

Evaluation of Visibility of EU external action

Final Report Volume 2 – Annexes Part 1

June 2012

Evaluation for the European Commission





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**Evaluation of Visibility of
EU external action**

Final Report

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ACRONYMS

AAPs	Annual Action Plans
ACP	Africa Caribbean and Pacific countries
AENEAS	Financial assistance to third states for Migration and Asylum
AIDCO	EuropeAid Co-operation Office
AfDB	African Development Bank
ALA	Community financial instrument for support to Asia and Latin America
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
APF	Africa Peace Facility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asia Nations
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
AU	African Union
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CARDS	Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation
CARIFORUM	Forum of the Caribbean Countries
CCA	Climate Change Adaptation
CCI	Cross-Cutting Issue
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CENSOR	Climate variability and El Niño Southern Oscillation project
CEPs	Country Environmental Profiles
CFA	Comprehensive Framework of Action
CIFOR	Center for International Forestry Research
CIGEM	Information and Management Center on Migration
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CLARIS	Europe-South America Climate Research Network
CLARIS-LPB	Project aims at predicting the regional climate change impacts on La Plata Basin (LPB) in South America
CLIMAFRICA	Climate change predictions in Sub-Saharan Africa
CODEV	Committee on Development
COM	Commission Communication
COP	Conference of the Parties
CPF	Collaborative Partnership on Forests
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy

CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DEL	EU Delegations
DG	Directorate General
DG CLIMA	Directorate General for Climate Action
DG COMM	Directorate General for Communication
DG DEV	Directorate General for Development
DG ECFIN	Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs
DG ELARG	Directorate General for Enlargement
DG ENV	Directorate General for Environment
DG JHA	Directorate General for Justice And Home Affairs
DG JLS	Directorate General for Justice, Freedom and Security
DG REGIO	Directorate General for Regional Policy
DG RELEX	External Relations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EEAS	European External Action Service
EAC	East African Community
EC	European Community - European Commission (when referring to Lisbon)
ECA	Eastern Europe & Central Asia
ECB	European Central Bank
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
ECOSOC	UN Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EF	Energy Facility
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighborhood Partnership Instrument
ENRTP	Thematic Programme for the Environment and Sustainable management of Natural Resources
EP	European Parliament
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
ERD	European Report on Development

EQs	Evaluation Questions
ERF	European Refugee Fund
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ETS	European Emissions Trading System
EU	European Union
EU ETS	EU Emissions Trading System
EULEX	EU Rule of Law Mission
EUroCLIMA	Climate change regional cooperation Programme
FCPF	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
FIP	Forest Investment Program
FSTP	Food Security Thematic Programme
FW	Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council
GCCA	Global Climate Change Alliance
GCFM	Global Climate Financing Mechanism
GEEREF	Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GHGs	Greenhouse Gases
GNI	Gross National Income
GPAFSN	Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Rights
HRFASP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
HRVP	High Representative/Vice President
HLTF	UN High Level Task Force
I&C	Information and Communication
IFF	International Financing Facility
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IFS	Instrument for Stability
IL	Intervention Logic
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IMF	International Monetary Fund

IOM	International Organization for Migration
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
JEU	Joint Evaluation Unit
LA	Local Authority
LAC	Latin America and Caribbean
LDC	Least Development Country
LIFE	EU's Financial Instrument supporting Environmental and Nature Conservation
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MEA	Multilateral Environmental Agreements
MEDA	European financial instrument for the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
MEUR	Million Euros
MME	EU-Africa Partnership on Migration and Employment
MTR	Mid-Term Review
MS	Member State
NAMAs	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIP	National Indicative Programme
NSA	Non-State Actor
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreements
PCD	Policy coherence for development
PCNAS	Post-Crisis Needs Assessments
PD	Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
POEM	Policy Options to Engage Asian Economies in a Post-Kyoto Regime
PSC	Political and Security Committee
QWeCI	Quantifying Weather and Climate Impacts on Health in Developing Countries project
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
RG	Reference Group
RIC	Relex Information Committee
ROM	Results-Oriented Monitoring system

RSP	Regional Strategy Paper
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation
SCP	Sustainable Consumption and Production
SEAs	Strategic Environmental Assessments
SEC	Commission Staff Working Document
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
SITCEN	Situation Centre
TACIS	Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States
3 Cs	Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNCSD	United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNECLAC	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFF	UN Forum on Forests
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
URGENCE	Urban Reduction of GHG Emissions in China and Europe project
V-FLEX	Vulnerability Flex mechanism
VPA	Voluntary Partnership Agreements
WB	World Bank
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
WTO	World Trade Organisation
WWF	World Wildlife Fund

ANNEX 1 -

TERMS OF REFERENCE



EUROPEAN COMMISSION
EuropeAid Co-operation Office

Evaluation

Evaluation of Visibility of EU external action

TERMS OF REFERENCE

February 2010

1. MANDATE

The Commission Services have requested the Joint Evaluation Unit to undertake an evaluation of **Visibility** of the EU external action as managed by the European Commission and covered by DG RELEX, DEV and AIDCO. This is part of the 2009 evaluation programme of the Relex Family of Directorates-General¹ as approved by the External Relations and Development Commissioners.

The main objectives of the evaluation are:

- to provide the relevant external co-operation services of the EC and the wider public with an overall independent assessment of the visibility of the Commission's external action;
- To identify key lessons in order to improve the current and future strategies of the Commission on visibility.

2. BACKGROUND

The title and mandate of the evaluation refer to 'EU action', an overall concept. The way EU external action is perceived by stakeholders depends not just one activity or policy but on how the full set of EU policies impact on those stakeholders and how effective they each are both individually and as a coherent group of policies.

Over the last fifty years the EU has developed a series of external policy instruments, political, economic, commercial and financial, which help to protect and promote European interests and values.

The **Treaty of Lisbon** which entered in force on 1 December 2009, aims at giving Europe a clear voice in relations with its partners worldwide and increasing the impact, the coherence and the visibility of the EU's external action. The High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy was appointed to enhance the scope and effectiveness of the EU's external action.

Over time, also the emphasis on the importance of the visibility of EU external action has increased. In 2006 the European Commission issued a communication to the European Council on 'Europe in the world – some practical proposals for greater coherence, effectiveness and visibility'². One of the main axes aimed at strengthening "...democratic accountability and visibility of EU policies and actions and thus to increase their public acceptance". As the title of the communication indicates, this concept of visibility is used in close interaction with coherence and effectiveness.

In light of the forthcoming strategic discussion on the priorities for the next planning cycle (realized through the EU Financial Perspectives) it is important to better understand the public awareness of EU external relation issues and to discuss possible recommendations to better reach the desired impact: public support for EU external action. Effects of visibility on coherence and effectiveness of EU actions should not be neglected. Visibility is a major issue

¹ Directorates General of External Relations, (RELEX), Development (DEV) and the EuropeAid Co-operation Office (AIDCO).

² COM (2006)278 final

for EU external action. Collectively, the European Commission and the individual member states provide more than half of development and humanitarian aid in the world and it is important to make sure that this support and the results achieved are known, both inside and outside Europe. Evidence points to varying levels of visibility, it is essential to understand, in order to possibly address, the **reasons** of good or possibly weak visibility. Therefore, visibility as perceived by stakeholders outside the EU and its possible effects are covered as well.

3. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

3.1 Purpose

The evaluation will be guided by the the evaluation criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability, coherence and the EC added value. The first five have been formalised by the OECD (DAC) and the latter two are specific to EC policies. It is understood that Impact issues, i.e effects of visibility should be dealt with only to the extent feasible.

The evaluation guidelines of DG COMM define visibility as: "The extent to which the target public is aware of a communication activity" and link it to the effectiveness criterion. However, the present study is more interested in the visibility created by the EU's external action themselves –and the effects of visibility as far as possible - and not just in the publicity created simply by communication activities. Where necessary clarification of different aspects of visibility will be made.

The aim of this evaluation is:

- To clarify the definition of visibility and if necessary elaborate a typology of different aspects of visibility, address the rationale and the aims of visibility
- To find out "if", "how" and "when" visibility works in the specific thematic areas set out below and covered by support through DG RELEX, DEV and AIDCO (always including the EC Delegations and Representations!). The analysis preparing the answer to this question may consider different types of target audiences and contexts³.
- To understand how visibility may be determined by a type of aid modality, and type of activity.

The evaluation should be **forward looking, providing lessons and recommendations** concerning visibility of EU external action in particular as regards:

- Visibility as a factor for democratic accountability – within the EU as well as towards the beneficiaries
- Visibility as a factor for increased coordination within the EU as well as in the donor community

³ Key specific contextual factors are important to mention but the study should seek to work more at the level of widespread perceptions than can be observed in a number of different contexts

- Visibility as a factor for increased coherence within the EU as well as in the international donor community.

The evaluation should take into account visibility as compared with other donors, notably on the basis of the study :

To the extent possible the evaluation will take into consideration – notably when formulating the recommendations – the ongoing institutional developments, in particular the role of the EEAS presently being created.

Negative visibility of EU external action, roots and consequences should be looked at as well, if observed.

The evaluation should serve policy decision-making and management purposes at different levels. The main users of the evaluation will be DG DEV, DG Relex, the EuropeAid Cooperation Office and the EU Delegations. Other EC services like DG ECHO, DG COMM, and DG TRADE may benefit from the results of this evaluation too. The evaluation should also generate results of interest to a broader audience, including the main stakeholders {EU tax payers, beneficiaries (governments and population of partner countries) and other donors (Member States, the multilaterals and others)}.

The evaluation should come to a **general overall judgement** of the extent to which Commission activities (policies, strategies, programmes, projects, political discussion...) have contributed to visibility of EU external action and its possible effects.

The evaluation shall lead to **CONCLUSIONS** based on objective, credible, reliable and valid findings and provide the EC with a set of operational and useful and relevant **recommendations**.

3.2 Target Audiences

The main target groups are:

- a. Stakeholders inside EU including the European citizens, policy makers in the EU institutions and in the Member States.
- b. Stakeholders outside EU, in the partner country including the final beneficiaries of EU actions and the Government of the partner country.
- c. Stakeholders outside EU, in the world including policy makers in OECD countries and in other multilateral organisations.

3.3 Temporal and geographical scope

The **temporal scope** of the present evaluation is included in the supporting activities for the six thematic areas for the time period 2005-2009; whenever possible 2010 data will be presented and/or integrated in the analysis. Depending on the thematic issue analysed, there might be the need to extend the view over earlier years, in order to ensure consistency of the issues presented.

The **geographical scope** includes all the countries where activities are undertaken and examples of EU visibility can demonstrate the productive role of the EU external action. This includes the countries of the regions of ACP, Neighbourhood, Asia and Latin America, as well as EU and OECD but not those presently covered by DG ELARG (mainly the Balkans). The study team will propose a sample of countries from which to collect data and/or to be visited. The sample will as far as feasible take into account the range and diversity of the EU's external action across the globe, as well as the thematic focus areas identified in 3.4

In the framework of this evaluation, the term "European Commission" is to be understood as prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, as the ensuing organisational arrangements will require some time to be put in place. However, evaluation recommendations have to be consistent and relevant within the new framework. The portfolios of the Directorates Generals mentioned in the terms of reference are those at the moment of the signature of the contract , i.e. 'Barroso I'.

3.4 Thematic scope

The title and mandate of the evaluation refers to 'EU action'. 'Action' is an overall concept, encompassing the full set of EU policies, statements, actions and activities. In terms of actions (in the very wide sense) generating visible effects EU and EC cannot be dissociated. It is the picture Europe (the EU) gives. Therefore the mandate of the study is to look at 'the visibility of EU external action'. As an institution the joint evaluation unit of the Relex family has only the mandate to judge activities (wide sense) undertaken or financed by the Relex family of the European Commission. Other actions, statements etc can be looked at, notably in terms of coherence and coordination.

The evaluation will assess activities undertaken and financed by the European Commission under the responsibility of the Directorates General of the Relex family. Relevant activities undertaken by other institutions of the European Union or other donors are looked at under the angle of coherence and coordination but not assessed as such. Relevant policy statements of the EU institutions (including the Council) and policies such as CFSP, and the possible consequences on the subject matter of this evaluation will be assessed. The evaluation does not refer to visibility activities undertaken for the enlargement of the European Union or for humanitarian aid purposes – wwith the exception of the above-mentioned coherence and coordination aspects. Focus will be given through the six thematic issues mentioned below, but visibility in other domains is not excluded. It will be described where relevant in the evaluation.

The evaluation will include a comprehensive desk phase followed by **FIELD MISSIONS** to be carried out for **6 different themes** listed below. The countries selected for the field missions should cover the various types and regions of co-operation as well as different experiences in the area of visibility. The evaluators shall identify and formulate in-depth questions during the desk phase and test hypotheses during the field missions.

The evaluation questions are validated and will become part of the contract. The countries for the field mission will be selected in consultation with the Reference Group.

Six themes which will be assessed in the evaluation regarding the visibility of the EU external actions:

- a. Crisis and fragile states : conflict prevention and peace building
- b. The current financial and economic crisis
- c. Food crisis
- d. Migration
- e. Climate change and energy
- f. Environment, biodiversity and deforestation

3.5 Focus issues

The consultants have also to look at:

- (1) The overall visibility strategy of the concerning EU external action
- (2) The political aspect of visibility through concrete and well developed examples (policy statements, declarations, actions)
- (3) The possible perception of the Commission as a change agent
- (4) The choice and use of different tools, channels and partners in specific situations / countries / goals
- (5) The choice of the different aid modalities (e. g. projects or budget support, etc.) and channels such as Civil Society Organisations, and their consequences on visibility of the EU external actions.
- (6) Visibility in co-ordination efforts or in situations where complementarity with EU Member States and with other donors, especially the multilaterals, might exist
- (7) Coherence between EU policies under the aspect of visibility – how visibility is positively or negatively affected by (a lack of) coherence with other policies
- (8) Recognition of the EC added value in EU external action,
- (9) Visibility in the short run (e.g. one media event) as differing from the visibility created by a long term presence or partnership.
- (10) Obstacles to effective visibility

The evaluators will take into account relevant ongoing and completed evaluations, studies and other documents. In particular the following are considered important (list not exhaustive):

- evaluation of EC support through the UN family
- evaluation of EC support through development banks

- evaluation of EC support for conflict prevention and peace building (ongoing)

A survey that addresses main issues regarding visibility of EU external actions will be made of selected EC delegations and OECD donors in order to provide relevant information. Main stakeholders should be involved in the study using different tools e.g. focus groups, pyramidal focus groups, etc.

4. METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

The overall methodology guidance for standard evaluations is available on the web page of the Evaluation Unit under the following address:

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/introduction/introduction_en.htm.

However, given the innovative nature of this evaluation, this methodology may only serve as a general guidance, and does not necessarily have to be applied rigorously. This also applies to the DAC criteria. Major deviations from the methodology will be presented in draft reports or notes and have to be validated by the JEU.

Within 14 days after the reception of the ToR, the Consultants will present a **launch note** which should contain:

- their understanding of the ToR;
- a methodological note including the implementation of the quality control;
- the provisional composition of the evaluation team with CVs⁴;
- a proposed budget⁵.

Following the launch note, the main key deliverables are:

- The kick-off meeting;
- The inception report;
- The desk report;
- The final report;
- The dissemination seminar in Brussels.

The consultants are invited to critically use all the available literature / studies / results (partial or completed, official or unofficial) done so far on the subject if they consider it can be useful for the drafting of the report.

The evaluation basic approach consists of **5 phases**, subdivided in **subsequent methodological stages** (phases for which consultant contribution is requested are marked in grey).

⁴ All birthday dates must be written in the following Format: dd/mm/yyyy

⁵ In the frame of a "framework contract"

<i>Five Main Phases of Development:</i>	<i>Methodological Stages:</i>
1. Preparation Phase	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reference group constitution ▪ ToR drafting
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Launch Note
2. Desk Phase 3. Field Phase 4. Synthesis phase	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Structuring of the evaluation ▪ Data Collection, verification of hypotheses ▪ Analysis ▪ Judgements on findings
5. Feedback and Dissemination	Dissemination Seminar in Brussels
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quality Grid ▪ Summaries ▪ Evinfo (summary for OECD and Commission databases) ▪ <i>Fiche contradictoire</i> (a statement of key recommendations followed by the Commission services' response)

4.1. Preparation Phase

The evaluation manager, within the Evaluation Unit, identifies the Commission services to be invited to the Reference Group (RG), which will ensure that the Commission expertise is fully utilised and all the relevant information is provided.

The evaluation manager prepares the *Terms of References* (ToR) for the evaluation and sends them to the Contractor.

The contractor will then present a *Launch Note* that shall contain: (i) the contractor understanding of the ToR, (ii) the proposed composition of the core evaluation team with individuals' *Curriculum Vitae* and (iii) the proposed work plan and budget for the evaluation.

4.2. Desk phase

4.2.1 Inception report

Following the approval of the *Launch Note* by the Evaluation Unit, the work will proceed to the structuring stage which shall lead to the production of an *Inception Report*.

The *Inception report* will first address the definition of visibility, the rationale behind it, the technical and political aspects of visibility, the elements which identify the visibility activities based on the different documents. The inception report will attempt to formulate a chain of cause and effect concerning the theme of the evaluation.

On the basis of the information collected, the evaluators will then:

- (1) Present a **preliminary set of evaluation questions (EQ), and if possible and useful, judgement criteria for each EQ and provisional indicators for each of the proposed judgement criteria**; If JC are not deemed useful, it will be explained why not. In any case, the evaluators will explain the approach to answer the question and on what basis a judgment/assessment will be made.

The evaluation questions will cover, to the extent possible the evaluation criteria relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, value added and coherence. Other issues such as 3Cs and gender will be considered as well where ever appropriate.

Present a preliminary set of hypotheses and related questions to be tested during the field phase. These will be accompanied by examples of potential judgement criteria and indicators to show how the study proposes to address, to the extent possible, the evaluation criteria as indicated above (section 3.1). After discussion with the JEU and the RG criteria and indicators (or substitutes) will be further refined during the desk phase.

- (2) Propose a set of criteria for selection of countries for the thematic examples. Based on these criteria, justify the choice of 8 countries for the fieldhase, as representative as possible, which would be examined in detail during the desk phase. Out of this sample of thematic examples, 8 countries will be selected for the field phase of the evaluation (during the desk phase).
- (3) Specify the **methodological tools** that will be used;
- (4) Present a detailed **workplan**, specifying the organisation and time schedule for the evaluation process.

The Contractor will present the *Inception Report* which shall be formally approved by the Evaluation Unit. The Reference group will comment on the *Inception Report* and on the Evaluation Questions and the proposed thematic examples.

4.2.2 Desk phase report

Upon approval of the *Inception Report*, the team of consultants will proceed to the Desk Phase of the evaluation. The Desk Phase shall be the moment when relevant information in Headquarters is gathered and analysed.

The desk report takes up the points dealt with in the inception report and goes into as much detail as necessary. In this stage, consultants are asked to:

- (1) Present a final set of **evaluation questions** along with appropriate **judgement criteria** and relevant quantitative and qualitative **indicators** where feasible and necessary;
- (2) Present the methodology for **data and information collection and validation**, both for the Desk phase and for the forthcoming field phase.
- (3) Present the **methods of analysis** of the information and data collected in order to draw findings that would enable to draw general conclusions; due to the difficulty of this exercise any limitation should be made explicit;
- (4) Present the way to come to **judgements** that directly relate to the Judgement criteria, though adaptable should the field findings require doing so.
- (5) Present the **preliminary findings responding to the evaluation questions** and the first hypotheses to be tested during the field missions.

- (6) For each of the six thematic issues, a common approach will be formulated for the data gathering, the analysis and the hypothesis to be tested in the field missions allowing to draw conclusions and lessons learned based on an homogeneous approach in each county example. The consultants will propose a draft structure for reporting on how evidence from the country visits will contribute to the thematic reports.

At the completion of this work, the evaluation team will present a *Desk Phase Report* setting out the results of this first phase of the evaluation including all the above listed tasks⁶ (the core part of the *Inception Report* will be annexed to the *Desk Phase Report*).

The RG will comment on *Desk Phase Report* based on which the necessary amendments will be specified. Formal approval of this report is to be made by the Evaluation Unit.

4.3 Field phase

Following satisfactory completion of the Desk Phase, the evaluation team will proceed to the field missions⁷.

The fieldwork shall be undertaken on the basis set out in the Final Desk Phase Report. If, during the course of the fieldwork, any significant deviations from the agreed methodology and/or schedule are perceived necessary, the Consultants must receive the approval of the Evaluation Unit before they can be applied.

Prior completion of each country visit the Evaluation team shall prepare for the EC Delegation concerned **a debriefing of the field mission**, seeking to validate the data and the information gathered.

When field missions are completed, the Evaluation team shall present results to the Reference Group in a debriefing.

4.4. Final reports and seminar

4.4.1. The Draft Final Report

Following completion of the field mission, the team will proceed to prepare the final report and six thematic reports (one for each theme). Each of these thematic reports will present the results on visibility of EU external actions from several countries visited. These reports will be annexed to the *Final Report*.

The Consultants will submit the draft final report in conformity with the structure set out in annex 2. any deviations from this format will be proposed by the consultants and validated by the JEU. Comments received during de-briefing meetings with the Delegations and the reference group must be taken into consideration.

⁶ All the databases produced for this aim will be integral part of the deliverable.

⁷ Nevertheless, if considered necessary for the adequate preparation of the field phase, the contractor might undertake pilot missions in parallel to the Desk Phase (subject to approval of the Evaluation Unit).

The Consultants may either accept or reject the comments but in case of rejection they must justify (in writing) the reasons for rejection (the comments and the Consultants' responses are annexed to the report). If the Consultants don't want to take them in the report, they must explain in a separate document the reasons why.

If the evaluation manager considers the report to be of sufficient quality (cf. annex 3), he/she will circulate it for comments to the reference group. The reference group will convene to discuss it in the presence of the evaluation team.

The evaluation team will also present the final report to the RG.

4.4.2. The Final Report

The Consultants will prepare the final report based on of further comments from the reference group, the stakeholders invited to comment and the evaluation manager. The final report will be in **English**, the executive summary (5 pages) will be translated into French and Spanish.

Upon approval of the final version, 60 copies of the **Final Main Report** (including the executive summary in French and Spanish) must be sent to the Evaluation Unit with an additional 10 reports with all printed annexes. A CD-Rom with the Final Main Report and annexes has to be added to each printed report.

The evaluators have to hand over on an appropriate support (electronic or paper) all relevant data gathered during the evaluation.

The contractor shall submit a **methodological note** explaining how the quality control and the capitalisation of lessons learned have been addressed.

The Evaluation Unit makes a formal judgement on the quality of the evaluation (annex 3).

The report should reflect a rigorous, methodical and thoughtful approach. The evaluation shall lead to **CONCLUSIONS** based on objective, credible, reliable and valid findings and provide the EC with a set of operational and useful **recommendations**.

Recommendations must be:

- Linked to the conclusions;
- Clustered, prioritised and targeted at specific addressees;
- Useful, relevant and operational;
- If possible, presented as options associated with benefits and risks.

The final version of the *Final Report* shall be presented in a way that allows publication without any further editing.

4.4.3 The Seminar

Following the approval of the final report, the evaluation manager will proceed to dissemination of the results (conclusions and recommendations) of the evaluation: (i) make a formal judgement on the evaluation using a standard quality assessment grid (see Annex 3); (ii) prepare an Evaluation Summary following the standard DAC format (EvInfo); (iii) prepare and circulate a three-column *Fiche Contradictoire* (FC). The FC is prepared by the Evaluation Unit in order to ensure feedback from the evaluation and an active response from the Commission services. All three documents will be published on the Web alongside with the *Final Report*.

The Evaluators will be required to assist in dissemination and follow-up activities. In coordination with the Evaluation Unit, they shall present the conclusions and recommendations during a seminar in Brussels. Limited number of other brief presentations might also be required.

The purpose of the seminar is to present the results, the conclusions and the recommendations of the evaluation to the main stakeholders concerned (EC services, Member States, Members of the European Parliament, representatives of the partner countries and civil society organisations and other donors).

The Consultants shall prepare a presentation (*Power point*) for the seminar. This presentation shall be considered as a product of the evaluation in the same way as the reports and the data basis. For the **seminar** 120 copies of the report (including the executive summary in French and Spanish) and 30 reports with full printed annexes (see annex 2 of the ToR) have to be produced.

The Consultants shall prepare the minutes of the seminar and provide them to the Joint Evaluation Unit one week after the date of the seminar.

The final **presentation** will include slides for:

- Context of the evaluation;
- Evaluation questions;
- Answers to the evaluation questions;
- Conclusions and;
- Recommendations;

5. MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF THE EVALUATION

The responsibility for the management and supervision of the evaluation will rest with the Evaluation Unit of the EuropeAid Co-operation Office. The progress of the evaluation will be followed closely by the Reference Group (RG) consisting of members of EC services concerned.

The RG will act as the main interface between the Evaluation Team and the Commission Services. The principal function of the Reference Group is to follow the evaluation process and more specifically:

- to advise on the scope and focus of the evaluation and the elaboration of the Terms of Reference;
- to act as the interface between the consultants and the Commission services;
- to advise on the quality of the work of the consultants;
- to facilitate access to information and documentation;
- to facilitate and assist in feedback of the findings and recommendations from the evaluation.

Several Reference Group meetings (about 4/5) will take place during the process of the evaluation, as indicated below in a time schedule.

6. EVALUATION TEAM

This evaluation is to be carried out by a team with advanced knowledge and experience in **development co-operation** in general terms, evaluation and in the specific topics mentioned.

Previous experience of conducting complex evaluations for international organisations (UN, Council of Europe, etc.) will be considered as an asset.

The Evaluation Unit recommends strongly that consultants from beneficiary countries will be employed (particularly, but not only, during the Field Phase).

The **team leader** must have proven experience in EC evaluation methodology. Furthermore he/she shall have a considerable experience in managing evaluations of a similar size and character. In addition, each country team should be led by an experienced member of the team (or directly by the team leader).

The team must be prepared to **work in English**, and possess excellent drafting skills. Knowledge of French and Spanish in particular for the field phase, is required.

The agreed Team composition may be subsequently adjusted if necessary in the light of the final Evaluation Questions and choice of countries once those have been validated.

The evaluation team should possess a sound knowledge and experience in:

- Visibility issues including communication.
- In all fields pertaining to the topic of the evaluation, notably: crisis and fragile states – conflict prevention and peace building, actual financing and economic crisis, food crisis, migration, climate change and energy, environment, biodiversity and deforestation.
- Evaluation methodology.

Consultants must be strictly neutral. Conflicts of interests must be avoided. A declaration of absence of conflict of interest should be signed by each consultant and annexed to the launch note.

7. TIMING

The evaluation will start in December 2009, upon signature of the contract by all parties; the completion of the *Final Report* is scheduled for Summer 2011.

The following is the *indicative* schedule:

<i>Evaluation Phases and Stages</i>	<i>Notes and Reports</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Meetings</i>
Terms of Reference		February 2010	
Starting Stage	Launch Note	March 2010	
Desk Phase			
Structuring Stage	Inception Report	May 2010	RG meeting
Desk Study	Draft Desk Report	September 2010	RG meeting

	Final Desk Report	November 2010	
Field Phase		January-February 2010	
	Presentation for the RG (including final notes on thematic examples)	March 2011	RG meeting
Final Report-Writing Phase			
	Draft Final Report	May 2011	RG meeting
	Final Report	July 2011	
Dissemination Seminar		September/ October 2011	

8. COST OF THE EVALUATION AND PAYMENT MODALITIES

The overall cost of the evaluation should not exceed **450 000 €**

This amount includes a provision for the international feedback **seminar in Brussels**. The seminar will be organised by the Evaluation Unit to present the results of the Evaluation; the presentation will be followed by a debate that shall be open to a large audience including Member States, other donors, international organisations, foundations and representatives of Civil society organisations. The budget for the seminar (fees, per diems and travel) will be presented separately in the launch note.

According to the service contract, payments modalities shall be as follow:

30% at the acceptance of the *Inception Note*, plus 2.5% of the agreed budget to be used for *quality control*;

50% at acceptance of *Draft Final Report*;

20% at acceptance of *Final Report*.

The invoices shall be sent to the Commission only after the Evaluation Unit confirms in writing the acceptance of the reports.

Annex 1 – Key Documentation (non-exhaustive list)

Action Plan to improve communicating Europe by the Commission – annex to Action Plan (July 2005)

Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM(2005) Plan D (October 2005) and its evaluation :

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/communication/pdf/evaluation_citizens_consultations_sep2009_en.pdf

White Paper on a European Communication Policy (February 2006)

The EU in the World Towards a Communication Strategy for the European Union's External Policy, 2006-2009 (February 2006)

Communication Strategy of EuropeAid for 2007-2009

Communication Action Plan for 2009

Internal Communication and Staff engagement Strategy for the European Commission – improving effectiveness and building a solid reputation from the inside out (July 2007)

Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions (April 2008)

CE Note pour les membres de la commission E/2367/2006 16 Novembre 2006

CE Note a l attention des membres de la commission E/2347/2007 22 Octobre 2007

The external Communication Activities, Tools & Structures of the European Commission Lessons Learned & New Avenues Summary Report & Recommendations (October 2007)

Communication on a new framework for cooperation on activities concerning the information and communication policy of the European Union (COM(2001)354)

Communication on an information and communication strategy for the European Union (COM(2002)350)

Communication on implementing the information and communication strategy for the European Union (COM(2004)196)

Communication to the European Council 'Europe in the world – some practical proposals for greater coherence, effectiveness and visibility' (COM 2006, 278)

"EvalComm, a practical toolkit for the evaluation of communication activities" under (EC internal website):

<http://www.cc.cec/wikis/display/EvalComm/Evaluation+Toolkit>

This website also gives access to a number of possibly relevant evaluation studies of communication activities of several DGs.

Evaluation of the information and communication activities of the European Commission Delegations for DG RELEX, 19th November 2008 The Evaluation Partnership Limited (TEP)

Reference Web sites:

The overall methodology guidance for evaluations:

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/methodology/index_en.htm

http://www.relex.ec.europa.eu/dir_and_units/dir_i/i-5/evaluations.htm

http://www.cc.cec/dgintranet/europeaid/info_com/communication_strategies/index_en.htm

http://www.cc.cec/home/dgserv/comm/index_en.htm

http://www.cc.cec/dgintranet/europeaid/info_com/communication_networks/index_en.htm

http://www.cc.cec/dgintranet/europeaid/info_com/visibility_issues/index_en.htm

Other key documents:

Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, OECD (2 March 2005)

Relevant evaluation reports related to communication / visibility /information, for details see:

Evaluation reports commissioned by the Evaluation Unit

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/index_en.htm

European evaluation inventory

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/dg/aidco/ms_ec_evaluations_inventory/evaluationslist.cfm?start=101

Relevant reports issued by WB, UN and other multilateral institutions, reports from MS and other donors

http://www.undp.org/eu/undp_brussels_partnerships.shtml

Annex 2. Outline Structure of the Final Evaluation Report

Length: The overall length of the final evaluation report should not be greater than *60 pages* (including the executive summary). Additional information on overall context, programme or aspects of methodology and analysis should be confined to annexes (which however should be restricted to the important information).

1. Executive Summary

Length: 5 pages maximum

This executive summary must produce the following information:

- 1.1 – Purpose of the evaluation;
- 1.2 – Background to the evaluation;
- 1.3 – Methodology;
- 1.4 – Analysis and main findings for each Evaluative Question; short overall assessment;
- 1.5 – Main conclusions;*
- 1.6 – Main recommendations.*

** Conclusions and recommendations must be ranked and prioritised according to their relevance to the evaluation and their importance, and they should also be cross-referenced back to the key findings. Length-wise, the parts dedicated to the conclusions and recommendations should represent about 40 % of the executive summary*

2. Introduction

Length: 5 pages

- 2.1. Synthesis of the Commission's Strategy and Programmes: their objectives, how they are prioritised and ordered, their logic both *internally* (ie. the existence – or not – of a logical link between the EC policies and instruments and expected impacts) and *externally* (ie. Within the context of the needs of the country, government policies, and the programmes of other donors); the implicit assumptions and risk factors; the intended impacts of the Commission's interventions.*
- 2.2. Context: brief analysis of the political, economic, social and cultural dimensions, as well as the needs, potential for and main constraints.*
- 2.3. Purpose of the Evaluation: presentation of the evaluative questions

** Only the main points of these sections should be developed within the report. More detailed treatment should be confined to annexes*

3. Methodology

Length: 10 pages

In order to answer the evaluative questions a number of methodological instruments must be presented by the consultants:

- 3.1. Judgement Criteria: which should have been selected (for each Evaluation Question) and agreed upon by the steering group;
- 3.2. Indicators: attached to each judgement criterion. This in turn will determine the scope

and methods of data collection;

- 3.3. Data and Information Collection: can consist of literature review, interviews, questionnaires, thematic examples, etc. The consultants will indicate any limitations and will describe how the data should be cross-checked to validate the analysis.
- 3.4. Methods of Analysis: of the data and information obtained for each Evaluation Question (again indicating any eventual limitations);
- 3.5. Methods of Judgement

4. Main Findings and Analysis

Length: 20 to 30 pages

- 4.1. Answers to each Evaluative Question, indicating findings and conclusions for each;
- 4.2. Overall assessment of the EC Strategy. This assessment should cover:
 - Relevance to needs and overall context, including development priorities and co-ordination with other donors;
 - Actual Impacts: established, compared to intended impacts, as well as unforeseen impacts or deadweight/substitution effects;
 - Effectiveness in terms of how far the intended results were achieved;
 - Efficiency: in terms of how far funding, personnel, regulatory, administrative, time and other resource considerations contributed or hindered the achievement of results;
 - Sustainability: whether the results can be maintained over time.
 - EC value added

5. A Full Set of Conclusions and Recommendations

Length: 10 pages

A Full set of Conclusions* and Recommendations* (i) for each evaluation question; (ii) as an overall judgement. (As an introduction to this chapter a short mention of the main objectives of the country programmes and whether they have been achieved)

**All conclusions should be cross-referenced back by paragraph to the appropriate findings. Recommendations must be ranked and prioritised according to their relevance and importance to the purpose of the evaluation (also they shall be cross-referenced back by paragraph to the appropriate conclusions).*

Annexes should include logical diagrams of EC strategies; judgement criteria forms; list of the projects and programmes specifically considered; project assessment fiches; list of people met; list of documentation; Terms of Reference; any other info (also in the form of tables) which contains factual basis used in the evaluation; etc.

- Power point presentation with 4 slides for each evaluation questions illustrating in a synthetic and schematic way the evaluation process: 1st slide) logical diagram with the evaluation question, 2nd slide) judgment criteria, indicators and target level, 3rd slide) findings compared with success criteria, and 4th slide) interventions of the EC plus limits of the evaluation.

Annex 3 - Quality assessment grid

Concerning these criteria, the evaluation report is:	Unacceptable	Poor	Good	Very good	Excellent
1. Meeting needs: Does the evaluation adequately address the information needs of the commissioning body and fit the terms of reference?					
2. Relevant scope: Is the rationale of the policy examined and its set of outputs, results and outcomes/impacts examined fully, including both intended and unexpected policy interactions and consequences?					
3. Defensible design: Is the evaluation design appropriate and adequate to ensure that the full set of findings, along with methodological limitations, is made accessible for answering the main evaluation questions?					
4. Reliable data: To what extent are the primary and secondary data selected adequate. Are they sufficiently reliable for their intended use?					
5. Sound analysis: Is quantitative information appropriately and systematically analysed according to the state of the art so that evaluation questions are answered in a valid way?					
6. Credible findings: Do findings follow logically from, and are they justified by, the data analysis and interpretations based on carefully described assumptions and rationale?					
7. Validity of the conclusions: Does the report provide clear conclusions? Are conclusions based on credible results?					
8. Usefulness of the recommendations: Are recommendations fair, unbiased by personnel or shareholders' views, and sufficiently detailed to be operationally applicable?					
9. Clearly reported: Does the report clearly describe the policy being evaluated, including its context and purpose, together with the procedures and findings of the evaluation, so that information provided can easily be understood?					
Taking into account the contextual constraints on the evaluation, the overall quality rating of the report is considered.					

(for details on how criteria are rated refer to:
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/europeaid/evaluation/methodology/guidelines/gui_qal_flr_trg_en.htm)

ANNEX 2 -

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

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As its work has progressed the evaluation team has obviously considered and reconsidered the conceptual framework of the evaluation. This has resulted in some new thinking and some further clarification of concepts, which are outlined below.

One of the key points in the conceptual framework is the working definition of visibility. Following the kick-off meeting the working definition of Visibility was defined as:

“The awareness and perception of the image created by EU external action among EU and non-EU stakeholders resulting from deliberate and non-deliberate actions by the EU”

By using this definition the Inception Report signalled first of all that there is a difference between the message that an actor seeks to convey and the perception of that same message by the audience. It is useful to elaborate a bit on this from a communication theory point of view.

Several issues determine whether a message conveyed by EU external action is perceived and appropriated in the same manner as it was intended. The message might be unclearly formulated. The values might be different between EU external action and the recipients abroad and what might have been intended as a positive message could be perceived as negative. For instance an open and free market might be a positive goal for the EU, but a threat to manufacturers in a protected home market.

It is also well documented that for a message to be appropriated by the receiving person it must reflect the reality as the person perceives it. Equally it must be acknowledged that the opinion of a recipient’s personal and professional networks often has far more influence than the opinion that has been conveyed through the media.

Furthermore, it is now generally accepted by communication professionals that, up to now mass media has been the single most important mediator of messages with regards to influencing the opinion of a broad target group or ‘the masses’ as they could be described. It is however important to add the nuance that mass media often, but not always, tends to involve one-way information that does not seek or allow for a dialogue with the recipient. Again, we know that two-way communication is by far the most influential if an actor wants to change people’s perception, attitudes or behaviour.

What still makes mass media so important for any communication strategy is that a good communicator will be able to set the agenda for thoughts and discussions among the broader public. The communicator will also in the way a story is presented to the media be very influential on the journalist’s framing of the story. Yet it is important to realise that even when a story with the desired framing is promulgated through the mass media it will only be appropriated by the recipient when the story reflects his or her reality and finds support in his or her social network.

For the EU external action the above theoretical background would mean that when it communicates in order to build the desired image it should consider:

- Using mass media to set the agenda
- Presenting stories to journalists in a manner that optimises a desirable framing
- Using social media with computer-mediated dialogue
- Communicating through broader networks like social, business, rights, professional and educational civil society organisations as partners in promulgating the desired image of EU external action
- Ensuring tight coordination of policies and messages from different EU partners

For the evaluator the theoretical background means that the evaluation should include analyses of:

- Media coverage of the selected themes and cases
- Journalists' perception of the image of EU
- Journalists' judgement of EU external action's communication priorities
- Civil society organisations' perception of EU external action's image
- Member States communication practices as benchmark for EU communication

The Study's agreed working definition of Visibility also makes very clear that EU external action might wish to create a certain image or perception in its target groups through communication or through its policies, programmes, projects or other actions, but other parts of EU including its member states might act differently and thereby add to the creation of another image than intended. This is very clear in the first part of the working definition.

While the first part of this definition of Visibility therefore works well, it is felt however that some adjustment would be useful to the second half working definition, that is the part referring to "...**resulting from deliberate and non-deliberate actions by the EU**". After all it is expected that all actions taken by EU are deliberate. There will be actions that are consistent with the objectives of Nice and Lisbon Treaties and there might also be actions that are not consistent, but they should still be deliberate. Even where policy, programme and project actions are not consistent with the external action objectives in the treaties they are definitely still intended actions albeit for other reasons.

Besides, the important role of the EU communication and public diplomacy in creating the perceived image of EU external action also policies, programmes and projects adds to the awareness, perception and image.

We therefore suggest an alternative working definition of Visibility as follows:

"The awareness and perception of the image of EU external action among EU and non-EU stakeholders resulting from EU communication activities or from other actions that have an impact on this image".

In the Inception Report a Communication Prism diagram was developed as a model to illustrate how there is a difference between the message that an actor seeks to convey and the perception of the same message by the audience. Following the suggested change in working definition of visibility the team suggests a refinement of the Communication Prism model. The model illustrates how the intended messages and image delivered by EU external action and other parts of the EU are refracted on their way to the recipients. A new version of the diagram is below (Figure 1). Each block in the diagram illustrates a step in the process of communication:


- In the first block *what is meant* to be conveyed is defined, that is, the intended awareness and perception of the image of EU external action is put in a context of strategy papers and messages delivered to defined target groups by EU external action including now also the HRFASP, the EEAS, and other parts of the EC, the EP, Council and MS.
- In the second block we have the *measures* or channels spreading the intended awareness and perception of the image of EU external action. The measures are partly communication activities including public diplomacy and partly the policies, programmes, projects and other actions carried out by EU including its external action.
- In the third block we have the *Communication Prism* itself refracting the messages and actions that were intended to create a desired awareness and perception of the image of EU external action or of other parts of EU. The refractions of messages and actions can be rooted in several things – hereunder different values and perspectives of sender and recipient, conflicts between message and reality, between policies, projects, programmes

and the actual needs and interests among the recipients, opinions of social and professional networks, or changes in context and circumstances.

- In the fourth and final block we have the *Visibility achieved*– the awareness and perception of the image that the target group has of EU external action from the messages and actions refracted through the prism. This is the result the intended communication, public diplomacy and other actions end up having with the target groups.

Figure 1 - The Communication Prism

The Communication Prism: What is meant is not always what is seen and maybe understood



As illustrated above even if the EU in its policies and activities, communication and messages follows the objectives for its visibility in the Nice and Lisbon treaties as in Article 3.5 of the latter, it is by no means certain that the visibility achieved is that what was intended.

Public Diplomacy

Since the EU communication strategies are often seen to encompass public relations, public diplomacy, outreach as well as information activities it might also be useful briefly to clarify the different concepts. In the draft communication of Mrs Ferrero-Waldner to the commission “The EU In The World - Towards A Communication Strategy For The European Union’s External Policy, 2006 – 2009” the strategy distinguishes between inside and outside the EU.

Outside the EU, the objective is to explain the EU’s policies and activities, as well as its underlying values and objectives, to current and potential opinion-formers as well as to the broader audience of the interested public at large. On the other hand:

“Within the EU, the overall objective is to engage in a more open dialogue with citizens and to better respond to their expectations, contributing to a fuller understanding of the EU’s external policies, instruments and concrete action”.

Public diplomacy as a concept was coined in the US half a century ago and identified the influence of the public in other countries as yet another potential tool to use in international policy. Traditionally public diplomacy has involved the government in one country financing the communication of favourable information about that country to the general public in other parts of the world. Later the concept developed into two-way state-financed communication between state and non-state actors across different countries. Besides information and two-way communication this could include cultural events, exchanges, study grants and other measures used to influence international public opinion to understand a nation's ideas, culture and actual policies and their goals.

More recently, in what researchers often call *new public diplomacy* the new communication landscape with non-state actors being interconnected with increased transparency public diplomacy moves away from the traditional efforts of projecting national images through mass media campaigns, to a negotiation of understanding with foreign publics - which requires more of a dialogue oriented communication⁸.

In the Draft Communication of Mrs Ferrero-Waldner to the Commission 'The EU in the World towards A Communication strategy for the European Union's external policy, 2006 – 2009' the EU itself defines public diplomacy as encompassing:

“...all activities which have an impact on the perceptions and the public opinion in third countries about the country or institution engaging in public diplomacy. They are therefore not only aimed at the media and the political actors of third countries but at their societies at large”(Chapter 3.2).

The Communication further states that strengthening the EU's public diplomacy requires work at all levels, where the representations in Member States and the Delegations in third countries have an essential role to play in providing information and communicating at national, regional and local levels. Reforms within Delegations should permit greater outreach activity, enabling the public and the press to put a face to the Commission, to engage the Commission in a real dialogue, and to allow the Commission to maintain a more consistent view of local concerns. A particular role will be with the Head of Delegation.

In this Communication the EU thus sees itself as the actor communicating to the public and reaching out to counterparts in member and non-member states as part of its public diplomacy efforts. Finally in a later publication 'EU Insight – Engaging the World, the EU's Public Diplomacy'(July 2009), published by the EU Delegation to the United States the Public Diplomacy concept is brought a step further:

“The “soft power” of public diplomacy plays a crucial role in the external relations of the European Union, and is closely integrated with EU policy both at home and abroad. Addressing today's global challenges—climate change, security, the global economy, and poverty, hunger and disease in the developing world—requires not only collaboration with partner countries and multilateral organizations, but also a broad measure of global support, both official and popular, to succeed.”

“In non-EU countries, more than 130 EU Delegations increase awareness of the EU; ensure broad understanding of EU policies, initiatives and messages; and build relationships with state and local officials, community and business leaders, the media, students, and civil society.”

In addition, a Public Diplomacy emphasis is also put on project and programme related information and communication activities. The *Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions* (EuropeAid, July 2009) is designed to ensure that actions funded by the EU incorporate information and communication activities designed to raise the awareness of the reasons and the EU support for the action, as well as the results and the impact of this support.

⁸ Lindholm, K and Olsson, E-K *Crisis communication as a multi-level game: The Muhammad cartoons from a crisis diplomacy perspective*, 2011, *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, SAGE.

In a broader perspective the concept of stressing the reasons, results and impact of EU support would, in relation to the Lisbon Treaty (TEU, Article 3.5), mean that messages should illustrate how the EU has been a major factor, for instance, in helping to establish peace and security in one or more regions, or the how EU through free and fair trade agreements has helped eradicate poverty. This is clearly the most important and influential type of communication in a traditional information and communication context trying to build the desired image of EU external action, because it allows citizens of the EU as well as worldwide to identify directly with the benefits based on commonly recognised human values.

However, as part of this evaluation it is indeed worth examining to what degree the activities as described in the *Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Actions* have the desired impact on the awareness and perception of the image of the EU external action in comparison with the above described public diplomacy activities and whether other ways forward would be more feasible to achieve the desired visibility goals.

ANNEX 3 -

THE EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK:

THE EXTERNAL ACTION OF THE EU

ANNEX 3 - THE EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK: THE EXTERNAL ACTION OF THE EU

The analysis of the normative and political framework of the EU external action is important to define the boundaries of the competence of the European Union in this domain, and to identify the related hierarchy of objectives in order to construct the Intervention Logic and the themes within the evaluation scope.

The overview begins with the provisions contained in the **Treaty of Nice** and then concentrates its attention on the **Lisbon Treaty** (Consolidated version) in accordance with the time scope of the evaluation. These are outlined in Table 1 below.

For the bulk of the period of this study the Nice TEU provides the normative framework with the Lisbon Treaty (TEU & TFEU) only coming in at the end. The evaluation team therefore started their reconstruction of the objectives in the intervention logic on the Treaty of Nice characterized by the structures in three pillars, where the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Defence Policy are integral parts of the second (intergovernmental) pillar and the Commercial, Development, Economic and financial cooperation, and Humanitarian policies (included in the external actions) are all part of the first (community) pillar. One fundamental issue which differentiates Nice from Lisbon is the competence of the Council in relation to the CFSP. Under Lisbon the European Council is responsible for defining the principles of and general guidelines for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including for matters with defence implications and of deciding on common strategies to be implemented by the Union. These are competences of the External Action in Lisbon.

However, for the purposes of this study, Lisbon provides a much stronger basis for the analysis of EU external action precisely because it does away with the three pillar construction still used by Nice and clarifies both the objectives and scope of EU external action in a global and harmonized manner. To take advantage of these improvements to the TEU and nevertheless remain faithful to the legal basis with which officials have to work, the study has chosen to build the intervention logic for the study largely on Nice, but also taking into consideration the Lisbon provisions as these will anyway be the framework to be used for the forward looking recommendations required by the TOR (section 3.1). In any case the policies and instruments of the external actions remained constant from one version of the Treaty to the other. The Intervention logic took into consideration this normative background but has also been elaborated following a more generic approach that does not rely on the normative framework so specifically, but rests more on the policies and instruments of EU external action.

The next chapter will include the analysis of the policy documents related more specifically to the visibility and communication of the external action.

Table 1 - The Treaties of Nice and Lisbon (Full text in annex 3)

TREATY OF NICE PROVISIONS: <i>Article 8 TEU; Articles 11(1), 12,13 TEU; Articles 17 (*), 18 TEU ; Articles 131; 177(1); 181a(1) TEU</i>	
EU External dimension	➤ <i>Article 8 TEU</i>
CFSP	➤ <i>Article 8 TEU;</i> ➤ <i>Articles 11(1), 12 ; 13 TEU;</i> ➤ <i>Articles 17 (*),18</i>
Common Commercial Policy	➤ <i>Article 131</i>
Development Cooperation	➤ <i>Article 177,1</i>

Economic and Financial Cooperation	➤ <i>Article 181a, 1</i>
LISBON CONSOLIDATED TREATY: <i>Article 3(5) TEU ; Article 21 (1,2) TEU ; TFEU, Titles I, II, III</i>	
Title V – General Provisions on the Union’s external action and specific provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy	➤ <i>Article 3(5)</i> ➤ <i>Article 21 (1,2)</i>
Consolidated Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union	Part Five External Action by the Union. Title I to Title III <u><i>Title I. General provisions refers to the general provisions laid down in Title V. Chapter 1 of the Treaty of the European Union (Article 21)</i></u> <u><i>Title II. Common commercial policy</i></u> <u><i>Title III. Cooperation with third countries and humanitarian aid</i></u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Chapter 1 Development Cooperation ➤ Chapter 2 Economic, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Third countries ➤ Chapter 3 Humanitarian Aid

The first and major difference between the Treaties of Nice and Lisbon is the division of the policies of the European Union in three Pillars under Nice that disappears with Lisbon. Thus with Nice the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Defense Policy are fall under Pillar II. In the area of CFSP the EC is expected to conduct action and promote coherence within the limits of its competences and powers, whereas the actual mandate for CFSP is with the Council. The other policies which complete the external framework, all fall under Pillar I. These include the Commercial policy, which is an exclusive competence of the Commission, and the Development, Humanitarian Aid and economic and financial cooperation which are all responsibilities shared between the Commission, the Council and Member States. In Lisbon the division in Pillars disappears giving a more organic and coherent structure to the external action that provides the basis for establishing the European External Action Service (EEAS) composed of officials from the Council, the Commission and the Member States. Nevertheless, as far as the content of external action objectives are concerned, we can observe that they remain substantially the same, with some differences in the formulation and in the level they appear in the different Treaties.

In terms of the objectives of EU external action a more detailed description indicates the following:

- Concerning the **global objectives** in Nice there is an explicit accent on the consolidation of Democracy and Human Rights (HR), whereas in Lisbon the reference is more implicit (Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests) being in any case the Democracy and HR at the foundation of the European Union. (Art 2, TEU – Lisbon. *The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.*)
- Concerning the **intermediate objectives**, the Lisbon Treaty puts an emphasis on the protection of the environment and the prevention of natural or man-made disasters. Otherwise the objectives are the same.

- Concerning the **specific objectives**, the policies correspond with each other, the only difference being the place of CFSP under a separate Pillar in Nice.
- In relation to the **operational objectives**, the difference concerns the mention of the specific instruments of the CFSP being the ones of the Pillar I equivalent.

For further clarity, the following table compares the Nice and Lisbon Treaties in their description of the external action of the EU.

Table 2 - External Action objectives: Comparative table between Nice and Lisbon Treaty

	Treaty of Nice	Lisbon Treaty
Overall Objectives	<p>-Developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms which are the founded principles of the EU (<i>Art 6, 11, TEU, 181TEC</i>) (<i>Pillars I & II</i>)</p> <p>-To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter. (<i>Art.11TEU</i>) (<i>Pillar II</i>)</p>	<p>Treaties Common Provisions: In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens (<i>TEU Art. 3.5</i>)</p>
Intermediate Objectives	<p>Strengthen the security of the Union in all ways, preserve peace, and promote international cooperation (<i>Pillar II</i>)</p> <p>-Contribute to the harmonious development of world trade through the progressive abolition of restrictions and the lowering of customs barriers</p> <p>-Ensure sustainable economic and social development, integration of the developing countries into the world economy, poverty reduction</p> <p>-Carry out, within its spheres of competence, economic, financial and technical cooperation measures with third countries (<i>Pillar I</i>)</p>	<p>To:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - safeguard its values, interests, security, independence and integrity - consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights - preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security - eradicating poverty - encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy - preserve and improve the quality of the environment - confront natural or man-made disasters - promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation <p>(<i>TEU Art. 21.2</i>)</p>
Specific Objectives	<p>-Define and implement CFSP Art. 11 (<i>Pillar II</i>)</p> <p>-Conduct Common Commercial Policies (<i>Article 131</i>)</p> <p>-Ensure Development Cooperation (<i>Article 177,1</i>)</p> <p>-Ensure Economic, Financial and technical cooperation (<i>Article 181a, 1</i>)</p> <p>-Develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries (Art. 8) – (<i>Pillar I</i>)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Conducting well the common commercial policy* (<i>Art.1.3.5</i> free and fair trade) 2) Ensuring development cooperation 3) Ensuring economic, financial & technical cooperation with 3rd countries 4) Ensuring Humanitarian aid* <p>(<i>TFEU Part Five</i>)</p>
Operational Objectives	<p>- PILLAR II - Defining the principles of and general guidelines for the CFSP,- Deciding on common strategies, Adopting</p>	<p>Develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the guiding</p>

	<p>joint actions and common positions,- Strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy.</p> <p>PILLAR I. Conclude specific agreements with third countries, regional and international organisations and ensure their implementations in the field of Commercial policy (exclusive competence), Development Cooperation, Economic, Financial and technical cooperation (shared competence)</p>	<p>Principles (<i>TEU Art. 21.2</i>)</p>
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ANNEX 4 -

INTERVENTION LOGIC

ANNEX 4 – THE EC INTERVENTION LOGIC (IL)

Two complementary types of diagrams have been developed to present the interrelationships and steps in the causality chain linking EU external action and the achievement of the EU's objective in terms of visibility:

1. The first type of diagram about 'Articulating Different Levels of Intervention' diagram emphasizes the relationship at different levels of articulation of three key factors about visibility of EU external action: (1) the policy objectives/instruments of EU External Action, (2) the Visibility strategies/priorities and (3) the perception of the Stakeholders and audiences. Two versions are presented: 1. Deals with the external action seen from the standpoint of the Treaty of Nice (p. 15) while the second version 1.1 deals with the same viewed from the Treaty of Lisbon (p.16). Another diagram, Diagram 3 (p. 32) situates the Evaluation Questions and their link with the different levels of intervention. It will be found in the section about Evaluation Questions. It is viewed with the standpoint of the Lisbon treaty to offer a view to recommendations so it takes the Lisbon view. However, as seen previously, the differences within the Terms of Reference of this evaluation are not significant.
2. The second type of diagram is the intervention logic proper and shows how the use of instruments induces results corresponding to a Global Objective. Diagram 2 (p. 19) seeks more specifically to reconstruct the logical chain of measures involved in creating a particular image in terms of output and impact, that is of how the EU can go about achieving its defined 'Visibility Objective' for its external action. A second version of the same, Diagram 4 (p. 33) places Evaluation Questions in their relationship with the intervention logic. It will also be found in the Evaluation Questions section.

➤ ***Articulating different levels of (policy) intervention (Diagram 1, based on Nice Treaty and Diagram1.1, based on Lisbon Treaty)***

This diagram should be read from the bottom left hand corner to the top right and is composed with three major columns: at the left "EU EXTERNAL ACTION", in the centre "VISIBILITY STRATEGIES/PRIORITIES" and at the right "STAKEHOLDERS". The flow goes from the definition and objectives of the external action of the EU(left) to how this is translated in a Visibility strategy (middle) into how it is perceived by stakeholders (right).

The left hand column is devoted to EU external action and moves up from the inputs of the different external action instruments (Inputs), through operational objectives (Actions), specific objectives (Outputs) and intermediate objectives (Outcomes) outlined in different articles of the Nice Treaty (Diagram 1).

The same is done for the Lisbon Treaty (Diagram 1.1).

Diagram 1: Articulating different levels of (policy) intervention (based on Nice Treaty – II Pillar in red)





Diagram 1.1: Intervention Logic 1 - Articulating different levels of interventions (based on Lisbon Treaty)



The left hand column is devoted to EU external action and moves up from the inputs of the different external action instruments (Inputs), through operational objectives (Actions), specific objectives (Outputs) and intermediate objectives (Outcomes) outlined in different articles of the Nice Treaty (Diagram 1).

In another Diagram 1.1, the left hand column has been changed to take account of the Lisbon Treaty (TEU Art 21), representing the EU external action is then to reach the desired global objective (Impact) that is identified right at the start of the Treaty in its third article.

“In its relations with the wider world the EU shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.” (Lisbon Treaty, TEU, Article 3.5)”.

Next to the EXTERNAL ACTION column, to the right of it, a column translates the wording into what can be differentiated in terms of, from bottom to top:

- **FEATURES** of the external action: i.e. a description of the instruments. The bottom box talk about the features of its external action: describing the work it is undertaking, the numbers of euros it intends to spend or the funding facilities it is creating. Describing these will give stakeholders a picture of the EU’s capacities, what it does around the globe and what specific actions it intends to take.
- **RESULTS** for which the wordings better translate what the instruments bring in terms of EU’s external action. Again this can be communicated in a straightforward quantitative way by listing the kilos of food delivered or the number of bridges or kilometres of roads built. Typically this can be done by simple actions such as ensuring EU flags appear on buildings or concrete objects or the EU is visibly credited with providing the funding for a project. Progress reports or briefings to different stakeholders or in different fora such as the European Parliament or to the media through a press conference are frequently used to communicate on results achieved.
- Finally, at the top, and most important of all, the **BENEFITS**. The third and highest level of this column is what the EU communicates on the benefits of its external action. This involves communicating usually far more qualitative and less quantitative messages about what the EU has actually achieved through its external actions and involves creating a more sophisticated image of the ultimate purpose and value of the EU’s work that speaks directly to the objectives set out in Article 3 (TEU) quoted above. The EU would thus for instance have been a major actor in helping to establish peace and security in some region of the world, or through its human rights activities it has helped enable a group of disadvantaged people gain their rights or freedom. This is clearly the most difficult type of message to convey and organizations usually adopt this as the key objective of their communication strategy after a number of years of having followed a learning curve going from communicating on features to communicating on results to finally communicate on benefits. Yet, the latter type of communication is the most important as it approximates most clearly to the way the EU wants to be remembered and in communication theory, is the most likely to be translated into “adhesion”.

A second central column (**VISIBILITY STRATEGIES/PRIORITIES**) then outlines the communication and information activities conducted to accompany the EU’s External Action and this column is also divided into different levels of objectives.

Following the Visibility Strategies/ Priorities column the diagram introduces the ‘Communication Prism’ through which all these messages will travel before they reach the intended audience of

stakeholders⁹ (the far right column). In transiting the prism they are refracted in different ways and what is perceived by the audiences is never quite the same as what the EU had hoped. As the messages emerge from the other side of the prism they constitute the **‘visibility’ of the EU’s external action**. In the diagram this is once again divided into the three levels of images related to simply features, or even better of the results or best of all of the benefits of EU external action.

The last column on the far right deals with what is perceived by STAKEHOLDERS. This column is again divided into three. It relates to the different types of message the EU can convey on its actions and the way they are translated by stakeholders into “widespread perceptions” again of features, results or benefits.

➤ ***Logical chain to achieve the ‘Visibility Objective’***

Diagram 2 works from left to right starting from the EU’s policies, strategies and instruments in the field of External Action (CFSP/ Dev. Coop., ENP), but it also shows external policy fields that are not among the tasks of the RELEX Family of DGs (RELEX, DEV and AIDCO) such as trade, migration, fisheries and ESDP. These will nevertheless have an impact on the image the EU creates around the world. In conjunction with these different domains of external action it is useful to distinguish the specific Communication & Information actions taken by these same DGs as these relate directly to visibility. Both of these groups of policies / strategies / instruments lead to Actions in the next column and together in the third column they combine to create and influence an image of the EU through different messages that they convey both intentionally and unintentionally.


⁹ Cf. section 2 Working Definition of Visibility

Diagram 2 – Intervention Logic 2: Achieving the “Visibility Objective of EU external action”


Intervention logic: Achieving the ‘Visibility Objective’ of EU External Action



Object of Study :



External to Study:



However, also in putting to this image created by the actions of the EU are actions from a different stream emerging from policies that are purely internal to the EU and have no external purpose. Thus, for example, the Common Agriculture Policy's purpose is to promote the development of EU agriculture and support the maintenance of the EU's rural environment, in the past it has also had a strong EU food security purpose to ensure that the EU could feed itself. In pursuing these ends, as is well known, it has created effects that are widely noted outside Europe and thus also contribute to creating the EU's external image. Other internal policies, such as research policy, cohesion policy or social policy, the single market and the euro, will each also have external effects to a greater or lesser extent and help to create in some way or other the image the EU has internationally.

The next column relates to Outcomes. The image the EU creates by its actions produces some form of outcome: the public, stakeholders and the media are attracted to pay attention to the EU because of the image it creates of itself. The fact that they pay attention is a first outcome. But what is more important is the second outcome: what perception of the EU do they retain? Finally, these Outcomes lead to a global objective or overall impact in terms of the Visibility of the EU's external action. This is the ultimate 'Visibility Objective', as we can call it, of the EU. This has three aspects to it:

- **Its Nature:** The EU wants a positive image of itself to be retained by the stakeholders the content of which has certain specific features: i.e. the EU wants to be known as the group of countries that stand for particular values and seeks to promote global peace and security, global solidarity, the eradication of poverty, etc.
- **Its Scale:** The EU wants this positive image to be retained by large numbers of the right sort of people and organizations: the stakeholders that it sees as key to its existence and future.
- **Its Accuracy:** The EU wants the image retained to be accurate and ideally, it should conform as closely as possible to the image of itself that it sought to convey in the first place.

Another key aspect of the Impact of the Visibility of EU External Action is that it should increase the power and influence of the EU. This is also a direct output of the steps the EU takes in its external action as well as in its internal policy areas. All these actions together combine to create the degree of power, albeit soft-power, and influence the EU has in international affairs. Some of its actions may of course even have a negative effect (e.g. the image left by the EPA negotiations in Africa is largely negative) and possibly decrease its global influence even though they are important for other internal reasons. Whether they are positive or negative however the net total of these actions create the Global Objective of the Impact the EU has externally.

The last column depicted on the right of the diagram is that this Impact, whether it be on the Visibility side or on the side of the results of specific actions themselves, then enables the EU to achieve (or not) its external objectives.

ANNEX 5 –

STANDARD FORMAT FOR COLLECTING EVIDENCE

IN RELATION TO THE EQS

ANNEX 5 - STANDARD FORMAT FOR COLLECTING EVIDENCE IN RELATION TO THE EQS

Preliminary Findings – Standard format for presentation in response to EQs

EQ 1	“How well does the image of the external action of the EU perceived by the stakeholders correspond to the key issues outlined in the definition and objectives of this external action (Nice Treaty: Art. 8 & 11; Lisbon Treaty: Art. 3 & 21) and to the image the EU seeks to convey?”	
	Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from ...
	JC.1.1. The EU has managed to disseminate the message to the relevant stakeholders in terms of content and reasons for its external action	
	<u>Indicator 1.1.1</u> The stakeholders know the definition of the external action of the EU <u>Indicator 1.1.2</u> The stakeholders know the content of the definition of the external action of the EU	
	JC.1.2. The EU has managed to transmit an image to stakeholders that correspond to the image that was sought to be conveyed	
	<u>Indicator 1.2.1</u> The images that are widely perceived by the stakeholders correspond to the communication objectives of the EU on its external action	
	<u>Preliminary Finding:</u>	

EQ 2	“How well do the Visibility communication priorities (Key Communication Messages from Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, i.e.: why, what, how) ¹⁰ achieve their objectives?”	
	Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from ...
	JC 2.1: The priorities (why, what, how) have been well perceived and understood by the stakeholders	
	<u>Indicator 2.1.1</u> The stakeholders perceive well why the EU does have an external action <u>Indicator 2.1.2</u> The stakeholders perceive well what defines EU as an actor on the world stage <u>Indicator 2.1.3</u> The stakeholders perceive well how the EU deploys its instruments around the world	
	JC 2.2.: The formulation of the priorities would have	

¹⁰ Section 2.2 of Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner’s Draft Communication to the Commission: 2 Feb 2006, “The EU in the World: Towards a Communication Strategy for the EU’s External Policy 2006-2009”

to be changed in order to gain an increased impact	
<u>Indicator 2.2.1</u> The stakeholders express the need for another formulation about the external action of the EU in order to make it more visible	
Preliminary Finding:	

EQ 3	To what extent does the EC view itself as implementing a single, clearly defined Visibility strategy to achieve an agreed public image for its external action?	
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from ...	
JC 3.1 – The external actions services have one common visibility strategy		
<u>Indicator 3.1.1</u> The number of communication / visibility strategies in the EC external action services and the variations between them <u>Indicator 3.1.2</u> The existence of functioning and respected coordination mechanisms between the responsible services		
JC 3.2 – Variations between the existing strategies are explained with valid reasons and an effort has been made to ensure overall coherence		
<u>Indicator 3.2.1</u> The existence of valid reasons to explain any differences detected between the strategies <u>Indicator 3.2.2</u> The overall coherence of the existing strategies is explained either in the documents or verbally in a consistent way by the officials responsible for them		
JC 3.3 – The overall strategy or strategies outline a clear and logical path to achieve the visibility goals of EU external action		
<u>Indicator 3.3.1</u> The strategy or strategies are easy to follow, specify a clear goal and outline a logical chain of actions. <u>Indicator 3.3.2</u> The logic of the chain of actions in the strategy(ies) is robust <u>Indicator 3.3.3</u> The communication strategies are sound-proofed by communication professionals		
JC 3.4 – Variations between the existing strategies do not cause problems in creating the right visibility		
<u>Indicator 3.4.1</u> Evidence of difficulties of achieving the visibility objectives <u>Indicator 3.4.2</u> Evidence of difficulties being ascribed		

to confusion on objectives or differences of points of view between the responsible services	
Preliminary Finding:	

EQ 4	“How well do stakeholders perceive the benefits of EU external action and not just its main features?”	
	Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from ...
	JC 4.1. The stakeholders are sufficiently exposed to a communication from the EU on Visibility of its external action that is organised to improve impact, retention, credibility and buying intention	
	<p><u>Indicator 4.1.1</u> The communication strategies are designed to improve impact, retention, credibility and “adherence/agreement” at the level of targeted stakeholders</p> <p><u>Indicator 4.1.2</u> The communication strategies are implemented to improve impact, retention, credibility and buying intention at the level of targeted stakeholders</p> <p><u>Indicator 4.1.3</u> The communication strategies are monitored and evaluated on impact, retention, credibility and buying intention at the level of targeted stakeholders</p>	
	JC 4.2. The stakeholders perceive and value the differences between the benefits of the EU external action and the results or the features/instruments	
	<p><u>Indicator 4.2.1</u> The communication strategies are designed to improve the perception of benefits at the level of targeted stakeholders</p> <p><u>Indicator 4.2.2</u> The communication strategies are implemented to improve the perception of benefits at the level of targeted stakeholders</p> <p><u>Indicator 4.1.3</u> The communication strategies are monitored and evaluated on the perception of benefits of targeted stakeholders</p>	
Preliminary Finding:		

EQ 5	To what extent is the EC’s visibility/communication work coordinated and complementary with that of the EU Member States, Council and Parliament?	
	Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from ...
	JC5.1 – The EC, MS and Council have a established	

coordination mechanism to discuss visibility issues	
<p><u>Indicator 5.1.1</u> Evidence of such a coordination mechanism (minutes of meetings held at regular intervals, agenda items on existing Council working groups, etc) being used regularly.</p> <p><u>Indicator 5.1.2</u> Evidence that points agreed on coordination and complementarity of visibility work are then followed up by actions by each of the three parties</p>	
JC5.2 – Council, EP and MS representatives are aware that their actions have an impact on the visibility of the EU as a whole	
<p><u>Indicator 5.2.1</u> Evidence of discussions on the need to coordinate with the Commission on visibility</p> <p><u>Indicator 5.2.2</u> Evidence that these discussions on the need to coordinate with the Commission on visibility are then followed up by action</p>	
JC5.3 – EC representatives take regular steps to liaise with MS, Council and EP on visibility issues in EU external action	
<p><u>Indicator 5.3.1</u> Evidence of discussions on the need to coordinate with the Member States, Council and EP on visibility</p> <p><u>Indicator 5.3.2</u> Evidence that these discussions on the need to coordinate with the Member States, Council and EP on visibility are then followed up by action</p>	
JC5.4 – Outside observers in a particular context (eg. In a partner country) see the EU (eg. MS embassies and EU Delegation) acting as a single entity rather than as a group of discordant actors	
<u>Indicator 5.4.1</u> No evidence emerges from interviewees or reports of examples of uncoordinated action on visibility or of MS actions conveying contradictory messages to the Commission	
<u>Preliminary Finding:</u>	

EQ 6	Are the EC's messages coherent across different EU external action and internal policy areas?	
	Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from ...
	JC6.1 – EU policy in other areas do not contradict EU external action	
	<p><u>Indicator 6.1.1</u> Evidence of incoherence between formal policies</p> <p><u>Indicator 6.1.2</u> Awareness among outside observers</p>	

<p>of incoherence in the EU's policy</p> <p><u>Indicator 6.1.3</u> Evidence from officials working in one EC policy sector that they have taken steps to improve policy coherence between their area of policy and other areas</p>	
<p>JC6.2 – Existence of contradictory messages being conveyed by different policy sectors</p>	
<p><u>Indicator 6.2.1</u> Evidence of contradictions between the visibility and communication strategies of different EC departments responsible for different policy sectors</p> <p><u>Indicator 6.2.2</u> Evidence that EC officials have taken steps to coordinate the messages to be conveyed on different policies so as to iron out possible contradictions</p> <p><u>Indicator 6.2.3</u> Awareness among outside observers of apparent contradictions (lack of coherence) between the messages conveyed by EU officials</p> <p><u>Indicator 6.2.4</u> Existence of press enquiries and requests for explanations about seeming contradictions in messages conveyed by EU</p>	
<p><u>Preliminary Finding:</u></p>	

<p>EQ 7</p>	<p>“How far does the perception of the value added of the EU as a global actor emerge clearly from its presence as in the major international organisations/fora? “</p>	
<p>Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators</p>	<p>Evidence identified from ...</p>	
<p>JC 7.1 The Commission has displayed political leadership in the implementation of its overall communication strategy and visibility activities, both internally and towards Council, MS ,EP and International Organisations</p>		
<p><u>Indicator 7.1.1</u> The degree of leadership (political and managerial) exercised internally to produce policy documents and take decisions (HQ and DEL)</p> <p><u>Indicator 7.1.2</u> The degree of leadership (political) related to key events with Council, MS and EP</p> <p><u>Indicator 7.1.3</u> Policy document with clear communication and visibility objective + implementation strategy produced with contribution of all external family DGs</p> <p><u>Indicator 7.1.4</u> Communication/visibility tools provide improved access to information on EU policies</p>		
<p>JC 7.2 The Commission has actively supported the further consolidation of the overall EU institutional architecture enabling a more coherent and effective</p>		

communication and visibility	
<p><u>Indicator 7.2.1</u> To what extent is the EU Institutional architecture conducive to ensuring responsive and coherent decisions have a strong visibility impact</p> <p><u>Indicator 7.2.2</u> To what extent EC has expressly push for reforms having a visibility impact</p>	
JC.7.3 The EU Delegation contributed to strengthen the image of the EC in the third countries and the knowledge on the EU policies and activities	
<p><u>Indicator 7.3.1</u> How the presence of Delegation in third countries is perceived by local stakeholders, including MSs and International organizations</p> <p><u>Indicators 7.3.2</u> To what extent the stakeholder in the country knows the EC policy and actions</p>	
JC 7. 4 If and how the EU has been able to demonstrate its specific added value in relation to the Presidency and MS and to influence the international organizations/bodies while making it visible externally	
<p><u>Indicator 7.4.1</u> Constant key role of the EC in reaching EU common positions to be presented in the ECOSOC, selected Trust Funds, UN HR Council.</p> <p><u>Indicator 7.4.2</u> How the EC role is perceived by selected International Organisations (HQ and field)</p> <p><u>Indicators 7.4.3</u> How the role of the EC in international fora is perceived by governments of third parties and OECD countries</p>	
<u>Preliminary Finding:</u>	

EQ 8	“How far are the resources mobilized by the EC adequate (human resources, budget) to carry out its visibility/communication strategy?”	
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from ...	
JC 8.1The Commission has sufficient levels of capacity (at HQ and in Delegations) to manage the various dimensions of communication/visibility actions (strategy programming, support to implementation, M and E)		
<p><u>Indicator 8.1.1</u> Qualification and tasks of staff dealing with communication/visibility in dedicated Unit and at DEL</p> <p><u>Indicator 8.1.2</u> Number of staff in HQ and Delegation compared with similar organisations (UN Agency and/or MS)</p>		

JC.8.2 Financial amount of communication visibility budget and % of dedicated budget from projects, programmes, budget support and dialogues	
<p><u>Indicator 8.2.1</u> Financial amount for staff and management services at HQ</p> <p><u>Indicator: 8.2.2</u> Financial amount for staff and management services at Delegation</p> <p><u>Indicator: 8.2.3</u> % or amount dedicated to visibility in financed projects/programme to CSOs, UN Agencies, Foundations, and Universities.</p> <p><u>Indicator 8.2.4</u> Availability of budget lines specifically related to visibility or other means to M &E visibility</p> <p><u>Indicator: 8.2.5</u> EC Resources used to check visibility compliance for projects/programme</p> <p><u>Indicator 8.2.6</u> Resources used for policy dialogue and new delivery methods</p>	
JC.8.3 The financial amount available for implement the communication visibility strategy is known by the Commission and the strategy is designed accordingly	
<p><u>Indicator 8.3.1</u> To what extent the strategy is designed taking in consideration the available resources (staff/budget)</p> <p><u>Indicator: 8.3.2</u> Involvement and training of external DGS and DEL personnel on visibility /communication not working in Communication Units</p>	
<u>Preliminary Finding:</u>	

EQ 9	“To what extent are the results in terms of stakeholder perceptions commensurate with the cost of conveying the messages both in financial and organisational terms? “
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from ...
JC 9.1 Are the stakeholders perception in selected policy areas and the 6thematics linked to specific messages conveyed by EC	
<p><u>Indicator 9.1.1</u> Measured results from attitudinal surveys of samples of particular stakeholder groups comparing perceptions of the EU and other comparable actors on EU external action and more specifically in the 6 thematic areas designated in the TOR</p> <p><u>Indicator 9.1.2</u> Measured results perceptions of informed actors from among the designated stakeholder groups</p> <p><u>Indicator 9.1.3</u> Measured results from comparison of</p>	

<p>main messages conveyed by the EU in specific communication efforts with the messages then retained by the media in covering the event or NGOs following the issue</p> <p><u>Indicator 9.1.4</u> If available from Eurobarometer or other comparable sources: Measured results from public opinion polls of attitudes towards EU and EU external action</p>	
<p>JC 9.2 Are the resources used in the selected policy area able to create specific message including strategy design and coordination</p>	
<p><u>Indicator 9.2.1</u> Number and qualification of personnel and Units +DEL involved in creating the message</p> <p><u>Indicator 9.2.2</u> Kind of tools (Internet, newsletter, declarations, press release, events, etc..) used to convey message in the different sectors</p> <p><u>Indicator 9.2.3</u> Cost of tools employed</p>	
<p>JC 9.3 The resources available for visibility work are effectively deployed in a well organized manner</p>	
<p><u>Indicator 9.3.1</u> Clear and logical organisational chart for the staff working on visibility available</p> <p><u>Indicator 9.3.2</u> Budgets for visibility work are clearly linked to the action plans</p>	
<p><u>Preliminary Finding:</u></p>	

EQ 10	How effectively do EC external action staff from different services translate the visibility strategy they are expected to implement into action plans that are consistent amongst each other?
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from ...
<p>JC10.1 – Commission staff coordinate with their colleagues in other departments on their visibility work</p>	
<p><u>Indicator 10.1.1</u> Evidence of coordination mechanisms (eg. minutes of meetings, correspondence on coordination, etc)</p> <p><u>Indicator 10.1.2</u> Evidence of changes in draft visibility action plans of different services as a result of having coordinated with colleagues in other services</p>	<p>Several references to the RIC were made in interviews</p>
<p>JC10.2 – Commission staff formulate action plans that are clearly based on their visibility strategy</p>	
<p><u>Indicator 10.2.1</u> The links between the action plans and the visibility strategy they are based on are clear and logical</p>	

JC10.3 – The visibility action plans produce expected results	
<u>Indicator 10.3.1</u> Evidence of results official expect and linked back to their own action plans <u>Indicator 10.3.2</u> The logical chain of the action plans to the results is solid	
<u>Preliminary Finding:</u>	

ANNEX 6 -

THE ORGANIZATION OF COMMUNICATION ACTIVITIES

WITHIN THE COMMISSION

ANNEX 6 - THE ORGANIZATION OF COMMUNICATION ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE COMMISSION

The Commission's external communication activities are under the responsibility of a *triangle* of three actors. These are the members of the Commission (the Commissioners) and their cabinets, the Directorate General for Communication, and within it, the Spokespersons' Service (SPP) and the Directorates General (DGs) with their individual communication units. Each entity, according to its mandate, is endowed with number of responsibilities and carries out specific tasks accordingly.

I. The cabinets

The Commissioner's cabinet carries the political responsibility, gives the impetus and has the final word on communication actions (especially if involving the Commissioner) and messages. The cabinet is at the direct service of its Commissioner and works in the general interest of the institution. Among its core tasks lies the one of raising the Commissioner's profile with the active support of the spokesperson and the services. The cabinet is on the top of the pyramid, in the chain of command, in charge of validating the Commission's messages. The cabinet and the services (DGs) cooperate on a daily basis. Clear working processes and methods are key to ensure swift cooperation and an optimal use of the resources. Formal and informal procedures are subject to practical arrangements: in some cases communication issues are channeled from the cabinet to the services via the spokesperson and vice versa. In other cases direct contacts take place at bilateral level: cabinet-Directorate General or cabinet-spokesperson or spokesperson-Directorate General.

II. DG COMM and the SPP

II.1.DG COMM

DG COMM, the Directorate General for Communication's mission "is to keep the general public and the media up to date on EU activities." DG Comm offers a wide range of communication services to the Commissioners/cabinets, the Spokesperson and the DGs' communication units. Among other things (see *DG COMM factsheets 'The European Commission communication tools, May 2011*), DG COMM:

- Undertakes daily media monitoring and provides a broad range of products, i.e. a daily press review, a daily news summary, a daily news digest and a daily dashboard (summary of policy news coverage in graphs and tables);
- Produces opinion poll surveys (Eurobarometer);
- Offers audiovisual services and facilities, i.e. TV/radio studios and crews, photographers, archive footage. Through Europe by Satellite (EbS), it produces and distributes footage and finalized products to broadcasters and journalists;
- Statistical tools to measure the impact of audiovisual productions;
- Supports web publishing (common templates for websites, advice, technical and editorial rules and standards);
- Coordinates a network of Commission Representations across the Member States whose role is to disseminate the Commission and Commissioners' messages to national and local media as well as to provide political intelligence about national developments.

II.2. The Spokespersons' Service (SPP)

The Spokespersons' Service is under the direct authority of the President of the Commission and is administratively linked to DG Communication. The SPP defines the principles governing communication to be applied.

The SPP is the official voice of the Commission vis-à-vis the written, audiovisual and internet press (recalling, as stated above, that the Representations also have a role in dealing with Member States' media).

The SPP provides information about the policies and decisions of the Commission to the media. It ensures media coverage of the Commission through a pro-active strategy. Each spokesperson is in charge of media communication for the member of the Commission whose portfolio he/she represents.

The SPP tasks

The SPP is in charge of organising press conferences, technical briefings and VIP corners in Brussels as well as in the countries visited by Members of the Commission (the latter in cooperation with the relevant Representations). The SPP deals with political issues in the press and organises daily midday briefings for accredited journalists. It prepares and issues all press releases and press memos as well as the speeches of the Commissioners. It provides internal and external strategic press planning tools (News Ahead and Top News respectively), as well as a weekly calendar of visits and meetings by the Members of the Commission (SEE COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT, The Working Methods of the Commission 2010-2014, ANNEX 3, p.27).

The Spokesperson and his/her assistants (press officer, administrative assistant) are in constant contact with the cabinet and the DG (see hereafter). The spokesperson relies on the DG's Communication unit to produce draft press material (press releases, memos...) which he/she then edits and sends to the cabinet for political validation of the content.

III. The Services

As a general point, the services of the Commission work under the responsibility of the College, hence under the responsibility of the Commissioner in charge of the portfolio concerned. The services are responsible for implementing the priorities decided by the College and developed by the Commissioner. The Services have a responsibility to work together and are coordinated by the Secretariat-General (2, See COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT, The Working Methods of the Commission 2010-2014, Annex 2, p.15).

III.1. The DGs' communication units

Inside each DG (Directorate General), there is a communication unit. Their sizes vary (generally between 10 – 20 staff). They are composed of administrators and assistants, some of whom possess specific technical skills, in particular webmasters and the social media animators. The remainder of the staff – at both assistant and administrator level – have not necessarily had a communication background prior to their assignment in the unit. However in recent years, the Commission has increasingly been recruiting communication professionals to fill in communication posts.

As the executive body of the EU, the Commission has a leadership role in communicating the values that underline Union's activities. The broad objective of the communication carried out by DGs that have an "external" remit, is to boost understanding in Europe and in third countries of

the concrete actions of the EU, both in terms of their commitment of solidarity with developing countries and in upholding the EU's core values and principles. Media-oriented communication work is central to the strategy but the contribution of the Communication Units to the latter may vary (see below).

a) Tasks of the Communication units

- Acts as a back office (internal service provider) for the spokesperson by preparing draft press material (lines to take, memos, press releases...);
- Monitors the implementation by partners (such as international organisations, UN agencies, NGOs) of their visibility obligations;
- Carries out joint visibility actions with partners implemented via different funding facilities (service contracts, operational agreements...);
- Implements communication projects through service contracts (eg: framework contracts implemented by large PR companies) and organises events (eg: Development Days);
- Produces a broad range of communication tools and products: websites, social media, printed publications (annual reviews, thematic publications, leaflets...).

b) Arrangements with the cabinet and the SPP

In practice there are a number of different arrangements in terms of collaboration among the three entities composing the “triangle”. For instance, it should be noted that the level of involvement of the DG's Communication units in media relations varies from one DG to the other, from a close involvement in preparing draft press material to no involvement at all. In the latter situation, the spokesperson may be directly in contact with the relevant operational units of the DG or only with the cabinet (which then deals with the DG).

Moreover, the various communication units of the external DGs have a variety of different coordination mechanisms in terms of information flows between their unit and the operational units, cabinet and spokesperson.

c) The coordination fora among the DGs Communication Units: the E-RIC

A key element of the units' core objectives is to undertake joint work with other Commission services, especially within the 'Relex' family (+ DG ECHO) and with DG COMM; other EU institutions/Member States and partner organisations where appropriate. Liaising among the Units is done on an ad-hoc basis and through regular, structured contacts. In a context of limited resources, DGs participate in joint events like the EU Development Days or contribute to publications, like the General Report on the Activities of the European Union (coordinated by DG COMM). Moreover, there are regular meetings such as the E-RIC that aim at sharing best practices and information on the respective activities.

ANNEX 7 - COUNTRY SELECTION

Criteria 4 Themes given by TOR	Proposals for countries to be visited	Case(s) to be studied in each country	Criteria 1 External action priorities	Criteria 2 Strategic partnerships	Criteria 3 Visibility Priorities	Criteria 5 Region of interventi on	Criteria 6 Amount of EC cooperation	Criteria 7 Amount spent on Visibility	Criterion 8 Income level
Crisis & fragile states	Somalia – Kenya and if possible Somalia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Major test case for the EC, EU and the international community response to Crisis & fragile states. – The EC working with the UN and AU has sought to be visible and an important actor (e.g. EUNAVFOR Somalia, EUTM Somalia) – The EU is currently developing an integrated strategy for Somalia to leverage a more effective collective response. – High priority country for the HRVP in Africa and EEAS. 	building peace and security, establishing democratic processes and institutions and strengthening HRs.	ACP-EU Partnership; Crisis Management and ESDP	Global solidarity, Africa	ACP - Africa	218 MEUR, plus 12 MEUR (food security; 15 MEUR (APF in 2007); 4 MEUR (IfS for AMISOM)	Low	Low-income country
	Georgia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Strong EC/EU engagement in the country in conflict prevention & peace building (e.g. a CSDP civilian mission and an EUSR) – the EC is also a significant player in the “Geneva” conflict resolution process. – useful background research has been undertaken in the context of the JEU Thematic Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding 	Promoting G.’s transition to a fully fledged democracy and mkt economy; implementing the ENP; preventing conflicts & strengthen security	Eastern partnership; Crisis Management and ESDP	European Neighbourhood Policy	ENPI East (Southern Caucasus)	24 + 120 MEUR	Medium	Lower/middle-income country
	Liberia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – The EU Delegation is the most significant field presence. – EU/EC visibility in trying to address longer term conflict prevention and state fragility in a least development country (LDC) which has not been high on the international agenda since the middle of last decade – Liberia was one of the options presented in the Inception Report, and may represent a good choice if this region, and income type is under-presented in the study. 	LRRD in a post-conflict fragile state; Eradicating poverty	ACP-EU Partnership; Crisis management; Development	Global solidarity, Africa	ACP - Africa	44 + 150 MEUR Top recipient of EU Aid (decile: 21th to 30th)	Low	Low-income country
Climate change & energy	Cambodia	<p><i>The Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) :</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cambodia Climate Change Alliance (co-funded by Sweden and UNDP), covering Government Capacity building, Disaster Risk Reduction, Coastal Management) - Visibility issues and benefits for Cambodian stakeholders of the 2008 GCCA Bangladesh conference and how the Declaration on CC between the EU, Bangladesh, Cambodia and Maldives (and Action Plans) are being implemented. 	Poverty eradication, Trade, dialogue in the field of governance and HRs	Development	Global solidarity	Asia	106.3 MEUR	Medium	Low-income country
	Maldives	<p><i>The Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) :</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to examine GCCA project covering: (i) mainstreaming CC ii) Low Carbon Development; (iii) Waste & Water Mgmt; - to cover the effects on SIDS stakeholders of the 2008 GCCA Bangladesh conference & the visibility issues of the Declaration by the Pacific Islands Forum Islands Forum States & the European Union on Climate Change, as well as the recent Pacific Regional Conference of March 2011. 	Assistance to cope with natural disasters; environmental sustainability through regional development	Disaster response, Development	Global solidarity	Asia	23.7MEUR (including tsunami aid in 2005-2006)	Low	Lower/middle-income countries

Criteria 4 Themes given by TOR	Proposals for countries to be visited	Case(s) to be studied in each country	Criteria 1 External action priorities	Criteria 2 Strategic partnerships	Criteria 3 Visibility Priorities	Criteria 5 Region of interventi on	Criteria 6 Amount of EC cooperation	Criteria 7 Amount spent on Visibility	Criterion 8 Income level
Environment biodiversity & deforestation	Indonesia	<i>Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT):</i> - Indonesia has a diversified environmental portfolio addressing forests, marine and coastal ecosystems with national and regional initiatives; - the EC has been one of the main donors since 1990 with a focus on forestry (one third of EC cooperation); - Deforestation has taken a dramatic dimension over the last decades becoming a highly visible case study; - Indonesia post-tsunami programmes makes the country an interesting case study for the visibility of the EU's prevention and rehabilitation strategies.	Preserve peace, prevent conflicts; Eradicating poverty; Assistance to cope with natural disasters	Disaster response; Development	Global solidarity	Asia	78 + 494 MEUR (whole period 2007-2013)	Medium	Lower/middle-income country
	Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	<i>Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT):</i> - The DRC has forest resources of regional and global importance and the EC cooperation covered forest biodiversity (through the regional ECOFAC programme) FLEGT and REDD.	consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, HRs; preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security; eradicate poverty	EC-ACP Partnership, Development Crisis management,	Global solidarity, Africa	ACP - Africa	409+514 MEUR; 86% of ODA from EU. Top recipient of EU Aid (decile: 11 th to 20 th)	Medium	Low-income country
	Sri Lanka	<i>Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT)</i> - Sri Lanka has valuable forest, marine & coastal ecosystems and is implementing EU projects in these areas; - has post-tsunami projects as well as interesting synergies with conflict management operations; - is a small island developing state (SIDS) and as such participates in global and regional initiatives addressing sustainable development of SIDS (Barbados Plan of Action and Mauritius strategy).	consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, HRs; preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen security; eradicate poverty; assistance to cope with natural or man-made disasters	Disaster response; Development	Global solidarity	Asia	402.4 MEUR (including post-tsunami reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, aid to uprooted people)	Low	Lower/middle-income country
Migration	Mali	The EDF-funded project: <i>Information and Management Center on Migration (CIGEM):</i> - The CIGEM is the operational translation of the <i>joint declaration on Migration and Development</i> , signed in Bamako by the EC, Mali, France and ECOWAS (2007). - The project was supported by several communication activities in the framework of the Migration inter service <i>Project Team</i> created for the 2008 Communication priorities plan of the Commission. - The broad range of information on the project enables to assess how visible the EU was around the case and what profile or image it achieved. - Mali is at crossroad of the <i>Southern migratory route to Europe</i> (South/North migration)	Eradicating poverty	(i) the EU-Africa Partnership; (ii) Mali is part of the ACP political dialogue on migration guided by Art. 13 of Cotonou	(i) Global solidarity and poverty reduction; (ii) The CIGEM sustains Mali in its response to migration flow.(iii) Africa	ACP - Africa	(i) 294 + 533 MEUR; (ii) Top recipient of EU Aid (decile: 21 th to 30 th).	Low public diplomacy & communication budget allocated for the EU Delegation in Mali	low income country

Evaluation of Visibility of EU external action

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Criteria 4 Themes given by TOR	Proposals for countries to be visited	Case(s) to be studied in each country	Criteria 1 External action priorities	Criteria 2 Strategic partnerships	Criteria 3 Visibility Priorities	Criteria 5 Region of interventi on	Criteria 6 Amount of EC cooperation	Criteria 7 Amount spent on Visibility	Criterion 8 Income level
Financial & economic crisis	Seychelles	<i>The Vulnerability FLEX mechanism (V-FLEX)</i> ¹¹ : – The Seychelles received EUR9 million from the V-FLEX programme (1.3% of GDP); – the V-FLEX represented the 1st budget support programme financed by the European Commission; – The Seychelles belong to the cluster of countries with the highest V-FLEX/GDP ratio	Preserve and improve the quality of the environment and sustainable management of global natural resources	ACP-EU Partnership Development	Global solidarity, Africa	ACP - Africa	€ 7,68 M	Low	Upper/middle-income country
	Dominica	<i>The Vulnerability FLEX mechanism (V-FLEX)</i> : – Dominica received around EUR5 mn V-FLEX funds, in addition to EUR 270,000 FLEX funds (2008). – As the Seychelles, Dominica belongs to the cluster of nations with the highest V-FLEX/GDP ratio; the combined FLEX and V-FLEX funds as a share of export shortfalls is among the highest in our sample with a value of 190.9%; and the country. – Dominica belongs to the highest cluster in terms of availability of communications channels.	Infrastructure (IX EDF); eradicate poverty through GBS	ACP-EU Partnership Development	Global solidarity, Africa	ACP - Caribbean	€ 7,5 M€	Low	Upper/middle-income country
	Grenada	<i>The Vulnerability FLEX mechanism (V-FLEX)</i> : – Grenada was the first Eastern Caribbean country to benefit from financial assistance under the V-FLEX mechanism, and the only Caribbean country to have received 2 V-FLEX allocations, except Haiti. – Intense media coverage of V-FLEX funds received – The country also scores fairly in terms of communication	Contribute to the social and economic recovery of the country	ACP-EU Partnership; Development	Global solidarity; Africa	ACP - Caribbean	€ 9,2M	Low	Upper/middle-income country
Food crisis	Nepal	<i>The Food Facility established in 2009</i> : – Nepal benefits from Food Facility calls for proposals and from IO support (FAO & WFP)	preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security	Development; FF implemented by FAO, WFP & 4 NGOs	Global solidarity	Asia	60 mln € & Food Facility: 23,3 mln € (2007-2010)		Low income country
	Mozambique	<i>The Food Facility established in 2009</i> : – Mozambique benefits from Food Facility calls for proposals and from IO support (FAO & IFAD)	eradicate poverty	ACP-EU Partnership; Development ; FF implemented with IFAD, FAO & 3 NGOs	Global solidarity, Africa	ACP - Africa	634.1 mln € (2008-2013) & Food Facility: 23,2 mln €		Low income country
	Kenya	<i>The Food Facility established in 2009</i> : –Kenya benefits from Food Facility calls for proposals and from IO support (FAO, WB&AU-IBAR)	eradicate poverty	ACP-EU Partnership Development ; FF implemented with IFAD, FAO & 3 NGOs	Global solidarity, Africa	ACP - Africa	399.4 mln € (2008-2013) & Food Facility 23,2 mln €		Low income country

¹¹ Accordingly, the sectoral experts have created ranking of countries relying on the following criteria: (i) V-FLEX funds as a share of GDP; (ii) V-FLEX as a percentage of shortfall of exports; (iii) Existence of additional EU and non-EU support funds; (iv) Criticality of V-FLEX funds in specific country contexts; (v) Visibility actions undertaken; (vi) Stage of development of communication channels

ANNEX 8 -

GUIDELINES FOR THE THEMATIC WORK

ANNEX 8 - GUIDELINES FOR THE THEMATIC WORK

Introduction

This is a first note to allow the thematic experts for the Evaluation of the Visibility of EU External Action to start their work. Further guidance will be provided over the coming weeks. If these Guidelines raise any questions for you please let us know, so that we can clarify things further.

Purpose of Field Missions & Thematic Reports

As indicated in the TOR the six themes are a key element of the methodology of this evaluation. The field missions are in turn central to the collection of data on the themes but as the themes are much broader than may be visible in one county, it is also important to collect other data on each theme through desk work and exchanges with EC officials at headquarters level. In addition the evaluation as a whole has other complementary data collection processes.

The process for the field missions is outlined in the TOR (see Annex 1 with relevant extracts from the TOR) but essentially it consists of the five following steps:

1. *Preparatory desk work* to frame the EU policy basis for the theme and make recommendations, to be presented in the Desk Report, on:
 - a. Choice of countries to visit
 - b. Options for what cases to study in these countries
 - c. Hypotheses to be tested in the field
2. *Approval of proposals*: by RG meeting to discuss the Desk Report and validate choices
3. *Conduct of field missions* to include on completion a debriefing of the EU Delegation
4. *Debriefing of RG* on return from field missions by means of a presentation (note and powerpoint) to an RG meeting
5. *Writing a 'thematic report'* which will be an annex to the Final report of the Study

Timetable for the Field Missions

To fit in with the current schedule of the evaluations the work has to be completed according to the following schedule:

- a. *Preparatory desk work* – to be done by **end February** for inclusion in the Desk Report which we are expected to submit
- b. *Approval of proposals* – will be at the RG meeting on the Desk Report around **21 March**
- c. *Conduct of field missions* – to be done during period **April to mid-June** with note on the findings to be written up by **end June**
- d. *Debriefing of RG* – to be done at the RG meeting in **early July**
- e. *Writing a 'thematic report'* – to be completed by end August

Preparing the Field Missions

A short note on each theme is required for inclusion in the Desk Report. This needs to do two things: frame the theme and provide the methodological recommendations referred to above.

That is some options and rationale on (a) which the countries to visit, (b) what cases to study in these countries, and (c) the hypotheses to be tested in the field.

Information to frame the theme

- Policy related and normative framework for the theme: i.e. EU policies on the theme, related strategic partnership agreements, major programmes and financial interventions, etc.
- EU Institutional organization: in relation to a specific theme: position of the Commission in relation to other Institutions (mainly the Council) for designing, programming and carrying out the relevant policies. Within the Commission which DG has the main responsibilities?
- Competences of the EC external relations specific DGs: in relation to the theme. The 3 relevant DGs for this Study are RELEX, Development & EuropeAid, but we also need to understand the changes related to the formation of EEAS and DEVCO
- Mechanisms of coordination: both formal and informal, among the DGs and with other EU Institutions (ideally also with Member States to the extent this is possible within the time constraints)
- EU finance allocation for visibility on theme: It will also be important to try and identify what financial resources the EC puts into raising EU visibility on the theme – but this may not be too much to do during the desk phase due to time constraints.

The Desk Report is to be submitted on 11 March, but we obviously need time to prepare the final version of the report and collate the recommendations for all the 6 themes.

Methodological Recommendations

The selection of where to go and what to study for the Field Missions has two levels. A first level is the selection of the countries themselves. There is a second level however of what ‘cases’ do the thematic studies then look at in the countries visited or internationally? By cases we can envisage *events* as already suggested in the Inception Report, but there is also a question of what EU funded programmes / projects / interventions to look at. Finally, the TOR for the Study stress that we must make clear what our hypotheses are to be tested during the field missions. These hypotheses should be related to the EQs for the Evaluation already established in the Inception Report. Each of these points is discussed in more detail below.

A. Choosing Countries for Field Missions

The choice of countries to visit for the Themes is discussed at some length in the Inception Report where a list of 8 different criteria are outlined and a grid with countries and some information about them is provided. In summary the 8 different criteria are designed i to ensure good coverage of:

1. Strategic priorities of EU external action
2. Strategic partnerships according to EU agreements with third countries and political priorities from the main Communications
3. Visibility/communication priorities (from draft communication from Ferrero-Waldner)
4. The 6 themes for the evaluation as per the TOR
5. Balanced coverage of the EU’s regions of intervention
6. Scale of financial contribution of EC cooperation
7. Importance of budget dedicated to visibility and communication

8. Levels of income of country – a range of different levels to be covered

The application of these criteria relate to the distribution of countries across the whole study (i.e. not within each theme). But in the first instance the thematic experts should provide suggestions of two or three countries which would be worth visiting in terms of EU visibility and their theme (a good starting point are the countries suggested in the Inception Report) and then we will consider how a selection of these countries can cover the 8 criteria. However, in making their proposals for countries to visit the thematic experts should also consider that it is *important to choose countries where the EU's external action has some visibility* so there is something tangible to assess.

At the same time care should be taken to avoid choosing 'extreme' countries in visibility terms, that is countries where the EU has no visibility at all in the thematic area under study or ones where it has an exaggerated visibility due, for instance, to being the only external actor with no real competitor. In other words, as we can only visit a limited number of countries we should generally choose countries where the EU is fairly 'average' in visibility terms so that we get a sample that is broadly representative of other situations. At the same time, it is recognised that extreme cases have their value in learning lessons and that therefore it may be useful to select one or two more 'extreme' cases which illustrate a particular point, but in such a case special attention must be paid to justifying this properly. Having one such 'extreme' case could therefore be considered in the final selection of countries made at the level of the whole evaluation.

B. Choosing 'Cases' to study in each Theme

The second level at which choices have to be made in the Thematic Studies is in the choice of events, EU activities, interventions, actions or programmes to be studied in the theme and/or country visited. In other words what *cases* should we study? The rationale being of course that we need to narrow things down if we are going to achieve anything useful in the short time available.

Five different types of cases have been identified as outlined in Table 1 below. For each theme the thematic expert should therefore identify a two or three such cases, ideally of different types depending what is available. A set of common criteria for making these choices is also proposed in Table 2. The suggestions we make will be approved by the RG meeting in March after which we will be able to start the field missions.

Table 1: Typology of Cases to study

<p>1. EVENTS – Spontaneous: Crises and other External Occurrences</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• These events occur and the EU has no influence over their occurrence though it may have seen them coming• Such events attract some public attention and are reported on in the media• EU has reacted to and made efforts to relate to this event through<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Interventions to respond to the event○ Efforts to clarify its own position○ Efforts to raise its own profile / visibility in relation to the event• Other actors have also reacted (eg. US, China, EU MS) allowing for comparisons• The EU may possibly even have failed to react to the event and its image might have suffered as a result <p>2. EVENTS – Planned: Conferences, Seminars, Launches, Opening</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Same as above, but as these events are foreseeable the EU should have made some

<p>preparations in advance and planned a strategy to raise its visibility</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Conferences should be part of a larger and longer-term initiative <p>3. EU INTERVENTIONS – Single Country</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Projects, programmes and budget support programmes• Project has some public profile and is reported on etc.• EU has had a hand designing the activity and so should have built in measures to enhance its own visibility in relation to it <p>4. EU INTERVENTIONS – Thematically based, single or multiple-country</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Thematically funded Single or Multiple country programmes or projects• Programme has some public profile• EU has had a hand designing the activity and so should have built in measures to enhance its own visibility in relation to it• Preferably, programmes involve a range of actors within developing countries and also actors within the EU <p>5. SPECIFIC VISIBILITY ACTIONS (Unrelated to a project or programme)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Planned general visibility actions by EU not linked to a specific programme or project.• EU has made an effort to raise its profile in country
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Building on this typology (Table 1) to guide their choice, thematic experts should also keep in mind the following criteria (Table 2) to help them assess what cases might be possible to study:

Table 2: Common Criteria for Choosing Cases

<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Choose what is possible – cases should be <i>feasible</i> as objects of study• The case should be ongoing or completed; some kind of evaluation information should be available to understand what the action achieved, if action achieved/is achieving its purpose and whether impacts are occurring or foreseen• The case should be related to statements, public opinions, communications or decisions by the EC (at least one DG), EU DEL and ideally also by the Council, Member States, EP, EU Banks, so as to allow for us to investigate questions of coherence, coordination etc.• Information exists to enable an assessment of how visible the EU was around the case and what profile or image it achieved; how much and what sort of effort and resources the EU put into raising or managing its visibility?• Contextual information is also available, for instance: (i) Delegation's own studies of visibility/communication work; (ii) information on how the EC's communication/information is organised; (iii) other information on the EU's visibility on the theme and in the country visited• Information exists to enable a comparison between the EU with other external actors• Cases can be positive, negative or neutral in visibility terms, i.e. they have had more or less impact on enhancing the visibility of the EU (whatever their impact as projects in themselves). EC officials will probably tend to propose positive cases and yet we should seek to have a range of cases that, a priori at least, look different.<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Positive: EU's image has improved
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- Neutral: There has been no discernable impact on the EU's visibility
- Negative: The EU's image has worsened. These cases are likely to be due to: (i) EU has not been able to improve its visibility despite trying to do so; (ii) EU image has worsened despite its best efforts; (iii) EU was caught unawares and failed to act appropriately/in time.

C. Relating the Thematic Studies to the EQs

The Hypotheses to be tested during the field visit need to be closely linked to the EQs as well as to the cases being studied and of course the theme in question.

The EQs are at a fairly general level and will need to be more specifically related to the cases being studied. Annex 2 provides a table of the EQs indicating the main sources¹² from which evidence is required to answer them. This reflects what is in the Judgement Criteria for each EQ as stipulated in the Inception Report. This table is specifically for the thematic studies and shows which answers rely most on the evidence from the themes and the field missions. (A similar table exists for the overall evaluation).

What the Table for the field missions shows is that all the EQs require evidence to be collected from the EU itself and in country particularly the EU Delegations. That is quantitative evidence if possible on what EC or other EU officials have done as well as qualitative information on their perceptions of how the EU does with respect to the issues raised in each EQ. At the same time, for triangulation or comparative purposes on many of the same EQs, it would also be useful to have evidence of how the EU is seen to have done in visibility terms or acted from some EU member state missions and the UN or other donor representatives¹³. On the other hand only 3 EQs (EQ1, 4 and 6) and possibly to some extent another 2 (EQ2 and EQ7) also require good evidence from national in-country stakeholders: that is partner governments, the media and CSOs.

Although it is difficult to be precise at the general level the hypotheses will probably take the form of articulating some of the concerns we have about the EU's visibility regarding the particular theme and the particular case you are looking at. These concerns would be based on the picture you have built up from studying the material you have managed to collect on the case from documents and interviews or phone discussions with the officials responsible for it at the EC in Brussels.

Data Collection

While a lot of the evidence collection for the themes will be through standard means such as structured interviews and the identification and analysis of documents and reports some more specialised tools are also needed. The Core Team of the Evaluation is therefore preparing some tools for you to use for data collection. These are identified below.

The budget also allows for a local consultant to help with this work and prepare the ground for the field missions. Identifying suitable local consultants should be done through your own contacts and those of DRN and the Core Team.

Media Coverage Analysis

A manual is being prepared on how to conduct a simple media coverage analysis in country around the cases chosen for study. This involves choosing a period of time in which the chosen

¹² Sources are graded in Annex 2 according to their importance as a source for answering the EQ: XXX: very important, XX: moderately important, X: useful; Blank: not relevant.

¹³ For instance on EQ5 EC officials in the Delegation may feel their visibility/communication work is very well coordinated and complementary to that of EU Members States and the Council and Parliament, but embassies of EU member states may feel the opposite and the UNDP may be thoroughly confused by different things different visitors from the EP, EU embassies or the Delegation have said to them and see no complementarity at all.

cases can be expected to have been covered in the local media and then analysing a selection of print media to see how the image of the EU comes through.

Focus Groups with CSOs

It is recommended you conduct a Focus Group with Civil Society Organisations representatives in country. This should ideally be set up by a local consultant before your visit. A manual has been prepared by the to help you organise this event.

If a Focus Group proves impossible to organise this should be replaced by at least a few structured interviews with CSO representatives.

The Field missions – relevant extracts from the TOR

Thematic scope

The evaluation will include a comprehensive desk phase followed by **field missions** to be carried out for **6 different themes** listed below. The countries selected for the field missions should cover the various types and regions of co-operation as well as different experiences in the area of visibility. The evaluators shall identify and formulate in-depth questions and test hypotheses during the field missions.

The evaluation questions are validated and will become part of the contract. The countries for the geographic analyses will be selected in consultation with the Reference Group.

Six themes which will be assessed in the evaluation regarding the visibility of the EU external actions are:

- g. Crisis and fragile states : conflict prevention and peace building
- h. Actual financial and economic crisis
- i. Food crisis
- j. Migration
- k. Climate change and energy
- l. Environment, biodiversity and deforestation

Field phase

Following satisfactory completion of the Desk Phase, the evaluation team will proceed to the field missions.

The fieldwork shall be undertaken on the basis set out in the Final Desk Phase Report. If during the course of the fieldwork any significant deviations from the agreed methodology and/or schedule are perceived necessary, the Consultants must receive the approval of the Evaluation Unit before they can be applied.

Prior completion of each country visit the Evaluation team shall prepare for the EC Delegation concerned **a debriefing of the field mission**, seeking to validate the data and the information gathered.

When field missions are completed, the Evaluation team shall present results to the Reference Group in a debriefing.

The Draft Final Report

Following completion of the field mission, the team will proceed to prepare the final report and six reports based on each one of the six themes. Each of the six thematic reports will present the results on visibility of EU external actions from several countries visited. These reports will be annexed to the *Final Report*.

Table 1 - EQs and Sources of Evidence - Specific Table for Thematic Studies

	Evaluation Questions (Key respondents & tools are derived from the EQs)	Key respondents (for EQs and JCs)	EC DGsBxl	EU Del	EU MS missions	UN/Mul ti- laterals	Partner Govts	Media in country	CSOs
EQ1	“How well does the image of the external action of the EU perceived by the stakeholders correspond to the key issues outlined in the definition and objectives of this external action (Nice Treaty: Art. 8 & 11; Lisbon Treaty: Art. 3 & 21) and to the image the EU seeks to convey?”	• Stakeholder views		XX	XX	XX	XXX	XXX	XXX
EQ2	“How well do the Visibility communication priorities (Key Communication Messages from Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, i.e.: why, what, how) achieve their objectives?”	• Stakeholders • Views EU institutions	XXX	XXX	XX		X	X	X
EQ3	To what extent does the EC view itself as implementing a single, clearly defined Visibility strategy to achieve an agreed public image for its external action?	• Internal views from EC		XXX					
EQ4	“How well do stakeholders perceive the benefits of EU external action and not just its main features?”	• Stakeholders	X	XX	XXX	XX	XXX	XXX	XXX
EQ5	To what extent is the EC’s visibility/communication work coordinated and complementary with that of the EU Member States, Council and Parliament?	• Views from EU institutions • External views	XXX	XX	XX				
EQ6	Are the EC’s messages coherent across different EU external action and internal policy areas?	• Internal EU • External views	XXX	XXX	XXX	XX	XXX		XXX
EQ7	“How far does the perception of the value added of the EU as a global actor emerge clearly from its presence as in the major international organisations/fora? “	• Internal EU • External views	XX	XX		XXX	XXX	X	X
EQ8	“How far are the resources mobilized by the EC adequate (human resources, budget) to carry out its visibility/communication strategy?”	• Internal EC • External views	XXX	XXX	XX	X			
EQ9	“To what extent are the results in terms of stakeholder perceptions commensurate with the cost of conveying the messages both in financial and organisational terms? “	• Internal EU • External views	XXX	XXX					
EQ10	How effectively does EC external action staff from different services translate the visibility strategy they are expected to implement into action plans that are consistent amongst each other?	• EC views • Stakeholders	XXX	XXX	X				

ANNEX 9 –

EVIDENCE FROM INTERVIEWS WITH EU OFFICIALS

IN RELATION TO THE EQS

ANNEX 9 - INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO EQS COLLECTED FROM INTERVIEWS WITH EU OFFICIALS

Interviews conducted in Brussels by James Mackie (ECDPM) in October 2011. The list of persons interviewed is provided in Annex 9

EQ 1	“How well does the image of the external action of the EU perceived by the stakeholders correspond to the key issues outlined in the definition and objectives of this external action (Nice Treaty: Art. 8 & 11; Lisbon Treaty: Art. 3 & 21) and to the image the EU seeks to convey?”	
	Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from interviews
<p>JC.1.1. The EU has managed to disseminate the message to the relevant stakeholders in terms of content and reasons for its external action</p>		<p>Yes. Within the EC services staff are familiar with the key issues of EU external action. However, most officials are also concerned about the way external stakeholders perceive EU external action.</p> <p>Overall officials judge the EU to have a generally positive and rather benign image, but one that lacks in details and accuracy and many of its actions have a low visibility with the public. In fact the EU’s image tends to be strongest in aid dependent countries.</p>
<p><u>Indicator 1.1.1</u> The stakeholders know the definition of the external action of the EU</p> <p><u>Indicator 1.1.2</u> The stakeholders know the content of the definition of the external action of the EU</p>		<p>Interviewees familiar with definition of EU external action and generally familiar with broad lines of content of EU external action</p> <p>However, many officials report problems with the image that they feel external stakeholders have of the EU’s external action.</p> <p>What comes across in the press generally coincides with the broad lines of the image the EU want to portray of itself: peace, partnerships, global solidarity, human rights etc. but the details are generally only poorly known.</p> <p>EU development aid is very important in the image of EU external action, though EU foreign policy in certain specific cases (Georgia, Palestine, Balkans, etc) is also known.</p> <p>Foreign policy is always reported in terms of problems and how officials deal with them</p>
<p>JC.1.2. The EU has managed to transmit an image to stakeholders that correspond to the image that was sought to be conveyed</p>		<p>Yes. Staff of the institutions seem to be well familiar with the image of EU external action that the EU wants to convey</p>
<p><u>Indicator 1.2.1</u> The images that are widely perceived by the stakeholders correspond to the communication objectives of the EU on its external action</p>		<p>Yes internally with EU officials but their view is that externally this is not the case except for small well-informed groups in Brussels. They are particularly concerned about the way European media portray EU external action which is felt to be often inaccurate and short on details. Some of the press is also seen as quite hostile at times.</p> <p>Much of the Brussels press corps is also not very expert on EU external action but tends to focus rather on EU internal policies.</p>

Preliminary Finding: There appears to be no difficulty with EU officials not having understood what the EU is seeking to convey as an image of EU external action.

At the same time there is a generally held view among EU officials that apart from a small well-informed group of people in or closely connected to Brussels, wider stakeholder groups have a limited image of EU external action that does not go beyond the broad lines. This is felt to be at least partly because the European media do not convey an accurate or sufficiently detailed image. Officials feel the EU has a generally positive and benign image though low visibility and its image is strongest in aid dependent countries.

EQ 2	“How well do the Visibility communication priorities (Key Communication Messages from Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, i.e.: why, what, how) ¹⁴ achieve their objectives?”	
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from interviews	
JC 2.1: The priorities (why, what, how) have been well perceived and understood by the stakeholders	Internally the priorities appear to be well entrenched as officials are generally familiar with them even if they do not know the draft Communication.	
<p><u>Indicator 2.1.1</u> The stakeholders perceive well why the EU does have an external action</p> <p><u>Indicator 2.1.2</u> The stakeholders perceive well what defines EU as an actor on the world stage</p> <p><u>Indicator 2.1.3</u> The stakeholders perceive well how the EU deploys its instruments around the world</p>	<p>While there was no difficulties with EU officials not being aware of at least some of the Visibility communication priorities, most of the more recently joined staff members were not familiar with the Draft Communication. Officials who were around at the time (2006) it came out, were clearly aware of it however.</p> <p>However they are sceptical as to how much the wider group of external stakeholders are really aware of these details</p>	
JC 2.2.: The formulation of the priorities would have to be changed in order to gain an increased impact	Priorities for communication will have to change as the transparency agenda takes stronger hold	
<u>Indicator 2.2.1</u> The stakeholders express the need for another formulation about the external action of the EU in order to make it more visible	<p>A new commitment to increase transparency means that officials recognise they need to change the way they communicate. They can no longer be so selective as essentially they have to be prepared to communicate on everything.</p> <p>Post-Lisbon reorganization of services does not yet seem to be having a major impact in terms of rethinking priorities.</p>	
<p>Preliminary Finding: Officials by and large appear to agree with the priorities even which seem to be well internalized in a general way, though many are not familiar with the Draft Communication. There is a recognition that as transparency becomes an important issue, there will be a need to be less selective in what is communicated</p>		

EQ 3	To what extent does the EC view itself as implementing a single, clearly defined Visibility strategy to achieve an agreed public image for its external action?	
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from interviews	

¹⁴ Section 2.2 of Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner’s Draft Communication to the Commission: 2 Feb 2006, “The EU in the World: Towards a Communication Strategy for the EU’s External Policy 2006-2009”

JC 3.1 – The external actions services have one common visibility strategy	By and large the external services do have a common outlook on what needs to be done though not a single strategy per se. They also have tools to ensure coordination. At the same time efforts are also made to give each Commissioner his/her own profile and there are some steps to draft separate strategies for different services.
<p><u>Indicator 3.1.1</u> The number of communication / visibility strategies in the EC external action services and the variations between them</p> <p><u>Indicator 3.1.2</u> The existence of functioning and respected coordination mechanisms between the responsible services</p>	<p>Inside the EC there is a functioning internal coordination mechanism (ERIC) which has been in existence for a number of years though it went into abeyance for about a year as the EEAS was being established.</p> <p>New communication strategies are being formulated now that the new services have been established. There are indications however that this is not being centrally but rather separately for each service.</p>
JC 3.2 – Variations between the existing strategies are explained with valid reasons and an effort has been made to ensure overall coherence	Yes there are reasons for variations and efforts are made to ensure coherence.
<p><u>Indicator 3.2.1</u> The existence of valid reasons to explain any differences detected between the strategies</p> <p><u>Indicator 3.2.2</u> The overall coherence of the existing strategies is explained either in the documents or verbally in a consistent way by the officials responsible for them</p>	<p>There is a different logic for different policy areas: thus for example foreign policy needs to react to events that emerge whereas for development there is more emphasis on medium to long term horizons.</p> <p>The spokes persons clearly also make a definite effort to each profile their own Commissioner. This creates an element of competition.</p> <p>Staff in other EU institutions perceive EC staff as very oriented towards the work and messages of their own service. When they need to cooperate with EC a particular C&I project which is common as EC has the money then the part of the EC providing the funds will expect their priorities to be featured and this can be to the detriment of EU wide messages.</p>
JC 3.3 – The overall strategy or strategies outline a clear and logical path to achieve the visibility goals of EU external action	Not possible to judge
<p><u>Indicator 3.3.1</u> The strategy or strategies are easy to follow, specify a clear goal and outline a logical chain of actions.</p> <p><u>Indicator 3.3.2</u> The logic of the chain of actions in the strategy(ies) is robust</p> <p><u>Indicator 3.3.3</u> The communication strategies are sound-proofed by communication professionals</p>	The new communication strategies are not available as yet.
JC 3.4 – Variations between the existing strategies do not cause problems in creating the right visibility	No indications of undue problems due to lack of coherence between the services.
<p><u>Indicator 3.4.1</u> Evidence of difficulties of achieving the visibility objectives</p> <p><u>Indicator 3.4.2</u> Evidence of difficulties being ascribed to confusion on objectives or differences of points of</p>	In practice there is a good deal of coordination between officials in the Commission and including the EEAS. The RIC/ERIC provides a useful forum and the spokesman service also brings the spokes people for each of the Commissioners including the

view between the responsible services	spokesman for Ashton (as a VP of the EC).
<p>Preliminary Finding: While differences in strategies and approaches between services in the EC are apparent there are also mechanisms to encourage collaboration both between the services (ERIC) and within the Spokesman service. DG DEVCO is currently drafting its own communication strategy and it is not yet clear how this will be integrated into the single broader strategy. The EEAS were thinking of doing the same although this appears to have been put on hold for the time being.</p>	

EQ 4	“How well do stakeholders perceive the benefits of EU external action and not just its main features?”	
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from interviews	
JC 4.1. The stakeholders are sufficiently exposed to a communication from the EU on Visibility of its external action that is organised to improve impact, retention, credibility and buying intention	<p>Media are regularly exposed to communications from the EU institutions. Variations in level of knowledge of correspondents. Some groups can be quite frustrating to deal with.</p> <p>Some topics are not as easy to communicate on because they are long-term with no immediate outcome to sell.</p>	
<p><u>Indicator 4.1.1</u> The communication strategies are designed to improve impact, retention, credibility and “adherence/agreement” at the level of targeted stakeholders</p> <p><u>Indicator 4.1.2</u> The communication strategies are implemented to improve impact, retention, credibility and buying intention at the level of targeted stakeholders</p> <p><u>Indicator 4.1.3</u> The communication strategies are monitored and evaluated on impact, retention, credibility and buying intention at the level of targeted stakeholders</p>	<p>Communicating positively on role of Council and the benefits it brought was very difficult (pre EEAS). Much of this work is long haul, selling a political process and engagement not a simple product with a clear benefit.</p> <p>There is a need to be much more systematic about communicating results of projects and make sure EU is visible.</p> <p>Relations with UK press (specifically on Ashton) are particularly frustrating</p>	
JC 4.2. The stakeholders perceive and value the differences between the benefits of the EU external action and the results or the features/instruments	<p>Level of Brussels press corps’ interest in external action is not that high so it can be important to work directly with media HQs in capitals.</p> <p>Some topics are easier to communicate on than others – trade easier than foreign policy.</p>	
<p><u>Indicator 4.2.1</u> The communication strategies are designed to improve the perception of benefits at the level of targeted stakeholders</p> <p><u>Indicator 4.2.2</u> The communication strategies are implemented to improve the perception of benefits at the level of targeted stakeholders</p> <p><u>Indicator 4.1.3</u> The communication strategies are monitored and evaluated on the perception of benefits of targeted stakeholders</p>	<p>Media correspondents in Brussels press corps are generally more interested in the EU internal policy and not so much external action. Often important to work directly with media HQs in capitals where there is more specialist knowledge and not through press corps. However, foreign correspondents are relatively knowledgeable.</p> <p>In area of Trade 27 member states see the value and benefits of working as the EU on trade so there is little difficulty.</p>	
<p>Preliminary Finding: Certain topics are easier for stakeholders to perceive the benefits on than for others according to EU officials. Thus Trade is an area where EU member states readily see the benefits of a EU level approach. Foreign policy is more difficult however and partly because it often involves a long-term</p>		

process with only limited moments when there is a clear result. For Development there is a need to be more results oriented and to communicate better on results.

EU officials have a variety of practical difficulties in communicating with stakeholders via the media but these do not seem to be un-surmountable.

EQ 5 To what extent is the EC's visibility/communication work coordinated and complementary with that of the EU Member States, Council and Parliament?	
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from interviews
JC5.1 – The EC, MS and Council have an established coordination mechanism to discuss visibility issues	There are several coordination mechanisms newly established between the EC and the EEAS. Inter-institutional coordination between the EC, Council and EP is at a more general level and does not seem to involve any external action focused mechanism
<p><u>Indicator 5.1.1</u> Evidence of such a coordination mechanism (minutes of meetings held at regular intervals, agenda items on existing Council working groups, etc) being used regularly.</p> <p><u>Indicator 5.1.2</u> Evidence that points agreed on coordination and complementarity of visibility work are then followed up by actions by each of the three parties</p>	<p>An established mechanism for coordination exists within the Commission the RIC now ERIC (External relations information committee) which meets fortnightly, though there was a 12 month gap between the old and the new committee during the reorganization. The EEAS is in the ERIC. The daily contact point is the FPI.</p> <p>In the Commission the spokesman service includes the EEAS and there is an internal coordinates on messages.</p> <p>However, the Council Sect is not involved in ERIC though there is apparently an inter-institutional group for which the EC link is in DG COMM. However there appears to be no specific established system to coordinate with them on EU external action or even one that can be called upon in an emergency.</p> <p>The EP is also not involved in any coordination mechanism on external action and seems to have poor contacts inside the other institutions, though very ad-hoc, cooperation with the Commission/Council is fine when occasion arises. Feeling that EC could be more proactive.</p> <p>There appears to be no established coordination on communication with MS, and one official said the best place for that was in the OECD!</p>
JC5.2 – Council, EP and MS representatives are aware that their actions have an impact on the visibility of the EU as a whole	There is an overall level of awareness in principle of the need to coordinate with the Commission, but this does not seem to result in regular practice. There appears to be some tendency to think it is the others who need to initiate that is probably exacerbated by working under pressure. In other words it appears that such coordination only occurs when officials see a direct incentive to initiate it themselves and there is no single office that sees it as their responsibility to encourage the EU to communicate as one.
<u>Indicator 5.2.1</u> Evidence of discussions on the need to	Council officials recognize the importance of

<p>coordinate with the Commission on visibility</p> <p><u>Indicator 5.2.2</u> Evidence that these discussions on the need to coordinate with the Commission on visibility are then followed up by action</p>	<p>coordination with the Commission, but say they often find it difficult.</p> <p>Those from the EP recognize this need when EP delegations are travelling and they take the initiative to do so, but are not so convinced about this being their responsibility in normal times (example of how press officers of Commissioners typically only report on what their Commissioner says when at EP and say nothing about how MEPs react)</p> <p>No evidence from MS</p>
<p>JC5.3 – EC representatives take regular steps to liaise with MS, Council and EP on visibility issues in EU external action</p>	<p>Both positive and negative examples were available of EC/EEAS officials practice on this. A lot seems to depend on personal contacts and there is no indication of officials receiving strong leadership / instructions on this.</p>
<p><u>Indicator 5.3.1</u> Evidence of discussions on the need to coordinate with the Member States, Council and EP on visibility</p> <p><u>Indicator 5.3.2</u> Evidence that these discussions on the need to coordinate with the Member States, Council and EP on visibility are then followed up by action</p>	<p>In other institutions there is a feeling the EC or EEAS could be more proactive in initiating these contacts.</p> <p>Examples given of both positive and negative approaches to this. Personal contacts clearly important. No indication of strong instructions on this.</p> <p>Feeling in other institutions that EC officials often too interested in profiling their own Commissioner or service and not in genuine collaboration.</p> <p>Trade issues are a bit different and there are not so many contacts between the EC and the other 2 institutions because they are not so active on this. On the other hand there are more regular contacts with the MS. Council and EEAS seem willing to cooperate, EP is more divided on trade so coordination not so easy.</p>
<p>JC5.4 – Outside observers in a particular context (eg. In a partner country) see the EU (eg. MS embassies and EU Delegation) acting as a single entity rather than as a group of discordant actors</p>	<p>n.a. here</p>
<p><u>Indicator 5.4.1</u> No evidence emerges from interviewees or reports of examples of uncoordinated action on visibility or of MS actions conveying contradictory messages to the Commission</p>	<p>n.a. here</p>
<p><u>Preliminary Finding:</u> Although interviewees accepted principle that EU should coordinate across institutions on communication on external action it is apparent that the mechanisms to do so have only patchy coverage and a lot depends on personal and ad-hoc contacts. There does not seem to be an overriding drive or leadership to coordinate actively across all institutions in this specific field though there is a central inter-institutional coordination mechanism that is not related to any specific sector. EC-EEAS coordination mechanisms are being established. Links between them and the Council Sect are not formalized though there are some overtures. Vis a vis the EP there is even less coordination except at specific moments – eg. when MEP delegations are travelling.</p>	

EQ 6 Are the EC's messages coherent across different EU external action and internal policy areas?

Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from interviews
JC6.1 – EU policy in other areas do not contradict EU external action	Coherence is recognized to some extent as a problem in communication but does not appear to be a major source of concern to officials. The one area where various officials recognize there are regular issues to resolve is trade. Communication staff need to be proactive on this.
<p><u>Indicator 6.1.1</u> Evidence of incoherence between formal policies</p> <p><u>Indicator 6.1.2</u> Awareness among outside observers of incoherence in the EU’s policy</p> <p><u>Indicator 6.1.3</u> Evidence from officials working in one EC policy sector that they have taken steps to improve policy coherence between their area of policy and other areas</p>	<p>Lack of coherence not seen as a major problem by some officials though it does come up.</p> <p>Main exception is with Trade and this is recognized by various officials including in trade area. For trade there is a need to analyse things through cold economic eyes to see if a particular deal makes sense or not - in foreign policy or in development the optic is different.</p> <p>Formal PCD processes are not enough to resolve issues communication staff have to be proactive and talk to colleagues in other sectors. This does not happen enough.</p>
JC6.2 – Existence of contradictory messages being conveyed by different policy sectors	Contradictory messages do exist – between trade and foreign policy or development policy, or between relations with different third parties.
<p><u>Indicator 6.2.1</u> Evidence of contradictions between the visibility and communication strategies of different EC departments responsible for different policy sectors</p> <p><u>Indicator 6.2.2</u> Evidence that EC officials have taken steps to coordinate the messages to be conveyed on different policies so as to iron out possible contradictions</p> <p><u>Indicator 6.2.3</u> Awareness among outside observers of apparent contradictions (lack of coherence) between the messages conveyed by EU officials</p> <p><u>Indicator 6.2.4</u> Existence of press enquiries and requests for explanations about seeming contradictions in messages conveyed by EU</p>	<p>Agriculture or trade can be problematic areas at times.</p> <p>Also can have contradictions between links with different third parties: eg. Georgia blocks links on improved relations with Russia.</p> <p>Big issue is trade: EU goes on pushing Doha Round ideas but no one really believes in DDA anymore.</p>
<p>Preliminary Finding: By and large EU officials do not seem to see lack of coherence as a major problem for the visibility of EU external action that needs to be resolved, though they do recognize that the EU’s trade interests can be a problem for other policy areas (foreign policy, development). Agriculture is also cited. Otherwise there can be contradictions between relations with different countries if these have different interests.</p>	

EQ 7	“How far does the perception of the value added of the EU as a global actor emerge clearly from its presence as in the major international organisations/fora? “	
	Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from interviews
JC 7.1 The Commission has displayed political leadership in the implementation of its overall communication strategy and visibility activities, both		The EU has shown leadership in its relationship with International Organisations though it is not always very assertive. The new speaking rights in the UN

internally and towards Council, MS, EP and International Organisations	will help. The FAFA agreement on practical coordination is also important though it does need to be followed more consistently.
<p><u>Indicator 7.1.1</u> The degree of leadership (political and managerial) exercised internally to produce policy documents and take decisions (HQ and DEL)</p> <p><u>Indicator 7.1.2</u> The degree of leadership (political) related to key events with Council, MS and EP</p> <p><u>Indicator 7.1.3</u> Policy document with clear communication and visibility objective + implementation strategy produced with contribution of all external family DGs</p> <p><u>Indicator 7.1.4</u> Communication/visibility tools provide improved access to information on EU policies</p>	<p>Now that the EU has speaking rights in the UN this can only improve matters.</p> <p>EU is by nature a rather apologetic organisation.</p> <p>With UN EC has negotiated deal on visibility but progress is slow and have to go pushing them on that. Now doing an annual assessment of Delegation reports on the implementation of FAFA and do see a slow upward trend.</p> <p>Very nature of EU aid is problematic because it is channeled through others and therefore EU visibility will inevitably be diluted.</p>
JC 7.2 The Commission has actively supported the further consolidation of the overall EU institutional architecture enabling a more coherent and effective communication and visibility	The EC has made efforts to put up a more unified front on dealings with the UN.
<p><u>Indicator 7.2.1</u> To what extent is the EU Institutional architecture conducive to ensuring responsive and coherent decisions have a strong visibility impact</p> <p><u>Indicator 7.2.2</u> To what extent EC has expressly pushed for reforms having a visibility impact</p>	The FAFA agreement provides a clear single agreement for the EC with the UN that stipulates visibility requirements
JC.7.3 The EU Delegation contributed to strengthen the image of the EC in the third countries and the knowledge on the EU policies and activities	n.a.
<p><u>Indicator 7.3.1</u> How the presence of Delegation in third countries is perceived by local stakeholders, including MSs and International organizations</p> <p><u>Indicators 7.3.2</u> To what extent the stakeholder in the country knows the EC policy and actions</p>	n.a.
JC 7. 4 If and how the EU has been able to demonstrate its specific added value in relation to the Presidency and MS and to influence the international organizations/bodies while making it visible externally	<p>There are also examples of foreign policy issues where the EU is recognized internationally as a major actor.</p> <p>Where the EU has clear leadership in relation to MS, as in the case of trade, this is a big help in terms of its legitimacy in international fora.</p>
<p><u>Indicator 7.4.1</u> Constant key role of the EC in reaching EU common positions to be presented in the ECOSOC, selected Trust Funds, UN HR Council.</p> <p><u>Indicator 7.4.2</u> How the EC role is perceived by selected International Organisations (HQ and field)</p> <p><u>Indicators 7.4.3</u> How the role of the EC in international fora is perceived by governments of third parties and OECD countries</p>	<p>EU does have the lead de-facto now in the Middle East and this has helped</p> <p>In past EU has shown leadership on Iran nuclear issue and thereby gained profile in international fora.</p> <p>In New York the UN press corps is very knowledgeable on foreign policy issues so good to work with them but have to be proactive.</p> <p>In Trade area it is easier than most areas because EU has clear leadership that is not contested so in WTO that is well understood.</p>

Preliminary Finding: The EU relationship with the UN and International Organisations is not always easy but tends to vary from one sector to another. In trade the leadership of the EU is clear and so it is well recognized in the WTO. In development the EU has no such leadership, the EU also uses the UN as one channel for its aid and the EU-MS also support the UN agencies in a similar fashion in parallel. The relationship is thus inevitably more complex and despite the Commission taking active steps to organize the relationship and conclude a clear agreement with the UN (the FAFA) there is still a need to monitor that and continue to push it though there is a slow positive trend to ensure the EU does get more visibility out of the funds it supplies to the UN. In foreign policy there are examples of specific issues or cases where the EU has take a lead and is recognised for that.

EQ 8 “How far are the resources mobilized by the EC adequate (human resources, budget) to carry out its visibility/communication strategy?”	
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from interviews
JC 8.1 The Commission has sufficient levels of capacity (at HQ and in Delegations) to manage the various dimensions of communication/visibility actions (strategy programming, support to implementation, M and E)	At HQ the Commission has about 20-30 staff working on C&I issues including 6 in the FPI at the service of the EEAS. In addition the spokesman service has one spokesperson per Commissioner and the HRVP. No information collected on the total number of C&I staff in Delegations though from the field studies and comments made in interviews it is probably 1-2 C&I staff per DEL on average.
<u>Indicator 8.1.1</u> Qualification and tasks of staff dealing with communication/visibility in dedicated Unit and at DEL <u>Indicator 8.1.2</u> Number of staff in HQ and Delegation compared with similar organisations (UN Agency and/or MS)	EC provides EEAS with about 6 staff in FPI for communication work, also one spokesperson in EC spokesperson service DEVCO C&T Unit has 24 people in total including 3 webmasters but going down to 20 in January 2012. In past DG DEV C&I Unit had 7 people and AIDCO 17 so a total of 24 also. No complaints voiced about recruiting qualified staff except in EP.
JC.8.2 Financial amount of communication visibility budget and % of dedicated budget from projects, programmes, budget support and dialogues	The funds for C&I work are very largely with the EC with neither the EEAS or the Council Secretariat having budgets of their own although they do have C&I staff. The total budget for visibility work on EU external action is estimated at around Euro 10M p.a., which is comparable to what DG AGRI has for same purpose. DG COMM also has a similar amount (but not dedicated only to EU external action). _____
<u>Indicator 8.2.1</u> Financial amount for staff and management services at HQ <u>Indicator: 8.2.2</u> Financial amount for staff and management services at Delegation <u>Indicator: 8.2.3</u> % or amount dedicated to visibility in financed projects/programme to CSOs, UN Agencies,	The EEAS does not have a budget, but uses EC budget in spokesperson service and in FPI. In total DG Trade has about Euro 1M p.a. for C&I. All Projects funded by DEVCO have allocations for C&I work. By one account this amounted to about 5% of project budget

<p>Foundations, and Universities.</p> <p><u>Indicator 8.2.4</u> Availability of budget lines specifically related to visibility or other means to M & E visibility</p> <p><u>Indicator: 8.2.5</u> EC Resources used to check visibility compliance for projects/programme</p> <p><u>Indicator 8.2.6</u> Resources used for policy dialogue and new delivery methods</p>	<p>Delegations are also allocated a small budget.</p> <p>DEVCO has a central C&I budget of Euro 5M p.a., of which Euro 3.5M went on EDD in 2010 and probably around Euro 2M in 2011.</p> <p>AIDCO direct budget for C&I Unit was Euro 1-1.8M p.a. with another Euro 1.4M from projects. The total C&I budget including funds in all AIDCO funded projects was around Euro 10M p.a. (~5% of project budget according to one source)</p> <p>DG DEV C&I budget was around Euro 5-6M p.a.</p> <p>DG Comm Budget about Euro 10M p.a., of which about Euro 4M goes on Eurobarometers.</p> <p>For the EP press office finance is not a problem, getting competent staff is more of an issue.</p> <p>Council Sect has no central budget for visibility although they do have staff for working with the press and phone bills are covered. The money is with the EC.</p> <p>Each ESDP mission does have at least one C&I person and a visibility budget. This person plays a key role.</p>
<p>JC.8.3 The financial amount available for implement the communication visibility strategy is known by the Commission and the strategy is designed accordingly</p>	<p>Yes</p>
<p><u>Indicator 8.3.1</u> To what extent the strategy is designed taking in consideration the available resources (staff/budget)</p> <p><u>Indicator: 8.3.2</u> Involvement and training of external DGS and DEL personnel on visibility /communication not working in Communication Units</p>	<p>There seems to be no difficulty with staff having information on the budget.</p> <p>At the same time it was made clear that none of the budgeting was automatic. There were no fixed percentages and everything had to be argued for.</p> <p>The DEVCO C&I Unit runs 2 day training sessions 4 times a year for 12-15 C&I persons from Delegations (i.e. 50-60 total p.a.) and maintains an intranet knowledge exchange platform for them for continuing exchange and contacts.</p>
<p>Preliminary Finding: A total budget of Euro 10M p.a. is estimated as available for C&I work/visibility actions for EU external action. Human resources at HQ level include about 30 people plus a spokesperson for each Commissioner. On going efforts are made to provide training and back-up advice and materials for Press and Information Officers in Delegations.</p> <p>The resources are therefore substantial and their adequacy is not put in question by interviewees. Equally human resources are not seen as a problem.</p>	

<p>EQ 9</p>	<p>“To what extent are the results in terms of stakeholder perceptions commensurate with the cost of conveying the messages both in financial and organisational terms?”</p>
<p>Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators</p>	<p>Evidence identified from interviews</p>
<p>Self assessment by interviews of impact achieved</p>	<p>C&I officials interviewed were by and large reasonably positive about the impact of their work on the visibility of the EU. Though they did acknowledge the difficulties involved to measure</p>

	<p>impact some efforts are made to monitor results.</p> <p>Officials also indicate the task is difficult because there is no real 'European public space' and the media are all nationally based.</p>
<p>Impressions gained from interviews as to officials views of the effectiveness of their work</p>	<p>"By definition the EU does not get its money's worth from communication spending because the press is writing from a national point of view".</p> <p>There is no European press, nor really any 'European public space'.</p> <p>DEVCO – very hard to measure impact.</p> <p>Council Sect – generally felt impact was good</p> <p>Trade – Feels there is an effective use of resources C&I and get value for money for it. Monitor their own output and try to measure afterwards</p>
<p>JC 9.1 Are the stakeholders perception in selected policy areas and the 6 thematics linked to specific messages conveyed by EC</p>	<p>No evidence</p>
<p><u>Indicator 9.1.1</u> Measured results from attitudinal surveys of samples of particular stakeholder groups comparing perceptions of the EU and other comparable actors on EU external action and more specifically in the 6 thematic areas designated in the TOR</p> <p><u>Indicator 9.1.2</u> Measured results perceptions of informed actors from among the designated stakeholder groups</p> <p><u>Indicator 9.1.3</u> Measured results from comparison of main messages conveyed by the EU in specific communication efforts with the messages then retained by the media in covering the event or NGOs following the issue</p> <p><u>Indicator 9.1.4</u> If available from Eurobarometer or other comparable sources: Measured results from public opinion polls of attitudes towards EU and EU external action</p>	<p>No evidence</p>
<p>JC 9.2 Are the resources used in the selected policy area able to create specific message including strategy design and coordination</p>	<p>A full range of different communications tools are used with the website and the EDD probably being the most prominent.</p>
<p><u>Indicator 9.2.1</u> Number and qualification of personnel and Units +DEL involved in creating the message</p> <p><u>Indicator 9.2.2</u> Kind of tools (Internet, newsletter, declarations, press release, events, etc..) used to convey message in the different sectors</p> <p><u>Indicator 9.2.3</u> Cost of tools employed</p>	<p>Internet – DEVCO website gets ±100-200,000 visitors per month – majority from inside the EU</p> <p>EDD takes up big chunk of budget Euro 3.5M in 2010 but more like Euro 2M in 2011.</p> <p>Good engagement of top management in C&I work in seminars etc.</p> <p>DG COMM funds Euronews.</p>
<p>JC 9.3 The resources available for visibility work are effectively deployed in a well organized manner</p>	<p>No evidence</p>

<p><u>Indicator 9.3.1</u> Clear and logical organisational chart for the staff working on visibility available</p> <p><u>Indicator 9.3.2</u> Budgets for visibility work are clearly linked to the action plans</p>	<p>No evidence</p>
<p>Preliminary Finding: EU C&I officials clearly feel their efforts achieve a degree of impact even though they recognize the difficulties of working in an environment where all media are nationally based apart from Euronews which the EU funds itself. They thus believe they are having some impact and do take steps to monitor this. They use a good range of methods with the website being the most important and the EDD another key tool.</p>	

EQ 10	How effectively do EC external action staff from different services translate the visibility strategy they are expected to implement into action plans that are consistent amongst each other?	
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from interviews	
<p>JC10.1 – Commission staff coordinate with their colleagues in other departments on their visibility work</p>	<p>Yes coordination inside the EC and with the EEAS seems to work well again now that the ERIC is re-established after the organizational restructuring</p>	
<p><u>Indicator 10.1.1</u> Evidence of coordination mechanisms (eg. minutes of meetings, correspondence on coordination, etc)</p> <p><u>Indicator 10.1.2</u> Evidence of changes in draft visibility action plans of different services as a result of having coordinated with colleagues in other services</p>	<p>Several references to the RIC and ERIC were made in many of the interviews showing that for the staff involved from different services this is an important coordination tool. However, its meetings lapsed for about a year in the organisational transition from pre to post Lisbon structures.</p> <p>Coordination beyond the EC and the EEAS to the other institutions is much less established.</p>	
<p>JC10.2 – Commission staff formulate action plans that are clearly based on their visibility strategy</p>	<p>No evidence</p>	
<p><u>Indicator 10.2.1</u> The links between the action plans and the visibility strategy they are based on are clear and logical</p>	<p>No evidence</p>	
<p>JC10.3 – The visibility action plans produce expected results</p>	<p>Officials feel they do reasonably well but also have plenty of ideas on how they could do better and are aware of other actors who do better in their eyes.</p>	
<p><u>Indicator 10.3.1</u> Evidence of results official expect and linked back to their own action plans</p> <p><u>Indicator 10.3.2</u> The logical chain of the action plans to the results is solid</p>	<p>EU is generally very bad at public relations Need to focus more on public diplomacy. Cannot do it all need to focus more.</p> <p>Now putting a lot of emphasis on communicating results (change from the past) and want to do more careful planning than in the past. Want to put more emphasis on media and link events to media. Finally plan to evaluate media impact.</p> <p>DG COMM is on top of its work but could do better. Need to focus more on communicating results. US much better than EU at that.</p> <p>Should work more with VIPs and copy the UN as they do better.</p>	
<p>Preliminary Finding: EU officials see themselves as being reasonably effective in their work on C&I. They want to focus more on communicating results and they are aware that there are other organisations they can learn from.</p>		

9.

ANNEX 10 –

REPORT FROM INTERVIEWS WITH CIVIL SOCIETY

ANNEX 10 - REPORT CIVIL SOCIETY INTERVIEWS BRUSSELS – VISIBILITY STUDY EU EXTERNAL ACTION

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September-October, 2011

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Methodological background

For this part of the study 13 interviews and 1 focus group discussion with Brussels civil society organisations with a European focus were held. The selection of respondents was based on a balance between (9) NGOs, in particular development umbrella organisations and those that specifically cover the different themes, and (5) external actions think tanks (TT). In addition, a balance was sought between ‘general experts’ (9) and ‘thematic experts’ (7, with all 6 themes covered). In most cases directors were interviewed, unless it was felt another member of staff was more appropriate, either because they were specifically focusing on EU external action or because they were an expert in one of the 6 themes. See appendix for a list of respondents and their organization and background, which will not be linked to quotes in the report due to confidentiality of the interviews.

The interviews took around 1 hour each and were held according to the questionnaire in appendix, which was based on the selected relevant Evaluation Questions defined in the Desk Report. The focus group discussion was organized around the hypothesis on the Security/ Fragile States theme defined in the Desk Report for specific use in that part of the report, but was translated into the corresponding EQs to be included in this analysis. For this analysis, where required, we have added several new Judgment Criteria (JC) and Indicators to the ‘Expected JC and Indicators’ identified in the Desk Report.

Whereas there was large consensus on a few key issues, there was great diversity in much of the results and examples given. This might be a consequence of the broad selection of stakeholders (e.g. thematic experts generally refer to their own field) and broad framing of questions, which was necessary for this study. To indicate weighting of views it is stated if something was just said by one (1) person or rather several or a (large) majority and where a difference was apparent between NGO and TT views this is indicated.

Characteristics of these interviewees

This group of interviewees is a key group of ‘multiplier’ persons, who are by definition Europe specialists in their domain and have access to wide networks often extending worldwide. Within these networks they act as resource person on the EU and focal points to which other network members often relate comments back about the EU. Their opinions of the EU are therefore

partially based on direct and quite intense exposure to the EU and comments on the EU made by wide constituencies.

The results: Key findings as based on EQs

A. Summary version

EQ 1

“How well does the image of the external action of the EU perceived by the stakeholders correspond to the key issues outlined in the definition and objectives of this external action (Nice Treaty: Art. 8 & 11; Lisbon Treaty: Art. 3 & 21) and to the image the EU seeks to convey?”

Preliminary Finding:

The image of EU external action perceived by stakeholders only partly corresponds to key issues outlined in the definition and objectives as defined in Lisbon and Nice, as well as the image the EU seeks to convey. The correspondence is most clear for the respondents themselves, who at least recognize the attempt, whereas they feel ‘outsiders’ will see this much less. The discrepancy between the desired and actual image of EU external action is one between rhetoric and practice. Action, or the lack of it, has most effect on the actual image rather than visibility measures.

The image of the EU is clearly a very mixed one: positive on intentions and resources for development, but critical on the incoherence of this with the reality of other policies, in particular trade. Lack of coherence seems a key factor in image building. Lack of true dialogue is another major issue. The EU is considered an important actor, but at the same time it is felt there is relatively little awareness of this outside Europe, as well as a perceived lack of power and diminishing leadership in several international fields. This relates a lot to internal dynamics with the MS and EEAS, as well as the crisis.

The image the EU wants to convey corresponds to the image perceived by Brussels CSOs in terms of ‘the largest donor’ with values (good intentions), but the respondents feel the positive image and influence that the EU expects to flow from that does not follow. This is partly due to negative perceptions of action in other areas and lack of effectiveness within the EU framework. In relation to the Draft Communication the terms (solidarity, Africa, multilateralism, global player) are well recognized by respondents, but more as EU objectives than in terms of what it really does.

EQ 2

“How well do the Visibility communication priorities (Key Communication Messages from Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, i.e.: why, what, how)¹⁵ achieve their objectives?”

Preliminary Findings:

Based on the interviews it appears that the Visibility communication priorities achieve their objectives to some extent, but there are also many problems. Respondents are very critical on EU communication efforts and skills more generally. This is strongly related to the difficulties of coordination with MS, EEAS and the crisis; and a lack of a clear narrative as a result. All respondents put substance before communication, if the first is lacking, the second cannot be a substitute to create an image.

On the other hand, most people do recognize the terminology, in several cases even without prompting. Terms used in describing the image and desired image of the EU (including ‘global solidarity’, ‘global player’ and ‘multilateralism’), are all terms from the Draft Communication. What does stand out is that while this desired image might be recognized, it is not actually achieved according to most interviewees. This relates to a difference between rhetoric and action and lack of actual weight, due to many internal and external reasons, that undermine the image that the EU desires.

More specifically on the Draft Communication the challenges are mostly recognized by the respondents and are seen as still largely relevant, even though some are considered outdated and others missing. The challenges part could be considered partially achieved. The objectives are not achieved in terms of dialogue, which is often absent according to respondents. Messages were partly achieved, as they were recognized but also questioned for contradictions with reality. Several criticisms were made of the Draft Communication, as well as suggestions, in particular to start with content and coherence before going into communication, and that this communication

¹⁵ Section 2.2 of Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner’s Draft Communication to the Commission: 2 Feb 2006, “The EU in the World: Towards a Communication Strategy for the EU’s External Policy 2006-2009”

should entail real dialogue and engagement with the outside world.

EQ 4 “How well do stakeholders perceive the benefits of EU external action and not just its main features?”

Preliminary Finding:

To some extent, within the direct constituency of respondents (NGOs and TTs), the stakeholders definitely perceive the benefits of EU external action. To a lesser extent they believe the broader public and actors outside the EU see the need for, and potential of EU external action, although awareness levels low and direct benefits might not always be felt.

The most important potential benefit is seen as the stronger external voice the EU can have as a collective, especially if used in promoting the interest of others (e.g. LDCs). Respondents feel this benefit is not really achieved however, though some positive examples are given of the EU using external action well. This lack of success is related to disagreements with the MS, as well as to the EEAS not yet being fully functional. Other important benefits of EU external action are identified as ‘having a partner for dialogue and space for influence’, which is currently lacking. This used to exist and is expected to return, although clear messages on what the EEAS is doing are essential for respondents to enjoy these benefits.

The most emphasized, important and stable benefit for development NGOs in North and South is funding. Development cooperation more broadly also brings perceived benefits according to some, although in some fields more than others and not always in implementation and effectiveness. The lack of awareness of the EU would imply less perception of benefits. In the end however, Southern countries and NGOs are said to feel these benefits are often undone by the incoherent and damaging policies of the EU in other areas like trade – something people seem to be more aware of that than positive benefits.

It seems that most perception of benefits is based on actual actions and less on communication efforts, although the latter might be more relevant for citizens inside the EU, as well as Southern partners, who are less aware and (therefore) might not feel benefits as directly. Respondents feel that visibility does not make up for lack of political action and practical benefits and can even be counter-productive.

EQ 5 To what extent is the EC’s visibility/communication work coordinated and complementary with that of the EU Member States, Council and Parliament?

Preliminary Finding:

Most respondents feel the C&I work of the EC is hardly coordinated with that of EU MS, Council and EP and that, despite some attempts, there are quite some issues with either achieving complementarity or coherent messages between institutions, as well as individuals within. The biggest problems are found with the MS, who do not actually seem to have an interest in coordinating messages or more generally in making the EC (and EU) look good, or just disagree too much with each other. The coordination between Barroso, van Rompuy and Ashton is also seen as complex. The EEAS has the potential to improve this, but so far there is not much positive movement and a few respondents highlight risks here as well. In the case of the Parliament, most respondents feel this is normal within the democratic framework it provides. Some respondents feel it is anyway ‘no more than logical’ that this coordination and coherence between institutions is not always there. Others feel the EU is actually not doing so bad on this.

EQ 6 Are the EC’s messages coherent across different EU external action and internal policy areas?

Preliminary Finding:

The EC’s messages are generally not considered coherent across different EU external action and internal policy areas. Policy incoherence and discrepancies between rhetoric and practice were a key theme in the interviews as

they are said to have serious damaging effects on EU visibility and image. Although most acknowledge that this is similar for any national government and understand the need for the EU to defend its own interests, almost all respondents do think there are major problems here. Many examples of incoherence were given, most prominently that between development objectives and trade policies that are perceived to be damaging developing countries. DG Trade is also seen as the most powerful, prevailing even over Barroso and the EEAS. Some pointed out attempts to achieve coherence, although these all face difficulties of some sort. Messages are also often incoherent, either with each other or with practice, relating to lack of internal communication and other institutional issues.

EQ 7 “How far does the perception of the value added of the EU as a global actor emerge clearly from its presence as in the major international organisations/fora? “

Preliminary Finding:

Although most respondents feel the EU is a relevant actor and its external action definitely has added value in the international arena, they question the image, role and real power of the EU. The potential for the EU as a collective of states to play an important role and be a positive and powerful actor in its own right is seen as high. Attempts to achieve this are acknowledged, but actual results are limited. The image and perceived role of the EU in international organisations and fora is a mixed picture. On the one hand there is the positive role of supporting multilateralism and international organisations work, on the other hand the EU is known as a difficult negotiation partner due to its structure. MS disagreement and the Euro crisis do not help the image. The real influence of the EU is questionable. Some respondents stress the over-representation and arrogance of the EU, which was clearly highlighted by the negative UN vote. The EU did not see this coming and it really showed how the EU is challenged by the rest of the world, in particular developing and emerging countries. The UN vote and Copenhagen were given as prime examples of the declining weight of the EU and the way its power is being challenged by the outside world. Other fora, such as G20 and G8, also raise challenges, such as what the role of EU is relative to those member states who are present.

For Delegations the image is not very positive: low quality of staff, lack of engagement with local society and involving them in development projects, no communication strategy, sometimes limited awareness of EU policies, inward looking closed attitudes and generally ‘bad diplomacy’.

Some evidence relevant to EQ9 was also collected even though this was not part of the formal interviews:

EQ 9 “To what extent are the results in terms of stakeholder perceptions commensurate with the cost of conveying the messages both in financial and organisational terms? “

Preliminary Finding: These interviewees are frequent observers of EU events though they may not know the costs involved. Yet a number were critical of the cost of the events relative to the visibility achieved. Interestingly however, the EDD do give rise to positive reactions (even though these are high cost events) which suggests that there may be some value added specifically in the EU organizing the EDD.

The results: Key findings as based on EQs

B. Full version

EQ 1	“How well does the image of the external action of the EU perceived by the stakeholders correspond to the key issues outlined in the definition and objectives of this external action (Nice Treaty: Art. 8 & 11; Lisbon Treaty: Art. 3 & 21) and to the image the EU seeks to convey?”
Judgment Criteria & Indicators	
JC.1.1. The EU has managed to disseminate the message to the relevant stakeholders in terms of content and reasons for its external action	<p>European level NGOs and Think Tanks based in Brussels are a very well informed audience with a sophisticated understanding of the EU. They are clearly highly aware of the main features of EU external action and able to distinguish between the image the EU wants to convey and the actual image it has in their fields both for themselves as EU specialists and for their own constituencies both inside European and externally.</p> <p>The image(s) they describe of the EU are certainly partially influenced by the communication work of the EU itself but also by their own observations, research and direct experience.</p>
Indicator 1.1.1/2 The stakeholders know the definition/content of the external action of the EU	<p>Interviewees themselves all know EU external action well, with specific focus areas.</p> <p>However, they feel there is a lack of awareness among EU citizens and among people from outside the EU with whom they are in contact with (e.g. with partner organisations).</p>
JC.1.2. The EU has managed to transmit an image to stakeholders that correspond to the image that was sought to be conveyed	<p>The EU has certainly managed to convey the image it wants to these well informed stakeholders because they are very aware of the EU’s communication work, however the image they have retained of the EU is also informed by other sources and thus they see discrepancies between the what they call the rhetoric and the practice.</p>
Indicator 1.2.1 The images that are widely perceived by the stakeholders correspond to the communication objectives of the EU on its external action	<p>The perceived image wish of the EU and its true image according to European civil society organisations based in Brussels certainly includes ideas pushed by the EU such as ‘the largest donor’ and with strong values, but these are mitigated by perceptions of the EU as having ‘good intentions’ but not always able to live to them. Moreover, these CSOs are sceptical about the positive image and influence that the EU expects to follow from that.</p>
Notes on image of EU from interviews below	
Overall perceived image of EU	<p>All respondents refer to the mixed image of EU external action.</p> <p>There is quite some consensus on the positive aspects of EU image:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most respondents refer to the image of the biggest donor, quite positive on development cooperation – at least on intentions and the resources. (e.g. key player on aid effectiveness, important role ODA) • Also quite often seen as an important actor on: Human rights (although practice less), global solidarity more generally, EU model itself, some neighborhood and enlargement, values (at least in rhetoric). Mentioned several times the image of EU

	<p>as multilateral champion.</p> <p>But there is also quite some consensus on key issues hampering a positive image of EU external action:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Respondents refer to the EU as: ‘confused’, ‘incoherent’, ‘contradictory’, ‘contrasting pictures’, ‘gives with one hand and takes with the other is what most NGOs feel’, mainly relating this to lack of policy coherence, with own interests prevailing in particular in trade; whereas TTs are more dispersed in their views. • PCD is major issue in almost all NGO interviews, they feel there are too many policies with negative impact on developing countries and take a much more critical stance towards the EU. (EPA and trade mentioned several times as most damaging; though PCD efforts are good) • There is generally much rhetoric vs practice (either due to actions or lack of it). some also refer to this as ‘hypocrisy’ and see it as a real danger to the image. • Lack of dialogue – including space for criticism - is emphasized by various TT (1) and NGO, though one respondent is very positive on this in area of food security.
<p>Relevance, weight and influence of the EU</p>	<p>Respondents feel the EU is a relevant actor, but not always visible (enough) and with a mixed and worsening picture on power too:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On visibility and relevance: Active player (e.g. climate) <i>vs</i> lack of action and implementation (due to coordination issues) or under the radar (e.g. security). It could play a more political role according to various respondents. • Most TT feel the EU is ‘not that powerful’ and in particular in relation to its economic weight and resources, including development cooperation; some NGO emphasise this wrong assumption of the EU as shown from Copenhagen and UN vote (see EQ7), and point out how the EU is overrepresented in IFI’s. They also they feel EU could/should be stronger though, if based on ‘right principles’. • Stronger in: Development debates, some climate; Some refer to ‘really a trade/ economic actor’. (see also EQ7 on multilateral mixed picture) • Less strong in: Security (3 vs 1), various other - see later (e.g. climate also here, other multilateral issues see EQ7). • No clear perception of the extent to which MS are more visible and powerful; although in some cases this seems the case (1 says REPER more powerful) <p>Why? (Major relevance of MS issues, EEAS and crisis)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A major reason for the confusion and negative impact on image of EU external action is nature of the EU and MS lack of support to EU external action (<i>‘not giving way to EU’</i> and downplaying role or even <i>‘promoting national at cost of EU’</i>), as well as general disagreement (which leads to lack of one voice and vision; <i>‘paralyzed by internal divisions’</i>; see EQ5). • The EEAS comes up as a major issue: There are clearly expectations or hopes EEAS will bring more coherence and weight to EU external action, but criticism on the current worse situation (<i>‘a mess’</i> with tensions, confusion and much lack of clarity and communication; <i>‘too much caught up in institutional changes’</i>) and doubts on the future. • The (euro)crisis also worsens both coordination/ agreement and therefore image (e.g. <i>‘pathetic image not being able to deal with that’</i> -1) • In specific fields due to own lack of action (e.g. climate & energy: not doing enough themselves, aid effectiveness: not taking lead anymore) • Other: A few respondents emphasise that image relates to expectations (e.g. HR and development rhetoric, as well as to strength and EEAS). Also relates to lack of understanding (both within and outside) as will show at several points.

<p>Image development on</p>	<p>More specifically on development there is a mixed image too:</p> <p>TT did not reflect on this much, only ‘biggest donor’ and generally quite positive, although one referred to lack of implementation due to coordination issues. Development NGOs focused on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leading role in terms of main donor (most), main actor engaged in aid effectiveness (Accra) and development finance (1), climate (2). In all these fields felt the role of the EU is declining however: lack of engagement and progressiveness on aid effectiveness debate (‘really a loss and damaging image globally’), PCD work and DG Dev taking leading role in that good. • Approach/ priorities: Quite critical on this, on the one hand EU is too traditional (too much charity or too colonial) and on the other worried about recent rhetoric on own interest (3, 1 on tied aid), private sector at cost of public sector, budget support (1). Positive on food security. • Effectiveness/ implementation: Not so good according to some (4; ‘at least in perception’ - partly due to MS rhetoric - or ‘less clear’), although improving according to one. Less transparent (1). • MDG fairly good, also in visibility; though now ‘taking a dip’ according to one • Positive on resource availability but very complex and rigid (and therefore sometimes exclusive) as donor (in both North and South); in South also does not seem so open – usually through Northern partner (yet; see delegations)
<p>Per theme</p>	<p><i>[more one off opinions due to small sample of experts per theme and divergent views]</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Climate (& Energy): in CC there is clearly a perception of the EU loosing leadership (3 TT and 3 NGO). Visible and doing a lot, but not always successful (Copenhagen) and diminishing leadership; in part due to lack of own action at home to reduce CO2 which damages legitimacy of asking others to, but also South feels less partnership – although EU has supported Southern delegations with resources and advice a lot according to one expert. TT refer more to energy security policies, criticism in relation to Russia (1) vs ‘more story line’ (1); lack of coherence with human rights and democracy principles, but better be honest on this (1). • Financial crisis: Most reflect on the damaging effect of not being able to solve the Euro crisis, but only two NGO reflect on this in relation to developing countries which is mixed. Whereas one feels the attempt was good, the other is very critical of the lack of the ‘disastrous (lack of) response’ (fragmented and late, pledges small amounts and didn’t disburse), especially in contrast to IFI’s which were the ‘real leaders’. Slightly better on tax evasion, but also issues there, in particular on coordination. • Food: One NGO (expert) very positive on food security policies and formulation process, but less sure on implementation. Food Facility is not well known, but one NGO feels it was ok response. TT (2) only refer to lack of logo on food aid. • Migration: ‘<i>A fortress from the outside, a leaking sieve on the inside</i>’ summarizes perceptions well according to two TT. One NGO emphasizes the missed opportunity for the EU to be ‘police of Europe’ when EU fails to speak out to MS ‘misbehaviour’. One TT refers to Frontex as a ‘thin initiative’ and highlights hypocrisy in visa relations with Russia. For one the EU plays no role in migration. • Security/ Fragile States: Some criticism (3?) vs one positive. Lack of policy and therefore visibility, worsening too. There are also criticisms on both visibility efforts on this in third countries and lack of real political action. • <i>Environment quite similar to climate it seems.</i> <p>Other: Neighborhood: Mixed voices, some (3) feel EU positively perceived, whilst some (2) think policies failed - as also showed from Libya and CEPS survey. Relatively little</p>

	<p>awareness. Critical of EU reactions to North Africa, although improving (1). Relates to enlargement, which is considered to be ok, but the EU is probably not so attractive now. Human Rights come up several times as an important field with mixed image. One strong view on the danger of HR rhetoric with no action in practice</p>
<p>External image specifically among respondents international contacts</p>	<p>Respondents point out the large differences of external perceptions, for example between smaller and bigger countries, or different type of origins (activist vs business). Overall there seems little awareness and true understanding of the EU, as well as quite some criticism.</p> <p>South (mainly Africa):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Little awareness (e.g. do not know policies, delegations). Do not see much difference between MS and EU or <i>'not seeing EU as donor in its own right'</i>. • Some emphasise perception of EUs importance but in both positive and negative sense: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ As donor with resources EU is appreciated ('EU mainly seen as financier'; although funding complex) and some benefits definitely felt (cf. EQ4), but approach, implementation and effectiveness not always good: either too traditional (2/3; 1 relating this to preference for emerging economies), lacking civil society engagement (3), suspicious of hidden agendas and own interests (2), mixed messages/ hypocrisy (many). ○ The impact of negative policies, in particular trade is important. EPAs were very damaging for the EU image in Africa (most NGOs). People also see that EU does not work on CC mitigation itself, so losing legitimacy; perceived similar in other fields (rhetoric vs practice). Not sure if EU seen more as development partner/funding source or economic/ trade block. • Delegations (cf. EQ7): often seen as distant, local people not sure how to get in (often go through Northern partners), some better relations of course. See CIDSE impact study 2007¹⁶, which showed perception of good will, but much criticism on approach and implementation, which was out of touch with society and reality. Communication with civil society was lacking (more government/clients) and not country-specific (sometimes not even right language). <p>Arab states: Very critical of the EU (4); for hypocrisy of advocating HR whilst also supporting earlier leaders, weak reaction to the crisis, as well as for trade (refusing to renegotiate) and migration. Two respondents refer to <i>'zero credibility'</i>. Also irrelevant (some); some disagreement on whether EU is still a model (1) or not (1).</p> <p>Other (loose comments):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • China interested, mainly economically and some security (2); see strength environ. (1); also confused on role of EU. • Asia more generally: referred to work of Martin Holland showing that EU only has strong image economically. Central Asia positive, despite trade (1). • Neighborhood feels positive according to one NGO, giving examples of good support in various countries. • US 'most nuanced', e.g. on EEAS set-up, some issues with lack of action (1) and financial positions EU (1) • Russia very critical because of energy restrictions EU and lack of visa access (1) • In multilateral arena not so good, see later (EQ7)

<p>Internal image among respondents stakeholders</p>	<p>The internal image is strongly affected by the MS downplaying the role of the EU, resulting in a less positive image with the public, which is in turn worsened by euro crisis and press coverage. There is also frustration over the failure of the EU to use its political clout and ineffectiveness of its action, lack of power.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MS are generally not really supportive of EEAS (even ‘in the way’), not wanting to give way; although some (smaller countries) see options for EU as useful for promoting their interests. A few refer to ‘nothing incisive’ being said or done. • Doubts on Europe at large strongly affect perceptions of External Action and in particular Development Cooperation (‘always hit most’ – 1). • Citizens are little aware of EU External Action according to most (some see its importance) and are generally critical of the EU, e.g. ‘oversized bureaucracy with too little action’ (wrongfully so; 2). The EEAS is incomprehensible (1). One refers to positive barometers (on EU and aid) that she does not really believe.
<p>Image the EU wants to convey according to respondents</p>	<p>There is a clear image (almost all respondents) of the EU wanting to present itself as the largest donor and a leading actor of solidarity; interested/ concerned, a partner, doing good, progressive etc (e.g. specifically on aid effectiveness, climate, other trends of the moment or more generally). Taking credit for it and also expecting EU to lead so as to influence.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some NGOs refer to Michel trying to establish higher profile on development, which also related to the EU being open about own interest in development cooperation ‘stop being angelique’ – at odds with image wish above. • In addition, some (3 NGO) refer to the attempt to present itself as coherent, and as having one voice – which also shows from setting up of EEAS. One refers to ambitions for stronger coordination role. • A third image EU seeks is that of a global player, powerful and vocal. This is also driven by changing and more crowded world and feeling need to reassert itself. • Finally there is the image of a multilateral champion, which only two responded (TT) mentioned explicitly, others more implicit. • Other: One reference to the former neutral approach and agenda of the EU, which is now more political. Another to image of EU as a protection for its own citizens which is now an empty message as Euro is under threat.
<p>Is the EU managing according to respondents?</p>	<p>Overall respondents feel that the image of biggest donor is there, but positive image and weight/influence that is expected to come with it not so much (and getting even less). Also implies the desired image of coherence is not achieved.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It seems that as one respondent states ‘sometimes the EU manages, other times it is not able to set the agenda’. (e.g. Copenhagen and UN) • Several respondents refer to the use of new terminology or attempt to reassert or reinvent itself, but believe this is still ‘missing the mark’ and ending up ‘with the same old thing’, according to one respondent because they might not have a choice (EU rationale being liberalization, damaging image on trade, in this case; but this is also related to the nature of the EU and MS issues). • Issues with achieving the desired image also show from the need for this study, according to one respondent.

Preliminary Finding:

The image of EU external action perceived by stakeholders only partly corresponds to key issues outlined in the definition and objectives as defined in Lisbon and Nice, as well as the image the EU seeks to convey. The correspondence is most clear for the respondents themselves, who at least recognize the attempt (e.g. solidarity and power), whereas they feel ‘outsiders’ will see this much less. The key discrepancy between the desired and actual image of EU external action is one between rhetoric and practice, and action – or lack of it – has most

effect on the actual image.

This image is clearly a very mixed one: positive on intentions and resources for development, but critical (very much in the case of NGOs) on the incoherence of this with the reality of other policies pursuing own interest, in particular trade. Lack of coherence seems a key factor in image building. Lack of true dialogue is another issue.

In terms of visibility more generally, the EU is considered an important actor but at the same time there is relatively little awareness outside Europe, as well as a perceived lack of power and diminishing leadership in several international fields. This relates a lot to internal dynamics with the MS and EEAS, as well as the crisis.

The image the EU wants to convey corresponds to the image perceived by Brussels CSO in terms of ‘the largest donor’ with values (good intentions), but the respondents feel the positive image and influence that the EU expects to flow from that does not follow from that. This is partly due to negative perceptions of action in other areas and lack of effectiveness within the EU framework.

In comparison with the definitions in the Draft Communication (cf. EQ2) the terminology is well recognized by respondents, but more in what they see the EU trying to do than what it really does. We find some similarities here with the Draft Communication in terms of solidarity, Africa, multilateralism and wanting to be a global player.

EQ 2	“How well do the Visibility communication priorities (Key Communication Messages from Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, i.e.: why, what, how) ¹⁷ achieve their objectives?”
Judgment Criteria & Indicators	
JC 2.1: The priorities (why, what, how) have been well perceived and understood by the stakeholders	<i>Overall respondents are well aware of EU external action. Many were also familiar with the external action communication priorities despite not knowing the Draft Communication.</i>
<u>Indicator.</u> Do respondents know the draft communication?	A large majority had never heard of this strategy , for some it rings a bell and two respondents actually knew it. In the last case they were not aware of any follow-up or evaluation. <i>One comment: ‘The fact that no one knows about this secret plan and this draft was the last one says something’.</i>
<u>Indicator.</u> Do they know the terminology?	Without prompting them, most respondents already referred to one or more of the priorities and key messages of the draft communication when they were asked for the image of EU External action, in particular ‘global solidarity’ and ‘multilateralism’. Overall respondents recognize the terminology, which still seems to be part of the EU approach to a large extent. It is questioned if it is really taken forward actively however, partly relating to doubts on rhetoric and practice of the EU. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One respondent really does not believe this communication as he was there when they discussed this and the intentions were different – mainly just showing how good the EU is, biggest donor etc. • A few people feel the issues defined in this strategy are too broad, no real guidance and therefore hard to say if they have really done this.
Objectives	Only a few respondents reflect on objectives .

¹⁷ Section 2.2 of Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner’s Draft Communication to the Commission: 2 Feb 2006, “The EU in the World: Towards a Communication Strategy for the EU’s External Policy 2006-2009”

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most question there to be much dialogue and explaining ('not adapted to citizens, always a deficit' and 'MS civil servants don't even know EU policies'), which corresponds to earlier remarks on this with EQ1, whilst two point out that the structured dialogue was a deliberate effort to do this (despite some criticisms). • Two NGO respondents refer to the guidelines that they are asked to follow for communicating EU contribution, which one claims has become more formalized in recent years, although control mechanism and capacity for follow up is lacking.
Challenges	<p>Challenges are most reflected upon and most visible and recognized (all but 1 respondent).</p> <p>NGOs mainly reflect upon Africa and Global solidarity as being the most obvious, most expressed.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Less clear since 2010 review of policy according to one respondent, and confused and less credible due to incoherence (several). • On Africa: Also shows from no ACP on list, strategic focus is Africa, seen as natural ally (also due to AU regional partner). Feedback: 'too much one blanket approach for diverse region'; and 'should include North Africa' • On Global Solidarity two relevant quotes: 'most confused', 'essential but vague'. • Neighborhood, in relation to enlargement, would now be more important – partly due to Arab spring (several); little awareness though. ENPI portal example of actual attempt for communication (but lack of real strategy behind). • One respondent thinks now would be more EEAS, neighborhood/ enlargement, Human Rights and Security ('which is the current key document'); Another misses 'multilateralism' in this list. • Some feel it is rather outdated or old fashioned, e.g. the approach towards Africa and solidarity (a bit traditional/ colonial). This also shows from the lack of 'global challenges/ public goods' according to 1 respondent; as well as emerging countries/ BRICS, which would be the biggest change (challenging everything else) according to one respondent.
Messages	<p>Messages were only addressed by NGO respondents, who recognize and support the messages (think they are good) but question them on several fronts:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contradicting reality is the main criticism: multilateralism vs bilateral trade negotiations (which is usually not fair and weakens multilateralism-1), soft power vs hard power messages recently (mainly MS leaders – 1), • Soft power: bit outdated according to 1, according to another it is what we want for the EU. • 'Acting together': One respondent feels citizens are not interested in messages like that. First define what this means and see how to fit into changing power dynamics in the world. Another points out that the Lisbon Treaty, the biggest visibility thing happening, is actually aimed towards that. • One more positive on results: The instruments for multilateralism are often presented by civil servants, so this is communicated successfully.
Feedback	<p>Although respondents all recognize terminology, they do not feel the EU is really achieving and question intentions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some (2/3) feel it is way too broad, hard to address/ communicate, but also to evaluate. E.g. 'Africa' one blanket approach. • Some outdated and others (new issues) missing, see challenges ('dynamics'; and soft power with messages).

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most TT emphasise the lack of strategy and action to really take this forward; shows up from different messages (1 and more later, EQ5 and 6) and the fact that this was last and unknown document (1). Relates again to MS failure of single line according to most.
<p>On communication more generally</p>	
<p>Difficulties/ context</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Here, ‘the MS issue’ comes back again. It is difficult to have clear communication, and a clear vision to communicate, if MS are not supportive and there is no agreement (‘lack of one voice’) - a situation currently worsened by the EEAS and crisis. (Something many respondents reflect upon) • The fact that there is no clear narrative, real substance and policies (‘fundamentals in deplorable state’) is actually considered the biggest constraint to communication as ‘Communication is a thin affair when substance is lacking’(or ‘what’s there to communicate’ and ‘it’s more an issue of policies than communication’). Most respondents therefore suggest to sort this out first (‘external face is still something that has to be sorted out’). A few respondents refer to lack of ambition in this regard; ‘EC officials say they cannot afford long-term vision due to MS, no collective vision’ • Another issue is the lack of resources and capacity more generally, MS ask EU to do too much with too little. • One respondent feels the main communication problem relates to the loss of freedom, creativity, courage etc with becoming a bean counters paradise (EC became too scared and financial after ‘Cresson affair’).
<p>What the EU could improve on in communication (general)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Doesn’t stand up for itself enough - in particular towards MS, but also more generally. Need to communicate added value of EU. • Doesn’t capitalize enough on successes and public not well targeted (e.g. MDG contracts and security achievements -2) <p>Several respondents emphasise that communication should be more about dialogue (which is lacking) than one-way communication, and warn against simply PR/branding and brochures.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One goes into this extensively and states that sector has always said this approach is too traditional, issues that should not be handled by communication people, no ‘branding of the EU’ like Michel and Manservisi tried, but instead real public debate and development education are key. This also goes for delegations, where at county level it is too much about respecting guidelines, forests of flags and signs; and no social communication strategy with real dialogue (which was found too demanding in the example of Guatemala, but also showing from the lack of understanding of the Arab spring as there was no real contact). This corresponds to other views on delegations/ country work. EPA process was also wrong, no real work meetings. • Other people also feel the lack of true communication at country level, in particular country-specific and adapted communication, (2) and when there is it can be too glossy, culturally insensitive and neglecting rural areas (1). • One refers to EU signs with empty buildings. • One respondent highlights the danger of too much and too glossy communication in fragile situations (example of van Rompuy handing out flyer ..). • People are unaware; e.g. Security actions are not explained. • This relates to another respondent highlighting the danger of focusing too much on visibility in the type of development projects you choose, e.g. infrastructure over social change processes (which should be the essence).

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The issue of rhetoric <i>vs</i> practice/ ‘doesn’t do what it says’ (as highlighted elsewhere) is a major problem for communication. • One refers to ‘blind spot for the press’, with too much confidence in the way press would shape opinion. • One summarizes general feeling quite well: ‘Communication is about substance and how to communicate – there are problems at all levels’. Others: <i>‘EU communication efforts are terrible’</i> and <i>‘failing to really communicate key messages’</i>.
<p>Poor communication qualities</p>	<p>A majority of respondents refers to the low level of communication skills in EU institutions, both civil servants and commissioners. Comments include: <i>‘Promoting themselves is not in culture, and where it is, it is no good’</i>, <i>‘always hire lawyers and they are hopeless at communication’</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On presentation and communication style: Bad; too detailed, too technical/ complex (most mentioned!), too defensive, too dry, not adapted. • Commissioners themselves not so good, with several exceptions of course. ‘Don’t get out enough’. Also ‘not straightforward enough, not compelling and not controversial enough’. Ashton’s team is considered poor, with not much presence, according to several respondents. (add)
<p>On communication instruments</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Publications: There is a lot, but not much thought goes into this. One feels there is too much, too expensive and not so useful. Another refers to quite useful Donor Atlas and some data from Spring Packages. The ERD is felt to have failed to achieve it’s objectives so far (2) • Events: Several (3) NGO respondents bring up the EDD as a key example of good communication efforts: awareness raising, debate, outreach, bringing in different actors and voices. It also raised the profile of EU development agenda. (All feel maybe too expensive, but still very good). Two respondents refer to the need to use events better by ensuring more substance and communication on own visions; one feels now EU has only a facilitating role, the other claims it is too much focused on form now (and too expensive). • Other: One refers to the importance of communication coming from Commissioners. Others refer to the important role delegations should play, which is often lacking now as there is no strategy and outreach.
<p>JC 2.2: The formulation of the priorities would have to be changed in order to gain an increased impact</p>	<p>Many of the interviewees felt the communication priorities could be updated, but argued that the key issue was to improve on substance rather than spend too much time and effort on communication.</p>
<p><u>Indicator 2.2.1</u> The stakeholders express the need for another formulation about the external action of the EU in order to make it more visible</p>	<p>In response to communication:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diverse opinions on the current relevance of priorities, that some feel are still valid and other feel are rather outdated. Several suggestions for new challenges (<i>See changes/ dynamics with challenges</i>). • Be more specific in instruments and challenges, divide between short term and long term priorities, set clear goals and really take forward (find out what your message really is and then do what you say). • Evaluate this approach, which is a ‘branding’ approach according to one – which is tricky according to most. Real dialogue needed. <p>Most suggestions are general and highlight the importance most respondents give to this issue <i>‘essential to communicate the need for EU external actions to citizens, our strategic partners and way of working to the outside world, showing EU has not turned its back on them’</i>.</p>

	<p>And <i>'huge benefit of communication strategy'</i>.</p> <p>The first and most important suggestion is to sort out substance first, which requires reflection and getting MS together (and buy-in; grounding strategies in national ones).</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1) 'Talk on issues that divide MS', 'define strategy for EU/MS interaction first', 'define 'together' first' and 'define added value and roles EU/MS'.2) Then look at the world around, changing dynamics and see where EU fits in. And real analysis of problems.3) Create a narrative/vision/story, clear line to communicate.4) Then do what you say. <p>One respondent refers to the fact that in this crisis it might be more difficult, but is also more important and provides an opportunity to get act together behind the scenes, getting to a long-term vision but still acting now.</p> <p>Focus on real debate, explaining, dialogue, outreach and (1) development education. One says this is not to be handled by communication staff and is more than panels, real work meetings and getting all different stakeholders together to defend interests and help take best decisions (for EU and no harm outside). Also in partner countries, in country specific and adapted manner. Requires transparency too, but as one says 'keep it simple and coherent'. Investing in civil society is a good way to achieve visibility, one says.</p> <p>Other:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Internal communication/ coordination on external communication would help; joint outputs. This might benefit from real clear procedures on how to get to position and who communicates that (2 here; but see EQ5 too). It is suggested to really act and present yourself as one.• Show what you are doing and capitalize when opportunities are there (not in simplistic way, but instruments and added value EU viz a viz MS/World Bank)• Improve style: not too complex, dry etc. And 'Keep it simple and coherent.' Be culturally sensitive and adaptive. <p>Improve use of existing instruments, in particular delegations, events and ERD. Delegations should fulfill role much better in engaging with civil society (also easiest way of achieving visibility according to one), being open/ real interlocutor, define strategies (real social communication, not branding), outreach also to rural areas. (<i>'create those conditions and you will see more positive image of the EU'</i>) Good delegation staff is an investment. It is also suggested that for visibility it is better to invest in civil society, rather than multilateral institutions.</p>
	<p><u>Preliminary Findings:</u></p> <p>Based on the interviews it appears that the Visibility communication priorities achieve their objectives to some extent, but there are also many problems.</p> <p>The fact that the Draft Communication is unknown and people strongly question to what extent it is really carried out and achieved, indicates a lack of perceived action and success. In addition, respondents are very critical on EU communication efforts and skills more generally. This is strongly related to the difficulties of coordination with MS, EEAS and the crisis; and a lack of narrative as a result. All respondents put substance before communication, so if the first is lacking – the second cannot be sufficient to achieve an image.</p> <p>On the other hand, most people do recognize the terminology, in several cases even without prompting. Terminology used in describing the image and desired image of the EU included 'global solidarity', 'global player' and 'multilateralism', all terms that are part of the Draft Communication. What does stand out here is that both EQ1 and 2 showed that this desired image might be recognized, but is not achieved according to most. This relates to a difference in rhetoric and action (or incoherencies) and lack of actual weight – due to many internal and external reasons - that damage the image that the EU desires.</p> <p>More specifically on the Draft Communication the challenges are mostly recognized by the respondents and</p>

overall still largely relevant, even though some are considered outdated and others missing. The challenges part could thus be considered partially achieved. The objectives are not achieved in terms of dialogue, which is often absent according to respondents, and to some extent for guidelines. Messages were partly achieved, as they were recognized but also questioned for contradictions with reality. Several criticisms with regard to the draft communication were put forward, as well as suggestions, in particular to start with content and coherence before going into communication (and act upon it or it can even be counterproductive), but also on what this communication should actually entail: real dialogue and engagement with the outside world.

EQ 4	“How well do stakeholders perceive the benefits of EU external action and not just its main features?”
Judgment Criteria & Indicators	
<p>JC 4.1. The stakeholders are sufficiently exposed to a communication from the EU on Visibility of its external action that is organised to improve impact, retention, credibility and buying intention</p>	<p>Based on the interviews it is hard to say whether this is the case.</p> <p>These stakeholders are certainly exposed to communications from the EU but they are also very knowledgeable about EU actions on the ground from their own research and networks in third countries.</p> <p>So while they definitely perceive benefits of these actions, the image they have of EU external action is probably more based on their knowledge of EU actions than on EU communication efforts.</p>
<p>JC 4.2. The stakeholders perceive and value the differences between the benefits of the EU external action and the results or the features/ instruments</p>	<p>CSOs and TTs in Brussels certainly can identify benefits of EU external action but they feel this is often undermined by negative policies in other areas and poor implementation. For development NGOs one of the biggest benefits is the availability of EU funding.</p> <p>From their contacts with constituencies outside the EU they feel that benefits of EU external action are also perceived outside the EU and in some cases highly valued.</p>
<p><u>Indicator:</u> Stakeholders see the need for EU external action:</p>	<p>All respondents see the need for EU external action. Most respondents also feel that in general people (both citizens and governments) see that it is better to have this than not having one, with the potential to be stronger together. MS/ national diplomats do fear their own position, but as one respondent claims, you do see the importance they attach from maintaining outreach to the EU(1). Again, the crisis and negative image of the EU does not help here.</p> <p>Some relevant quotes: ‘We want EU leadership’ and ‘[EEAS] Could be very useful also to the world’,</p> <p>This is mainly related to internal perceptions. Outside perceptions on the need for EU external action is not much discussed in interviews, but some people feel that other countries see benefits of dealing with one partner (smaller countries more?); provides opportunities but can also create difficulties in negotiations where the EU cannot be flexible once a common position is found. Below we also find that people do see the benefits to some extent.</p>
<p><u>Indicator:</u> People experience benefits</p>	<p>It is felt the potential for benefits from EU external action is strong but EU external action ought to be more coherent and should involve a more collective</p>

<p>of EU external action:</p> <p>Within the EU</p>	<p>approach, thus the potential has not really been achieved yet.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In some cases MS / permanent representatives are still stronger and/or more successful (2). • This relates again to the image, power, MS and institutional (EEAS) issues of the EU as described earlier. • <i>'EU role as global player is also undermined by EEAS'</i>: confusion and doubts outside, but also internally: less access for civil society, complete mess and less action, no agenda (various), quite well summarized as <i>'There is no point in having EEAS if no one knows what it's doing'</i>. • There is frustration about this. 'We are a weak regional player with no vision' and 'There is a lack of positive leadership' (although Barroso is said to be ok at securing key leaders on specific issue and giving it a Pan-European dimension). • There is a lack of political effectiveness: See Arab Spring (several refer to this in critical manner, one says some work done behind the scenes). One respondent is strong on the lack of strategy for security crisis situations, resulting in the EU being seen as 'unpredictable and unreliable' in this field. As those achievements that are reached are not communicated, there is little perception of benefits. • The potential benefit of EU external action in being stronger and setting the agenda is thus not often felt, and when it is, it is ad-hoc or concerns specific issues. • Some positive examples of the EU being a stronger player international negotiations are: Accra, where they played a good role (1), energy where they showed the need for a coherent voice, having to act as one under UNFCC really brought up many positions worldwide (1). • Another positive example are the financial instruments and regulatory frameworks that the EU has and others don't; so that in the G20 for instance the EU can be a very effective in terms of implementation of decisions. <p>Benefits of resources felt, in particular for development organisations. The EU is also good on funding according to one. Some reflect more generally on positive role in development, but funding seems most key.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • With regard to funding, the complexity is again highlighted, as this excludes some partners from participating (several). • Besides funding, having a partner for dialogue and space for influence NGOs are important benefits (several), and/or back-up towards MS (1); Several respondents say this is now an issue with the EEAS, as there is little access. • Appreciated for work on donor coherence, which implies less coordination for NGOs (1); other just refers to the potential for this and more effectiveness as a result (1) • Although a few respondents refer to the benefits of aid being felt, they are not always positive on actual policy priorities and implementation and effectiveness of development programmes/projects (several). One relevant example is the lack of effectiveness perceived as a result of not engaging with local society in project implementation (2 and CIDSE study). • Benefits perceived for: Tsunami response (1), PCD agenda (1); Accra (1); climate and supporting delegations (2; now less); partially for MDG/Aid effectiveness debate (1 good 1 not) and partially for food and financial responses (valued according to some, but one respondent very critical of financial efforts). (see also EQ1) • On budget support: harder to prove results (1), but for ultimate benefits developing countries it is tricky that this agenda is loosing ground (1). (committed to ODA, checking MS on this; benefits of having MS or EU to choose for most progressive –
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	<p>although Nordic voices lost)</p> <p>Benefits of development funding/ cooperation, however, are often undone by incoherencies/ damaging policies to South (in particular trade; various NGO respondents).</p> <p>Citizens: Not really aware and probably not much direct perception of benefits, also due to negative image crisis and MS not helping this.</p> <p>In international negotiations having the EU can both help and hinder the process, as first internal negotiations are carried out (1), but it also takes a while to build the internal consensus and then there is little flexibility left as EU negotiators are wary to break open the internal agreement; (1/2)</p>
<p>Outside: perceptions developing countries</p> <p>in</p>	<p>Perception benefits in the South:</p> <p>Mainly in terms of resources to developing countries and partners, who see EU 'mainly as financier' as several people claim.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • So sense of benefit from funding, although very complex, which excludes some. Direct funding (although tricky) and more openness is suggested. • In actual projects, some people (2) feel benefits are also perceived there ('EU can really make a difference'), whereas others refer to lack of engagement civil society and lack of visibility of the EU, as well as criticism of implementation or effectiveness more generally (2). • Generally the awareness is very low however according to several respondents, who claim very few people in the South would either see the EU as a donor in its own right or know any policies etc. One respondent refers to the fact third countries do not really enjoy any communication by the EU and no mechanism for this ('Myself I communicate activities of the EU instead'), which corresponds to the CIDSE study (2007) showing lacking (adapted) communication of delegations. Rural areas are even less included. Flags are not perceived to be really successful in all this. • One respondent claims benefits were definitely felt in the field of environment and climate where the EU did much to support Southern delegations. On the other hand this sense of partnership is diminishing and so is the role of the EU in this sector (2). • One respondent 'has heard military missions were perceived quite well in Africa'. • Much benefits undone by incoherencies (see earlier); people see the move towards more own interest, less public support and more private sector; generally Africans more 'suspicious of hidden agenda's. <p>Asia: mainly sees benefits as economic partner according to several. One says Central Asia very positive. For the Caucasus one respondent said that there is much desire for the EU to play a political role which it does not do sufficiently.</p> <p>Neighborhood countries: There is perception of benefits according to two respondents (one provides several examples of supported civil society dialogues and ENPI framework in various countries). Another respondent thinks policies failed and benefits were thus not achieved and perceived (also referring to CEPS survey). One states that expectations on EU's political role is not achieved here either.</p> <p>Arab countries clearly do not perceive any benefits now according to respondents, see earlier.</p>
<p><u>Indicator:</u> The perception of benefits is based on communication rather than actions</p>	<p>Respondents themselves feel that the EU's image is mainly based on actual actions. Outside the EU there is less perception of benefits in the first place, nor much communication (only flags). Respondents feel that visibility does not make up for lack of political action and practical benefits – even counter-productive.</p> <p>Funding of organisations is a key perception and a clear action, and so are the trade policies, thus the benefits that are perceived are based on actions.</p>

Preliminary Finding:

To some extent the stakeholders definitely perceive the benefits of EU external action; mainly within the direct constituency of respondents (NGOs and TTs). To a lesser extent they believe also the broader public and actors outside the EU see the need for, and potential of EU external action, although they are little aware and might not always feel direct benefits (yet).

The most important potential benefit is perceived in having a stronger voice to the outside as a collective, especially if also promoting the interest of others, e.g. developing countries. Respondents feel this benefit is not really achieved however, although a few positive examples are given of EU using its external action well. This lack of success is again related to MS disagreement, as well as institutional issues with the EEAS set-up, which is lacking effectiveness at this point.

Important benefits of EU external action are also seen to be 'having a partner for dialogue and space for influence', which is currently lacking. It was there before however and is expected to return, although clear communication on what the EEAS is doing is essential for respondents to enjoy these benefits.

The most emphasized, important and more stable benefit for development NGOs in North and South is the funding. Development cooperation more broadly also brings perceived benefits according to some, although in some fields more than others and not always in implementation and effectiveness. The lack of awareness of the EU would imply less perception of benefits. In the end however, Southern countries and NGOs are said to feel these benefits are often undone by the incoherent and damaging policies of the EU in areas like trade – something people seem to be more aware of that than positive benefits.

It seems that most perception of benefits is based on actual actions and less on communication efforts, although the latter might be more relevant for citizens inside the EU, as well as Southern partners, who are less aware and (therefore) might not feel benefits as directly. Respondents feel that visibility does not make up for lack of political action and practical benefits and can even be counter-productive.

EQ 5	To what extent is the EC's visibility/communication work coordinated and complementary with that of the EU Member States, Council and Parliament?
Judgment Criteria & Indicators	
JC5.1 – The EC, MS and Council have an established coordination mechanism to discuss visibility issues	It is generally believed there is little coordination and there are quite some issues with either achieving complementarity or coherent messages (often different) between institutions, as well as individuals within. This relates again mainly to MS not wanting to give things away, not promoting the EU and disagreeing with each other and the EU.
<p><u>Indicator:</u> respondents feel there is the attempt to coordinate</p> <p><u>Indicator:</u> respondents feel they manage to coordinate</p>	<p>Several respondents feel there is the attempt to coordinate visibility work, but there are problems with this:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A few respondents see them trying to coordinate, there is the desire, but it is not easy and differences remain; or they simply end up with the lowest denominator, which is a problem (e.g. damages support inside). Then they still have to 'publicly smile and say there's agreement'. • Ashton is trying to prevent contradictions, but is then criticized for 'following others' (1). Institutions generally careful with press (Rompuuy most positive image because of low profile; Barroso is careful with press -1) • According to one respondent the Dutch do claim to be improving on coordination; first EU standpoint and then outside (although this doesn't always work and they still attend meetings themselves, even if represented by EU; they also lack knowledge on EU, which is sometimes outplayed by negotiation partners)

	<p><i>'Each institution has its own policy and messages don't come from the EU but from 1 institution only, which is strange', but also 'if the EU acts in a certain way, the whole EU institutions suffer or benefit' (and then denial of responsibility).</i></p> <p>MS vs EU</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some important decisions are negotiated collectively, but not portrayed as such (1 explicit, others implicit) • Collection of states no common understanding of what they want out of the process (Council ends up with lowest denominator) • MS try to put the EU in bad light and/or try to 'bypass the Union': <i>'MS not interested in making EU a bloc'; 'promoting EU interest over own'; 'Brussels power grab, all downsizing the importance of EU decision making'; 'Look at the real intentions of foreign ministries and deliberate acts of disloyalty'</i> (this all affects also how seriously EU is taken as well, including by outsiders) • MS are not delegating foreign affairs and communication on it (several) - and don't want big changes in approach (1) • Combined with lack of leadership EU towards MS (several) and no champion for the EU amongst MS (1) • MS are also not always aware of EU policies (1) • One feels that there is less talk of different EU institutions anymore, but MS issue is still prevalent. <p>Relevance of EEAS to this:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On the one hand this seeks to promote a more coherent view and voice, tools of RELEX and Council in more consistent framework. • But so far more institutional rebound: Confusion (What does it mean? Role division?) and a mess, too much absorbed in internal to focus on external (see also EQ1 and 2). • And general risks: One refers to general higher complexity with Lisbon Treaty and another points out there is a serious risk of increased disconnectedness due to the double hat of Ashton and trade policy not integrated. <p>And crisis also worsened this, although one respondent claims the 'power grab' was also during high EU times, so not just for the crisis.</p> <p>On the bright side, a few people are actually more positive on this.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One (1) states it is not 'as messy as they say' as different institutions are quite coherent in big situations – also due to same political color of leadership / all EPP. • One respondent feels it gets less incoherent if you go wider (as compared to DGs) as different institutions and countries are doing different things, have different priorities – so not necessarily an issue of one voice. • Another feels visibility is not contradictory (for any institution) but also not coordinated (although most respondents thus disagree on both) • Or simply understand that it's <i>'hard to unite interests and communicate this clearly'</i> (1), as well as <i>'logical that they see external action through different lenses'</i> (1) and <i>'normal in democratic system'</i> (1), in particular for the parliament, which is also more political (several).
<p>Respondents give examples of coordination or complementarity</p>	<p>Only one good example are given:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EC doing much on donor complementarity, getting them to act together. Not far yet, but could benefit perception of EU.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • good examples • bad examples 	<p>There are more – but all different - bad examples given, e.g.:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most mentioned: With the Arab spring there was clearly disagreement on what EU’s position was (even in one room -1) and issues of coordination: first Ashton had to say something, then Barroso, then the presidency (1; and several others more implicit) • With the Bin Laden killing it was not coordinated and there were different messages, despite official statements (whether it was extrajudicial or not). (1) • Where MS take ‘hard power’ positions, the EU claims to promote soft power. (1) • Budget support: MS/Council questioning this, whereas EU/EC used to be leader on this, now some attempt to fight but not enough (1) • Inconsistency on climate finance: Each MS wants own flag waving and own approach, deliberate lack of coordination by MS (1) • Structured dialogue started out with all institutions (RELAX, EEAS), but ended only with AIDCO (1)
<p>JC5.4 – Outside observers in a particular context (eg. In a partner country) see the EU (eg. MS embassies and EU Delegation) acting as a single entity rather than as a group of discordant actors</p>	<p>To the respondents, who all work in Brussels, the EU is clearly not a single entity; to the public maybe to some extent.</p> <p>For the outside however, they feel this is much more the case – largely due to unawareness, confusion, or lack of interest. In the South there is often not even a difference between EU and MS, let alone between DG Trade and the EEAS. This does not necessarily mean they act as a single entity, but for the outside it is just ‘all the same’. It also relates to the fact that the visibility is rather low in general –partly due to the lacking role of delegations. Big players/ countries and NGOs do see and use divisions according to several respondents.</p>
<p><u>Indicator 5.4.1</u> No evidence emerges (..) of MS actions conveying contradictory messages to the Commission</p>	<p>Many examples of MS actions and messages contradicting the Commission were given, with MS either trying to downsize the importance of the EU and promote themselves (see JC1) or in specific cases, such as after the Bin Laden killing.</p> <p>On institutions some specifically relevant remarks were made:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ‘<i>They see no difference between DG Trade or EEAS</i>’ (1) - ‘<i>The coordination issue is less problematic in the outside world as they see the EU for what it is, nothing else</i>’
<p><u>Preliminary Finding:</u></p> <p>Most respondents feel the visibility work of the EC is very little coordinated with that of EU MS, Council and Parliament and feel that, despite some attempts, there are quite some issues with either achieving complementarity or coherent messages between institutions, as well as individuals within.</p> <p>The biggest problems are again found with MS, who do not actually seem to have an interest in coordinating messages or making the EC (and EU) look good more generally, or just disagree too much with each other. Also the coordination between Barroso, van Rompuy and Ashton is complex.</p> <p>The EEAS has the potential to improve this, but so far there is more institutional rebound than positive change and a few respondents highlight risks here as well.</p> <p>Respondents perceive coordination issues between and within all institutions, as divergent messages appear.</p> <p>In the case of the Parliament, most respondents feel this is normal within the democratic framework it provides. Some respondents feel it is anyway ‘no more than logical’ that this coordination and coherence between institutions is not always there. Others feel the EU is actually not doing so bad on this.</p>	

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EQ 6	Are the EC's messages coherent across different EU external action and internal policy areas?
Judgment Criteria & Indicators	
JC6.1 – EU policy in other areas do not contradict EU external action	There is a high level of awareness of policy coherence as an issue particularly in NGO circles.
<p><u>Indicator 6.1.2</u> Awareness among outside observers of incoherence in the EU's policy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • General 	<p>The issue of incoherence was brought up by almost all respondents, in particular NGOs, numerous times during the interviews. In EQ1 we clearly saw that policy incoherence, as well as lack of coherence between rhetoric and practice more generally (also 'impression of double standards'), has a major impact on the image of the EU.</p> <p>Qualification: Respondents did point out that this is a problem with any national government as well, so it must be put into context; but a majority clearly finds this very problematic. A few people feel it must be more difficult for the EU to get to coherent policies due to its complex bureaucracy and being accountable to disagreeing MS, but a few others point out the fact that the EC actually has more potential for doing well on this, partly due to the fact that they are fewer people.</p> <p>Difficulties are found in the lack of communication between DGs, other bureaucratic reasons, personalities and institutions holding on to power. One person feels the approach is too ad-hoc and too much based on tools, not on issues and objectives. One refers to the danger of creating the EEAS outside and not including trade there, which is a missed opportunity. Several people highlight the fact that DG Trade (where most incoherencies are found) generally prevails over other factions, not just DG DEV but also EEAS and Barroso. (According to one respondent this is because of the liberalization foundation underlying EU rationale.) Most understand the importance of protecting own interest, which was worsened with the crisis, but still the hypocrisy following from that is damaging for the image.</p>
Examples of incoherencies	<p>Various examples of (key) incoherencies are given by respondents, mainly in relation to development and with trade clearly standing out:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development and Trade policies of the EU are the key incoherence that respondents (most NGOs and a few TT) highlight as very dangerous and damaging. Several refer to the EPAs as the biggest mistake and express their disappointment with DG DEV for not standing up enough against DG Trade (1 or 2) and even advocating for EPAs (1). Development objectives are generally seen to clash with own, mainly economic interests – for example also in the field of food security and agriculture, market protection, business interest, arms trade, natural resources etc. Whereas one NGO respondent refers to the liberal nature as problematic, others feel it is more protectionist. • Human rights and democracy policies and rhetoric was seen to be incoherent with supporting Ben Ali and others (several).

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multilateralism vs bilateralism (bilateral FTAs; several). • Climate Change Mitigation: asking others to commit and not acting oneself (2); with less priority for the issue (due to other crises) now also less coherence (1) • Conflict and migration are two other areas mentioned as incoherent (with development or other partnership/Arab; and human rights; 4) <p>Several incoherencies are highlighted within DG DEV:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The fact that more money is going to the private sector automatically means there will be less public support (1) • On G20 tax issues the lead negotiator listened to DG MARKT instead of own (good/ progressive) unit and took a position at odds with his own people; on tax havens no good communication between DGs and it took for civil society to get them at the table (1) • As we saw, championing for EPAs by Development commissioner was seen as an act at odds with development objectives. In addition, the recent emphasis on own interest is seen to be contradicting with the primary aim of poverty alleviation.
<p>Examples given by respondents on mechanisms and good attempts</p>	<p>There are very few positive examples of attempts and actual coherence.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Two respondents refer to mechanisms, one to the Instrument for Stability and the other on coordinating positions with IFI's (also with MS). In both cases there is potential but not success yet, e.g. the IFS was not used for Lebanon. • The work on PCD by DG DEV is appreciated, although one respondent feels it is small and loosing ground now ('kind of translated into Lisbon Treaty (...) and becoming blurred quickly as EEAS officials speak of PC instead of PCD'). • On Climate there has been a rare period of coherence of 2-3 years a few years back, also when higher on agenda (1) • One respondent feels coherence is slightly better on peace and security and MDGs • One respondent points out that there is the recognition that export subsidies need to be phased out; in addition some positive developments with treaty on arms control and potentially financial transactions tax.
<p>JC6.2 – Existence of contradictory messages being conveyed by different policy sectors</p>	<p>Examples given of incoherence messages from DGs DEV and CLIMA. Examples given (ENP, Bosnia) of the EU giving out mixed messages which caused confusion.</p>
<p><u>Indicator 6.2.3</u> Awareness among outside observers of apparent contradictions (lack of coherence) between the messages conveyed by EU officials</p>	<p>Messages are often incoherent with each other or with practice [rhetoric vs practice]</p> <p>Some refer to the lack of communication and strategy for this, as well as other institutional issues:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Difficulties are found in the lack of communication between DGs, other bureaucratic reasons, personalities and institutions holding on to power. One person feels the approach is too ad-hoc and too much based on tools, not on issues and objectives. • There is no internal communication on external communication according to several respondents. One says: <i>"I have too many experiences of speaking to someone in DEVCO on something that CLIMA also worked on and they give divergent responses or are even arguing with each other in meetings"</i>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is a lack of strategy for this (several), or a variety ('Even within the EC there are different guidelines from the head quarters'). One respondent suggests the need for a cabinet approach and institutionalizing ties. <p>Examples are also given:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On climate: As we saw earlier, the message of the EU convincing others on climate change commitments is not in line with own policies. Another refers to 'big voice with nothing behind'. There is also incoherence between messages from DG DEV and CLIMA more generally, including contradicting each other in meetings (unawareness and disagreement -1). • Within development cooperation and DG DEV several respondents see contradictory messages on own interest <i>vs</i> solidarity and poverty alleviation. One respondent refers to a rhetoric continuously praising effectiveness of the private sector, which is similar to saying public sector / budget support is not so good and thus implicitly undermining own investments there. • The incoherence between international solidarity and human rights and expressions of own interest also fit here. • Neighborhood/ ENPI shows an attempt of the EU to keep them close, but with no clarity or strategy for membership (mixed messages, creating confusion -1). • In Bosnia the EC is sending out diverse messages according to one respondent (because no strategy -1).
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Preliminary Finding:

The EC's messages are generally not considered coherent across different EU external action and internal policy areas. We find that policy incoherence and discrepancies between rhetoric and practice are a key theme in the interviews as they are said to have serious damaging effects on EU visibility/ image. Although most acknowledge that this is similar for any national government and some very much put this into context, as well as understand the need to defend own interests, almost all respondents do think there are major problems here. Many examples of incoherence are given, most prominently that between development objectives and trade policies that are perceived to be damaging developing countries. It is interesting that DG Trade is also mentioned as the most powerful, prevailing even over Barroso and EEAS. Some point out attempts to achieve coherence, although these all face difficulties of some sort. Messages are also often incoherent, either with each other or with practice, relating to lack of internal communication and other institutional issues.

EQ 7	"How far does the perception of the value added of the EU as a global actor emerge clearly from its presence as in the major international organisations/fora? "
Judgment Criteria & Indicators	
JC7.4: If and how the EU has been able to demonstrate its specific added value in relation to the Presidency and MS and to influence the international organizations while making it visible externally	<p>Respondents clearly feel the EU is a strong supporter of multilateralism.</p> <p>The Kyoto Protocol is given as a specific example of where the EU played a useful role. The EU also has a useful role in representing some of the smaller Member States.</p> <p>However, there is also a view emerging that the role and weight of the EU is diminishing in international fora, the initially negative vote on the role of the EU in the UN is one example of this, the Copenhagen climate summit another and the failure to reform the IMF a third.</p>

<p><u>Indicator:</u> How the role and image of the EC in international fora is perceived by respondents</p>	<p>The image and perceived role of the EU in international organisations and fora is again a mixed picture, showing some parallels with the image as described in EQ1.</p> <p>Some useful things stand out however:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU is known as a strong supporter of multilateralism and the UN in particular, which is appreciated according to several respondents; e.g. for the benefits this brings to development and the voice of developing countries. (with some qualifications - contradictions with bilateral trade efforts). In the case of FAO the role of the EU is considered very positive (e.g. global perspective for dialogue and partnerships with World Food Summit and land guidelines - 1). <p>At the same time there is quite some criticism on the EU for several reasons:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The internal disagreement and structure make the EU a difficult negotiation party, that is not flexible once it has a position. On the other hand the fact that they have their own multilateral process first, could be seen as positive (1). • The idea of overrepresentation of the EU is only explicitly mentioned by one respondent, and that is in the case of WB and IMF (reforming a bit but not enough), but the striking example of the UN vote (on special status for the EU) shows that both respondents and external actors (in particular developing and emerging countries) feel this is the case too. One respondent, however, feels that in the case of FAO the EU is too modest and could be demanding more as based on their (economic) weight. • Other: Two respondents highlight the fact that the EU is not always the progressive player it is hoped to be (e.g. on strengthening UN tax committee). The image described in EQ1 also shows higher hopes for a positive role of the EU. • 'Not having their act together' leads to a 'pathetic image' according to one respondent, or 'the global image is that the EU is not managing'. • A last very critical image description is '<i>Self-centered, privileged, not realizing world changing and a bit isolated</i>' (the latter referring to the example of the human rights council where the EU was often seen to promote something which was not actually suitable for its partners).
<p><u>Indicator:</u> How they view the influence and political leadership of the EU</p>	<p>The EU is considered relevant, but the actual weight and influence of the EU is often questioned, often related to a lack of taking (political) leadership. The power is 'disappointing', 'not as much as it could be' etc. The UN vote is given as a prime example of declining weight of the EU and the challenging of its power by the outside world.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EQ 1 showed: Lack of weight/ relevance due to MS issues and institutional challenges on the one hand, but losing credibility and therefore power due to hypocrisy or mixed messages on the other. (add?) 'Some MS are obstinate' • At the same time, respondents feel that – in particular with the request for one UN vote – the EU demands too much (most) . One refers to the EU demanding too little (example of FAO – 1; maybe TTs?). • The fact that there are so many arenas, some of which only have MS representation officially, makes it more complicated for the EU to play its role in the international sphere. Some respondents think MS are more powerful in some cases, e.g. G20 and G8 and in negotiations with states who value embassies higher than EU delegation. Some NGO respondents highlight the fact that the EU is not a full member there, which is not in line with one TT respondent and with reality. It shows that visibility of the EU might be lower here, as one respondent also points out. Having both the EU and a few MS also raises questions on roles viz a viz each other and the potential of the EU to represent smaller countries. (1) • '<i>We are not good at speaking with one voice and when we do, we still don't achieve what we want. We have no persuasive power.</i>'

	<p>NB: Differences in relation to different institutions not clear; most reflection is on MS.</p>
<p><u>Indicator:</u> Key examples of role, image and power</p>	<p>More positive on power and leadership:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is the attempt to become more vocal and play more of a coordinating role (2), possibly EEAS helps in this. • One respondent emphasizes the massive role of the EU in coordinating national delegations, which they manage quite well. • One respondent feels the EC is a big player on international regulatory issues. • A positive example is found for Kyoto (key role EU) and a few successes prior to Copenhagen as a result of EU efforts at different levels. (1). Earlier we also saw an important (but diminishing) role in development fora, e.g. Accra. <p>Key examples, in particular showing the failure of the EU to set the agenda:</p> <p>The UN vote is mentioned by a large majority of respondents as a prime example of the (somewhat negative) image and (diminishing) power of the EU in the international arena.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What stands out is the assumption of the EU that they should get this, which is criticized by most. Even if they would like to see a united EU vote, it would be an overrepresentation to have both – something that was generally felt within the UN/ the countries that voted against. ('European supremacy was wrong') • Some highlight the fact that the EU did not see this coming, caused by bad diplomacy – either on side of delegation (most people feel this is the case) or Brussels/ Ashton (1)- and a 'bit autistic', 'bad timing', but Ashton pushed it through', • Respondents make the link with a broader challenging of the power of the EU, even 'just for the sake of it'. 'It encapsulates resentment amongst BRICs of the EU in multilateralism and is an explicit confrontation with the rest of the world'. This also shows from applauding after the vote. <p>Climate is the second most mentioned example as representative for the changing (diminishing) role of the EU:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Several respondents refer to Copenhagen as an example of failure of the EU to play its role in the international arena. Although they feel the EU initially had some leadership (and 'successes before Copenhagen'), this was lost by 'not being in the room' and failing coordination (MS) in Copenhagen (also other issues of legitimacy and less partnership, see EQ1). • Southern countries have also been somewhat disappointed in the 'partnership' (3), in particular Pacific (1). • Some good examples of the EU role do come from the UNFCCC however. • Also the EU is still considered the 'most progressive bloc, a fairly constructive partner and supportive of third country participation' (1); some others implicitly refer to the fact the EU does try and takes it seriously (although lack of action inside) <p>Another example of failure is IMF reform: joint position came very late due to internal disagreement. Mechanisms for this don't deliver. One refers to the perception that the EU is not progressive enough on tax issues (no strong mandate due to disagreement), another to outsiders finding the EU difficult to deal with on financial regulation.</p>
<p><u>Indicator:</u> added value in relation to others where possible (limited response).</p>	<p>Although most respondents feel the EU definitely has an added value as compared to MS and Presidency, not much demonstration or examples of this are given:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multilateral process on its own could be contribution. (1) • True desire of multilateralism, also due to their own nature (several). Useful work on

	<p>UN system and security council (1). (Real challenge for the future, need to discuss the principles?)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Representing smaller countries is a potential benefit in G20, G8 etc. At the same time this is where questions come into play as to how the EU's role (and added value) is in relation to present MS. Visibility is also more of an issue here. (several)
<p>JC.7.3 The EU Delegation contributed to strengthen the image of the EC in the third countries and the knowledge on the EU policies and activities</p>	<p>Interviewees comments on the role of EU Delegations are quite critical. This seems to be largely based on the experience of civil society organisations (both the respondents own organisations and their partners) in dealing with Delegations. They cite in particular a lack of experienced staff and a lack of engagement in dealing with CSOs.</p> <p>One organisation (CIDSE – network of catholic development NGOs) had actually done a study on this and have published their report.</p>
<p><u>Indicator 7.3.1</u> How the presence of Delegation in third countries is perceived by [and by respondents themselves] local stakeholders, including MSs and International organizations</p> <p><u>Indicators 7.3.2</u> To what extent the stakeholder in the country knows the EC policy and actions</p>	<p>About half of the respondents reflect on the role of delegations and most of them are quite critical, based both on perceptions from here (e.g. lack of quality staff, awareness of EU policies and real strategies and efforts for communication perceived by the NGOs) as well as what they see in third countries (with some variety between delegations of course):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The lack of visibility and engagement with civil society of delegations is most criticised, as well as the lack of (coherent) strategies to achieve this (3/4). Communication is lacking ('not part of their work') or not country specific (2/3). A CIDSE impact study of 2007 showed in more detail how civil society felt the lack dialogue, involvement in projects etc. Others refer to the distance and 'closedness' of the delegations perceived by their partners, who usually work via Northern partners for funding and other requests <p>Most respondents feel EC policy and actions are little known by development partners (civil society) and more generally by third countries.</p> <p>With regard to the UN vote, several respondents reflect very critically upon the UN delegation of the EU at the time (e.g. 'generally bad', 'did not do its work well', 'that was just bad diplomacy' – both the vote and the fact that they did not see it coming).</p>
<p><u>Preliminary Finding:</u></p> <p>Although most respondents feel the EU external action definitely has an <u>added value</u> in the international arena and is a relevant actor, they question the image, role and power the EU plays at this point. Again, there is much potential for EU to play an important role as a collective of states and to be a positive and powerful actor in its own right, and they see some attempts for this, but this is not sufficiently achieved. It starts with the image and perceived role of the EU in international organisations and fora, which is again a mixed picture, showing some parallels with the image as described in EQ1. On the one hand there is the positive role of supporting multilateralism and international organisations work, on the other hand the EU is considered a difficult negotiation partner due to its structure. MS disagreement and the Euro crisis does not help the image. Whereas the actual power of the EU is questioned, some respondents still emphasise the overrepresentation and arrogance of the EU, which is most clearly highlighted by the negative UN vote that the EU did not see coming and really showed how they are being challenged by the rest of the world, in particular developing and emerging countries.</p> <p>The UN vote and Copenhagen are given as prime examples of the declining weight of the EU and in the case of the UN also the challenging of its power by the outside world. The multitude of fora, such as G20 and G8, also cause (unaddressed) challenges, such as what the role of EU is in relation to present member states.</p> <p>With regard to delegations the image is not very positive: A few reflect upon low quality of staff, lack of fulfilling its role in engaging with local society and involving them in development projects, no communication strategy, sometimes lacking awareness of EU policies, closed and, in the case of the UN vote, generally 'bad diplomacy'.</p>	

Some supplementary evidence relevant to EQ9 was also collected even though this was not part of the formal interviews. See below:

EQ 9 “To what extent are the results in terms of stakeholder perceptions commensurate with the cost of conveying the messages both in financial and organisational terms? “	
Expected Judgement Criteria & Indicators	Evidence identified from interviews
JC 9.3 The resources available for visibility work are effectively deployed in a well organized manner	From their external view point CSO respondents are critical of what they see as excessive spending on communication in relation to the results achieved
<u>Indicator:</u> Respondents observations from attending EU C&I events	Several respondents refer to high spending on communication in relation to (little) results. Events are generally considered too expensive, although a few respondents do feel the European Development Days really pay off.
<p>Preliminary Finding: The CSO and TT interviewees are not well placed to judge the efficiency of the EU’s spending on communication, because they only see the output, and even then only part of the output, but they do attend EU organized events relatively frequently. This experience prompts a number of critical comments about levels of expenditure relative to the visibility result achieved. Interestingly however the EDD do give rise to some positive reactions (even though these are the biggest expenditure on C&I of DEVCO) which suggests that there may be some value added specifically in the EU organizing the EDD.</p>	

APPENDIX 1: LIST OF RESPONDENTS [interviews conducted between 18 July and 26 September 2011]

<u>Respondent</u>	<u>Organisation</u>	<u>Position</u>
1. Sven Biscop	EGMONT	Director of two study programmes
2. Michael Emerson	CEPS	Associate Senior Research Fellow
3. Giles Merritt	Friends of Europe	Secretary General
4. Rob van Drimmelen	Aprodev	General Secretary
5. Rosa Balfour	EPC	Senior Policy Analyst
6. Sally Nicholson	WNF	Senior Policy Officer
7. Nuria Molina	Eurodad	Director
8. Olivier Consolo	Concord	Director
9. Andre Sapir	Brueghel	Research Fellow
10. Simon Stocker	Eurostep	Director
11. Denise Auclair	CIDSE	Policy and Advocacy Officer
12. Karim Harris	Climate Action Network	Deputy Director

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|--|---------------------------------|--|
| 13. Stineke Oenema | ICCO | Programme coordinator/ Chair W.G. F.S. |
| 14. Catherine Woollard,
Josephine Liebl and Herta
Eckert (focus group) | EPLO and International
Alert | Executive Director, Policy Officer (both
EPLO) and Senior Representative (IA) |

APPENDIX 2: Questionnaire used for interviews

Part 1: Background of interviewee (experience and constituency):

1. How long have you been working on / following EU external action issues?
2. On behalf of which groups (North and/or South) can you speak on EU external action?
3. Themes or fields you are more familiar with?

Part 2: Questions

1. EQ1: Image of the external action of the EU perceived by the stakeholders

- a. What is your general perception of external action of the EU? And how do you think other stakeholders view this?
- b. How would you describe the image that the EU wants to create in the public and international eye?

2. EQ2: Do the Visibility/communication priorities achieve their objectives?

- a. Are you familiar with the EU external action communication strategy?
 - i. Do you know the definition and content?
 - ii. Is it clear?
- b. Do you recognize this/ these priorities or do you have a different image? (*When shown handout 'key communication messages/strategy'*)
- c. How well are priorities achieved and/ or recognized?
- d. How does this differ for the specific themes? For specific aid modalities?
- e. To what extent is this related to (i) EU External actions themselves, or (ii) EU Communication work?
- f. What do you think of the Communication Strategy?
- g. How could the EU improve the Visibility of its external action? (Either through actions themselves or communication strategy)

3. EQ4: Do stakeholders perceive the benefits of EU external action?

- a. What benefits from EU external action do you and other stakeholders see and experience? Why?
- b. Does this change and if so how for (i) Specific themes? (ii) Different aid modalities?
- c. To what extent is this related to the Communication Strategy or actions themselves?

Part 3: Additional questions:

- 4. EQ5: Is the EC's visibility/communication work coordinated and complementary with that of the EU Member States, Council and Parliament?**
- a. Do you feel the coordination is working well?
 - b. What complementarity do you see?
 - c. In EU visibility/communication work: Any examples of good or poor
 - i. Coordination?
 - ii. Complementarity?
 - d. Do you see the EU as a single entity or as a discordant group of actors?
 - e. Does this differ for specific themes?
 - f. Any specific remarks on the role and image of the EC/EU Delegations?
- 5. EQ 6: 'Are the EC's messages coherent across different EU external action and internal policy areas?**
- a. Any good and bad examples?
 - b. Does this differ for the specific themes?
- 6. EQ 7: Does the value added of the EU as a global actor emerge clearly in major international organizations and fora?**
- a. How do you think the EU is seen in major international organizations and fora?
 - b. Does this differ for specific themes?
 - c. Are there examples of where the EU has proven itself to be a relevant actor in major international organizations and fora?

ANNEX 11 –

LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

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THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

NAME	FUNCTION	DG & UNIT
Ian BARBER	Head of Unit	DG Communication, Research and speedwriting of Comm.A.2
Lauriane BERTRAND	Administrator	DG Communication, Unit A6, Media networks
Michael MANN	Spokesperson for EEAS	Spokespersons' Service, Strategic Communications SGg5
Catherine RAY	Spokesperson for Development	Spokespersons' Service Global and Sustainable Europe SPP03
Peter SANDLER	Head of Unit	DG TRADE, Policy Coordination of unit 0.1
Philip LOOP	Head of Unit	DG DEVCO, Information, Communication and Front Office, Unit 04
Aur�lie GODEFROY	Policy officer	DG DEVCO, Communication & Transparency, DGA1.B.4
Wojciech LUBOWIECKI	Head of Unit	DG DEVCO, Communication & Transparency Unit DGA1.B.4
David RINGROSE	Head of Unit	DG INFSO, Unit S3 Communication and Information
Gerhard SABATHIL	Director	EEAS, Strategy, Coordination and Analysis, Unit L

THE COUNCIL OF THE EU

NAME	FUNCTION	UNIT
Reijo KEMPPINEN	Director General	Press, Communication and Transparency
Cristina GALLACH	Ex-spokesman Javier Solana	Public Relations and Communications

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

NAME	FUNCTION	UNIT
Istvan PERGER	Team Coordinator: external affairs	Press Office: Foreign Affairs (AFET), Development (DEVE), International Trade (INTA), Human Rights (DROI), Security and Defense (SEDE), ACP, Euromed, Eurolat, Euronest

MEMBER STATES REPRESENTATIONS IN BRUSSELS

NAME	FUNCTION	COUNTRY
Martina SKOK	Counsellor for Humanitarian Aid and Development, MARTINA.SKOK@GOV.SI	Slovenia
Mirko CIGLER, PSC	PSC Ambassador, MIRKO.CIGLER@GOV.SI	
Lise Gregoire-Van HAAREN	Conseiller Antici, LISE.GREGOIRE@MINBUZA.NL	The Netherlands
Helen BOWER	Head of Communication and Visits, HELEN.BOWER@FCO.GOV.UK	UK

UNITED NATIONS

NAME	FUNCTION	ORGANISATION
Jean-Luc Onckelinx	Desk Officer for the EU and Benelux	United nations Regional Information Centre (UNRIC)
Antonio VIGILANTE	Director	UN/UNDP Office Brussels
Nicola HARRINGTON	Deputy Director	UN/UNDP Office Brussels
Pierre HARZE	Deputy Director	UN/UNDP Office Brussels

NGOS

NAME	FUNCTION	NGO
Elise FORD	Head of EU advocacy	OXFAM
Josephine LIEBL	Policy officer	EPLO
Romain PHILIPPE	Policy Coordinator	CONCORDE

JOURNALISTS

NAME	FUNCTION	COUNTRY
Lixin YANG	The Epoch Times, LIXIN.YANG@EPOCHTIMES.COM	China
Bernardo DE MIGUEL	Cinco Días, RENEDO@SKYNET.BE	Spain
Paul AMES	Freelance (former AP correspondent), pames@amesmedia.eu	UK
Maria Laura FRANCIOSI	ANSA	Italy
Dominica COSIC	WPROST	Poland
Nawab KHAN	INEP news agency, Kuwait News Agency, kunabelgium@yahoo.com	India & Kuwait
Marco APPEL	Proceso	Mexico
David CRONIN	David CRONIN, Inter Press Service, (Irish nationality working for a global news agency)	Ireland
Ioannis DIMITRIADIS	AZZAMAN.COM (Greek nationality working for Arabian media), , DIMYIANNIS@GMAIL.COM	Greece
Anne-Marie MOURADIAN	Radio France Internationale, Bureau de Bruxelles	France
Joshua MASSARENTI	Afronline.org/AgiAfro/Vita	Italy
Leonoor KOIJK	Trouw newspaper	The Netherlands