incoming governments would lie on changes relative to longer-term development policies rather than on redeveloping the entire policy. This would allow issuing policy statements earlier in the government cycle and more focused stakeholder participation.

DPP Validity and Development Timescales

DPPs display a harmful discrepancy between the guidance they provide and implementation realities. Typical timeframes from corporate decision-making to implementation and further to realising development results (including national intervention patterns and replenishment cycles of international organisations) exceed DPP validity periods considerably. In addition, important downstream policies required to render DPP guidance tangible are sometimes issued late in the government cycle, with unclear status and validity in the next.

Yet, DPPs represent and are written as the Finnish development policy, i.e. a policy to which all Finnish development activities and results should adhere. This can force MFA staff and partners into otherwise unnecessary window dressing

of ongoing projects and programmes into a language more fitting with current policies. DPPs do not provide guidance on previously committed and still ongoing work nor on when development results related to the present DPP are to be expected. DPPs, with their limited validity period, also encounter the principal challenge of attempting to define development work that will be executed and bear results under future governments – governments that will by then have issued their own DPPs.

Most benchmarked countries and organisations operate under long-term policies and plans that exceed governmental (or replenishment) cycles and allow consistently pursuing long-term development objectives across those cycles.

8b. The Evaluation Team concludes that the MFA/Finland need to operate according to a longer-time strategic plan which reflects realistic development time-scales.

Quality of Target-Setting in DPPs

The quality and strength of guidance in DPPs is quite weak from a RBM perspective. DPPs do not commit to concrete results of Finnish development work nor to institutional performance targets. Good quality target statements are only found for a few guidance elements on the budget and MFA output levels. Overall target-setting qualities of the numerous guidance elements in DPPs remain low. Most guidance elements have issues with one or more quality criteria for target-setting, i.e. are either not well defined, meaningful, clearly committed to, or cannot be monitored with reasonable effort. In addition, DPPs provide very little guidance on relative priorities between different policy and aid implementation channels, between different lines of work within those channels, and between individual measures. Between DPPs, this lack of prioritisation is exacerbated as subsequent DPPs usually do not address previous guidance but simply add another guidance layer.

Most benchmarked countries and organisations have set explicit targets – both qualitative and quantitative – in comprehensive RBM frameworks.

8c. The Evaluation Team concludes that corporate–level target-setting at the MFA is inadequate and current development policy and cooperation work operates without clear goalposts, apart from a limited number of targets on the budget and MFA output level. A comprehensive RBM framework – encompassing both qualitative objectives and quantitative results targets – is required.

Validity and Status of Downstream Policy Guidance

Downstream guidance documents are numerous and often without clear status. Apart from several promising exceptions, downstream guidance exhibits similar quality issues with respect to RBM as DPP guidance. Guidance is produced with some time-lag to DPPs, sometimes late in the government cycle, and its status under subsequent DPPs is sometimes unclear.

8d. The Evaluation Team concludes that the status, the validity and authority of downstream policies need to be clarified.

DPPs and Policy Coherence

DPPs are formally government documents but don't appear to exhibit any tangible authority over other ministries. This has important consequences for development work that requires cooperation in Finland beyond the MFA. Two steering and consultative bodies are of importance for policy coherence: the PCD Network and the DPC. However, the main focus has been on awareness-raising and in EU-level policy coherence. Both bodies lack authoritative mandates to strengthen Finland's policy coherence programme in a strategic and results-oriented way.

8e. The Evaluation Team concludes that policy coherence for development, a central topic in all three DPPs, requires a strengthened PCD Network (or DPC) mandate and cabinet-level leadership to be implemented as envisaged in development policies of the last 12 years. Alternatively, the underlying Theory of Change should be adapted to the MFA's mandate, i.e. reflect ways to influence rather than implement changes in other policy sectors.

Learning from Results

Little direct evidence for learning from results is visible in DPPs and downstream policies also make little reference to evaluative findings or monitored performance. For two of the three DPPs covered by this evaluation, formulation processes showed due attention to collecting earlier implementing experiences and reviewing evaluative findings by others. It appears that more learning from results and MFA staff input materialised in DPPs under Ministers with less personal input into the policy formulation process. Formulation processes between DPPs differed and for each of them the learning process was designed ad-hoc. Overall, there seems to be no standardised, systematic process of distilling results experience and incorporating insights into policy formulation.

Benchmarked countries and organisations emphasised the importance of evaluation as integral element of RBM.

8f. The Evaluation Team concludes that the MFA has been able to incorporate some learning from results into policy formulation in the past. The extent of learning is difficult to establish and the process can be systematised and rendered more transparent. Evaluation represents an integral element of results-oriented learning.

Implementation Compliance with DPP Guidance

With only few quality targets in DPPs, the assessment of how diligently DPPs were implemented was difficult. An important finding is that the policy formulation and budgeting processes at the MFA have largely remained isolated from each other. This poses inherent problems for RBM since it is difficult to commit to results without knowing what resources will be available.

Regarding compliance with DPP targets, about two thirds of budget and outcome targets were met. These represent most of the good quality targets in DPPs. Several target indicators however are not systematically monitored and reported which raises the question how results-oriented implementation towards those targets can actually take place.

Two thematic and one country exemplary study found some evidence of the effects of DPP guidance. Overall, however, unclear policy guidance, the lack of concrete targets, an absence of strategic thematic approaches, as well as inadequate MFA information systems hamper concrete follow-up.

8g. The Evaluation Team concludes that DPPs, because of their low target–setting qualities, do not allow straightforward verification of compliance with policy guidance apart from some budget and MFA output targets of limited relevance for RBM. In case studies, qualitative evidence for influence of DPPs on downstream guidance and programming itself was found but result–oriented implementation of policy guidance was, itself, found to be hindered by the absence of concrete and verifiable development objectives.

Integration of RBM in Policy Implementation

Along policy implementation channels, some important progress has been made towards integrating RBM in planning, implementation and reporting. Comprehensive result-oriented country strategies for long-term partner countries and multilateral influencing plans that exhibit results frameworks have the potential to make significant contributions to establishing RBM in Finnish development cooperation. Both frameworks are being – and require to be – further developed.

Importantly, the country strategy results frameworks enjoy increasing staff support. Most other aid channels, including CSO and EU cooperation, have not yet moved towards using RBM on an aggregated level. One reason for this has been lack of guidance and incentives to prepare corporate level, results-oriented annual reports for those channels. The current AfT Action Plan, despite some shortcomings, represents a good practice attempt for adopting a programmatic approach based on RBM. Despite progress in ensuring policy coherence at the international level and a promising food security pilot, domestic policy coherence work suffers from being driven largely by the MFA alone instead of through a trans-ministerial mandate, and from the lack of a strategic approach with concrete targets and dedicated resources.

8h. The Evaluation Team concludes that for bilateral cooperation with long-term partner countries and, in a somewhat earlier stage of development, influencing plans for multilateral organisations, promising integration of RBM is under way. Policy coherence work and other development cooperation channels still lack results–oriented frameworks.

Reporting

Within the MFA, reporting differs along policy implementation channels with varying aggregation levels and synthesis. No synthesis reports covering entire policy implementation channels are produced. The most comprehensive reports in terms of their relevance for RBM are for long-term bilateral partner countries on the implementation of their strategies and do include results data. They however remain on the country level apart from recent regional synthesis attempts. Other channels remain mostly on the level of inputs and outputs and at the project or instrument-level.

The annual reports to Parliament were, hence, compiled from various sources and based on ad-hoc requests for information. They report budget information but no aggregated information on results other than in narratives and examples.

8i. The Evaluation Team concludes that there is no systematic reporting on results along policy implementation channels. For some channels, not even basic portfolio data is available in aggregated form. This lack of corporate results information is also visible in reports to Parliament.

Development Policy Steering Group

Of the two steering and advisory bodies internal to the MFA, the DPSG represents a useful platform for deliberating MFA-wide decisions, priorities and approaches. Its mandate has recently been strengthened and ministerial attendance frequency has doubled. The DPSG has the potential to fill policy guidance gaps of DPPs and to provide downstream guidance policies with status and authority, including strengthening the link between results-oriented planning and budgeting that represents a weakness in the current steering structure.

8j. The Evaluation Team concludes that, with recently increased ministerial attention, the DPSG has the potential to guide policy setting and implementation beyond the DPPs.

Quality Assurance Board

The Quality Assurance Board (QAB) plays a central quality assurance role and diligently screens and rates projects and programmes in all development cooperation channels at proposal stage, apart from multilateral and humanitarian cooperation. Its main value-add lies in the recommendations it issues. The quality screening itself is limited to verifying consistency with general policy guidance rather than providing a more thorough quality assessment and appraisal of potential for future results. At present, there is no mechanism for conducting portfolio-level assessments and the QAB does not appraise multilateral and humanitarian cooperation, or work on policy coherence.

8k. The Evaluation Team concludes that, for RBM, the QAB has more potential than presently realised in terms of thorough quality appraisals of proposals, generating ex-ante quality scoring information, issuing regular opinions on portfolio evolution, and possibly extending its coverage of policy implementation channels further.

Information Management

In terms of financial and results information management, the present TTS system focuses on financial information but also attempts to cover, separately, some 2012 DPP-related results. At present, the system can be used to monitor input-related policy directions but does not track results adequately. The AHA-KYT system does not yet cover all aid channels and does not allow summarising portfolio data (e.g. for cross cutting objectives) or to access comprehensive information on results although in principle some of the information is available.

8l. The Evaluation Team concludes that the MFA does currently not possess a functional results-oriented, corporate-level information and financial management system. The existing project intervention systems and databases as well as available data would enable, with some integration and further development, monitoring and reporting of basic results information. From international experience with RBM implementation, user-friendly information systems on the corporate level represent a key requirement for success.

Organisational Culture
Compared to 2010, the MFA's organisational culture in 2014 shows initial signs of becoming more supportive of a results focus but, at present, staffing patterns, incentives and overall attitude towards risk remain overall unfavourable for RBM and the MFA has not yet developed a results culture. Responsibilities for results remain largely unassigned in the organisation.

The fact that the MFA is an integrated Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and International Development has important advantages, for example for policy coherence, but also challenges that need to be managed, for example in terms of job rotation and skills of diplomatic staff and of the availability and influence of advisors.

8m. The Evaluation Team concludes that substantial change in organisational culture, staff incentives, and management style is necessary to successfully and sustainably integrate results-oriented management, learning and reporting at the MFA.

Additional International RBM Implementation Experience
The body of experience with RBM in the public sector is rich and covers decades of implementation efforts. One key insight is that the required commitment and effort for introducing RBM has often been underestimated, leading to unsatisfactory results.

Benchmarked countries and organisations that have introduced RBM have made clear and explicit policy commitments to a results agenda that included the introduction of concrete tools, such as indicator-based results frameworks and comparative evaluations.

8n. The Evaluation Team concludes that a realistic understanding of the effort related to introducing RBM at the MFA needs to be established and that strong and explicit policy and senior leadership commitment to RBM is required, including the commitment to concrete monitoring and evaluation tools for RBM. Since rushing implementation of RBM without sufficient organisational ownership and capacity has led to difficulties and even failure in some countries and organisations, care must be taken at the MFA to plan technical implementation in sync with the equally important organisational implementation of RBM.

From international experience, value-adding implementation of RBM can only succeed if learning and accountability purposes are adequately balanced as each purpose sets quite different incentives and drives quite different organisational behaviour.

8o. The Evaluation Team further concludes that the introduction of RBM at the MFA needs to emphasise the learning aspects of RBM by encouraging staff initiative, risk-taking and learning from failure as well as from success, and by avoiding a regime dominated by compliance. Overall, a strong results culture needs to be established.

Most benchmarking countries and organisation have introduced comprehensive RBM frameworks of which indicator-driven results frameworks were one important part. Compared to a small set of key indicators, the large number of indicators in those frameworks (70 and more) may dilute rather than strengthen accountability and tip the important balance between learning and accountability purposed of RBM towards the latter. The MFA may be better advised with a smaller set of key indicators.

8p. The Evaluation Team further concludes that, when determining the number of indicators driving a corporate results framework, benefits and risks for both accountability and learning should be balanced.

9 RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter presents the recommendations of this report. Each recommendation is explained and timing and responsibilities for implementation are specified.

Recommendation 1. Establish long-term goals and principles of Finnish development policy.

The key goals, values and principles of Finnish development policy should be encoded in a policy document beyond individual DPPs and beyond the 4-year horizon of government cycles. This process should be led by the incoming Minister for International Development but can be prepared before the new government is appointed. Broad participation and support are required and could be facilitated, for example, through the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Development Policy Committee. The ensuing document should be debated in Parliament and receive formal endorsement or be enacted as act of law or any other legal form suitable for enshrining those goals, values and principles on a long-term basis. The scope of this document can also extend to other matters such as overall funding commitments, policy priorities, or reporting requirements, but care should be taken to include guidance that is likely to be also supported by subsequent governments. Such guidance related to specific governments would be better placed in governmental development policy statements.

Timing: begin in 2015 and finalize in 2016.
Responsible: Minister for International Development, Under Secretary of State for Development Policy, DoDP leadership, Foreign Affairs Committee.

Recommendation 2. Replace future DPPs by concise 3–5 page Development Policy Statements that fully embrace the results agenda.

Instead of a full DPP, the next incoming government and Minister for International Development should issue a short Development Policy Statement (DPS). The DPS should refer to Finland's long-term goals, values and principles rather than redeveloping them and should embrace the RBM agenda as key priority. The DPS should highlight changes to the status quo rather than attempting to rewrite the entire Finnish development policy. For the successful implementation of the envisaged results agenda at the MFA, full and explicit policy commitment to RBM and its tools is required.

Once a long-term strategic plan (recommendation 3) has been developed and adopted, future DPS' should explicitly refer to Finland's long-term goals, values and principles, and to that plan. Rather than covering all of Finnish development policy, the DPS' should focus on reaffirming or changing priorities in the strategic plan, using the plan's language, results categories and budget estimates. The budget and results targets in the strategic plan are then adapted to

accommodate this guidance while ensuring that existing commitments remain honoured.

Timing: publish not later than 3 months after beginning of each governmental period.
Responsible: Minister for International Development.

Recommendation 3. Develop a long-term strategic plan for Finnish development policy implementation.

Develop a long-term strategic plan (for example for 8-10 years, on a rolling basis) for Finnish development policy implementation. This plan then governs the implementation of Finnish development policy and sets the targets (budget and results) against which results performance is reported. The plan should integrate the current budget and action planning systems with the Strategic Results Framework (recommendation 4). The strategic plan should be based on:

· The general goals and principles of Finnish development policy (recommendation 1);
· Existing commitments (international agreements and operational commitments);
· The priorities set by the government and by the Minister for International Development (recommendation 2); and
· Best estimates for future budgets.

Timing: until 2016.
Responsible: Minister for International Development, Under Secretary of State for Development Policy, DoDP leadership, DPSG, RBM adviser(s).

Recommendation 4. Develop a Theory of Change and a Strategic Results Framework at the MFA corporate level.

Develop a simple but sound Theory of Change (ToC) and a pragmatic but robust Strategic Results Framework (SRF).

The ToC should provide a logical and plausible storyline explaining through what causal steps the MFA's corporate and implementation activities and outputs (e.g. policies, strategies, decisions, projects, programmes) will achieve intended development outcomes and impacts. The ToC should cover all policy implementation channels, several of which are likely to exhibit multiple pathways. It should clearly identify underlying assumptions and the degree to which the MFA has control over results along the chain. In addition to explaining how impact is achieved through each policy implementation channel, the ToC should also provide a rationale and criteria for prioritising between and within channels, for example which countries, multilateral organisations, and international NGOs to fund.

The SRF should define intended results along these implementation pathways on three levels: development outputs and outcomes, institutional performance, and organisational effectiveness. It should begin with a limited set of quantitative and qualitative indicators that are selected because their information is already available or can be easily obtained.

If quantitative information is not available, performance or assessment scores can be useful. Some key development indicators should be selected for aggregation and future upward reporting to Parliament. Over time, the SRF should be further developed to cover all policy implementation channels and corporate-level performance. Overall, the number of reporting indicators and related monitoring resource and time requirements should always be balanced against the benefits in terms of learning and demonstrating results. The total number of indicators should remain considerably below the number of 70 (and more) observed in benchmarked frameworks.

Over time and guided by the usefulness for managing implementation, learning, and accountability reporting, the ToC and the SRF should gradually be further developed.

Timing: first, simple versions in 2015, elaboration after that.
Responsible: DoDP leadership, other departments in the ministry and their top management, RBM adviser(s).

Recommendation 5. Develop and commit to a realistic RBM strategy.

Starting from the present RBM implementation plan, a comprehensive strategy for RBM at the MFA should be developed, with full endorsement and continued support of the incoming Minister for International Development. The strategy should be developed collaboratively with all MFA department and units affected by it and cover the following elements:
- A comprehensive definition of RBM at the MFA;
- A description of the objectives of integrating RBM at the MFA;
- The necessary steps to reach those objectives through a series of organisational and technical changes, including the means by which a results culture can be strengthened at the MFA; and
- An updated RBM implementation plan for the next governmental period developed.

The RBM strategy and implementation plan themselves should display good practice characteristics of results-oriented management, clearly justify implementation efforts by the results they contribute to, display accountable reporting on progress, and embrace continuous learning on how to best implement RBM at the MFA. It should reflect a pragmatic prioritised approach that first builds on using existing systems, data, processes and habits, then on comparatively easy changes, and only implements drastic changes when clearly required.

Timing: 2015.
Responsible: Minister for International Development, DoDP leadership, other departments in the ministry and their top management, RBM adviser(s).

Recommendation 6. Continue development of policy channel strategies and results frameworks.

Bilateral country strategies and multilateral influencing plans should continue to be developed and be linked with the overall Theory of Change and the Stra-

tegic Results Framework. The existence and quality of those strategies and selected strategic features and results indicators should become indicators in the overall SRF. For the multilateral channel, the influencing strategies as well as the rationale for funding decisions for individual multilaterals need to be developed further.

For all other policy implementation channels and instruments, as well as for policy coherence work, basic intervention strategies and results frameworks should be developed. These documents should be kept short, simple and should be directly linked to the corporate Theory of Change and SRF, and the strategic plan. Based on their perceived usefulness for managing implementation, learning, and accountability, the different strategies and results frameworks should be further developed. Each strategy should be assigned an institutional owner.

Timing: until 2016, continuous updates after that.
Responsible: DPSG, DoDP leadership, other departments in the ministry and their top management, RBM adviser(s).

Recommendation 7. Systematise learning from results.
Systematise learning from results at the MFA through transparent implementation feedback, objective assessment and consideration of institutional performance, and effectiveness and efficiency in contributing to development results. Evaluations should be strategically employed to verify key assumptions in the MFA's Theory of Change, to review implementation progress and achievement of results along the strategic plan, to generate standardised development quality scores from project reviews, and to synthesise experiences of others, for example in the case of multilateral aid reviews. More than to date comparative assessments should be conducted that can inform prioritisation across and within policy implementation channels.

Timing: until 2016.
Responsible: DoDP leadership, other departments in the ministry and their top management, RBM adviser(s), EVA-11.

Recommendation 8. Build a seamless reporting hierarchy along policy implementation channels and for corporate reporting to Parliament.
Build a seamless reporting hierarchy along policy implementation channels (including work on policy coherence), using aggregated indicators, performance scores, and qualitative information that allows transparent and informed decision-making, supports learning from results, and feeds MFA internal and external reports. Accountability for and learning from results should be strengthened by thoroughly following up on all targets of the strategic plan, whether met or not, as well as unintended consequences, and by transparently demonstrating reasons for (and lessons drawn from) reported performance.

Timing: from 2016, regular synthesis reports for each policy implementation channel and from 2019 onwards, 4-yearly reports to Parliament.
Responsible: Minister for International Development, DoDP leadership, other departments in the ministry and their top management, RBM adviser, EVA-11.

Recommendation 9. Integrate and further develop present systems into a user friendly management systems for financial and results information.
Build on present efforts with the TTS and AHA-KYT and install a user-friendly results and financial information management system to support results monitoring along the long-term strategic plan and the channel strategies. This system should integrate financial, administrative, and results information across the intervention cycle and also cover cross-cutting objectives. Competition and duplication between existing systems and during systems development should be categorically avoided.

Timing: architecture in 2015, implementation in 2016.
Responsible: MFA leadership, MFA Financial Management Unit, Unit for Administrative and Legal Development Cooperation Matters.

Recommendation 10. Strengthen quality assurance.
To increase accountability for results, the mandate and the capacity of the Quality Assurance Board should be strengthened to allow it to conduct thorough quality appraisals of proposals, generate ex-ante quality scoring information and issue regular opinions on portfolio evolution. In a first step, an extended template and a set of realistic and practical good practice quality benchmark criteria should be derived from implementation experience. The Quality Assurance Board's coverage should be extended to cover all policy implementation channels or, minimally, alternative quality assurance mechanism with similar functionalities should be devised to guarantee full quality assurance coverage of the MFA's development work.

Timing: until 2016.
Responsible: DoDP leadership, DPSG, RBM adviser(s).

Recommendation 11. Strengthen the policy coherence mandate.
The mandate of the high-level network of Policy Coherence for Development (or alternatively, of the DPC) should be strengthened to cover analysis of domestic and foreign conflicts and synergies between development and other sector policies and to issue recommendations to the government. Policy coherence work should receive direct attention by the Prime Minister's office. Instead, if such an elevation of the status of policy coherence work is not feasible, future guidance and the ToC along this policy implementation channel should be adjusted to what can be realistically expected from an MFA-led effort, i.e. to awareness-raising and limited influence on policies beyond the MFA's mandate.

Timing: until 2016.
Responsible: Minister for International Development, the Secretary of State, Under Secretary of State for Development Policy.

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ANNEXES

EVALUATION
FINLAND'S DEVELOPMENT POLICY
PROGRAMMES FROM A RESULTS-BASED
MANAGEMENT POINT OF VIEW 2003-2013

Annexes to the Evaluation Report

CONTENTS

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AfDB	African Development Bank
AfT	Aid for Trade
AHA-KYT	MFA development cooperation intervention administrative database system
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency System
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
CEDAW UN	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination of Women
CIDA	Canadian Agency for International Development
CSO	Civil society organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DFID	Department for International Development, UK
DoDP	Department for Development Policy
DPC	Development Policy Committee
DPP	Development Policy Program
DPSG	Development Policy Steering Group
EU	European Union
EUR	Euro
EVA-11	MFA Development Evaluation Unit
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FLEGT	Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade
GDP	Gross domestic product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GP	Government programme
HIV	Human immunodeficiency virus
HRBA	Human-rights based approach
ICAI	Independent Commission for Aid Impact
ICPD	International Conference on Population and Development
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ITT	Instructions to the Tenderers
KEPA	Kehitysyhteistyön palvelukeskus (umbrella organisation for Finnish civil society organisations who work with development cooperation)
KEPO	Kehityspolitiikka (Development Policy)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MEA	Multilateral environmental agreement
MEUR	Million euro
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
MKUKUTA II	National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty in Tanzania
MKUZA II	Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty II
MUSD	Million United States Dollars
NAP	National Action Plan

NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
NZAID	New Zealand Agency for International Development
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PCD	High-level Network on Policy Coherence for Development
QAB	Quality Assurance Board
RBM	Results-based Management
RBA	Results-based Approach
REDD	Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
SD	Sustainable Development
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SPRU	Results Management Unit
ToR	Terms of Reference
TTS	Operating and financial plan
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCBD	United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity
UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation
UNFCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFF	United Nation Forum on Forests
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	The United Nations Children's Fund
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNU Wider	The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economic Research -
UNWomen	The United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UONGOZI	Institute of African Leadership for Sustainable Development in Tanzania
USAID	The United States Agency for International Development

ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

EVALUATION OF FINLAND'S DEVELOPMENT POLICY PROGRAMMES FROM A RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT POINT OF VIEW 2003–2013

1 BACKGROUND TO THE EVALUATION

Aid effectiveness, results-based management (RBM) and accountability in development cooperation have been main themes in the dialogue between developing countries and the donor community. In the past ten years, a series of high level meetings has been held on these themes in Rome, Accra, Paris, Busan and Mexico. Therefore it is important to evaluate these aspects also in Finland's development policy and programming of development cooperation.

This is the Terms of Reference (ToR) of a formative evaluation on how the strategic objectives, policy priorities and approaches of the Development Policy Programmes (DPP) are translated to programmes and policy influencing plans leading to results. The evaluation also analyses how the results of the Finnish development cooperation and policy influencing are monitored and reported at the strategic level, how this information is utilized in decision-making and how this reporting informs the new development policy programmes. Period to be analysed is 2003-2013 which covers three different policy programmes of three governments.

This evaluation assesses the DPPs from results-based management point of view. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland's (MFA) results-based approach (RBA) was evaluated recently and most of the recommendations are now implemented in developing more efficient and effective management processes. The MFA already applies results-based management at programme and project levels. The strategic and policy level documents refer to the results-based approach, but the principles are not yet systematically applied to all the processes and structures. The MFA realizes the challenges it currently faces with reporting on the implementation of the DPPs and hopes to improve its systems. Systematic RBM development work is on-going and based on a specific action plan.

The definition of the expected results of Finland's development policy and cooperation is a complex process. It integrates the political visions of the Finnish government, priorities of partner countries, the experience of citizens and beneficiaries, lessons learned by development partners, and the international commitments made by Finland. This evaluation is needed to learn how these aspects can be taken into account in formulation of a results-based Development Policy Programme, and in strengthening results-based management in the MFA.

Government Programmes and Related Development Policy Programmes

The political visions of Finland's development policy are established when a new Government Programme (GP) is agreed upon by the government forming parties. The three Government Programmes in last 10 years covered by this evaluation are the following:

- The Government Programme of Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen's Government (Finnish Government 2003) http://valtioneuvosto.fi/tiedostot/julkinen/vn/hallitus/vanhasen-hallitusohjelma-2003/en.pdf

- Government Programme of Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen's second Cabinet (Finnish Government 2007) http://valtioneuvosto.fi/tietoarkisto/aiemmat-hallitukset/vanhanenII/hallitusohjelma/pdf/en.pdf
- Programme of Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen's Government (Finnish Government 2011) http://valtioneuvosto.fi/hallitus/hallitusohjelma/pdf/en334743.pdf

Each of the Government Programmes has a specific section on development policy. However, the other sections of the programmes have also influence on how Finland's development policy and development cooperation should be implemented in practice.

The level of abstraction of the Government programme text differs from programme to programme, and usually the goals are not clearly defined. However, in terms of results-based development, this level of policy formulation *sets the political vision on the expected impact of the Finnish development policy and development cooperation*.

All three Government Programmes have been concretized in a Development Policy Programme. DPPs *set the vision on the intended results as well as define the strategic approach of Finland to achieve these results* (taking ideally into account the human and financial resources available). It is often further complemented with special guidelines explaining the approaches and commitments of the Finnish government.

The DPP preparation process has been facilitated by the MFA, steered by the Minister responsible for international development and approved by the government. In practice, these policy programmes have formed the main starting point for planning, implementing and reporting of the development cooperation of Finland over the past ten years.

The government programme related DPP documents covered by this evaluation are:
- Development Policy. Government Resolution 5.2.2004, MFA http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=84297&nodeid=15457&contentlan=2&culture=en-US
- Development policy programme 2007. Towards a Sustainable and Just World Community. Government Decision-in-Principle 2007, MFA http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=107497&nodeid=15457&contentlan=2&culture=en-US
- Finland's Development Policy Programme. Government Decision-in-Principle 16 February 2012, MFA http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=251855&nodeid=15457&contentlan=2&culture=en-US
One of the critical aspects is how DPPs are able to learn from the past and to guide the development inputs and activities toward results over time, as the results are typically achieved during the next DPP period. Therefore, from the results-based management point of view, each new DPP is supposed to build upon the learnings from the implementation of the previous programmes, and secure the continuity of the Finnish contribution.
Some evaluations and reviews have already recently been conducted regarding the programmes as well as results-based management processes of the MFA. The most relevant to this topic are the following:
- 2003 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) peer review, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/dac-peer-review-offinland_journal_dev-v4-art25-en
- 2007 OECD DAC Peer review, http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/39772751.pdf
- 2012 OECD DAC Peer review http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/PRFINLAND2012.pdf
- 2011:2 Results-Based Approach in Finnish Development Cooperation, http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=233028&nodeid=15454&contentlan=2&culture=en-US

- 2010:4: The Sustainability Dimension in Addressing Poverty Reduction: Synthesis of Evaluations, http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=207704&nodeid=15454&contentlan=2&culture=en-US
- 2008:6: The Cross-cutting Themes in the Finnish Development Cooperation, http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=161458&nodeid=15454&contentlan=2&culture=en-US
- 2007:3 Implementation of the Paris Declaration in Finland, http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=126515&nodeid=15454&contentlan=2&culture=en-US

Also several sectoral, thematic, policy and country programme evaluations have been done, that have a reference to the topic (See all of our evaluations: http://formin.finland.fi/developmentpolicy/evaluations).

2 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE EVALUATION

The purpose of the evaluation is to serve strategic planning and decision making needs of the oncoming governments and the MFA. This information also helps the Ministry to develop further the DPPs and results-based management, especially the policy steering processes of the development policy and cooperation of Finland.

The objective of the evaluation is to assess the previous three DPPs and related policy steering process as well as the formulation processes of DPPs and strategic accountability structures from the results-based management point of view.
Evaluation itself is also a major tool for accountability. Thus, the evaluation will inform the general public, parliamentarians, academia, and development professionals outside the immediate sphere of the decision-makers in development policy of what has been achieved by the use of public funds.

3 SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

This evaluation is a formative evaluation focusing in the following aspects of DPP (see results-chain framework in the end of the document):

The *formulation processes* of the three latest DPPs from accountability, ownership and continuity points of view.

The *overall structure* of three latest DPPs from the results-based management point of view.

The key *policy steering processes and structures* ensuring that policy priorities are reflected in resource allocations, working modalities and division of the work within the MFA and embassies (incl. Operating and Financial Plans, policy guidelines and other intellectual inputs like training and advise, the mandates and roles of the Minister for International Development, the Department for Development Policy, regional departments, organizational joint bodies like Development Policy Committee, Development Policy Steering Group, and Quality Assurance Board as well as the Government high-level network of Policy Coherence for Development, PCD Network).

The *accountability structures* at strategic level (like annual reporting of the MFA to the Parliament).

In this evaluation, using the result chain logic, the *programming documents, policy influencing plans and funding decisions are seen as outputs of the system, and therefore reflecting* how the expected outcomes and policy priorities of DPPs have been reflected at this level of the result chain. Also the policy content and

priorities of DPPs will be assessed only from the results-based management point of view. This means that the main principles and priorities mentioned in the DPPs (like human rights, equality and sustainable development) will be used only as examples to describe how successfully these principles and priorities have been transformed into practical programmes and influencing processes.

The temporal scope of the evaluation is 2003–2013, covering the latest three government programmes. The DPP forms the basis for the development commitment of the government for four years but the Implementation of the DPP overlaps with the next DPPs. The evaluation is expected to construct a timeline demonstrating the evolving results-based management structures of DPPs and related steering and accountability processes.

The focus of the evaluation will be at system wide strategic level processes, programming and reporting levels, not at the practical implementation of individual programmes or instruments. The relevant strategic level decision making bodies include the following: Development Policy Committee; Development Policy Steering Group, Quality Assurance Board.

The evaluation covers regional and country programming as well as European Union (EU) and multilateral programming civil society organisation (CSO) cooperation, humanitarian assistance and policy influencing processes.

All major instruments are covered, but only at normative, guideline, instruction and overall funding allocation levels, not at the individual programme level. However, samples of programme documents, funding decisions as well as reports will be used to demonstrate the programmatic links from policy priorities and principles to results-based programmes.

A systematic analysis of the main policy documents and previous relevant evaluations and reviews (see the list in chapter 1) on the focus areas should form the baseline for the assessment, and the recommendations should be benchmarked with similar processes of carefully chosen development agencies or donor countries. The evaluation team should identify 2–3 international benchmarks in order to formulate innovative but practical recommendations on how to, and to what direction Finland should steer its development policy setting and implementation processes in the challenging and ever changing development domain. Benchmarks can be done in a participatory manner involving the MFA key stakeholders in some parts of the benchmarking process.

4 EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The main evaluation question is:
How have the last three Development Policy Programmes succeeded in defining the foundation for results-based development policy and cooperation?

The evaluation will define a limited number of sub-questions (up to a maximum of 12) that will be prepared as a part of the inception report. The evaluation is also expected to construct a timeline demonstrating the evolvement of the RBM development policy of the MFA and apply a theory of change approach in order to contextualize the evaluation questions to fit in the assessment of DPP and the results-based management (RBM) processes and structures of the MFA. An initial results chain framework is in the end of this ToR. The evaluation team is expected to clarify and further develop it, when defining the evaluation question matrix. The evaluation will also cover the OECD/DAC and EU criteria where applicable.

5 GENERAL APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The evaluation will serve strategic planning and decision making needs by providing concrete, practical and innovative recommendations that are based on objective analysis and observations as well as logical conclusions. The approach and working modality will be participatory. Data collection and analysis methodology should be elaborated further in the inception report. The previous RBA evaluation results must be taken into account when designing the evaluation approach and methodology.

The main method used in this evaluation will be document review combined with statistics and interviews of the key stakeholders in Finland and in benchmarked agencies. The evaluation team is expected to propose a detailed methodology as well as suitable benchmark countries in the inception report. The methods of analysing data will be mixed multiple methods (both quantitative and qualitative).

The main sources of information will be the Government Programme documents, Development Policy Programme documents, official policy guidelines and other policy steering documents, capacity building and instructional materials, all the MFA programming documents, samples of funding decisions, administrative in-house norms and decisions on resource allocation (human and financial). Also the documentation related to the division of work in programming as well as reporting of results of development cooperation (strategic level and system level documents and statistics). Samples of lower level documents can be used only to demonstrate the links between policy and programming in selected policy priorities, goals and principles. In addition, instrument guidelines and their revisions as well as strategic level resource allocations can be used (and samples of individual programme and funding decisions only for demonstration purposes). The findings from documents should be verified through interviews of the key people. The key informant groups should be initially indicated in the proposal, and identified in more details during the inception phase. As the document repository is very broad and extensive, sampling can be utilized. Sampling principles and its effect to reliability and validity of the evaluation must be elaborated separately.

The evaluation should use statistics on funding decisions over the time and seek different alternative sources of information in order to verify other observations (triangulation). Trustworthy of the findings should be assessed, and taken in account when making conclusions and recommendations.

During the process the evaluation team is expected to show sensitivity to political nature of strategic level issues, gender roles, ethnicity, beliefs, manners and customs of all stakeholders. The evaluators will respect the rights and desire of the interviewees and stakeholders to provide information in confidence. Direct quotes from interviewees and stakeholders may be used in the reports, if deemed necessary, only anonymously.

The evaluation team is encouraged to raise issues that it deems important to the evaluation but are not mentioned in these terms of reference. Similarly, the team is encouraged to take up issues included in the terms of reference which it does not deem feasible.

6 EVALUATION PROCESS, TIMELINES AND DELIVERABLES

The evaluation consists of the following phases and will produce the respective deliverables. The process will move forward according to the phases described below. A new phase is initiated when all the deliverables of the previous phase have been approved by EVA-11. The reports will be delivered in Word-format (Microsoft Word 2010) with all the tables and pictures also separately in their original formats.

I. Start-up Meeting
The purpose of the start-up meeting is to discuss the entire evaluation process including practical issues related to the field visits, reporting (including agreeing on reporting format and writing instructions) and administrative matters. Start-up meeting can also be organized as a video conference. The start-up meeting will be organized by EVA-11 right after the signing of the contract in the end of June 2014.

II. Inception
Deliverables: Inception report and inception meeting (incl. minutes of the meeting)
This phase includes a plan for data collection and preliminary data analysis as well as the preparation of an inception report and organization of an inception meeting in Helsinki.

Preparation of the main and specific evaluation questions, evaluation matrix and the work plan constitute the inception report. The general evaluation questions will also be opened into specific research questions and respective indicators. The methodology and sources of verification will be explained in detail, including the methods and tools of analyses, scoring or rating systems and alike.

The division of tasks between the team members will be finalized in the inception report. In addition, a list of stakeholder groups to be interviewed will be included in the inception report. The inception report will also suggest an outline of the final reports. The structure of the report will follow the established overall structure of the evaluation reports of the Ministry. Inception report should be kept concise and should not exceed 25 pages, annexes excluded. The inception report will be submitted latest in the end of July 2014.

The consultant will organize the inception meeting in Helsinki in mid-August. The meeting can also be organized as video conference.

III. Desk Study
Deliverable: Desk study report
Desk study phase consists of an analysis of the written material and revised plan for the interview phase. Desk study report will provide a concise analysis of the previous evaluations, policy documents, guidelines, instruments, working mandates and official division of work, thematic/regional programming, context analysis, and other relevant documents related to the evaluation subject. It will also present a plan for the interviews and benchmarking visits including the identification of local informants (government authorities, academia, research groups/institutes, civil society representatives, other donors etc.) and other sources of information (studies, publications, statistical data etc.) as well as an outline of the interview questions and a plan for the bench marking process.

Desk study report will be submitted to EVA-11 and is subject to the approval of EVA-11 prior to the interviews in Finland and the bench marking process. The report should be kept concise and clear. It should be submitted latest on mid-September 2014.

IV. Bench Marking
Deliverable: A joint benchmarking mission with participants from the MFA
The benchmarking process and related visits are expected to take place in mid-November 2014. The purpose of the benchmarking is to reflect and validate the results and assessments in the light of donor harmonization and preparation of the global Post 2015 agenda. The MFA team participating the benchmarking mission will be maximum 5 persons, who will be nominated and cost covered by EVA-11.

The preliminary results of benchmarking process and related visits will be presented and discussed during the mission, and the reflected output of the benchmarking will then be integrated to the final analysis. In addition, the benchmarking outputs will be documented as a separate section in the final report and discussed at the final public presentation to be organized by EVA-11 in Helsinki.

After the benchmarking, further interviews and document study in Finland may still be needed to complement the information collected during the desk study phase and the field visits.

V. Final Reporting
Deliverable: Final report (including final draft report and final report) and public presentation supported by a power point presentation. The final report should be kept clear, concise and consistent. The report should contain inter alia the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations and the logic on those should be clear and based on evidence.

The final draft report must be available mid December 2014. A public presentation will be organized on when the final draft report is ready. The final draft report will be subjected to a round of comments by the parties concerned.

The report will be finalized based on the comments received and will be ready by 24 January 2015. The final report must include abstract and summary in Finnish, Swedish and English.

In addition to the presentations in Helsinki, a presentation of the findings of the evaluation may also be organized through a webinar or video conference.
The MFA also requires access to the evaluation team's interim evidence documents, e.g. completed matrices, although it is not expected that these should be of publishable quality. We are also aware that they may include confidential information. All confidential information will be handled properly.

The Consultant will submit a methodological note explaining how the quality control was addressed during the evaluation and how the capitalization of lessons learned has also been addressed.

It should be noted that the final draft report and final report may be subjected to an external peer review of internationally recognized experts. The views of the peer reviewers will anonymously be made available to the Consultant contracted to perform this evaluation.

7 EXPERTISE REQUIRED

In overall, successful conduct of the evaluation requires a senior expertise in overall state of the art international development policy and cooperation issues including policy level processes, programming and aid management, policy coherence for development, development cooperation modalities and players in the global scene. It also requires solid experience in agency wide policy and strategy evaluations and hands-on long-term experience at the agency as well as field levels. It also requires deep understanding of Finnish development policy management structures, current topics in development policy (e.g. logical framework and theory of change, human rights-based approach and cross-cutting objectives). In depth knowledge in policy processes, governance and results-based management is also needed.

The competencies of the team members will be complementary.

The evaluation team will include a mix of male and female experts. The team will also include experts from both developed and developing countries.

One of the senior experts of the team will be identified as the Team Leader. The Team Leader will lead the work and will be ultimately responsible for the deliverables. The evaluation team will work under the leadership of the Team Leader who carries the final responsibility of completing the evaluation.

Detailed team requirements are included in the Instructions to the Tenderers (ITT).

8 BUDGET AND PAYMENT MODALITIES

The evaluation will not cost more than EUR 250 000 (value added tax excluded).

9 MANAGEMENT OF THE EVALUATION

The Development Evaluation Unit (EVA-11) will be responsible for the management of the evaluation. The EVA-11 will work closely with other units/departments of the Ministry and other stakeholders in Finland and abroad.

10 MANDATE

The evaluation team is entitled and expected to discuss matters relevant to this evaluation with pertinent persons and organizations. However, it is not authorized to make any commitments on behalf of the Government of Finland. The evaluation team does not represent the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland in any capacity.

The evaluation team has no immaterial rights to any of the material collected in the course of the evaluation or to any draft or final reports produced as a result of this assignment.

11 AUTHORISATION

Helsinki, 4.4.2014

Jyrki Pulkkinen
Director
Development Evaluation Unit
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

Scope of the evaluation

Impact · Outcome · Output · Activity · Input

Outcome expectations

Impact expectations

Development Policy Committee

Government PCD network

Result management

Development Policy Steering Group

Quality Assurance Board

Beneficiaries

DEVELOPMENT

Results of Finland's development cooperation contributes to the well-being of the people in its partner countries as planned. Finland is able to make an impact in the international fora.

Partners

IMPLEMENTATION

Interventions progress as planned and produce intended results based on the reports by partners and external assessments.

MFA Units

DECISIONS

Programmes and processes are set up to channel the funds as deemed most suitable. Instruments are used in a complementary manner.

MFA DoDP

STEERING

Resources (human and financial) are allocated and work between the MFA Units is divided effectively to achieve the set goals and implement the programmes and processes in line with the DPP and key guidelines.

Minister

PARTICIPATION

Development Policy Programme (DPP) & official guidelines defines the 1) intended results, 2) priorities for resources utilization and 3) approach for implementing development programmes and processes.

Government programme

Learning

Monitoring

Evaluation

Accountability

ANNEX 2: PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

Alphabetical list of persons interviewed (individual and group interviews)

	Name	Position, Unit/Department and Organization
1	**Markku Aho**	Former Counsellor (retired), Unit for International Environmental Policy, MFA
2	**Helena Airaksinen**	Director, Unit for Eastern and Western Africa, MFA
3	**Kari Alanko**	Deputy Director General, Department for Africa and the Middle East, MFA
5	**Sinikka Antila**	Ambassador, Embassy of Finland, Tanzania, MFA
4	**Pertti Anttinen**	Senior Adviser, Steering and coordination of development Cooperation,, Department for Africa and the Middle East, MFA
6	**Brian Baldwin**	Senior Operations Management Officer, Programme Management Department, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
7	**Andrew Bennett**	President, Tropical Agricultural Association, United Kingdom (UK)
8	**Tomas Bergenholtz**	Senior Adviser, Swedish International Development Agency, Sida
9	**Les Campbell**	Director, Value for Money, DfID
10	**Tuukka Castrén**	Senior Forestry Specialist, World Bank, former Senior Adviser, Development Policy, MFA
11	**Alexandra Cran-McGreehin**	Head of Secretariat, Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), UK
12	**Martti Eirola**	Counsellor, Unit for Sectoral Policy, Department of Development Policy (DoDP), MFA
13	**Fabrizio Felloni**	Senior Evaluation Officer, Independent Office of Evaluation, IFAD
14	**Hanna Gehör**	Attaché, Unit for Environmental Policy, DoDP, MFA
15	**Maria Halava-Napoles**	First Secretary, Unit for Environmental Policy, DoDP, MFA
16	**Petri Hautaniemi**	Senior Officer, Unit for Civil Society, DoDP, MFA
17	**Vuokko Jutila**	Tanzania Team Leader, Unit for Eastern and Western Africa, MFA
18	**Ulla Järvelä-Seppinen**	Senior Adviser, Development Policy, Unit for General Development Policy and Planning, DoDP, MFA
19	**Vesa Kaarakka**	Senior Adviser, Unit for Sectoral Policy, DoDP, MFA
20	**Päivi Kannisto**	Senior Adviser, Unit for Sectoral Policy, MFA
21	**Lotta Karlsson**	Director, Unit for Administrative and Legal Development Cooperation Matters, DoDP, MFA

22	**Milma Kettunen**	Desk Officer, Department for Africa and the Middle East, MFA
23	**Marja-Liisa Kiljunen**	Deputy Director, Unit for Civil Society, DoDP, MFA
24	**Antero Klemola**	Senior Adviser, Department for the Americas and Asia, MFA
25	**Kristiina Kuvaja**	Director, Unit for Sectoral Policy, DoDP, MFA
26	**Riikka Laatu**	Deputy Director General, DoDP, MFA
26	**Sarah Lacoche**	Director, Accountability and Strategic Pilot, French Development Agency
28	**Matti Lahtinen**	Senior Officer, Unit for Civil Society, DoDP, MFA
29	**Satu Lassila**	Senior Adviser, The United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UNWomen); Former Senior Adviser, Unit for Humanitarian Assistance, DoDP, MFA
30	**Ari Mäki**	Ambassador (Afghanistan), MFA
31	**Kati Manner**	Counsellor/Head of Cooperation, Department for Africa and the Middle East, MFA
32	**John Mayne**	Adviser on Public Sector Performance and RBM expert
33	**Päivi Mattila**	General Secretary, Finnish League for Human Rights
34	**Simon Maxwell**	Senior Research Associate, Overseas Development Institute, UK
35	**Heli Mikkola**	Senior Officer, Unit for United Nations (UN) Development Issues, MFA
36	**Matti Nummelin**	Senior Adviser, Unit for Sectoral Policy, DoDP, MFA
37	**Riitta Oksanen**	Senior Evaluation Officer, EVA-11, MFA
38	**Simo-Pekka Parviainen**	First Secretary, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy (Tanzania), MFA
39	**Denise Patrick**	Statistics Adviser, Improving Aid Impact Team, DfID
40	**Sami Pirkkala**	Counsellor, Unit for Environmental Policy, DoDP, MFA
41	**Pekka Puustinen**	Director General, DoDP, MFA
42	**Sian Rasdale**	Senior Statistics Adviser, DfID
43	**Hanna Rinkineva**	Deputy Director, Unit for General Development Policy and Planning, DoDP, MFA
44	**Tessa Rintala**	Administrator, Unit for Civil Society, MFA
45	**Mehaka Rountree**	Principal Development Manager, Development Strategy & Effectiveness, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
46	**Olli Ruohomäki**	Senior Adviser, Team Leader for South Asia, Department for the Americas and Asia, MFA
47	**Katariina Sario**	Senior Adviser, Unit for Sectoral Policy, DoDP, MFA
48	**Iina Soiri**	Director, Nordic Africa Institute
49	**Marikki Stochetti**	Secretary General, Development Policy Committee
50	**Janne Sykkö**	Administrative Secretary, Concessional Loans and Finnpartnership, Unit for Development Financing Institutions, MFA
51	**Juhani Toivonen**	Senior Adviser, Development policy issues, Unit for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, MFA
52	**Laura Torvinen**	Director, Unit for Development Financing Institutions, DoDP, MFA
53	**Janet Vähämäki**	PhD candidate, School of Business, Stockholm University, Consultant and RBM expert
54	**Arto Valjas**	Senior Adviser, Department for Africa and the Middle East, MFA
55	**Lotta Valtonen**	Counsellor (budget support and governance, Embassy of Finland, Tanzania, MFA
56	**Ingrid Van Aalst**	Principal Evaluation and Research Manager, Development strategy and effectiveness, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
57	**Katariina Vartiainen**	Senior Adviser, Unit for Sectoral Policy, DoDP, MFA
58	**Suvi Virkkunen**	Senior Adviser, Development Policy, DoDP, MFA

59	**Timo Voipio**	Senior Adviser, Unit for Sectoral Policy, DoDP, MFA
60	**Max Von Bonsdorff**	Senior Adviser, Unit for General Development Policy and Planning, DoDP, MFA
61	**Hannah Widstam**	Methods Group, Department for Management of Development Aid, MFA, Sweden
62	**Kent Wilska**	Counsellor, Department for External Relations, MFA
63	**Bernard Woods**	Principal Results Management Specialist, Results Management Unit (SPRU), Strategy and Policy Department, Asian Development Bank
64	**Hisham Zehni**	Strategic Planning Officer, Strategic Planning and Budget Division, IFAD

ANNEX 3: SURVEY RESULTS

Timing

An online survey of MFA staff involved in development cooperation was conducted between November 5 and December 5, 2014 for the present evaluation. Due to an enlargement of the targeted group in mid-November, the survey was executed in two rounds that took place as displayed in the table below.

Survey Group	Date Survey Launched	Date Survey Officially Closed	Date Survey Results Last Received
1st round	November 5, 2014	November 18, 2014	November 21, 2014
2nd round	November 21, 2014	November 28, 2014	December 5, 2014

Method and Content

The survey was divided into five sections:

1. General information on the respondent;
2. The contents and context of the Development Policy Programmes (DPPs);
3. The influencing factors and effects of each DPP. Respondents who felt knowledgeable only on the 2012 DPP were automatically directed to questions;
4. Downstream guidance and MFA structure for the implementation of the DPPs
5. Accountability and results at the MFA. In this section, one question containing selected statements of a MFA staff survey conducted in 2010 in the context of the RBM evaluation was included in order to identify trends in MFA staff opinions.

Questions were mostly asking for the level agreement or disagreement of respondents with statements formulated in a provocative way in order to trigger their reactions. Some contradictory statements were included to verify the consistency of responses. For each question apart from the last (comparison with the 2010 RBM survey), the survey systematically provided respondents with the possibility to comment their answers or give further input. These comments are summarized at the end of each question in a way to ensure the confidentiality of respondents.

Target Group and Response Rate

Targeted group	218
Disqualified (no experience or not working on the Development Policy)	2
Targeted group clean	216
Number of responses received	98
• Excluded (only first section completed)	8

• Included:
  o full responses
  o at least 20% of the survey completed
	90
	84
	6

Response rate	41,7 %

Colour Coding

In the following, the survey results will be presented in tables using a colour coding scheme. The scheme is based on the number of responses received per answer. The selected scheme colours answers with a higher response rate green and those with a lower response rate red. Response rates are based on a sliding scale. Please see the example below for an illustrative explanation.

Answer	5	4	3	2	1	0

SURVEY RESULTS

Question 1. In which departments (and units, in the case of DoDP) of the Finnish MFA have you been working since 2004? (You can select more than one option).

Responses	Number of responses	Share of responses*
At an Embassy	48	53%
Department for Africa and the Middle East	18	20%
Department for the Americas and Asia	13	14%
Department for Europe	2	2%
Department for Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia	3	3%
Unit for General Development Policy or Unit for Administrative and Legal Development Cooperation Matters - formerly Unit for General Development Policy and Planning (part of DoDP)	13	14%
Unit for Sectoral Policy (part of DoDP)	16	18%
Unit for Civil Society - formerly Unit for Non-Governmental Organisations (part of DoDP)	3	3%
Unit for UN Development Issues (part of DoDP)	4	4%

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	Number of responses	Share of responses
Unit for Development Financing Institutions (part of DoDP)	7	8%
Unit for International Environmental Policy (part of DoDP)	5	6%
Unit for Humanitarian Assistance and Humanitarian Assistance Policy - formerly Unit for Humanitarian Assistance (part of DoDP)	2	2%
Other (please specify) • Unit for UN and general global affairs • Unit for communications of current affairs • Minister's cabinet (KEMI), Unit for Development Communication • Team of the DG at the DoDP, Secretariat of the Development Policy Committee (DPC) • Unit for development evaluation • Department of Communication and Culture • Department for Development Policy • Minister's Cabinet • Department for External Economic Relations • Development Communication Unit, Trade Policy Unit, Personnel Planning Unit • Department of External Economic Relations	18	20%
Total	**152**	**169%**

*based on the number of respondents to the survey (90)

Question 2. Please indicate your current position in the organization.

Responses	Number of responses	Share of responses*
Director General	0	0%
Deputy Director General	3	3%
Unit Director	5	6%
Ambassador	4	4%
First Secretary	5	6%
Counsellor	32	36%
Senior Officer	2	2%
(Senior) Adviser	16	18%
Program Officer (ylitarkastaja, tarkastaja)	15	17%
Attaché	0	0%
Other (please specify) • Assistant • Second Secretary (administrative affairs) • Team leader • Adviser (Erityisasiantuntija) • Deputy Director / Team Leader	13	15%
Total	**95**	**106%**

*based on the number of respondents to the survey (90)

Question 3. Please estimate for how many years you have worked at the MFA between 2004 and 2014. Try to estimate the total time in years rather than counting calendar years and do not count MFA secondments to external institutions.

Responses	Number of responses	Share of responses
0	2	2%
1	7	8%
2	5	6%
3	3	3%
4	5	6%
5	9	10%
6	8	9%
7	2	2%
8	9	10%
9	10	11%
10	23	26%
11	4	5%
Total	**87**	**100%**

Question 4. During that time at the MFA, how many different positions did you work in? Again, please do not count MFA secondments to external institutions and do not count promotions without change of job duties.

Responses	Number of responses	Share of responses
1 (I have worked in one and the same position in the MFA)	23	26%
2	19	21%
3	24	27%
4	15	17%
5 or more	9	10%
Total	**90**	**100%**

Question 5. Since 2004, to what policy implementation channel(s) has your work contributed. (You can select more than one option).

Responses	Number of responses	Share of responses*
Multilateral cooperation	58	64%
The European Union and/or the European Development Fund	35	39%
Bilateral and regional cooperation	74	82%
Non-Governmental Organisations	48	53%
Humanitarian assistance	13	14%
Development policy beyond development cooperation (e.g. policy coherence)	37	41%
Other (please specify) • The work all implementation • Aid for Trade (AFT) • Thematic cooperation via multilateral organizations, trade and development/ Aid for Trade • neighbouring area cooperation	6	7%
Total	**271**	**301%**

*based on the number of respondents to the survey (90)

Question 6. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements on the characteristics of DPPs. (Please note: these statements are sometimes formulated in a provocative way in order to trigger your reaction. They do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the evaluators).

Responses	Strongly disagree	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Strongly agree	Total Number of responses
DPPs clearly define the principles and values of Finnish development policy	0	10	50	30	90
DPPs provide clear and measurable objectives and priorities for Finnish development policy implementation	21	34	32	2	89
DPPs list a lot of important goals and principles but fail to establish clear priorities between them	3	12	40	34	89
New DPPs clearly identify changes compared to previous DPPs	6	35	38	8	87
DPPs do not make many concrete commitments. Ongoing work can mostly be interpreted to also fit new DPPs	1	20	53	16	90
From 2004 to 2012, DPPs have become more useful for results-based management, i.e. they provide increasingly clear and measurable objectives and priorities for Finnish development policy implementation	9	44	32	3	88

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Responses	Strongly disagree	Disagree some-what	Agree some-what	Strongly agree	Total Number of responses
DPPs do not reflect a realistic understanding of existing and ongoing budget commitments, for example in bilateral cooperation	2	29	45	10	86
DPPs logically build on previous DPPs and the related "inherited" portfolio	9	39	35	5	88
DPPs provide a realistic timeline as to when to expect future results	31	44	13	1	89
DPPs define responsibilities for the MFA but not for other Finnish ministries	1	11	50	27	89
DPPs are - or would be - the right policy document to define development-related responsibilities of other Finnish ministries, for example related to policy coherence	5	12	51	22	90
Downstream guidance documents (e.g. strategies, action plans) do a great job at translating overall DPP guidance into practical guidance for operations	5	41	33	8	87
Downstream guidance documents (e.g. strategies, action plans) provide clear and measurable objectives for specific themes, sectors and policy and cooperation channels	13	46	27	1	87
Summary of 17 comments received					

Several comments aim at clarifying that a policy and a strategy are different things and that the DPP should be more focused on main priorities rather than trying to set verifiable results and budgets. Some complain about the amount of guidance produced, the effort put in their formulation compared to actual implementation and their disconnection from the reality of implementation.

Question 7. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements related to the life cycle of DPPs. (Please note: these statements are sometimes formulated in a provocative way in order to trigger your reaction. They do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the evaluators).

Responses	Strongly disagree	Disagree some-what	Agree some-what	Strongly agree	Total Number of responses
New DPPs every four years represents too short a timescale for development work	1	8	30	50	89
DPPs do not provide clear guidance on the implementation of activities commenced under the previous DPP. It is not clear what the new government and minister wants to do with work started in the previous governmental period	0	9	46	34	89
Important downstream guidance documents (e.g. strategies, action plans) are sometimes produced only towards the end of the DPP period	0	17	52	15	84

Responses	Strongly disagree	Disagree some-what	Agree some-what	Strongly agree	Total Number of responses
Downstream guidance documents (e.g. strategies, action plans) are produced too late to be of much use during the DPP period they apply to	0	24	45	15	84
Downstream guidance documents (e.g. strategies, action plans) are usually valid beyond one DPP period. It is therefore not problematic even if they are sometimes produced late in the DPP period	2	29	47	6	84
Summary of 14 comments received					
Comments reiterate that the 4-years cycle is too short to enable effective work and results. Several respondents clarify the status and validity of downstream guidance: they are not systematically connected to the DPP, it is unclear whether they remain valid beyond the DPP or, their validity exceeds the DPP.					

Question 8. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements on possibilities of improvements of DPP guidance. (Please note: these statements are sometimes formulated in a provocative way in order to trigger your reaction. They do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the evaluators).

Responses	Strongly disagree	Disagree some-what	Agree some-what	Strongly agree	Total Number of responses
The MFA urgently needs a longer-term (beyond 4 years) strategic guidance for its development policy that remains stable over government cycles	0	11	28	51	90
DPPs should be reduced to contain only a policy vision and not attempt at setting concrete objectives and targets	6	30	30	19	85
The DPP document itself should contain clear and measurable targets and indicators	9	34	39	5	87
DPP should be supported by a separate, detailed implementation plan, road map or results framework that clearly describes at what point in time what results are planned	4	12	40	32	88
There should be a smooth transition between DPPs: new DPPs should systematically address ongoing activities and consider experiences made under the previous DPP	0	6	31	51	88
Key elements of Finnish development policy should be anchored in a law on development and DPPs should complement this law	15	28	32	12	87
DPPs should be replaced by a law on development	30	37	15	3	85
Summary of 17 comments received					
Several comments suggest a long-term vision accompanied by a separate implementation plan or results framework. Others wish to see long-term vision defined at the unit level or concrete allocation decisions and implementation left to the country.					

Question 9. Our evaluation focuses on the last three DPPs: 2004, 2007 and 2012. Please indicate which DPP(s) you feel familiar enough with to answer some questions about it.

Responses	Number of responses	Total Number of responses
I can only provide information on the 2012 DPP (the survey will take you directly to questions about that DPP)	45	90
I can (also) provide information on an older DPP	45	90

Question 10a. In your opinion, what were the major factors influencing the contents of the 2004 DPP? Skip this question if you feel you don't know enough about the 2004 DPP.

2004					
Responses	Not sure	No or marginal influence	Significant but not dominant influence	Dominant influence	Total Number of responses
The Government Programme	6	0	9	2	17
The background and ideas of the Minister for International Development	1	7	6	2	16
Systematic evaluation of past DPP implementation or otherwise making use of lessons learned regarding previous DPP implementation	3	7	5	1	16
Earlier experiences and results of Finnish development cooperation assessed in evaluation reports	2	2	12	1	17
Experiences of other donor countries and development agencies	2	3	8	4	17
OECD DAC peer reviews of Finland	4	1	10	1	16
International agreements and discourses	1	0	13	3	17
The views and input of MFA staff	1	1	7	8	17
Negotiations with non-governmental stakeholders (Civil Society Organizations, research institutes, business and workers organizations, etc.)	4	2	9	1	16
The views and inputs of other Finnish Ministries	7	8	1	0	16
Other influencing factors (please specify in the comment box below)	10	0	1	1	12
Summary of 4 comments received					
Single key persons suggested as influence					

Question 10b. In your opinion, what were the major factors influencing the contents of the 2007 DPP? Skip this question if you feel you don't know enough about the 2007 DPP.

2007					
Responses	Not sure	No or marginal influence	Significant but not dominant influence	Domi- nant influence	Total Number of responses
The Government Programme	6	13	18	1	38
The background and ideas of the Minister for International Development	0	0	1	41	42
Systematic evaluation of past DPP imple- mentation or otherwise making use of lessons learned regarding previous DPP implementation	5	30	4	0	39
Earlier experiences and results of Finnish development cooperation assessed in evalu- ation reports	5	24	11	0	40
Experiences of other donor countries and development agencies	8	22	9	0	39
OECD DAC peer reviews of Finland	8	20	10	1	39
International agreements and discourses	2	10	25	3	40
The views and input of MFA staff	2	17	20	1	40
Negotiations with non-governmental stake- holders (Civil Society Organizations, research institutes, business and workers organiza- tions, etc.)	5	19	12	2	38
The views and inputs of other Finnish Ministries	12	21	5	0	38
Other influencing factors (please specify in the comment box below)	17	4	1	1	23
Summary of 5 comments received					
The Río conference suggested as influence and the influence of the minister emphasized again.					

Question 10c. In your opinion, what were the major factors influencing the contents of the 2012 DPP? Skip this question if you feel you don't know enough about the 2012 DPP.

2012					
Responses	Not sure	No or marginal influence	Significant but not dominant influence	Dominant influence	Total Number of responses
The Government Programme	4	12	46	12	74
The background and ideas of the Minister for International Development	1	2	13	60	76
Systematic evaluation of past DPP implementation or otherwise making use of lessons learned regarding previous DPP implementation	6	39	28	0	73
Earlier experiences and results of Finnish development cooperation assessed in evaluation reports	9	31	31	1	72
Experiences of other donor countries and development agencies	8	25	34	5	72
OECD DAC peer reviews of Finland	16	24	28	3	71
International agreements and discourses	6	8	45	13	72
The views and input of MFA staff	5	11	44	13	73
Negotiations with non-governmental stakeholders (Civil Society Organizations, research institutes, business and workers organizations, etc.)	3	7	39	25	74
The views and inputs of other Finnish Ministries	14	42	15	1	72
Input from the Development Policy Committee	22	12	33	2	69
Other influencing factors (please specify in the comment box below)	24	3	2	1	30
Summary of 7 comments received					
Political party and grouping behind the minister and single key people suggested as influence					

Question 11a. What effects and changes did you observe that were clearly caused by the 2004 DPP? Please indicate the intensity of change observed for the following items. Skip this question if you feel you don't know enough about the 2004 DPP.

2004					
Responses	**No significant change**	**Modest change**	**Significant change**	**Sub-stantial change**	**Total Number of responses**
The production of additional downstream guidance on specific themes, sectors and channels	1	5	7	3	16
The allocation of resources	1	8	6	2	17
The discontinuation of some activities	2	9	2	2	15
The way I or my unit work(s)	3	7	5	1	16
Categories and/or targets against which to report	3	7	4	0	14
The introduction of new instruments of development cooperation	2	5	4	3	14
The emphasis put on some activities and/or areas of work	1	4	7	4	16
Summary of 4 comments received					
Changes observed: focus and collaboration between trade and development, emphasis on programmatic aid and budget support, emphasis on Policy Coherence for Development					

Question 11b. What effects and changes did you observe that were clearly caused by the 2007 DPP? Please indicate the intensity of change observed for the following items. Skip this question if you feel you don't know enough about the 2007 DPP.

2007					
Responses	**No significant change**	**Modest change**	**Significant change**	**Sub-stantial change**	**Total Number of responses**
The production of additional downstream guidance on specific themes, sectors and channels	2	10	21	5	38
The allocation of resources	0	5	19	15	39
The discontinuation of some activities	1	12	13	11	37
The way I or my unit work(s)	5	17	12	4	38
Categories and/or targets against which to report	9	18	7	1	35
The introduction of new instruments of development cooperation	2	15	15	4	36
The emphasis put on some activities and/or areas of work	0	0	22	18	40
Summary of 3 comments received					
Changes observed: emphasis of Finnish Value Added and Aid for Trade					

Question 11c. What effects and changes did you observe that were clearly caused by the 2012 DPP? Please indicate the intensity of change observed for the following items. Skip this question if you feel you don't know enough about the 2012 DPP.

2012					
Responses	**No significant change**	**Modest change**	**Significant change**	**Sub-stantial change**	**Total Number of responses**
The production of additional downstream guidance on specific themes, sectors and channels	6	22	29	12	69
The allocation of resources	5	26	26	9	66
The discontinuation of some activities	10	31	23	5	69
The way I or my unit work(s)	12	24	19	10	65
Categories and/or targets against which to report	10	16	34	8	68
The introduction of new instruments of development cooperation	12	41	13	2	68
The emphasis put on some activities and/or areas of work	3	10	30	27	70
Summary of 12 comments received					
Changes observed: emphasis on aid effectiveness, human-rights based approach (HRBA) but without concrete guidance, increased attention to the role of NGOs, introduction of country strategies. Several respondents mention that previous agreements, budget cuts and human resource allocation made operationalization and change difficult					

Question 12. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statement on downstream guidance issued to implement DPPs. This includes more specific guidance on sector, themes or channels of Finnish development policy. Examples are country and influencing strategies, guidelines and action plans. (Please note: these statements are sometimes formulated in a provocative way in order to trigger your reaction. They do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the evaluators).

Responses	Strongly disagree	Disagree some-what	Agree some-what	Strongly agree	Total Number of responses
DPPs do not provide concrete enough guidance for formulating sector and thematic policies and guidelines	3	25	51	4	83
DPPs do not provide concrete enough guidance for allocating financial and human resources	2	14	45	22	83
Targets and indicators for downstream work can be derived clearly and unambiguously from DPPs	29	38	14	2	83
Downstream guidance derived from DPPs defines tangible results to be attained	18	40	21	2	81
DPP implementation and downstream guidance is strongly influenced by other factors than the DPP itself, for example: the minister's own priorities beyond the DPP, MFA expert staff priorities, international negotiations, emerging international best practices and international agreements	1	6	46	28	81
Sector and thematic policies, guidelines and action plans must be further developed to include also results frameworks with targets and indicators	2	8	34	38	82
The status of guidance, in terms of how mandatory and binding it is, of these downstream guidance documents is clear to everyone	24	38	17	1	80
The policies and guidelines for cross-cutting objectives provide clear objectives and measurable targets	24	46	10	1	81
Summary of 10 comments received					
Respondents point at the amount of downstream guidance and the non-concrete character of some (e.g. HRBA) and several influences on downstream guidance and implementation such as the minister, habits at the MFA or the commitment of budget during the previous DPP cycle. Some suggestions are made to improve of the information system and the inclusion of cross-cutting objectives in sector-specific guidance to foster implementation and to rely on country offices and/or sectors to develop and implement concrete guidelines.					

Question 13. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements related to the management structure of the MFA. (Please note: these statements are sometimes formulated in a provocative way in order to trigger your reaction. They do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the evaluators).

Responses	Strongly disagree	Disagree some-what	Agree some-what	Strongly agree	Total Number of responses
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs' organisational and management structure is well-suited for implementing the DPPs	6	42	29	4	81
DPPs have a clearly defined "institutional owner", i.e. an organisational unit within the MFA responsible for overseeing its implementation	14	32	30	5	81
Downstream guidance documents each have clearly defined "institutional owners", i.e. organisational units within the MFA responsible for overseeing their implementation	8	33	37	2	80
DPP and downstream guidance does not match MFA's structure in terms of department and units. It remains unclear who is responsible for what	3	31	30	12	76
The fact that all MFA departments are at the same level in terms of management hierarchy makes it difficult to manage and oversee DPP implementation	10	30	29	10	79
Mandates and responsibilities for the implementation of DPPs are clearly distributed within the MFA, i.e. there is a clear an unbroken chain of command	21	36	20	4	81
The fact that the MFA is responsible for foreign policy and trade, in addition to development policy, makes it hard to focus staff time, skills and experiences on DPP implementation	12	30	27	12	81
The fact that the MFA is responsible for foreign policy and trade, in addition to development policy, has great advantages (e.g. coherent implementation of development policy) compared to a stand-alone development ministry	4	9	45	24	82
The fact that diplomatic staff sometimes has limited knowledge and experience in international development is a serious issue when implementing DPPs	3	15	38	27	83
The regular rotation required by diplomatic career paths constitute a serious issue for the consistent implementation of DPPs	5	20	34	23	82

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Position changes and leaves of absence of MFA adviser staff seriously hinder the consistent implementation of DPPs	7	27	36	11	81

Summary of 16 comments received

Comments concern:
- The MFA structure: the integrated structure is seen both as a strength to foster coherence and avoid marginality of development cooperation and as a weakness for effective implementation and less valued field at the MFA.
- The "confusing" division of work between DoDP and implementing units and departments.
- The lack skills and experience of rotating staff and the fact that rotation also concerns programme officers and administrative staff.

Question 14. Are your work or the work of your unit on development policy and/or development cooperation assessed against clear and measurable targets? Please provide examples of concrete indicators that are used in the text box below.

Responses	No target at this level	Neither clear nor measurable targets	Clear but not measurable targets	Clear and measurable targets	Total Number of responses
At the organizational level, e.g. MFA human resources, career pathways, reporting lines, job descriptions, etc.	13	31	24	5	73
At the corporate level, e.g. timeliness of processes, results of quality assurance, share of projects with good evaluation results, quality of downstream guidance, country and influencing strategies, etc.	14	36	18	3	71
At the input level, e.g. the allocation of financial resources and staff capacity	10	28	18	14	70
At the output level, e.g. immediate results of MFA activities such as delivered training units, participation in external meetings, number of vaccines applied	15	31	11	14	71
At the level of development outcomes, e.g. number of people lifted from poverty, number of km of street built, number of ha of forest saved	13	21	22	15	71
Related to cross-cutting objectives and overarching approaches, e.g. gender, human rights, inequality, sustainable development etc.	6	38	25	3	72

Summary of 16 examples and comments received

Concrete examples of indicators provided by respondents are number of training participants, number of proposal reviewed, number of participations in meetings and events, number of political reports written in the region. Several respondents point at the progress made at the country level in identifying measurable targets, at the Aid for Trade (AFT) effort to measure results and at the annual targets defined in the Operating and Financial Plan (TTS). Some respondents highlighted that the clarity and measurability of targets depend on the activity and that targets do not necessarily need to be measurable to be verifiable.

Question 15. Do you have concrete suggestions for addressing any of the above issues?

The majority of the suggestions concern the appreciation and visibility of development cooperation in the ministry and society. Suggestions are made to improve the training and strengthen the career paths of administrative and diplomatic staff, to reinforce the results focus and the line of accountability for the implementation of the DPP or to have a separate development agency.

Question 16. How do you agree with the following statements on Results-Based Management at the MFA? (Please note: these statements are sometimes formulated in a provocative way in order to trigger your reaction. They do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the evaluators).

Responses	Strongly disagree	Disagree some-what	Agree some-what	Strongly agree	Total Number of responses
There are clear instructions on what Results-Based Management means in terms of setting objectives, measuring results, and reporting and learning from results.	14	35	30	3	82
My unit has a clear line for reporting results and knows how the information is used upwards	8	38	29	7	82
There are clearly identified results areas with responsible "managers", i.e. responsibilities for results are clearly allocated within MFA	16	35	28	2	81
Results monitoring and reporting are important mainly for accountability purposes such as reporting upwards to the parliament and general public	8	27	28	17	80
Results monitoring and reporting are equally important for accountability and management purposes, i.e. for making MFA perform more effectively and efficiently	1	12	31	38	82
We are tracking information on results but it is not used enough in reporting	4	26	39	13	82
We need to considerably increase the type and number of results indicators that are used	4	33	29	14	80
We need to establish solid financial and operational databases capable of tracking results	3	7	31	38	79
Summary					
On the one hand, several respondents point at the progress made at the country level and the need at the MFA to implement change slowly and to focus on mind-sets rather than technical aspects of RBM. On the other hand, many comments advise to be careful and sensitive with putting too much emphasis and human resources on RBM (rather than actual operations) and developing too many, only quantifiable indicators (rather than few standard and some process indicators) that might affect the actual achievement of results. While some ask for a simple and user-friendly data system, others point at the systematic failure of data systems until now and fear additional burden of work caused by complex reporting and databases.					

Question 17. Almost done now ... In 2010, a survey was conducted as part of the evaluation on results-based management (RBM) that was published in 2011. In order to identify a trend in opinions on RBM at the MFA, we would appreciate if you could indicate your level of agreement with the following, selected statements from that survey.

Responses	Don't know	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Total Number of responses
The need to achieve development results is clearly stated as a priority by senior managers	4	2	19	47	10	82
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) encourages risk taking and mistakes in the pursuit of development results	5	21	46	8	1	81
Staff at MFA Headquarters and staff based at Embassies share the same priorities to manage for results	10	1	23	44	3	81
There are effective follow-up and actions on management response to evaluation	10	3	35	29	3	80
Whether positive or negative, performance information is used to foster learning	11	5	31	33	0	80
The MFA is adequately staffed to meet current policy objectives for development cooperation and follow an RBM approach	4	16	38	18	6	82
In our office adequate time and structured occasions are made available to learn from results and evaluations.	1	12	43	24	0	80
The MFA's rewards systems provide real incentives for strengthening a results culture within the ministry	9	27	39	5	1	81

2010 survey results – for comparison

Responses	Don't know	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Total Number of responses
The need to achieve development results is clearly stated as a priority by senior managers	7	8	18	38	4	75
The MFA encourages risk taking and mistakes in the pursuit of development results	7	26	38	4	0	75
Staff at MFA Headquarters and staff based at Embassies share the same priorities to manage for results	10	2	30	27	3	72
There are effective follow-up and actions on management response to evaluation	12	9	34	15	2	72
Whether positive or negative, performance information is used to foster learning	13	8	30	21	1	73
The MFA is adequately staffed to meet current policy objectives for development cooperation and follow an RBM approach	8	24	30	8	2	72
In our office adequate time and structured occasions are made available to learn from results and evaluations.	5	19	39	9	0	72
The MFA's rewards systems provide real incentives for strengthening a results culture within the ministry	13	25	33	1	0	72

Question 18. Comments – did we forget anything?

Summary of 6 comments received
Respondents identified or reiterated the following points: • The perceived disconnection between DoDP and the regional departments. • The possibility of ensuring continuity between the DPPs by starting the DPP formulation before a new minister is appointed. • The problematic amount of priorities, strategies and related reporting exercises. • The clarity of the distinction between development related activities and the organization's performance/management.

FINLAND'S DEVELOPMENT POLICY PROGRAMMES FROM A RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT POINT OF VIEW 2003-2013

ANNEX 4: THEME AND COUNTRY EXEMPLARY STUDIES

4a Exemplary Theme Study: Gender

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Gender and women's rights as exemplary study. In the Inception Phase of this evaluation gender and women's rights, as a Development Policy Programme (DPP) cross-cutting theme or objective, was selected for an exemplary study. The selection was based on the key criterion that it has been a central cross-cutting theme and, since the 2012 DPP, a central objective in all three DPPs under evaluation. The gender exemplary study aims at highlighting most evaluation questions from the perspective of this theme, starting from the Government Programme (GP) and DPP level to downstream policy guidance, implementation, and to upwards reporting on results.

The evaluation methodology, tools and methods of the exemplary gender and women's rights study follow the uniform evaluation approach (see Chapter 2 of the main report).

Data gathering and analysis were conducted using a two-pronged approach: mainstreaming and gender-specific perspective. Gender-related questions were included in relevant interviews, word-counts of minutes, and the online-survey either explicitly as gender-specific or implicitly as a cross-cutting objective. Triangulation was used to verify and validate the robustness and generalisability of information obtained within and across information sources and between data collection methods.

A large number of documents internal and external to the MFA were reviewed. MFA documents include all GPs and DPPs within the evaluation period; "downstream" documents such as sectoral and thematic guidelines (23) including gender-specific guidance documents; country participation plans (8); country strategies (7); influencing plans for multilateral organisations (15); "upstream" documents such as gender specific evaluations (2) and a sample of evaluations (16) comprising of country, sector and wide evaluations; a sample of DPSG (Development Policy Steering Group) minutes (word count), sample of Quality Assurance Board (QAB) minutes (word count), and DPC (Development Policy Committee) annual reports (13).

In addition to incorporating gender and women's rights in the interviews, gender specific discussions based on the evaluation questions were conducted with the current and previous Gender Advisers (3) and the persons responsible for United National Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 coordination and implementation (2).

1.2 Context

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have set the overall development agenda since year 2000, and thereby for the evaluation period. MDGs linked gender in the development effectiveness agenda by setting a specific goal and targets for promoting gender equality and empowering women, followed by indicators. In addition, international human rights instruments all contain agreed priorities for the

achievement of gender equality and have formed the basis for development dialogue on gender and women's rights for decades. These include e.g. the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) adopted in 1979, the Beijing Platform for Action in 1995 (Beijing + 5; Beijing +10; Beijing +15), and the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) Programme of Action in 1994.

The UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on Women, Peace and Security in 2000 (and consequently) 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009) and 1960 (2010) make a link between development and security and calls for such measures as the prevention of violation of the rights of women and girls in conflicts and prosecution of any such violations, increased participation by women in decision-making about conflict resolution and peace processes, and training in gender-related issues for personnel who take part in peacekeeping and peace-building operations.

Aid effectiveness agenda. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), followed by the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (2011) brought gender on the aid effectiveness agenda. By the time of Busan, gender equality was recognized as critical to achieving development results and there was an explicit commitment to integrating targets on gender equality and women's empowerment in accountability mechanisms. The Busan Joint Action Plan for Gender Equality and Development (2011) states that the collection of gender-relevant data and strong accountability mechanisms are critical to designing effective and appropriate policies, targeting investments, and advancing development progress and human rights.

EU. In addition to the UN conventions, declarations and programmes of action, the EU Consensus on Development (2005) recognises gender equality as a goal in its own right and identifies it as one of the five essential principles of development cooperation. In 2007, the Commission adopted a Communication on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development Cooperation which called for promoting clear objectives and indicators on gender equality. In 2008 the EU adopted an Agenda for Action on MDGs to step up efforts to achieve the MDG targets by 2015 that contained a strong focus on gender equality. The first EU Plan of Action on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development for 2010-2015 defines a three pronged strategy for EU countries, policy dialogue, mainstreaming and targeted actions. It includes actions, indicators and a timetable.

In addition, **Finland's Equality Act** stipulates that gender equality must be actively promoted. Finland's Act on Equality Between Women and Men stipulates the duty of authorities to promote gender equality purposefully and systematically and to change any circumstances that prevent the achievement of equality. The Government of Finland is committed to promoting gender mainstreaming in all its activities. The purpose of mainstreaming is to create a political and administrative procedural culture in which the principles of equality promotion lead to practical action. The Equality Act is binding in all the different areas of administration, including those of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Finland Government Action Plan for Gender Equality 2012–2015 (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 2012:22) is currently in force, and the first Government Report on Gender Equality drawn up in 2010. Each ministry is responsible for implementing measures in the Action Plan that fall within its administrative sector. The Ministry will select at least one project or area in which the gender aspect will be specifically addressed. The gender equality aspects are also to be incorporated in the principal duties of ministries: legislation preparation, budget proposal preparation, performance management and operations planning.

1.3 Summary of Relevant Evaluations, Assessment and Peer Reviews
There are only two gender-specific evaluations carried out during the period under review, one of them

is a baseline study and the other is linked to gender, development and security. In section 2.4 observations are made concerning how these and some other recent evaluations implicitly addressing gender as a cross-cutting theme/objective have possibly contributed to learning and developing policy guidance.

Gender Baseline Study for Finnish Development Cooperation. The overall objective of this study (2005) was to help operationalise the Strategy and Action Plan for Promoting Gender Equality in Finland's Policy for Developing Countries 2003–2007 (MFA 2003 b), and establish a baseline and the status of gender mainstreaming at the time of the study. This is a rare example of a baseline study linked to a policy level action in the Finnish development policy implementation. The main findings relevant for RBM are the following:

- Systematization, reporting, monitoring: gender mainstreaming is left, to a considerable extent, to the personal interest and good will of individual staff members which does not promote the institutionalisation of gender mainstreaming. For example, there seems to be no laid-down requirement for MFA-related staff to report on their integration of gender issues to their supervisors. Over 80 percent of respondents indicated that they rarely or never do such reporting. In-built mechanisms for monitoring of gender mainstreaming within MFA activities require much more attention.
- Financial and human resources and accountability: there is good support for the Gender Strategy and Action Plan (2003-2007) which, however, in terms of implementation is undermined by inadequate financial and human resources as well as inadequate accountability. Better guidance is required in the form of revising, updating and operationalizing the plan. The MFA should also demand and ensure the inclusion of the promotion of gender equality in the TORs and expertise requirements in all its bilateral programmes through concrete goals and activities.
- Capacity building: while capacity is reportedly strong within the MFA regarding gender mainstreaming, there remains a significant proportion of MFA-related staff that requires skill-base strengthening in terms of gender mainstreaming across a range of areas. Key capacity building needs are related to gender concepts and gender mainstreaming in practice, but also to integrating gender into sectoral support, budgetary considerations, political deliberations and country negotiations.
- Country strategies: MFA staff proposed that Finland should start preparing country strategies, at least together with the eight long-term partner countries. From a gender point of view, this could have the benefit of strategically determining, together with the partner countries, what is to be achieved in terms of gender equality.
- Tools: the need for providing more practical gender related materials was noted throughout the different components of the Baseline Study.
- Goals and objectives: the gender-related goals and objectives should be more clearly stated and information on gender equality systematically followed through in the logical framework, with gender-disaggregated programme purpose, results and activities. This applies as well to the final project/programme documents prepared during an inception/start-up phase, equally requiring human and financial resources.
- Non-governmental organisations (NGOs): modification of gender related questions.

Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 "Women, Peace and Security" Gender Baseline Study for Finnish Development Cooperation
- Focus and approach: a twin-track strategy in promotion of gender equality should be adopted and implemented meaning significant financial support to specific projects on gender equality and women's rights together with gender mainstreaming, rather than mainstreaming as a strategy alone. The focus of support should be clearer and better mainstreamed particularly in rural devel-

opment, and with UNSCR 1325 not derived from general support to gender policies and plans. The focus should be on a limited number of sectors, providing support for gender equality within these sectors, and providing long-term support for the chosen sectors also in the post-conflict/conflict countries.

- Monitoring: a better monitoring system should be developed specifically regarding development policy and cooperation, including a data base on interventions, developing a set of key indicators based on the ongoing indicator development by UN agencies and demanding reporting respectively by each bilateral programme.
- Capacity development: tailor-made capacity development for the MFA and Embassy personnel in main partner countries and conflict countries is considered.
- Management framework: better guidance is required in the form of revising, updating and operationalising the MFA Gender Strategy and Plan of Action (2003–2007). The MFA should also demand and ensure the inclusion of the promotion of gender equality in the TORs and expertise requirements through concrete goals and activities in all its bilateral programmes.

OECD Peer Reviews. OECD peer reviews rarely address gender explicitly, but implicitly as a cross-cutting issue. In the 2003 peer review, a clear recommendation was made to enhance gender equality based on Finland's new strategy and action program, and to pay attention to the rights of women, children, minorities and the disabled. The 2007 peer review again acknowledged the existence of the gender strategy and policy and recommended that the available guidelines and strategies on cross-cutting themes (gender and others) are systematically applied in the dialogue with partners on projects and programs. The 2012 peer review referred to an evaluation on cross-cutting issues which revealed that cross-cutting issues have not always been understood and implemented systematically (MFA 2011c) which was also acknowledged by Finland. It was recommended that Finland produce clear policy guidance on what it intends to achieve through each cross-cutting objective, including gender, to help integrate these objectives into its development programs.

2 RESULTS FOCUS AND LEARNING FROM RESULTS IN PROMOTION OF GENDER EQUALITY IN FINNISH DEVELOPMENT POLICY

2.1 Government Programme and Development Policy Programme Guidance Elements and Their Relevance for RBM

In this section, the degree and quality of guidance provided through the GPs and DPPs and through the downstream policy documents on sustainable development are assessed following the criteria introduced in Chapter 4.1.1 of the Main Report.

Government Programmes 2003, 2007and 2011
The GPs provide very limited explicit guidance, even qualitative, on gender in the foreign and security policy sections and gender equality specific sections. The GP policy statements are quite general and non-committal. At best, they identify key areas of focus and principles and possibly indication of increasing support.

Gender equality is identified implicitly, as part of the MDGs and human rights, as one of the foreign policy priorities in all three GPs. The only specific reference to gender equality is in the foreign and security policy sections of the 2007 GP which states that Finland is to make a significant contribution to international crisis management while paying particular attention to the position of women in conflicts and crisis management. The link between gender and international crisis management in the 2007 GP is a

major change compared to the 2003 GP. In the 2011 GP, gender equality is explicitly defined as a societal goal which needs to be taken into account in all aspects of public decision-making and activities. As the concepts are broad and mainly implicit, it does not provide concrete guidance. The most concrete guidance is provided on women and security aspects and in the 2007 GP in a relatively committal way by stating that "Finland endeavours to make a significant contribution to international crisis management while paying particular attention to the position of women in conflicts and crisis management".

Development Policy Programmes 2004, 2007 and 2012 from a RBM perspective
The quality and strength of target setting related to gender equality is quite weak. Concrete targets are generally missing and statements are often non-committable and not easy to monitor. Guidance is almost without exception qualitative in nature, expressing general support and intentions, as well as adherence to certain principles. The DPP guidance related to gender equality and women's rights is largely unverifiable or unmeasurable.

In all three DPPs gender is linked to the MDG 3 gender specific goal and the promotion of women's rights. In the 2007 DPP there is also a link to economic development and well-being and in the 2012 DPP more detailed attention to gender in different sectors. In the 2004 DPP the Strategy and Action Plan for Promoting Gender Equality in Finland's Policy for Developing Countries for 2003–2007 adopted by the MFA in 2003 is referred to as a guidance document for implementation (MFA 2003b). This somewhat increases the specificity of the guidance. Specific support areas in a few selected sectors are mentioned such as education and health, which are verifiable and in line with MDGs, and trafficking of women and children. However, there is no further detailed guidance in these areas.

The 2007 DPP was the vaguest about cross-cutting issues. It only states the cross-cutting themes, including gender without dedicating any separate section to cross-cutting issues and gender. The DPP states that particular attention must be paid to the special needs of women and children, and in humanitarian assistance full consideration is to be given to age and gender issues, both of which are unverifiable objectives. Gender issues are also to be taken into consideration in the environmental impact assessment in humanitarian assistance. No concrete targets and indicators are set.

In the 2012 DPP, more concrete, specific measures are included to attain all cross-cutting objectives. Along with other cross-cutting issues, gender and women's rights have shifted from "consideration" (2004 and 2007 DPPs) to their inclusion, for the first time, as "binding objectives" the 2012 DPP. Gender is mainstreamed in priorities and specific measures, particularly in natural resource management and climate agreements, sustainable natural resource management, education and health. The 2012 DPP also indicates Finland's support to involving women in conflict prevention, peace keeping and peace-building, in accordance with UNSCR 1325, and to the participation of women in decision making and the rejection of any form of discrimination that gives rise to gender inequality (sexual and domestic violence, as well as unequal rights of ownership and inheritance). Partner countries are further encouraged to compile gender disaggregated data.

The guidance on gender equality and women's rights has improved, but as evidenced in the interviews, in multiple evaluations reviewed and in the online survey, it is not sufficient to fully operationalise the cross-cutting issues, including gender. 86 percent of the survey respondents are of the opinion that the DPP does not provide clear guidance regarding cross-cutting objectives, which implicitly includes gender. This was also confirmed in multiple interviews. Neither are there verifiable targets and indicators to measure the achievements nor clearly identified means to achieve the objectives. A results-chain approach is missing.

Gender equality, women's rights and the link to the rights-based approach as concepts and as a cross-cutting theme/objective to be 'mainstreamed' are considered complex and would require prioritisation and detailed guidance for operationalisation in the downstream documents, as expressed in the interviews, particularly with advisers. There is also a growing consensus among donor organisations that, while 'mainstreaming' is a worthy goal, it has generally failed to deliver on its promise to infuse all development efforts and that relatively more attention and commitment to gender-specific initiatives and gender budget lines are needed, if significant and sustainable gender equality results are to be achieved. A number of donor organisations found that focused actions and funding can be more effective in grounding institutional commitment in analysis, design, planning, delivery, reporting and accountability systems (CIDA 2008). Recently there has also been a shift to more HR-based approach which, to a certain extent, has further blurred how gender and women's rights should be promoted as in the case of Denmark's strategy 'Right to Better Life' (2012) or the MFA's new HRBA guidelines that lack the "how" factor and do not give specific guidance on what the linkage between gender equality and women's rights mean in practice.

Learning from others

Finland can learn a lot from other donors in its efforts to improve RBM in promoting gender equality. Finland is one of the few countries that does not have a gender action plan. Sida (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency) and DANIDA (Danish International Development Agency) have such a results-oriented frameworks. Almost all OECD countries have their commitment set out in a gender equality policy and strategy.

- The Canadian Agency for International Development (CIDA) has developed a Gender Equality Action Plan (2010-13) to strengthen the implementation of its Policy on Gender Equality with clear objectives, accountability and mandatory reporting structures which has contributed to achieving more consistent and substantive gender equality results. The performance assessment framework sets out assessment tools for reviewing the investments in relation to corporate gender equality results, and a means to aggregate assessments of investments. This will be followed up by gender-specific studies.
- The Australian Agency for International Development's (AusAID) second Gender and Development Action Plan in 2008 has made it mandatory to carry out monitoring and annual reviews of gender action plans used in African Development Bank programmes (AfDB, 2012). This system of linking planning and accountability to implementation has been described as an emerging good practice with respect to ensuring that gender equality action plans become useful operational tools for achieving gender equality results (AfDB, 2012).
- The UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) are investing in developing clearer theories of change, logic models and results frameworks for gender equality and women's rights interventions (ECG, 2012). Some are also investing in longer-term change processes, guided by a theory of change which takes account of the gradual process of achieving changes in support of gender equality. DFID ensures accountability for gender equality through its core reporting process. Nine indicators on girls and women have been included in DFID's corporate results framework. All parts of DFID, including country offices, report against this core set of indicators twice a year. This ensures that the whole organisation – particularly country directors – deliver on gender equality commitments. The Management Board and directors of divisions, countries and regions are responsible for reporting on gender equality results. A senior Director General-level gender equality champion sits in the Management Board and holds other directors to account. She also reports to the Minister. A group of senior managers chaired by the Director-General meets twice a year to assess progress against the Strategic Vision for Girls and Women. Gender equality objectives are included in performance management frameworks.

- At the Asian Development Bank (ADB), gender equity is one of five drivers of change in the 2020 Strategy and gender equality outcomes are explicitly integrated into the corporate results framework. The new ADB Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment Operational Plan for 2013-20 (ADB 2013a) and results framework for 2013-16 (ADB 2013b) serve as the roadmap for translating the corporate strategy into concrete and measureable operations to support gender equality outcomes. The ADB's approach is unique in that it focuses on gender equality outputs and outcomes rather than policy commitments.

The post-MDG dialogue, Beijing +20 and UNSCR 1325 +15 next year will be important new guiding global frameworks for addressing gender equality and women's rights, and should form the basis for the priority setting, monitoring indicators and further development of methodologies i.e. mainstreaming vs. targeted actions, or both, in the next DPP and downstream documents.

2.2 Guidance Elements in Downstream Policies, Action Plans, and Strategies

The number of documents giving guidance specifically for gender and women's rights is limited. However, each DPP period has a gender specific guiding document, even though the DPP 2007 and 2012 are covered by a multi-ministerial action plan for the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security. As all of these guiding documents are action plans, they provide a relatively strong framework from a RBM perspective. In addition to the gender-specific guiding documents, sector and instrument-specific guidelines are to provide guidance on mainstreaming gender, along with the principle of mainstreaming. Furthermore, guidelines related to cross-cutting issues, country strategy and influencing plan preparation are to guide the work on gender and women's rights.

Progress has been made in downstream implementation documents, such as influencing plans and country strategies but they still vary in quality and are not systematized. The 2003-2007 Strategy and Action Plan for Gender Equality is an exception, and a best practice together with UNSCR 1325 National Action Plans (NAPs).

The correlation between DPPs and downstream documents also varies. In the 2004 DPP, the focus was on mainstreaming whereas the 2012 DPP contained three complementary strategies – mainstreaming, targeted actions and policy dialogue. This has enabled a better inclusion of gender objectives in implementing tools and guidelines such as multilateral influencing plans, QAB formats and the country strategy guidelines.

Gender Specific Guidance

2004 DPP: The key document providing a RBM framework for gender is the Strategy and Action Plan Promoting Gender Equality in Finland's Policy for Developing Countries 2003–2007 issued just before the preparation of the 2004 DPP (MFA 2003b). As a combined strategy and action plan, it includes detailed objectives, lines of action and overall principles of strategy in line with the 2004 DPP priorities. The action plan sets detailed actions, responsible parties, measures to be taken and a timeframe. It further includes bi- and multilateral cooperation, NGO cooperation and policy dialogue. It also contains monitoring plans. The Gender Strategy and Action Plan 2003–2007 was not renewed. This constituted a step backwards on the gender and development agenda.

2007 DPP: the UNSCR 1325 (2000) "Women, Peace and Security" Finland's National Action Plan (NAP) 2008–2011 is a joint action plan for five ministries. This Action Plan is a response to Finland's 2007 Development Policy Programme which emphasises the goals of comprehensive security and the rule of law. It sets goals on women's role and participation in conflict prevention, peace negotiations and peace-building, crisis management training, the practical realisation of operations, the themes of Resolution

1325 and their contribution to a better implementation of human rights. This guidance is specific and activity-based indicators, without quantitative targets, are incorporated. The responsible ministries are clearly indicated.

DPP 2012: the UNSCR 1325 (2000) "Women, Peace and Security" Finland's National Action Plan 2012–2016 is the second action plan. In addition to the first plan, implementation and monitoring aspects have been developed. Each responsible party mentioned is to implement and report on achievement of the Action Plan's objectives. The plan includes an improved monitoring framework and indicators based on the global indicators for Women, Peace and Security by the UN. In both action plans, a reporting mechanism is also indicated.

In both NAPs, objectives are set and followed by general support statements such as "Finland supports developing countries in the formulation of their own national 1325 Action Plans". Responsible ministries are indicated and a follow-up plan is included. A reporting mechanism is identified both internationally and internally. The Government's annual development cooperation report to the Parliament is also to address the implementation of the Action Plan. A Follow-up Group is to coordinate and monitor the implementation of the Action Plan. However, no quantifiable targets, indicators, and budget can be found in the NAPs.

Sectoral and Thematic Guidelines
The quality of operational guidelines, both sectoral and thematic, varies greatly in relation to gender and RBM. Most of them include gender (only three of the reviewed guidelines did not have any reference to gender). In most cases, gender is mentioned either as a cross-cutting issue or in opportunities or challenges but not followed by concrete any guidance. Generally, guidelines do not have concrete targets and indicators, are activity-oriented and do not provide concrete guidance on how gender equality and women's rights should be addressed. The AfT Action Plan 2012–13 is a good example of a plan that aims at providing a basis for improved RBM in terms of gender. The main objective indicator is to be disaggregated by sex, gender is addressed in a specific focus theme (women's entrepreneurship) and gender-specific indicators have been set.

Participation Plans
References to gender or women's rights in the participation plans are very limited, if any. In the rare cases in which gender is mentioned, gender and women's rights as a cross-cutting issue are said to be taken into consideration or enhanced without any further detail, target or indicator. Specific references are made to already existing activities.

Country Strategies
The quality of country strategies varies in relation to gender and RBM. All of them include gender but this reaches from vague statements to clearly including a separate chapter in the strategy, identifying specific support and defining objectives in the logical model; including gender in the instruments, inputs and resources part; specifying key indicators in the results monitoring framework and also mainstreaming in other country development results and target setting. Gender specific objectives, specific objectives and indicators can be found only in very few cases and, even in these few cases, targets are not necessarily set.

Although country strategies constitute a huge step forward from the participation plans, they still do not provide the basis for RBM-based implementation and reporting/monitoring. They are activity-driven and seldom set outcome or impact indicators. As a result, reporting is also activity-driven. This is criticized in some of the management responses to country strategies (e.g. activity-based reporting, no quality of

outcomes, key indicator missing, quantitative and qualitative data missing, and indicator development needed). Unless a gender specific objective is set at the objective or specific objective level, there will be no reporting on gender in the annual results reports. This was acknowledged and confirmed in interviews. Country strategies constitute a base but transforming them into RBM tools requires capacity development, guidance and/or feedback from the management and advisers during their preparation (indicators, targets setting etc.).

Influencing Plans

The promotion of gender equality and/or women's rights are explicitly mentioned in practically all influencing plans for multilateral organisations either as a thematic priority (e.g. Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) – on land ownership; UNICEF, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) – on girls' education; the Global Environment Facility – on climate negotiations), or as a priority related to the organization's modus operandi (development or improvement of organization's own gender strategies and results frameworks and/or human resource policies) or as support to an organization with an explicit mandate to promote gender equality e.g. UNWomen. Gender targets have been set but their quality varies across the different plans. They are mostly vague and depend not only on actions by Finland. For example, targets set for negotiations are not pre-determined. Some quantified targets are set, such as the number of gender-specific projects within the organization, but again they do not depend solely on Finland.

Responsibilities are allocated to both the multilateral department and advisers. According to the interviews, this is not very realistic. The lack of human resources to maximize the influence is a challenge explicitly mentioned some plans (UNWomen) and confirmed by interviewees.

2.3 Planning for Results and Learning from the Past: Influences Shaping the Gender-related Policy Guidance and Formulation Processes

Development Policy Programme Formulation

The DPPs contain no explicit reference to learning from results related to gender equality and women's rights. Generally, DPPs follow the international agenda driven by MDGs and the global rights gender and women's rights frameworks as described in 1.2. The survey results show that international frameworks are a significant (68 percent), if not a dominant (14 percent) influencing factor. References to MDGs and human rights frameworks related to gender equality are made in all DPPs and gender has remained as a cross-cutting theme/objective in all DPPs.

The survey results show that the Minister's influence is dominant (63 percent) in the formulation process. This is also confirmed in the interviews with the Gender Advisers and the persons responsible for UNSCR 1325 regarding the gender agenda. Interviews implied that the vague addressing of gender equality in the 2007 DPP was largely due to other priorities set by the Minister for International Development and Trade, and that gender equality was added to the DPP only after a written complaint by civil society organisations. Interviews also revealed that the influence exerted by the Minister played an important role in not renewing the Gender Strategy and Action Plan after it expired in 2007. At the same time, though, the then-President had a pronounced interest for women and the climate change agenda, together with other "high drivers" (key individuals) of the women and security agenda. Interviews confirmed that this was a very important factor for promoting the gender agenda. The link between security and development became one of the important themes in both the 2007 GP and 2007 DPP. The first NAP was prepared before the 2007 DPP but the dialogue on security and development was already ongoing at the international level. Despite the high level "drivers", Finland was the last of Nordic countries to prepare a NAP under high pressure also from civil society organisations.

Several interviewees stated that, when high-level "drivers" push an agenda, operationalisation follows. Within the MFA, the security agenda, together with UN Resolution 1325, is highly visible internationally and has been much further operationalised than the gender agenda as a cross-cutting theme or objective within development cooperation. In development cooperation, Finland's commitment is also visible but it has been much more difficult to put the policy in practice. Gender advisers have influenced the DPP formulation by lobbying from inside and commenting on the drafts. They consider their role in practical rather than policy aspects of the DPPs.

Learning during Implementation

Challenges regarding the operationalization of cross-cutting issues, including gender, are and have been largely known within the MFA as evidenced e.g. in the DPC and DPSG minutes and in multiple evaluation results. This learning has not yet been put in practice. Various gender-specific and other evaluations have recommended better ways operationalise cross-cutting issues. The 2014 evaluation on Complementarity in Finnish Development Cooperation (Bäck et al 2014) concludes that cross-cutting themes have been addressed rather unevenly across different parts of development cooperation. Issues raised in the 2008 evaluation on cross-cutting themes (Kääriä et al 2008; NAO 2008) and 2010 evaluations on Sustainability in Poverty Reduction (Caldecott et al 2010) still persisted in 2012 such as incomplete and inconsistent inclusion of cross-cutting themes and objectives in planning and programme documents, uneven discussion of cross-cutting objectives in negotiations with partner governments and partner organisations and insufficient indicators for monitoring. One positive example is making gender, women's rights and other cross-cutting issues a binding cross-cutting objective as this starts trickling down to the implementation guidance documents.

Two DPC annual reports (2007 and 2009) raise the issue of cross-cutting issues. The 2007 report expressed its support to the Strategy and Action plan on Gender Equality 2003–2007, which interestingly is quite close to its expiration without renewal. It also states that mainstreaming the cross-cutting approach is incomplete and raises the issue of the lack of personnel and tools for following the cross-cutting themes and of gender-sensitive indicators. It calls for training and appointing persons in charge and recommends projects supporting special gender equality, vulnerable groups and environmental projects.

The 2009 DPC report acknowledges the finding of the two evaluations on cross-cutting issues. It states that the MFA's gender equality goals have not had any effect on the decisions made on projects dealing with women's rights and strengthening the position of women and girls. Neither have the amounts of the support corresponded to the weight given to the promotion of the gender equality in the DPP. It calls for the QAB to pay more attention to cross-cutting issues and suggests including cross-cutting issues in the annual report to the Parliament. Information systems should further be developed to ease monitoring of implementation, including budget and sector support and instruments. UNSCR 1325 was mentioned as an example of concrete mainstreaming of women's human rights.

In a DPSG meeting that took place in 2011 (MFA 2011), it was notified that the management has not sufficiently responded to the recommendations of the evaluations regarding cross-cutting issues, partly because their operationalisation is challenging and the issues are difficult. Summaries of management responses to 28 evaluations between 2008 and 2013 that addressed gender as a cross-cutting theme or objective indicate that, in two third of the cases, references and corrective measures are made to cross-cutting issues (in top 5).

3 FOCUS ON RESULTS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN FINNISH DEVELOPMENT POLICY

3.1 MFA Gender Financing Trends

Annex 7 provides information on development financing trends during the evaluation period up to 2012. There are challenges in linking the DPPs and budget planning and monitoring in the case of gender and women's rights. The OECD DAC coding system, Gender Equality Policy Marker, provides uniformity which is essential for consistent international reporting. Data has been collected by DAC since 1991 which enables documenting trends in Finland's focus on promoting gender equality. It also allows tracking by selected sectors, percentage of gender equality focus to top ten recipients and top ten recipients of gender equality focused aid. It involves three levels of classification of aid as 'principal' when gender equality is an explicit objective, 'significant' when gender equality is significant but secondary objective or 'not targeted'.

A significant drawback is that tracking includes only a small portion of the development assistance. It includes only the official development assistance (ODA) eligible payment and does not capture the allocations beyond ODA, leaving e.g. multilateral support unreported, apart from bi-multilateral assistance which is classified as bilateral assistance in the case of MFA. Several in-depth studies on specific topics are also produced on pilot basis: aid in support of women's economic empowerment, aid in support of gender equality in fragile and conflict-affected states, aid in support of education and health spending, aid in humanitarian situations.

ODA Eligible Funding for Gender Equality

The statistics based on actual ODA expenditures demonstrate the steady rise of gender-related funding during the evaluation period: Gender-related funding, combining both 'principal' and 'significant' markings, as share of total ODA funding have been increasing steadily, from 19% in 2006 to 41% in 2013 according to MFA statistics (Figure 2). This reflects the increasing importance given to gender equality objectives in the development policies.

Figure 2   Expenditures by Gender as a goal

Source: Data provided by the MFA

The increase has been the fastest in last two years, especially for interventions with gender as a main goal. The percentage of ODA with 'principal' gender objectives, i.e. with an explicit gender objective, remained between 1-2 percent in 2006-2012, and suddenly increased up to 8 percent in 2013. This

increase coincides with the 2012 DPP which made cross-cutting themes more visible and shift to so called binding objectives anchored in a three-pronged approach consisting of mainstreaming, targeted gender actions, and policy influence.

Funding Trends of Multilateral Organisations

The multilateral budgets are organisation-based. This hinders gender-related disaggregation of funding, apart from gender-based organisation such as UNWomen and possibly UNFPA which has focused on sexual and reproductive health issues and UNICEF for its work on girls education. Funding for gender-specific organisations has significantly increased while funding to other international organisations has remained stable. This reflects the stronger focus on gender as a cross-cutting objective in the 2012 DPP (Kehityspoliittinen osasto/Tilastollinen seuranta, Yleisavustukset monenkeskisille yhteistyöka-naville, maksatukset 2006–2013):

- Funding for UNWomen took a very significant leap in 2013. It started increasing from 1 Million Euro (MEUR) in 2010 to 2MEUR in 2011 to reach 3MEUR in 2012 and 12MEUR in 2013. This significant funding increase made Finland UNWomen's largest donor.
- The funding to UNFPA also significantly increased from 29MEUR in 2012 to 35.5MEUR in 2013. Finland is the third largest donor (core funding) of this organisation.
- UNICEF's funding has increased from 17MEUR in 2012 to 21EUR in 2013.

Gender as a Cross-cutting Issue in DPPs and Funding

The relatively limited DDP guidance on gender, combined with a budget structure which does not correspond to the DPP structure as well as an unadapted information system, make it difficult, if not impossible, to match the DPP's gender guidance with any budget figures. The 2015-2018 TTS includes references to the status of women as a cross-cutting objective in its sections on globalization and poverty reduction, sustainable development, human rights and broad-based security. The only gender-specific targets set in the matrix concern the implementation of the 1325 as part of the foreign and security policy agenda. However, the targets set are vague and non-measurable. The fact that the information system does not enable disaggregation by themes makes monitoring challenging.

4 MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR GENDER RESULTS

Accountability Framework and Structure

Currently there is no management mechanism that would enable monitoring the delivery of results of cross-cutting objectives, including gender, and making related management decisions. Management is primarily done by inputs and through the project cycle management, including the work of the Quality Assurance Board.

The desk officer's task is to ensure that the proposal submitted to the QAB deals with all cross-cutting objectives including gender. Desk officers vary widely in terms of their experience and skills. Many officers assuming an administrative role are to mainstream gender. The advisers responsible for gender and related sectors try to ensure that proposals for interventions are aligned with the DPP and cross-cutting objectives in general. Constant staff turnout at the MFA compromises the result-orientation and the quality of planning. According to interviewees, this lack of continuity also reduces the responsibility for results delivery.

There is no systematic quality assurance mechanism for gender. The QAB process does not ensure quality at entry and comes too late for advisers to make significant changes. Gender expertise during the QAB meeting or for comments is solely included on ad hoc basis. The QAB only deals with bilateral and

multi-bilateral ODA-eligible assistance. There is no systematic link to harmonize priorities and their operationalisation between regional and multilateral departments.

The word count analysis of the minutes of the DPC, DPSG and QAB indicates that gender and cross-cutting issues have been most actively addressed in the DPC. The highest number of hits coincides with the implementation of the Gender Strategy and Action Plan and the cross-cutting evaluations (2008). The QAB and DPSG have been less active in raising issues regarding cross-cutting themes and objectives or gender.

Figure 3   Gender-related keyword frequency analysis across DPC, DPSG and QAB

Source: DPC, DPSG and QAB minutes, team analysis

Reporting on Results

The Evaluation Team could not find any evidence on systematic, synthesis reporting on aggregate development results related to gender, apart from input reporting based on the OECD DAC Gender Policy Markers. There is no management and reporting structure that would cover such a broad theme as gender and women's rights. The information available on gender results in an aggregate or even at the level of individual interventions is very limited and cannot be used for accountability or management purposes. Furthermore, the management information system (AHA-KYT) and the budgeting system do not provide a sound data base for aggregate reporting on gender. Results achieved in the context of the UNSCR 1325 NAP are reported annually to the Foreign Affairs Committee. This constitutes a positive example.

Bilateral project-based reporting may or may not include gender. While the principles might have been adequately captured in documentation, the framing of indicators and setting up of appropriate Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) systems to monitor change have been poor due to the lack of baseline studies and inadequate budgetary provisions as evidenced in multiple evaluations and confirmed in interviews.

Country strategies are still activity-driven without gender-related outcome or impact indicators. Annual country-level reporting on gender will depend on the inclusion of such indicators in the country strategy. Until now, influencing plans for multilateral organisations are activity-based when it comes to gender. Some indicators have been developed. Since no report has been issued so far (under preparation), it is not yet possible to assess how systematically and at which level of aggregation gender-related results will be reported. There is no requirement for NGOs to report on gender.

5 KEY POINTS

The key points of the gender-specific theme case study are summarised below along the key evaluation questions.

Evaluation question 1: What is the nature of guidance provided in Development Policy Programmes?
- The DPP guidance on gender and women's rights has improved, but still does not provide the necessary basis for RBM. The shift in the DPP from "consideration" to a binding "objective" is an important step regarding the status of guidance. However, because of its nature, the DPP does not indicate concrete targets, indicators, human or financial resources. Concrete guidance is also absent from downstream guidance documents.
- Currently there is no gender-specific guidance for development policy implementation, apart from UNSCR 1325 NAPs which are linked to security.
- Concepts such as 'gender equality', 'women's rights' and the link to the human rights-based approach are not clearly defined and thus not 'mainstreamed' i.e. operationalised in downstream documents. There is a need for gender-specific guidance to operationalise them to support the RBM development process.

Evaluation question 2: How responsive have DPPs and other guidance documents been to learning from earlier results?
- The international agenda driven by the MDGs, the global human rights frameworks also endorsed by EU and Finland's internal gender equality commitments give a solid base for further DPPs.
- Internal learning and particularly acting upon the learning has been weak. The challenges of designing, implementing and monitoring the cross-cutting issues, including gender equality, are and have been known for a long time within the MFA management but only slowly addressed and acted upon. Learning, together with other factors, might have contributed to the change of the status of cross-cutting issues into binding objectives which has only recently started trickling down to the implementation guidance documents.
- Learning from other donors and international actors should be a priority regarding gender equality and RBM. There is a lot to learn from others. Finland is one of the few countries that currently do not have a gender-specific strategy and action plan, in contrast to e.g. Denmark (Danida) and Sweden (Sida).

Evaluation question 3: How consequently and diligently has DPP guidance been implemented?
- Downstream implementation documents, such as influencing plans and country strategies and related results frameworks are an important step in operationalising gender-related DPP guidance from a RBM perspective. Still, their quality varies a lot. Most of the downstream guidance documents include gender either as a cross-cutting issue or in opportunities and challenges to be addressed, which does not result in concrete targeting or strategies. Guidance is rather activity-based than outcome or impact-oriented. Targets and indicators are generally missing.
- Budgeting and financial mechanisms do not allow explicitly and precisely disaggregating the funding allocated to gender. The limited guidance contained in DPPs, combined with a budget structure disconnected from DPPs and challenges posed by the information system make it difficult, if not impossible, to match the DPP's gender guidance with any budget.
- Tracking of gender allocations based on the OECD DAC Gender Policy Marker also poses challenges. It leaves parts of the funding expenditures unreported and is based on a relatively subjective assessment largely made by desk officers who may or may not be experienced in attributing these markers.

- High level policy commitments do not correspond to the in-house human and financial resource. There are no clear policies and strategies to support implementation of these commitments.

Question 4: To what degree is upwards accountability exercised, consistent and relevant?
- The existing information system is not able to provide a basis for systematic and aggregated reporting on results, apart from reports issued in the context of the 1325 NAP to the Foreign Affairs Committee. The information available on gender results, even at the level of individual interventions, is limited, if any, and can be used neither for accountability nor for management purposes.
- Currently, there is no management mechanism that would allow monitoring the delivery of results on cross-cutting objectives and making related management decisions. The existing quality assurance process is not able not ensure quality at entry or exit, and comes too late in the project cycle for advisers to induce significant changes. In addition, the QAB only deals with bilateral and multi-bilateral ODA-eligible assistance. This does not allow harmonizing priorities and their operationalisation between regional and multilateral departments.

6 PROPOSED ACTION TO IMPROVE RBM RELATED TO GENDER EQUALITY AS A CROSS-CUTTING OBJECTIVES

- **Development policy planning**
  o DPP should clearly include 3–4 key strategic policy priorities to be systematically promoted in the strategy and action plan developed in downstream guidance documents, particularly country strategies, influencing plans and bilateral projects. Targets need to be set up in the DPP and/or in a gender strategy and action plan for financial allocations to further improve the 'principal' and 'significant' gender markings.
  o A corporate result-based Gender Equality Strategy and Action Plan for the implementation of the DPP commitment should be re-adopted. Such a strategy is to define 3–4 key priorities in line with the DPP. The action plan should provide further strategic focus on the implementation, outline goals, targets, indicators, accountabilities and timeframes, as well as measurable outcomes.
  o A separate, thematic operational budget for the promotion of gender equality needs to be secured in order to move to more targeted actions with gender-specific budgets.
  o A study should be undertaken on cross-cutting issues including gender equality and RBM and the learning from international post MDG, Beijing +20, UNSCR 1325 +15 dialogue and other internationally relevant policy and RBM trends.
- **Implementation**
  o Systematic gender-related assistance and a quality assurance system should be ensured in the preparation of the results frameworks attached country strategies and influencing plans.
  o More systematic, dynamic and formal linkages are needed between regional and multilateral departments and advisers.
- **Accountability, monitoring and reporting**
  o The role of the QAB and/or quality assurance system should be redefined.
  o The management information systems (AHA-KYT) need to be modified to respond to the needs for aggregate gender reporting.
  o Upwards reporting on gender should be obligatory and based on key indicators.
  o Gender should form part of individual performance assessments and job descriptions to enhance accountability.

4b Exemplary Theme Study: Sustainable Development

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

In the Inception Phase, it was agreed that two so-called evergreen topics, sustainable development (SD) and gender, would be selected for a more detailed exemplary study. These themes have been important elements of the three Development Policy Programmes (DPPs) under evaluation and even earlier, in one form or another. The SD exemplary study aims at highlighting most evaluation questions from the perspective of this theme, starting from the Government Programme (GP) and DPP level to downstream policy guidance, implementation, and then upwards reporting on results.

SD has been addressed in each DPP (MFA 2004d, MFA 2007e, MFA 2012e) but the concept's interpretation and areas of emphasis have changed over the years. One challenge in terms of policy guidance that will be discussed below is the very meaning of this concept. Its interpretation also affects the areas to be covered in this assessment. Support to environment (including climate) and to the forest sector or sustainable forest management through different aid channels are studied in more detail in this case study, with some attention to the water sector. This leaves out some aspects of SD, e.g. a part of the energy support that is linked to the sustainable use of natural resource or the social dimensions of SD.

This study follows the same approach and applies similar evaluation tools as the overall evaluation (see the methodology section of the main report):
- assessing and characterising the three GPs and DPPs from the perspective of RBM and SD;
- assessing the following key downstream policy guidance documents in terms of SD guidance elements, their relevance for RBM and the influences shaping the guidelines (including learning): Development Policy Guidelines for Forest Sector (MFA 2013), International Strategy for Finland's Water Sector (MFA 2009a), Finnish Development Policy Guidelines for Environment (MFA 2009b), Development Policy Guidelines for Forest Sector (MFA 2009c); and
- assessing the implementation guidance and accountability for results.

The analysis relied on the following tools:
- document review;
- interview of nine MFA staff members dealing with SD including advisers, and members of the MFA Sustainability Team and Crosscutting Team (Environment);
- analysis of the minutes of policy steering bodies: QAB, DPC, DPSG and PCD Network; and
- online survey.

1.2 Context

Since the 1987 report of the World Commission on Environment and Development 'Our Common Future' (Brundtland Commission 1987), and in particular the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, the Finnish government and its line ministries have embraced the principle of SD as one the key development principles at both the domestic and international level.

In 2000, the United Nations Millennium Summit approved the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) including several goals and sub-goals dealing with different aspects of SD. All three GP and DPPs refer to the MDGs as a guiding framework. The 2002 Sustainable Development Summit in Johannesburg, the 2005 World Summit on Sustainable Development, and the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) have influenced the context for Finland's development work related to SD.

For example, the 2004 DPP identified SD as a key principle, and environment as a central cross-cutting theme, and the 2012 DPP adopted climate sustainability as a cross-cutting objective.

Many of the international actions linked to the implementation of the Rio Declaration and its Action Plan (Agenda 21), including the MDGs and various environmental conventions, have formed a context for Finland's development policy and cooperation in SD and environment over the last two decades. Finland, as a signatory to the various related multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), has committed itself to supporting developing countries and reporting on environmental issues. The most relevant agreements and forums are:
- The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC);
- The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD), and the related Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+);
- The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD);
- The Vienna Convention of the Protection of the Ozone Layer;
- The United Nation Forum on Forests (UNFF);
- Other environmental agreements, including regional environmental agreements.

These global processes and MEAs have resulted in the establishment of programmes such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and mechanisms for their funding, including the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and a range of climate-related funds to which Finland contributes.

1.3 Summary of Relevant Evaluations, Assessment and Peer Reviews

Most recent evaluations linked to SD have identified RBM-related issues and potential for improvement. In section 2.4 observations are made concerning how the various evaluations have possibly contributed to learning and developing policy guidance.

Finnish Support to Forestry and Biological Resources (Hardcastle et al 2010)

This evaluation found that monitoring and reporting is primarily focused on activities and the use of inputs. Monitoring of results and impacts is limited. There is a need to improve the design of interventions include indicators related to achievements and impacts.

The Sustainability Dimension in Addressing Poverty Reduction: Synthesis of Evaluations (Caldecott et al 2010)

This evaluation identified serious problems in the quality of programme and project design. Clear and measurable objectives and indicators for monitoring and evaluating achievements were often missing. Although SD has been identified in the 2004 and 2007 DPPs as a principle cutting across all development cooperation or as a primary goal, there is no obligatory requirement to consistently embed environmental sustainability in all cooperation.

The Finnish Development Cooperation in the Water Sector (Matz et al 2010)

Planning, reviews and evaluations do not sufficiently acknowledge the importance of impacts, but rather remain to a great extent on the level of activities and outputs. The evaluation recommends that water development cooperation become more results and impact-oriented and related indicators be adopted.

Evaluation of Environmental Management in Finland's Development Cooperation (Kääriä et al 2006)

This evaluation moved beyond the project level and concluded that there is a need to develop targets and indicators for the environment sector cooperation as part of a strategy for environmental cooperation. The management information system, including the data collection and statistical system, should urgently be revised to allow the necessary monitoring and reporting.

These findings and recommendations concerning SD and the environment are consistent with the 2011 evaluation on the Results-Based Approach in Finnish Development Cooperation (Poate et al 2011) and the Meta-Evaluation of Decentralised Evaluations in 2010 and 2011 (Sørensen and Thulstrup 2012). It should be noted that the evaluations mentioned above, contrary to the present evaluation, viewed RBM from a programmes and projects perspective with limited or no focus on aggregate, synthesis monitoring and upwards reporting of results.

2 RESULTS FOCUS AND LEARNING FROM RESULTS IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN FINNISH DEVELOPMENT POLICY

2.1. Government Programme and Development Policy Programme Guidance Elements and Their Relevance for RBM

This section addressed the degree and quality of guidance provided through the GPs and DPPs and through the downstream policy documents on SD along the criteria introduced in Chapter 4.1.1 of the Main Report.

Government Programmes 2003, 2007 and 2011

Quality of Guidance

GPs naturally cannot be expected to go into detail. GP guidance is qualitative and general by nature. Policy statements made in the GPs are quite general and non-committal. At best, they identify key areas of focus and principles or increasing support.

SD is identified in all three GPs as one of the key objectives for development policy implementation. In fact, the promotion of SD is an underlying principle of these GPs as a whole, both at the domestic and international level.

All three GPs provide some guidance in terms of areas to be emphasised in the promotion of SD. For example, support to various themes or processes such as the implementation of the Kyoto climate accord and contributing to MDGs are emphasised in these GPs. The 2003 GP emphasises the environmental dimension of SD, the 2007 GP elevates climate change to a core element, and the 2011 GP provides a more balanced view of SD by explicitly paying attention to its social and economic dimensions.

Policy Coherence

Several interviewees felt that GPs could be clearer in terms of policy coherence. GPs make reference to various environmental matters and objectives or activities which are cross-sectoral by nature. They however do not systematically and clearly identify responsibilities or accountability for results on these topics among ministries.

Development Policy Programmes 2004, 2007 and 2012 from a RBM perspective

The degree to which targets are well-defined

The quality and strength of target setting related to SD are quite weak. Concrete targets are generally missing and general statements, or unclear concepts are not easy to monitor. Guidance is almost without exception qualitative in nature, expressing general support and intentions, as well as adherence to certain principles. The DPPs are strongest in justifying the areas for involvement, expressing implementation principles and identifying general themes linked to SD. The 2012 DPP further identifies 12 key tasks to promote sustainable management of natural resources.

The way SD has been understood in DPPs, i.e. what aspects of SD have been emphasised, has changed over time despite the continuity in the GP SD-related guidance. In the case of the 2007 DPP, SD was adopted as an underlying, all-encompassing approach to development policy planning and implementation (similar to the HRBA in the 2012 DPP) without such guidance provided in the 2007 GP. In the 2012 DPP, climate sustainability was made a cross-cutting objective and a concept of "inclusive green economy" was added as one of the four key development policy priority areas, again, without similar emphasis or reference in the GP. No concrete guidance is provided concerning objectives and results to be delivered under climate sustainability and the inclusive green economy. Numerous interviewees pointed out that these concepts are not well operationalised.

The degree to which targets are relevant and meaningful

There is very little concrete target setting while commitments and intents are expressed. The targets set are relevant but not really meaningful because there give no indication of the intensity (e.g. size) of support expected.

The degree to which targets are clearly committed to

Policy statements are usually non-committable, and not backed with allocated responsibilities and time boundaries for delivering results. Statements such as "Finland will work systematically towards the achievement of ecologically, socially and economically sustainable development" are common. The issues of non-committal language was raised in many interviews.

The degree to which the achievement of targets can be verified straightforwardly

The DPP guidance related to SD is largely unverifiable or unmeasurable because targets and concepts are not clear and lack indicators. However, some of the expressed approaches or tasks can be verified, e.g. Finland will adopt a climate sustainability tool, or the environmental and social impacts of planned interventions will be assessed, even if there are no quantifiable objectives. A statement such as "the impacts of development cooperation on climate must be assessed comprehensively ex ante" is verifiable. According to interviews, unclear SD concepts pose problems for monitoring and verification because they hinder monitoring the use of funding and even less to account for the results. Furthermore, the concepts of climate sustainability and inclusive green economy do overlap. This is challenging for the establishment of RBM.

Location of targets along the MFA's results chain

The three assessed DPPs do not demonstrate the use of results-chain thinking, or a theory-of-change (TOC) approach. More concrete policy statements are input-oriented rather than results-oriented and expressed at the "high end" of the results chain. The links between the proposed action and the areas of emphasis and broader objectives related to SD are not easily visible. In the case of the 2004 DPP, SD is to be promoted to deal with and eradicate the causes of conflicts and violence. However, in the 2012 DPP, the proposed actions (12 tasks or approaches) to contribute to the sustainable management of natural resources implies some kind of TOC thinking with hierarchical activities, albeit not systematically expressed.

Interviews and survey findings mirror the findings of the desk analysis. There is a general understanding that DPPs give high priority to SD and supporting MEAs related e.g. to climate change. However, many criticise the DPPs for containing vague or unclear concepts such as "sustainable development" itself or "inclusive green economy", for expressing too many general policy statements and general principles, and for lacking clear objectives. Interviewees also suggested that a 4-year planning horizon is too short considering the nature of SD-related development cooperation. The objectives and financing needs for the MEA processes go beyond 4 years: they do not follow the Finnish DPP cycle. 66 percent of

the respondents are of the view that DPPs do not provide concrete enough guidance for formulating sector and thematic policies and guidelines, and 71 percent feel that it is not possible to derive targets and indicators for downstream policy guidance clearly and unambiguously from DPPs.

As pointed in interviews, the status of the DPPs is problematic in the context of policy coherence. Many environmental issues are cross-sectoral by nature and, hence, linked to the work of the ministries responsible for the environment, water, forestry, agriculture and trade and industry. Although each DPP is in principle a government policy document, it is in fact commonly seen as a MFA policy document. The DPP cannot really influence other ministries at the same level.

In summary, DPPs do not provide an adequate basis for RBM in relation to SD although SD is a key element of each DPP being evaluated. The DPPs are not results but rather input or activity-oriented. They are not supported by any results frameworks. Neither do they provide concrete objectives and measurable targets nor do they introduce indicators related to SD objectives set in the DPPs. Furthermore, unclear or changing SD concepts across DPPs make it difficult to set concrete targets and monitor resource allocation.

2.2 Guidance Elements in Downstream Policies

The degree to which targets are well-defined

Downstream policy guidance documents for environment, forestry and water are a mixture of normative guidance, e.g. principles to be followed and best practices, and policy guidance. The guidance is primarily qualitative in nature. Thematic areas and topics, organisations, processes, and priority regions and countries to be targeted are generally identified. In the case of forestry, policy guidelines are also used to provide a framework for already existing programme or project portfolio.

The 2013 and 2009 development policies for forestry and environment, respectively, try to be more programmatic than past guidelines. The policy for environmental cooperation identifies two priority themes for environmental cooperation as well as more concrete guidance such as increasing financial support for some activities or processes. Important international environmental agreements to be supported are listed.

Although some see the downstream guidelines too general, interviewees feel that they are still able to guide resource allocation and to justify the involvement of Finland in specific areas. It is easier to obtain support for areas mentioned in the guidance documents.

Several interviewees felt that, although the DPPs could set clearer priorities and contain more concrete objectives and targets, it is even more important to have more concrete downstream policy guidance, tools and instructions to guide the implementation of SD and environment agenda. The wish for more timely and operational guidance was commonly expressed.

The degree to which targets are clearly committed to

Policy statements are usually non-committable and not backed with allocation of responsibilities and time boundaries for delivering results. However, since they link planned action and support to specific aid channels, implementation responsibilities are implicitly expressed. In the case of the forestry guidelines, the implementation partners for some action have been clearly identified.

The degree to which achievement of targets can be verified straightforwardly

The reviewed guidelines do not contain concrete targets and indicators. The 2009 forestry guidelines

only had a simple action plan, which makes verification difficult. The policy guidelines are mainly activity or input-oriented with limited attention paid to results. Qualitative verification is however possible when it comes to assessing whether a proposed measure was taken or not.

3 PLANNING FOR RESULTS AND LEARNING FROM THE PAST: INFLUENCES SHAPING THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT-RELATED POLICY GUIDANCE AND FORMULATION PROCESSES

The Evaluation Team could not find much documentation on the design and influencing processes of the relevant downstream policy guidance documents in 2003-2013. However, the review of the policies for forest sector and environment as well as the information provided in interviews shed light on the influences that shaped these policies.

The DPPs clearly influenced the drafting of downstream policy guidance. This is especially true for the forestry (MFA 2009c, MFA 2013) and environment sectors (MFA 2009b) but less so for the international strategy for the water sector (MFA 2009a). According to those involved in the drafting processes, the DPP served as a guiding document when developing the forestry guidelines.

However, the main influences come from the MEAs and various environmental negotiations and processes such as the MDGs, the UNFCC including REDD, and UNCED. In the case of forestry, EU's policy instruments such as the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan and the UNFF objectives and processes play an important role. Together with the EU forest policy objectives and international best practices, these instruments have influenced the content of the forestry guidelines more than the DPPs. In the 2013 policy on the forest sector, the goals adopted are directly derived from the UNFF goals. These goals were also reflected in the 2007 objective setting (for the Action Plan).

It is important to note that, although the 2009 policy on forest sector draws on the 2007 DPP, it was not driven by it. The preparation of the 2009 policy has its origin in the alignment of the forest sector development cooperation with international developments which occurred in 2004-2005. Many element of the policy were already in place before 2007. On the other hand, the update of this policy in 2013 was driven by the introduction of the new DPP in 2012. The review of the 2013 development policy on the forest sector demonstrates a strong correlation with the 2012 DPP.

Some downstream policy guidance documents, such as the 2009 Development Policy for the Forest Sector, refer to making use of the main findings of past forestry evaluations, (Evaluation of Finnish Forest Sector Development Cooperation, Hardcastle et al 2003). According to an interviewee, the revised 2013 guideline also made use of an independent major forestry evaluation (Finnish Support to Forestry and Biological Resources, Hardcastle et al 2010)

4 FOCUS ON RESULTS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN FINNISH DEVELOPMENT POLICY

4.1 MFA Sustainable Development Financing Trends
Annex 7 provides information on development financing trends during the evaluation period up to 2012. The table demonstrates the challenges in linking the DPPs and budget planning and monitoring in the case of SD. The OECD DAC coding system provides uniformity, which is essential for consistent international reporting but it is not flexible enough to deal with thematic support such as SD, environment, climate sustainability or inclusive green economy. However, it is possible to obtain sector data, e.g. on forestry, using these statistics.

The statistics demonstrate how forestry funding has increased and accelerated in 2010 and 2011. The rapid increase reflects the influence of the 2007 DPP and the Minister's influence in implementing the DPP. Forestry was seen as an important sector for contributing to ecological sustainability and making use of the Finnish value added.

However, it is possible to monitor SD funding (related to environment) at the MFA by using the OECD DAC Rio Markers. The DAC is monitoring external development finance targeting environmental objectives through its Creditor Reporting System using "policy markers". For each aid activity they report to the OECD, donors are requested to indicate whether or not it targets environmental objectives. The markers are linked to funding that flows into to the implementation of the various MEAs.

In 2010, environmental financing almost doubled after a relatively steady development. This not only reflects the influence of the 2007 GP and DPP which highlighted the importance of supporting ecological sustainability and climate change mitigation and adaptation but also the Minister's support for the topic during the DPP implementation. However, the tripled support between 2008 and 2010 is mainly explained by international agreements and the resulting commitment by industrial countries, Finland included, to increasing funding dedicated to environmental issues (Kansainväliset ympäristösopimukset ja Suomen kehityspolitiikka 2012).

4.2 Influences on Implementation

Overall, interviewees feel that DPPs provide an important general framework for planning and implementating SD-related cooperation. They identify general areas of priority, and can be used to justify intervention proposals or identify priority areas to be addressed e.g. in the influencing plans for multilateral organisations dealing with the implementation of MEAs. For example, funding to GEF and UNDP has been increased in the past due to the DPP emphasis on SD and environment and to the Finnish commitment to MEAs. However, interviewees do not perceive the DPP as a key document influencing resource allocation related to international environmental policy. The more concrete guidance on implementation comes from multilateral environmental agreements and their implementation plans, various international environmental negotiations and forums, international policy discourses on emerging issues and best practices, sector and thematic policy guidelines related to SD such as the new forestry sector guidelines, and political influence.

Political influence on implementation has been perceived as very strong after the 2007 DPP. According to MFA advisers and staff of regional departments and embassies, the incoming Minister himself initiated new projects or initiatives such as the Institute of African Leadership for SD in Tanzania (UONGOZI). He further increased resources to the forestry and environment sectors both at bilateral and multilateral level.

However, the MFA's Sustainability Team's work is mainly influenced by five MEAs, the MDGs and the SD Goals (SDGs), various downstream policy guidance documents such as those for forests, water and sanitation, and environment, and less importantly by the DPP. A lot of the funding is based on longer-term commitments and decisions linked to MEAs such as climate agreements and their action plans. Commitments are commonly made to organisations whose planning horizons extend beyond the 4 years DPP period as demonstrated in 3.1 above. All three DPPs highlight the importance of MDGs and support to MEAs. The more detailed guidance in terms of areas or topics to be supported comes from the action plans, programs and initiatives of the organisations and processes linked to MEAs.

5 MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR RESULTS

There is no common management structure at the MFA that would cover SD and environment as whole. Just as in other sectors or thematic areas, the management is based on the MFA structure: regional departments focus on bilateral support, e.g. regional environmental projects or national sustainable forest management projects; and multilateral units such as the Unit for International Environmental Policy or units responsible for UN-organisations focus on Finland's support to organisations and processes linked to implementation of MEAs.

Management is primarily done by inputs and through the project cycle management, including the work of the Quality Assurance Board. The desk officer's task is to ensure that the proposal submitted to the QAB deals with all cross-cutting objectives, including climate sustainability. The advisers responsible for environment and related sectors try to ensure that proposals are aligned with the DPP and relevant thematic and sectoral policies and guidelines, including forestry, environment and water, and with cross-cutting objectives in general. Frequent changes of staff at the MFA compromise the results orientation and the quality of planning. The lack of staff continuity also reduces the responsibility for delivering results.

The Evaluation Team could not find any evidence of systematic, synthesis reporting of aggregate development results related to SD. There is no reporting structure that would cover such a broad theme as SD. The lack of aggregate reporting applies to forestry, water, environment, and climate change cooperation. Specific reporting challenges are related to unclear or changing concepts such as 'inclusive green economy', climate sustainability as a crosscutting objective or SD itself. Concepts for which there are no Rio markers and DAC codes are difficult to monitor for staff working on SD or responsible for development statistics. Furthermore, the QAB and AHA-KYT system and most importantly the budgeting system cannot deal with the 'inclusive green economy' priority area.

The most common form of reporting upwards is through inputs, i.e. the use of funding. The MFA reports expenditures on forestry and water according to the DAC system. This system provides useful data related only to some aspects of SD (see 3.1 above). All OECD countries, Finland included, have a reporting duty concerning MEAs. Hence, aid linked to MEAs is monitored and reported. Climate change reporting is done every second year. Three reports on international MEAs and Finnish development policy have been published, the last one in 2012 (Kansainväliset ympäristösopimukset ja Suomen kehityspolitiikka 2012). These reports allow monitoring the Finnish Development Policy against the MEAs. The Rio marker reporting is not concerned with measuring results but enable monitoring performance regarding the commitments possibly expressed in DPPs.

At the bilateral level, the quality control system linked to the AHA-KYT project administration system could, in principle, provide information on planned delivery of results related to SD but it is not yet being done. In the case of bilateral support, project and programme completion reports are not yet being used to collect and report information on performance. The new country strategies and related results framework should report on all cross-cutting objectives including climate sustainability. This is not yet being done systematically.

At the multilateral level, the MFA has to rely on the results monitoring and reporting systems of supported organisations such as the GEF, UNEP or FAO, and try to influence their results-orientation and reporting. For example, Finland has tried to push FAO towards using RBM. These organisations should have results frameworks and indicators linked to higher, globally agreed development targets. However, there has not yet been any effort to systematically use the results information of e.g. UNEP or the GEF.

6 KEY POINTS

Key points are summarised below along the key evaluation questions.

Evaluation question 1: What is the nature of guidance provided in Development Policy Programmes?
- Sustainable development (SD) is identified in all three GPs as one of the key objectives for development policy implementation; this is reflected in all 3 DPPs.
- The DPPs and downstream policy guidance related to SD are perceived as useful but they do not provide a basis for RBM because they lack concrete targets and indicators. They are rather input and activity-oriented than results-oriented.
- The quality and strength of target setting are quite weak. Concrete targets are generally missing and general statements are not easy to monitor. The SD concept in GPs and DPPs is very broad. This leaves much room for interpretation, e.g. by the incoming Minister, during implementation.
- Guidance is almost without exception qualitative in nature, expressing general support and intentions, as well as adherence to certain principles. Policy documents sometimes use vague concepts such as inclusive green economic, which causes problems for setting targets, programming and monitoring.
- The DPPs differ in quality of guidance. The 2012 DPP is the strongest in terms of providing guidance. It identifies 12 key tasks to be supported to promote the sustainable management of natural resources.

Evaluation question 2: How responsive have DPPs and other guidance documents been to learning from earlier results?
- Some downstream policy guidance documents, such as the 2009 Development Policy for Forest Sector, refer to making use of the main finding of past forestry evaluation, and the revised 2013 guideline also made use of a major independent forestry evaluation.
- However, there is no evidence on the impact of learning. References to the past seem to be used to justify the present approach and portfolio rather than in a critical and analytical approach to learning from past efforts.

Evaluation question 3: How consequently and diligently has DPP guidance been implemented?
- DPPs clearly influence the drafting of downstream policy guidance and implementation. The 2013 policy on the forest sector demonstrates a strong correlation with the 2012 DPP. Funding to sustainable forest management, climate change and environment increased after 2007, consistent with the policy guidance.
- However, the main influences on implementation come from the MEAs and various environmental negotiations and processes such as the MDGs, the UNFCC including REDD, and UNCED. In the case of forestry, EU's policy instruments like EU FLEGT Action Plan and the UNFF objectives and processes also played a major role.
- Interviewed MFA staff felt that these have influenced the implementation more than the DPPs.

Question 4: To what degree is upwards accountability exercised, consistent and relevant?
- At present, it is not possible to monitor and report on the delivery of results. Challenges exist even in monitoring the use of inputs related to SD, although improvements have been made especially regarding the reporting on activities related to MEAs.
- There is no evidence on systematic, synthesis reporting on aggregate development results related to SD. The lack of aggregate reporting applies to the forestry, water, environment and climate change cooperation.
- Challenges in reported are related to unclear or changing concepts such as climate sustainability

as a crosscutting objective, inclusive green economy or SD itself.
- The budgeting, aid expenditure monitoring and AHA-KYT systems also struggle with these diffuse concepts.
- The most common form of reporting upwards is through inputs, i.e. use of funding and comprehensive reporting using Rio markers on environment, including qualitative discussion.

4c Exemplary Country Study: Tanzania

1 INTRODUCTION

The exemplary study on Tanzania contributes to the evaluation of Finland's development policy programmes from a results-based management point of view. It sets out to answer one key evaluation question: how have the DPPs succeeded in defining the foundation for results-based development policy and cooperation? This study provides a snapshot of how successfully DPP guidance has influenced country programming and processes, especially during the last two DPPs. The 2004 DPP is so far away that it was not feasible to study that period, primarily because of the lack of documentation and difficulties in accessing people for interviews.

Tanzania is a key longest partner for Finland development cooperation and one of the largest recipients of Finnish Official Development Assistance (ODA). Finland has been supporting Tanzania's development efforts since the late 1960s. Tanzania's current development plans are guided by the grand vision known as Vision 2025 that aims at transforming Tanzania to become a middle-income country by 2025 as well as its second phase National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty in Tanzania (MKUKUTA II - 2010/11 – 2014/15) and the Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty II (MKUZA II). In order to achieve its goals, the priorities are clearly set in the Five Year Development Plan (2011/12-2015/16). There is a MKUKUTA monitoring system aiming at annually assessing performance, challenges, and lessons learned. Finland belongs to 11 working MKUKUTA groups out of 25 sector working groups (MFA 2013, 2013:7). Despite being a small donor in Tanzania compared to other development Partners, Finland has exercised some level of influence in joint programming for being active in various working groups, dealing e.g. with budget support, environment and local government, including chairing some of them.

The study methods and sources of information included interviewing current Finnish Embassy staff in Tanzania and former embassy staff at the MFA in Helsinki as well as people in the Department of Africa and Middle East currently involved with development cooperation in Tanzania. In addition, one government official in the Tanzania Planning Commission was interviewed by phone. Key documents reviewed include the 2007 and 2012 DPPs, 2007 country assistance planning documentation and reports, the current country strategy and related semi-annual and annual reports, and various Tanzania development plans.

The assessment is structured around the four evaluation questions.

2 EVALUATION QUESTION 1: WHAT IS THE NATURE OF GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN DPPS WITH RESPECT TO STRENGTH, SPECIFICITY AND SCOPE OF OBJECTIVES AND APPROACHES?

The 2007 DPP (MFA 2007d). The goals of the 2007 DPP related to the eradication of poverty and ecologically sustainable development matched with Tanzania's development plans on poverty reduction (MKU-

KUTA and MKUZA). Cross-cutting themes were equally relevant guidance. They included the promotion of the rights and the status of women and girls and the rights of groups that are easily excluded, promoting social equality, and combating the human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency system (HIV/AIDS) (2007 DPP, p. 16). The policy also emphasized that "development cooperation is planned jointly with the partner country on the basis of its development plans and ownership" (MFA 2007d, p. 17). This was in line with Tanzania's aid harmonization and donor coordination efforts. The 2007 DPP stated that Finland will continue using budget support where it is feasible. However, the policy qualified it by pointing out that the "role of budget support in our development cooperation will be considered in the near future" (MFA 2007d, p. 29). Project cooperation was emphasized in the policy and sets the stage for the proliferation of projects in the post-2007 country programming (MFA 2007d, p. 29; Caldecott et al 2012).

The 2007 DPP provided strong general guidance for Tanzania country programming as indicated above. However, the policy and follow-up guidance on country assistance planning (osallistumissuunnitelmat) did not provide concrete guidance that would have allowed moving towards more results-oriented approach. The concept of 'results-based' is not mentioned in the DPP section 7 of the policy that deals with implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The same applies to the MFA instructions on country assistance planning (MFA 2008g). The DPP also introduced the concept of "the Finnish" value added, which according to the interviews and MFA-commissioned study (Koponen at al 2012), was not easy to understand and operationalise in country programming.

2012 DPP (MFA 2012e). The eradication of extreme poverty has remained the overarching goal of Finland's development policy and so also in Tanzania's development plans. The four main priority areas of the 2012 DPP as well as its cross-cutting issues are in line with Tanzania's development plans on poverty reduction, governance and sustainable development. The 2012 DPP emphasised the application of human-rights based approach to development. Initially, the meaning and translation of the concept into the Tanzania country programming was not clear. The MFA guidelines about the 2012 DPP were delayed. This led to confusion in the beginning.

The 2012 DPP gives guidance concerning the modality of cooperation stating that it will now be based on the perspective of "effectiveness and concentration" i.e. "the size of programmes and projects will be increased and their number reduced" in order to reduce fragmentation (MFA 2012e, p. 17). This provides a specific guideline to Tanzania where the number of projects had proliferated after the 2007 DPP following the common trend for all donors in Tanzania largely caused by frustration among donors in Tanzania with the difficulties of working with the government systems. The Country Strategy for Development Cooperation with Tanzania 2013-2016 intends to reduce the number of interventions from 16 to about 7 by 2016. (MFA 2013h, p. 21).

The 2012 DPP provided more concrete guidance of relevance for RBM than the 2007 DPP. The policy emphasises "the results and quality of development cooperation. Baseline assessments, clear target-setting as well as systematic monitoring and reporting on activities will be enhanced" (MFA 2012e, p. 8). The term "development results" is used in the document (rather than development goals). The new DPP also sets an objective of preparing country strategies for long-term partner countries focusing on development results. This provides a concrete framework for Tanzania cooperation in terms of planning and reporting and for managing with more results-orientation. In interviews, the country strategies were greatly valued. This approach and related tools are hoped to be further developed and institutionalised at the MFA.

Although interviewees stated that more concrete policy guidance was sometimes needed, at the same time, it was seen as positive that DPPs are open enough to provide some flexibility in programming. There's a great need for flexibility because the implementation of DPPs must respect the realities on the

ground and needs of national beneficiaries. It would be difficult for the Embassy to start making major adjustments each time there is a new DPP.

3 EVALUATION QUESTION 2: HOW RESPONSIVE HAVE DPPS AND OTHER GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS BEEN TO LEARNING FROM EARLIER RESULTS?

According to the interview, the Country Assistance Plan for Tanzania was prepared so quickly – due to the tight deadline given by the Minister and the fact that Tanzania was the first country he visited – that there was no time for assessing lessons learned. Furthermore, the Minister himself wanted to influence the programme.

However, the Country Strategy prepared in 2013 builds explicitly on the 2012 Tanzania country programme evaluation (Caldecott et al 2012) findings concerning e.g. weaknesses due to fragmentation, positive achievements in past forestry cooperation, and general budget support contribution to poverty reduction. It also draws on lessons regarding aid effectiveness both in Tanzania and internationally. Importantly, the template provided by the DoDP for the preparation of country strategies required that lessons learned be analysed and reported in the background of the strategy document (MFA 2012p, p. 9). The main lessons that informed the country strategy included the following:
   · Results were achieved in programmes that had strong partnership and joint programming, while bilateral projects that lacked sector coordination or country-level synergies were not very successful;
   · After 2008, the volume of Finnish project aid and number of projects increased in Tanzania and aid became increasingly fragmented similar to other donors operating in Tanzania. This trend and related problems, including challenges in managing the portfolio efficiently, were recognised and measures to minimise the fragmentation are outlined in the country strategy. The strategy aims at focusing Finland's efforts on a limited number of sectors in order to achieve maximum results, shifting the focus from project-based support to programme-based support and building synergies between and among programmes (MFA 2013h, pp. 10 and 12).

As the analysis below indicates, the implementation can be driven a lot by political influence by the incoming Minister. This does not have to be necessarily a problem but the experience tells that it can reduce the use of lessons learned.

4 EVALUATION QUESTION 3: HOW CONSEQUENTLY AND DILIGENTLY HAS DPP GUIDANCE BEEN IMPLEMENTED?

Implementing the 2007 DPP
The 2007 DPP strongly guided the development cooperation implementation, including the preparation of the Tanzania country assistance plan. The policy included several sectors to be supported by Finland including environment, energy, forests, agriculture, water, regional policy, trade, and information society. New areas of cooperation were established based on the 2007 policy guidance e.g. the energy project to improve the reliability of electric power supply in Dar es Salaam, Information Society and ICT Sector Development and the UONGOZI Institute of African Leadership for Sustainable Development (Caldecott et al 2012, interviews).

Numerous interviews of MFA staff and the Tanzania country evaluation (Caldecott et al 2012) suggest that the implementation of the 2007 DPP in Tanzania was influenced more by direct input from the

Finnish Minister for Foreign Trade and International Development than by the DPP itself. According to the 2012 Evaluation of Finland's cooperation in Tanzania, the Minister was not in favour of general budget support but he could not reverse the process as commitments were already made. Instead he stabilised budget support and increased project support. The design of Agri-business development (LIMAS) in Mtwara and Lindi regions in 2009 is reported to be very much influenced by the Minister against the Embassy's advice for discontinuation of the planning process. The 2012 country evaluation (Caldecott et al 2012) concludes that *"It is clear in retrospect that decisions made in this period [2008-2011) were based on the minister's personal views on development, rather than on analysis or consensus. [...] The end result of this disordered and obscure programming process was a highly fragmented country programme"*. The interviews of Embassy staff and Tanzania country team representatives confirmed these conclusions, but also emphasised that the share of budget support in general has been going down in Tanzania and there has been a common trend among the donors to rely more on the project approach because of difficulties in working with government systems.

Implementing the 2012 DPP

The Tanzania country strategy and the 2012 DPP show strong correlations of objectives and themes such as HRBA, vulnerable groups, political rights, and cross-cutting objectives including gender equality and climate sustainability. The 2012 DPP has an objective of reducing fragmentation of Finnish support. For Tanzania, this objective was translated into the target to halve the number of projects by the end of the current government period.

The current country strategy states development results, derived from Tanzania's development plans which are in line with the 2012 DPP priorities. However, it has been somewhat difficult to start implementing the new DPP priorities because most funds had already been committed and tied for years even beyond the DPP period. Possibly up to 80 percent of the total budget of EUR 120 million in 2012–2015 was committed to pre-2012 DPP interventions (primarily to 2007 DPP-related interventions).

Interviewees commonly stated that DPPs represent only one among several influences. Country development objectives and programs, and donor coordination and harmonisation add important influences for country programming and objective setting. Donor aid harmonisation has influenced country programming. Finland's withdrawal from the education and justice sectors was necessitated due to the changed division of labour among the development partners. This change is referred in the country strategy as being the "biggest change in the country programming" (MFA 2013h, p. 9). Political influence has been a factors also after the 2012 DPP. According to the interviews, the incoming minister put a lot of emphasis on human rights issues whereas the last two ministers had focused on domestic revenue mobilization and taxation issues.

However, despite of the adoption of the 2012 DPP, the main priorities of Finland's cooperation in Tanzania, including the sectors of cooperation, have remained stable for the last decade. As stated in an interview, *"The DPPs give broad guidance on what to focus on. They are somehow open and that gives us some flexibility in our programming. Usually, there have been no dramatic changes in our programming despite the changes of the DPPs. The Embassy can easily adapt to the new policies by re-focusing within the existing programmes e.g. human rights issues. It is difficult to change every four years"*. Thus, the programmes and projects have not really changed, e.g. forestry has remained one of the main focus areas for 20 years. What this implies is that while DPPs have come and withered away, priority areas, programmes and some projects have endured beyond the timeframe of an individual DPP. Further, it has been possible to influence the design of already existing projects "afterwards" so that they pay more attention e.g. to HRBA and cross-cutting objectives.

Regarding the focus on the human rights-based approach, the Embassy has adopted a broader perspective encompassing governance and service delivery, access to land, inclusive livelihood, access to employment etc. According to the Embassy, all these are human-rights issues. This means that the already existing project portfolio is quite relevant considering the policy directions of the new DPP. The Embassy also pays a great deal of attention to human rights issues in its existing programmes, e.g. doing close monitoring of rights, and on how to report them.

When it comes to implementing the 2012 DPP, reducing the aid intervention fragmentation is a major priority. The 2012 portfolio includes 16 ongoing interventions from the previous period (2007–2011) for which financial commitments had already been made. It is expected that some of these interventions will be phased out when the project and programme cycle comes to an end; e.g. the energy sector project in Dar es Salaam and the Zanzibar project on the sustainable management of land and environment (SMOLE) may be closed.

Management for results in Tanzania country programming

Overall, there has been some improvement in adhering to the management by results (i.e. post-2012 DPP). The Country Strategy for Development Cooperation with Tanzania 2013–2016 states development results, which are derived from the Tanzania's development plans; they are also fully consistent with the 2012 DPP policy directions. These development results include:

· Development Result 1: Good governance and equitable service delivery
· Development Result 2: Sustainable management of the natural resources and access to land
· Development Result 3: Promotion of inclusive, sustainable and employment enhancing growth

The country strategy identifies concrete objectives, which can be measurable. For instance, under development result 1, Finland's objectives include the following

· Improved state accountability and transparency, measured by improved public financial management and audit systems; improved transparency in the governance of budget resources and natural resources; citizens' wider participation in decision-making and strengthened oversight in monitoring government actions.
· Reduction of inequality through improved service delivery, measured by improved structures and information systems for equitable service delivery; more equitable and needs-based allocation of budgetary funds at the local government level.

These country level objectives are linked to Tanzania's own result frameworks. For instance, the overarching goal of the Tanzania's Vision 2025 of becoming "middle income country with diversified competitive economy and high quality of life through accelerated economic growth and poverty reduction" constitutes the basis from which Finland's development results are derived. This main goal of Tanzania is also included in the logic model reporting in the Annual Results Report prepared by the Embassy.

The Results Monitoring Framework consists of results indicators that are based on national objectives and already existing indicators. The indicators are made from multiple sources including MKUKUTA II and MKUZA II monitoring systems, the Five-Year Development Plan, Controller and Auditor General Reports, the multi-annual Performance Assessment Framework, General Budget Support Annual Reviews, the Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics data, etc. The results indicators are also drawn from international ranking reports such as the UNDP Human Development Index ranking, MDG progress reports, the Corruption Perception ranking, the EIU Democracy Index ranking, etc. The time span for these results and indicators (short- or long-term indicators) is not indicated.

The evidence of results-chain or theory of change thinking is not very vivid. There are no concrete, measurable objectives, and results indicators related to gender and other cross-cutting objectives.

Many donors use the national results frameworks to monitor outcomes and impact e.g. through PAF and MKUKUTA monitoring systems. However, at times, some donors add their own indicators and this tends to create some tension in the government-donor relations.

5 EVALUATION QUESTION 4: TO WHAT DEGREE IS UPWARDS ACCOUNTABILITY EXERCISED, CONSISTENT AND RELEVANT?

Before the Country Strategy there was no systematic effort to report on results and achievements; also there was no result framework against which to report. The Tanzania Country Assistance Plan after the 2007 DPP did not bring a major improvement. RBM was not on the agenda like it is now. However, the country strategy approach has brought a much needed structure and results orientation with concrete target setting, indicators, monitoring and reporting performance.

Project and programme results are aggregated into a country results report titled "Annual Results Report on Development Policy and Cooperation". This annual report contains indicators, which are based on the country plans as discussed above. Reporting is semi-annually to the Department of Africa and Middle East that provides a management response. The DDG of the Department presents the annual report with management response to the DPSG where it is discussed. The Minister may provide feedback on bigger themes and issues, which has to be followed up. In this way, the country strategy works as an important management tool. Improved accountability is only one aspect of this approach.

Country reporting feeds into the regional synthesis report. One such report has already been prepared (MFA 2014v). There are still problems with the consistency of indicators and their aggregation, the availability of data and how to link project results with higher level objectives.

The availability of data is a serious issue. Many of the indicators cannot be easily reported annually because of the lack of data, or because some changes take much longer to be realised. In one interview, it was suggested not to try to report results yearly, at least not for all indicators. Further, there is a risk of paying too much attention to collecting data on indicators, which would be a problem because of the human resource shortage at the Embassy, or that the Embassy would start paying more attention to those interventions for which results are easy to measure and quantify.

There is a challenge in getting information from some programmes and projects to measure the delivery of results. This applies e.g. to the local government reform programme. Furthermore, the 4 years DPP cycle is too short for monitoring development results. Usually projects and programmes last longer than the policy life span. Sida's Results Framework for Tanzania extends over 7 years.

6 LEARNING FROM INTERNATIONAL PEERS

It was difficult getting one-to-one interviews with Sida and DFID staff. The analysis is based on Results Framework documents available on their official websites. The documents include DFID's Operational Plan 2011–2015 (DFID 2012) and related results strategy and Sida's (2013) Results Strategy for Sweden's International Development Cooperation in Tanzania 2013–2019 (Sida 2013). Examples of the Tanzania results frameworks of Sida and DFID are summarised below.

Sida
The Results strategy is more long-term and is formulated to last 7 years (2013–2019). Sweden's objectives

are clearly defined with results areas, specific targets and time span indicated in some results areas. For instance, the implementation of activities in the Results Strategy are expected to lead to results in three areas (Sida Results Strategy 2013–2019, pp. 1–2)

- More jobs and developed energy and agricultural markets, as measured by increased access to safe and sustainable energy including the ambition that at least 300,000 people gain access to electricity.
- Improved education and increased entrepreneurship, as measured by greater number of girls and boys who acquire knowledge and skills in school, greater number of young people who complete vocational education and training including the ambition that at least 100,000 people find employment.

The framework explicitly identifies the target groups (or the main beneficiaries) as being women, children and young people (Sida Results strategy 2013-2019, p. 1). The contribution of Swedish development cooperation is clearly indicated in certain results areas: *"During the most recent strategy period, Swedish development cooperation has contributed to about 20 percent of all new rural connections to the electricity grid since 2006, access to financial services for close to 1 million small business and poor people (of whom more than half are women and young people), and enhanced research capacity through doctoral programmes in which some 100 doctoral students have been awarded degrees"* (Sida Country Strategy 2013-2019, p. 2).

The bi-annual reporting process includes bi-annual meetings between the Embassy management and Sida headquarters on implementation progress, opportunities, risks and challenges. The embassy also works out annual operational plans which pick up on issues identified in the strategy reporting and make necessary adjustment to the country program. Towards the end of the country strategy cycle, there will typically be a more thorough follow up of the experiences and results of the strategy implementation that will influence the design of the next country strategy.

Sida has started exploring options for more concrete results-based approaches. It has come furthest in the education sector where it plans to sign an agreement in 2015 on a contribution with a "Payment for Results" design. This follows the World Bank instrument on "Payment for Results" in which payments linked to specific results are made *ex post*. Sida is considering a similar approach for the next energy sector contribution and might also consider it for social protection contributions.

DFID

DFID's operational plan for Tanzania lasts for five years (2011-2015). It is aligned to MKUKUTA II (2010/11–2014/15). It has clearly stated three strategic objectives including wealth creation, delivering of the MGDs, getting the government to work better and helping Tanzanians hold their government to account (DFID Operational Plan 2011-2015).

- Target groups are specifically identified as being girls and women.
- Indicators, expected results and targets are clearly indicated. On wealth creation, the indicator is for example "rural men and women raise their incomes, 563,500 people over four years"; "additional people have access to financial services, 741,000 people over four years (75 percent of women)".
- The Operational Plan provides guidance on evidence supporting results, value for money delivering, monitoring and evaluation, transparency and human rights assessment.

There are some lessons that Finland could adopt from the Sida and DFID results frameworks including having a longer-term plan, clearly defined target groups and specific indicators with clear time spans and outcomes.

ANNEX 5: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES WITH RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT

This annex complements chapter 7 of the main report on international experiences with RBM. Chapter 7 is based on a review of RBM-related literature and observations made on selected benchmarking countries and international organisations.

The present annex follows this structure. The first section presents insights from the literature on RBM. First, potential conflicts between the main purposes of RBM highlighted by several authors are presented, followed by the challenges and principles in the implementation of RBM identified by John Mayne. The second section explains and displays the results frameworks used by the benchmarking partners selected for this evaluation.

1. Literature review

Balance between accountability and managing for results

RBM, as defined by the UNDP (among others), is supposed to answer two purposes:

> "RBM is a management strategy by which […] the actors […] use information and evidence on actual results **to inform decision making** on the design, resourcing and delivery of programmes and activities as well as **for accountability and reporting**." (emphasis added UNDG 2011, p. 2)

As discussed in section 7.1 of the main report and according to Binnendijk (2000, pp. 119), the two purposes of accountability and management for results potentially induce conflicting behaviours in organisations. Table 1 below illustrates the conflicting behaviours induced by the two driving forces of RBM.

Table 1   Behaviour induced by accountability versus management for results

Accountability for Results	Managing for Results
Emphasizes meeting targets	Emphasizes continuous improvements
Focus pushed down to outputs	Focus shifts up to outcomes and impacts
Requires independent assessment or verification	Emphasizes self-assessments and participation
Greater concern with attribution	Less concern with attribution
Implies rigorous methods and high quality data	Favours rapid, low cost methods
Encourages conservative behaviour	Encourages risk-taking, experimenting, learning

Source: Binnendijk (Binnendijk 2000, p. 121)

Binnendiijk (2000, p. 122) further introduced two mnemonics reflecting how RBM-related opportunities can turn into risks, if the balance between uses of RBM is not observed:

- "What gets measured gets done": how indicators can motivate staff to achieve results but also distort true objectives not fully mapped by indicators or if too little space is left to qualitative studies and adequate supervision; and
- "You become what you measure": that RBM induces a shift in development work towards easily quantifiable activities and approaches at the expense of "soft" areas of capacity-building, policy advice and advocacy.

In the same vein, in 2010, former USAID administrator Natsios summarised (Natsios 2010, p. 1):

"One of the little understood, but most powerful and disruptive tensions in established aid agencies lies in the clash between the compliance side of aid programs – the counter-bureaucracy – and the technical, programmatic side. The essential balance between these two in development programs has now been skewed to such a degree in the U.S. aid system (and in the World Bank as well) that the imbalance threatens programme integrity. The counter-bureaucracy ignores a central principle of development theory – that those development programs that are most precisely and easily measured are the least transformational, and those programs that are most transformational are the least measurable."

Vähämäki et al (Vähämäki et al 2011, p. 9) conclude that „[...] since development cooperation funds ultimately come from taxpayers in donor countries, results information from activities funded through development cooperation is mostly used for accountability to domestic audiences in donor countries, and to legitimise donor government policies in regard to development cooperation."

Challenges and Principles identified by John Mayne in the implementation of RBM

Mayne lists typical organisational and technical challenges that get in the way of implementing and mainstreaming RBM in a public organisation (see Table 2).

Table 2 Challenges to Implementing Results-Based Management in Public Organizations

Organizational challenges	Technical challenges
1. Fostering the right climate 2. Setting realistic expectations 3. Implementing to get buy-in and use 4. Setting outcome expectations 5. Selectivity 6. Avoiding distorting behaviour 7. Accountability for outcomes	8. Measurements 9. Attribution 10. Linking financial and performance information 11. Data quality 12. Reporting performance

Source: Mayne (Mayne 2007b, p. 90)

In response to these challenges, the following principles for implementing RBM in an organization were written by John Mayne and kindly provided to the evaluation team per email.

Principle 1. Foster senior-level leadership in results-based management

Effective leadership is essential if results-based management is to succeed and requires:

1.1 Demonstrated senior management leadership, providing ongoing commitment and managing expectations for RBM

1.2 A knowledge of and capacity for results management among senior management and other senior managers

Principle 2. Promote and support a results-oriented culture

Fostering an appropriate organizational culture of results is critical and requires:

2.1 Informed demand for results information with managers at all levels asking for and about results information, and requirements in place for results-based planning, budgeting and reporting

2.2 Supportive organizational systems, incentives (formal and informal), procedures and practices, including providing adequate autonomy to manage for results

2.3 A results-oriented practical accountability regime, recognizing the challenges and supporting learning

2.4 A capacity to learn and adapt, making time for learning and tolerating mistakes

2.5 A capacity for results measurement and results-based management, centrally and in the field

2.6 A clear role and responsibilities for results-based management

Principle 3. Build results-based strategic frameworks with ownership at all levels

The organization needs to set out the overall and specific results its programmes are collectively and individually intended to achieve and how best to structure itself to achieve them, namely:

3.1 An organizational results-based strategic plan, agreed by the governing body, outlining organizational objectives, intervention strategies used and major risks faced, with the organization's programmes aligned with the strategic results in the plan.

3.2 Results strategies[5] for programmes showing context, objectives and resources used, and the results chains employed – including the roles of partners – outlining the theory and logic and assumptions behind the programme design, the risks faced and the mitigation strategies used.

3.3 Reasonably clear and concrete performance expectations for programmes.

3.4 A sensible strategy for measuring key results, including a manageable set of performance indicators and complementary evaluations, appropriate to the different complexities of the programmes.

3.5 A reporting strategy identifying which aspects of performance (indicators and evaluations) will be reported to whom and when.

3.6 Ownership by managers and staff of results frameworks that are relevant and useful.

Principle 4. Measure results sensibly

The organization needs to gather and analyse credible information on performance through:

4.1 Credibly measuring activities, results and costs using both ongoing monitoring and periodic evaluation, and assessing actual activities, results and costs in light of the performance expectations.

4.2 Assessing the contribution and influence made by the programmes to the observed results.

Principle 5. Develop user-friendly information systems for handling results information

RBM and related information systems need to support RBM practices, not hinder them:

5.1 Building cost-effective, user-friendly and relevant information systems for handling results information, such as monitoring, analysing, reporting, project management, financial and human resources systems.

Principle 6. Use results information for learning and managing, as well as for reporting and accountability

Realizing the benefits from results-based management requires:

6.1 Learning from performance information to inform and improve programme performance and budgets, balancing corporate and managers' information needs.

6.2 Identifying and using best practices to improve performance.

6.3 Credible performance reporting internally and externally, telling a coherent performance story.

6.4 Use relevant results information to inform accountability assessments.

[5] Items 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 comprise a results framework.

Source: Mayne, J.

2. Results frameworks of benchmarking partners

The following section presents the results frameworks of the selected benchmarks. Sweden is not repre-
sented since it does not use a results framework.

ADB

Since 2008, the ADB uses a 2-section and 4-tier results framework derived from its 2020 Strategy and
composed of 87 indicators. The current revised framework is valid for the period 2013-2016. ADB assess-
es its progress annually against the results framework's indicators, baselines, and targets. Based on the
annual development effectiveness review, management decides upon actions that need to be taken to
improve the ADB's effectiveness.

Figure 4   ADB's Results Framework 2013-16 and examples for indicators for each level

Source: ADB (ADB 2013b, pp. 5)

France

France has not adopted RBM as management tool in development cooperation. However, an accountabil-
ity tool was designed in 2011 and a revised version of it is now attached to the recently adopted law on
development (Journal Officiel de la République française 2014). This tool takes the form of a mandatory
reporting matrix including 17 indicators for bilateral development aid and 14 indicators for multilateral
development aid.

The indicators are reported to the Parliament every two years. Their relevance is regularly reviewed by
the National Commission for Decentralized Cooperation and the National Council for Development and
International Solidarity.
Table 3 on next page provides selected examples for these indicators.

**Table 3**   Examples for mandatory aggregate indicators

N°	Indicator for bilateral aid (sample)	Area
1	Number of small-holder farms supported by AFD financed programmes	Agriculture, food security
5	a. Number of children enrolled in primary and secondary school b. Number of children who have completed primary school c. Number of young people received in training institutions supported by the AFD	Education and training
13	Number of projects having a nutritional objective	Cross-cutting
N°	Indicator for multilateral aid (sample)	Area
2	Number of children vaccinated through our contribution to the GAVI Alliance	Health
6	Number of manuals and educational material provided (African Development Bank)	Education
12	Number of constructed or reconstructed roads (World Bank)	Infrastructure (transport)

Source: Journal Officiel de la République française 2014 (Annex 2 to the Rapport)

IFAD

As with ADB's results framework, IFAD's Results Measurement Framework has a top level with 7 indicators that track development outcomes to which IFAD contributes but that are not attributable to its activities. Levels 2 and 3 in this framework (with 14 indicators each) correspond to the second level in IFAD's framework. They measure country-level outcomes (level 2) and outputs (level 3) attributed to IFAD-supported programmes and projects. The information for these indicators is mostly drawn from project completion report ratings and IFAD's Results and Impact Measurement System (RIMS), a comprehensive arrangement for tracking various project-level activities, outputs and outcomes and for conducting impact surveys with methodological indicator and measurement guidance (IFAD 2014). Level 4 measures IFAD's operational effectiveness with 20 indicators, drawing from various sources: quality assurance ratings, client surveys, IFAD's project portfolio management system, review scores and office records. 15 level 5 indicators measure IFAD's organisational effectiveness and efficiency based on office records.

Figure 5 Levels of IFAD's Results Measurement Framework and examples for indicators at each level

Level 1: Global poverty reduction and agricultural development outcomes		1.1.2. Prevalence of undernourishment in population (percent)
Level 2: IFAD's contribution to development outcomes and impact		2.1.6. Sustainability of benefits (percent)
Level 3: Concrete country programme and project outputs		3.4. People trained in livestock production practices/technologies
Level 4: Operational effectiveness of country programmes and projects		4.4.1. Time from project approval to first disbursement (months)
Level 5: Organizational effectiveness and efficiency		5.2.1. Percentage of staff positively engaged in IFAD objectives

Source: IFAD (IFAD 2011c, pp. 5)

New Zealand

The results framework of the International Development Group (formerly NZAID, New Zealand Agency for International Development) is inspired by ADB's framework but levels 3 and 4 of ADBs framework are collapsed into one level in the NZ framework The levels are defined as follows (NZAID 2013, p. 1):

· **Level 1 (28 indicators): global development results.** Focuses on development results to which the New Zealand Aid Programme is seeking to contribute in partner countries. These results are likely to be medium-term or long-term outcomes and cannot be attributed to New Zealand Aid Programme alone - they are supported by many actors including partner countries and other donors. Examples for indicators at this level are the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) per person or the net enrolment ratio in primary and secondary education;

· **Level 2 (30 indicators and 4 activity manager assessments): direct New Zealand development results.** Focuses on the direct contribution of the New Zealand Aid Programme to development results in partner countries. These results should be more readily attributable to the New Zealand Aid Programme and are likely to be key outputs, short-term or medium-term outcomes that have been supported or achieved by our Activities and Programmes. Examples for indicators at the outcome and output levels are the additional value of agricultural production (Outcome) and the number of people who have gained access to agricultural technologies (Output, disaggregated by sex);

· **Level 3 (27 indicators): operational and organisational performance.** Focuses on effective and efficient management of operations and the organisation – in support of results. Examples for indicators at this level are the Dollars leveraged from partnerships or the value of activities that have been 'scaled-up' or replicated (Dollars and number).

United Kingdom

Results framework. DFID has introduced a 4-tier results framework with 22 MDG level indicators (level 1) and respectively 26 and 51 indicators for bilateral and multilateral development cooperation (level 2). For level 3 and 4, DIFD's results framework does not specify any indicator but rather priority or service areas (see Figure 6 below).

Figure 6   DFID's results Framework and examples for indicators

Level 1: Progress on key development outcomes MDG1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger MDG2: Achieve universal primary education MDG3: Promote gender equality and empower women MDG4: Reduce Child Mortality MDG5: Improve maternal health MDG6: Combat HIV&AIDS, malaria and other diseases MDG7: Ensure environmental sustainability	Prevalence of underweight children under-five years of age
Level 2: DFID Results • Bilateral programme results • Multilateral programme results	Number of people with access to financial services as a result of DFID support
Level 3: Operational Effectiveness • Portfolio Quality • Pipeline Delivery • Monitoring and Evaluation • Performance against Structural Reform Plan	No indicator specified in the results framework but performance area such as *Portfolio Quality* and *Pipeline Delivery*
Level 4: Organisational Effectiveness • Human Resources • Employee Engagement • Workforce diversity • Finance • Procurement • Estates	No indicator specified in the results framework but service area such as human resources and employee engagement

Examples for indicators

Source: DFID (DFID 2014, pp.3)

Examples for reporting requirements. As highlighted in the main report, the 2006 Act establishes detailed directives for reporting to the Parliament. Some examples for such detailed reporting requirements are:

- "The Secretary of State shall include in each annual report his assessment of the year in which he expects that the target for expenditure on official development assistance to amount to 0.7 percent of gross national income will be met by the United Kingdom." (Elisabeth II 2006a, p. 2, section 3)
- "(1) Each annual report must include the Secretary of State's assessment of the following matters –
  (a) what progress has been made generally towards the achievement of Millennium Development Goals 1 to 7,
  (b) the effectiveness in pursuing Millennium Development Goals 1 to 7 of multilateral aid generally to which the United Kingdom contributes,
  (c) the effectiveness in pursuing Millennium Development Goals 1 to 7 of bilateral aid provided by the United Kingdom to not fewer than 20 countries specified in the report, selected according to criteria so specified,
  (d) what progress has been made in promoting untied aid. [...]" (Elisabeth II 2006a, p. 2, section 4)
- "(1) The Secretary of State shall include in each annual report such general or specific observations as he thinks appropriate on the effects of policies and programmes pursued by Government departments on –
  o the promotion of sustainable development in countries outside the United Kingdom,
  o the reduction of poverty in such countries.
  - (2) Such observations are to include observations on the pursuit of Millennium Development Goal 8, including in particular progress towards –
  o the development of an open trading system that is rule-based and non-discriminatory and expands trading opportunities for low income countries,
  o the development of an open financial system that is rule-based and non-discriminatory,
  (e) the enhancement of debt relief for low income countries. [...](Elisabeth II 2006a, p. 3, section 5)

Evidence-based decision-making on allocation. In 2011, DFID published two aid reviews of bilateral and multilateral development aid, making and comparing value for money judgments across countries and international organisations.

The Bilateral Aid Review ranked countries according to an index combining two factors: the development need and the potential for aid to be effective. This index helps identify the countries where development aid is likely to have the highest impact on poverty reduction. The ranking results are displayed in Table 4 below. Following this review, bilateral cooperation was ended with 16 countries.

Table 4 Countries in order of their position in the Need-Effectiveness Index

Quartile 1[6]	Quartile 2	Quartile 3	Quartile 4
India	Cameroon	Sri Lanka	El Salvador
Nigeria	Guinea	**Tajikistan**	Mongolia
Ethiopia	Benin	**Kyrgyz Republic**	Tunisia
Bangladesh	Madagascar	Djibouti	Iran
Pakistan	**Nepal**	Colombia	Solomon Islands
Uganda	Haiti	Swaziland	Kazakhstan
DRC	Chad	**Zimbabwe**	Azerbaijan
Afghanistan	**Liberia**	Thailand	Dominican Republic
Tanzania	Angola	Bhutan	Jordan
Burkina Faso	Iraq	Georgia	Cape Verde
Niger	Vietnam	Guatemala	Ukraine
Kenya	Cambodia	Bolivia	Paraguay
Burundi	Central African Republic	**Occupied Palestinian Territories**	Guyana
Mozambique	Uzbekistan	Brazil	Sao Tome and Principe
Rwanda	Togo	Timor-Leste	Jamaica
Mali	Mauritania	Honduras	Maldives
Burma	Egypt	Algeria	Ecuador
Sierra Leone	Papua New Guinea	**Somalia**	Albania
Indonesia	Laos	Nicaragua	Bosnia & Herzegovina
Yemen	Philippines	Syria	Equatorial Guinea
Senegal	Gambia	Moldova	Samoa
Ghana	Guinea-Bissau	Namibia	Turkmenistan
China	Morocco	Armenia	Fiji

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| Sudan	Lesotho	Peru	Cuba
Côte d'Ivoire	Congo, Republic	Serbia	Macedonia
Malawi	Eritrea	Comoros	Suriname
Zambia			Belarus

Notes: DFID focus countries are highlighted in bold. Orange and yellow marked cells respectively represent the 5 percent of countries with highest scores and the next 5 percent highest scoring countries.
Source: DFID (DFID 2011a, pp.19)

In a similar vein, the Multilateral Aid Review assessed the value for money of UK aid through funding to multilateral organisations. The performance of 43 multilateral organisations was measured along two main dimensions: its organizational strength and its contribution to UK development objectives. 9 were assessed to offer poor value for money and 9 to offer very good value for money while the remaining 25 offered good or adequate value for money, as displayed in Figure 7 below.

Based on this assessment, DFID ended its support to 4 multilateral organisations and reprioritized it among the remaining 39.

Figure 7   Multilateral assessment overview

Note: [1] includes humanitarian objectives

Source: DFID (DFID 2011b, p. iv)

ANNEX 6: PROCESS ANALYSIS – DPP FORMULATION, IMPLEMENTATION AND REPORTING

This annex summarizes the results of a desk review of the formulation, implementation and reporting processes and timeline of the three DPPs considered in this evaluation. The analysis is based on documentation provided by the MFA upon keyword searches in its internal documentation system. It takes into account the broader political context within which DPPs fall.

The DPP processes are more or less formal and documented. Therefore, this description does not claim to be exhaustive, especially for older DPPs. Comparison between the DPPs is made where possible. The desk review was complemented by interviews of persons involved in the processes of formulation, implementation or reporting of the DPPs as well as by survey questions.

The DPP Life-cycle
Life-cycle
The DPP life-cycle as represented in the flowchart in Figure 5 below is divided into 5 years, corresponding to major milestones in the DPP processes and political context rather than to calendar years:
- year 0 begins with the parliamentary elections and the appointment of the government with the production of the Government Programme and usually ends with the government decision-in-principle on the new DPP (March to February);
- Year 1 and 2 represent the two years of production of downstream guidance and implementation of the DPP under the government in place;
- Year 3 is the last year of the government in place and also corresponds to the pre-election phase and preparation of the formulation of the new DPP, i.e. year -1 in the life-cycle of the next DPP.

Phases
The formulation of the DPP extends over a period of 1 to 2 years (from year -1 to end of year 0). In theory, the implementation of the DPP starts by year 1 and continues over year 2. The formulation of downstream guidance can reach until the end of year 3. Then the formulation process of the next DPP starts during year 3 (which corresponds to year -1 in the next DPP cycle). Reporting directly related to the implementation of the DPP has not been systematic during the last three DPP periods.

It should be noted that the life-cycle of the 2007 DPP was slightly different than the other two: the parliamentary elections took place earlier and the Government Programme was issued earlier; the government decision-in-principle on the DPP was made in April of year 0, i.e. four months earlier in the cycle than the 2004 and 2012 DPPs.

Political Context
Assuming that the DPP "validity" reaches from government decision-in-principle to government decision-in-principle of the successor DPP, two or more ministers are active during each DPP validity period:
- DPP 2004 "saw" as ministers: Paula Lehtomäki, Mari Kiviniemi (during maternity leave of the former), and Paavo Väyrynen, all Center Party members;
- DPP 2007 "saw" as ministers Paavo Väyrynen (Center Party) and Heidi Hautala (Green League);

- DPP 2012 "saw" as ministers Heidi Hautala (Green League), Pekka Haavisto (Green League), and Sirpa Paatero (Social Democratic Party)

DPP Formulation

Apart from the government decision-in-principle, there is no formally defined process for formulating and approving the DPP. This process happens rather in an ad hoc manner and has involved the relevant Minister, MFA staff, the Development Policy Steering Group and external stakeholders to different degrees during the last three DPP periods.

Planning and Preparatory Work

planning and preparatory work for the formulation of the next DPP usually starts during year -1, i.e. before the elections take place in March or April of year 0.

2004 DPP: Planning and preparatory work for the formulation of the 2004 DPP started during year 0 when the newly appointed minister Paula Lehtomäki launched the background and preparatory work in June 2003 by asking MFA units for the analysis of their work between 2000 and 2003.

2007 DPP: planning and preparatory work was far advanced at the end of year -1. Discussion processes related to aid effectiveness and harmonization had taken place before the 2007 parliamentary elections. The outputs of these discussions were supposed to feed into the 2007 DPP. A draft DPP was ready before Minister Paavo Väyrynen was appointed.

2012 DPP: during year -1, internal feedback was gathered from MFA departments on the implementation of the 2007 DPP and the consultation and writing roadmap was planned. When she officially took office in June 2011, Minister Heidi Hautala approved the planned process.

Linearity

Not all three DPPs followed linear or planned sequence of events when preparing and formulating the DPP.

2004 DPP: the consultation and drafting processes were planned by the DPSG. The draft DPP was initially planned to be finalized end of November. During the second meeting of the DPSG, minister Lehtomäki emphasized the importance of producing a good quality DPP and to remain flexible in the formulation process. Overall, consultations took place and comments were required at different stages and in parallel to the writing process.

2007 DPP: the preparatory work done during year -1 was interrupted as the Minister for International Trade and Development came into office. Discussions related to aid effectiveness and harmonisation were discontinued and, according to numerous interviewees, the draft DPP was almost entirely re-written by the new minister. It is not clear how consultations held and comments gathered interacted with the DPP drafting process.

2012: The 2012 DPP followed a precise roadmap that foresaw the sequential collection of input through written communication with MFA units and embassies, a series of internal and external consultations events and, in parallel, the possibility for the broad public to provide input through a special webpage. Based on this input, the drafting and commenting process started with drafts being successively produced and commented.

Participation and Consultation

The formulation processes of the three DPPs involved MFA internal and external stakeholders to varying degrees.

2004 DPP: the 2004 DPP formulation process involved many stakeholders in meetings and through comments on the draft DPP and aimed at the highest possible transparency. According to the notes of a DPSG meeting, it was decided in a multi-stakeholder event to consult other ministries, the Parliament's Foreign Affairs and Budget and Finance Committees and the DPC in the preparation of the DPP. An NGO working group in charge of drafting the DPP section on development cooperation with civil society organised a meeting to gather the inputs from civil society. Due to the amount of comments received, it was decided to schedule a second meeting. A meeting on the "relationship of Finnish agricultural policy and development policy - tools for the preparation of DPP" was held with participants from the MFA, other ministries, Finnfund, research organisations, etc. Participants were offered the possibility to provide comments on the draft shortly after. A discussion event with state officials was further organized to identify policy and consistency challenges of different sectors of state administration, as well as means and measures to promote coherence. Ministries were invited to comment the draft DPP.

2007 DPP: traceable participation and consultations during the formulation of the 2007 DPP are limited to consultations with KEPA (the Finnish NGO umbrella organisation) and the Confederation of Finnish Industries. Comments on the draft DPP were further provided by NGOs and MFA units and embassies.

2012 DPP: The formulation of the 2012 DPP involved internal and external stakeholders both during the input gathering and the drafting phase (see Figure 6). In an open event, the Minister announced the KEPO (Kehityspolitiikka) OPEN process, a series of four internal and external consultation meetings on different topics of the DPP (1. the operating environment and objectives; 2. consistency; 3. principles and effectiveness; 4. forms and resources of cooperation). MFA departments and embassies were further requested to provide written input on the DPP. During the input gathering phase, a webpage was open for comments and input by the broad public. The DPP was then drafted with regular review and input by the DPSG. A draft was presented to and commented by MFA departments and embassies, then modified and sent to non-governmental stakeholders and other ministries for further comments.

Figure 8 Major DPP formulation, implementation and monitoring steps in the DPP cycle

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Figure 9
Formulation process
of the 2012 DPP

DPP Implementation and Monitoring of DPP Implementation

Implementation Plans

After the formal approval by the government, the MFA starts implementing the measures contained in the DPP. This has been done in different ways for the three DPPs at stake.

2004 DPP: one month after the government decision-in-principle on the DPP, DoDP requested MFA departments and units to provide their own implementation plan for the years 2004 and 2005. Later this year, the plan for 2005 would be fine-tuned and further implementation plans established for 2006-2006. Implementation plans were to follow a loose structure provided by DoDP indicating the measures envisaged and responsibility per year. Individual plans were assembled by DoDP. In 2004 and 2005, DoDP produced yearly evaluation reports on the implementation of the DPP based on information requested from the MFA units, departments and embassies. These reports could not be found for subsequent years.

2007 DPP: no central implementation plan could be found for the 2007 DPP. Rather, several guidelines were distributed on planning and implementing the DPP and on how to draft a country participation plan in long-term cooperation countries or regional or focus-theme plans. Further, trainings and seminars were held on development policy and cooperation, among others on making use of the Finnish know-how and value added through the IKI instrument. No document was found related to reporting on the progress or status of the implementation of the 2007 DPP.

2012 DPP: about a month after the government decision-in-principle, the new DPP was presented to state officials working on development policy at embassies and the ministry headquarter in a yearly conference with a special focus on its implementation. DoDP further issued an implementation plan along the 16 main measures listed in the DPP and three further development measures or procedures: "green economy", "budget support" and "sector guidelines and studying the consistency of development policy sector and theme guidelines and rationalization of publishing". For each measure, specific activities and responsibilities were defined. The plan was approved by the DPSG and regularly updated to reflect the progress made towards the achievement of the specific actions and activities planned. The last update found was issued in December 2012.

Downstream Guidance

The production of downstream guidance (i.e. action plans or strategies for sectors, approaches or cross-cutting objectives) constitutes an intermediary step in the implementation of the DPPs. Downstream guidance is however produced during the whole DPP cycle and occasionally reaches until the end of year 3, although it is not clear to what extent downstream guidance remains valid from one DPP period to another. This is especially the case for the Human Rights Based Approach for which a new guidance document is being prepared shortly before the next parliamentary elections. Figure 10 illustrates the time-lag between the approval of the DPP and the production of downstream guidance by mapping examples of guidance produced under each DPP to their year and (whenever indicated) month of publication in the DPP cycle.

Reporting per Aid Channel

Reporting on the implementation of development cooperation was mapped per aid channel and instrument or tool and is depicted in Table 5 below. The matrix indicates the type of reports produced, the location of the reported information on the results chain (RBM elements) as well as the level of aggregation of information reported.

Figure 10
Production of downstream guidance in the DPP cycle
Source: own representation

DPP cycle

Year 0
March 00 – February 01
Formulation of DPP

Year 1
March 01 – February 02
Operationalisation

Year 2
March 02 – February 03
Operationalisation

Year 3
March 03 – February 04
Operationalisation and preparation of next DPP

2004 DPP

Elections 16.03.03
→ GP 24.06.03
→ DPP 05.02.04

Rural development strategy (2004)
HIV/Aids policy (2004)

ICT and information society guidelines (2005)
Concessional credits guidelines (2005)

NGO development cooperation guidelines (2006)
Policy for the health sector (2007)

2007 DPP

Elections 18.03.07
→ GP 19.04.07
→ DPP 18.10.07

Country development programmes (Mar-Oct 2008)
Multilateral Cooperation policy (2008)

Forest sector policy (2009)
Water sector strategy (2009)

Guideline for civil society (2010)
Development and security guidelines (2010)

2012 DPP

Elections 17.04.11
→ GP 22.06.11
→ DPP 16.02.12

Humanitarian assistance policy (Oct 2012)
AfT action plan (2012)
HRBA Guidelines (Feb 2013)
Country strategies (Feb 2013)

Humanitarian assistance guidelines (Aug 2013)
Influencing strategies for IOs (from Dec 2013 on)

Some influencing strategies for IOs (Mar 2014)
Policy on fragile states (May 2014)
Work Plan on the HRBA (in preparation)

Table 5 Map of reporting along aid channels

Aid channel	Instrument/Tool	Reports	RBM elements	Aggregation
Bilateral cooperation	Country strategy (for long-term partners countries)	• Semi-annual reports • Annually updated results matrix and financial plan • Logic model • No synthesis along entire channel (but for regions)	• Budget/Input • Activity • Output • Outcome indicators	Country and region
	Institutional Cooperation Instrument (IKI)	• Quarter-yearly portfolio status report	• Budget • Activity	Instrument
	Local Cooperation Fund (PYM)	• Yearly report at country level	• Budget/input • Output • Outcome (ad hoc)	Country
	Concessional credits	• Project progress reports • Final project evaluation	• Budget/input • Output	Project
	Finnfund and Finnpartnership	• Finnfund annual report including Finnpartnership • Annual report to the Owner-ship Steering Department under the Prime Minister	• Budget/input • Ex ante outcome indicator	Instrument Instrument
Multilateral cooperation	DFIs, UN organisations etc.	• Matrix of results based on influencing plans • No synthesis	• N/A	Individual institution
EU cooperation	• EDF • EU (budget support)	• Various reports • No synthesis	• N/A	Not at EU level
NGO development cooperation	• NGO programme support/ Partnership agreement • NGO project support	• Annual (project) reports following MFA template	• Budget / Input • Output	Individual NGOs or projects
Humanitarian assistance	• UN organizations • NGO projects	• Reports by organisation • No synthesis	• Budget/input • Description of results	Individual organisations
Aid for Trade	Projects, programmes, partnerships	• At least an annual report per initiative	• Outcome indicators	Instrument

Source: reports and interviews

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ANNEX 7: PORTFOLIO AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

Portfolio "Vintage" Analysis – Time Elapsed between Funding Decision and Disbursement

The following analysis was conducted by the Evaluation Team with substantial support from MFA staff responsible for development statistics to demonstrate the time-lag between the commitment, i.e. funding decision, and disbursement of funding, over DPP periods.

Actual annual MFA expenditures are depicted and attributed to the years in which the funds were committed. The analysis covers about 80 percent of the overall Finnish ODA expenditures and excludes MFA administrative costs, Finnfund capital increases, expenditures of NGO partner organisation and some other expenditure for which no clear attribution to fund commitments could be made.

The analysis indicates how long disbursements occur after the commitments and how, during each DPP period, a government is in a fact largely implementing the decisions of the previous governments. Since the implementation of most projects and programmes can take years, actual development results can therefore be expected to occur either under the next government period or even under the government periods after.

Projects and programmes in the bilateral aid channel undergo a long process of negotiation, preparation and appraisal. This means that a substantial time exists between the actual decision to do a bilateral project – which we call the principal commitment decision – and the official funding decision. In order to reflect the actual time elapsed between the principal commitment decision and disbursement, a blanket delay of 2 years was assumed between the principal commitment decision and the funding decision. This is a rough approximation based on the experience of a team member and several interviewees with MFA bilateral projects and programmes. There are also delays in other aid channels but their decision-making cycles are usually much shorter, and often less than a year. Hence, the adjustment outlined above was not applied to other channels. The provided overall lag can be considered to be a conservative estimate.

The adjusted results of this "vintage" analysis are depicted in Figure 11 and Figure 12 below. The results depicted in these charts depend on the assumed magnitude of the time-lag between the principal commitment decision and the actual funding decision. For matters of clarity and transparency, the results are also represented without the 2-years adjustment for the bilateral aid channel in Figure 13 and Figure 14.

Figure 11 Annual adjusted expenditure by year of financing decisio

%

Legend (right):
- N/A
- 2013
- 2012
- 2011
- 2010
- 2009
- 2008
- 2007
- 2006
- 2005
- 2004
- 2003
- 2002
- 2001
- 2000
- 1999

YEAR OF EXPENDITURE

Source: data provided by the MFA

Figure 12 Adjusted annual expenditure by financing year and DPP period

%   DPP 2004   DPP 2007   DPP 2012

YEAR OF EXPENDITURE

■ Decision before 2004   ■ Decision 2004–2007   ■ Decision 2008–2011   ■ Decision 2012–2013

Source: data provided by the MFA

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Figure 13 Annual expenditure by year of financing decision - not adjusted

YEAR OF EXPENDITURE

Source: data provided by the MFA

Figure 14 Annual expenditure by financing year and DPP period – not adjusted

YEAR OF EXPENDITURE

■ Decisions before 2004   ■ Decision 2004–2007   ■ Decision 2008–2011   ■ Decision 2012–2013

Source: data provided by the MFA

Financial Analysis

The following charts depict breakdowns of the Finnish ODA expenditures:

· by aid channel 2003 to 2013 (Figure 15)
· by sector for the years 2003 to 2012 (Figure 16)

The data for both charts were provided by the Finnish MFA and extracted from the data gathered along the OECD classification of aid channels and sectors.

Figure 15 Expenditures by Aid Channel

Legend:
- Multilateral Development Cooperation
- Gender as main goal
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Support for non-governmental organisations' development cooperation, KEPA and development communication
- Country-specific and Regional Development Cooperation
- Non-Country- Specific Development Cooperation
- Planning, Evaluation and Internal Audit of Development Cooperation
- Concessional Credits

Source: data provided by the MFA

Figure 16 Finnish ODA by Sectors

Legend:
- Action Relating to Debt
- Tourism
- Transport & Storage
- Dev. Food Aid/Food Security Ass.
- Business & Other Services
- Trade Policies & Regulations
- Industry, Mining, Construction
- Banking & Financial Services
- Population Pol./Progr. & Reproductive Health
- Health
- Communications
- Other Social Infrastructure & Services
- Energy
- Education
- Water Supply & Sanitation
- Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing
- General Budget Support
- Commodity Aid / General Prog. Ass.
- Multi-Sector / Cross-Cutting
- Humanitarian Aid

Source: data extracted on 07 Oct 2014 11:46 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat

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EVALUATION

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MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FINLAND