

Evaluation

DEMO Finland Development Programme



Evaluation report 2009:6

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FINLAND

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ISBN: 951-724-549-1, ISSN: 1235-7618



Evaluation

Political Parties of Finland for Democracy (DEMO Finland) Development Programme

Evaluation report 2009:6







Evaluation



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Roger Hällhag
Fredrik M Sjöberg

Evaluation report 2009:6

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FINLAND

This evaluation was commissioned by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland to Rud Pedersen Global Affairs AB. The Consultants bear the sole responsibility for the contents of the report. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.



This report can be accessed at <http://formin.finland.fi>
Hard copies can be requested from EVA-11@formin.fi
or
Development Evaluation (EVA-11)
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
P.O.Box 519
00023 GOVERNMENT
Finland

ISBN 978-951-724-784-9 (printed)
ISBN 978-951-724-785-0 (pdf)
ISSN 1235-7618
Cover photo: Fredrik M Sjöberg
Cover design: Anni Palotie
Printing house: Hakapaino Oy, Helsinki, 2009

Anyone reproducing the content or part of the content of the report should acknowledge the source. Proposed reference: Hällhag R & Sjöberg F M 2009 *Political Parties of Finland for Democracy (DEMO Finland) Development Programme*. Evaluation report 2009:6. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Hakapaino Oy, Helsinki, 74 p.
ISBN 978-951-724-784-9.

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PREFACE

The multi-party democracy development programme of DEMO Finland has been evaluated. The organization, DEMO Finland is an NGO which brings together all political parties represented in the Finnish Parliament. All parliamentary parties are represented in the governing body of DEMO Finland. The purpose of DEMO Finland's development programme is to advance pluralistic democracy and multi-party systems in the two countries, where DEMO Finland has established cooperation and an office, namely Nepal and Tanzania. In Nepal the counterparts are the youth wings of political parties and in Tanzania the focus of work is on women's political organizations.

The development policy of Finland puts great value in the promotion of democracy. The involvement of parliaments and democratic party systems to development is seen as one vehicle in the advancement of multi-party system democracy and participatory and democratic decision-making and subsequently sustainable development.

A two-member team of experts on multi-party democracy building and development performed the evaluation, namely Roger Hällhag and Fredrik M. Sjöberg from Rud Pedersen Global Affairs AB.

The evaluation looked at the period from 2004 to-date. Initially there was a preparatory phase which included exchange visits among political parties from and to Finland. In 2006 DEMO Finland was established as an organization to manage the development programme emerged from the initial activities.

The conclusions of the evaluation point out that the development programme of DEMO Finland indeed attends to crucial challenges of democratization, trying to empower those whose voice is not heard. The evaluation, however, points out that for success the local political parties need to be willing to engage. In this respect, the programme is more advanced in Nepal than in Tanzania. Thus, the evaluation concludes that Finland, as a donor, and its political parties should continue to engage in the democracy building focusing on the weaknesses of the party systems. Moreover, a more variegated selection of intervention tools could be developed. In this respect, the evaluation saw it wise that DEMO Finland seeks to widen the funding sources. There were also a number of other practical recommendations to both DEMO Finland and to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland in terms of management, procedures, and funding level and timing.

Helsinki, 12.10.2009

Aira Päivöke
Director
Development Evaluation



ACRONYMS

ALI	Department for Africa and the Middle East at the Ministry
Anandidevi	Nepal Sabhawana Party
ASA	Department for the Americas and Asia at the Ministry
CA	Constituent Assembly (Nepal)
CCDST	Citizen's Campaign for Democracy and Social Transformation
CCM	Revolutionary Party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi)
Chadema	Party for Democracy and Progress (Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo)
CMI	Crisis Management Initiative
CPN-ML	Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist)
CPN-U	Communist Party of Nepal (United)
CPN-UML	Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist)
CPWP	Cross-Party Women's Platform (Tanzania)
CUF	Civic United Front (Chama Cha Wananchi)
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DDTP	Deeping Democracy in Tanzania Programme
DEMO	Political Parties of Finland for Democracy – DEMO Finland
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DPC	Development Policy Committee
DUA	Democrat Union of Africa
€	Currency euro
EU	Euroopan Unioni/Europeiska Unionen/European Union
FDP	Free Democratic Party (Germany)
FES	Friedrich Ebert Foundation
FNS	Friedrich Naumann Foundation
FPTP	First Past the Post
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
IDEA	The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
JYA	Joint Youth Agenda
KEO-11	Unit for General Development Policy and Planning at the Ministry (the contemporary KEO-10)
KEO-20	Unit for Sectoral Policy at the Ministry
KEO-33	Unit for Non-Governmental Organizations at the Ministry (the contemporary KEO-30)
KESU	Advisory Board for Relations with Developing Countries
LFA	Logical Framework Approach
LFM	Logical Framework Matrix
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
MINISTRY	Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

MJF	Madhesi Rights Forum
MP	Member of Parliament
NC	Nepali Congress
NDI	The National Democratic Institute (USA)
NEC	National Electoral Commission (Tanzania)
NFN	NGO Federation of Nepal
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIMD	Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
NSU	Nepal Student Union
TCD	Tanzania Centre for Democracy
TLP	Tanzania Labour Party
TMDP	Terai-Madhes Democratic Party
ToR	Terms of Reference
ToT	Training of Trainers
UDP	United Democratic Party
UK	United Kingdom
UM	Ulkoasiainministeriö/Utrikesministeriet
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNMIN	United Nations Mission in Nepal
USA	United States of America
UWT	Union of Tanzania Women (Umoja Wa Wanawake Tanzania)
VICOBA	Village Community Bank (Tanzania)
WFD	Westminster Foundation for Democracy
YCL	The Maoist Young Communist League

Puolueiden Kansainvälisen Demokratiayhteistyöohjelman (DEMO Finland) Evaluointi

Roger Hällhag ja Fredrik M Sjöberg

Ulkoasiainministeriön evaluointiraportti 2009:6

ISBN 978-951-724-784-9 (painettu); ISBN 978-951-724-785-0 (pdf);
ISSN 1235-7618

Raportti on luettavissa kokonaisuudessaan <http://formin.finland.fi>

TIIVISTELMÄ

Evaluaation tarkoitus on antaa yleiskuva DEMO Finland ry:n kehitysyhteistyötoiminnasta, joka alkoi vuonna 2006, kahden vuoden pilotin jälkeen, ja vetää johtopäätöksiä tulevaisuuden suunnittelua varten. Metodeina käytettiin systemaattista dokumenttitutkimusta, 80 keskeisen toimijan ja tarkkailijan haastattelua, mielipidekyselyä, johon vastasi 100 osallistujaa sekä fokusryhmäkeskusteluja yli 200 osallistujalle.

Todettakoon, että DEMO Finland käsittelee keskeisiä ongelmia demokratisoinnin saralla tavalla, joka on asianmukaista silloin, kun suurin osa puolueista kohdemaissa sitoutuu osallistumaan. Näin on tapahtunut Nepalissa, mutta Tansaniassa puolueiden sitoutuminen on ollut huomattavasti heikompaa. Ohjelma on tehokas tällä hetkellä Nepalissa, mutta ei vielä tässä vaiheessa Tansaniassa. Kustannusten hallinta on asianmukaista. Toiminta Nepalissa on tähän asti ollut kustannustehokasta, mutta Tansaniassa vähemmän tehokasta. Omistajuus ja kestävyys on kyseenalaista, mikä vaatii uusia toimintatapoja sekä aikaperspektiiviä ja päätösstrategiaa. Huomattavaa vaikutusta on havaittavissa ainakin lyhyellä tähtäimellä, ja lisäarvoa on tuotu, mikä on erityisen tuntuva Nepalissa. Perusoletuksia, tarvearvioita ja riskejä ei systemaattisesti käsitellä, eikä niistä pidetä kirjaa eikä tietoja jaeta.

Suomen ja sen poliittisten puolueiden tulisi jatkaa sitoutumistaan demokratian kehittämiseen ja keskittyä kumppanimaissa puolueiden heikouksiin, samalla kun ne harkitsevat laajempia toimintamalleja, mikä vaatii myös rahoituksen lisäämistä siitä, mitä mitä DEMOlle on tähän mennessä myönnetty. DEMO:n tulisi määritellä yksityiskohtaisesti työmenetelmät kaikissa ohjelmatoiminnan vaiheissa ja dokumentoida ne ohjekirjaksi, pohjautuen muiden avustusjärjestöjen parhaisiin menetelmiin.

Avainsanat: demokratian rakentaminen, kehitysyhteistyö, puoluejärjestelmä, poliittinen puolue, Nepal, Tansania

Utvärdering av Biståndsprogrammet Partiernas Internationella Demokratisamarbete (DEMO Finland)

Roger Hällhag och Fredrik M Sjöberg

Utrikesministeriets utvärderingsrapport 2009:6

ISBN 978-951-724-784-9 (print); ISBN 978-951-724-785-0 (pdf);
ISSN 1235-7618

Rapporten finns i sin helhet på adressen <http://formin.finland.fi>

ABSTRAKT

Utvärderingens syfte är att ge en övergripande bild av DEMO Finlands biståndsaktiviteter, som påbörjades 2006 efter en pilotfas från 2004, och identifiera lärdomar till nytta för planering av den framtida verksamheten. Utvärderingsmetoderna har varit systematiska dokumentstudier, intervjuer med 80 nyckelpersoner och observatörer, enkäter som besvarats av 100 deltagare i programmets aktiviteter och fokusgrupper med över 200 deltagare.

En slutsats är att DEMO Finland tar sig an avgörande utmaningar mot demokratisering på ett sätt som är relevant när flertalet politiska partier i ett mottagarland är villiga att delta. Detta har varit fallet i Nepal, medan uppslutningen i Tanzania är mycket svagare. Programmet har en pågående effekt i Nepal, men ännu inte i Tanzania. Sund kostnadskontroll finns och arbetet är hittills effektivt i Nepal, men mindre effektivt i Tanzania. Ägandeskap och hållbarhet kan ifrågasättas och nya arbetssätt behövs, liksom tidsramar och strategier för att avsluta väl. Viktig verkan och mervärde har uppnåtts åtminstone på kort sikt, mest påtagligt i Nepal. Bakomliggande antaganden, behovsbedömningar och risker är varken systematiskt utförda, dokumenterade eller delade.

Finland och dess politiska partier rekommenderas fortsätta engagera sig i demokrati-bygge som tar sig an svagheter i partier och partisystem, samtidigt som man bör överväga en mer varierad uppsättning av arbetssätt och mer resurser än vad DEMO Finland har tilldelats. Utrikesministeriet bör upprätthålla de brukliga kraven för biståndsprogram, samtidigt som DEMO bör erbjudas mer långsiktiga och större anslag. DEMO bör i detalj precisera arbetsrutinerna i alla steg i programcykeln och dokumentera dem i manualer, baserat på god praxis i andra biståndsorganisationer.

Nyckelord: demokrati-bygge, bistånd, partisystem, politiska partier, Nepal, Tanzania

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Roger Hällhag and Fredrik M Sjöberg

Evaluation Report of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2009:6

ISBN 978-951-724-784-9 (printed); ISBN 978-951-724-785-0 (pdf);
ISSN 1235-7618

The full report can be accessed at <http://formin.finland.fi>

ABSTRACT

The purpose of the evaluation is to achieve an overall picture of the development activities of DEMO Finland, which began in 2006 after a pilot phase from 2004, and to draw lessons for the benefit of future planning. The methods used were systematic document study, interviews with 80 key actors and observers, a survey answered by 100 participants and focus groups with over 200 participants.

It is concluded that DEMO Finland is attending to crucial challenges of democratization in a manner that is relevant when most political parties in a target country are willing to engage. That has been the case in Nepal, while commitment in Tanzania is much weaker. The programme is effective at this point in Nepal, but not yet in Tanzania. Cost control is sound and work is cost efficient in Nepal until now, while less efficient in Tanzania. Ownership and sustainability are questionable and require new modalities, as well as time perspective and exit strategies. There is important impact at least for the short-term and value added, more tangibly in Nepal. Underlying assumptions, assessment of needs and risk are neither systematically done, nor documented nor shared.

Finland and its political parties are recommended to continue engaging in democracy building attending to weaknesses in parties and party systems, while considering a more varied set of tools and with more resource than DEMO Finland has been granted. The Ministry should uphold standard aid programme requirements, while DEMO should be offered longer term and larger funding. DEMO should specify in detail the work procedures at all stages of the programme cycle and document them in manuals, drawing on best practices of other aid organisations.

Keywords: democracy building, development aid, party system, political party, Nepal, Tanzania

YHTEENVETO

Evaluaation tarkoitus, kuten toimeksiannossa todetaan, on antaa yleiskuva DEMO Finland ry:n (DEMO) kehitysyhteistyötoiminnasta ja vetää johtopäätöksiä tulevaisuuden suunnittelua varten. Lisäksi Suomen ulkoasiainministeriö (UM) on vähemmän muodollisesti ilmoittanut arvioijille, että evaluaation suositukset tulevat pohjustamaan keskustelua, joiden lopputuloksena päätetään ohjelman toimintatavoista ja rahoituksesta vuodesta 2010 alkaen.

Koska arvioitavana on meneillään oleva ohjelma, ei evaluaatio käsittele lopputuloksia vaan toimii pikemminkin puolivälitarkastuksena. Toistaiseksi mitään osa-aluetta ei ole saatettu päätökseen tai lakkautettu. 2009 on neljäs toimintavuosi 2004–2005 pilottivaiheen jälkeen. Tiedot on hankittu vuoden 2009 puoliväliin mennessä ja syyskuun aikana on raportoitu sekä kerätty kommentteja UM:stä ja DEMOsta. Evaluaation tekijöinä olemme pyrkineet avaamaan luottavaisen keskustelun DEMOn ja sen sidosryhmien välille tehden selväksi, että arviointiprosessin ja kritiikin tarkoituksena on tukea organisaation päämääriä. Evaluaation tulisi antaa kaikille asianosaisille tilaisuus tarkentaa roolejaan ja ehdottaa parannuksia.

Evaluaation kokonaisvaltainen tavoite on saavuttaa selkeä kuva DEMOn toiminnan merkityksestä Suomen Kehitysyhteistyöpolitiikan tavoitteiden täyttämiseksi. Erityistavoitteena on saada lisätietoa valittujen kohderyhmien, naisten ja nuorten, poliittisten vaikutusmahdollisuuksien vahvistamisesta. DEMOn yhteydessä kohderyhmiä edustavat niiden puoluesitoutuneet osiot. Toimeksianto määrittelee evaluaation kriteerit ja erikoiskysymykset. Ne on ryhmitelty luvussa 3 analyysia ohjaavina ensisijaisina arviointikriteereinä.

Keskeinen kysymys on DEMOn konseptin validiteetti, hyödyllisyys ja lisäarvo demokratian, ihmisoikeuksien ja hyvän hallinnon kehittämisen edistämiseksi. Mitä merkitystä on sillä, että kehitykseen poliittisen kentän eri puolueita saatetaan yhteistyöhön keskenään ja lahjoittajamaan kaikkien puolueiden kanssa? Muut avainkysymykset koskevat sitä, ovatko ohjelman suunnittelun pohjana toimineet riittävästi verifioidut ja määritellyt tarpeet; onko erilaisten sidosryhmien välillä yhteneväistä päämäärää; onko toiminta hyvin organisoitua ja vastaako se tarkoitustansa ja ovatko resurssit määrällisesti sopivia ja hyvin käytettyjä.

Evaluaation tietojen hankkimisessa ja tarkastelussa käytetyt menetelmät olivat systemaattinen dokumenttitutkimus, haastattelut keskeisten toimijoiden ja tarkkailijoiden kanssa, osanottajien mielipidekysely ja fokusryhmä-haastattelut. Asiakirjat saatiin joko elektronisessa tai kopioidussa muodossa UM:stä ja DEMO:n toimistosta. Yhteensä 397 henkilöä osallistui tavalla tai toisella (semistrukturoidut haastattelut, tarkkailu, fokusryhmä-haastattelut), joista 279 naista ja 118 miestä.

Tansaniassa ohjelma kohdistuu naisten poliittisen osallistumisen vahvistamiseen. Sen ansiosta naisten aliedustus on saanut lisämerkitystä poliittisten puolueiden ohjelmassa. Strateginen apu voisi poistaa esteitä yhteiskunnan eri tasoilla kontekstissa, jossa naiset ovat valmiit, ainakin osittain, hakeutumaan vahvempiin poliittisiin rooleihin. Naisten valtuuttaminen edustaa valtavaa demokratisoinnin ja kehityksen potentiaalia. Ohjelman toteutus on kuitenkin ollut hidasta ja ongelmallista. Vaikutus yltyä toistaiseksi vain rajoitettuihin piireihin kansallisella tasolla sekä muutamaan paikkaan Kyelan piirikunnassa, jossa pilottihanketta on toteutettu. Ohjelmamallin ja projektin hallinnon epävakaus vaikeuttavat tehtäviä. Efektiviisyyttä ja tehokkuutta ei ole saavutettu vielä lähes viisi vuotta kestäneiden pilottijakson ja ohjelmatyön jälkeen. Erilaisia strategioita on kokeiltu.

Nepalin ohjelma on erityisen relevantti ja tuli tarpeeseen lisäten nuorten pahasti puutteellisia vaikutusmahdollisuuksia poliittisissa puolueissa ja demokraattisessa politiikassa. Merkittäviä positiivisia tuloksia on saavutettu, kun vaikutusvaltaisia nuoriso- ja opiskelijajohtajia on saatu sitoutumaan dialogiin ja kiinnittämään huomionsa poliittisiin menettelytapoihin. Levittäytyminen maan eri osiin on ensisijaisen tärkeää ja se on käynnistynyt lupaavasti. Kehitysohjelmien omistajuuteen liittyy puutteita, joiden takia ohjelman kestävyys ja sen vaikutuksen laajentaminen kyseenalaistuvat. Kuten Tansaniassa, aikaperspektiiviä eikä exit-strategiaa ole määriteltä.

Alkuperäinen päämäärä dialogin ja aidosti molemminpuolisen oppimisen aikaansaamiseksi poliittisten johtajien ja aktivistien välille Suomessa ja Suomen kehitysyhteistyön kohdemaissa on väistynyt toiminnan painopisteen keskittyessä erityisiin projektikysymyksiin Tansaniassa ja Nepalissa. Opintomatkat, seminaarit, julkiset aktiviteetit ja sisäinen tiedotus tuovat tärkeää näkyvyyttä ja huomiota kehittymässä oleville puolueille. Pitkän aikavälin positiivinen vaikutus on todennäköistä, mutta vaikeasti tarkistettavissa lukuun ottamatta useiden asianosaisten lausuntoja Suomessa.

Vaikutus globaaliin demokratisointitukeen on hyvin rajallista ja potentiaalinen alittavaa, sillä toiminnan mittakaava ja tulokset ovat vaatimattomia. Koheesio ja koordinaatio on vähäistä molempien kohdemaiden puolueisiin liittyvään demokraatitukeen liittyen, ja myös laajemmassa mittakaavassa. DEMO ja avunantajana Suomi, eivät tässä suhteessa eroa lainkaan toisista avunantajista.

DEMON päämäärät ja toiminta linjautuvat hyvin Suomen kehitysyhteistyöpolitiikkaan, sillä ne asettavat painopisteensä sellaisten perustavanlaatuisien prioriteettien toimivuuden lisäämiseen kuin demokratia, ihmisoikeudet, tasa-arvokysymykset ja jossain määrin myös heikkojen ja aliedustettujen ryhmien asema. Köyhyyden vähentäminen on epäsuoraa, eikä sitä voida millään tavalla varmistaa tässä toimintavaiheessa. Voidaan kuitenkin olettaa, että demokratia ja aliedustettujen ryhmien, kuten naiset ja nuoret, voimakkaampi osallistuminen on myös köyhän väestön etujen mukaista. Tällainen yhteys on todennäköinen, mutta sitä ei voida pitää itsestäänselvyysnä. Aiheesta on käytävä poliittista keskustelua ja vuoropuhelua, joiden aikaansaamisessa DEMO voi olla avuksi.

Todettakoon, että DEMO Finland käsittelee keskeisiä ongelmia demokratisoinnin saralla tavalla, joka on relevanttia silloin kun suurin osa puolueista kohdemaissa sitoutuu. Näin on tapahtunut Nepalissa, mutta Tansaniassa puolueiden sitoutuminen on ollut huomattavasti heikompaa. Ohjelma on tehokas tällä hetkellä Nepalissa, mutta ei vielä tässä vaiheessa Tansaniassa. Suomessa vaikutus tullaan toteamaan pitkällä aikavälillä ja puoluekohtaisesti. Kustannusten hallinta on kunnossa ja toiminta Nepalissa on tähän asti ollut kustannustehokasta, mutta vähemmän tehokasta Tansaniassa. Omis-tajuus ja kestävyys on kyseenalaista vaatien uusia toimintatapoja sekä aikaperspektiiviä ja päätösstrategiaa.

Huomattavaa vaikutusta on havaittavissa ainakin lyhyellä tähtämellä, ja lisäarvoa on tuotu, mikä on erityisen tuntuva Nepalissa. Koherenssi ja koordinaatio toisten avustus-ohjelmien kanssa voisi olla toimivampaa, mutta Tansaniassa vilpittömät yritykset alalla saivat turhauttavan päätöksen. Perusoletukset, tarvearviot ja riskit eivät tule systemaattisesti käsitellyiksi, niistä ei pidetä kirjaa, eikä tietoja jaeta.

Suomen ja sen poliittisten puolueiden tulisi jatkaa sitoutumistaan demokratisoinnin kehittämiseen ja keskittyä puolueiden heikouksiin samalla kun ne ottavat harkintaan laajemmat toimintamallit ja suuremmat varat kuin mitä DEMOLle on myönnetty.

Poliitikkojen (ja puolueiden) välisen dialogin Suomessa ja sen ensisijaisissa yhteistyömaissa tulisi olla irrallisesti rahoitettu DEMOn tai jonkin toisen entiteetin ohjelma. Sitä ei tulisi sekoittaa kehitysyhteistyöohjelmiin. Päämäärät ovat erilaiset ja painopiste hämärtyy niiden välissä, käytännön ongelmat politisoituvat turhaan ja dialogin molemminpuolisuus kärsii. Globaalille kehitykselle relevanttien poliittisten päätösten tekijöiden altistaminen kehitysmaiden todellisuudelle ja dialogin järjestäminen näiden maiden virkaveljien kanssa on hyvin tärkeää. Poliitikot ottavat vastuuta suurista sijoituksesta kehitysapuun ja he tarvitsevat tällaista vuorovaikutusta, yhtäältä tehdäkseen parempia päätöksiä ja toisaalta voidakseen tiedottaa toiminnasta ja saada hyväksynnän jatkoapuun suomalaisilta äänestäjiltä ja veronmaksajilta. Suomen kohdemaiden rajoitettu määrä tekee dialogista verrattain helppoa. Päätöksen tekijät voivat syventyä asioihin eikä siitä koidu kohtuuttomia kuluja.

Tansanian ohjelmalle tulisi asettaa aikarajat ja exit strategia. Lupaavat toiminnat Kyelassa tulisi siirtää Village Community Bankille (VICOBA), sikäli kun se pystyy kehittymään ja voimistumaan, tai jollekin toiselle kehitysyhteistyöorganisaatiolle, joka voisi panna toimeen taloudelliseen ja poliittiseen valtuuttamiseen tähtäävää koulutusta laajalla mittakaavalla.

Nepalin ohjelmassa tukitoiminnalle tarpeellinen aikaperspektiivi ja mahdollinen pitkän aikavälin kumppanuus nuoriso- ja opiskelijajärjestöjen kanssa tulisi ottaa käyttöön. Järjestöjen jäsenten tulisi antaa toteuttaa ennalta sovittua toimintaa, jonka budjetti on lyöty lukkoon tarkasti määriteltyjen taloudellisten ja raportointia käsittelevien ohjesääntöjen mukaan.

Yleisesti ottaen on ensisijaisen tärkeää, että DEMO on tilivelvollinen myös kohdeorganisaatioille ja että se siirtää enemmän resurssien hallintovastuuta sovituin ehdoin. Systemaattiset tarvearviot tulee liittää DEMOn ohjelmaan ja tämän käytännön laaja jakaminen kohderyhmien kanssa on edellytys DEMO-projektien uudistamiselle tai käynnistämiseksi.

Olisi tärkeää keskustella siitä, tulisiko DEMOn puolueiden välistä lähestymistapaa täydentää lisäämällä kapasiteetin vahvistusta yksittäisille poliittisille organisaatioille. Tämän täytyy perustua puolueiden tarpeisiin kohdemaisissa eikä intresseihin tai sopimuksiin Suomen rajojen sisällä. DEMO järjestönä voisi työskennellä suoraan kohdemaiden yksittäisten puolueiden kanssa, sikäli kun se vaikuttaa ensisijaiselta puoluejärjestelmän kehityksen kannalta. Kyseinen toiminta voidaan suorittaa suomalaisten sisäpuolueiden osallistumisella tai ilman sitä.

UM:n ei pitäisi höllentää standardinmukaisista ohjelmatukivaatimuksista DEMOn kohdalla. Sen sijaan DEMOLle tulisi tarjota pitkäkestoisempaa ja runsaampaa rahoitusta. Rahoitushakemukset tulisi tehdä kolmeksi budjettivuodeksi, siten että DEMO toimittaa vuosisuunnitelman hyvissä ajoin ennen toteutusvuotta. Kun tämä käytäntö saadaan toimivaksi, kolmivuotinen suunnitelma ja perustavanlaatuista johto- ja hallintotyötä ylläpitävä rahoitus pitäisi ottaa käyttöön. Vuosiraportteja pitäisi vaatia, mutta hyväksytyjen suunnitelmien on oltava riittävä tae ensimmäisiä maksuja varten, jotta toimintaa voitaisiin toteuttaa vuoden alusta alkaen.

DEMON tulisi määritellä yksityiskohtaisesti työmenetelmät kaikissa ohjelmahallinnan vaiheissa ja dokumentoida nämä ohjekirjaan, pohjautuen muiden avustusjärjestöjen parhaisiin menetelmiin. Pysyäkseen ammatillisena organisaationa, DEMOn on välttämätöntä palkata tai kouluttaa henkilökuntaa näiden tehtävien hoitamiseen. DEMOn jäsenten ja johtokunnan tulisi päättää hakevatko he laajempaa rahoituskantaa kuin Suomen kehitysyhteistyövarat ja, sikäli kun he päättävät niin tehdä, omistaa aikaa sen löytämiseen. Varojen keruu, maksut ja Euroopan Unionin (EU) apurahastot ovat varteenotettavia mahdollisuuksia.

SAMMANFATTNING

Utvärderingens syfte, som det anges i uppdragsbeskrivningen, är att ge en övergripande bild av DEMO Finlands (DEMO) utvecklingsinsatser och identifiera lärdomar till nytta för planering av den framtida verksamheten. Informellt har utvärderarna informerats av Utrikesministeriet (UM) om att deras rekommendationer kommer att vara utgångspunkt för diskussioner och slutligt beslut om programformer och finansiering från år 2010.

Då studien görs av ett pågående program är utvärderingen inte en bedömning av slutresultat utan kan anses utgöra en översyn. Hittills har ingen programaktivitet avslutats eller fasats ut. 2009 är det fjärde verksamhetsåret efter pilotfasen under 2004–2005. Information har samlats in under mitten av 2009 med avrapportering och tillfälle till kommentarer från UM och DEMO i september. Som utvärderare har vi strävat efter en förtroendefull dialog med DEMO och dess intressenter, så att det klart framgår att utvärderingsprocessen och eventuell kritik är avsedd att stödja organisationens mål. Utvärderingen bör ge alla intressenter tillfälle att klargöra sina roller och föreslå förbättringar.

Det övergripande syftet med utvärderingen är att få en klar bild av nyttan av DEMO:s aktiviteter när det gäller att uppnå finländska utvecklingspolitiska mål. Ett särskilt syfte är att dra lärdomar om att politiskt stärka de utvalda målgrupperna, som här är kvinnor och ungdomar vilka för DEMO:s syften representeras av partianknutna kvinno- och ungdomsförbund. Uppdragsbeskrivningen anger kriterier och särskilda frågor att utvärdera. Dessa samlas under de huvudsakliga utvärderingskriterier som styr analysen i kapitel 3.

En viktig fråga är giltigheten, nyttan och mervärdet av konceptet bakom DEMO när det gäller att främja demokratisk utveckling, mänskliga rättigheter och gott samhällsstyre. Vad är värdet av att få partier över hela den politiska skalan att samverka sinsemellan och med alla partier ett givarland? Andra centrala frågor är om programmet är utformat utifrån noggrant bedöma behov; om det finns enighet om syftena hos den breda skaran av intressenter; om aktiviteterna är välorganiserade och anses tjäna sina syften samt om resurserna är av lämplig omfattning och väl använda.

Metoderna för att hitta och verifiera information har varit systematiska dokumentstudier, intervjuer med nyckelpersoner och observatörer, deltagarenkäter och fokusgrupper med deltagare. Dokumenten mottogs i elektronisk eller kopierad form från UM och DEMO:s kontor. Totalt delgav 397 personer oss synpunkter på ett eller annat sätt (semistrukturerade intervjuer, enkäter eller fokusgrupper), varav 279 var kvinnor och 118 män.

I Tanzania är programmet relevant genom att ta sig an kvinnors underrepresentation i politiken. Det har hjälpt att sätta frågan högre på dagordningen inom politiska partier.

Strategiskt bistånd kan bryta ner hinder på olika samhällsnivåer i ett sammanhang där kvinnor, åtminstone delvis, nu är beredda att anta en starkare politisk roll. Politiskt stärkande av kvinnorna utgör en enorm potential för att nå ytterligare demokratisering och utveckling. Samtidigt har programmets genomförande varit långsamt och problemfyllt. Påverkan sträcker sig ännu inte bortom begränsade kretsar på nationell nivå samt de fåtal ställen i Kyela-distriktet som nås av ett pilotprojekt. Vacklande programutformning och projektstyrning har gjort uppgifterna svårare. Avsedd effekt och kostnadseffektivitet har ännu inte uppnåtts efter nästan fem år av pilot- och programarbete. Olika strategier har prövats.

Programmet i Nepal är högst relevant och kom igång lägligt för att tackla en allvarlig brist på möjligheter för unga att göra sig hörda i politiska partier och demokratisk politik. Viktiga positiva resultat har uppnåtts i att få tongivande ungdoms- och studentledare att göra åtaganden om dialog och börja rikta uppmärksamhet mot policyfrågor. Att nå ut i landet är avgörande och har påbörjats på ett lovande sätt. Det finns brister i ägandeskap över programmets tjänster, vilket sätter hållbarhet och förmågan att utvidga effekten i fråga. Precis som i Tanzania har varken tidsramar eller strategi för att avsluta programmet angetts.

Den ursprungliga ambitionen att möjliggöra dialog och faktiskt ömsesidigt lärande mellan politiska ledare och aktivister i Finland och huvudländer för Finlands utvecklingsbistånd har ersatts av fokus på särskilda projektfrågor i Tanzania och Nepal. Studiebesök, seminarier, offentliga aktiviteter och intern kommunikation erbjuder viktig exponering och uppmärksamhet på partiets roll i utvecklings-sammanhang. En långsiktigt positiv effekt är sannolik, men svår att bevisa utöver de bedömningar som ett flertal intressenter i Finland gör.

Bidraget till det globala demokratibiståndet är mycket begränsat och når inte sin potential på grund av sin ringa omfattning och resultat. Samstämmigheten och samordningen inom partiinriktat demokratistöd är också liten, både i de två mottagarländerna och globalt sett. DEMO och Finland är i detta avseende varken bättre eller sämre än andra aktörer och givare.

DEMO:s syften och aktivitet stämmer väl överens med finsk politik för utvecklings-samarbete, särskilt som man fokuserar på och omsätter i praktisk handling övergripande prioriteringar som demokrati, mänskliga rättigheter, jämställdhet mellan kvinnor och män och i viss utsträckning tar upp situationen för sårbara och underrepresenterade grupper. Bidraget till fattigdomsbekämpning är indirekt och kan inte ens avlägset bekräftas i det här stadiet. Det utgår från antagandet att demokrati och en mer bestämd roll för underrepresenterade, som kvinnor och unga, även hjälper till att skydda de fattigas intressen. Sambandet finns sannolikt, men kan inte tas för givet. Det måste fortsätta att vara ett ämne för den politiska debatt och dialog som DEMO kan hjälpa till att ordna.

För att summera de huvudsakliga rönen, så tar sig DEMO Finland an avgörande utmaningar mot demokratisering på ett sätt som är relevant när flertalet politiska partier i ett mottagarland är villiga att delta. Det har varit fallet i Nepal, medan uppslutningen i Tanzania är mycket svagare. Programmet har en pågående effekt i Nepal, men ännu inte i Tanzania. Effekterna i Finland är långsiktiga och beror på de enskilda medlemspartierna. Sund kostnads kontroll finns. Arbetet är hittills kostnadseffektivt i Nepal, men i mindre grad i Tanzania. Ägandeskap och hållbarhet kan ifrågasättas och nya arbetssätt behövs, liksom tidsramar och strategier för att avsluta väl.

Viktig verkan och mervärde har uppnåtts åtminstone på kort sikt, mest påtagligt i Nepal. Bakomliggande antaganden, behovsbedömningar och risker är varken systematisk utförda, dokumenterade eller allmänt delade.



Finland och dess politiska partier rekommenderas fortsätta engagera sig i demokrati-bygge som tar sig an svagheter i partier och partisystem, samtidigt som man bör överväga en mer varierad uppsättning av arbetssätt och mer resurser än vad DEMO Finland har tilldelats.

Dialog mellan politiker (och deras partier) i Finland och viktiga samarbetsländer bör vara ett separat finansierat program inom DEMO eller en annan organisation. Det är inte bra att blanda ihop med genomförandet av ett utvecklingsprogram. Syftena är olika, fokusering går förlorad i förhållande till båda målen, praktiska problem blir onödigtvis politiserade och dialogens ömsesidighet blir lidande. Att visa upp förhållandena i utvecklingsländer för dem som fattar beslut som påverkar den globala utvecklingen och samtidigt ordna en dialog med motsvarigheterna i dessa länder är mycket viktigt. Politikerna tar ansvar för omfattande investeringar i utvecklingsbistånd och behöver detta utbyte, både för att fatta bättre beslut och för att kunna kommunicera och vinna acceptans för fortsatt bistånd från finländska väljare och skattebetalare. Det begränsade antalet långsiktiga samarbetsländer förenklar. Beslutsfattare kan gräva djupare och till en begränsad kostnad.

För programmet i Tanzania bör en slutpunkt och en strategi för att överlämna fastställas. De lovande aktiviteterna i Kyela bör överföras till Village Community Bank (VICOBA), om organisationen kan förbättras och stärkas, eller annan utvecklingsorganisation som kan utföra träning för ekonomiskt och politiskt bemäktigande i stor skala.

För programmet i Nepal bör tidsramar för stöd och möjliga långsiktiga relationer med ungdoms- och studentplattformen anges. Plattformens medlemmar bör få genomföra överenskomna aktiviteter med en fast budget i enlighet med strikta riktlinjer för ekonomi och rapportering.

På det hela taget är det väsentligt att DEMO även blir ansvarigt inför samarbetsorganisationerna och överför mer ansvar för styrning av resurser på överenskomna



villkor. Systematiska behovsbedömningar bör införas i DEMO:s programarbete och delas öppet med målgrupperna som en bas för fortsatta eller nya projekt.

Det vore viktigt att diskutera om DEMO:s tvärpolitiska arbetssätt bör kompletteras med kapacitetsstöd till enskilda politiska organisationer. Detta måste utgå från partiernas behov i mottagarländerna, inte intresse och organisatoriska omständigheter i Finland. DEMO kunde som organisation arbeta direkt med enskilda partier, om det bedöms som väsentligt för den fortsatta utvecklingen av det aktuella partisystemet. Detta kan göras med eller utan medverkan från systerpartier i Finland.

Utrikesministeriet bör upprätthålla de brukliga kraven för biståndsprogram, samtidigt som DEMO bör erbjudas mer långsiktiga och större anslag. Anslagsansökningar bör omfatta tre budgetår med årlig översyn av planerna i god tid före verksamhetsåret. Löpande planering för tre år framåt och basanslag för grundläggande ledning och administration bör fasas in. Årsrapporter bör krävas, men godkända planer måste vara tillräckligt för de första utbetalningarna så att verksamhet från början av året medges.

DEMO bör i detalj precisera arbetsrutinerna i alla steg av programcykeln och dokumentera dem i manualer, vilka återspeglar god praxis i andra biståndsorganisationer. Om man skall förbli en i huvudsak professionell organisation måste personal rekryteras och fortbildas i förhållande till dessa arbetsuppgifter.

DEMO:s medlemmar och styrelse bör besluta att söka en bredare finansieringsbas än Finlands statliga utvecklingsbistånd och i så fall anslå tid till att finna finansieringen. Frivillig insamling, avgifter och Europeiska Unionens (EU) biståndsmedel är några källor att överväga.

SUMMARY



The purpose of the evaluation, as stated in the Terms of Reference, is to achieve an overall picture of the development activities of DEMO Finland (DEMO) and to draw lessons for the benefit of future planning. Less formally, evaluators have been told by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA) that their recommendations will serve as a basis for discussions leading to final decisions about programme modalities and funding from year 2010.

As it studies an ongoing programme, this evaluation is not assessing final results and can be taken as a mid-term review. Until now no line of activity has been concluded or phased out. 2009 is the fourth year of operation after the pilot phase in 2004–2005. Information has been gathered by mid-2009 with reporting and opportunity for comments from MFA and DEMO in September. As evaluators we have attempted to establish a trustful dialogue with DEMO and its stakeholders, making clear that the evaluation process and any criticism should support the goals of the organisation. The evaluation should give all stakeholders opportunity to clarify their roles and suggest improvements.

The overall evaluation objective is to gain a clear picture of the utility of DEMO's activities in the fulfilment of Finnish Development Policy goals. A particular objective is to learn lessons about the political empowerment of selected target groups, namely women and youth, which for the purpose of DEMO are represented by their respected party-affiliated wings. The Terms of Reference give the criteria and special questions for the evaluation. They are grouped under the main evaluation criteria guiding the analysis in chapter 3.

A major question is the validity, utility and value added of the concept behind DEMO in promoting development of democracy, human rights and good governance. What is the use of making parties across the political spectrum in a developing country interact among themselves and with all parties in a donor country? Other key questions are if the programme is designed on the basis of needs that have been properly assessed; if there is unity of purpose among the wide range of stakeholders; if the activities are well organized and seen as serving their purpose, and if resources are of appropriate size and well used.

The methods for finding and verifying information were systematic document study, interviews with key actors and observers, participant surveys and participant focus groups. Documents were received in either electronic or copied versions from MFA and DEMO Finland offices. A total of 397 persons gave their input in one or the other format (semi-structured interviews, surveys, or focus groups), 279 of them female and 118 male.



In Tanzania the programme is relevant in aiming at underrepresentation of women in politics. It has helped to set the issue higher on the agenda within political parties. Strategic assistance could unlock obstacles at different levels of a society in a context where women are, at least partly, prepared to assume stronger political roles. Empowerment of women represents a huge potential for democratization and development. However, programme implementation has been slow and ridden with problems. Impact does not yet go beyond limited circles at national level and a few locations in Kyela district served by a pilot project. Shaky programme design and project management has made the tasks harder. Effectiveness and efficiency has not yet been achieved after almost five years of pilot and programme work. Different strategies have been tried.

The programme in Nepal is highly relevant and came in timely to deal with the severe lack of voice for youth in political parties and democratic politics. There are important positive results in making influential youth and student leaders commit to dialogue and start turning their attention policy matters. Outreach in the country is crucial and has begun in a promising manner. There are deficiencies in ownership of programme services, which puts sustainability and capacity to widen impact in question. As in Tanzania, a time perspective or exit strategy for the programme has not been set.

The original ambition of arranging for dialogue and truly mutual learning between political leaders and activists in Finland and target countries for Finnish development has been substituted by a focus on the particular project issues in Tanzania and Nepal. Study visits, seminars, public activities and internal communication provide important exposure and attention to parties in development. A positive long-term impact is likely, but hard to verify beyond the assessments of several stakeholders in Finland.

The contribution to global democracy assistance is very limited and below potential, because of modest scale and results. There is also little cohesion and coordination among party-related democracy assistance in the two target countries, as well as globally. DEMO and Finland are neither better nor worse than other donors in this.

The objectives and activities of DEMO are well aligned with Finnish development cooperation policies, especially in focusing and making operational cross-cutting priorities like democracy, human rights, gender and to some extent the situation for vulnerable and underrepresented groups. The contribution to poverty reduction is indirect and cannot remotely be confirmed at this stage. It rests on the assumption that democracy and a more assertive role for underrepresented groups, like women and youth, also helps protect the interests of the poor. That linkage is likely, but cannot be taken for granted. It must remain a subject for the political debates and dialogues that DEMO can help arrange.

To summarize the main findings, DEMO Finland is attending to crucial challenges of democratization in a manner that is relevant when most political parties in a target country are willing to engage. That has been the case in Nepal, while commitment in

Tanzania is much weaker. The programme is effective at this point in Nepal, but not yet in Tanzania. Effects in Finland are long-term and up to each member party. Cost control is sound and work is cost efficient in Nepal until now, while less efficient in Tanzania. Ownership and sustainability are questionable and require new modalities, as well as time perspective and strategies for ending.

There is important impact at least for the short-term and value added, more tangibly in Nepal. Coherence and coordination with other aid programmes could be better, but sincere attempts in Tanzania have been frustrated. Underlying assumptions, assessment of needs and risk are neither systematically done, nor documented and shared.



Finland and its political parties should continue engaging in democracy building and target weaknesses in parties, while considering a more varied set of tools and with more resources than DEMO has been granted.

Dialogue between politicians (and their parties) in Finland and key partner countries should be a separately funded programme by DEMO or another entity. It is not good to mix it up with the operations of a development programme. The objectives are different, focus is lost in relation to both objectives, practical problems become unnecessarily politicised and the mutuality of the dialogue suffers. Exposing the makers of political decisions of relevance for global developments to realities in developing countries, and arranging a dialogue with counterparts in these countries, is very important. The politicians are taking responsibility for large investments in development aid and need this exchange, both to take better decisions and to be able to communicate and get acceptance for further aid from Finnish voters and taxpayers. The limited number of Finnish target countries make a dialogue relatively easy. Decision makers can dig deeper and do it with limited costs.

For the Tanzania programme deadlines and an exit strategy should be set. Promising activities in Kyela should be handed over to Village Community Bank (VICOPA), if it can be improved and strengthened, or another development organisation, which can implement economic and political empowerment training on a large scale.

For the Nepal programme, a time perspective for support and possible long-term relations with the youth and student platform should be set. Platform members should be let to implement agreed activities with a set budget according to strict financial and reporting guidelines.

In general, it is essential to make DEMO accountable to target organisations as well and transfer more responsibility for management of resources on agreed terms. Systematic needs assessment should be introduced into DEMO programming and widely shared with target groups as a basis for any continued or new DEMO projects.



It would be important to discuss if DEMO's cross-party approach should be complemented by capacity aid for individual political organisations. This has to be based on the needs of parties in target countries, not on interest and arrangements in Finland. DEMO as an organization could work directly with individual parties in target countries, if it is deemed essential for the further development of the party system. It can be done with or without involving sister parties in Finland.

MFA should not relax standard aid programme requirements for DEMO. DEMO should instead be offered longer term and larger funding. Funding applications should be for three budget years with early annual review of well before the implementation year. When this works, revolving planning for three years ahead and core funding basic management and administrative should be phased in. Annual reports should be required, but approved plans must be enough for first payments in order to allow implementation from the beginning of the year.

DEMO should specify in detail the work procedures at all stages of the programme cycle and document them in manuals, drawing on best practices of other aid organisations. If to remain an all-professional organisation, staff must be recruited or trained for these tasks. DEMO members and Board should decide if to seek a wider funding base than Finnish development aid and, if so, devote their time to finding it. Fund raising, fees and European Union's (EU) aid funds are among sources to consider.

FINDINGS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
IMPACT GENERALLY AND IN FINLAND		
The fact that Finland and its political parties are promoting multi-party democracy is welcomed by the parties targeted and other stakeholders	Even if the programme is modest in resources, value is being added and positive results are noted. There are large needs unattended to and potential for Finland to make more of its particular contributions	Finland and its political parties should continue engaging in democracy building and target weaknesses in parties, while considering a more varied set of tools and with more resources than DEMO has been granted
The initial ambition of development policy dialogue and mutual learning between Finland and target countries has vanished. It is at best a side-effect, even if still vaguely referred to in presentations, strategy and plans	Naturally the operational focus is on programme results in target countries, which is required for funding DEMO. North-South political dialogue would still be important for improving and democratically controlling development cooperation	Dialogue between politicians (and their parties) in Finland and key partner countries should be a separately funded programme by DEMO or another entity
Exchange and study visits can give powerful exposure, but are costly and difficult to manage	Delegation visits are only effective as an integral part of a wider programme	Any exchange visit needs to be carefully planned for content and purposeful tasks of participants
DEMO does not have methods or clear criteria for analysing a programme proposal. To go on in Tanzania was decided before what to do and why	Careful consultations on the basis of stakeholder wishes can be a good enough basis for a start, but risk for unforeseen problems is very high	Needs assessment should be introduced and widely shared as the political and operational basis for any continued or new DEMO programmes
Some beneficiaries request capacity building for individual party organisations, which partly has been met by some joint training of trainers	There are capacity building needs to attend to in the parties that make up the democratic system. Finland can make a useful contribution	Discuss if DEMO's cross-party offer should be complemented by capacity aid for individual political organisations. It can be done with or without involving sister parties in Finland
TANZANIA PROGRAMME		
Cross-party women's platform is still not operational. Useful but also conflictive processes have been triggered	Too much focus on the institutional arrangement in a setting with small or divided parties (and big egos) using their veto to hamper a too open-ended process	Set deadlines and an exit strategy. An option is to focus on a widely owned agenda and let willing members of an open platform implement agreed activities with a set budget
Gender training in Kyela is not with women wings of parties. The pilot project in 2008-2009 shows the powerful potential of gender training within VICOBA	Such training is very important in combining women's economic and political empowerment. DEMO is not appropriate and efficient in running it though	Promising activities in Kyela should be handed over to VICOBA, if it can be enhanced, or another development organisation which can scale up

NEPAL PROGRAMME		
The youth and student platform works according to plan and intentions with appropriate flexibility. It is welcomed by participants, especially smaller organisations, while framed and conditioned by DEMO	The neutral and resourceful facilitation by DEMO has been key to success, but viability beyond DEMO presence is much in question	Clarify time perspective of support and possible long-term relations. Let willing platform members implement agreed activities with a set budget
District workshops respond to needs, but could be managed in a more cost efficient manner enhancing ownership and building capacity	Youth and student wings in districts would be more empowered if responsibility was handed over while continuing support on agreed terms	Agree plan and budget for each of the target districts based on strict financial and reporting guidelines. Let target organisations implement
ADMINISTRATIVE SET UP AND MANAGEMENT		
There are weaknesses in DEMO planning and management, as well as in clarity of requirements, timelines and handling by MFA	DEMO must improve its programme planning and management, so as to make it easily understood and accountable to all stakeholders in target countries and Finland	DEMO should specify in detail the work procedures at all stages of the programme and project cycles and document them in manuals, drawing on best practices in other aid organisations. If to remain an all-professional organisation, staff must be recruited or trained for these tasks
	DEMO is entirely dependent on Finnish MFA development funds for all activities, which gives no scope for other initiatives. The late and long MFA decision process on annual projects disrupts timely implementation	DEMO members and Board should decide if to seek a wider funding base than Finnish development aid and, if so, devote their own time to finding it. Fund raising, fees and EU aid funds are among sources to consider
	Today's funding is too limited and too short-term to allow working in a fully efficient manner. Staffing in Helsinki is now at a minimum, making DEMO fragile. On the other hand, with better routines Helsinki should be able to handle some more programmes, bringing down the proportion of headquarter costs	MFA should not relax standard aid programme requirements for DEMO. DEMO should instead be offered longer term and larger funding. Applications should be for three budget years with early annual reviews. Revolving three year planning and basic core funding should be phased in
DEMO tightly controls its own budget in target countries, not involving the beneficiaries on financial matters	Ownership and therefore sustainability is weak with no financial accountability to target organisations	Make DEMO accountable to target organisations as well and transfer more responsibility for management of resources on agreed terms

National staff in target countries have difficulties to be seen as impartial (non-partisan)	National knowledge, language skills, networks and access is much required while having to be balanced against ability to remain impartial in the political competition and negotiations	International (Finnish) presence and staff should be used for initiating processes in conflictive political settings, while the exit strategy should define how to phase them out
Finnish embassies do not much engage DEMO in spite of its unique insight into politics and access to (emerging) political leaders	The synergy of high profile political and diplomatic connections could further motivate key beneficiaries. Embassy attention lends legitimacy to DEMO even if individual activities cannot be endorsed	Involve the embassies and make appropriate use of their country knowledge and specific political access

1 INTRODUCTION TO THE EVALUATION

1.1 Purpose, Timing and Main Questions

The purpose of the evaluation, as stated in the Terms of Reference (ToR; Annex 1), is to achieve an overall picture of the development activities of DEMO Finland (DEMO) and to draw lessons from the past for the benefit of future planning. Less formally, evaluators have been told by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA) that their recommendations will serve as a basis for discussions leading to final decisions about programme modalities and funding from year 2010.

As it studies an ongoing programme, this evaluation is not assessing final results and can be taken as a mid-term review. Until now no line of activity has been concluded or phased out. 2009 is the fourth year of operation after the pilot phase in 2004–2005. Information has been gathered from June to August 2009 with presentation and opportunity for comments from MFA and DEMO in September. As evaluators we have attempted to establish a trustful dialogue with DEMO and its stakeholders, making clear that the evaluation process should support the goals of the organisation. We hope that any criticism is seen as a constructive contribution. A useful evaluation process should give all stakeholders opportunity to clarify their roles and suggest improvements.

The overall objective of the evaluation is to gain a clear picture of the utility of DEMO's activities in the fulfilment of Finnish Development Policy goals. A particular objective is to learn lessons about the political empowerment of selected target groups, namely women and youth, for the purpose of DEMO represented by their respected party-affiliated wings. The Terms of Reference and its methodological references clearly and extensively give the criteria and special questions for the evaluation as chartered in the evaluation matrix (Annex 3). They are grouped under the evaluation criteria guiding the analysis in chapter 3.

A major question is the validity, utility and value added of the concept behind DEMO in promoting development of democracy, human rights and good governance. What is the use of making parties across the political spectrum in a developing country interact among themselves and with all parties in a particular donor country? Other key questions are if the programme is designed on the basis of needs that have been properly assessed; if there is unity of purpose among the wide range of stakeholders; if the activities are well organized and seen as serving the purpose, and if resources are of appropriate size and well used.

1.2 Methodology

The methods available for finding and verifying information were systematic document study (Annex 6), interviews with key actors and observers, participant surveys and participant focus groups (Annex 2). Documents were received in either electronic or copied versions from MFA and DEMO offices.

A total of 397 persons gave their input in one or the other format (semi-structured interviews, surveys, or focus groups), 279 of them female and 118 male. 81 semi-structured interview sessions were conducted with key actors in Finland, Tanzania and Nepal. These provided valuable insight into processes, perceptions, and opinions among decision makers, implementers, and beneficiaries. To complement this even further, participant surveys were conducted in Nepal (41) and Tanzania (54) with face-to-face interviews mainly at district level (Annex 5). In Tanzania we identified accessible villages with different profiles in terms of local election results, also considering delivery of activities. In the case of Nepal we purposefully selected one of the most challenging, yet accessible, districts where a district level consultation was held. The selected district is not necessarily representative, but adds to the picture we got from central level actors in Kathmandu. In the case of stakeholders and beneficiaries in Finland we complemented our semi-structured interviews with an online survey (22). Furthermore, we organized a total of 10 beneficiary focus group discussions in both Tanzania and Nepal. Experts using national languages moderated these.

1.3 Evaluation Organisation and Team

The Evaluation of Development Cooperation department of the MFA issued an open invitation to tender for the evaluation project 89855401 by mid-April 2009. Rud Pedersen Global Affairs AB, Stockholm, Sweden, was contracted for the task in late May.

The evaluation team has comprised of Mr. Roger Hällhag, team leader, and Mr. Fredrik Sjöberg. The team members bring together backgrounds in policy-making, project design, implementation and evaluation in relation to democracy assistance programmes, as well as academic study and personal experience of the functioning of parties and party systems around the world. As a Finnish-speaker, Sjöberg was responsible for much of the document study.

Hällhag visited Helsinki 11–12 June for initial interviews after which an inception report was submitted. Sjöberg visited in Helsinki 8–9 July for archival documentation study and interviews. Additional interviews have been made by phone. The team was in Tanzania 1–11 August, visiting Dar es Salaam and Kyela, and in Kathmandu, Nepal, 12–20 August. Observations were discussed with MFA and DEMO 8 September. A draft report was submitted on 21 September for comments by key stakeholders and then a final version on 2 October.

In Tanzania Ms. Brenda Joshua provided assistance to conduct participant questionnaire interviews in Kyela district and Ms. Rehema Mbalamwezi volunteered as an interpreter. In Nepal Mr. Santosh Bisht moderated focus groups, Mr. Gaurav K.C. assisted with participant interviews in Rautahat district and Ms. Swornika Balla interpreted.

The evaluation team is highly grateful to staff members of DEMO, as well as the MFA and Finnish embassies, in making information available and responding to repetitive questions, always in a friendly and professional manner. Special appreciation goes to Dr. Ave Maria Semakafu in Tanzania, as well as Ms. Johanna Poutanen and Ms. Basu Gautam in Nepal, who prepared impressively complete interview programmes while respecting the integrity of the interviewees and the evaluation process.

2 DESCRIPTION OF DEMO

2.1 Purpose, Logic and Stakeholders

In short, the basic purpose and logic is to engage the political parties and their associated organisations, for example for youth and women, in Finland and a target country for Finnish development assistance in a cooperation that is beneficial to democratization in that country. A principle has been that all activities must have a cross-party character. In broad terms this purpose has remained since the agreement in Finland to start a pilot programme with Tanzania in 2004. Motivations, strategic thinking, other objectives, priorities among them and the working modalities have evolved over time around a core of promoting cross-party platforms for political organisations representing the chosen target groups, offering study visits to and from Finland, and organising training.

All eight political parties represented in the Finnish parliament are members of DEMO and are represented in the Board of this officially registered voluntary organisation. Decision-making is thus made through negotiating broad acceptance of common denominators and general guidelines to the secretariat. Party organisations are also represented in two working groups, on gender for Tanzania and on youth for Nepal.

Management and operational responsibility is with an Executive Director and her staff in Helsinki (full time programme coordinator and part time assistant), Dar es Salaam (part time coordinator) and Kathmandu (two full time coordinators). Some administrative and logistic services are subcontracted.

MFA has provided all funding for DEMO since inception, except small membership fees from Finnish parties. Board members, participants and most trainers in Finland and target countries take part voluntarily or as part of their political jobs. Parliamentarians

are supposed to find travelling funding from other sources and other party representatives are not paid all their costs when travelling.

2.2 Background and Policy Context

With the new wave of democratization around the world that was triggered after the fall of unelected one-party systems in Europe from 1989, the matter of giving international support to democratization became a hot issue. It has remained so since, while also being questioned not only by authoritarian regimes and detractors of the mainly Western protagonists of such aid, but also those questioning its sometimes frustratingly slow results. Even if many and large countries mainly in Asia and the Arab world remain undemocratic and democracy is shaky in many societies, political freedom and multiparty elections has been recognised as universal norms in order to achieve peace and development. United Nations is lending political legitimacy to democracy building and its organs are engaging in technical assistance.

Much democracy promotion efforts and financial assistance has gone into preparing and running elections, reforming and constructing democratic constitutions and key public institutions, and promotion of a lively civil society and free media. The approach to political parties has been much more cautious, in spite of their indispensable role in democratic elections. Because of the obvious risk of partiality on part of foreign actors and a wide distrust in existing parties and their leaders, many development donors have left this weak link in the chain alone. The field of political party assistance was for long left to a limited number of actors from a handful of donor countries, usually with modest budgets.

There has been a slow growth in number of actors, variety of approaches and budgets for party aid over the past two decades. Multilateral actors like the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), regional bodies and even development banks have joined in, as the international development community gradually has accepted arguments for working with the parties that make democracy function or not. This stirred interest in Finland and a debate started in earnest almost ten years ago.

According to how DEMO presents itself (for example at www.demofinland.org) the rationale for its establishment was and remains the 2004 Finnish Government Resolution on Development Policy. It says that “respect for human rights, promotion of gender equality, social equality, democracy, good governance and sound economic management are essential cornerstones of development”. “Improving the premises for well-functioning parliaments and party systems in developing countries lays the foundations for the development and consolidation of democracy. The Government is examining the prospects for making better use of the experience and participation of Finnish Members of Parliament (MP) and political parties.” The result was DEMO.

In 2007 the Finnish Government adopted a new Development policy programme entitled “Towards a Sustainable and Just World Community”, which reiterated that “democracy and the rule of law and the consolidation of human rights and a functioning civil society is a precondition for economically, ecologically and socially sustainable development” (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2007).

2.3 Initiative and Pre-studies from 2001

In this section we outline the deliberations about the role of parties and democracy dialogue that preceded the formal establishment of DEMO in September 2005. Major developments in each target country regarding the work of the organisation are covered.

In the spring of 2001 an external report was commissioned by the Development Policy Unit at the MFA with the purpose of looking into party development assistance modalities. A report was delivered by Ms. Kaisa Karttunen in which she outlined different party support practices in other countries. Stakeholders in Finland gave their opinions about the report. In the autumn of 2001 a working group was set up under the auspices of *Advisory Board for Relations with Developing Countries* (KESU). The working group contained participants nominated by political parties, experts and civil society representatives. Domestic and international experts were invited to give presentations at working group sessions. The final report titled ‘*Proposal for Parties’ developing country and regional cooperation and dialogue for the promotion of Democracy*’ was submitted in March 2002. The report outlined two main modalities for the organisation of the development cooperation. The Centre Party and smaller parliamentary parties supported the idea of a separate cross-party association with work only on joint projects. The Social Democratic Party and the National Coalition Party on the other hand advocated funding for party-to-party projects, as well as a separate cross-party association with responsibilities for joint projects. No decisions were made before parliamentary elections in 2003.

In January 2004 the broad-based and all-party consultative Development Policy Committee (DPC, successor to KESU) included the idea of party aid into the draft Development Policy resolution. In February a working group was established to draft a proposal for the establishment of parties’ democracy development cooperation. In June a report was ready and on the basis of which DPC proposed an association for parties represented in the parliament. The purpose of would be to plan and implement joint multi-party projects. However, it was also stated that individual parties could apply for funding for their own projects, as long as there was agreement in the Board of directors and the purpose was ‘democracy dialogue’.

2.4 Pilot Phase with Tanzania 2004–2005

In preparation for the establishment of DEMO a Tanzanian delegation was invited to Finland at the time of local elections in October 2004. MFA provided the funding with 37 485 € for a project entitled *Democracy Dialogue Programme* (Demokratia-dialogi Ohjelma). The delegation consisted of nine representatives from all parties represented in the Union Parliament of Tanzania and other invitees, like gender trainer Dr. Ave Maria Semakafu, who later became the coordinator for DEMO in Tanzania. This was the first phase of the pilot project aiming to:

- Begin a dialogue programme in one long-term partner country of Finland while the Finnish political parties were setting up an organisation to run a long-term democracy dialogue programme in several countries.
- Establish a good relationship between the Finnish and the Tanzanian political parties for a longer-term democracy dialogue.
- Learn lessons for future work both with the Tanzanians as well as with other countries' parties.
- Provide a many-sided and useful programme for the participants of the pilot as well as those Finnish and Tanzanian political actors met during the visits.

The second phase consisted of a ten-person delegation to Tanzania in April 2005 to familiarize party representatives with democracy developments. Later in 2005 a smaller delegation of three went to Tanzania to follow the electoral process and to finalize the discussions on cooperation modalities with local partners (Phase III).

2.5 Establishment in 2005

The voluntary association DEMO was formed on 7 September 2005 with the official name *Parties' International Democracy Cooperation DEMO* (Puolueiden kansainvälinen demokraatiyhteistyö DEMO ry). A compromise was reached where DEMO got as its main task to organize joint projects, while doors were kept open for future party-to-party support projects channelled through the same association. The official registration came into force on 4 January 2006.

2.6 Interaction with MFA

Since the establishment of DEMO in 2005 the grant application process has been organized at the last moment during the winter months. Application documents have been submitted late in the autumn for the coming year. Rounds of requests for revisions and clarifications by the Ministry have always extended well into the year of intended implementation. For the grant application DEMO has usually been requested to use

the NGO (Non-governmental Organisation) Project Plan and Grant Application format. At the Ministry the lead role in the last few application rounds has been with a Programme Officer at the Unit for General Development Policy, coordinating input from country desks as well as the Steering Group. Eventually the Development Cooperation Quality Group at the MFA proposes a decision, which is presented to the Minister for final approval.

In the early days the democracy dialogue (the precursor to DEMO) was funded through the East and West Africa Unit at the Ministry. This made perfect sense since the project took off with Tanzania-Finland exchange visits. The very first official DEMO grant application was at the turn of the year 2005/2006. This was filed as a *NGO Project Grant Application* (kansalaisjärjestöjen hanketukihakemus) and a detailed *Project Plan* (hankesuunnitelma) was attached. This was largely in line with the standard NGO application procedures at the Ministry, where each organisation submits one Grant Application and a separate Project Plan for each project (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2005a; 2005b). In a February 2006 meeting the East and West Africa Unit formulated a funding proposal whereby DEMO would receive 220 000 € for 2006, starting in March 2006. This amount was almost exactly the same amount as DEMO had outlined in their budget for 2006. The MFA decided to allocate resources from the Country and Regional Cooperation budget line, because DEMO had at that point still not been officially registered for the one-year period required of NGO applicants. The proposal said that in the future DEMO would be funded through the NGO unit.

For 2007 DEMO submitted a freely formulated Grant Application, including the prescribed logical framework approach (LFA) for the projects, to the Unit for General Development Policy and Planning (KEO-11, later renamed KEO-10). To this first regular application, the following comments were made by relevant MFA units: The country desk for Nepal was supportive even if more detailed work plans were asked for. The NGO unit (KEO-33, the contemporary KEO-30) was more critical pointing out problems with a quickly expanding budget; going from an unreported pilot to scaled-up activities; the lack of self-financing; vaguely formulated objectives and results etc. It should be noted that a report from the pilot was indeed done, but it is not attempting to assess specific needs or suitable assistance modalities. The Department for Africa and the Middle-East (ALI) called for more specific objectives and activity measures highlighting the importance of democratic budget control (participatory budgeting). The Department for the Americas and Asia (ASA) commented on the unspecified nature of the budget and also noted the lack of self-financing and the fact that over 40% of the expenses was for travels. Furthermore, the Human Rights Advisor notes that over a third of the planned expenses were for travels and that 40% for salary and administrative expenses. Many of the commentators highlighted that DEMO applied for 100 000 € for “activities yet to be specified”. The proposed Central America project was scrapped in apparent agreement between MFA and DEMO. MFA further said that the grant for 2007 would still be in the Project Grant form, due to DEMO not fulfilling the two-year requirement for State Support. The application process for 2007 went well in to the spring of 2007 before a grant was awarded.

For 2008 a Project Plan Form was again submitted to KEO-10 using the NGO application format. A Grant Application was later finalized in January 2008 in a freely formulated manner. The Quality Group made a recommendation at their March 2008 meeting to grant 300 000 € to DEMO, instead of the 450 000 € they had applied for. Their remarks said that plans are too general, objectives too ambitious and difficult to reach, the purpose of exchange visits remains unclear, specific activity plans are lacking, and the budget is not specified enough. The grant was still awarded later in the spring after the final budget had been approved in mid-April.

The 2009 application had a similar Project Plan document filled in and submitted, as in previous years, to the KEO-10 unit. DEMO started preparing for the application already in August 2008. In February the following year KEO-10 desk officer called attention to how vaguely activities were defined, poorly constructed LFA-matrices, and the still unspecified nature of the budget. The Special Advisor on Democracy (KEO-20) recommended on 16 March 2009 that 400 000 € would be granted, while noting that the objectives of DEMO are still not specific enough and that output and impact measures are consequently lacking. In mid-March the MFA Quality Group decided to give their support to the application, which proceeded to the Minister's office and was finally signed by mid-April. DEMO had then halted planned activities and was struggling with payment of staff salaries. MFA asked for further clarification as a condition for a second instalment in June 2009, which was paid out only one month later causing further delays.

In December 2008 a MFA-DEMO meeting discussed future funding arrangements. The idea about multi-year programme funding (core funding, not project specific) from the MFA category Special State Support (*eräät valtionavut*) was agreed upon. It was stated that even if DEMO's work is process-oriented there needs to be a focus on achievable and measurable results. It was agreed that for 2010 DEMO would file a three-year plan and fill in an application based on the NGO form, including a Grant Application, a Project Plan and Logical Framework Matrices for all sub-projects. As of September 2009, there is a proposed separate budget line of 500 000 € per year set aside for DEMO in the development aid budget to be approved by the parliament, but not as a Special State Support. The specific form and timelines of a funding application for 2010–2012 is still to be determined.

2.7 Activities from 2006 until mid-2009

2006 was the first year of programme activities for DEMO Finland with a budget of 220 000 € for activities in Finland and Tanzania. The first steps for work in Nepal were taken this year with a separate MFA grant (Table 1).

Table 1 Annual MFA grants applied for, granted and spent (€).

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Amount granted by MFA	37 485	61 128	220 000	300 000	300 000	400 000
Amount applied for			220 000		450 000	500 000
Actual spending			136 092	164 000	188 000	

* Note: Due to the built-in delays in the annual funding procedure it is understandable that there is under-spending by 31 December or as DEMO put it 'the real financial year has never been the calendar year'.

In 2007–2008 there were total annual budgets of 300 000 € for activities in both Tanzania and Nepal, as well as in Finland. For 2009 the total budget increased by 33%. The following table outlines the major cost categories (Table 2).

Table 2 Budgeted cost categories over time.

Allocation %	2006	2007	2008	2009
Direct support of partner	5%	8%	-	-
Total administration (management)	44%	35%	47%	54%
Training and multiparty dialogue	14%	3%	22%	23%
Travel	35%	43%	26%	20%
Other	3%	11%	4%	2%

* Note: Figures are from the approved budgets, not money actually spent (see table 1). Comparing over time is made difficult by changing cost coding that identifies expenditure type rather than activities. In an alternative estimate for 2009 DEMO gives 34 % and 18 % administration costs in Finland and target countries respectively.

2.7.1 Tanzania

The Tanzania project took off where the pilot project ended, with exchange visits and mutual learning being at the forefront. The purpose was always clear – facilitating cross-party interaction among the political parties and enhancing their capacity. DEMO's work in Tanzania has come to focus on two different levels, one at the national with setting up of a Cross-Party Women's Platform (CPWP) as the key objective. Later another leg has become village level training activities in Kyela district.

Significant difficulties were encountered in starting up programme activities. National and international partnership attempts with Tanzania Centre for Democracy (TCD) and United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) did not result in any lasting collaboration. Furthermore, the institutionalization of the women's platform was severely delayed affecting the overall Tanzania programme.

2006

The main event was a training seminar in Tanzania in cooperation with TCD in October. Eight representatives from Finnish women's organisations took part. The purpose of the trip was to conduct a training seminar (100 participants from parliamentary parties, both sexes) and to continue planning for future activities. The delegation also participated in a seminar in Zanzibar organized by the Finnish embassy. The outcome was a resolution outlining the need for a joint platform for all youth (Youth Council) and a national convention of women across party lines. TCD and DEMO declared that they would continue co-operation, specifically on gender issues and the democratization of the budget allocation process.

2007

Three visits to Tanzania were organized in 2007 with seminars in conjunction. A main activity was the May seminar in Dar es Salaam on 'Women's Participation in Politics' with twelve participants from Finland and 112 from Tanzania, mostly female politicians. The outcome was a recommendation to create a 'clear structure for women's co-operation across party lines and the provision of logistical facilities for the potential joint organisation for women'. For the organisation of the event a women's steering committee had been established under the auspices of TCD. Three issues were identified for future consideration: 1) training of trainers to be able to reach the districts; 2) creating a framework for co-operation of women (annual conference); and 3) technical facilities for the potential joint organisation for women.

The main activity in the autumn was the November training of trainers (ToT) seminar in Dar es Salaam on the theme of 'Monitoring of public financial resources' with 12 party representatives from Finland, including one Member of Parliament (MP) and 33 participants from Tanzania. The purpose was to start a ToT programme. It should be noted that this was not a proper training event, but rather a topical seminar. There was no emphasis on pedagogical and organisational matters. However, a resolution was passed (again) outlining the 'need to establish a body for the purpose of bringing together women from different political parties under the co-ordination of TCD' and the need for further training. At this point a local contact person has been engaged. Later in 2007 relations with TCD severely deteriorated. According to DEMO, TCD did not respond to contact attempts and also allegedly beefed up seminar budgets.

2008

DEMO started to operate with local staff in January 2008. Early in the year DEMO sent a letter to the leaders of all parliamentary parties cancelling the partnership with TCD on the basis of mismanagement and unwillingness to accommodate a women's platform. An argument forwarded by individual representatives of TCD – formally headed by the leaders of parliamentary parties – is that DEMO crippled political parties by mobilizing women to form an NGO and take distance from their respective parties. The problems in setting up the CPWP made 'North-South dialogue' the priority in the first part of 2008. In May 2008 a delegation of women politicians and activists

visited Finland with the purpose of providing tools for empowerment of women in politics.

In October 2008 the first CPWP met for a two-day seminar on the theme 'Together We Can Improve Women Participation In Politics And Decision-Making'. This was a training workshop with the aim of coming up with an action plan. It was also agreed that all the participants would go back to their mother parties to come up with suggestions on the structure and working modalities of the platform.

Training of Trainers for local activists on gender issues and budget monitoring also started in 2008. The bulk of activities at the district level have been training for members in Village Community Bank (VICOBA) groups in three days' sessions on economic empowerment (household economy), leadership and group work, and gender and women's rights. Participants are common poor women and some men, who have been invited by VICOBA to set up self-help groups for the purpose of economic empowerment. One training round in late 2008 targeted village leaders.

2009

The platform was supposed to be launched and outreach work was envisioned to make the platform known. However, due to disagreements over the institutional arrangement this had not yet started at the time of evaluation in early August 2009. In May 2009 a delegation of eight party nominated women visited Finland. VICOBA group training in Kyela continued. Plans are there for more training of village leaders and elected officials in second half of 2009.

2.7.2 Nepal

As a precursor to the work in Nepal a series of seminars were organized in the spring of 2006 in cooperation with MFA, Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Finnish Parliament. Already in 2006 cross-party working groups were set up in both Finland and Nepal. Later the same year a fact-finding mission was conducted by DEMO's Executive Director to assess the possibility to start a democracy dialogue between Nepalese and Finnish political youth organisations in support of democracy building.

It was recommended to work with an established local partner, The NGO Federation of Nepal (NFN), in creating a space for dialogue between youth and students of the established parties. A regional (sub-national) approach was also advised.

For 2007, an application for a separate Nepal project was included with the objectives of encouraging cross-party co-operation; bringing together all political youth organisations in Finland and Nepal; facilitating inter-generation dialogue; and increasing the capacity and channels of influence of political youth organisations in relation to their mother parties. In this first Nepal application activity areas were outlined as

training of youth and student activists, dialogues and material production. Furthermore a co-operation with IDEA was envisioned.

2007

The cross-party youth and student platform organized its first meetings and conferences in the spring of 2007. In all of these events there were Finnish guests present. An early agreement was reached about a *Joint Youth Agenda* (JYA), a policy-document that aims to identify the most central problems for Nepalese youth and develop policy suggestions that all organizations agree to. The Agenda is based on the five elements of inclusive democracy; universal access to social services; equal opportunities for all youth; education for all; and sustainable and equitable development. The topics agreed by the national platform have then been discussed during 2008–2009 with members in five out of 75 districts in order to enable drafting of a more comprehensive, inclusive and detailed agenda. In 2007 participation included youth wings of the parties of the interim government formed as part of the peace process.

A study visit to Finland had been included in the application for 2007, but never materialized. There were three small delegations from Finland to Nepal, including monitoring missions. One was conducted in December in conjunction with the inauguration of the programme. The report noted some progress, while pointing to practical problems, like unexpected changes in personnel. It highlighted that local ownership had been consolidated. An Advisory Board was set up at the December meeting. Implementing partners in this first phase were Citizen's Campaign for Democracy and Social Transformation (CCDST) at NFN and IDEA.

2008

The meetings with the cross-party youth platform continued with each meeting chaired by a participating organisation on a rotational basis. The platform met eight times during the year and had capacity-building sessions (e.g. leadership skills, organisational development and advocacy). After the April 2008 Constituent Assembly (CA) elections, the platform was expanded to incorporate the new Madhesi parties.

At district level workshops were held to consult about the youth agenda topics. A core group of 35 trained activists coordinated and received a total of ten days of training. In most of the five selected districts two two-day trainings were organized reaching over 400 persons. During the year the first round Youth Caucus was also organized. This was a programme conducted by Alliance for Peace, but partly financed by DEMO with a grant of 10 000 €. As for outreach, a flyer propagating youth political participation was produced in 15 000 copies and disseminated by platform organisations during the general election in April 2008. Together with IDEA, *Young Experts Group*, was initiated during the year with the idea of supporting 15 young female leaders from parties, CA and civil society. Exchanges with Finland were also conducted, in both directions, with delegations of eight to eleven participants.

2009

The Platform organized regular meetings and training, focusing on topics like leadership and women's empowerment, as well as planning of activities. A second delegation visit to Finland was conducted in May 2009. The work with the district level workshops continued in the spring of 2009 with over 300 participants. By mid-2009 central level representatives have begun draft the agenda into its final form on the basis of suggestions documented and collected at district-level. Before finalization, organizations are supposed to hold wider internal consultations to get approval and commitment to JYA.

2.7.3 Finland

As noted exchange visits to Finland have been arranged from both target countries. The main were:

- Tanzania delegation visiting Finland during the local elections, October 2004 (10 leading politicians)
- First official DEMO delegation from Tanzania, May 2006 (6 participants)
- Tanzanian delegation to Finland May 2008 (9 women politicians)
- Nepalese delegation in Finland, October 2008 (12 youth politicians)
- Joint delegation from Tanzania and Nepal, May 2009 (19 women and youth politicians)

At one bigger event in June 2007 Thomas Carothers presented his ideas on democracy aid and the role of party aid. Seminars on other topics and countries have also been arranged, like Iran and Somalia, as well as regular participation in the annual World Village Festival in Helsinki. DEMO has also given briefings to individual parties and relevant bodies interested in party aid and democracy issues.

Two books have been published in the MFA *Experience* series with the purpose of serving both DEMO and Finnish embassies throughout the world:

- Women's Role in Finnish Democracy Building (Korppi-Tommola 2006)
- Political Youth Organisations: Strengthening the Voice of Youth in Politics (English and Nepali) (Falck 2007)

Starting in 2009 a regular newsletter is now published.

2.7.4 Other Activities

Through its Executive Director DEMO is taking some part in international consultations and networking among actors in democracy assistance and party aid in Europe. Ms. Sarpama has been appointed a Member of the Board of European Partnership for Democracy. DEMO has had exchange visits with Norwegian Centre

for Democracy Support, a similar intention by Norwegian parties, which has changed track after several evaluations since it was set up in 2002.

2.7.5 Rejected Programme Proposals

In the 2007 there was an application a project planned for in Central America for 33 000 €. According to the DEMO Annual Plan for 2007, the Finnish MFA approached it for party related work in Nicaragua, Guatemala and Honduras. The intention was to plan for the project during 2007 and start implementing it the following year in cooperation with UNDP. After further consultations DEMO and MFA agreed not to pursue the project. No other proposals have reached that stage of preparation.

3 KEY FINDINGS FROM THE ANALYSIS

To get an appropriate overview of the programme, the evaluation is done over the following programme components. All activities in each country are discussed together. We also comment on the contribution that DEMO makes to the global efforts to promote and build democracy.

- Tanzania
 - Institutional platform for five women wings
 - Exchange visits with Finland
 - Training in Kyela district on gender issues
- Nepal
 - Platform for joint policy agenda among 15 student and youth wings
 - Exchange visit with Finland
 - Platform workshops in five districts
- Finland
 - Exchange or dialogue between parties in Finland and target countries
 - Informing the development opinion in Finland and Finnish parties

3.1 Tanzania

3.1.1 Relevance of the Programme

After the pilot phase all stakeholders took for granted that DEMO should keep working with political parties in Tanzania. A welcoming response from Tanzania parties, a high priority to the country in Finnish aid and an assumption of close, longstanding and knowledgeable relations seems to have been the basis for going ahead. In a pilot phase report topics of future dialogue on democracy were identified as the roles of media,

opposition, and women, as well as democratic preparation of party programmes. In the beginning TCD was seen as a direct fit and natural partner for DEMO, as both organisations represent all parliamentary parties. According to DEMO's report after a TCD delegation with all five parties to Finland in May 2006, the Tanzanians expressed wishes to continue co-operation on (1) democratization of budget processes, (2) general accountability and openness of the political system, and (3) capacity building for women, youth and marginalized groups. Responding to the last wish a major seminar on women in politics was agreed for October 2006. That set the stage for all subsequent activity.

From then on the programme came to focus on women's political participation or, operationally, how it can be strengthened through promotion of women wings in the political parties. Women are certainly underrepresented among elected representatives in Tanzania, in spite of a strong tradition of political organisation through Union of Tanzanian Women (UWT) claiming to have 20 million members (46 % of the population). UWT is the women wing of the ruling Revolutionary Party (CCM). It was the only separately organised women's wing, when DEMO started to engage political parties on the issue. The operational solution thus had inspiration from both how Finnish parties are organised and a powerful precedence in Tanzania.

As usual in electoral systems with single member constituencies it is proving difficult for women to get nominated and elected in Tanzania. This is compensated for by Special seats proportionally distributed among parties at national, regional and district level. Women hold 7.3% of constituency seats in parliament and 30.4% of total seats. Women and others with Special seats lack a direct mandate from a constituency and are politically much more dependent on the goodwill of party leaders, making it more difficult to speak up on issues that might be conflictive in the party.

As a general approach we find DEMO's focus on women in politics and their role within parties to be most relevant. We have also found very little direct engagement with party organisations on the issue of women's role by other democracy development partners, which suggests a value added by DEMO. But the chosen approach – enhancing women's representation and voice in politics through promotion of self-governing women wings and an early institutionalisation of a cross-party platform for these wings – is more open to discussion.

DEMO has sought confirmation the relevance of the subject and their approach through consultations with their counterparts. Meetings with delegations of members from all parties and general conferences resolutions have been taken to confirm mutual interest. However, there is a risk that dissent and conflicting priorities are not voiced in such settings. Participant with unclear mandates and personal motivation have little reason to not conform, especially over issues that are of high priority to those hosting and paying a pleasant trip or event. A systematic assessment of needs and views in each party organisation could have helped identify the serious challenges to come. Is there readiness to give women more say, why is it not already happening and can foreign

intervention make a positive difference? Initially DEMO left to TCD to carry out joint activities and to manage any problems with the political parties involved.

Exchange visits to and from Finland have been a key instrument in the programme, especially until 2007, and we find them to have reasonable relevance. The exposure and learning is highly appreciated by Tanzanian participants in visits. Finnish presentations in Tanzania are less enthusiastically received, which by some are explained by language problems (weak English on both sides). It is natural that a personal experience has a stronger impact.

The training in Kyela district is seeking its relevance in making local government decision makers accountable to their constituencies and in particular to women. This is further motivated by a government decentralisation process supported by Finland and other donors. Reaching out to grassroots and going beyond the established political scene in Dar es Salaam was early on identified as important by most stakeholders. Many continue to affirm this opinion strongly and spontaneously.

Interviewed VICOBA group members are very positive about the training, many remarking about how it had helped to know their rights and defend them within their families. A few women told about plans to be candidates in October 2009 ward level elections. Many surveyed participants showed strong support for a party, over 90% being members of a party. Most were for CCM (60%), but in all groups there were some opposition supporters. We found many "grass root" women to be strongly articulate about their party allegiance, often evolving around their attitude to whether the dominant party is good or bad. Several times group members said that they would support good women candidates irrespective of their party affiliation. A very positive view of DEMO training was indicated in survey responses. 83% deemed it as 'very useful' for them personally.

Nevertheless, we find only distant relevance of the training in Kyela for the DEMO objective of a "functioning and inclusive multiparty democracy with improved participation of women". Apart from the training only benefitting citizens in a few locations, there are hardly any relations to women wings. The only link we found is that some VICOBA and DEMO organisers, coordinators and trainers are known members, representatives and candidates of parties. The positive exposure they gain through the DEMO assisted programme can certainly improve their chances in elections, particularly among women voters, and maybe set positive precedents.

Moreover, monitoring of public expenditure is not yet part of the training content for the targeted women. We find that a rational choice by the training partner Women Wake Up and local trainers, even it is a problematic deviation from DEMO's intentions. It is simply not realistic to expect the poorest of women to fight and take control of powerful public decision makers, if they do not even control their household economy and can manage basic family needs. At the same time, we found VICOBA group

members to be remarkably vocal and insightful about their need, irrespective of poverty and little formal education. The potential for these women to hold public office bearers accountable certainly seems to be there.

Massive economic empowerment and rights awareness among women, then hopefully leading to their political empowerment, is most relevant and necessary for several development goals. In spite of evaluating the DEMO training activities in Kyela district as generally positive, we do not think that DEMO is the right organisation to secure effective and efficient delivery at grassroots level. To bypass its prime partners – political parties and their organisations – in order to deliver a desirable programme is neither appropriate nor viable. Alternatives should be sought.

3.1.2 Effectiveness and Cost-efficiency

The Cross-Party Women's Platform has not yet been constituted, in spite of ongoing efforts based on tentative agreements since three years. There have been repeated reports about agreements among parties and a core group of women representatives are meeting regularly. All since 2006 discussion have very much focused on the institutional aspects of setting up a platform. That narrow focus might explain some of the lack of progress.

Some core group representatives have also had less than full mandates from their parties and organisations, which was evident from interviews. In August 2009 still only CCM had a women wing with leaders not appointed by the party leadership. It remained evident that UWT's has internal differences about the desirability of a cross-party platform as well as relations with DEMO. The Party for Democracy and Progress (Chadema) was in the process of setting up a women wing through membership registration and leadership elections. The United Democratic Party (UDP) and the Tanzania Labour Party (TLP) women represent their party leaderships' very different views on relations with DEMO and TCD. A new consensus was reported in late August. If it is possible to set up a meaningful cross-party women's platform in a year of elections (local level in October 2009 with districts, regions and national level one year later) remains to be seen. Beyond the mere constitution, the agenda it sets for itself is crucial. Any pressure on parties to nominate more women candidates would be a first breakthrough, but there is also a risk that platform politics deflect women leaders' attention to that task.

Some effects can be noted in the public political discourse, both in relation to women's participation and the idea of women pursuing common interest across the party landscape. President Kikwete, leader of CCM, lent support to both notions at the CCM national congress in January 2009, where DEMO paid costs of guest participation by women leaders from the opposition.

DEMO's determination to pursue a platform for women wings has generated strong conflicts, firstly with TCD – supposedly representing a consensus view among the

leaders of all parliamentary parties – as well as with and within individual parties. “DEMO wants to steal our women” has been one allegation. We believe that some of these conflicts are natural and necessary, when promoting women in politics at the expense of the men in power. Successfully engaging in such conflicts as a foreign actor requires full involvement and backing from the intended target organisations.

Until now investments in the women’s platform have not paid off in a tangible manner. Women’s role in parties has certainly been moved up the agenda and might remain there. DEMO is running its programme with a tight cost control, but Tanzania is an expensive country, particularly for aid programme related costs (qualified staff, transport, conference venues etc.). Aid, tourism and mining investments drive inflation in an economy with very low productive capacity to meet most demand generated by these sources of income. Other less cost conscious aid programmes sets standards for how much and for what DEMO needs to pay, which we also observed in Nepal.

The exchange visits have been at least partially effective in relation to intended results. Some remark that the strong focus on visiting at the time of elections is problematic. Even if it is instructive to see how democracy in another country is when most intense, few politicians have time to talk during election days.

The learning outcome is always fragile as immediate beneficiaries are just a handful of individuals. Therefore costly study visits can only be justified if they are integral to a wider programme and their effects can only be assessed for the programme as a whole. Not budgeting visits within country programmes suggest that integration remains unclear. Visits have to be organised with clear objectives, sharp content and in direct relation with other programme activities. In general, study visits to Finland seem to have more benefits relative to costs than large delegations to Tanzania. Combining training of trainers with Finnish delegation visits is recognised to not have worked as intended, instead turning into more general seminars. The role of each Finnish delegate, beyond personal exposure and manifesting broad political backing, and Tanzanian selection of participants are issues that need better definition (Table 3).

Table 3 Total spent in Tanzania 2008 and budgeted for 2009.

Allocation	2008		2009 (budgeted)	
	Sum €	%	Sum €	%
Women’s platform	19 307	31%	31 500	38%
Training in Kyela	15 809	25%	20 800	25%
Management overhead	28 125	44%	31 000	37%

* There are difficulties in comparing numbers over time. See note in table 2.

DEMO has had a strong challenge in the fact that travel is extremely attractive at a personal level. Making it a key programme component requires utmost care not to distort the motives of the people involved. Criteria for participant selection should be specific, objectively motivated and agreed beforehand. The practice of DEMO making the final selection stirs controversy and might undercut the partner organisations. Some of the nominations not meeting reasonable criteria have been stopped.

As discussed, the training in Kyela can be seen as somewhat effective for general development. It should be noted that the Kyela pilot project budget is low in both relative and absolute terms with 19 000 € for 2009. Still, we find the operations to be far below potential. Trainers are conducting few courses each. Until May 2009 there were a total of 250 training sessions reported, which means 32 per trainer (two in each session) or 3 training day per month since the pilot started. Until August 2008, only 30 groups had received all three sessions, 80 groups partial training and 101 of 211 groups not yet any training, according to Kyela coordinators' oral report.

One of two Kyela coordinators lives and studies in Dar es Salaam. Costs are prohibitively high in relation to the budget for her or the national ("local") coordinator to visit Kyela. Coordinators operate on slim resources and do their tasks as part-time volunteers which give coordinators little leverage to demand timely delivery. We also find it dubious that trainers' transport costs are compensated by a small fixed monthly amount instead of payment of actual costs. This gives a disincentive to be active and do more than a couple of activities per month. Neither does monthly payment fit with the fact that training is not conducted during months of harvest, rains and election periods.

Given the demand for such training after now having built reputation and the low costs, a well-managed programme could easily multiply the effect. A calculation example: 15 full time trainers doing 16 training days per month is 240 trainer days or 120 sessions. This represents 40 fully trained groups with 1 000 members per month. With a low estimate four suitable months each year; it would be easy to fully train another 160 groups per year.

For trainers to commit full time in these months even 10 € a training day would be attractive. Today they get no remuneration, as compared with outside training of trainers facilitators getting 230 € per work day plus accommodation. Transport and writing material could be another 10 € for each session day, bringing the cost to 30 € per session, 90 € per group or 3.60 € per member. Meals for course participants should probably be standard, if it allows more focused attention to the course. Training cost should only apply during training periods. Follow up with participants should be part of VICOPA attention to the Groups.

3.1.3 Appropriate Setup

In general we find that DEMO's set up (strong conceptual and technical association with Finland, almost exclusive restriction to cross-party modalities, strong focus on women wings and representation) can work for a temporary intervention. Some reasons for the difficulties in getting full commitment to the programme from parties and only half-existent women wings are probably lack of timelines and little clarity about what cooperation and resources DEMO would offer a cross-party platform. Until now DEMO has offered a small annual menu of activities for free without letting beneficiaries know costs. An informed and accountable discussion about the best use of resources has not been possible.

There is no explicit exit strategy to this open-ended programme. "A long-term democracy dialogue" was an aim set as a conclusion of the pilot phase. In building democracy it is certainly necessary to be ready for impact in the longer term only. That does not justify vague plans and drifts in implementation. We believe that these shortcomings on part of DEMO have increased because of short-term funding only by MFA. Funding for one year only (or less due to late decisions) adds much uncertainty, disrupting planning and execution.

In Kyela DEMO got it right by partnering with VICOBA. That organisation is new and has to prove itself, but has a concept that fits the type of training DEMO came to offer. The idea is to organise networks of mutual support and learning among neighbours in order to improve livelihood and incomes. VICOBA groups could provide training (for example in entrepreneurship skill which was requested in all groups we met) or extending micro credits. None of the groups we met have yet been offered such support and some dissatisfaction was expressed. (In some cases views felt muted, maybe by the presence of us evaluators together with VICOBA, DEMO and church officials.) Still, with help in getting their groups organised, women we talked to (men were asked not to attend) told about quick progress in savings and management of household incomes. In some cases joint productive activities had been organised, complementing and supposedly encouraging existing individual enterprising based on traditional skills.

With the Kyela pilot project DEMO has certainly shaped its offer according to real needs, but deviated too much from its task of capacity building for political parties.

Making the shortcuts of engaging with individuals when parties prove difficult is no viable alternative.

3.1.4 Sustainability and Impact

Because of the weaknesses described we believe that the present programme is unlikely to lead to sustainable results and impact. However, it is not impossible that lasting effects might come out. That depends on if Tanzanian parties, women leaders and

activists can agree and commit to a basic agenda, even if it might not be expressed in a joint platform. DEMO has learnt to become more careful, offering facilitation rather than intervening in CPWP deliberations. Promisingly, the women leaders have also discussed negotiating funding from the government for a platform. There is also potential to engage the vast organisational experience of UWT and CCM, hopefully in renewed and more accountable form. Chadema and CUF are increasingly realising and acting on a need to appeal to women voters, who are becoming less pliant.

As activities in Kyela do not clearly contribute to the programme's admittedly lofty objectives, sustainability is less relevant. This pilot project has given a very appealing response and initial impact among common citizens. DEMO cannot effectively and efficiently meet the needs and expectations without a reshaping itself.

3.1.5 Value-added, Coherence, Cooperation and Coordination

As described, we find a value added as attention to women wings of political parties by other democracy development actors is scant. Emphasise on Finnish institutional solutions is inspiring but also limiting. An idea about exchange of experience with African neighbours (regional dialogue) this year was dropped in the budget process with MFA, but should not be forgotten.

From the beginning in Tanzania, DEMO took much inspiration from Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), which is similarly setup by the parliamentary parties in Netherlands to promote multiparty democracy. NIMD is a vastly bigger organisation with programmes in 17 target countries, 34 staff members and expenditure of 9 725 215 € in 2008 of which 94 % was funded by Dutch MFA. 424 135 € was used in Tanzania, mainly for "work through TCD focusing on electoral and constitutional Reform. TCD has been lobbying for an amended Political Party Act and a more even political playing field. TCD's political party capacity-building programme is fostering accountability and ethical leadership." NIMD funds individual parties' capacity building by grants to apply for annually. It has phased out foreign staff in Tanzania. For all practical purposes the coordination with NIMD ended when DEMO decided to break with TCD.

Individual party aid reaches the principal opposition parties and they deem it important. Apart from NIMD support offered to all, CUF gets assistance from liberal parties in Norway and German FDP-linked Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNS). Chadema is part of conservative Democrat Union of Africa (DUA), which provides networking and youth leadership training. The party also has direct support provided by conservative parties in the United Kingdom (UK), Norway and Sweden. On the other hand, CCM has only had a few past projects with British Labour Party, instead relying on networks in Africa, primarily with former liberation movements, and longstanding relations including student exchange with China and Cuba.

In Kyela district there is scope for strong value added. DEMO chose a district where almost no other development actors have attended to gender issues, in spite of being an area most severely affected by HIV/AIDS with particularly grave consequences for women with their traditional family responsibilities. This is however not sufficient motive to continue gender training, if others can do better.

DEMO early sought close cooperation with partners, first TCD together with NIMD, and then UNIFEM. As DEMO broke with TCD after strong conflicts about direction and management of the programme, including allegations about misuse of funds, neither NIMD nor any other actor or donor to TCD supported DEMO. On the contrary, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has joined NIMD as a funder of TCD as a part of the broad and large Deepening Democracy in Tanzania Programme (DDTP), sponsored by the main bilateral donors. An evaluation of DDTP this year was fairly positive about TCD without looking at much detail. DDTP is recommended to be extended in time and budget in spite of (or due to) weak results and very high costs (which evaluators did not comment upon because UNDP had not explicitly requested an assessment of cost efficiency).

UNDP is in addition planning a 2010 Election Programme where TCD might be a beneficiary or left out. Finland is a funder unlike for DDTP. DEMO's efforts of cooperation or their concerns have not got official support of Finland as a donor or leading member of UNDP and UNIFEM. Our conclusion is therefore that coherence among aid actors has been low.

3.2 Nepal

3.2.1 Relevance

In general terms we find the programme in Nepal as most relevant and in addition very timely. In a post-conflict situation where all parties are now claiming to commit to democratic politics, it is very important to make the leaders of often brutal youth and student organisations make the same commitment, get to know each other, open channels of communication and start engaging themselves and each other on policy matters. The main role for young party activists in Nepal are to be mobilised in mass rallies, blockades and other actions to protest and put pressure on behalf of the party. Violence and threats of it are common in politics and mix with extortion and other forms of criminality. At the same time, there is admirable idealism and belief in politics to overcome the deprived situation in which the vast majority live.

Requests at a seminar in Helsinki in 2006 led to consultations in Nepal and with Finnish Nepal experts, and then a positive assessment in dialogue between DEMO and MFA. No formal needs analysis was done, but the marginalised role of young people in politics was evident and confirmed by political youth representatives. Several

of the programme issues discussed for Tanzania are reflected in Nepal, some with different outcome.

Exchange visits are a relevant as a programme element, particularly as Nepal has been strongly isolated until recently. However, the information revolution is transformative and is coming fast because of cultural and economic integration with India, as well as growing contact with China. Exchange with Finland gives other perspectives on politics and development. Relations with the neighbours, as well as UK, and United States of America (USA) are complex and for many clouded by suspicion about hidden interests.

Extending the platforms for engagement and policy dialogue to districts is a natural and necessary step to help consolidate whatever can be agreed in at national level in Kathmandu. To make peace among foot soldiers is a daily challenge to party leaders and the peace process as a whole. The civil war was partly fought between an establishment linked to the capital and rural people who felt neglected by royal and democratic governments.

3.2.2 Effectiveness and Cost-efficiency

The programme has been implemented according to agreed plans with due flexibility for new developments. It has been managed in a well-organised and cost efficient manner. The idea of a cross-party student and youth platform was welcomed and rather quickly adopted. All organisations have committed and take partial responsibility for programme implementation, even if some of the most important members express a certain reserve, which is natural in bigger political organisations. Smaller organisations have more to benefit from getting a platform and are almost uniformly very enthusiastic and uncritical. One criticism by some is a bias in access to participation from Nepal Student Union (NSU) of the Nepali Congress Party (NC). It is not surprising if DEMO constantly needs to prove its ability to act outside the Kathmandu bubble.

For good and bad Nepalese organisations are more institutionalised and there is much less scope for individual acting than in Tanzania. The political culture is hierarchical and even militaristic. To bind leaders into civil politics is thus crucial. In this respect DEMO's programme becomes one of the least costly peacekeeping efforts one can imagine. The Maoist Young Communist League (YCL) is slightly less active than others. YCL is arguable the most representative of disaffected youth, best organised and most violent with its background in an ostensibly successful insurgency.

Instead of the focus in Tanzania on institutional arrangements to support principles of women's representation, the programme in Nepal sought from the outset to strengthen the voice of youth by articulating joint policy proposals. One can question the democratic sense of encouraging political elites to agree among themselves. Nevertheless, the policy focus is a qualitative step forward and some observers suggested that youth leaders have improved their capacity to discuss policies since the programme begun.

Interviews point to high appreciation for the programme, its concept and the activities offered. Survey respondents who had participated in workshops in Rautahat district were somewhat less enthusiastic than participants in Kyela, Tanzania (Annex 4).

These observations do not necessarily represent failure but rather expectations for more. Four of the target organisations from the three largest parties suggested DEMO or Finland to offer individual capacity building. (In Tanzania all five parties did.)

We noted an important difference in perception. DEMO is strongly convinced about having offered a programme requested and defined by the target organisations, but interviewees do not see it that way. One key leader says that DEMO sets the agenda and participants can only say yes or no. Another has said that youth leaders let DEMO believe so; in order to keep the Finns happy and make them commit useful resources. Party leaders give diplomatic reasons for their positive attitude about the programme without knowing much about its content and results. This suggests that development cooperation is seen as bargaining in a way that pleases donors rather finding funding for needs defined by Nepalese politicians and organisations.

The huge attraction of travel to Finland presents the same problems as in Tanzania. Participant selection by DEMO has caused unhappiness among some leaders. There are different perceptions about whether DEMO or the target organisations make the final decision. Both claims say that the other is responsible.

Table 4 Total spent in Nepal 2008 and budgeted for 2009.

Allocation	2008		2009 (budgeted)	
	Sum €	%	Sum €	%
Platform	15 399	23%	26 000	31%
District	15 399	23%	15 400	19%
Management overhead	36 839	54%	41 600	50%

* For 2008 it is impossible to separate the two sub-projects (platform and districts) from each other. Therefore we have simply split the programmatic costs between the two.

** The DEMO office in Nepal, which is covered by the Management overhead, provides meeting space for the platform and could therefore be considered as a programme cost, not as overhead.

Total budget (excluding exchange visits) for 2008 was 84 000 €, of which 68 000 € was spent. DEMO accounts focus on input (type of expenditure) instead of output (activity), which makes analysis and follow up harder (Table 4).

District activities have also been carried with a strong cost control. Suggestions are actually that more quality would be much improved with higher spending on accommodation (less travel, attendance during all event, socialisation among youth

leaders usually not meeting) and interpreters. DEMO coordinators taking care of all practical matters means a huge overhead costs. This minimizes risks and brings useful experience to DEMO, but is neither cost efficient nor sustainable beyond a pilot phase. There are indications

3.2.3 Appropriate Setup

We find the setup to be appropriate until now. Cost pressure to recruit non-Nepalese staff locally partly explains rapid staff turnover until early 2008, delaying implementation. Late agreements in Helsinki with MFA about annual plans and budgets have caused disruption too.

3.2.4 Sustainability and Impact

The immediate impact is very positive and can have lasting effect in defusing political violence and promoting a more democratic culture. At the same time this general results are fragile. Their success or failure depends on political events and developments beyond the reach of the programme and target organisations.

As in Tanzania, DEMO is offering a menu of activities at a cost unknown to platform organisations and DEMO takes care of organising the events, although in close consultation with the organisations and their participation as facilitators in district level activities. The micromanagement is comfortable for platform members that are relieved of practical and financial responsibilities. It also prevents real ownership and any sustainability of activities beyond what DEMO can and likes to offer. DEMO has not presented any time perspective or exit strategy.

DEMO is encouraging and supporting platform members to discuss the shape of an institutionalisation. These internal consultations have presently got stuck or at least delayed, apparently because the process and maybe its purpose are unclear to organisations. Political tensions are also high at the moment. Platform talks might not move forward unless DEMO spells out its future role, which hardly can be permanent.

One exit strategy could be to relate the Platform and its Joint Youth Agenda (JYA) to the national youth council proposed as part of a National Youth Policy prepared by the government.

3.2.5 Value-added, Coherence, Cooperation and Coordination

The programme had a strong value added at a time when no other foreign partners would or could engage directly with political student and youth organisations across the political scale. A Finnish intervention was accepted as neutral and inoffensive enough.

Several donors support indirect attempts to engage political youth through Nepalese non-governmental organisations, but NGOs are seen by varying degrees of suspicion and contempt by political parties. Most are seen as private business ventures aimed at extracting donor funding and representing more or less hidden personal, party or foreign interests. Almost none have a membership base. Party political organisations are among the few with true mass base and outreach across the country.

Other foreign actors are now increasingly engaging political youth, making DEMO less unique. The most notable project is the consultations about the national youth policy in which the Norwegian embassy has engaged the five largest youth organisations at national level and in all 75 districts. The approach is quite similar to DEMO with the differences of linkage to an existing government policy process (largely unaffected by the change of government), full technical and financial responsibility by the youth organisations to organise all district workshops at a budget of 800 € each (direct costs are on par with DEMO), no donor profile in public but active involvement of the embassy and the ambassador with national youth leaders.

American National Democratic Institute (NDI) works with capacity building of the principle parties except Maoists. A few Norwegian and Swedish parties have capacity building projects with individual Nepalese parties. German social democratic Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) is well established since long without foreign staff and focusing on publication of political literature by Nepalese and foreign authors. India, China and Japan are also active with parties in different respects. Japan is engages political youth in economic development projects.

Until now actors engaging with party organisations have been rather secretive, but as information is sifting through. Denmark, Norway, USA and UK have just come together for donor coordination (or at least exchange of information) “on political party reform”. They have not registered any Finnish embassy interest. A work group is also envisaged for implementing actors, like NDI, DANIDA (Denmark), IDEA, DEMO and some respected Nepalese NGO.

3.3 Finland

3.3.1 Relevance and Effectiveness

An early objective set for DEMO was to arrange for dialogue and mutual learning between political parties in Finland and the eight countries chosen by Finland for long term development cooperation. The concluding report of the pilot phase was for example titled “Finnish-Tanzanian intra-party dialogue on democracy”. It reported “commonly agreed topics of future dialogue” and listed positive and negative comments on the Finnish political system and electoral process by Tanzanians, as well as the other way

around. However, already a strategy paper from DEMO's establishment in early 2006 is suggesting that promotion of dialogue and mutual learning within target countries is a core function. In the Strategy for 2009–2011 the ambition of a North-South dialogue has been substituted by a focus on promoting democracy in target countries. Involving Finnish party activists is described as means rather than a goal.

The shift in perspective was confirmed by DEMO management as necessary when all activities are financed by MFA from the aid budget and have to be motivated in terms of results in target countries. At the same time the Strategy still spells out “building awareness of development policy and positive attitudes to development cooperation in Finnish political culture” as one of six strategic goals and the last application to MFA reiterates such an objective for activities in Finland.

Delegation visits to and from Finland have continued to be intrinsic to the concept and a large part of DEMO activities, even if less frequent and costly than during the pilot phase and initially. They still tend to be partly motivated by what learning they bring to Finnish politics.

It is correct that visits in both directions, a small number of seminars in Helsinki and communication with members through working group meeting and newsletter bring exposure, give knowledge and inspire Finnish politicians and activists involved. Almost all interview and survey respondents attest to that.

It is difficult to ascertain the relevance of activities in Finland. How they are described and motivated is a moving target. Essentially we find them to be side effects of work with target countries. If objectives were better clarified it could be highly relevant to organise dialogue about democracy and development among political decision makers, as well as to better inform and positively engage political activists and public opinion.

For either objective to be dealt with effectively special programmes with earmarked funds would be necessary. Otherwise results will remain limited to party, youth and women leaders with a special interest in development policy. It is then up to each party if it gives attention to development issues or lets those involved with DEMO nurture their interest in isolation.

3.3.2 Cost-efficiency and Setup

Today's activities are run as spin off from the country programmes and costs are not accounted for separately. Still it is clear that engaging participants and informing stakeholders in Finland take much staff time and real costs are considerable. The cost could be justified with better-defined objectives and activities to meet them.

As suggested from decreasing delegation travel DEMO has been sensitive criticism about “political tourism”.

With its need to focus on delivering operation results in challenging settings DEMO is hardly the right setup for organising a qualified policy dialogue with some or all Finnish long term partner countries on a wide range of issues beyond the functioning of democracy.

3.3.3 Sustainability and Impact

Activity targeted at Finland is not separately organised and cannot really be evaluated on sustainability and impact. It is rather that dialogue and communication about the results of development aid are necessary to sustain political support for development cooperation more widely.

3.3.4 Value-added

DEMO adds value because few other actors bring attention to and discuss the role of politicians and parties in development. At the same time there is attention in Finland to the political side of globalisation thanks to the Helsinki process and the debate it has inspired.

3.4 Assumptions and Risks

We find that DEMO applies a general approach in making assumptions, even if it has been differently applied in programme countries. The work in Tanzania started from a general agreement among stakeholders, including Tanzanian politicians, that democracy needs strengthening and the assumption that it can be helped by Finnish counterparts. A limited set of activities (institutionalised cross-party dialogue, exchange with Finland, associated training) was then chosen, more based on what Finnish parties could agree to do together than being the right methods in Tanzania.

Definition of the specific problems, objectives and results came further down the line. General consultation identified women's role and representation as one area of obvious shortcomings, which then DEMO chose as the exclusive focus together with some key women leaders in Tanzania. The previously chosen counterpart TCD and parties had misgivings, but probably felt compelled to at least pretend playing along not to cause conflict with women leaders and DEMO.

Sequencing programme planning like this does not necessarily lead wrong, but is very risky. In framing very strictly what can be offered, objectives and activities easily become very donor defined and driven. The target organisations are essentially asked to take it or leave it. As long as the offer is seen as reasonable, they of course take it, at least to see what they can get out of it as organisations or persons.

In Tanzania DEMO did not sufficiently aligning expectations or sense of purpose among stakeholders before going ahead to tackle its chosen problem. Nor was the chosen programme based on any documented analysis of obstacles to women in politics or discussion about alternative methods to deal with the problem. DEMO has struggled in Tanzania all since.

In Nepal the offer by DEMO has not been much different, but the specific challenge of youth participation was taken as the starting point for consultations. If it had been found that the problem could not be tackled the DEMO way, we are quite convinced that those broad consultations had lead to a decision not to enter. This is what happened in Central America, where several international actors are offering to facilitate cross-party interaction of various kinds.

In Nepal a careful approach, for example delaying a young women's working group until broader acceptance had been won, has helped manage obstacles and risk. DEMO has also not put the grave problems of political violence, criminality and gross corruption in some target organisations on the agenda. They remain under the carpet for now, which might be a necessary political compromise for now.

A programme of political engagement in a challenged democracy is risky by definition. Risk is a reality to manage, not a reason to stay away. Risks are particularly high in Nepal and worth taking. The point of better analysing, writing down and discussing risks among stakeholders is to increase chances that they are dealt with. Shared analysis and recognition of risks and rewards across the political spectrum is actually one of the possible benefits of DEMO's cross-party approach.

3.5 Systems of Governance, Management and Resources

The overall planning, management and reporting have several weaknesses. They do not hinder implementation, but makes it less effective, efficient and reliable than it should be.

The Finnish stakeholders often argue that development cooperation involving parties on both ends require very particular arrangements and procedures. The same is said in most other donor countries, which almost all have uneasy relations between the government aid officials and the implementers of party-related aid. We think that assumption of uniqueness of party aid is a mistake when allowed to affect operations. All aid providers have unique tasks and expertise. That does not mean that principles and best practices in project management have to be reinvented or sacrificed.

MFA officials often argue that DEMO should be treated like any aid project in order to protect it (and MFA) from allegations of favours to politicians. It follows that procedures should be strict, especially as the organisation has proven weak, and that

this actually is a help to the organisation. At the same time, MFA has a dilemma in having detailed control, while at the same time wanting to keep distance from DEMO's political character and choices.

The position of most DEMO officials and board members is that party aid is so special that application procedures for NGOs or "technical" aid programmes are not applicable to it. ("We are not drilling wells that are easily counted.") There is even a perception among many DEMO affiliated individuals that the MFA is consciously hindering their work, due to a lack of understanding of the nature of party aid.

The differing views are coming to a crunch in the annual applications. Logical framework matrices, which are very abstract to many practitioners, are filled out with much agony as part of a taxing and time-consuming process of negotiations to settle a budget agreement. In the end neither DEMO nor MFA is comfortable with the process and its results.

DEMO has indeed been given special procedures by MFA. This is well motivated in some distinct aspects, like not applying the NGO standard of 15 % cash contribution. A separate budget line is therefore natural. Weaknesses in programme planning and management have been tolerated, which on the other hand is detrimental. In our view, these half-hearted decisions and temporary compromises have become a pattern. A new start is needed, where strict terms for quality and clear application procedures and timelines are combined with chances for longer term planning and expansion.

DEMO and the Finnish government and parliament, as DEMO's sole or main funder, should give full backing to such a principled and stable arrangement. In donor countries where the government in agreement with opposition has clarified terms for party aid there is not much unease in implementation or public controversy. This is notable in the UK where cross-party Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) funds pure sister party projects, while the Department for International Development (DFID) funds much party aid without British parties, and the US where partisan institutes run very diverse programmes, often with cross-party approaches.

DEMO has been kept as a limited pilot project. This is a limbo. Irrespective of internal shortcomings that need to be fixed, DEMO is too small a programme with too few projects to become fully efficient. It has not been given the chance to get sufficient professional capacity and expertise in its field. Too much has been left to depend on the Executive Director alone. Given these imposed limitations, DEMO has made rational choices in restricting its engagement to two target countries and scale back some of the lofty ambitions.

DEMO knows well what activities it wants to focus on, but today the logical link is weak with the ambitious objectives, purposes and results in annual programme and strategy documents. Indicators of results and their means of verification are not usefully

defined and quantified, making it almost impossible to say to what degree results are achieved. It is undeniably very difficult to measure results of democracy promotion efforts, not least to isolate causes and effects. However, political sciences have developed methods (like recurrent stakeholder interviews, target group surveys, expert ratings, and focus groups) for assessing “soft” change and likely causal relations. They could and should be used. DEMO does often ask event participant to fill out evaluation forms, which has given useful feedback. This is good, but the results should be presented and utilized in further planning in a more systematic manner.

Project documents are also not operational in character or flexible enough to handle unforeseen events (which could be built into planning), so they tend to be put aside until it is time to make an annual report. Change of plans might be motivated, but it is not clear how they are authorised and documented. Monitoring rely on frequent e-mail correspondence and quarterly reporting by country coordinators. There is no standardized format for reporting measurables (target number of participants vs. actual numbers etc).

Operational project management is orderly and satisfactory in Nepal with two full time coordinators. It is functional but less transparent at national level in Tanzania with one part time coordinator only for implementation and many programme challenges. In Kyela district where implementation should be very technical, management and reporting is sketchy, late and generally disorganised. We find careful control of expenditures at all levels, even to the extent that financial reporting takes too much management time. This is indicated by significant under-spending in relation to budget, also showing short implementation capacity. Still we find DEMO’s seemingly minute care with money well motivated. It sets an example in societies were all believe aid to be embezzled and many try to do it. That being said, overall project management has slowly improved over the years, as experience and headquarter’s capacity has been built up.

3.6 The Global Role of DEMO

The contribution of DEMO to democracy in the world is of course very limited, as the size of the programme; its resources and results are modest. As the strategy of cooperation with implementation partners (TCD and UNIFEM) in Tanzania was deemed a failure and dropped, the bilateral profile of activities has been underscored. Wider impact on development efforts must come from tangible results in target countries, which can then be recognised and replicated. DEMO is not yet there. The achievements in Nepal are important and interesting, but can easily be seen as too situation-specific for meaningful application in other societies with deep conflicts.

To the extent DEMO can help fostering knowledge, enthusiasm and practical involvement in democracy promotion and development cooperation in Finnish political

organisations, this will have political effects even if hard to foresee and assess. The choice about how to use opportunities lies with each party. Now however, it is notable that DEMO is not much referred to as part of Finland's combined efforts as an important donor of development aid donor. Lingering doubts about the concept or results of DEMO are probably a reason why.

There is potential for playing a stronger role, not least because the global field of party aid is small. Even if we advocate more of openness leading to less overlap and better coherence among democracy promoters, we also see a strong value in making Finland's development experience more known and understood. Few other societies have seen such rapid economic and social transformation, reconstruction of society after war and violent conflict, a high degree of social cohesion within a welfare state that retains its productivity, and mature political culture with strong women's political participation and an unforgiving attitude to corruption.

4 CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

4.1 Overall Performance

In Tanzania the programme is relevant in aiming at underrepresentation of women in politics. It has helped to set the issue higher on the agenda within political parties. Strategic assistance could unlock obstacles at different levels of a society in a context where women are, at least partly, prepared to assume stronger political roles. Empowerment of women represents a huge potential for democratization and development.

However, programme implementation has been slow and ridden with problems. Impact does not yet go beyond limited circles at national level and a few locations in Kyela district served by a pilot project. Shaky programme design and project management has made the tasks harder. Effectiveness and efficiency has not yet been achieved after almost five years of pilot and programme work. Different strategies have been tried.

The programme in Nepal is highly relevant and came in timely to deal with the severe lack of voice for youth in political parties and democratic politics, in spite of being important organisations for good and bad in the country's violent political strife. There are important positive results in making influential youth and student leaders commit to dialogue and start turning their attention to policy matters. Outreach in the country is crucial and has begun in a promising manner. There are deficiencies in ownership of programme services, which puts sustainability and capacity to widen impact in question. As in Tanzania, a time perspective or exit strategy for the programme has not been set.

The original ambition of arranging for dialogue and truly mutual learning between political leaders and activists in Finland and target countries for Finnish development aid has been substituted by a focus on the particular project issues in Tanzania and Nepal. Study visits, seminars, public activities and internal communication provide important exposure and attention to parties in development. A positive long-term impact is likely, but hard to verify beyond the assessments of several stakeholders.

The contribution to global democracy assistance is very limited and below potential, because of modest scale and results. There is also little cohesion and coordination among party-related democracy assistance in the two target countries, as well as globally. DEMO and Finland are neither better nor worse than other donors in this.

The objectives and activities of DEMO are well aligned with Finnish development cooperation policies, especially in focusing and making operational cross-cutting priorities like democracy, human rights, gender and to some extent the situation for vulnerable and underrepresented groups. The contribution to poverty reduction is indirect and cannot remotely be confirmed at this stage. It rests on the assumption that democracy and a more assertive role for underrepresented groups, like women and youth, also helps protect the interests of the poor. That linkage is likely, but cannot be taken for granted. It must remain a subject for the political debates and dialogues that DEMO can help arrange.

In summary, DEMO is attending to crucial challenges of democratization in a manner that is relevant when most political parties in a target country are willing to engage. That has been the case in Nepal, while commitment in Tanzania is much weaker. The programme is effective at this point in Nepal, but not yet in Tanzania. Effects in Finland are long-term and up to each member party. Cost control is sound and work is cost efficient in Nepal until now, while less efficient in Tanzania. Ownership and sustainability is questionable and require new modalities, as well as time perspective and exit strategies. There is important impact at least for the short-term and value added, more tangibly in Nepal. Coherence and coordination with other aid programmes could be better, but sincere attempts in Tanzania have been frustrated. Underlying assumptions, assessment of needs and risk are neither systematically done, nor documented nor shared.

4.2 Results against Evaluation Criteria and Indicators

The DEMO Programme is weak on evaluability, with ever changing Logical Framework Approach (LFA) definitions, few measurable indicators and general assessments with unclear basis. Sound judgement of knowledgeable persons is a good start, but not sufficient evidence. Yes, democracy is hard to measure but this is not a good enough reason not to try. Both in the policy and the scholarly community there is serious attention paid to this issue that DEMO should put to use. Furthermore, there are

techniques for finding out from participants how they have been affected, which we have used for this evaluation.

DEMO's application of the well-established LFA is unsatisfactory in that monitoring and reporting does not follow the LFA matrices (LFM). In the logical framework matrices included in the 2008 application the following indicators were outlined under the overall objectives section (sources of verification in brackets):

Tanzania (identical with the 2009 application)

- Number of women candidates running for elections (official statistics)
- Number of women in city councils (records at district level)
- Number of seats in the Parliament and city councils (official statistics and party statistics)

Nepal (some minor changes in the 2009 Logical Framework Matrix)

- Progress of peace process (United Nations Mission in Nepal, UNMIN, reports)
- Functioning of multi-party system and existence of 7-party alliance (CA/ interim governing structure)
- Number of youth within the CA (election results and party lists of candidates)

Many sources of verification are inherently problematic both in terms of validity and reliability, but it is possible to find relevant indicators for politics and parties, and to put numbers to them. Opinion polling is all about that. We do not find any systematic attempts to use the indicators outlined in the LFMs for monitoring or reporting purposes. Part of the problem is the lack of baseline measures that could be used as a point of reference for performance evaluation. For instance, in the annual report from 2008 there is no mention of these indicators on overall objectives level. On the results and activities level there are no systematic attempts to monitor the progress in relation to the stated indicators.

4.3 Key Policy Issues

4.3.1 Working Modalities

Facilitation of cross-party dialogue and joint capacity building is by definition the speciality of DEMO. For the evaluators it is premature to draw too far-reaching conclusions, but we note that this approach can work under the right circumstances. However, the intervention logic is not clearly stated and elaborated upon in the working documents of DEMO. There is certainly no template for 'pluralistic democracy', since the power balance and the set of actors are different in all countries. The uncertainty in a post-conflict context with historically well-established power bases (Nepal) can be

contrasted with the stability – for good or bad – of established *benign dominant party systems*, like in Tanzania (Carothers 2006). The incentives for engaging in a dialogue are quite different for the actors in the two settings. The cross-party dialogue approach is not necessarily suitable in dominant party systems (Carothers 2006 p. 203).

In Tanzania, the focus on establishing a national convention of women across party lines was outlined in 2006. Setting up such a mechanism in a patriarchal society was never going to be easy. Useful but also conflictive processes have been triggered by the DEMO project. However, too much focus has been on the institutional arrangement in a setting with small or divided parties using their veto to hamper a too open-ended process. The focus was institutional and due to the imbalanced nature of the party scene (and among women wings) it was difficult to get all actors to fully commit to the process.

Gender training in Kyela on the other hand is a consciously non-institutional approach, not working directly with women wings of parties at all. The pilot project in 2008–2009 shows powerful potential of gender training within the existing organizational structure (VICOBA). Such training is very important in combining women's economic and political empowerment. But DEMO is not appropriate and efficient for running it.

In Nepal, the situation in terms of the party system and the development trajectory (from failed democracy over civil strife to peace and constitution drafting processes, all in a context of strong economic and social change and uncertainty) is rather different. DEMO's work with the youth and student platform goes according to plan and intentions. Participants, especially smaller organisations, welcome the platform while it continues to be framed and conditioned by DEMO. The neutral and resourceful facilitation by DEMO has been key to present success, but viability beyond DEMO presence is much in question.

District workshops respond to needs, but could be managed in a more cost efficient manner enhancing ownership and building capacity. Youth and student wings in districts would be more empowered if responsibility was handed over while continuing support on agreed terms. All parties have committed to dialogue during the constitutional process, but what happens when it is over?

It could be that DEMO should keep specialising on cross-party platforms. The lesson learned is then that it is not a temple that fits everywhere. Engaging in an open-ended process like in Tanzania require more tools, which is what DEMO has done in Kyela by dropping its cross-party modality.

An alternative for DEMO and Finnish development policy is to widen the party aid toolbox (by DEMO or through other channels). There are many requests for capacity building for individual party organisations, which DEMO partly is trying to deal with by some joint training of trainers.

Other party aid actors, like NIMD, German political foundations and USA party institutes, are combining cross-party and individual party projects. It is important to note that individual party projects do not necessarily have to be between sister parties or with any parties at all on the donor side. Non-partisan organisations can be implementers and then use expertise with party political experience when called for.

More donors and actors can certainly make a useful contribution and at the same time guarantee diversity. We cannot draw conclusions about whether Finland should join in as a more ambitious implementer and/or funder. It should be discussed further.

4.3.2 Intervention Strategy

There are important differences in strategy in Tanzania and Nepal pointing to possible lessons learned. In Tanzania's dominant party system, insistence on including all opposition gives a role out of proportion to diminutive parties with no real women wings. To partly overcome multiple obstacles and get activities going, DEMO has relied on selected individuals. The results are mixed and may so far have been counterproductive.

In contrast, with Nepal's more balanced or even fragmented political scene 15 youth wings are engaged, but just representing the eight largest parties of more than 20 in parliament). A few more have applied to join and existing members consider their applications. A basic sense of shared commitment has been created without making the group feel exclusive.

The Kyela project in Tanzania is closely linked to a reformist ruling party member of parliament. In a dominant party system it might be highly rational to attempt reforming the dominating party from inside, while not disregarding the critical outside pressure that a skilled opposition can uphold. Such a strategy might not be appropriate to discuss openly, but needs clarity, monitoring, fair judgement and fine-tuning on part of programme managers and in this case the DEMO Board.

To get started in Nepal DEMO relied on a Kathmandu based NGO establishment, often linked with Nepali Congress and Communist Party of Nepal – United Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML). Finland's "neutral" and generous profile provided enough balance to win acceptance, but questions of bias are there. This was a risky strategy, but it worked to get started. However, the Kathmandu establishment and old parties are at the core of Nepal's failed governance. There is still alleged bias in favour of Nepal Congress (NC) students Nepal Student Union (NSU) and lingering scepticism among other major parties.

The lesson is that platforms should be coalitions of the willing. Enforced arrangements with the unwilling will either derange or oblige a search for a common denominator which is too small.

4.3.3 Administrative Setup and Management

There are weaknesses in DEMO planning and management, as well as the Ministry's clarity and timeliness in handling of the programme. DEMO must improve its programme planning and management, so as to make it easily understood and accountable to all stakeholders in target countries and Finland. Completing the plans and grants applications in the autumn only a few months before the start of the programme year is impossibly late. The late and long MFA decision-making process on annual funding projects is not suited to timely implementation and encourages irrational reliance on unspent funds from previous year. Regular NGO applications are submitted in May the year before, which allows for proper decision-making, including clarifications if necessary, and then preparations before execution begins.

Furthermore, DEMO is entirely dependent on Finnish MFA development funds for all activities, which gives no scope for independent initiatives. Today's funding is too limited and too short-term to allow working in a fully efficient manner. Staffing in Helsinki is now at a minimum, making DEMO fragile. On the other hand, with better routines Helsinki should be able to handle some more programmes, bringing down the proportion of headquarter costs.

In the target countries DEMO tightly controls its own budget, not involving the beneficiaries on financial matters. Motivated by a zero tolerance of corruption, it also raises issues of ownership and sustainability. If beneficiaries have no budgetary or financial insight, accountability will never produce the intended long-term impact.

National staff in target countries has difficulties to be seen as impartial (non-partisan). National knowledge, language skills, networks and access are much required while having to be balanced against ability to remain impartial in the political competition and negotiations.

Finnish embassies do not much engage DEMO in spite of its unique insight into politics and access to (emerging) political leaders. The synergy of high profile political and diplomatic connections could further motivate key beneficiaries. Embassy attention lends legitimacy to DEMO even if individual activities cannot be endorsed.

4.4 Aid Dependency

Particularly in Tanzania we found enormous challenges in the political effects of aid dependence, especially evident on the national level. Many interviews and stories reflected an attitude of appealing to donors to resolve any problem, thereby also letting foreigners at least partly define both problems and solutions, in this case in the political system itself. More encouragingly, among women in the villages the low expectations about outsiders coming to fix problems were much more realistic and sound. Nobody

there suggested cash contributions, even as a solution for survival. All VICOBA groups requested entrepreneurship training in order to better help themselves. In one VICOBA group, a member stood up and said, “we need knowledge – if we get millions of shillings it would be wasted, because we don’t know how to use the money”.

Political representatives expressed no such hesitations about foreign funding, even if a few noted that an excessive role of donors in political processes hampers responsibility. An opposition women leader said that her hopes about multiparty democracy had veined, starting to believe that it is just a tactical concession by the rulers to keep donors happy.

Half a century of reliance on foreign donors for virtually any public investment or consumption has created a situation where policies are framed by foreign priorities and conditions. There seems to be a political culture of never saying no to donors and stressing helplessness in those negotiations. Perverse incentives can take root – helplessness becomes an advantage in getting resources. Such attitudes kill sustainability. This subject is sensitive for recipients and donors alike. There is no better place to deal with it than in a dialogue among responsible politicians.

4.5 Gender Balance

Given the focus on gender and strengthening women’s participation in Tanzania, gender balance in activities is and should not be an immediate priority. The programme is still to some extent targeting and engaging male politicians, when it can be helpful. Some training for men planned for this year is now said to be postponed, which can be reasonable if the change in plans are authorised according to internal guidelines.

In Nepal male dominance is an issue and balancing efforts should be carefully considered.

There is a very strong female dominance among DEMO Board and staff with women in all leading positions, and among MFA staff with responsibility for DEMO. This is also questionable and should be carefully considered for the future.

5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF DEMO AND FINNISH PARTY AID

5.1 Impact generally and in Finland

Finland and its political parties should continue engaging in democracy building and target weaknesses in parties, while considering a more varied set of tools and with more resource than DEMO has been granted.

Dialogue between politicians (and their parties) in Finland and key partner countries should be a separately funded programme by DEMO or another entity. It is not good to mix it up with the operations of a development programme. The objectives are different, focus is lost in relation to both objectives, practical problems become unnecessarily politicised and the mutuality of the dialogue suffers. Will direct beneficiaries really speak truths that might hurt?

Exposing the makers of political decisions and their base in the party to realities in target countries, and arranging a dialogue with counterparts in these countries, is very important. The politicians are taking responsibility for large investments in development and need this exchange, in order to make the right decision and to be able to communicate and get acceptance for further aid from Finnish voters and taxpayers. The limited number of Finnish target countries make a dialogue easier, allowing decision makers to dig deeper and do it with less costs.

Any exchange visits should be even more carefully planned for content and purposeful tasks of participants. Criteria for participant selection should be specific, objectively motivated and agreed beforehand, as for the procedures.

Discuss if DEMO's cross-party offer should be complemented by capacity aid for individual political organisations. It can be done with or without involving any sister parties in Finland.

5.2 Governance and Management of DEMO

Needs assessment should be introduced and widely shared with target groups and serve as a basis for any continued or new DEMO programmes. DEMO should be made accountable to target organisations and transfer more responsibility for management of resources on agreed terms.

MFA should not relax standard aid programme requirements for DEMO. DEMO should instead be offered longer term and larger funding. Funding applications should

be for three budget years with early annual review of plans well before the implementation year. When this works, revolving planning for three years ahead and core funding for basic management and administrative should be phased in. Annual reports should be required, but approved plans must be enough for first payments in order to allow implementation from the beginning of the year.

DEMO should specify in detail the work procedures at all stages of the programme cycle and document them in manuals, drawing on best practices in other aid organisations. If to remain an all-professional organisation, staff must be recruited or trained for these tasks. International (Finnish) presence and staff should be used for initiating processes in conflictive political settings, while the exit strategy should define how to phase them out.

DEMO members and Board should decide if to seek a wider funding base than Finnish development aid and, if so, devote their time to finding it. Fund raising, fees and EU aid funds are among sources to consider.

Involve the embassies and make appropriate use of their country knowledge and specific political access.

5.2.1 Tanzania Programme

Set deadlines and an exit strategy. An option is to focus on a locally owned agenda and let willing members of an open platform implement agreed activities with a set budget.

Promising activities in Kyela should be handed over to VICOBA, if it can be improved and strengthened, or another development organisation, which can implement economic and political empowerment training on a large scale.

5.2.2 Nepal Programme

Clarify time perspective of support and possible long-term relations. Agree plan and budget for each of the target districts based on strict financial and reporting guidelines. Let willing platform members implement agreed activities with a set budget.

5.2.3 Future Expansion

There is probably unmet demand for the kind of cross-party dialogue that DEMO has specialized in. In order to be more efficient with more target countries and parties, DEMO needs to formulate its expansion strategy. Based on the experiences from both Tanzania and Nepal it is possible to draw some conclusions about where to focus. First of all, the party system in the target country should be assessed. Not all party systems are equally suited for the dialogue approach (Carothers 2006 p. 203).

DEMO could benefit from focusing on potential target countries with *distributed party systems*, like Nepal especially after 2008 elections, and then make systematic needs assessments. Conditions in *dominant party systems*, like in Tanzania and often elsewhere in Africa, rather suggest using other tools for reforming the dominant party and/or strengthening opposition parties. Cross-party dialogue can be useful for setting norms for electoral conduct etc, but will remain inherently troubled by imbalances in the party system.

On the basis of the needs assessment, pilot projects on the platform template can be next step. Alternatively, DEMO could add resources and diversify existing arrangements like to it attempted with TCD in Tanzania. To then target women or youth might be very appropriate, as many party aid actors much focus on existing (male and old) party elites.

5.3 Checklist for more Effective Party Aid by DEMO and Finland

- I. Identify or develop methods for needs analysis and objective setting owned by target parties, avoiding superficial, donor-framed and -driven activities.
- II. Longer-term commitment by party aid donors and providers, provided that agreed party development plans are adhered to by target organisations and evaluations made.
- III. Open and shared information about party aid programmes including their budgets (except to repressed parties), to allow sound public scrutiny, learning and avoiding wasteful overlaps. Diversity is a vital strength of party aid and too much donor coordination is politically dubious. Still, regular sharing of information among donors and party aid providers should lead to more effective distribution of labour and/or joint efforts.
- IV. Reaching early, broad agreement about principles, standards and norms for democratic party functioning is a key topic of cross-party dialogues. Legal reforms or introduction of regulation, which require enforcement, is the next step only. Publicity, carrots and sticks are required to win individual party commitment.
- V. Support international initiatives to set such standard, preferably by political parties themselves in internationals/networks or sub-regions. Follow up on national level in parliament, election commissions or other fora for intra-party dialogue.
- VI. More emphasis on policymaking capacity of political parties, responding to both individual and cross-party requests and needs. Reaching Millennium



Development Goals (MDGs) is an entry point.

- VII. Build on relative success in getting more women into politics at national and local level. Translation of information about success stories and manuals.
- VIII. Civil society should be encouraged to engage with political parties, not discouraged or prevented as some donor agencies do today.
- IX. Making new information and communication technologies available to political parties at all levels, training leaders and activists for two-way communication. Large economies of scale motivate donor deals with technology providers.
- X. Donor funding of direct public funding arrangements in least developed countries. Arrangements and funding criteria could get additional credibility by involving regional inter-governmental or inter-parliamentary organisations.
- XI. A larger role for party internationals/networks in identifying needs and targeting party aid. Make peer reviews and other democracy initiatives by party internationals and other party networks eligible for funding by UN Democracy Fund and other donors.
- XII. Regional inter-governmental organisations, including development banks, can support better “intellectual infrastructure” for party politics, like publication and translation of knowledge, libraries, websites, research centres, exchange and training programmes, and meeting facilities.

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ANNEX 1 TERMS OF REFERENCE

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
Office of the Under Secretary of State
Evaluation of Development Cooperation

Terms of Reference

Evaluation of Political Parties of Finland for Democracy (DEMO Finland) Development Programme (89855401)

1 Background

DEMO is an independent registered organisation bringing together all parties represented in the Finnish Parliament and included in the official registrar of political parties. All parliamentary parties in Finland are represented in the governing body of DEMO, elected for a 2-year period at a time. The operational organisation of DEMO is quite small in Finland, only two full-time and one part-time permanent staff with an additional field staff of two full-time and one half-time persons.

The aim of DEMO is to advance pluralistic democracy by fostering multi-party systems in its cooperating countries by implementing development cooperation projects between the political movements in developing countries and the DEMO member parties in Finland. In its work, DEMO emphasises the importance of multi-party democracy and supports the strengthening of this type of cooperation in practice. The work of DEMO is much based, among others, on the resolutions of the United Nations Summit in 2005 and the Decision-in-principle on Development Policy of the Finnish Government, adopted in 2004 and adjusted in accordance to the new policy paper of 2007. This Finnish development policy clearly states that respect of human rights, gender equity, social equality and promotion of democracy are essential preconditions for development. Moreover, the Finnish development policy paper of 2004 recognizes that promoting the work of parliaments and democratic party systems enhance the development and consolidation of democracy. The 2007 Development Policy Programme of Finland particularly underlines the importance of socially sustainable development. DEMO is a new kind of actor among the Finnish non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in that it is an organisation of parties for parties. Yet, at the same time, it fosters constructive interaction between parties and civil society at large.

The above wider principles are reflected in the development activity programme of DEMO as special focus areas:

- enhancing the opportunities for women, youth and special groups to participate and have an impact in their political environment; groups are always party actors;
- promotion of transparency and openness in the political system;
- development of regional and local activities;
- support to open and democratic budget planning process.

The development activities of DEMO offer a platform for dialogue between parties in the developing partner countries. DEMO also supports training programmes aiming at the creation of a “neutral” space for cooperation between the local parties. Through this activity development is promoted. – The development programmes supported by DEMO are planned together with the local stakeholders emphasizing local ownership and responsibility. Thus, the content of these programmes is geared towards meeting the locally identified needs. Special beneficiary groups to the DEMO -sponsored activities include women, youth, people with special needs and minorities, in other words, groups that frequently lack in capacity to make their voices heard.

What DEMO can offer in addition to facilitating this cross-party activity and relevant capacity-building is the expertise in good inter-party cooperation models and *vice versa* the members of DEMO achieve first-hand information on the political systems and working modalities in the partner countries and their operating environments, giving them a better understanding of development issues..

DEMO, for the moment, works in Nepal and in Tanzania. The focus area in Tanzania is the advancement of women’s political empowerment and in Nepal the enhancement of equal opportunities for the political youth to influence decision-making. The development cooperation work of DEMO started in earnest in 2006, after the official registration of DEMO. In 2004–2006 some pilot activities were carried out in Tanzania from 2004 to 2006, on the basis of which work, a further programme was designed, with a gender working group, established in 2007. All political women’s organisations in Finland are represented as well as Nytkis (the Coalition of Finnish Women’s Associations), which serves as an advisory resource in the planning, implementation, and follow-up of the Tanzania programme.

In 2007 DEMO’s cooperation activities were widened to Nepal as a result of local initiative and string support from the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. After preliminary needs-assessment and consultations with local stakeholders, DEMO started supporting the cross-party cooperation of political student and youth organisations in Nepal. This was much needed in the tense post-conflict environment, in which DEMO provided a neutral space for the groups to work together, as well as the much needed capacity building.

The third pillar of DEMO's work is to enhance Finnish Parliamentary parties' understanding and interest in development issues. Through active participation in DEMO's governing body, working groups and events, the political party actors are sensitised to the complexities of development co-operation and to questions related to the advancement of multi-party democracy in developing countries. This work in Finland is geared to supporting the activities in Tanzania and Nepal and is constantly aiming at bringing on board new actors and institutionalising the knowledge within the parties.

Further to working with and through local organisations in either of the two countries, DEMO is a member of a wide network of international organisations and players. For example, in 2006–2007, DEMO organized together with UNDP and the Finnish youth cooperation "Allianssi", a special training to the leaders of Finnish political youth organisations. In addition to working closely with a wide array of Finnish civil society organisations and development NGOs, such as the Finnish NGO platform to the European Union (Kehys) and the Finnish NGO Foundation for Human Rights (KIOS). DEMO exercises also cooperation with foreign political associations and foundations, as well as other democracy support organisations, such as the Netherlands Institute for Multi-party Democracy, the Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support, the Westminster Foundation, and the international Idea.. Moreover, DEMO is an active affiliated organisation of the European Partnership for Democracy, which has a good working relationship with the European Network of Political Foundations.

In cooperation with the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, DEMO has published "Finnish Experience" -series. In 2006, a book on "Women's Role in Finnish Democracy Building" was published, and in 2007 on youth, "Strengthening the Voice of Youth in Politics", translated also to Nepali. From 2009, DEMO has also started to publish a regular electronic newsletter.

2 Purpose and Objective of the Evaluation

Evaluation is a regular feature in the implementation of any type of development cooperation. It offers a point of learning from the past and an independent means for executing accountability on spending public funds. The purpose of the evaluation is to achieve an overall picture on the development activities of DEMO and to draw lessons from the past for the benefit of future planning. This evaluation may also offer an opportunity to extract good practices in the type of development activity that DEMO exhibits. Likewise, comparison with similar arrangements elsewhere will enhance the overall understanding and significance of development cooperation through politically geared arrangements.

The overall objective is that through the evaluation, a clear picture emerges on the utility of DEMO's activities in the fulfilment of the goals set in the Finnish Development Policy. A particular objective is to learn lessons from experience in the empowerment

of selected target groups, women and youth in politics. Thus a major question shall be the validity, utility and value added of a concept of pluralistic democracy support by political actors in development, and in particular, as a vehicle to promote the development of democracy, human rights and good governance as particular cross-cutting development themes. It should be noted, that DEMO is an independent civil society organisation which has a wide range of activities outside the development cooperation context.

It is, however, understood that influencing good governance, human rights, and democracy patterns in any country is a long-time goal, which cannot be reached in just a few years. Yet, some trends, positive, negative or indifferent, most probably are discernible already at this stage. These trends constitute an important cluster of outcomes of this evaluation.

3 Scope of the Evaluation

The evaluation will cover the full range of activities of DEMO, including both the preparatory pilot phase of 2004–2006, and the actual formal implementation from 2006 onwards. The evaluation will also include field trips to Nepal and Tanzania. To the extent deemed necessary, contacts shall also be made to the network of collaborating bodies, at the level of European organisations, the UN at local level, and other local or regional cooperating partners. In other words, the evaluation will endeavour to assess the activities and significance of DEMO as an organisation and player in the implementation of the Finnish Development Policy, illustrated by a representative sample of all dimensions of its functions. Due to its unique nature in respect of political parties, resembling arrangements shall be identified, for example, in Germany and the Netherlands, and briefly assessed, for comparison. Another dimension is the organisational setup of DEMO, its administration and governance systems. Also the Ministry's administrative functions shall be looked at.

4 Evaluation Criteria

Due to the relatively short duration of the implementation of DEMO's programme, 2004–2009, the full range of development evaluation criteria of the OECD/DAC may not be possible to assess. In this case the major focus shall be on relevance of the activities, effectiveness of these activities at the outcome and/or output level, and their efficiency. Sustainability of outputs at the effect or impact levels may not be discernible or identifiable as yet, but some reference could be made to the expected sustainability of the benefits at the final beneficiary level and at institutional level. Sustainability in terms of financial security and skills development shall, to the extent feasible, be assessed. Impact should only be looked at the level of potential trends identifiable and of people affected by the activities.

Of other evaluation criteria, the value added, coherence, cooperation and coordination both internationally and in Finland with the broader civil society are also important. Within the criteria “value added”, the particular connection to the political parties in Finland and in the cooperating countries and organisations is a special dimension.

A special dimension in the evaluation shall also be the analysis of assumptions made at the planning and implementation of the cooperation programme, and how the possible built-in risks to these assumptions have been factored in. Has there, in the overall, been any consideration of risks and of risk management, in particular, at the field level. This dimension is of great importance as civil rights, parliamentarism, and democracy, at the level of individual beneficiaries of DEMO’s programme, touch much upon issues, which in many countries still are sensitive. In countries where deficiencies in respect of human rights, democratic procedures and rule of law occur, the risk assessment and extrapolation of risk assumptions to the level of beneficiaries of the implemented activities becomes all the more important. Risks may include, for example, obstacles to politically-oriented activity, production of materials, free expression of opinions, training events etc.

In terms of DEMO being a vehicle to implement the Finnish Development Policy, the importance of looking at the activities through the wider angle of the cross-cutting themes of good governance, rule of law and human rights becomes central, the themes as conduits to the overarching goal of Finnish Development Policies, the poverty reduction.

In the assessment of DEMO as recipient of public funding the evaluation shall assess the adherence of DEMO to the pertinent reporting schedules, guidelines, and the appropriateness of financial management and decision-making procedures. An assessment of the internal working modalities, organisational structure and decision-making shall be done. Similarly the guidance and administrative functions of the Ministry shall be looked at.

4.1 Special Questions on the Evaluation Criteria

The bigger clusters of questions in this evaluation can be rounded as DEMO being:

- 1) a platform of contact between political actors at different levels and the ordinary people and marginalised groups of people, such as youth and women;
- 2) a special modality of implementing development cooperation in the area of democracy, good governance and rights of people;
- 3) useful and of special value to implement democracy support;
- 4) a modality to contribute to institutionalization of development-positive culture and knowledge among political actors at the level of cooperating countries and in Finland.

In the following the questions are much related to the work of DEMO at the field level with its local partners. However, the set of questions presented below is non-exhaustive, and the evaluation team should use their expertise to add to these questions new dimensions as they deem necessary. In the following each of the evaluation criteria is first defined according to the OECD/DAC *Evaluation Criteria* (pls. see also *Evaluation Guidelines: Between past and future*, 2007. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland or the web-page of OECD: <http://www.oecd.org>).

Relevance is defined as “*the extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor*”.

The evaluation shall assess:

- The validity of the programme objectives of DEMO with the development policies and objectives of the beneficiaries of the interventions?
- The bases of intervention planning: needs assessments, local initiatives, or other? Mechanisms of needs assessments? Mechanisms of planning and communicating with local level in the course of planning?
- The bases for the selection of the cooperating countries, target beneficiary groups, and intervention subject areas?
- The validity and suitability of modes of operation at different levels, horizontal networking with different organisations, working in the cooperating countries’ organisations, and working with the target beneficiary groups?
- How do the interventions fulfil the development policy objectives of the donor (Finland) in the overall, and in terms of the relevant cross-cutting themes (good governance, rule of law, human rights, gender equality and interest of special vulnerable groups).
- Hierarchical levels of cooperating counterparts, in other words, impact platforms, in particular, in the two target countries – higher government level, parliament, political parties or leaders, political youth or women’s groups with official status, or any other?

Effectiveness is “*a measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives*”.

The evaluation shall assess:

- The modalities by which the achievement of the programme objectives have been planned to be measured or have in reality been monitored and assessed. Data-bases, management information systems, or any other ways? Availability of monitoring data to local counterparts?
- Are there clear in-built sets of indicators and yardsticks for the specific objectives defined?
- Is there any evidence of achieving the set objectives at the level of outputs/outcomes? To what extent? Any unexpected benefits or drawbacks, particular obstacles met and how they were overcome?
- Major factors, external and internal, influencing the achievement of the set objectives?
- Has the cross-cutting issues of the Finnish Development Policies in general, been implemented in the development interventions subject to evaluation?

Assessment of the DEMO programme's overall approach to furthering the cross-cutting issues among cooperating development partners and *vice versa* the utility of the cross-cutting themes as a cluster in the fulfilment of the objectives of DEMO's programme?

Efficiency is "*a measure of the outputs (qualitative and quantitative) in relation to the inputs*".

The evaluation shall assess:

- Can the expenditure and material inputs of the entire DEMO's programme be justified as compared with the qualitative or quantitative outputs (outcomes / results)?
- Were the individual activities cost-efficient in material and expenditure terms as compared with the verifiable outputs (outcomes / results).
- Has there been any consideration of alternative ways or approaches to achieve the set outputs?
- Timeliness of implementation and achievement of the objectives at the beneficiary level?
- Is the governance and administrative systems of DEMO suitable and sensible to implementing the programme defined?

Sustainability is *a measure concerning the likelihood of continuance of the benefits after the donor funding comes to an end.*

The evaluation shall assess:

- The measures taken to secure sustainability of benefits in the course of the implementation of the programme at the level of target beneficiaries? For example, financial sustainability, skills development sustainability, sustainability of mechanisms to foster inclusive multi-party democracy (such as cross-party platforms; information flow in human rights and democracy sense? Sustainability of empowerment accomplished (if any)?
- Have any major factors influencing the sustainability in a negative way been identified and have any approaches been devised to overcome them? This is a particularly important question as the topical areas of DEMO's development activities are "difficult" areas of operation in many developing countries. Have any risks materialized?
- In terms of training and skills development, has any critical number or mass of trained influential constituencies been defined to which the programme targets specifically its activities? Selection criteria for beneficiaries?
- In the spirit and letter of the Paris Declaration, the systems and procedures of the cooperating partners should, to the extent feasible, be utilised. To what extent does DEMO use, for example, local trainers and teachers or local personnel in the implementation of field activities? and local procurement systems (if any used)? Moreover, what is the involvement of the local beneficiaries' representatives in the decision-making concerning the contents of the development interventions? The role of locals in monitoring, defining achievements, and reporting?

- How has the three sustainability dimensions of the Finnish development policy (economic, social, and environmental) been implemented in the DEMO programme?
- How is the accumulated information, skills and knowledge been institutionalized? Is there follow up to this aspect? How is the institutional learning assessed in the monitoring systems at the level of the target countries and at the headquarters of DEMO?
- Sustainability of benefits at the beneficiary level, gender disaggregated?

Impact assesses *the positive and negative changes, direct or indirect, intended or unintended, produced by a development intervention*. As stated above, true impacts at the secondary and tertiary levels, may not be assessed after just a few years of operation. However, at this point it would be useful to identify trends and early discernible signs of changes that may be attributed to the development interventions of DEMO. Such questions as, How many people have been affected? and Has there taken place any discernible changes attributable to the development interventions of Demo? may already be possible to assess. The impacts / effects largely relate to the sustainability and should be looked at in that context.. Are there immediate positive (or negative) response -type of effects discernible? their potential longer-term sustainability?.

Value Added can be *measured as the difference between the DEMO interventions being implemented in any target area and with the target population, or what might happen without the intervention?*

The evaluation shall assess:

- Whether the DEMO programme has been a conduit of benefits which otherwise would not have been there?
- What additional value can be achieved through development cooperation delivered by an organisation with a close and wide contact surface with a multi-party system in Finland?
- Are there any factors which can lessen the added value?
- Are there any specific ethical values added?

Assumptions and Risks are part of the logical framework which has been utilized in the planning of country level operations of DEMO. These issues are of particular importance as the topical area in which DEMO operates represent those issues that are difficult in many developing countries, the cross-cutting themes (governance, democracy, human rights etc. of the Finnish Development Policy).

The evaluation shall assess:

- How have the potential risks been built-in in the assumptions made in the planning of the programmes?
- Has there been any overall recognition of potential risks and preventive measures planned for the abatement of the effects of risks, should they materialize?

- Has there been any consideration of risks that may become over the beneficiaries of the development interventions, for example, those trained in the observance of democratic procedures, human rights, the rights of women and youth, and similar topics? Is there any built-in follow-up or monitoring system, which records and communicates events after the specific one-time development interventions are completed?
- Any yet unappreciated risks occurred in the current mode of work of DEMO in development cooperation? How it was managed?
- Any precautionary measures in place to prevent corrupt behaviour? Written code of conduct?
- Any measures in place to prevent mismanagement or fraud of funding resources? Financial procedures, are they transparent?
- Assets in the custody of the development programme and counterparts; are there accurate lists of assets? Have purchased equipment (if any) been clearly marked and inventory-listed and checked at regular intervals?

Coherence, Cooperation and Coordination

The evaluation shall assess:

- Networking partners and patterns - has DEMO's actual development cooperation programme benefitted from the wider networking activities? Any tripartite cooperation patterns emerging?
- Are there any permanent cooperation or coordination modalities of work established between DEMO and, for example, some European organisations with similar background and connections to the political sphere and the parliament?
- Patterns of coordinating with local level stakeholders? Who are the counterparts?
- Patterns of planning intervention programmes?
- Level of local ownership/leadership or alignment with local plans?
- Coordination with other similar organisations at global and at local levels? Any joint programming or field level administration?
- Does the support to DEMO implement the policy coherence requirements of the Finnish Development Cooperation Policy?
- Cooperation and contact with the Finnish civil society organisations in Finland and at the level of country-based work in Nepal and Tanzania? Are there any mechanisms of information exchange in general and on local beneficiaries to avoid overlapping and to ensure coherence of activities?

Administration of DEMO Development Programme and Governance

The evaluation will look at the overall governance and administration and modalities of work DEMO in respect of development cooperation funding being part of it. The following questions shall be elucidated:

- Overall management of the development programme within the context of other activities of DEMO?

- Resources at the central office and in the country offices; pools of resources outside the organisation proper?
- Advisory and support networks at home? In the field?
- Lines of decision-making, are they clear? Authorization modalities?
- Accountability trail – is it defined and discernible? Disaggregation of duties in financial management, handling and approval of expenditures?
- Existence of guidelines and manuals on how development cooperation is planned, carried out, and monitored? Are these manuals available at the field level? Have their contents been elaborated to the local cooperating parties? Have the significance of the cross-cutting themes been elaborated?
- Monitoring of implementation: is there acceptable track record of regular monitoring against the accepted plans and indicators contained therein? Lines of responsibility in follow-up and monitoring, are they clear between DEMO and the local counterparts? Modalities of communication?
- Archiving, can documents be tracked back and are they systematically organized?

Administration in the Ministry

- Are management processes and lines of responsibility clear?
- Archiving systems, do they exhibit reliable records on funding and narrative reporting?
- Coordination and information exchange modalities between the Ministry and DEMO?
- Formal arrangements of governance and administration between the two parties?

Other Evaluation Issues

The evaluators should use their expertise and assess any other dimension of the subject of the evaluation that they deem appropriate and relevant to the fulfilling of the purpose and objectives of this evaluation.

5 Methodology

The evaluation methodology includes perusal of existing documentation in DEMO and in the Ministry as well as with the collaborating parties at the field level. The work entails desk-work, interviews in person and/or by e-mail or phone, teleconferencing or other means, field-trip to both Nepal and Tanzania, possibly in Brussels and headquarter of some other multi-party or political foundation. Verification of findings of the evaluation should utilize, whenever possible, multiple sources and be obtained by multiple methods. It would be useful should the evaluation team prepare, at the outset of the evaluation, an evaluation matrix which combines the evaluation criteria and the questions they intend to explore, with indicators that they intend to use in verification of the findings. (Methodological references include: European Commission 2006 *Evaluation methodology for European Commission's External Assistance*. Office for Official Publications of the EC. ISBN 92-79-00681-9).

6 Work Plan

The evaluation team shall prepare a work plan, which is called inception report, at the outset of the evaluation. The work plan shall include the division of tasks between the evaluation team (should follow the tender) and time-tables. The inception report shall also elaborate on the approach and critical issues of the evaluation task as well as include the evaluation matrix referred to in Para 5 above. There are outlines of the contents of the inception and other reports in the recent *Evaluation Guidelines – Between Past and Future 2007* of MFA (ISBN 978-951-724-624-8).

7 Expertise Required

The specific requirements of the Evaluation Team are contained in the Instructions to Tender Document, which constitutes Annex A to the Invitation to Tender, this Terms of Reference being Annex B.

The overall requirements towards the evaluators include relevant experience in democracy support or political sphere overall and/or in evaluating similar development programmes and arrangements to this evaluation. Knowledge of foreign respective arrangements, political foundations, cross-party organisations and other democracy support organisations, with development cooperation dimensions, is an asset. Experience in developing countries is a requirement. The qualifications of the Team Members should be mutually reinforcing and complementary. Local expert must be included in the team. The team should be gender-balanced.

8 Reporting

The following reports shall be submitted:

- Inception report / work plan, after two weeks from signature of the contract. It will describe the approach, methodology, critical issues, time-table and division of labour, and contain the evaluation matrix with indicators.
- Oral report immediately after the field trip with power point presentation and an outline of issues. An oral presentation of the findings may also be organized locally prior to departure from the field trip.
- Draft Final Report which is nearly the final one, shall be subjected to a round of comments of the stakeholders. The Draft Final Report should be ready the first week of August. After receipt of comments, precisions or corrections, the report is finalised. Commenting time is about two weeks.
- Final Report is submitted not later than two weeks after receipt of the comments, with a tentative time table of the first week of September 2009. The final report discusses all evaluation issues and questions, and is organized in separate sections,

including sections of findings, conclusions and recommendations. It will also feature the methodology used and define the limitations to the evaluation. The report's editorial status shall follow detailed instructions provided by MFA, be proof-red, copy-edited, and ready to print.

The Final Report shall be clear and concise, with language that is easily comprehensible by ordinary readers. The body-text should not exceed 30 pages. Annex 1 is the terms of reference, Annex 2 the people interviewed, and Annex 3 the evaluation matrix. Other annexes may be added, if needed. Special instructions to authors of evaluation reports of the Ministry shall be followed. The final report is submitted to the Ministry both in the electronic form as pdf and word-files, and with a covering letter in four (4) hard copies for archival purposes.

The OECD/DAC Development Evaluation Quality Standards should be observed in the compilation of the contents of the report. The Evaluation Team is requested to reflect the report against a matrix based on these standards. The matrix is submitted together with the report. The Quality of the report is assessed against the EU Evaluation quality matrix. Both documents can be obtained from the Ministry at the time of commencement of the Contract, or be downloaded from the respective web-pages.

- Oral presentation of results is organized after completion of the evaluation and submission of the Final Report. The team leader is required to do a power point supported presentation either in a public event or in an event organized particularly to the stakeholders of this development intervention. Preferably also the other member of the team could attend the final presentation.

The Evaluation Guidelines – Between Past and Future (2008) of the Ministry, contain a suggested model for the content of a Final Report. The Guidelines are available at the Development Evaluation Office of the Ministry or at the web-page of the ministry.

9 Time schedule

The evaluation shall start soon after conclusion of the Contract and be carried out from early May 2009 to the end of September 2009. The Desk phase of the evaluation is expected materialize during May 2009, the field trip during June 2009, partly July-August 2009, if required. The draft final report is submitted no later than 5 September 2009. After receipt of comments by 19 September 2009, the report is finalised and submitted to the Ministry no later than 30 September 2009.

The timing of the final presentation of the results of the evaluation shall be scheduled for early October 2009, agreed upon between the team and the Ministry later on.

10 Budget

The budget of this evaluation shall not exceed 70.000 Euros. VAT is excluded.

11 Mandate

The Evaluation Team is expected to consult people at different levels of society relevant to the evaluation topic and actual activities. However, the Team is not allowed to make any commitments on behalf of the Government of Finland or any other party to this evaluation.

Helsinki, 26 March 2009

Aira Päivöke
Director





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ISBN 978-951-724-784-9 (printed)
ISBN 978-951-724-785-0 (pdf)
ISSN 1235-7618

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland