Evaluation of Visibility of EU external action

Final Report

Volume 4 – Thematic Report on

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Volume 4 – Thematic Report on Crisis and Fragile States

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. POLICY RELATED AND NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE THEME 2

2.1. EU policies and approach 2

2.2. Major Strategic Partnership Agreements 4

3. EU INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION IN RELATION TO THE THEME 6

3.1 Position of Commission in relation to other Institutions 6

3.2 Commission DG responsible 6

4. COMPETENCES OF THE EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS SPECIFIC DGS: IN RELATION TO THE THEME 7

4.1 European Commission prior to 2011 7

4.2 The European External Action Service and DEVCO 7

5. MECHANISMS OF COORDINATION 8

5.1 Formal and informal mechanisms among DGs 8

5.2 The formal methods of coordination with member-states and other EU institutions 9

5.3 Major Programmes and Financial Interventions 9

5.4 EU finance allocation for visibility on theme 11

6. FIELD VISIT PHASE 12

6.1 Hypotheses to test related to crisis & fragile states: conflict prevention and peace building 12

6.2 Rationale for choice of cases and country 13

6.2.1 Case selection 13

6.2.2 Country Selection 13

6.3 Data collection during the field mission (methodological issues) 13

6.3.1 Data collection 13

6.3.2 Interviews 14

6.3.3 Strategies and Action Plans collected 14

6.3.4 Documentation and audio-visual material collected 14

6.3.5 Media Analysis (Local) 15

6.3.6 Validation seminar with experts on conflict and fragility (Brussels) 15

6.4 Aggregation of Findings 15

6.4.1 Findings from the field mission hypothesis 16

6.4.2 Findings from Georgia in relation to each EQs 17

6.5 Conclusions and Recommendations 22

6.5.1 Conclusions and Recommendations related to Hypotheses 22

6.5.2 Conclusions and Recommendations related to Evaluation Questions 23

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: STANDARD FORMAT FOR EVIDENCE IN RELATION TO EQS (GEORGIA)

ANNEX 2: LIST OF PERSONS, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANISATIONS INTERVIEWED

ANNEX 3: BIBLIOGRAPHY

ANNEX 4: LOCAL MEDIA MONITORING

ANNEX 5: EXCERPT FROM THE TREATY OF LISBON

ACRONYMS

ACP	Africa Caribbean and Pacific countries
AIDCO	EuropeAid Co-operation Office
AfDB	African Development Bank
ALA	Community financial instrument for support to Asia and Latin America
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
APF	Africa Peace Facility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AU	African Union
CBO	Community based organizations
CCI	Cross-Cutting Issue
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
COBERM	Confidence Building Early Response Mechanism
CODEV	Committee on Development
COM	Commission Communication
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DEL	EU Delegations
DG	Directorate General
DG DEV	Directorate General for Development
DG RELEX	External Relations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EEAS	European External Action Service
EC	European Community - European Commission (when referring to Lisbon)
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democratization and Human Rights
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument
EP	European Parliament

EPLO	European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
ERD	European Report on Development
EQs	Evaluation Questions
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EULEX	EU Rule of Law Mission (in Kosovo)
EUMM	European Union Monitoring Mission
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Rights
HRFASP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
HRVP	High Representative/Vice President
HLTF	UN High Level Task Force
I&C	Information and Communication
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IfS	Instrument for Stability
IL	Intervention Logic
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization.
INSC	Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
JEU	Joint Evaluation Unit
LA	Local Authority
LAC	Latin America and Caribbean
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MEDA	European financial instrument for the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
MEUR	Million Euros
MS	Member State
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization

NIP	National Indicative Programme
NSA	Non-State Actor
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCD	Policy coherence for development
PCNAS	Post-Crisis Needs Assessments
PD	Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
PSC	Political and Security Committee
RG	Reference Group
RIC	Relex Information Committee
ROM	Results-Oriented Monitoring system
RSP	Regional Strategy Paper
SEC	Commission Staff Working Document
TACIS	Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States
3 Cs	Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WB	World Bank

1. INTRODUCTION

The EU is a major player in crisis and fragile states: conflict prevention and peacebuilding and the theme is a significant component of EU external action. In terms of breadth of policy scope and commitments and instruments, investment of financial resources, and development of its policy and normative framework the EU is second only to the United Nations (Sherriff, Gourlay, Hohmeister and Koeb, 2010). It is also an area where there has been a steady increase in the level of financial resources devoted to it from 2001 to 2010.

In addition the Lisbon Treaty elevates the scope and ambition of EU external policy to a new level. Its chapter on external action even opens with an article on principles. Somewhat mirroring the doctrine of the 2003 European Security Strategy, the text captures fundamental values, such as human rights and democracy, as well as aspects underlying the EU's much bespoken "soft power". The Treaty recognises conflict prevention as an objective of EU external action. The CFSP is explicitly referred to as having both civilian and military aspects, and the High Representative of the Union has an explicit role to ensure both are coordinated.

The original EU 2001 policy framework for conflict prevention is still seen as progressive, and it represents well-considered strategic ideas that are still relevant. Yet in a new era, with the Lisbon Treaty and the EEAS, there is a need to re-commit to conflict prevention and bring this policy agenda up to date. The rationale of Lisbon Treaty commitments, fresh institutions and a review of the EU's Gothenburg Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict could provide a strong rationale for a new policy framework and commitment. Indeed the June 2011 Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention underline the role of conflict prevention and called for comprehensive approaches towards it that integrate all EU entities, member states and key international partners in a post-Lisbon environment.

In the past the Commission has, under pressure from the European Parliament to fill the conflict prevention policy gap, rather than outsourcing its policy thinking on conflict prevention to consultants and external contractors. Establishment of the EEAS is considered an opportunity to reverse this trend and to ensure conflict prevention policy hub is recreated. A first step has been taken with the newly created Directorate on Conflict Prevention and Security policy in the EEAS which could also improve institutional memory and leadership on conflict prevention and a specific Division of Peacebuilding, Conflict Prevention and Mediation (VI.C.1).

In the past officials' ability to access technical support for conflict-sensitive programming was relatively limited. The staffing changes in the EEAS and EU delegations represent an opportunity to ensure good training and specific operational guidance to inform conflict-sensitive programming in terms of both overarching guidelines and input on specific geographical areas and themes. Yet the EU has sought to gain visibility for the breadth of its action in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Box 1: Programming of geographic instruments

The EU has five stages of programming geographic instruments:

1. Country/regional allocations. Six- or seven-year resource allocations for each region and country based on population, needs/poverty assessments, absorption capacity and commitment to political reform.
2. Country/regional strategy papers (CSPs/RSPs). Five- to seven-year strategic assessments of the political and economic situation of a given country or region and general themes of intended response (including political dialogue, development efforts and trade initiatives).
3. National/regional indicative programmes (NIPs/RIPs). These are derived from the CSPs/RSPs and identify priority sectors and themes for assistance in the country including multi-year financial envelopes. NIPs/RIPs are half the lifespan of the CSPs/RSPs.
4. Annual action programmes. In-country efforts set within the overall and financial limits of the CSP and NIP.
5. Implementation. Contracting, management, monitoring and evaluation among others.

The first three stages are closely intertwined, with the analysis of needs, priorities and performance generally followed by elaboration of a response strategy and allocation of aid based on the identified needs, priorities and performance. For countries in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific (ACP), programming is a joint exercise under the European Development Fund (EDF); for countries covered by the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy), it is based on dialogue. In either case, programming should be conducted at the country level and aligned with national priorities and national development strategy.

The EEAS is in the lead in stages 1, 2 and 3, with the Commission managing stages 4 and 5. The rationale for this split is that the EEAS, as a coordinating body of all EU external action, brings together the different strands of EU policy (environment, trade, security, migration and development). A unified geographic desk system allows the EEAS to focus on overall political strategic issues, while leaving mainstream cooperation and technical aspects of programming to the Commission. This could provide more impetus for mainstreaming conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the future, including visibility relating to such action.

Moreover the Lisbon Treaty significantly enhances the status of the delegations turning them into legal entities able to represent the Union in a full range of competencies. This implies combining into one service the Council delegations in New York and Geneva and the EU delegations worldwide. Under the authority of the High Representative of the Union, the delegations are required to cooperate closely with member state representations. They monitor compliance with and implementation of EU policies, and also are required to contribute to formulating these policies. On paper this bodes well for conflict prevention, provided that it is prioritised and the right competences exist at the country level (Sherriff, Gourlay, Hohmeister and Koeb, 2010).

2. POLICY RELATED AND NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE THEME

2.1. EU policies and approach

In understanding the EU's approach to "crisis and fragile states: conflict prevention and peacebuilding" and visibility there are various levels that need to be appreciated. The policy related and normative framework has been developed both at the **EU-wide level** and also the **EC level**. Yet both the EU and EC champion an "integrated or comprehensive approach" that seeks to blur both the lines between EC and EU as a whole and between the EU and other international actors (see ADE 2010). This inevitably leads to some blurring of visibility as well.

The start of the new millennium was marked by a drive for an **EU-wide** conflict prevention policy. Visibility and political sponsorship was brought to this by the then EU Presidency of Sweden and the personality of Swedish Foreign Minister in Anna Lindh supported by the then High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana (Council) and EU Commissioner for External Relations at (DG RELEX) Chris Patten. This resulted in the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict (also known as the Gothenburg Programme) in 2001 agreed by the Council (European Council 2001).

At the same time the European Commission at the **EC level** issued its first Communication for Conflict Prevention in 2001 (EC 2001) (see core elements noted in the figure 3). This emphasized three pillars of; 1) projecting stability (long-term prevention), 2) strengthening cooperation with international partners and 3) reacting quickly to nascent conflicts (short-term prevention).

Both the EC Communication on Conflict Prevention and the Gothenburg Programme are still seen as the key European policy documents for conflict prevention and are somewhat overarching. Neither, however, contains an unambiguous definition of "conflict prevention" or of "peacebuilding". Indeed to this day there is still considerable confusion between short-term crisis management and longer-term conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and responding to fragile states that has a knock on affect on EU visibility in this theme. While all these issues are indeed interlinked and connected they are not entirely synonymous.

From 2001 a number of other policy initiatives have been undertaken at both the EC and EU level that are also highly relevant to the theme of "Crisis & fragile states: conflict prevention & peace building". At the **EU level** the European Security Strategy of 2003 and the EU Consensus on Development of 2005 (which included as a core component conflict prevention, peacebuilding and fragile states) were important policy developments. On more specific issues "within" the broader field of "Crisis & fragile states: conflict prevention & peace building" such as demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants there were also policy developments in 2005. The European Council adopted Council Conclusions on an EU response to situations of fragility and Security and Development in November 2007 (European Council in 2007) and prior to this also in 2007 the Commission had prior to this issued a communication titled *Towards an EU Response to situations of fragility – engaging in difficult environments for sustainable development, stability and peace* (EC. 2007). In addition other issues such as security sector reform and women, peace and security, children and armed conflict have also been covered at both the EU and EC level. Aligned to this several EU presidencies sought to draw visibility from their actions in advancing policy developments in these areas (see Sherriff with Barnes 2008 for one example).

Figure 1: EC policy approach to conflict prevention according to its 2001 Communication



Source: Adapted from EC (2001); ADE with ECDPM et al. (2009); Gourlay (2009)

While the drivers of the initial developments of conflict prevention in 2001 were multiple the international community's and the EU's visible failures in preventing the Rwandan genocide and also the Balkans wars of the 1990s spurred the policy community in Europe to develop new commitments. Likewise the event of September the 11th 2001 and a growing awareness of the impact of state fragility on both security and development concerns were also reflected on policy developments at the EU but also at the EC level (see, ADE, 2010).

While the EU and EC have developed considerable humanitarian capacity much of which carries some visibility it has always gone a considerable way to note that these are underpinned by the principles of neutrality and impartiality and are therefore distinct from the more political action in crisis response, fragile states, conflict prevention and peacebuilding (European Council et al, 2008).

Yet in practice the EU's visibility "on the ground" may be blurred between EC humanitarian initiatives and other policy interventions.

Despite the importance of an overarching policy and normative framework it is clearly specific crises, conflict situations and failed states that gather the most visibility for the EU in this particular theme. Also the constant independent critique of both the EU and EC has not been that they have noted developed pa good policy framework for this theme but rather implementation of this in specific contexts (EPLO et al, 2007 and 2011). The EC and EU responses play themselves out in particular geographic contexts. From 2005 to 2009 the crises, conflicts and state fragility in the specific regional contexts of the Caucasus (most notably Georgia), Middle East (most notably Lebanon, Israel/Palestine and Iraq), West Horn of Africa (most notably Somalia but also Kenya) to name just a few were high on the EU agenda eliciting multiple initiatives with an impact on visibility. But apart from these high profile cases the EU also engaged in most conflict and fragile contexts globally throughout the period, it would therefore not be an accurate representation of the EU's approach to visibility in this theme just to focus on globally "high profile" cases. Indeed in many of these higher profile cases the EU and EC visibility may be less because of the actions of other international players such as major individual EU member-states, the United Nations or the United States, not to mention regional powers.

2.2. Major Strategic Partnership Agreements

Both the EU and EC policy frameworks related to conflict prevention note the importance of partnerships in achieving policy outcomes. The importance of three partners of the EC stand out in terms of amount of policy dialogue, joint actions and the shear level of EC resources channelled through them in relation to "Crisis & fragile states: conflict prevention & peace building". The United Nations, the African Union and the World Bank are indisputably amongst the most important multilateral partners. This is reflected in formal policy relationships with these entities and also the joint statements and visibility activities undertaken with them. While these relations extend beyond funding, the amount of EU resources channelled through these three organisations is a clear indication of their importance, particularly as contracting partners of the European Commission. International organisations (almost exclusively the UN and the World Bank) received 63 per cent of the total contract amount spent by the European Commission on conflict prevention and peace building during 2001–08 (Figure 4). For purposes of comparison, regional organisations, made up largely of the African Union and the African regional economic communities, received 9 per cent of this total spending.

Figure 2: Contracting partners of the European Commission for conflict prevention and peace-building (not including the Balkans), 2001-08



Source: ADE with ECDPM et al. (2009)

a. The United Nations

As was noted by Benita Ferrero-Waldner Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy and Karel De Gucht Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid in 2009, "*The UN and the EU are the only multilateral actors with the ability to draw on a wide array of instruments at all stages of the conflict cycle and to build bridges with longer-term stabilisation and development efforts, supported by around €1.2 billion (US$ 1.7 billion) of Commission support. This provides us with the potential for an effective partnership."* (United Nations and European Commission 2009). The EC's 2003 Communication *The Choice of Multilateralism* characterises conflict prevention and crisis management as areas in which "*the goals and activities of the EU and UN are united by the premise that the case for multilateralism and international cooperation is unequivocal*" EC 2003). The 2003 Communication claims that 'incontestable advantages' could be derived from linking the universal legitimacy of the UN with the economic and political weight of the EU.

Commission assistance is provided through a wide range of UN agencies and programmes. EuropeAid annual reports routinely mention no fewer than 38 UN bodies. A high proportion of these funds are channelled to countries in situations of crisis, where UN agencies and programmes are present and mandated to deliver recovery assistance. UNDP annual reviews of the Commission-UN partnership show 18 of the 20 countries receiving over €15 million a year to be countries experiencing political crisis (Sherriff, Gourlay, Hohmeister and Koeb 2010). From 1999 to 2006 the UNDP was the principal UN recipient of development assistance, receiving 40 per cent of the EC contributions channelled through the UN (ADE 2008b).

Yet it is not only the downstream intervention activities undertaken by the EC and EU but also the upstream political and diplomatic actions with and through the UN (and the visibility of these) that are important for gaining outcomes in this theme. This is important beyond the UN as the EU has often been criticized in many diplomatic situations particularly crisis situations of being a "global payer rather than a global player" (see for example, European Parliament 2010)

b. African Union

The establishment of the African Union in 2002 signalled a new beginning, not just for Africa and its management of its own internal affairs but also a new opening for international partners. The EU was keen to support African initiatives on peace and security. While the EC had supported peace operations at the regional level (e.g. via ECOWAS) it recognised this as an area where African leadership at the continental level was probably essential.

The European Commission first backed the AU Commission with a grant of €12 million in early 2003. This included €10 million for peace and security work and the balance for institutional development. Following a request from African Heads of State at the AU Maputo Summit in July 2003, the EC took the ambitious step of proposing establishment of the African Peace Facility, supported by €250 million from the European Development Fund (EDF) for Africa-led peacekeeping operations, most notably the African Union Mission (AMIS) in Darfur. The AU was expected to co-manage these funds through the new AU Peace and Security Council (established May 2004). Thus, the AU rapidly became a major political partner of the EU in a way that other global actors were at first reluctant to contemplate. Establishment of the African Peace Facility was also ambitious within the EU, as it involved the large-scale use of funds allocated for ACP development cooperation to support peacekeeping and also the development of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The African Peace Facility has been used particularly to finance AU peacekeeping in Sudan and Somalia as well as other less visible interventions.

In 2007 after the signing of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy a specific AU-EU Partnership on Peace and Security was set up to further drive collaboration. The EU now contends that it spends collectively more than €1 billion on peace and security issues to support African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (African Union and European Union, 2010). In the 3rd EU-Africa Summit deliberations the EU-Africa work in this area was noted as the "cornerstone of our cooperation" (African Union and European Union 2010) and before that the European Commission noted that, "This partnership [on

peace and security] has been the most successful partnership of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy" (European Commission 2010). The Africa Peace Facility is also a particular and relatively unique innovation of the EC in cooperation with the AU in terms of its nature and approach, which should make isolating visibility gained from it and its activities more easily discernable from that of other international actors.

As with the United Nations it is not only the downstream implementation activities undertaken with the African Union and the associated African Peace and Security Architecture players (and the visibility for these) but rather the political partnership that is important for outcomes and visibility in this area.

c. World Bank

While the World Bank is not seen as a major player in terms of the more political aspects of conflict prevention and peace-building it is one of the major partners of the European Commission in crisis, conflict and fragile contexts. The Commission chooses to work with the World Bank largely due to the Bank's capacity to manage internationally agreed mechanisms (e.g. large emergency trust funds for Iraq and Afghanistan) and its recognised thematic expertise on budget support, reconstruction and rehabilitation, public finance management, debt reduction, government capacity-building and macro-economic stabilization.

Beyond channelling money through the World Bank, the Commission cooperates in core activities in conflict prevention, multilateral post-crisis needs assessments (PCNAs) and recovery planning. The partners signed a joint declaration on PCNAs in 2008 (EC, UN & World Bank 2008). That document called for more communication on fragility and conflict at headquarters level and in the field and for promoting shared benchmarks and results frameworks, joint processes for monitoring and review and a common PCNA methodology. The first such joint assessment was completed in Georgia in 2008. The World Bank itself is seeking to increase its visibility and action in this area with the 2011 World Development Report focusing on '*Conflict, Security, and Development*' which has been developed both to push forward an ambitious policy agenda and raise profile.

3. EU INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION IN RELATION TO THE THEME

3.1 Position of Commission in relation to other Institutions

At the EU level the response to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a European Defence and Security Policy (ESDP) can also be seen to be part of this theme although occurring under pillar 2. At the Cologne European Council in 1999, Heads of State declared, "[The EU] must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises" (Council Secretariat 2006). Since then, 24 ESDP/CSDP missions have been launched. These have focused on police, judiciary and customs reform, capacity building and border monitoring. The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) is the largest mission so far, but in other areas these EU missions have also been a visible and high profile representation of EU action in this area. These have occurred both within the EU Neighbourhood but also within Africa and even one in Asia (Aceh, Indonesia).

3.2 Commission DG responsible

The main European Commission Directorate responsible for crisis, conflict prevention and peace-building was DG RELEX prior to formation of the European External Action Service but other Directorates also had some important responsibilities. DG Development took the lead on fragile states policy which at times in the past lead to some competition between the EC Directorates, while Europeaid was involved in the implementation of policy and programmes. However the Communication from the Commission from 2001 made it clear that conflict prevention was to be mainstreamed in all areas of action and therefore all relevant DGs of the Commission. This diffusion

of responsibility has somewhat diminished effective implementation and collective visibility in this area.

4. COMPETENCES OF THE EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS SPECIFIC DGS: IN RELATION TO THE THEME

4.1 European Commission prior to 2011

The European Commission has a number of units with thematic relevance to conflict prevention in addition to the geographic desks (Table 3). DG RELEX's Unit A2 (Crisis Response and Peacebuilding) is the main actor on conflict prevention, and has grown substantially since 2001. Here again, however, the primary focus is on crisis response rather than on conflict prevention. The Commission had a network of crisis correspondents at the headquarters level and a crisis room that provides early warning and analytical support for the Commission. On fragile states, DG DEV's Unit C2 on Pan-African Issues and Institutions, Governance and Migration has a security and peace focus. EuropeAid deals with operational and day-to-day management issues as well as supporting programming. It has specific units (with expertise on security sector reform) dedicated to the African Union and the African Peace Facility, as well as to governance, security, human rights and gender. Since its 2001 Communication the Commission has paid more attention to conflict prevention in its country and regional programming.

Table 1: EC thematic units directly related to conflict prevention until December 2010

Directorate-General for External Relations (DG RELEX)	**Directorate A:** Crisis Platform. Policy Coordination in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This includes section **A2** on Crisis Response and Peacebuilding (with crisis room), section **A3** on CSFP operations and section **A4** on security policy **Directorate B:** Multilateral Relations and Human Rights. This includes section **B1** on human rights, section **B2** on democratisation and elections, and the Treaties Office (section**B3**) on multilateral relations with the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe
Directorate-General for Development (DG DEV)	**Unit C2:** Pan-African Issues and Institutions, Governance and Migration. Had a section on peace and security as well as a specific officer working on situations of fragility
EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO)	**Unit C6:** African Union and African Peace Facility **Unit E4:** Governance, Security, Human Rights and Gender

4.2 The European External Action Service and DEVCO

Since the creation and setting up of the European External Action Service a new set of units and associated bodies has became into being relevant to, "Crisis & fragile states: conflict prevention & peace building". This is very much work in progress.

Table 2: EC thematic units directly related to conflict prevention after December 2010

Department of Global and Multilateral Issues	Conflict Prevention and Security Policy (Directorate) (VI.C) and a - Peacebuilding, conflict prevention, mediation (Division) (VI.C.1)
Managing Director for Crisis Response and Operational Coordination	The Managing Director does have a staff separate from the other units noted
Crisis Management	EU Military Staff

Structures	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
Situation Centre (SITCEN)	This Centre still has over 100 officials tasked with analysis and early warning.
Africa Department	Pan-African Affairs Division (does have peace and security relevant expertise within it)

In addition to the EEAS there is the Foreign Policy Instrument Service a specific unit associated to the EEAS that reports to Catherine Ashton directly in her role as Vice-President of the European Commission. This unit also has responsibility for managing the short-term elements of the Instrument for Stability (IfS). The IfS is the most visible dedicated financial instrument related to conflict prevention and peacebuilding yet is actually housed in the Commission's new Foreign Policy Instruments Service. DEVCO is currently undergoing some institutional changes that has created a number of the units relevant for the theme. In some of the earlier interim organigrammes for DEVCO a specific unit for Peace and Security was called for but this did not materialise in the end.

Relevant specific units European Commission DEVCO Units for Crisis and Fragile States-Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding are:

- **Unit A.5 Fragility and Crisis Management**. Defines the policy framework for cooperation with countries in situation of fragility or crisis; provides support, guidance and tools to manage effectively and coherently major crisis situations; deals with countries in situation of fragility.
- **Unit D.1 Governance, Democracy, Gender, Human Rights.** Ensures the external dimension of these four issues, including justice and security and electoral assistance. Manages the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).
- **Unit D.5 Instrument for Stability, Nuclear Safety**. Focuses its attention on work related to the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) and on the long term actions financed by the Instrument for Stability (IfS), while the short term actions related to crisis preparedness and peace building partnership are being managed by FPI in the EEAS.
- **Unit E.4 Africa-EU Partnership, Peace Facility**. Focal point for the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) and for Pan-African institutions, policy processes and institutional capacity building. Programming, Management and Implementation of the African Peace Facility (APF). Promotes complementarity between APF actions and other initiatives in the area of Peace and Security. Ensures thematic support, policy definition and coherence on peace, security and development in Africa.

5. MECHANISMS OF COORDINATION

5.1 Formal and informal mechanisms among DGs

For the majority of the period of this evaluation there was no standing formal mechanism for coordination amongst the DGs on the theme of "Crisis & fragile states: conflict prevention & peace building". However, for individual countries there are mechanisms which have been used between DG DEV and DG RELEX on one hand and Europeaid on the other. In 2008-2009 there were attempts to operationalise and merge an Action Plan on both Security and Development linked to an Action Plan on Situations of Fragility that would involve both DG RELEX and DG DEVELOPMENT as well as member-states. A number of meetings were held and pilot countries (for Situations of Fragility) chosen, a Draft Action Plan was ready for inter-service consultations just before the ToL entered into force. Efforts to re-develop this Action Plan as of the launch of the new Commission Development Policy on "An Agenda for Change" in September 2011 are noted.

In 2011 an Informal Inter-Service Working Group was formed by the EEAS under the leadership of a Deputy Secretary General. This has changed into the Conflict Prevention Platform within the EEAS but it is an Inter Service Group with links to the Commission (DEVCO). The precise mandate and duties of this group are yet to be finalised.

5.2 The formal methods of coordination with member-states and other EU institutions

In response to "crisis and fragile states: conflict prevention and peacebuilding" the EU uses the full range of structures, mechanisms and arrangements for EU external action. Listed in the box below are the most commonly used and most important mechanism.

Box 2: Council of the European Union Structures

The *General Affairs & External Relation Council* (prior to Lisbon Treaty) was composed of one representative at ministerial level from each Member State, who is empowered to commit their Government. Council members are politically accountable to their national parliaments. It often discussed crisis and fragile states: conflict prevention and peace building and committed the EU to numerous political and policy ventures in this realm.

FAC (after Lisbon treaty) *Foreign Affairs Council* was created by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 and meets usually once a month at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. It can also meet with or have sessions with other thematic Ministers in other realms relevant to external action (defence, development, trade). It is chaired by the High Representative and individual and regional crisis and fragile states are often on the agenda as are methods to promote conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

*Political and Security Committee (*PSC). Tasked to oversee the CFSP. It exercises political control and provides strategic direction in crisis management operations. Conflict prevention is within its remit; it however focuses most of its energy on immediate crises. It is represented by ambassador level officials of the EU member-states. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty the Director of the Crisis Platform within DG RELEX or other regional senior RELEX officials would attend from the Commission side. Prior to Lisbon it was chaired by the revolving EU Presidency, now it is chaired by a senior official of the European External Action Service.

Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). Tasked to manage civilian crisis operations and to support the PSC. It is attended by diplomats of EU member-states and the Commission now EEAS. Conflict prevention and peace building is within its mandate, however, this is rarely on the agenda, as again CIVCOM used to focus more on immediate crisis issues. It again is also now chaired by an official of the EEAS.

Geographic Committees. Committees that deal with Africa, Asia, Latin America, Middle East etc also regularly deal with 'Crisis & fragile states: conflict prevention &peace-building' as part of their remit who have member-state representatives and were also attended by Commission officials. These committees are also now chaired by the EEAS.

Committee on Development (CODEV). Primarily with a development remit but also discusses issues of fragility and fragile states as well as security and development. Commission officials attended, and unlike the other committees mentioned remains being chaired by the revolving EU Presidency.

5.3 Major Programmes and Financial Interventions

There are no specific figures for the funds spent on the entire theme of "Crisis & fragile states: conflict prevention & peace building", yet the Thematic evaluation of the European Commission: Support to conflict prevention and peace building. Preliminary study: Scoping and mapping, completed by ADE for the Joint Evaluation Unit in 2009 provides the closest thing to verifiable figures (ADE with ECDPM et al. 2009). Below is a reproduction of some of the key figures from this study:

Allocation of the amounts contracted and paid by regions and countries

The Commission is intervening in conflict prevention and peace-building in all regions where its external cooperation is implemented. The allocation of amounts contracted and paid for CPPB interventions as between these regions is shown in the figure below.

Figure 3: Breakdown of amounts contracted by regions



Source: CRIS and ADE analysis
Note: **ACP**: African, Caribbean and Pacific countries ; **ASIA**: Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Indonasia, Laos, Philippines, Thailand, Viet Nam ; **ENP - MEDA**: Jordan, Lebanon, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israel, Algeria, Egypt, Lybia, Morocco ; **ENP - TACIS**: Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirghyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tadzhikistan, Ukraine ; **MULTI REGION**: covering several regions or unspecified location

The regional breakdown is as follows:

- The largest share of amounts contracted for CPPB interventions concerns the ACP region (35%), mainly to support the (Africa Peace Facility) APF, other interventions in Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC);
- The Asia region receives 28% of the total amount contracted, most of which (81%) goes to Afghanistan (€695m) and Iraq (€668m);
- The ENP – MEDA region represents 27% of the total amount contracted. It mainly concerns interventions in the West Bank & Gaza strip (€1,497m out of €1,600m for the whole region);
- The ENP – TACIS region represents 4%, Latin America, 4% and the category multi region[1], 2%.

The report of ADE also notes that spending in this area is mainstreamed across many different EC instruments. While it could be argued that the Instrument of Stability is the instrument most clearly associated directly with "Crisis & fragile states: conflict prevention & peace building" it is only one instrument and not financially the largest. Yet as there have been specific "visibility" measures undertaken associated with it and it is clearly the most consistently relevant it does merit special attention. The EU has a number of financial instruments relevant to preventing and responding to conflict and fragility. According to the 2009 preliminary study for the evaluation of EC conflict prevention and peacebuilding there was a total spend of €6.2 billion from 2001 to 2008 (not including the Balkans) (ADE with ECDPM et al. 2009). Yet 59 per cent of these funds went to Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and the West Bank/Gaza (ADE with ECDPM et al. 2009).

[1] Multi region covers several regions or unspecified location

Figure 4: Amounts spent for preventing and responding to conflict and fragility from European Commission budget lines, 2001-08



Source: ADE with ECDPM et al. (2009)

5.4 EU finance allocation for visibility on theme

While it would be desirable to assess the financial resources the EC puts into raising EU visibility on the theme it was not possible. The evaluation of EC conflict prevention and peacebuilding did not disaggregate data when it came to visibility.

It is difficult to look at overarching approaches to "pure visibility" a few specific actions are known. Examples include biannual conference and a series of books led by DG RELEX in the past related to EU conflict prevention, crisis management and peace building (primarily focusing on the Instrument for Stability). The EEAS website itself notes, "A series of books have been published by DG RELEX on the topic of EU conflict prevention, crisis management and peace building". Two are true reportages on the implementation of the Instrument of Stability. Three are hybrid publications: in part reproducing the proceedings of major consensus conferences in the field of crisis response, in part manuals of crisis response and early warning, and in part witness accounts of response projects delivered by a wide range of practitioners (officials in charge of IFS projects, officials in charge of CFSP operations, NGOs professionals, scholars etc.)" (EEAS, 2011).

In 2009 the European Commission's DG Development along with certain member-states also funded and supported the first European Report on Development which focussed on "Overcoming Fragility". This was also accompanied by a number of initiatives designed to raise it's, and the EU's, visibility on the theme (ERD, 2009).

6. FIELD VISIT PHASE

6.1 Hypotheses to test related to crisis & fragile states: conflict prevention and peace building

Issue 1: It is at the field level that crisis and conflict are prevented, peace is built, and state fragility addressed. Yet the distinction between what different aspects of EU institutions do and the visibility accorded to them will be hard to discern in these environments. It will therefore be difficult to isolate the visibility of different initiatives of the EC from the EU in relation to this topic. This is further compounded by the fact that both the EU and the EC see the "integrated approach" as crucial to gaining outcomes and so that gaining visibility for distinct EU actors is counter to policy commitments made (ADE 2010). The visibility of the EU's CFSP decisions and particularly ESDP/CSDP missions (see below) under 'pillar 2' of EU action and the EC's humanitarian action often eclipses that of its still very substantial more structural and longer term approach to, "Crisis & fragile states: conflict prevention & peace building" that has in the past been undertaken by the European Commission.

Hypothesis: **At the country level it is difficult to differentiate between the EC and EU level with the entire EU benefitting or "suffering" from EU visibility efforts that may or may not be coherent with each other.**

Related Evaluation questions (EQ4) To what extent is the EC's visibility/communication work coordinated and complementary with that of the EU Members-States, Council and Parliament; *(EQ6):* "Are the EC's messages coherent across different EU external action and internal policy areas" and "(EQ3) "To what extent does the EC view itself as implementing a single, clearly defined Visibility strategy to achieve an agreed public image for its external action?"

Issue 2*:* Despite the undoubted assets that the European Union brings Crisis & fragile states: conflict prevention & peace building it is often not seen as the most important or an important actor when compared to others. How much of this is related to its limited visibility or are there other factors that are more important?

Hypothesis: **The EU has a lack of visibility in the thematic area of *Crisis & fragile states, conflict prevention & peace building* not because of visibility actions but rather its ability to achieve outcomes.**

Related Evaluation question: (EQ1) How well does the image of the external action of the EU perceived by the stakeholders correspond to the definition and objectives of this external action and (EQ4) How well do stakeholder perceive the benefits of EU external action and not just its main features?

Issue 3: By working in partnership with key strategic international partners, the EC is often reliant on others to achieve outcomes in terms of *Crisis & fragile states: conflict prevention & peace building.* Yet these partners may increase or decrease the EC's visibility. Moreover, for achieving outcomes in *Crisis & fragile states: conflict prevention & peace building* it may at times be better for the EC/EU NOT to have visibility.

Hypothesis: The EC/EU visibility is diluted or enhanced by working with international partners on **Crisis & fragile states: conflict prevention & peace building.**

Related Evaluation question: EQ7 "How far does the perception of the value added of the EU as a global actor emerge clearly from its presence as in the major international organisations…"

Issue 4: Conflict prevention and peacebuilding are sometimes extremely sensitive**.** In some countries implementers have been kidnapped or killed for association with donor programmes when the donors are seen as parties to the conflict. At the political level certain negotiations and involvement in negotiations are better done behind closed doors.

Hypothesis: **At times there may be good reasons for achieving outcomes for the EU to have or require less, diminished or no visibility.**

6.2 Rationale for choice of cases and country

6.2.1 Case selection

As noted above the approach the EU and the Commission uses in dealing with conflict prevention and peacebuilding is "an integrated approach" (ADE 2010). This approach looks at four different dimensions that are all themselves linked.

- First is the time dimension of integrating short-term crisis management activities with longer-term structural conflict prevention activities.
- Second is the geographic dimension of integrating different levels of engagement at the local, national, regional and also global level.
- Third is the dimension of what, that is integrating different types of activities such as demobilisation, disarmament and re-integration of former combatants.
- The final dimension is "with whom" which refers to the European Commission working in an integrated fashion with other actors internally to the European Commission but also externally in the EU family, and/or with other members of the international community.

Therefore the term "case" in this study refers to the "integrated approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding" rather than any particular EC project, programme or initiative.

6.2.2 Country Selection

Georgia. Rationale: Georgia represents a long-term, consistent and on-going engagement of the EC with regards the theme. The crisis that erupted in Georgia in 2008 drew an unprecedented response from the EU, though this also built on a decade of EC and EU engagement that emphasised both conflict prevention & peace building in the country. The EC's engagement is also complimented and complicated by EU multiple actions including a CSDP civilian mission and an EUSR for Georgia and until recently an EUSR for the region more generally. This significant and multi-faceted EU engagement is relatively unique but is an example of where the EU has deployed almost all its tools towards the goals of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Georgia is a middle income country within the EU Neighbourhood Policy area so that it represents a different proposition from poorer countries or those covered by other EU policy frameworks. In addition to "on the ground" activities in country the EC is also a significant player in the "Geneva" conflict resolution process at the global level. In Georgia additional background research on this topic (but not a field trip) has been undertaken in the context of the JEU Thematic Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding that provided a very useful basis to build upon. Georgia was also one of four possible field visits put forward in the original "Desk Report" as a field visit site the other being Liberia, Somalia or New York (as the home of the UN and focus of global efforts on conflict and peace). The arguments made for the inclusion of Georgia case study regarding how it would compliment other case studies and the acceptance of a possible mission by the EU Delegation and the preference of the Reference Group meant that Georgia was selected.

6.3 Data collection during the field mission (methodological issues)

6.3.1 Data collection

A field visit was conducted from the 4th to the 9th of July 2011. The field mission was conducted in the capital Tbilisi and therefore did not include visits to the site of implementation of EC projects outside of Tbilisi nor did it visit the "breakaway regions" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These breakaway regions have a different perspective on the EU and the role of the EU in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Therefore the context of EU visibility in these breakaway regions is vastly different from that within the rest of Georgia.

During the field mission fours types of data were collected:

1) Interviews with key stakeholders (see annex I)

2) Collection of strategies and actions plans (see bibliography)

3) Documentation directly related to EU visibility produced by the EU and third parties (see annex II)

4) Media analysis undertaken by the specialist local consultant, of a selection of the Georgian print media and TV stations main news programmes in line with the general guidelines given on media analysis. This occurred for the period 04 July to 11th July (8 days)

In addition

5) Upon return a small focus group (non-Georgia specific) was conducted on the theme with key individuals to again ascertain if the findings were relevant.

In addition a Powerpoint presentation was made to EU Delegation staff on Friday the 8th of July to "validate" the field study preliminary. This presentation even thought it did was not only feature positive findings was enthusiastically endorsed by those present at the meeting as a good reflection of the reality of the challenges of achieving EU visibility goals in Georgia. Other background material that was specific research on how the EU was perceived in Georgia was also referred to as it was available and deemed highly relevant (see bibliography for reference to some of this).

6.3.2 Interviews

The interviews with 43 individuals concerned with the thematic focus of this part of the study were also conducted in the form of structured interviews from 4th to the 8th of July in Tbilisi, Georgia. Interviewees represented a selection of those dealing with issues under examination in the form of EU officials from various EU institutions in country, the UNHCR and UNDP, international and local NGOs, Georgian governmental institutions, a European member state's officials (Poland) and local journalists from print and electronic media representing both those that were pro government and those that were independent or seen as critical of the government (see annex I).

6.3.3 Strategies and Action Plans collected

Strategies and action plans at the project level were viewed on a number of projects. At the overarching strategic level these were considered sensitive and restricted by the EU Delegation themselves and the status of the current "strategy" (*"Concept Note – Principles for a communication strategy 2010-2011")* was somewhat in flux given that a new Head of Delegation had recently arrived and that there were changes in the EEAS. The EUMM also shared their overarching public communications strategy. In addition communications was also referred to in other sensitive non-public documents such as the emerging EU Human Rights Strategy for Georgia that was in the process of being finalised. It foresaw that Communications would be a key aspect of this strategy including issues around consistency of the message given by different EU entities.

6.3.4 Documentation and audio-visual material collected

The collected documentation and audio-visual material directly related to EU visibility was diverse and comprehensive. However, it provides only a small "snap-shot" of the amount of visibility actions that the EU or its partners undertakes. Almost all implementing partners (particularly INGOs) that were interviewed had extensive examples of where EU visibility was showcased. It was simply not practical to gather all of this information that would have represented in total over hundreds of publications. Also its utility for analysis would have been very limited as most of the material produced was in Georgian language and script thus limiting the readership to Georgians only. Therefore a selection of material was chosen including some examples related to crisis and fragile states, conflict prevention and peacebuilding. One of those examples included material produced by

the UNDP/COBERN project. This project deliberately chose English as the language of public communication as the alternative of using Georgian, Russian or Abkhaz languages would have resulted in additional difficulties given the sensitivities even the use of these languages as a marker of identity triggers amongst the conflicting groups.

Snap-shot of visibility material collected

GYLA/CIPDD/Saferworld (2010) Community Perceptions of the Causes and Effects of the August 2008 Conflict in Kvemo Kartli, Samegrelo, Samtskhe-Javakheti and Shida Kartli

GYLA/CIPDD/Saferworld (2011) Peace, Security and Stability in Georgia – A Community-informed strategy

GYLA/International Society for fair elections and Democracy (2011) Peopole's Manifesto (book and DVD)

COBERM/Union of Wives, of Invalids and Lost Warriors (2011) Together for Peace and Democracy (Booklet and brochure)

Tabula Magazine (2011) Interview with Head of EU Delegation to Georgia, Ambassador Philip Dimitrov. International edition No. 10. June 2011. Pp. 9-12.

Weekly Georgian Journal (2011) Don't blame EU. Complimentary Issue No. 25 (203). July 2011. P. 11.

UNHCR (2010) New Home for a New Life. (booklet)

UNHCR (2010) Support for multi-track dialogue on the human and economic dimension of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict/ Programme to support increased transparency and credibility of parliamentary and regional elections/ Support to mitigate the consequences of the armed conflict 2008. Reportage in photographs.

Oxfam (2010) The Long Wait (DVD on IDPs of South Ossetia and Abkhazia)

Toleranti Association (2010) Annual report 2008-2009.

6.3.5 Media Analysis (Local)

This was an analysis of local media from the 4th of July to the 11th of July. It covered a variety of different types of media including daily and one weekly publication as well as television news. It focussed on when the European Union or EU member-states (or other international organisations such as the UN or NATO) were mentioned directly in relation to conflict and peace issues. It was undertaken by the local consultant who is a specialised media monitor because the media was not only in the Georgian language but also Georgian script. This media ranged from government leaning daily newspapers with circulations of around 5000 to independent opposition leaning weekly newspaper *Kviris Palitra 1* with a circulation of around 70000, to the main news programme on *TV Channel RUSTAV12*. It is included in annex II to this document.

6.3.6 Validation seminar with experts on conflict and fragility (Brussels)

This was a meeting held to counter-pose findings from Georgia on the theme and hypothesis with experts on conflict prevention and peace building with good EU knowledge based outside Georgia. It was attended by Catherine Woollard (CW), Executive Director of the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), EPLO is a network of NGOs and think tanks active in the field of peacebuilding, who share an interest in promoting sustainable peacebuilding policies among decision-makers in the European Union. EPLO and EPLO members have been funded by the EC and are familiar with Visibility Guidelines. Catherine has visited EC funded projects of EPLO members in a number of third countries. Also in attendance was Josephine Liebl, Policy Officer, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office. Finally Herta Eckert Senior Representative Brussels Office, International Alert an independent peacebuilding organisation that works to lay the foundations for lasting peace and security in communities affected by violent conflict attended. Herta has also managed EC funded activities in conflict zones including Georgia.

6.4 Aggregation of Findings

From the above sources of evidence the following findings in relation to the hypothesis and the evaluation questions were made (after synthesising information via the evaluation grids where the evaluation questions are concerned).

6.4.1 Findings from the field mission hypothesis

Hypothesis one "At the country level it is difficult to differentiate between the EC and EU level with the entire EU benefitting or "suffering" from EU visibility efforts that may or may not be coherent with each other".

At the level of EU it was found the Georgian general public tends not to differentiate between EU institutions, EU member states, European non-EU member states and the Council of Europe (even at times conflating non-EU members such as Switzerland and Norway or even NATO). Anything carrying the blue-golden flag is more often than not perceived as "EU" and all actors' actions feed into the perception of the EU by the wider Georgian population. The blurred image seems to be encouraged by governmental statements or strategy to associate themselves with the EU (and the EU flag that is usually flown alongside the Georgian flag) and popular aspirations to be a modern European state and have EU member-ship. Differentiation tends to occur rather at the level of elites and implementing partners (Georgian or international). Where there was differentiation, was at the level of some EU member-states vis-à-vis their position towards Russia which is related to conflict dynamics in Georgia. Actions of EU member-states that were considered "pro-Russian" by the Georgian media (i.e. potential selling on military hardware to Russia by France or deals for Russian gas by Germany) were portrayed negatively. Broadly speaking France and Germany were seen as more pro-Russian and former Eastern European states such as Estonia and Poland being viewed as more friendly towards Georgia and hostile to Russia.

Hypothesis two states "The EU has a lack of visibility in the thematic area of Crisis & fragile states, conflict prevention & peace building not because of visibility actions but rather its ability to achieve outcomes".

The findings suggest high EU visibility in the country immediately after and during the 2008 conflict might have contributed to raising expectations in terms of security and protection that could not be fulfilled – partly pushed by the government's and medias agenda for a robust military intervention by NATO and the West. Yet the expectation for a military intervention was more on NATO than the EU. The EU is more visible to those of the general public those in more direct contact with EU entities (EUMM areas, EU funded actions with IDPs and ethnic minorities, COBERM) and it is those who recognize the EU's role in conflict prevention and peace building. This is due to the impact these actions have as well as the visibility generated. Because of sensitivities the EU has diminished visibility (Abkhazia) or no visibility (South Ossetia where it is not allowed to operate) in some cases. With the ebbing of the immediate "crisis" phase of the conflict in 2008 aspirations towards the EU extended beyond those related only to conflict prevention and peace building although this is still a major factor. Yet it was emphasised by those interviewed that outcomes in conflict prevention and peacebuilding were more important than visibility actions, as summed up by one Georgian journalist with the phrase "*better do it once than say it 100 times*." At the expert seminar post-the field mission participants strongly indicated that visibility actions that are not backed up with the EU's ability to support the achievement of positive outcomes directly undermine the credibility of the EU and are therefore counter-productive.

Hypothesis three suggested "The EC/EU visibility is diluted or enhanced by working with international partners on Crisis & fragile states: conflict prevention & peace building".

From the field study it emerged that there were indeed cases of the EU's visibility being diluted by working with international partners (due to disregard of visibility agreements by one major implementer in one instance, and the use of budget support). Overall however visibility was enhanced by working with international partners (INGOs particularly) who carry EU visibility to local communities and provide a face and an interlocutor. The latter is enhanced by wider public outreach and activities undertaken at local level. At the expert seminar participants strongly indicated that INGOs give better and more creative visibility than UN agencies in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This was partially confirmed by the field phase in Georgia.

The **fourth hypothesis** posits that "At times there may be good reasons for achieving outcomes (in relation to conflict prevention and peace building) to have less, diminished or no EU visibility".

The findings suggest there are cases when sensitive issues and negotiations with the government of Georgia at times receive better outcomes when there is no visibility for the EU and when those take place behind the scenes. Yet this was also challenged. It might be the case that keeping a lower profile is sometime preferable in order to avoid raising unrealistic expectations of what an otherwise omnipresent actor such as the EU can do. Yet in most Georgian cases[2] visible 'backing' by the EU as a political actor who is at the same time perceived as a reliable implementing partner may be better for achieving desirable outcomes in terms conflict prevention and peacebuilding. It became evident there is a very real need for conflict-sensitive implementation of visibility guidelines in certain cases (breakaway regions for example). Instrument for Stability implemented actions in Abkhazia had been adapted regarding EU visibility. The UN and some implementing partners at times did not want to be too closely associated with the EU because the EU has an official position of territorial integrity of Georgia that means they are not perceived as neutral. Here context specific decisions on visibility (to have, diminished or more visibility) clearly yielded better results. At the expert seminar post the Georgian mission it was strongly emphasised that the EU visibility guidelines needed to be conflict sensitive otherwise they risk at worst putting implementers at risk or directly undermining the achieving of conflict prevention and peace building goals. Indeed the evaluators own experience with EU funded actions in other settings than Georgia and on a previous visit to Abkhazia would also strongly bear this out.

6.4.2 Findings from Georgia in relation to each EQs

EQ 1 "How well does the image of the external action of the EU perceived by the stakeholders correspond to the key issues outlined in the definition and objectives of this external action (Nice Treaty: Art. 8 & 11; Lisbon Treaty: Art. 3 & 21) and to the image the EU seeks to convey?"

Stakeholders articulated their view of the image EU external action in terms of rights, democratisation, peace and security, good governance, humanitarian concerns, economic development objectives, and democratic values. Also the view of "preparing Georgia for EU membership" was also mentioned. Some misunderstandings of EU entities and difference between them were not understood and "EU jargon" cited as getting in the way of understanding the different aspects of the EU. It is unclear how much this image is related to EU visibility actions or rather Georgian aspirations for EU membership and the information about the EU perpetuated by the Government and media itself (unprompted and unrelated to the actions of the EU). Also while stakeholders funded by the EU perceive the EU as 1) a political actor 2) a major donor, a number of interviewees mentioned seeing the EU as a donor first and a political actor second. While the EU is generally viewed positively there was a major disappointment amongst the Georgian population about the lack of Western engagement (primarily NATO and US but also EU) following the war with Russia in 2008.

Also there may be unrealistic expectations about the EU both as an actor in external affairs and as a political and economic Union. How much this unrealistic expectation has been created by visibility action is difficult, if not impossible to discern from a study of this nature. In the interviews the EU was seen as a credible and reliable political and economic actor with a generally positive image prevailing. Overall the image of the EU gained from interviews was largely in line with findings of the ENPI Info Centre public surveys for Georgia, with 91% of opinion formers responding that that Georgia has good or fairly good relations with the EU and 88% of the general population making similar statements (ENPI Info Centre, 2010). Yet there were questions of how well informed/knowledge based the perception of the EU was amongst the general population. It was

[2] Georgia is exceptional in this regard as government, opposition and the broader population have a strong Pro-European attitude.

also unclear if the EU was seeking to convey the message enough on the major forms of mass-media that Georgians respond to – most notably television. Television and media tends to cover "big" issues such as the appointment of the new EU Ambassador or new the EU head of Monitor Missions but not so much how EU engages on a daily basis (confirmed by local media study). On major issues it appears that the US Ambassador (first) and the EU (second) are the two voices of the international community that are sought out by the media.

It is not only the image that the EU has as an actor towards Georgia but rather the EU's internal and external policies towards Russia that contribute to EU visibility in the country (and particularly related to the theme). In the popular media the EU's attitude and actions towards Russia are positively reported when seen as hostile to Russia and negatively reported when seen as overly friendly or applying double standards. (See media survey).

EQ 2 "How well do the Visibility communication priorities (Key Communication Messages from Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, i.e.: why, what, how)[3] achieve their objectives?"

A more specific understanding of the "why" and "what" the EU is trying to achieve in Georgia rather than the broad external action goals (such as human rights and democracy) is less developed from by all stakeholders interviewed. The ENP framework that is suppose to guide all EU action at the macro regional level was only mentioned by one government interviewee, and generally interviewees were broad rather than specific about what EU was trying to achieve in Georgia. Even when questioned about what was being 'communicated' by the EC's engagement in specific projects those interviewed also mentioned rather broad goals than specifics.

EU Ambassador and the EU often are quoted in media and seen along with US as the major international player in the country. Also as an important actor in conflict prevention and peacebuilding the public perception often is coupled with the disappointment regarding the lack of a more militarily robust role in 2008 war. However, the EU suffered less negative fall out from this "disappointment"/unrealistic expectation in Georgia than US or NATO). Also the news cycle has also moved on since 2008 and is not focussing so much on conflict prevention and peacebuilding issues where the EU is concerned but rather more on food safety, visa facilitation, trade, issues although there is still an interest in EU-Russia relations and its indirect relation to the conflict.

EQ 3 To what extent does the EC view itself as implementing a single, clearly defined Visibility strategy to achieve an agreed public image for its external action?

Different policy arms of the European Commission (including beyond DEVCO/EEAS) seem to develop their own policy messages without reference to each other coming from Brussels (trade, visa facilitation, external action, human rights, IDPs, EU-Russia). It was difficult for the EU Delegation in Georgia to keep on top of all of this and mostly it is reactive when stories "break" in the media in terms of responding to the policy messages generated by different entities in Brussels. At the Georgian level in some areas (such as Human Rights) there have been attempts to develop a comprehensive strategy with communications ideas attached. But this is more the exception rather than the rule. EC officials interviewed questioned the challenge of developing a single clearly defined visibility strategy in the absence of a clear higher level political strategy for Georgia. A visibility strategy developed by the EU Delegation was considered highly sensitive and it was unclear whether it had been officially signed off by the new Head of Delegation/Ambassador, or whether it may be further revised in light of developments regarding the coming into being and functioning of the EEAS.

Generally the EC officials viewed that they were more reactive than proactive in portrayal of EU perspectives on issues in the public domain (but potentially it is difficult to get issues into the public domain proactively unless they have already become a "news story"), despite the best efforts of EC officials with standard tools such as press releases. EU entities generally noted overall there were not

[3] Section 2.2 of Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner's Draft Communication to the Commission: 2 Feb 2006, "The EU in the World: Towards a Communication Strategy for the EU's External Policy 2006-2009"

any problems of inconsistency at the meta level within Georgia. There is a question if the EU Institutions/EEAS have a clear and detailed political strategy in Georgia from which a coherent visibility strategy can flow rather than broad strategic orientations only. Various stakeholders (including but beyond EU officials) noted that the absence of a clear and detailed political strategy made it difficult for the EU to have a consistent visibility strategy. Particularly as getting into the mass media to reach the wider population would require engagement on high profile political issues rather than downstream implementation activities that the EC was funding.

EQ 4 "How well do stakeholders perceive the benefits of EU external action and not just its main features?"

It is not EC visibility actions that alone generate stakeholders' views of EU external action, as in Georgia this is heavily influenced by the specificities of the Georgian context. Of the recurring themes noted by those interviewed were 1) Georgia sees itself as a European country wanting to positively culturally identify with European values and the EU 2) The Government's (and most of the oppositions) official policy is to work towards EU membership 3) A significant percentage of the population think that Georgia is already an EU member (ENPI Info Centre, 2010). Yet the EU's collective financial and political weight is felt (albeit not at the level some would wish or think is possible). The EU is seen as credible and reliable partner to the government, the broader society and most implementing partners. Also stakeholders, and particularly implementing partners see that it in most circumstances it is useful to have the "EU" visibility in Georgia as it adds credibility and weight to funded actions in most circumstances. Overall in Georgia there is a positive feeling towards the EU as a political entity and an actor within the Georgian context. Some significant degree of caution should be exercised in attributing this positive image to EU visibility actions.

EQ 5 To what extent is the EC's visibility/communication work coordinated and complementary with that of the EU Member States, Council and Parliament?

Information sharing and some coordination exist at the political level (HOMs, EUMM briefings) and on an ad hoc basis. No formal mechanisms to coordinate visibility messages amongst the EU family were discovered in country and some degree of competition between EU bodies and also a desire to have some distance is noted due to because of different mandates and purposes (EU Delegation, EUSR-G/EUSR-SC, EUMM). The EUMM, EU Delegation and EUSR each have their own communication/visibility strategies and there was no evidence of formal harmonization despite generally good working relations. But some informal and ad hoc methods are used particularly on sensitive matters and there are political forums for coordination that do seem to discuss issues relevant to visibility (HoMs meetings, EUMM briefings, EUSR sharing info with Delegation, EUMM briefing HoD on sensitive issues). EUMM and EUSRs tend to make that many official public statements so when they do these are checked/coordinated with the embassy. Yet there is competition between EU actors in Georgia that is not always helpful as different EU entities leadership are vying for their own visibility. At times EU member-states are portrayed as not coherent in their foreign policy actions with overall EU approaches to external action (France / Germany portrayed as more pro-Russian in the press given their stances towards Russia) but it is unclear as to what EU visibility/communications could do about this or whether it would be a good use of resources. This is because the foreign policies of France and Germany are generally more 'friendly' towards Russia than those of newer EU member-states such as Estonia and Poland.

While more coherence in EU visibility is desirable there were no major incidents identified where the lack of coherence had resulted in a significant difficulty for the EU in Georgia. This does not mean these have not occurred, and it seemed in some interviews if there were incidents. But given their extreme sensitivity officials were unwilling to talk about them even if they would not be identified in the interviews.

Yet many EU stakeholders questioned whether the EU's collective "weight" was being brought to bear on relevant issues in Georgia or whether the EU was "visible enough". There was some hope/expectation from EU stakeholders that the EEAS may bring greater coherence "oversight" and direction which would then would follow through to visibility. At the same time there was also

scepticism if this would really be the case. It is too early to really judge in this regard. Yet in the absence of an agreed EU political strategy for Georgia and different mandates for EU bodies in country and different perspectives of EU member-states it may be difficult to achieve entirely coherent EU visibility.

EQ 6 Are the EC's messages coherent across different EU external action and internal policy areas?

Generally stakeholders interviewed did not have a sophisticated enough understanding of the details of EU internal and external policy areas to pick up inconsistencies amongst them. As noted above the different DGs of the Commission have their own communication strategies and do communicate in the public domain in Georgia but not always in reference to or coordination with each other. Some keen interest amongst certain elite stakeholders and journalists about how EU policies related to trade and visa facilitation were noted. Again these should be seen in the framework of (1) desire for Georgian visa free access and most favourable trading relations and (2) Russia-Georgian relations. Here Georgian officials and media were at times questioning why Russia that had "invaded" Georgia in 2009 - and had been acknowledged by the EU to have done so - would get what they see as preferential treatment for visas over or in equal to Georgians that had friendly relations with the EU. Therefore inconsistencies on Human Rights and Freedom of Movement and visa facilitation were picked up by a few stakeholders and presented in the press. Also certain issues associated with EU Food Safety seemed to have been deliberately misreported for political ends, that is deliberate falsehoods about how EU food safety rules were impeding legitimate Georgian entry to EU markets. However, the EU did issue rebuttals that were also picked up in some of the Georgian press. Generally however it seems that inconsistencies between EU external and internal action are not picked up by the general population, whether or not the EU communicates coherently or incoherently.

EQ 7 "How far does the perception of the value added of the EU as a global actor emerge clearly from its presence as in the major international organisations/fora?"

The UN and EU relationship in Georgia is more than just about "visibility", rather there is a clear added value on both sides for working together. In Georgia the EU is the major donor to the UN and its agencies. It is this role as a donor rather than the EU's role as a political actor in international fora that is the role in which the EU is visible for in Georgia. There have been some incidents where EU has not received appropriate levels of visibility for UN funded projects particularly where the UNHCR has been concerned with one instance in particular with EU IfS funding not getting appropriate visibility yet this has now be addressed. With UNDP, FAO and UNICEF the EU-UN relationship seems to be adequate with only one UN agency the UNHCR was there a particular past incident where there was a breach of visibility commitments that has not been addressed. UN agencies in Georgia seem acutely aware of the issue of importance of EU visibility with difficulties existing in the past. What particularly frustrated the EU was that it wasn't a question of resources but rather not following through on commitments. Yet an on-going tension between the EU some UN agencies has remained with EU officials noting that it does not get in their minds appropriate levels of visibility from its funding of certain UN agencies (in contrast to INGOs and local CBOs who seem to be more creative and willing in pursuing EC visibility actions).

EQ 8 "How far are the resources mobilized by the EC adequate (human resources, budget) to carry out its visibility/communication strategy?"

The EU Delegation is seen and appreciated for having responsive, open and accessible staff with good knowledge that are available to both journalists and to other stakeholders both on and off the record. Only in a very few interviewees questioned the accessibility to EU Delegation staff on visibility matters. Also access beyond communication specialists to the EU Ambassador, task managers and thematic specialists in the EU Delegation was also particularly appreciated by stakeholders (and also seemed appreciated by EU Delegation officials that there was a culture to be able to engage publically). Indeed this is also noted as an efficient way to engage with journalists and other stakeholders if all EU Delegation officials can speak to the press and others.

Box 3: Increasing the EU's "voices" at country level – The role of EU Delegation staff as spokespeople

In interviews during the Georgia case study field visit it was established that EU Delegation staff including contract agents were encouraged at had the right to speak to journalists on topics within their competence. Additional support was given by the press and communication officer to these staff when they requested it as well. EU Delegation staff and contract agents highly appreciated this level of trust and flexibility shown to them by the senior management of the EU Delegation. On the demand side the capitol (Tbilisi) based members of the media interviewed were also extremely positive about the level of access they had to staff across the EU Delegation it being a recurring positive theme in almost all interviews with this target group. Obviously Georgia is a particular case in which you have a largely positive press and a pro-EU country, so caution should be taken on replicating it without taking context into consideration. But clearly the fact that EU Delegation staff had this greater responsibility was appreciated both by themselves and by their interlocutors in the media

The EU Delegation seems to be effectively mobilized for visibility at elite level. No external actors interviewed thought that the EU Delegation lacked the staff, resources or guidance on visibility in Georgia and no internal EU interviewed complained about lack of financial resources. There were some questions about the professional capacity and capabilities of the Georgian media which complicates the EU Delegation's communication and visibility engagements, although Georgia is one of the more advanced countries in the region in this regards. There is also a question if there is sufficient breadth of expertise on communications issues in non-communications specialist staff within the EU Delegations. Also questions came from stakeholders about whether the EU is "visible" or proactive enough in challenging the government, in public statements and visibility that is sometimes perceived as too deferential (perspective of journalists, UN agencies, INGOs, local NGOs). In the media monitoring of Georgia this perception was also confirmed. The EU Delegation may have a lack of visibility on certain sensitive actions towards the government as part of its political approach or due to the lack of clear political decision to challenge the government, rather than human resources and budget. Yet it can be questioned how efficient EU Delegation staff can be in promoting visibility when political prioritisation is not clear on certain issues. Connected to this it is questionable how much more efficient the EU Delegation staff can be in promoting visibility when political prioritisation is not clear on certain issues.

EQ 9 "To what extent are the results in terms of stakeholder perceptions commensurate with the cost of conveying the messages both in financial and organisational terms?"

The EU Delegation seems to be efficient at conveying messages to elites and those that are recipients of EC funds (directly or indirectly) on a relatively small budget. Other EU entities such as the EUMM are effective in communicating with those communities it comes into direct contact with (more effective than the EU Delegation however the EU Delegation doesn't have its own direct projects in communities). Yet with the EUMM, this is only a tiny proportion of the population. There are a number of questions around if the EU through its visibility actions has been "reaching" the broader popular perception (more than the Tbilisi elite or those implementing partners and/or communities that accept EC funds). Yet this would require a popular media that finds it interesting enough to engage with the EU on the issues that the EU is trying to promote, and this is not always self-evident or straightforward. It is far from clear whether or not additional resources would actually assist in achieving this.

There were some questions amongst implementing partners (UN, INGOs, CSOs) using EC funds about the level of resources and activities that have to be devoted or required to be devoted from these funds to EC visibility as being too much. However, this was a minority opinion among those interviewed. It is, however that the cultural context and the feeling of gratitude for EC supports prevented some local implementers from uttering criticism on the extent of EU visibility requirements (and the resources require to be devoted to them. Yet others see that this devotion of resources (financial and organisational) is only problematic if you "view visibility for visibility sake", rather than an integral part of the project achieving its own objectives. Indeed it would seem some of the most creative approaches to promoting EU visibility adopted by INGOs such as Oxfam and NRC (TV slots, information campaigns, commissioning documentaries for local TV) were driven by

an approach that sees visibility as integral to achieving the mission of the organisation and the goals of the project. In this regard publicising close association with the EU is often seen as something positive to be exploited rather than as an additional chore or cost to be met. However, there are some double standards here, with the EU wanting both visibility for actions that it funds, but also a disclaimer so it can disassociate itself.

EQ 10 How effectively do EC external action staff from different services translate the visibility strategy they are expected to implement into action plans that are consistent amongst each other?

A nascent overarching communication strategy does exist at level of EU Delegation yet its status was currently unclear – and action plans exist in most circumstances for EC funded actions. Action plans and actions of EC partners seen seem to be well developed (often with EU Delegation technical support) at level of INGO/Georgian implementing partners. These action plans and visibility actions have been recently adapted in "conflict situations" for a more flexible and nuanced approach to the specificities of this context. Yet questions if they are fully "conflict sensitive" (planned, implemented and evaluated with their impact on conflict dynamics as a key consideration) remain. No serious consistency issues emerged from the different action plans seen nor did the stakeholders interviewed identify any.

6.5 Conclusions and Recommendations

6.5.1 Conclusions and Recommendations related to Hypotheses

Hypothesis one "At the country level it is difficult to differentiate between the EC and EU level with the entire EU benefitting or "suffering" from EU visibility efforts that may or may not be coherent with each other".

Evidence from the country case study largely proves this hypothesis **largely validated**. This lack of differentiation is at its strongest in terms of EU entities (Different DGs, EEAS, EUMM, EUSR-Georgia, EUSR-South Caucasus) where distinction is not made even amongst many elites/journalists. There is some differentiation at elite/journalist level between the actions of EU member-states some of which are clearly viewed (and reported as such) as more "pro-Russian" in the conflict dynamics because of specific actions towards Russia while others are viewed as more friendly to Georgia (primarily former Soviet block countries that are now EU members).

- **Recommendation:** Coherence of action and messages is necessary to maintain credibility so this should flow from an agreed EU political strategy. The EU in its visibility actions should not spend time or resources in differentiating its different aspects and be aware that all "EU" actors will be perceived as one entity.

Hypothesis two states "The EU has a lack of visibility in the thematic area of Crisis & fragile states, conflict prevention & peace building not because of visibility actions but rather its ability to achieve outcomes".

This was also **largely validated** yet it also relates in Georgia to the high expectations the Georgian people and elites had of the EU/NATO in solving the conflict. To those that come in direct contact with the EU as an implementing partners the EU is seen as a credible and reliable partner including in the areas of conflict prevention and peace building and it is the EU's diplomatic action and financial resources that give it credibility not its specific visibility actions.

- **Recommendation: The** EU should be mindful of the expectations it creates by its visibility actions. In crisis states and fragility seeking conflict prevention and peace building outcomes should be where the overwhelming focus should be placed. Visibility actions by themselves could be counter-productive if there is a credibility gap from what the EU "claims" as outcomes and its contribution and what people/elites both experience and perceive as the EU's contribution to outcomes.

Hypothesis three suggested "The EC/EU visibility is diluted or enhanced by working with international partners on Crisis & fragile states: conflict prevention & peace building". EC/EU visibility is **somewhat diluted in working with international partners** particularly UN agencies. Local and international NGOs seemed to be better, more cost effective and creative that UN agencies in bringing about EC/EU visibility in their projects. This was largely as they saw a distinct added value in being clearly associated with the EU while the UN wants to appear sometimes more neutral. Yet the UN is a crucial implementing partner for the EU in Georgia in the field of crisis & fragile states: conflict prevention and peace building.

- **Recommendation:** 1) Ensure that UN agencies and their implementing partners follow visibility guidelines and monitor this closely, but accept that some loss of EU visibility may be an acceptable "trade off" as the UN is a crucial implementing partner that adds value beyond merely visibility 2) acknowledge good work in the INGO/CSO field to reward and incentivise performance in terms of visibility.

The **fourth hypothesis** posits that "At times there may be good reasons for achieving outcomes to have less, diminished or no visibility in the theme of crisis states and fragility: conflict prevention and peace building".

This was **strongly endorsed** that there are times that less, diminished or no visibility is particularly appropriate in Crisis and Fragile States: Conflict Prevention and Peace Building. Although the converse is also at times true, for example that strong EU visibility in Georgia actually may be positive in some circumstances for achieving outcomes in conflict prevention and peace building. This therefore calls for a differentiated response.

- **Recommendation:** The EU visibility guidelines place a strong emphasis on the importance of "conflict sensitivity" and "risk management". That is that EU visibility must be planned, implemented and evaluated with its possible impact on conflict dynamics as a key consideration. If in the initial phases EU visibility is regarded as a risk that could damage potential goals or at worst put implementers and those participating at risk then a differentiated response must be allowed with limited or no visibility[4]. There must be no unyielding requirements to follow EU visibility guidelines if specific reasons can be presented why they may be counterproductive for conflict prevention and peace building aims or the safety of staff or implementers.

6.5.2 Conclusions and Recommendations related to Evaluation Questions

EQ 1*"How well does the image of the external action of the EU perceived by the stakeholders correspond to the key issues outlined in the definition and objectives of this external action (Nice Treaty: Art. 8 & 11; Lisbon Treaty: Art. 3 & 21) and to the image the EU seeks to convey?"*

Finding: That the EU is broadly perceived to be in line with the definitions and objectives of external action. Yet it may relate more to expectations of population and elites in Georgia than specific actions taken by the EU in terms of visibility.

EQ 2 "*How well do the Visibility communication priorities (Key Communication Messages from Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, i.e.: why, what, how) achieve their objectives?"*

Finding: Amore specific understanding of the EU's "why, what, and how "is some what blurred and not widely understood within Georgian context. Almost all actors interviewed (and much of the media reporting) thought the EU should more visibly challenge the government on the detail of issues around democracy, human rights, IDPs, health etc.

EQ 3 *To what extent does the EC view itself as implementing a single, clearly defined Visibility strategy to achieve an agreed public image for its external action?*

[4] The EU's Communication and Visibility Manual, 2010 (p.17) allows for exceptions to be made for security.

Finding: That the EC itself is quite self-critical and notes that it is not implementing this, but it is also that this is difficult to achieve in the absence of a clear EU political strategy in Georgia and given the different mandates and priorities of different EC entities.

EQ 4 "*How well do stakeholders perceive the benefits of EU external action and not just its main features?"*

Finding: It is not EC visibility actions alone that generate stakeholders' views of EU external action. The majority of the population does not come into direct contact with the EU. But the EU is seen as a credible and reliable partner by elite/journalists/and implementing partners and it is useful to have the "EU" visibility in Georgia as it adds credibility and weight to funded actions in most circumstances. The general population was found to have a very positive view of the EU as verified by independent polls.

EQ 5 *To what extent is the EC's visibility/communication work coordinated and complementary with that of the EU Member States, Council and Parliament?*

Finding: There is no evidence that the EC's visibility/communication work is coordinated with that of EU Member-States, Council or the Parliament in Georgia. There is some political coordination through EU HOMs and action of EUMM, and on messaging on particularly sensitive conflict matters. Yet the EU is widely seen as not bringing its collective weight to bear on relevant issues because it is not speaking with one voice or consistently (this view is strongly shared by EU stakeholders that were interviewed themselves).

EQ 6 *Are the EC's messages coherent across different EU external action and internal policy areas?*

Finding: Generally stakeholders interviewed did not have a sophisticated enough understanding of the details of EU internal and external policy areas to pick up inconsistencies amongst them. Yet some journalists and NGOs did note that in their perception the EU is not consistent in its actions towards Russia (trade and visa free travel). E.g. That Russia is given preferential trade and visa arrangements by the EU over or equal to those of Georgia when EU widely criticised Russia's conduct in the Georgian conflict of 2008. These "inconsistencies" are picked up in the Georgian media, yet not all are always accurately reported.

EQ 7 *"How far does the perception of the value added of the EU as a global actor emerge clearly from its presence as in the major international organisations/fora?* "

Finding: The EU loses visibility working through international organisations in Georgia. While more can be done to ensure that it looses less visibility it is an inevitable trade off that working through international organisations that add value and have a particular role but will detract from EU visibility.

EQ 8 *"How far are the resources mobilized by the EC adequate (human resources, budget) to carry out its visibility/communication strategy?"*

Finding: The resources were seen as adequate. What was cited as a more crucial obstacle to EU visibility is clear and consistent political direction and follow through on this.

EQ 9 *"To what extent are the results in terms of stakeholder perceptions commensurate with the cost of conveying the messages both in financial and organisational terms?"*

The EU Delegation seems to be efficient at conveying messages to elites and to those that are recipients of EC funds directly (as implementing partners) or recipients of these funds. A number questioned if EU was "reaching" popular perception in wider Georgia society (i.e. beyond Tbilisi elite focused or those communities that the EC implementing partners are operational in). It is unclear whether additional resources would assist here.

EQ 10 *How effectively do EC external action staff from different services translate the visibility strategy they are expected to implement into action plans that are consistent amongst each other?*

Finding: Some action plans do exist with practical ideas of events, press release, videos, and documentaries for local TV, EU branding of products, special launch/opening activities.

Implementing partners are also assisted in developing their own action plans by the EU Delegation themselves.

ANNEX 1: STANDARD FORMAT FOR COLLECTING EVIDENCE IN RELATION TO THE EQS (GEORGIA)

EQ 1	"How well does the image of the external action of the EU perceived by the stakeholders correspond to the key issues outlined in the definition and objectives of this external action (Nice Treaty: Art. 8 & 11; Lisbon Treaty: Art. 3 & 21) and to the image the EU seeks to convey?"	
Expected Judgment Criteria & Indicators	**Evidence identified from …**	**Relevant To**
JC.1.1. The EU has managed to disseminate the message to the relevant stakeholders in terms of content and reasons for its external action		All
Indicator 1.1.1 The stakeholders know the definition of the external action of the EU Indicator 1.1.2 The stakeholders know the content of the definition of the external action of the EU	- People were asking questions about EU's intentions (GFTVE-I-1's answer: support of democratic aspirations/ values), - Conferences taking place in country make strategic purpose more clear than plugs and signs (GFTVE-I-2) - EU entities on the ground: need for clear political guidance (GFTVE-I-3) - Need to be clear what external actions wants and what message it wants to convey (GFTVE-I-3)	All
JC.1.2. The EU has managed to transmit an image to stakeholders that correspond to the image that was sought to be conveyed		All
Indicator 1.2.1 The images that are widely perceived by the stakeholders correspond to the communication objectives of the EU on its external action	- EU is more than a donor, is an ally in advocacy and an ally in negotiations with the government. More important than the donor part. Without that we really have a problem. (GFTVE-I-4) - Some certain situations during which the EU was very helpful: List of all projects required in Abkhazia, EU supports implementing agencies. EU and other donors back up. Eviction centers: EU helped to explain to the government why it is important to respect rules and timelines. Has changed the culture of things. (GFTVE-I-4) - As it gets sensitive: Division of roles: EU: Interlocutor to governments, Lobbying behind the scenes. EUD very engaged. No public press statements. The one taking a stance publicly then is UNHCR. (GFTVE-I-4) - image the EU projects in Georgia: big and serious player (giving resources to organisations to enable theme to operate to meet the needs of vulnerable	All

	people in Georgia) (GFTVE-I-5) - Conferences taking place in country make strategic purpose more clear than plugs and signs (GFTVE-I-2) - Image of EU: really positive, has influence over the government, can change things, Georgia on its way to model life in a European manner (GFTVE-I-6) - Visibility is not something that can stand alone: need to fill certain policy areas with content first (GFTVE-I-7)	

Preliminary Finding:

Stakeholders articulated their view of the image EU external action in terms of rights, democratisation, peace and security, good governance, humanitarian concerns, economic development objectives, and democratic values. Also the view of "preparing Georgia for EU membership" was also mentioned. Some misunderstandings of EU entities and difference between them were not understood and "EU jargon" cited as getting in the way of understanding the different aspects of the EU. It is unclear how much this image is related to EU visibility actions or rather Georgian aspirations for EU membership and the information about the EU perpetuated by the Government and media itself (unprompted and unrelated to the actions of the EU). Also while stakeholders funded by the EU perceive the EU as 1) a political actor 2) a major donor, a number of interviewees mentioned seeing the EU as a donor first and a political actor second. While the EU is generally viewed positively there was a major disappointment amongst the Georgian population about the lack of Western engagement (primarily NATO and US but also EU) following the war with Russia in 2008.

Also there may be unrealistic expectations about the EU both as an actor in external affairs and as a political and economic Union. How much this unrealistic expectation has been created by visibility action is difficult, if not impossible to discern from a study of this nature. In the interviews the EU was seen as a credible and reliable political and economic actor with a generally positive image prevailing. Overall the image of the EU gained from interviews was largely in line with findings of the ENPI Info Centre public surveys for Georgia, with 91% of opinion formers responding that that Georgia has good or fairly good relations with the EU and 88% of the general population making similar statements (ENPI Info Centre, 2010). Yet there were questions of how well informed/knowledge based the perception of the EU was amongst the general population, It was also unclear if the EU was seeking to convey the message enough on the major forms of mass-media that Georgians respond to – most notably television. Television and media tends to cover "big" issues such as the appointment of the new EU Ambassador or new the EU head of Monitor Missions but not so much how EU engages on a daily basis (confirmed by local media study). On major issues it appears that the US Ambassador (first) and the EU (second) are the two voices of the international community that are sought out by the media.

It is not only the image that the EU has as an actor towards Georgia but rather the EU's internal and external policies towards Russia that contribute to EU visibility in the country (and particularly related to the theme). In the popular media the EU's attitude and actions towards Russia are positively reported when seen as hostile to Russia and negatively reported when seen as overly friendly or applying double standards. (See media survey).

EQ 2	"How well do the Visibility communication priorities (Key Communication Messages from Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, i.e.: why, what, how)[5] achieve their objectives? "	
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	**Evidence identified from …**	
JC 2.1: The priorities (why, what, how) have been well perceived and understood by the stakeholders		All
Indicator 2.1.1 The stakeholders perceive well why the EU does have an external action Indicator 2.1.2 The stakeholders perceive well what defines EU as an actor on the world stage	- In the Georgian public the EU is so omnipresent that even the meat case sounds convincing (GFTVE-I-8) - 2008 conflict: If we need help the EU is not there (GFTVE-I-9) - Reason for the EU's engagement with Georgia: expand its market (GFTVE-I-10) - EU: Political partner and development partner (GFTVE-I-11) - Why does the EU do support your organization? 2003 Georgia and EU signed agreement on repatriation, Georgia has an obligation in this thing, EU has also interest in it, thematically it was close to the EU's priorities (GFTVE-I-12) - Beneficiaries do not distinguish between different funders as long as they are not the government (GFTVE-I-13) - Conferences taking place in country make strategic purpose more clear than plugs and signs (GFTVE-I-2) - EU priorities: ENP, Eastern partnership, flagship initiatives, panels (GFTVE-I-10) - clear communication of what the EU wants missing (example of economic requirement: "good progress" – unclear what this means, may be it's tactic) (GFTVE-I-10) - EU wants to achieve socio-economic progress in the country, part of the ENP (GFTVE-I-11) - In general people know what we are doing but sometimes we are kidnapped by a certain government (GFTVE-I-14) - EU perceived as the one who channels high resources to rehabilitation (IDP and vulnerable people) (GFTVE-I-5)	All

[5] Section 2.2 of Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner's Draft Communication to the Commission: 2 Feb 2006, "The EU in the World: Towards a Communication Strategy for the EU's External Policy 2006-2009"

Indicator 2.1.3 The stakeholders perceive well how the EU deploys its instruments around the world	- Image of EU: really positive, has influence over the government, can change things, Georgia on its way to model life in a European manner (GFTVE-I-6) - EU messages: aim to improve living conditions of most vulnerable in a sustainable way, society transformation, gender mainstreaming, governance streamed, awareness raising (GFTVE-I-13) - EU flag and involvement boost confidence of beneficiaries into implementor (GFTVE-I-13) - Credibility: general understanding of the Georgian population: Georgia to be integrated into EU (GFTVE-I-13) - Grassroot level: EU is considered a reliable partner, two flags add up to the trust (in Georgia) (GFTVE-I-15) - First few weeks of mandate: school visits in rural areas had a dramatic impact on adjusting people's perceptions to EUMM's mandate (GFTVE-I-16) - Visibility of actions taken is hard to achieve on matters regarding the high political level like policy reform or budget support (no visibility) --> also government usually not very keen on this visibility (GFTVE-I-7) - Visibility is not something that can stand alone: need to fill certain policy areas with content first (GFTVE-I-7)	
JC 2.2.: The formulation of the priorities would have to be changed in order to gain an increased impact		**EC – EC partners**
Indicator 2.2.1 The stakeholders express the need for another formulation about the external action of the EU in order to make it more visible	- There might be other ways of doing visibility. Is visibility the right way? Sometimes it looks very blunt. More stickers than anything else. But what make the difference to the people? (GFTVE-I-4) - Government was/is building the image: EU is the solution to this country (GFTVE-I-5) - EU too dogmatic regarding visibility guideline's details, others much more pragmatic (GFTVE-I-2) - Need to adjust visibility actions more on the local needs, EU is adding up (GFTVE-I-13) - Beneficiaries do not distinguish between different funders as long as they are not the government (GFTVE-I-13) - Problems with visibility: in South Ossetia and Abkhazia: EU was sensitive to these difficulties --> Visibility requirements part of the reporting requirements: decision to decide case by case on this (understanding on the EU side) (GFTVE-I-15)	All – EC partners

	- There is a provisions stating that there are exceptions to implementing visibility (GFTVE-I-15) - Before Visibility: need to work on substance first (GFTVE-I-16) - Need to be clear what external actions wants and what message it wants to convey (GFTVE-I-3) - Results are more important than PR (GFTVE-I-3) - Visibility should not be like promotion: preferable to send out a clear message about the EU's role: Important not to raise unrealistic expectations (GFTVE-I-3) - It would be better if the visibility was directly connected to the activities supported than something attached to it (GFTVE-I-7) - Visibility is not something that can stand alone: need to fill certain policy areas with content first (GFTVE-I-7)	
Preliminary Finding: A more specific understanding of the "why" and "what" the EU is trying to achieve in Georgia rather than the broad external action goals (such as human rights and democracy) is less developed from by all stakeholders interviewed. The ENP framework that is suppose to guide all EU action at the macro regional level was only mentioned by one government interviewee, and generally interviewees were broad rather than specific about what EU was trying to achieve in Georgia. Even when questioned about what was being 'communicated' by the EC's engagement in specific projects those interviewed also mentioned rather broad goals than specifics. EU Ambassador and the EU often are quoted in media and seen along with US as the major international player in the country. Also as an important actor in conflict prevention and peacebuilding the public perception often is coupled with the disappointment regarding the lack of a more militarily robust role in 2008 war. However, the EU suffered less negative fall out from this "disappointment"/unrealistic expectation in Georgia than US or NATO). Also the news cycle has also moved on since 2008 and is not focussing so much on conflict prevention and peacebuilding issues where the EU is concerned but rather more on food safety, visa facilitation, trade, issues although there is still an interest in EU-Russia relations and its indirect relation to the conflict.		

EQ 3	To what extent does the EC view itself as implementing a single, clearly defined Visibility strategy to achieve an agreed public image for its external action?	
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	**Evidence identified from …**	
JC 3.1 – The external actions services have one common visibility strategy	- Slow process of re-branding from Brussels, to ensure greater harmony (GFTVE-I-16) - EEAS: mainly confusion, EUSR: mainly coordinated through ambassador (GFTVE-I-3) - Need to be clear what external actions wants and what message it wants to convey (GFTVE-I-3) - Interaction of different EU entities: there is no communication strategy but need for a two-way dialogue	EU Del

	(GFTVE-I-7) - There is a problem of communication between Brussels and EUD (GFTVE-I-7)	
Indicator 3.1.1 The number of communication / visibility strategies in the EC external action services and the variations between them Indicator 3.1.2 The existence of functioning and respected coordination mechanisms between the responsible services		EU Del
JC 3.2 – Variations between the existing strategies are explained with valid reasons and an effort has been made to ensure overall coherence		EU Del
Indicator 3.2.1 The existence of valid reasons to explain any differences detected between the strategies Indicator 3.2.2 The overall coherence of the existing strategies is explained either in the documents or verbally in a consistent way by the officials responsible for them	- Visibility strategies are applied only to very professional implementers and partners, smaller ones do not have a lot of experience (GFTVE-I-7) - People-to- people programmes (example "Youth in Action") have very good visibility as participants use their own tools like facebook to spread the message of the programme (GFTVE-I-7)	EU Del EU Del
JC 3.3 – The overall strategy or strategies outline a clear and logical path to achieve the visibility goals of EU external action		EU DEl
Indicator 3.3.1 The strategy or strategies are easy to follow, specify a clear goal and outline a logical chain of actions. Indicator 3.3.2 The logic of the chain of actions in the strategy(ies) is robust Indicator 3.3.3 The communication strategies are sound-proofed by communication professionals	- Guidelines perceived as useful, compared to other donors the EU is having more clear guidelines (GFTVE-I-11) - It would be easier if guidelines were clearer, or less dogmatic approach from EUD (GFTVE-I-2) - visibility strategy only for very professional implementers, smaller ones who do not have a lot of experience less pressure; implementers come up with their own ideas of how to implement requirements for visibility (GFTVE-I-7)	EU Del EU Del EU Del
JC 3.4 – Variations between the existing strategies do not cause problems in creating the right visibility	- It would be helpful to have a specialist on IDP/ humanitarian action related to visibility issues, who has the authority to help: Programme staff could be given a bit more responsibility when it comes to the	EU Del / All

	implementation of the guidelines in conflict sensitive cases (GFTVE-I-2) - Problems with visibility: in South Ossetia and Abkhazia: EU was sensitive to these difficulties --> Visibility requirements part of the reporting requirements: decision to decide case by case on this (understanding on the EU side): Use of English as a neutral language (GFTVE-I-15) - There is a provisions stating that there are exceptions to implementing visibility (GFTVE-I-15) - Limits to advertising and spending on it due to ethical codex and people's understandings: EUMM's role adds credibility to the overall presence and image, improves the EUD, adds political weight --> substance over visibility (GFTVE-I-16) - Results should be more important than PR (GFTVE-I-3)	
Indicator 3.4.1 Evidence of difficulties of achieving the visibility objectives Indicator 3.4.2 Evidence of difficulties being ascribed to confusion on objectives or differences of points of view between the responsible services	- Implementers know EU logo has to be displayed. Informing of the EU being involved. Leave it to them how they would like to show visibility. Just has to be approved. More creative ideas needed, guidelines sometimes too strict, sometimes not clear enough (GFTVE-I-4) - EU too dogmatic line regarding the visibility guideline's details, others are much more pragmatic (GFTVE-I-2) - EUMM: most visible international actor (GFTVE-I-16) - Slow process of re-branding from Brussels, to ensure greater harmony (GFTVE-I-16) - Problem with UNDP: beneficiary and public broadcaster not aware of the fact a project was funded by the EU (GFTVE-I-7) - Problem with UNHCR: in the beginning UNHCR contract did not say EU was donor and required UNHCR visibility only ("Winterization and shelter support to Returnees in the Gori-Tskhinvali Corridor") stickers with EU logotypes were gradually attached to each cottage once an EC evaluation found there were no EU tags (GFTVE-I-13) - Sometimes it looks very blunt. More stickers than anything else. But what makes the difference to the people? (GFTVE-I-4) - Implementers tend to restrict to the minimum of current guidelines (GFTVE-I-7) - visibility guidelines: shorter, more consumer friendly version would be preferable, examples of best practices (website for example) would be helpful for implementers (GFTVE-I-7)	All All

Preliminary Finding: Different policy arms of the European Commission (including beyond DEVCO)/EEAS seem to develop their own policy messages without reference to each other coming from Brussels (trade, visa facilitation, external action, human rights, IDPs, EU-Russia). It was difficult for the EU Delegation in Georgia to keep on top of all of this and mostly it is reactive when stories "break" in the media in terms of responding to the policy messages generated by different entities in Brussels. At the Georgian level in some areas (such as Human Rights) there have been attempts to develop a comprehensive strategy with communications ideas attached. But this is more the exception rather than the rule. EC officials interviewed questioned the challenge of developing a single clearly defined visibility strategy in the absence of a clear higher level political strategy for Georgia. A visibility strategy developed by the EU Delegation was considered highly sensitive and it was unclear whether it had been officially signed off by the new Head of Delegation/Ambassador, or whether it may be further revised in light of developments regarding the coming into being and functioning of the EEAS.

Generally the EC officials viewed that they were more reactive than proactive in portrayal of EU perspectives on issues in the public domain (but potentially it is difficult to get issues into the public domain proactively unless they have already become a "news story"), despite the best efforts of EC officials with standard tools such as press releases. EU entities generally noted overall there were not any problems of inconsistency at the meta level within Georgia. There is a question if the EU Institutions/EEAS have a clear and detailed political strategy in Georgia from which a coherent visibility strategy can flow rather than broad strategic orientations only. Various stakeholders (including but beyond EU officials) noted that the absence of a clear and detailed political strategy made it difficult for the EU to have a consistent visibility strategy. Particularly as getting into the mass media to reach the wider population would require engagement on high profile political issues rather than downstream implementation activities that the EC was funding.

EQ 4	"How well do stakeholders perceive the benefits of EU external action and not just its main features?"	
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	**Evidence identified from …**	
JC 4.1. The stakeholders are sufficiently exposed to a communication from the EU on Visibility of its external action that is organised to improve impact, retention, credibility and buying intention	- It is difficult to communicate something like budget support to the broader public (GFTVE-I-9) - The output of EU communication in the form of press releases, workshops and inaction on issues of human rights downgrades EU credibility (GFTVE-I-17) - EU visibility manual: first the one from 2005, now the one of 2010: position of the logo and disclaimer, guidelines are very clear and significant, we know EU pays a lot of attention to visibility: We and all our implementing partners double-check before anything goes to the print (GFTVE-I-5) - EU messages: aim to improve living conditions of most vulnerable in a sustainable way, society transformation, gender mainstreaming, governance streamed, awareness raising (GFTVE-I-13) - Not aware there is a visibility plan (GFTVE-I-15) - Formalized communication system between EUD and other EU entities: everyone issues	All

	press statements independently, not really exchanges (GFTVE-I-3)	
Indicator 4.1.1 The communication strategies are designed to improve impact, retention, credibility and "adherence/agreement" at the level of targeted stakeholders Indicator 4.1.2 The communication strategies are implemented to improve impact, retention, credibility and buying intention at the level of targeted stakeholders Indicator 4.1.3 The communication strategies are monitored and evaluated on impact, retention, credibility and buying intention at the level of targeted stakeholders	- Visibility is not an aim in itself: some policy areas have to be filled with content first (GFTVE-I-7)	EU Del EU Del EU Del
JC 4.2. The stakeholders perceive and value the differences between the benefits of the EU external action and the results or the features/instruments		
Indicator 4.2.1 The communication strategies are designed to improve the perception of benefits at the level of targeted stakeholders Indicator 4.2.2 The communication strategies are implemented to improve the perception of benefits at the level of targeted stakeholders Indicator 4.1.3 The communication strategies are monitored and evaluated on the perception of benefits of targeted stakeholders	- EU requirements by far most elaborated. Many donors find it extremely unfair that EU gets so much visibility though their donations are strictly earmarked whereas others might do less. US same amount, but less visibility. EU most demanding to the annoyance of other donors which implementor has to balance (GFTVE-I-4) - Limits to advertising and spending on it due to ethical codex and people's understandings (GFTVE-I-16) - Compared to other donors: EU very demanding (with USAID at the same time), least flexible, very strict (GFTVE-I-13) - EU needs to identify what it wants to achieve in terms of communication before. Just Putting a plug might even be counterproductive. EU will have to do something beyond the funding to win hearts and minds (GFTVE-I-4) - visibility guidelines: shorter, more consumer friendly guidelines would be preferable, examples of best practices (accessible on a website for example) would be helpful (GFTVE-I-7)	EU Del
Preliminary Finding: It is not EC visibility actions that alone generate stakeholders' views of EU external action, as in Georgia this is heavily influenced by the specificities of the Georgian context. Of the recurring themes noted by those interviewed were 1) Georgia sees itself as a European country wanting to positively culturally identify with European values and the EU 2) The Government's (and most of the		

oppositions) official policy is to work towards EU membership 3) A significant percentage of the population think that Georgia is already an EU member (ENPI Info Centre, 2010). Yet the EU's collective financial and political weight is felt (albeit not at the level some would wish or think is possible). The EU is seen as credible and reliable partner to the government, the broader society and most implementing partners. Also stakeholders, and particularly implementing partners see that it in most circumstances it is useful to have the "EU" visibility in Georgia as it adds credibility and weight to funded actions in most circumstances. Overall in Georgia there is a positive feeling towards the EU as a political entity and an actor within the Georgian context. Some significant degree of caution should be exercised in attributing this positive image to EU visibility actions.

EQ 5	To what extent is the EC's visibility/communication work coordinated and complementary with that of the EU Member States, Council and Parliament?	
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	**Evidence identified from …**	
JC5.1 – The EC, MS and Council have a established coordination mechanism to discuss visibility issues	- EU MS & embassies: very good cooperation, weekly update to which all embassies (incl. US, Japanese & Swiss embassies plus UN) are invited (most of them attend) (GFTVE-I-16) - EUD receives more detailed information, EUD will issue statement together based on the information they get from us (independent, balanced) (GFTVE-I-16) - Operational: increasingly effective cooperation over the past years, conscious of post-Lisbon changes (GFTVE-I-16) - Georgia: could be a wonderful test case for the EEAS to be coherent with all the different EU actors involved regarding substance (GFTVE-I-16) - EUMM: own communication strategy (GFTVE-I-16) - Public statements: only make statements when there is a security related issue which would benefit from EUMM making a statement (usually in response to an incident), that's been done by EUMM themselves (part of mandate) (GFTVE-I-16) - Weekly EUMM meeting has now become standard weekly regular point where international community can receive information (GFTVE-I-16) - Political leadership: EUSR mandate to give political guidance to EUMM, not clear whether EUSR part of EEAS or not, chain of command for EUMM, EUD & EUSR is different (GFTVE-I-3)	**EU Del, EUMM, EUSR, EU MS**
Indicator 5.1.1 Evidence of such a	- Regular meetings with EUD and EUMM to	

coordination mechanism (minutes of meetings held at regular intervals, agenda items on existing Council working groups, etc) being used regularly. Indicator 5.1.2 Evidence that points agreed on coordination and complementarity of visibility work are then followed up by actions by each of the three parties	discuss what is important for their work (GFTVE-I-3) - HoDs meetings: depends on situation whether information or need to speak out with one voice (GFTVE-I-18) - In practice there are consultations with EU funding actors and MS: example: 18 shooting incident, content of what EUMM will publicly say will not be a surprise nor undermine role of other EU actors (GFTVE-I-16) - EUMM currently restricting public communication to issues of security (GFTVE-I-16)	
JC5.2 – Council, EP and MS representatives are aware that their actions have an impact on the visibility of the EU as a whole	- EUMM: most visible international actor (not only EU actor) but feedback to the EUD (GFTVE-I-16) - EUMM visibility actions incorporate information of the overall EU context (GFTVE-I-16) - EUMM: most visible international actor but they feedback to the EUD (GFTVE-I-16) - Yes but they go their own way anyway (GFTVE-I-19)	EU Del, EUMM, EUSR, EU MS
Indicator 5.2.1 Evidence of discussions on the need to coordinate with the Commission on visibility Indicator 5.2.2 Evidence that these discussions on the need to coordinate with the Commission on visibility are then followed up by action	- EU agreed regarding visibility: lack of coherence is the problem not lack of strategy (example: meeting with EU representatives after which each spread different messages) (GFTVE-I-20) - In practice there are consultations with EU funding actors and MS: example: 18 shooting incident, content of what EUMM will publicly say will not be a surprise nor undermine role of other EU actors (GFTVE-I-16) - Trying to do some joint events but not always possible: example of such an event: musicians for Polish Presidency: EUD did not have the funds to participate but EUMM made sure their visibility actions did not contradict EUD actions (GFTVE-I-16)	EU Del, EUMM, EUSR, EU MS
JC5.3 – EC representatives take regular steps to liaise with MS, Council and EP on visibility issues in EU external action	- Joint event: European education fair organized together with EU MS (DAAD, British Council etc.)	EU Del, EUMM, EUSR, EUMM, EU MS
Indicator 5.3.1 Evidence of discussions on the need to coordinate with the Member States, Council and EP on visibility	- Discussion between EU ambassadors in Georgia: before Lisbon coherence needed to be discussed, inconsistency between different voices (GFTVE-I-18) - Strong EU MS in Georgia complicate having one voice (GFTVE-I-18)	EU Del, EUMM, EUSR, EU MS

Indicator 5.3.2 Evidence that these discussions on the need to coordinate with the Member States, Council and EP on visibility are then followed up by action	- Discussions about joint visibility are taking place. This concerns joint statements/ press release (coordination only since 3 years) (GFTVE-I-18) - Without Geneva talks, without EUMM we would have a completely different situation - on the ground: EU only actor, EU playing the main role (GFTVE-I-18) - What do EEAS & DEVCO need to know: key thing is coordination, we work well with EUD, but EUD has some difficulties concerning funding – EUMM has a very specific role to play, their main focus is on their own mandate (GFTVE-I-16) - EUMM provides EUD with more detailed information on the areas they work in: procedure: EUMM & EUD will issue a statement together based (GFTVE-I-16) - Unclear during Hungarian presidency: who has which role, now it's clearer, EU ambassador having the coordinating role (GFTVE-I-18) - Lower level coordination: EUD coordinating very well (donors) (GFTVE-I-18) - There is only space for one voice from Brussels (Trade, external relations) (GFTVE-I-18) - In practice there are consultations with EU funding actors and MS: example: 18 shooting incident, content of what EUMM will publicly say will not be a surprise nor undermine role of other EU actors (GFTVE-I-16) - Pens & other visibility gadgets gets through to us only very slowly (GFTVE-I-16)	
JC5.4 – Outside observers in a particular context (eg. In a partner country) see the EU (eg. MS embassies and EU Delegation) acting as a single entity rather than as a group of discordant actors	- General public confuses the Council of Europe with EU entities and perceives all as one (GFTVE-I-21) - Unclear to Georgian politicians which EU representation is the one that is most important, which one should be listened to (GFTVE-I-20) - All EU MS are perceived as a European block (GFTVE-I-18) - Confusion of NATO & EU membership among wider public (GFTVE-I-18)	All

	- We were inexperienced when we applied for EU funding, had lots of questions on visibility, but consultations on visibility directly from Brussels, funding from Brussels directly (GFTVE-I-12) - EUD: made them pay attention to the tender, EUD helpful in preparing their application (all country programme) (GFTVE-I-12) - EUMM are participating in COBERM events (GFTVE-I-15) - Formalized communication system between EUD and other EU entities: everyone issues press statements independently, not really exchanges (GFTVE-I-3)	
Indicator 5.4.1 No evidence emerges from interviewees or reports of examples of uncoordinated action on visibility or of MS actions conveying contradictory messages to the Commission	- Incoherences between MS & EU: example FTA negotiations with EC (GFTVE-I-10) - Cooperation directly with DG Region & the EUD (GFTVE-I-11) - It would be helpful to have specialist on IDP/ humanitarian action related to visibility issues, who has the authority to help (communication staff not sensitive enough to adapt guidelines in a conflict –sensitive way) (GFTVE-I-2) - Programme staff could be given a bit more responsibility when it comes to the implementation of the guidelines (GFTVE-I-2) - EUMM has its own communication strategy (GFTVE-I-16) - EUMM has to spend more time on what it is doing individually (GFTVE-I-16)	All

Preliminary Finding:. Information sharing and some coordination exist at the political level (HOMs, EUMM briefings) and on an ad hoc basis. No formal mechanisms to coordinate visibility messages amongst the EU family were discovered in country and some degree of competition between EU bodies and also a desire to have some distance is noted due to because of different mandates and purposes (EU Delegation, EUSR-G/EUSR-SC, EUMM). The EUMM, EU Delegation and EUSR each have their own communication/visibility strategies and there was no evidence of formal harmonization despite generally good working relations. But some informal and ad hoc methods are used particularly on sensitive matters and there are political forums for coordination that do seem to discuss issues relevant to visibility (HoMs meetings, EUMM briefings, EUSR sharing info with Delegation, EUMM briefing HoD on sensitive issues). EUMM and EUSRs tend to make that many official public statements so when they do these are checked/coordinated with the embassy. Yet there is competition between EU actors in Georgia that is not always helpful as different EU entities leadership are vying for their own visibility. At times EU member-states are portrayed as not coherent in their foreign policy actions with overall EU approaches to external action(France / Germany portrayed as more pro-Russian in the press given their stances towards Russia) but it is unclear as to what EU visibility/communications could do about this or whether it would be a good use of resources. This is because the foreign policies of France and Germany are generally more 'friendly' towards Russia than those of newer EU member-states such as Estonia and Poland.

While more coherence in EU visibility is desirable there were no major incidents identified where the lack of coherence had resulted in a significant difficulty for the EU in Georgia. This does not mean these have not occurred, and it seemed in some interviews if there were incidents. But given their extreme sensitivity

officials were unwilling to talk about them even if they would not be identified in the interviews.

Yet many EU stakeholders questioned whether the EU's collective "weight" was being brought to bear on relevant issues in Georgia or whether the EU was "visible enough". There was some hope/expectation from EU stakeholders that the EEAS may bring greater coherence "oversight" and direction which would then would follow through to visibility. At the same time there was also scepticism if this would really be the case. It is too early to really judge in this regard. Yet in the absence of an agreed EU political strategy for Georgia and different mandates for EU bodies in country and different perspectives of EU member-states it may be difficult to achieve entirely coherent EU visibility.

EQ 6	Are the EC's messages coherent across different EU external action and internal policy areas?	
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	**Evidence identified from …**	
JC6.1 – EU policy in other areas do not contradict EU external action	- Wondering whether what we preach and what we do is consistent (GFTVE-I-8) - EUMM and EUD communicate on different issues so that it is not conflicting (GFTVE-I-13)	**All**
Indicator 6.1.1 Evidence of incoherence between formal policies		All
Indicator 6.1.2 Awareness among outside observers of incoherence in the EU's policy		All
Indicator 6.1.3 Evidence from officials working in one EC policy sector that they have taken steps to improve policy coherence between their area of policy and other areas		All
JC6.2 – Existence of contradictory messages being conveyed by different policy sectors	- We should speak out louder (GFTVE-I-8) - EU will have to do something beyond funding to win hearts and minds (GFTVE-I-4) - Association agreement and negotiations going on right now, FTA, EU presence can help solve some Georgian problems but we can only do it with one voice on the political level (from Brussels) (GFTVE-I-18) - Political statements from Brx are not the only problem, also contradicting messages from MS (GFTVE-I-18) - reports arriving in Brussels do not reflect realities on the ground (GFTVE-I-3)	**EC/EU actors**
Indicator 6.2.1 Evidence of contradictions between the visibility and communication strategies of different EC departments responsible for different policy sectors	- EUD, EUMM, EUSR also compete (GFTVE-I-3)	EC/EU actors

Indicator 6.2.2 Evidence that EC officials have taken steps to coordinate the messages to be conveyed on different policies so as to iron out possible contradictions Indicator 6.2.3 Awareness among outside observers of apparent contradictions (lack of coherence) between the messages conveyed by EU officials Indicator 6.2.4 Existence of press enquiries and requests for explanations about seeming contradictions in messages conveyed by EU		
Preliminary Finding: Generally stakeholders interviewed did not have a sophisticated enough understanding of the details of EU internal and external policy areas to pick up inconsistencies amongst them. As noted above the different DGs of the Commission have their own communication strategies and do communicate in the public domain in Georgia but not always in reference to or coordination with each other. Some keen interest amongst certain elite stakeholders and journalists about how EU policies related to trade and visa facilitation were noted. Again these should be seen in the framework of (1) desire for Georgian visa free access and most favourable trading relations and (2) Russia-Georgian relations. Here Georgian officials and media were at times questioning why Russia that had "invaded" Georgia in 2009 - and had been acknowledged by the EU to have done so - would get what they see as preferential treatment for visas over or in equal to Georgians that had friendly relations with the EU. Therefore inconsistencies on Human Rights and Freedom of Movement and visa facilitation were picked up by a few stakeholders and presented in the press. Also certain issues associated with EU Food Safety seemed to have been deliberately misreported for political ends, that is deliberate falsehoods about how EU food safety rules were impeding legitimate Georgian entry to EU markets. However, the EU did issue rebuttals that were also picked up in some of the Georgian press. Generally however it seems that inconsistencies between EU external and internal action are not picked up by the general population, whether or not the EU communicates coherently or incoherently.		

EQ 7	"How far does the perception of the value added of the EU as a global actor emerge clearly from its presence as in the major international organisations/fora? "	
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	**Evidence identified from …**	
JC 7.1 The Commission has displayed political leadership in the implementation of its overall communication strategy and visibility activities, both internally and towards Council, MS ,EP and International Organisations		**EU actors**
Indicator 7.1.1 The degree of leadership (political and managerial) exercised internally to produce policy documents and take decisions (HQ and DEL) Indicator 7.1.2 The degree of leadership	- There are communication problems between Brussels and the Delegation (GFTVE-I-7) - HoDs meetings: joint visibility: joint statements/ press release on special issues only depending on situation	EU actors (Head of EU Delegation) EU actors / All

(political) related to key events with Council, MS and EP Indicator 7.1.3 Policy document with clear communication and visibility objective + implementation strategy produced with contribution of all external family DGs Indicator 7.1.4 Communication/visibility tools provide improved access to information on EU policies	(coordination only since 3 years, first by the presidency now by the EUD) (GFTVE-I-20) - Cooperation with MS: EUD has leading role: weekly meetings (EU HoM), also weekly meetings in EUMM (with EUD, EUSR stopped attending as they have no Political Advisor) (GFTVE-I-3) - EU entities on the ground: need for clear political guidance (GFTVE-I-3)	
JC 7.2 The Commission has actively supported the further consolidation of the overall EU institutional architecture enabling a more coherent and effective communication and visibility		**EU Del**
Indicator 7.2.1 To what extent is the EU Institutional architecture conducive to ensuring responsive and coherent decisions have a strong visibility impact Indicator 7.2.2 To what extent EC has expressly push for reforms having a visibility impact		EU actors EU actors
JC.7.3 The EU Delegation contributed to strengthen the image of the EC in the third countries and the knowledge on the EU policies and activities	- EU is a topic in the news on a daily basis (GFTVE-I-7) - Public intervention of the Head of Delegation is important: delegation needs to speak out louder (GFTVE-I-7) - Due to the sensitivity of the issue of conflict prevention strong visibility not necessarily sought though it is financially the most important work area of the delegation (GFTVE-I-7) - Georgian population does not know about the multi governance structure of the EU (GFTVE-I-7) - Sometimes it is very difficult to get information from the delegation (have to write 16 e-mails, meeting agreed doesn't take place, especially on hot topics it's hard to get a reply) (GFTVE-I-21) - GYLA had three shorter TV footages of documentaries of three cases of citizen-authorities interaction (requirement of the visibility guidelines), initially one planned, in consultation with EU delegation communication officer it was decided that this would be split into three smaller footages	All

	- EUMM's role adds credibility to the overall presence and image, improves the EUD, adds political weight (GFTVE-I-16) - EUMM provides EUD with more detailed information on the areas they work in: procedure: EUMM & EUD will issue a statement together based (GFTVE-I-16) - EUD is the big brother, more political, EUSR causes less costs (GFTVE-I-3) - EUD provided EUSR with EU gadgets (cups, t-shirts with EU logo) bearing the blue flag (GFTVE-I-3) - Cooperation with MS: EUD has leading role: weekly meetings (EU HoM), also weekly meetings in EUMM (with EUD, EUSR stopped attending as they have no Political Advisor)	
<u>Indicator 7.3.1</u> How the presence of Delegation in third countries is perceived by local stakeholders, including MSs and International organizations <u>Indicators 7.3.2</u> To what extent the stakeholder in the country knows the EC policy and actions	- Contacting EUD: sending samples of PR to them, very responsive, just approved (GFTVE-I-1) - Very easy to have access to communication person in the EUD (GFTVE-I-5) - Compared to other donors: EUD very accessible (GFTVE-I-5) - EUD: easier to avoid the, don't find it supportive - EUD is focal point (GFTVE-I-13) - Press releases are drafted by UNDP and cleared by EUD; Problematic: when requests for clearance are sometimes delayed (GFTVE-I-15) - From EUD they did not get EU flags, had to buy them at the stationary (GFTVE-I-15) - EUD: usually very responsive, only EU entity communicating with COBERM - EUSR & EUD: very good source of information and vice versa (GFTVE-I-16) - Whenever IDP topics discussed EUD always participating, are in touch with them every day. EUD capacity much appreciated (GFTVE-I-4) - EU not only donor but also decision maker: transparency and visibility	All All

	needed for this task (GFTVE-I-5) - Visibility just side effect, projects are result-oriented (GFTVE-I-5) - EU delegation helpful on technical issues: how to print what (GFTVE-I-12) - EUD often regional seminars on visibility and implementation of guidelines (GFTVE-I-12) - Local finance manager in the EUD was helpful was very helpful explaining what visibility means (GFTVE-I-12) - EUD: Not most helpful attitude of the person responsible (GFTVE-I-2) - EU = guarantee of solid management (GFTVE-I-15) - EU flag visible a lot in governmental institutions (GFTVE-I-3)	
JC 7. 4 If and how the EU has been able to demonstrate its specific added value in relation to the Presidency and MS and to influence the international organizations/bodies while making it visible externally		EU actors
Indicator 7.4.1 Constant key role of the EC in reaching EU common positions to be presented in the ECOSOC, selected Trust Funds, UN HR Council. Indicator 7.4.2 How the EC role is perceived by selected International Organisations (HQ and field) Indicators 7.4.3 How the role of the EC in international fora is perceived by governments of third parties and OECD countries		
Preliminary Finding: The UN and EU relationship in Georgia is more than just about "visibility", rather there is a clear added value on both sides for working together. In Georgia the EU is the major donor to the UN and its agencies. It is this role as a donor rather than the EU's role as a political actor in international fora that is the role in which the EU is visibile for in Georgia. There have been some incidents where EU has not received appropriate levels of visibility for UN funded projects particularly where the UNHCR has been concerned with one instance in particular with EU IfS funding not getting appropriate visibility yet this has now be addressed. With UNDP, FAO and UNICEF the EU-UN relationship seems to be better. with only one UNHCR-EU particular past incident. UN agencies in Georgia seem acutely aware of the issue of importance of EU visibility with difficulties existing in the past. What particularly frustrated the EU was that it wasn't a question of resources but rather not following through on commitments. Yet an on-going tension between the EU some UN agencies has remained with EU officials noting that it does not get in their minds appropriate levels of visibility from its funding of certain UN agencies (in contrast to INGOs and local CBOs who seem to be more creative and willing in pursuing EC visibility actions).		

EQ 8	"How far are the resources mobilized by the EC adequate (human resources, budget) to carry out its visibility/communication strategy?"	
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	**Evidence identified from …**	
JC 8.1The Commission has sufficient levels of capacity (at HQ and in Delegations) to manage the various dimensions of communication/visibility actions (strategy programming, support to implementation, M and E)		**EU Delegation, EU actors**
Indicator 8.1.1 Qualification and tasks of staff dealing with communication/visibility in dedicated Unit and at DEL Indicator 8.1.2 Number of staff in HQ and Delegation compared with similar organisations (UN Agency and/or MS)	- No external relations officer at UNHCR anymore. Is this really the post you want to have paid for? There are other more pressing issues. (GFTVE-I-4) - COBERM will be producing its own visibility brochure with success stories with direct beneficiaries to reach out to ordinary citizens (GFTVE-I-15) - first it goes to UNDP press officer then to EUD (GFTVE-I-15) - EUMM: Public information office (GFTVE-I-3) - EUSR: 1 public & information advisor based in Brussels (GFTVE-I-3) - EUSR: Media monitoring: Abkhaz and Russian media plus Georgian press coverage equally, - Abkhazia in contrast to EUD: EUSR can confirm (they have political liaison office there) (GFTVE-I-3) - South Ossestia diffferent as not allowed to travel there (GFTVE-I-3) - EUMM has a big PR section (only international staff) i.e. they cannot monitor local news (GFTVE-I-3)	EU Delegation EU Delegation / UN agencies / EU MS
JC.8.2 Financial amount of communication visibility budget and % of dedicated budget from projects, programmes, budget support and dialogues		

Indicator 8.2.1 Financial amount for staff and management services at HQ		EU Delegation
Indicator: 8.2.2 Financial amount for staff and management services at Delegation		EU Delegation
Indicator: 8. 2.3 % or amount dedicated to visibility in financed projects/programme to CSOs, UN Agencies, Foundations, and Universities.	- EU requirements by far most elaborated. Many donors find it extremely unfair that EU gets so much visibility though their donations are strictly earmarked whereas others might do less. US same amount, but less visibility. EU most demanding to the annoyance of other donors which implementer has to balance (GFTVE-I-4) - 20, 000 of budget (4 mio.) for visibility activities: amount was decided jointly in the beginning (GFTVE-I-15) - National round table at Oxfam: not enough money for translator, talked to contact person in EUD: EUD came to participate, brought translators (GFTVE-I-5) - Compared to other donors: number of resources spent on visibility up to Oxfam, not laid out, long-term partner: nothing is difficult; resources received very high (GFTVE-I-5) - Compared to other donors: number of resources spent on visibility up to Oxfam, not laid out, long-term partner: nothing is difficult; resources received very high - Special funding only for visibility very good: visibility guidelines helpful as easier for auditing (GFTVE-I-12) - EUSR small budget and resources (GFTVE-I-3) - Capacity to deliver visibility in a politically sensitive situations: EUD in a good position, EUMM has a big PR section (only international staff) i.e. they cannot monitor local news, EUSR: key players have to know what's going on (GFTVE-I-3) - Takes lots of time but is worthwhile: takes about 30% of the time of the organization (GFTVE-I-12) - It is difficult to use up all the money for visibility within the timeframe (GFTVE-I-12) - Small project: does not even have a PR person, visibility guidelines can easily be	Implementing Partners Implementing Partners Implementing Partners
Indicator 8.2.4 Availability of budget lines specifically related to visibility or other means to M&E visibility Indicator: 8.2.5 EC Resources used to check visibility compliance for projects/programme		

Indicator 8.2.6 Resources used for policy dialogue and new delivery methods	implemented (GFTVE-I-13)	
JC.8.3 The financial amount available for implement the communication visibility strategy is known by the Commission and the strategy is designed accordingly		EU Delegation
Indicator 8.3.1 To what extent the strategy is designed taking in consideration the available resources (staff/budget) Indicator: 8.3.2 Involvement and training of external DGS and DEL personnel on visibility /communication not working in Communication Units		EU Delegation EU Delegation

Preliminary Finding: EU Delegation is seen and appreciated for having responsive, open and accessible staff with good knowledge that are available to both journalists and to other stakeholders both on and off the record. Only in a very few interviewees questioned the accessibility to EU Delegation staff on visibility matters. Also access beyond communication specialists to the EU Ambassador, task managers and thematic specialists in the EU Delegation was also particularly appreciated by stakeholders (and also seemed appreciated by EU Delegation officials that there was a culture to be able to engage publically). Indeed this is also noted as an efficient way to engage with journalists and other stakeholders if all EU Delegation officials can speak to the press and others. The EU Delegation seems to be effectively mobilized for visibility at elite level. No external actors interviewed thought that the EU Delegation lacked the staff, resources or guidance on visibility in Georgia and no internal EU interviewed complained about lack of financial resources. There were some questions about the professional capacity and capabilities of the Georgian media which complicates the EU Delegation's communication and visibility engagements, although Georgia is one of the more advanced countries in the region in this regards. There is also a question if there is sufficient breadth of expertise on communications issues in non-communications specialist staff within the EU Delegations. Also questions came from stakeholders about whether the EU is "visible" or proactive enough in challenging the government, in public statements and visibility that is sometimes perceived as too deferential (perspective of journalists, UN agencies, INGOs, local NGOs). In the media monitoring of Georgia this perception was also confirmed. The EU Delegation may have a lack of visibility on certain sensitive actions towards the government as part of its political approach or due to the lack of aclear political decision to challenge the government, rather than human resources and budget. Yet it can be questioned how efficient EU Delegation staff can be in promoting visibility when political prioritisation is not clear on certain issues. Connected to this it is questionable how much more efficient the EU Delegation staff can be in promoting visibility when political prioritisation is not clear on certain issues.

EQ 9	"To what extent are the results in terms of stakeholder perceptions commensurate with the cost of conveying the messages both in financial and organisational terms? "	
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	**Evidence identified from …**	
JC 9.1 Are the stakeholders perception in selected policy areas and the 6thematics linked to specific messages conveyed by EC	- Beneficiaries perceive some of the housing funded by the EU as developed by the Georgian government (GFTVE-I-22) - Problematic: EUD required to print place names on visibility material on Abkhazia in Georgian language: this is not conflict sensitive: it would be easier if there was a less dogmatic approach from EUD regarding visibility guidelines (GFTVE-I-2) - EUMM: interaction between them and implementer as they monitor the same IDP projects (GFTVE-I-13) - Problems with visibility: in South Ossetia and Abkhazia: COBERM had been identified with the Georgian governments' strategies on occupied territories in the past, EU was sensitive to these difficulties (GFTVE-I-15) - There is a provisions stating that there are exceptions to implementing visibility (GFTVE-I-15) - Use of English as a neutral language (GFTVE-I-15) - IfS filled a gap at a time when it was very necessary but 18 months are a very short period of time (GFTVE-I-15) - Limits to advertising and spending on it due to ethical codex and people's understandings (GFTVE-I-16) - there are cases when non-visibility is preferable ; example: NATO overdose visibility made population expect NATO to be their salvation (GFTVE-I-3) - Visibility should not be like a promotion: preferable to send out clear message about the EU's role but important not to raise unrealistic expectations (GFTVE-I-3) - Results more important than PR (GFTVE-I-3) - Capacity to deliver visibility in a politically sensitive situations: EUD in a good position, EUMM has a big PR section	**All**

	(only international staff) i.e. they cannot monitor local news (GFTVE-I-3) - EU MS cross-check information on sensitive issues (GFTVE-I-3)	
Indicator 9.1.1 Measured results from attitudinal surveys of samples of particular stakeholder groups comparing perceptions of the EU and other comparable actors on EU external action and more specifically in the 6 thematic areas designated in the TOR Indicator 9.1.2 Measured results perceptions of informed actors from among the designated stakeholder groups Indicator 9.1.3 Measured results from comparison of main messages conveyed by the EU in specific communication efforts with the messages then retained by the media in covering the event or NGOs following the issue Indicator 9.1.4 If available from Eurobarometer or other comparable sources: Measured results from public opinion polls of attitudes towards EU and EU external action	- 86% positive EU and 81% positive NATO survey - Putting a plug on CPPB difficult. EU no access to South-Ossetia, usually doesn't go to Abkhazia. EU monitoring mission for UNHCR recently came and did not visit Abkhazia. Long-term matters. Outcome sometimes better to keep it on a lower profile as it can turn the whole situation around and not necessarily in a positive way. EU ambassador here does not go to the press himself (UNHCR) - Compared to other donors: number of resources spent on visibility up to Oxfam, not laid out, long-term partner: nothing is difficult; resources received very high (GFTVE-I-5) - EUMM operating in places where implementer has its activities, informal coordination: EUMM have their specific task (monitoring the security situation): EUMM wanted to see information before it was going to the print (GFTVE-I-5) - We and all our implementing partners doublecheck before anything goes to the print (GFTVE-I-5) - EU = guarantee of solid management (GFTVE-I-15) - confusion of EUMM with EUD : EUMM omnipresent (GFTVE-I-7) - Challenge: Sometimes EU funds through UN at the same time funds our implementing partners directly. Sometimes too many layers. (GFTVE-I-4)	All
JC 9.2 Are the resources used in the selected policy area able to create specific message including strategy design and coordination		**EU Delegation**
Indicator 9.2.1 Number and qualification of personnel and Units +DEL involved in creating the message Indicator 9.2.2 Kind of tools (Internet, newsletter, declarations, press release, events, etc..) used to convey message in the different sectors	- TV documentaries and footages, brochures, booklets (GFTVE-I-1) - Visibility: through media (TV, newspapers), GIZ produced special newspaper that picked up on all the	EU Delegation / other stakeholders opinions

	projects funded (also online), programme broadcasted weekly that informs population about infrastructure developments (focus on what the ministry is doing: but also in cooperation with donors), when MoU signed in Feb. 2011: event in Tbilisi & Brx & joint press release; also jointly agreed for EU funded projects: EU logos, banners, opening ceremonies (GFTVE-I-11) - opening of the centres had highest visibility, invited TVs, banners, flags, very successful for organisation to get TV coverage, also have website (GFTVE-I-12) - issued different kinds a visibility gadgets that looked so nice that they were agreed to be the best visibility case ever seen at stakeholder meeting (GFTVE-I-12) - Visibility actions: newsletter after each round of receiving grants, folders, notepads, key holder et and pens, Opening ceremony: banner, Use of English as a neutral language, Electronic version of their logo: merges UNDP, COBERM and EU (GFTVE-I-15) - Mission needed to communicate added value to stakeholders: personal contacts are key, right formulations to convey messages in order not to offend anyone or the other side (GFTVE-I-3) - EUSR was travelling all over the country to give interviews on the issue, former EUSR was keen in giving comments and briefings for the press (GFTVE-I-3) - IfS projects: Briefing notes and press releases. Local press and media (local regional newspapers, regional, governmental, public). Media produces it in Georgian mainly and English (GFTVE-I-4) - newspaper for IDP to inform them about rights and opportunities, documentary film about IDP: screened on local television (EU, logo and disclaimer on them) (GFTVE-I-5) - EUSR small budget and resources, EUD gave flagged gadgets (cups, t-shirts with EU logo) to EUSR (GFTVE-I-3) - Tone of the local media: Rather positive based on press releases and in direct contact with beneficiaries. Media that	

Indicator 9.2.3 Cost of tools employed	covers vast majority of population. (GFTVE-I-4) - have EU flag in office. Inform about our donors. Opening ceremonies. Website stories. Beneficiaries know about it. By implementing. Message on the project per se (GFTVE-I-4)	
JC 9.3 The resources available for visibility work are effectively deployed in a well organized manner		EU
Indicator 9.3.1 Clear and logical organisational chart for the staff working on visibility available Indicator 9.3.2 Budgets for visibility work are clearly linked to the action plans		EU Delegation EU Delegation

Preliminary Finding: The EU Delegation seems to be efficient at conveying messages to elites and those that are recipients of EC funds (directly or indirectly) on a relatively small budget. Other EU entities such as the EUMM are effective in communicating with those communities it comes into direct contact with (more effective than the EU Delegation however the EU Delegation doesn't have its own direct projects in communities). Yet with the EUMM, this is only a tiny proportion of the population. There are a number of questions around if the EU through its visibility actions has been "reaching" the broader popular perception (more than the Tbilisi elite or those implementing partners and/or communities that accept EC funds). Yet this would require a popular media that finds it interesting enough to engage with the EU on the issues that the EU is trying to promote, and this is not always self-evident or straightforward. It is far from clear whether or not additional resources would actually assist in achieving this.

There were some questions amongst implementing partners (UN, INGOs, CSOs) usingEC funds about the level of resources and activities that have to be devoted or required to be devoted from these funds to EC visibility as being too much. However, this was a minority opinion among those interviewed. It is, however that the cultural context and the feeling of gratitude for EC supports prevented some local implementers from uttering criticism on the extent of EU visibility requirements (and the resources require to be devoted to them. Yet others see that this devotion of resources (financial and organisational) is only problematic if you "view visibility for visibility sake", rather than an integral part of the project achieving its own objectives. Indeed it would seem some of the most creative approaches to promoting EU visibility adopted by INGOs such as Oxfam and NRC (TV slots, information campaigns, commissioning documentaries for local TV) were driven by an approach that sees visibility as integral to achieving the mission of the organisation and the goals of the project. In this regard publicising close association with the EU is often seen as something positive to be exploited rather than as an additional chore or cost to be met. However, there are some double standards here, with the EU wanting both visibility for actions that it funds, but also a disclaimer so it can disassociate itself.

EQ 10	How effectively do EC external action staff from different services translate the visibility strategy they are expected to implement into action plans that are consistent amongst each other?	
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	**Evidence identified from …**	
JC10.1 – Commission staff coordinate with their colleagues in other departments on their visibility work	- no connection/coordination between the bilateral and regional level regarding target audience (GFTVE-I-7)	**EU Delegation**
Indicator 10.1.1 Evidence of coordination mechanisms (eg. minutes of meetings, correspondence on coordination, etc) Indicator 10.1.2 Evidence of changes in draft visibility action plans of different services as a result of having coordinated with colleagues in other services		EU Delegation EU Delegation
JC10.2 – Commission staff formulate action plans that are clearly based on their visibility strategy		**EU Delegation**
Indicator 10.2.1 The links between the action plans and the visibility strategy they are based on are clear and logical		EU Delegation
JC10.3 – The visibility action plans produce expected results	- current visibility action mainly reaches the elite level but not the broader population (GFTVE-I-7)	EU Delegation
Indicator 10.3.1 Evidence of results official expect and linked back to their own action plans Indicator 10.3.2 The logical chain of the action plans to the results is solid		EU Delegation EU Delegation

Preliminary Finding:

A nascent overarching communication strategy does exist at level of EU Delegation yet its status was currently unclear – and action plans exist in most circumstances for EC funded actions. Action plans and actions of EC partners seen seem to be well developed (often with EU Delegation technical support) at level of INGO/Georgian implementing partners. These action plans and visibility actions have been recently adapted in "conflict situations" for a more flexible and nuanced approach to the specificities of this contexts. Yet questions if they are fully "conflict sensitive" (planned, implemented and evaluated with their impact on conflict dynamics as a key consideration) remain. No serious consistency issues emerged from the different action plans seen nor did the stakeholders interviewed identify any.

Hypotheses

1. At the country level it is **difficult to differentiate between the EC and EU** level with the entire EU benefitting or "suffering" from EU visibility efforts that may or may not be coherent with each other.

- What single MS do (example France, Germany) is perceived as EU (GFTVE-I-21), others distinguish between MS on some themes which affect the Georgian context, EU perceived as the more important actor (compare to MS)
- People do not care where funds come from (GFTVE-I-2), Beneficiaries do not distinguish between different funders as long as they are not the government (GFTVE-I-13)
- Differentiation: general population usually does not distinguish between different levels and often perceive the Council of Europe as an EU entity, too
- Anything that carries the blue-golden flag is perceived as EU
- No clear minding in the citizens what the EU means and what they do (GFTVE-I-17, GFTVE-I-23)
- Different EU MS: each country has their own interests (GFTVE-I-17)
- General source of information for the broader public (in ascending order): TV, internet, newspapers (depends on affordability of media, less in rural areas) (GFTVE-I-6)
- Public EU statements are understandable only to the elites not for the common public (GFTVE-I-17)
- It is unclear to see who speaks at the highest level for the EU (GFTVE-I-24)
- Differentiation between EC & MS but EC is key partner and key player, MS play less of a role (GFTVE-I-25)
- Political leadership actively involved in blurring the picture of what the EU is (free trade agreement, for example, would require adapting) blurred picture helps the discourse not being about sensitive issues (GFTVE-I-2)
- government playing with EU vs MS confusion, government benefits from picturing EU as an ally (GFTVE-I-22)
- EU Delegation keen to differentiate themselves from EUMM (GFTVE-I-22), people do not differentiate between EU delegation and EUMM (GFTVE-I-22)
- Norway invited to a meeting for EU donors (GFTVE-I-22) as Europeans seem to be perceived as one kind
- EU benefitting from general pro-European attitude in the country, joining the EU as final objective though blurred picture of what it is
- All EU MS perceived as a European block (GFTVE-I-20)
- Confusion of NATO & EU membership (GFTVE-I-20)

The general public tends to not to differentiate between EU institutions, EU member states, European non-EU member states and the Council of Europe. Anything carrying the blue-golden flag is more often than not perceived as EU and all actors' actions feed into the EU's perception by the Georgian population. Differentiation tends to occur rather at the level of elites and implementing partners.

2. **The EU has a lack of visibility** in the thematic area of *Crisis & fragile states, conflict prevention & peace building* not because of visibility actions **but rather its ability to achieve outcomes**

Outcomes – Lack of visibility

- Some of the outcomes desired "unrealistic" (EU to provide military support in 2008 conflict)
- Actions of government contributed to generating the expectation
- EU active in peacebuilding activities behind the scenes (GFTVE-I-22)

Outcomes – No lack of visibility:

- Those in more direct contact with EU entities (EUMM areas, EU funded actions with IDPs, those ethnic minorities benefitting from consultation through NGOs) do recognize EU's role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding and beneficiaries are said to acknowledge a positive impact on their lives (GFTVE-I-26); only those benefitting from EU aid get additional information on the EU (GFTVE-I-6)
- EUMM's role adds credibility to the overall presence and image of the EU, improves image and adds political weight (GFTVE-I-16)
- COBERM activities: EU is visible
- EU is visible in IDP projects it funds
- Due to high visibility (additional reasons?) population is expecting protection and security from EU
- Lack of knowledge of the EU's multi-governance structure within the population

High EU visibility in the country might have contributed to raising expectations in terms of security and protection that could not be fulfilled. The EU is visible to those in more direct contact with EU entities (EUMM areas, EU funded actions with IDPs, and ethnic minorities, COBERM) do recognize EU's role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding due to the impact these actions have by a visible EU actor.

3. **The EC/EU visibility is diluted or enhanced by working with international partners** on *Crisis & fragile states: conflict prevention & peace building.*

Diluted

- Whenever there is an implementing partner there are issues with visibility, tendency that working with partners diminishes visibility, especially when working with the UN (GFTVE-I-27)
- Channelled through UNHCR "Winterization and shelter support to Returnees in the Gori-Tskhinvali Corridor" (funded through IfS) has been officially started on September 15, 2008 and completed on December 31, 2008. The UNHCR contract did not mention the EU as a funder nor in the visibility guidelines. An evaluation of the EU discovered this lack of visibility and the stickers with EU logotypes were gradually attached to each cottage in the period of December 2008 - February 2009. (GFTVE-I-13)
- People do not care where funds come from (GFTVE-I-2), Beneficiaries do not distinguish between different funders as long as they are not the government (GFTVE-I-13)
- Beneficiaries are important, face is UNHCR first and foremost. Also stakeholders at the end of the day first go to the UNHCR. UNHCR is the one dealing with it on a daily basis. (GFTVE-I-4)

- Budget support provided remains invisible
- Government implemented IDP projects that are EU funded are claimed by the government to be created by the government only (GFTVE-I-22)

Enhanced

- Case of a very small NGO whose only funder is the EU and who had no previous experience with visibility guidelines: They sought advise and were consulted intensively by Brussels and the EUD later on visibility. They spend about 30% of their time with EU visibility. Have banners, opening speeches, pens, t-shirts, caps, gadgets etc on all their public devices. EU flag out of their regional offices is even washed by their beneficiaries as an expression of gratitude to the EU. TV footages and talkshow airtime bought.
- EU flag and involvement boost confidence of beneficiaries into implementing organisation, EU = guarantee of solid management (GFTVE-I-13, GFTVE-I-5, GFTVE-I-28)
- Government implemented IDP projects that are EU funded have EU visibility (GFTVE-I-25)
- Visibility actions: newsletter after each round of receiving grants, folders, notepads, keyholders and pens (GFTVE-I-28), TV footages, newspaper,
- EU logo is merged with implementing organisation's logo (cannot be missed)
- All IDP projects funded carry EU logo
- IDP project implementers on the ground also orally inform local population about EU funding of shelters (GFTVE-I-22)

Keep in mind

- Compared to other donors: EU most demanding and sensitive (with USAID at the same time) regarding their visibility guidelines, least flexible (GFTVE-I-13, GFTVE-I-4, GFTVE-I-5, GFTVE-I-1, GFTVE-I-26)

There were cases of EU's visibility being diluted by working with international partners (disregard of visibility agreements by the implementer, budget support) overall however visibility was enhanced by working with international partners who carry EU visibility to local communities and provide a face to it.

4. At times there **may be good reasons for achieving outcomes to have less, diminished or no visibility**.

- Georgian public used to a government that does not communicate all its actions, have understanding for this approach
- However there has been case that called for a more conflict-sensitive implementation of visibility guidelines than the general guidelines prescribe. In that case the way visibility guidelines were recommended to be implemented by the EU were felt counterproductive to the context and aim of the project concerned (temporary solution: Need to involve content staff in the implementation of visibility guidelines in conflict areas?)
- There are cases when sensitive issues with the government receive better outcomes when there is no visibility of the EU's criticism (Ambassador) + EU is more than a donor, it's an ally in advocacy and an ally in negotiations with the government: Eviction centers: EU helped to explain to the government why it is important to respect rules and timelines. Has changed the culture of things. As it get sensitive, EU ambassador prefers UNHCR speaks. Taking a

stance publicly: UNHCR. Interlucating with governments: EU. Lobbied behind the scenes. No public press statements. EU people very engaged. (GFTVE-I-4)

- There is a provisions stating that there are exceptions to implementing visibility which is helpful in situations of conflict and sensitive issues: in these cases decisions are taken on a case by case basis (GFTVE-I-28)
- There are cases when non-visibility is preferable in order to avoid raising unrealistic expectations of what an otherwise omnipresent actor can do (GFTVE-I-3)
- Outcome sometimes better to keep it on a lower profile as it can turn the whole situation around and not necessarily in a positive way (GFTVE-I-4)

There are cases when sensitive issues and negotiations with the government receive better outcomes when there is no visibility for the EU and when those take place behind the scenes. It might be the case that keeping a lower profile is sometime preferable in order to avoid raising unrealistic expectations of what an otherwise omnipresent actor can do. There is a need for conflict-sensitive implementation of visibility guidelines in certain cases.

ANNEX 2: LIST OF PERSONS, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANISATIONS INTERVIEWED

Institution/ Organisation	*Name*	*Position*
EU Delegation		
EU Delegation	Giuseppe Vasquez	Press Information Officer
EU Delegation	Michal Nekvasil	Second Secretary, Deputy Head of Operation
EU Delegation	Dr Oliver Reisner	Project Manager - Civil Society, Culture
EU Delegation	Boris Iarochevitch	Minister Counsellor, Deputy Head Delegation
EU Delegation	Phillip Dimitrov	EU Delegation Ambassador
EU Delegation	Caroline Stampfer	Attaché
EU Delegation	Camilla Aberg	Young Expert
EUMM	Jussi Saressalo	Deputy Head of Mission
EUMM	Adam Derby	Political Advisor
EUMM	Steve Bird	Head of Press and Public Information Office Spokesperson
EUMM	Jürgen Schmidt	Chief Reporting and Information Section
EU MSs		
Embassy of the Republic of Poland	Maciej Dachowski	Head of Political and Economic Section
Embassy of the Republic of Poland	Piotr Burzynski	Secretary for Economic and Consular Affairs
Embassy of the Republic of Poland	Lech Konczak	Secretary for Development Aid, Culture and Press Issues
Government		
Ministry of Georgia for European and Euro-Atlantic integration	Dr Eka Sepashvili	Senior Specialist European Integration
Ministry of internally Displaced Persons	Tamar Basilia	Head of Department

Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure of Georgia	Nino Danibegashvili	Head of International Relations Service
Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure of Georgia	Mariam Tsikvadze	Chief Specialist International Relations Service
UN		
UNHCR	Rita Richter	Programme Officer
UNHCR	Simone Wolken	Representative
UNHCR	Besik Andriadze	Project Maneger Asisstance
UNDP/COBERM	Irina Liczek	Project Manager
UNDP/COBERM	Bezhan Kozanashvili	Project Coordinator
EUSR		
EUSR	Giorgi Vardishvili	National Expert - Political and Media Analyst
EUSR	Ulrich Christensen	Mission Security Officer for the EUSR SC
CSOs		
Norwegian Refugee Council	Tina Gewis	Protection and Advocacy Adviser
Norwegian Refugee Council	Manana Gabashvili	Deputy Director
Danish Refugee Council	Guy Edmunds	Project Manager
Georgian Young Lawyers Association	Diana Zhgenti	Project Coordinator
Georgian Young Lawyers Association	Lela Taliuri	Project Coordinator
Georgian Young Lawyers Association	Tinatin Avaliani	Project Coordinator
International Relief	Irakli Pruidze	Country Director

& Development		
International Relief & Development	Irakli Gotsiridze	Logistical Manager
Care International	Vakhtang Piranishvili	Project Director
Asociacia Toleranti	Tsira Meskhishvili	Head of Organisation
Oxfam	Keti Getiashvili	Country Director
Oxfam	Tea Varsimashvili	Project coordinator
Journalists		
Georgian Daily Resonansi	Eliso Chapidze	Editor in Chief
Freelancer Journalist	Zviad Coridze	Freelancer
Radio `Green Wave`	Medea Imerlishvili	Author/Moderator
TV Maestro/Kviris Palitra	Shalva Ramishvili	Author/Moderator/Writer
The Messenger	Zaza Gachechiladze	Founder/Editor
Tabula Magazine	Avto Koridze	Writer/Political Analyst

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ANNEX 4: LOCAL MEDIA MONITORING

Media sources

- 24 Saati, Georgian daily newspaper, 4-11 July 2011,
- Resonance, Georgian daily newspaper, 4-11 July 2011,
- Kviris Palitra, Georgian weekly newspaper, 4-11 July 2011,
- TV Rustavi 2, Georgian daily news broadcasting, 4-11 July 2011

5 July 2011 24 Saati

MEDIA SPECIFICS			
Type	Newspaper	**Political Leaning**	Governmental leaning
Frequency	Daily	**Status**	Independent
Circulation	5,000	**Ownership**	IMP
Readership Profile	Georgian Speaking Community, including Government and diplomatic corps		
CUTTING SPECIFICS			
Media	24 Saati	**Number of Pages**	1/5 out of 10
Date	July 5, 2011	**Ad Value**	EUR 50
Source	Own	**Tone**	Positive
Headline	**Estonian President Met Saakashvili**		

5 July 2011 Kviris Palitra 1

MEDIA SPECIFICS			
Type	Newspaper	**Political Leaning**	Oppositional leaning
Frequency	Weekly	**Status**	Independent
Circulation	70,000	**Ownership**	Kviris Palitra
Readership Profile	Georgian Speaking Community, including Government and diplomatic corps		
CUTTING SPECIFICS			
Media	Kviris Palitra	**Number of Pages**	1/2 out of 40
Date	July 5, 2011	**Ad Value**	EUR 50
Source	Own	**Tone**	Positive

Headline	**Tom De Wahl: No way the Democracy lighthouse**
Summary	The publication published the article of the European journalist Tom De Waal (Carnegie Endowment), where the author criticizes Georgian Government for its incoherent politics on the issues of justice, court, legislation, and human rights. The author makes a geographical evaluation of Georgia as a European country and believes that President Saakashvili`s wish to turn Georgia into a new Singapore is unrealistic. Considering its problems with Russia, the best model for Georgia is the EU model, but at the same time, getting close to the EU means to compromise on the concept of monopolization that the ruling party warmly embraces.. Being a member of the EU brings with it a responsibility for Georgia to become a true democracy as well as implement several other obligations.

5 July Resonansi

MEDIA SPECIFICS			
Type	Newspaper	**Political Leaning**	Oppositional
Frequency	Daily	**Status**	Independent
Circulation	Aprox 4,500	**Ownership**	Resonansi
Readership Profile	Georgian Speaking Community, including Government and diplomatic corps		
CUTTING SPECIFICS			
Media	Resonansi	**Number of Pages**	½ out of 14
Date	July 5, 2011	**Ad Value**	EUR 120
Source	Own	**Tone**	Neutral
Headline	**When and with which borders will Georgia become a member of NATO**		
Summary	The publication has published a statement from Mr. Ragozin, the Russian Representative to Nato, which has been broadcasted during the Moscow-Brussels video conference. Mr. Ragozin stated, that before becoming a member of NATO, Georgia should decide whether they want to join NATO with South Osetia and Abkhazia, currently occupied by the Russian Military bases, or recognize these entities as independent republics. Rogozin also admitted that if Georgia becomes a member of NATO, an increased level of conflicts in Eastern and Southern Europe should be expected. `Thanks to Brussels and Washington, Saakashvili already has lost a significant part of the territories`- Ragozin says. The local experts in conflict regulation and security issues (Irakli Sesiashvili and Zurab Abashidze) believed that there might be truth to the statement since the future of the Georgian occupied territories' unclear future will make NATO hesitant to make a decision regarding the acceptance of Georgia as a member state.		

5 July 2011 TV Channel RUSTV12

MEDIA SPECIFICS			
Type	News Porgrame Courier	**Political Leaning**	Governmental leaning
Frequency		**Status**	Independent
Circulation		**Ownership**	Rustavi2
Readership Profile	Georgian Speaking Community, including Government and diplomatic corps		
CUTTING SPECIFICS			
Media	TV Channel Rustavi2	**Number of Pages**	
Date	July 5, 2011	**Ad Value**	
Source	Own	**Tone**	Positive
Headline	**Estonian President met Saakashvili**		
Summary	The President of Estonia, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, arrives in Tbilisi today to attend official meetings. The President arrived in Batumi yesterday. Mr. Ilves did some sightseeing and was impressed with the sights of the Adjarian capital. The President also visited the newly opened House of Justice, a new branch of the Justice Ministry, offering all registration services under one roof. At the House of Justice, the President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili welcomed the President. Saakashvili thanked Ilves for his demonstrated support of Georgia. President Ilves focused on the reforms implemented by Georgia during the past few years, which has made the country exemplary.		

6 July 2011 24 Saati

MEDIA SPECIFICS			
Type	Newspaper	**Political Leaning**	Governmental leaning
Frequency	Daily	**Status**	Independent
Circulation	5,000	**Ownership**	IMP
Readership Profile	Georgian Speaking Community, including Government and diplomatic corps		
CUTTING SPECIFICS			
Media	24 Saati	**Number of Pages**	1/5 out of 10
Date	July 6, 2011	**Ad Value**	EUR 50
Source	Own	**Tone**	Positive
Headline	**Georgian Foreign Affairs Minister to meet with the Swiss Ambassador to the Russian Federation**		

Summary	The Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Grigol Vashadze, met with the Ambassador of Switzerland to the Russian Federation, Walter Giger, and the Ambassador of Switzerland to Georgia, Giunter Bechler. During the meeting, bilateral and multilateral issues between the two countries were discussed. The discussion also concerned the Georgian-Russian relationship and the negotiations within the Geneva Talks. The Minister evaluated the role of the Switzerland in the mediation process between Russian and Georgia as positive.

6 July 2011 Resonansi

MEDIA SPECIFICS			
Type	Newspaper	**Political Leaning**	Oppositional
Frequency	Daily	**Status**	Independent
Circulation	Aprox 4,500	**Ownership**	Resonansi
Readership Profile	Georgian Speaking Community, including Government and diplomatic corps		
CUTTING SPECIFICS			
Media	Resonansi	**Number of Pages**	½ out of 14
Date	July 6, 2011	**Ad Value**	EUR 120
Source	Own	**Tone**	Positive
Headline	**EU Mission with Peacemaking mandate**		
Summary	EUMM has a new Head from Poland. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kishkevich will be Head of the Mission during 2 months. His mandate will expire on September 14, but the Mission will continue its work in Georgia. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nino Kalandadze said: `What EUMM does in Georgia is of crucial importance to the country, even though the mission operates on a limited basis since it does not have access o the occupied territories`. The President of the European Integration Research Center, Vasil Chkoidze, has reviewed the outcomes of the new appointments in EUMM. He believes that EUMM minimized the conflict during the Georgian-Russian war and described in detail all the violations that took place on an ethnic basis during that period. He says that they welcome EUMM to stay in Georgia, as his role in the preparation of Georgia's de-occupational work is very important. At the same time, EUMM's presence can ensure that the country will be protected against the accusations and provocations from other countries' propaganda . Currently EUMM has three key goals: Stabilisation, normalisation and restoration of confidence. EUMM has only managed to meet the first goal. To fulfil the other two goals should only be possible after the mission have had access to the occupied territories. The most recent political events, like the UN resolution and the EP resolution, agreed upon before the EU-Russia summit, as well as the sever statement of Rasmussen, instill hope that EUMM will succeed with the conflict area accessibility if its mission in Georgia is to be extended.		

6 July 2011 TV Channel RUSTAV12

MEDIA SPECIFICS			
Type	News Porgrame Courier	**Political Leaning**	Governmental leaning
Frequency		**Status**	Independent
Circulation		**Ownership**	Rustavi2
Readership Profile	Georgian Speaking Community, including Government and diplomatic corps		
CUTTING SPECIFICS			
Media	TV Channel Rustavi2	**Number of Pages**	
Date	July 6, 2011	**Ad Value**	
Source	Own	**Tone**	Positive
Headline	**New Head of the EUMM in Georgia**		
Summary	On 5 July 2011, Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, welcomed the decision by the Political and Security Committee to appoint Andrzej Tyszkiewicz as Head of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia. "I am very pleased that Member States have decided on the basis of my proposal to appoint Andrzej Tyszkiewicz, from Poland, as Head of Mission for the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM). Mr. Andrzej Tyszkiewicz has the necessary skills required to conduct a large-scale civilian monitoring mission in a complex political environment. His experience constitutes the appropriate background to run EUMM, while continuing to deliver on the implementation of the Missions mandate. I am sure he will lead this mission to greater achievements for enhancing security and stability in Georgia as well as in the whole region, while building confidence amongst the parties to the 2008 conflict for finding a peaceful and long-lasting solution. For that reason, Mr. Andrzej Tyszkiewicz will have my full support and that of the EU as a whole."		

7 July 2011 24 Saati

MEDIA SPECIFICS			
Type	Newspaper	**Political Leaning**	Governmental leaning
Frequency	Daily	**Status**	Independent
Circulation	5,000	**Ownership**	IMP
Readership Profile	Georgian Speaking Community, including Government and diplomatic corps		
CUTTING SPECIFICS			
Media	24 Saati	**Number of Pages**	1/2 out of 10

Date	July 7, 2011	**Ad Value**	EUR 80
Source	Own	**Tone**	Neutral
Headline	**EU warns Russia**		
Summary	EU criticizes Russia for its unfair and non-transparent electoral legislation. This critique was formulated in the proposal that the EU prepared to submit to the EP for voting. The EP members ask Ashton and Poland, the current EU President, to be cautions in future negotiation on a partnership with Russia. The resolution states that "Real strategic partnership considers common values. Russia-EU relationship should be followed by the strengthening of democracy and human rights defense in the country".		

7-8 July 2011 24 Saati

MEDIA SPECIFICS			
Type	Newspaper	**Political Leaning**	Governmental leaning
Frequency	Daily	**Status**	Independent
Circulation	5,000	**Ownership**	IMP
Readership Profile	Georgian Speaking Community, including Government and diplomatic corps		
CUTTING SPECIFICS			
Media	24 Saati	**Number of Pages**	1/5 out of 10
Date	July 7, 2011	**Ad Value**	EUR 40
Source	Own	**Tone**	Positive
Headline	**Georgian Minister of Healthcare to visit Poland**		
Summary	Georgian Minister of Healthcare has left for his official visit to Poland. Mr. Urushadze will meet with his Polish colleague and present a speech on the Georgian social reforms at the international conference.		

MEDIA SPECIFICS			
Type	Newspaper	**Political Leaning**	Governmental leaning
Frequency	Daily	**Status**	Independent
Circulation	5,000	**Ownership**	IMP
Readership Profile	Georgian Speaking Community, including Government and diplomatic corps		
CUTTING SPECIFICS			
Media	24 Saati	**Number of**	1/4 out of 10

		Pages	
Date	July 8, 2011	**Ad Value**	EUR 55
Source	Own	**Tone**	Neutral
Headline	**Georgia Minister of Education is paying visit To Poland**		
Summary	The Georgian Minister of Education Dimitry Shashkin participated in the conference 'Eastern Dimension of Mobility' that was organized by the EU and the EC in Warsaw on July 6-7. At the conference, Georgia has been given the green light to apply for grants from an 11 million Euros fund aimed at developing the educational systems of Eastern Partnership countries. Dimitry Shashkin said in his statement that 'Georgia is a part of the European Educational system. Within the frame of this funding scheme, Georgian students will have a chance to obtain European diplomas.'		

11 july 2011 Resonansi

MEDIA SPECIFICS			
Type	Newspaper	**Political Leaning**	Oppositional
Frequency	Daily	**Status**	Independent
Circulation	Aprox 4,500	**Ownership**	Resonansi
Readership Profile	Georgian Speaking Community, including Government and diplomatic corps		
CUTTING SPECIFICS			
Media	Resonansi	**Number of Pages**	1 page out of 14
Date	July 11, 2011	**Ad Value**	EUR 160
Source	Own	**Tone**	Negative
Headline	**Unfortunately, Georgian Democracy has no ally**		
Summary	The publication interviewed the political analyst George Margvelashvili. In this interview, Mr. Margvelashvili states that European countries refuse to criticize Saakashvili. Margvelashvili says that 'Europe has always advocated for democracy in Georgia. Before the May facts, EU's main priorities were stabilization, and then democracy. Europe believes in Saakashvili and accepts his rules of the game. Georgian democracy is not being protected. It is obvious that Saakashvili does not intend to establish democratic elections in the country, and the EU does not undertake any serious measures against this'..		

11 July 2011 TV Channel RUSTV12

MEDIA SPECIFICS			
Type	News Porgrame Courier	**Political Leaning**	Governmental leaning
Frequency		**Status**	Independent
Circulation		**Ownership**	Rustavi2
Readership Profile	Georgian Speaking Community, including Government and diplomatic corps		
CUTTING SPECIFICS			
Media	TV Channel Rustavi2	**Number of Pages**	
Date	July 11, 2011	**Ad Value**	
Source	Own	**Tone**	Positive
Headline	**PACE welcomes amendments to civil code**		
Summary	The co-rapporteurs of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly's Monitoring Committee for Georgia, Michael Aastrup Jensen (Denmark, ALDE) and Kastriot Islami (Albania, SOC), today hailed the adoption of the amendments to the civil code that allows for other faiths and denominations than the Georgian Orthodox Church to be registered as legal entities of public law. 'This is an important improvement for all religious communities in Georgia and follows recommendations by the Assembly. It reaffirms the respect given by Georgia for the right of freedom of religion and principle of inter religious tolerance' they said. (***Note from the expert: Almost 100% of the Georgian (Over 70% of Georgian Population) orthodox are against the amendment)***		

ANNEX 5: EXCERPT FROM THE TREATY OF LISBON

Treaty of Lisbon
Treaty on the European Union

Title V, General provisions on the Union's External Action and specific provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy

Chapter I, Provisions having general application

Article 21

1. The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.

The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.

2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to:

(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity;

(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law;

(c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders;

(d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty;

(e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade;

(f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development;

(g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; and

(h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.