



Evaluation of the European Union's regional co-operation with Asia

Final Report
Volume 2
March 2014

*Evaluation carried out on behalf of
the European Commission*



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Contract No EVA 2011/Lot 4
Specific contract No 2012/305114

**This evaluation was commissioned by
the Evaluation Unit of the
Directorate General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid
(European Commission)**

*The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors' points of view
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Cover Picture sources: SWITCH Asia, FLEGT Asia, EuropeAid Multimedia Library, Jörn Dosch & Jan Douwe Meindertsma

Evaluation of the European Union's regional co-operation with Asia Final Report

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

AADMER	ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Responses
AARNet	Australia's Academic and Research Network
AATIP	ASEAN Air Transport Integration Project
ACCESS	Academic Co-operation Europe South-East-Asia Support
ACD	ASEAN Cosmetics Directive
ACDD	ASEAN Customs Declaration Document
ACDM	ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management
ACSS	Asian Conference on the Social Sciences
ACT	Action for Conflict Transformation
ACTFA	ASEAN-China Free Trade Area
ACTIVE ASIA	Asia – Europe Credit Transfer in Virtual and Distance Education
ACTLN	ASEAN Cosmetic Testing Laboratory Network
ACTS	Certificates of Origin as the steps on the way of a fully computerised ASEAN Customs Transit System
ACU	ASEAN Cyber University
ADFIAP	Association of Development Financing Institutions in Asia and the Pacific
ADPC	Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre
ADRA	The Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AEC	ASEAN Economic Community
AEEF	Asia Europe Economic Forum
AEGDM	ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management
AEMAS	ASEAN Energy Management Scheme
AEMM	ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting
AENEAS	Programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the area of migration and asylum
AFTA	ASEAN free trade agreement
AGDM	Age, Gender and Diversity Mainstreaming
AHA	ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management
AHI	Avian and Human Influenza
AHIF	Avian and Human Influenza Facility
AHTN	ASEAN Harmonised Tariff Nomenclature
AIF	Asian Investment Facility
AIMO	ASEAN Integration Monitoring Office
AIT	Asian Institute of Technology
ALA	Asia-Latin America
ALAC	Advice and Legal Aid Centres
ALFA	Programme of co-operation between Higher Education Institutions of the European Union and Latin America
ALGANT-DOC	Algebra, Geometry and Number Theory
AMS	ASEAN Member States
APAN	All Partners Access Network
APRIS	ASEAN Project for Regional Integration Support
APRSCP	Asian Pacific Roundtable on Sustainable Consumption and Production
APUF	Asia Pacific Urban forum
ARF	ASEAN regional forum
ARISE	ASEAN Regional Integration Support
ARPD	ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management
ARRND	Agreement on Rapid Response for Natural Disasters

ASB	Arbeiter Samariter Bund
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asia Nations
ASEAN-BAC	ASEAN Business Advisory Council
ASEANStats	ASEAN statistical unit
ASEC	ASEAN Secretariat
ASEF	Asia Europe Foundation
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
ASEMUNDUS	A multinational project enhancing co-operation between. European and Asian higher education institutions
ASHOM	ASEAN Heads of Statistical Offices Meeting
ASW	ASEAN Single Window
ATIGA	ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement
AUN	ASEAN University Network
AUP	Aid to uprooted people
AusAID	Australian Development Agency
AVEMPACE	mobility exchange programme
AWGIP	ASEAN Working Group on Intellectual Property Co-operation
BCM	Bilateral Coordination Mechanism
BIMSTEC	Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Techno-Economic Co-operation
BM	Border Management
BMZ	German Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development
BOMCA	Border Management Central Asia
BOMNAF	Border Management for Northern Afghanistan
CA	Contract Agents
CAAs	Civil Aviation Authorities
CBTA	Cross-Border Transport Agreement
CCCA	Cambodia Climate Change Alliance
CDC	Community Development Councils
CDI-ASIE	Development Co-operation Instrument for Asia
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CEN	European Committee for Standardisation
CEPT	Common Effective Preferential Tariff
CfP	Calls for Proposals
CISAMAP	Community Integrated Social and Medical Assistance Programme
CLE	Country-level Evaluation
CLMV	Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam
CLV	Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam
CODOC	Co-operation on Doctoral Education between Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe
COGEN	The European Association for the Promotion of Cogeneration
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPET	Central Point of Expertise on Timber
CPL	Competition Policy and Law
CPTFWG	Customs Procedures and Trade Facilitation Working Group
CRED	Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
CRIS	Common RELEX Information System
CSCP	Centre for Sustainable Consumption and Production
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CU	Customs Unions
DAAD	Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAU	Demsoe assistance to the uprooted
DCI	Development Co-operation Instrument
DCI-ASIE	Development Co-operation Instrument for Asia
DCI-ENV	Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources including Energy
DF	Dialogue Facility
DG	Directorate General

DG DEVCO	Directorate General Development and Cooperation
DG ECFIN	DG for Economic and Financial Affairs
DG EFCIN	Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs
DG EMPL	Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
DG HOME	DG Home Affairs
DG RELEX	Directorate-General for the External Relations
DG RTD	DG for Research and Innovation
DG SANCO	DG for Health and Consumers
DG TAXUD	DG Taxation and Customs Union
DG TRADE	Directorate General for Trade
DGCAs	Directorates General of Civil Aviation
DIPECHO	Disaster Preparedness ECHO
DM	Disaster Management
DMC	Disaster Management Centre
DMRS	ASEAN Disaster Monitoring and Response System
DP	Dublin Agreed Principles
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DRRM	Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
E4DCs	European Environmental Engineering Education for Developing Countries
EACEA	Education, Audiovisual & Culture Executive Agency
EACEA	Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency
EACOVIOE	Enhance the Attractiveness of Computer Vision and Robotics in Europe
EAEF	EC-ASEAN Energy Facility
EAMBMP	EU-ASEAN Migration and Border Management Programme
EAMR	External Assistance Management Report
EASA	European Aviation Safety Agency
EASCAP	EU-ASEAN Statistical Capacity Building Programme
EC	European Commission
ECAP	EU-ASEAN Project on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States
ECS	Economy and Society
ECTS	European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System
ECW	External Co-operation Window
ECW	External Co-operation Window
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EEE	Electrical and Electronic Equipment
EEERR	ASEAN Harmonised Electrical and Electronics Equipment Regulatory Regime
EFI	European Forestry Institute
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights
ELC	Economic Land Concession
EM	Erasmus Mundus
EMA	EM Alumni Association
EMJD	Erasmus Mundus Joint Doctoral
EMMA	Erasmus Mundus Mobility with Asia
EMMC	Erasmus Mundus Masters Course
ENRTP	Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources including Energy
ENVforum	Asia Europe Environment Forum
EPO	European Patent Office
EPU	Economic Planning Unit
EQ	Evaluation Questions
ERRCM	Early Recovery and Rehabilitation for Central Mindanao
ESCAP	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

ESRT	Environmentally and Socially Responsible Tourism capacity development program
ETC	European Topic Centre
EU	European Union
EUD	European Union Delegation
EUTR	EU Timber Regulation
FA	Financial Agreement
FAA	US Federal Aviation Administration
FAFA	Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FLEGT	Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade
FP	Framework Programme for Research
FS	Food Security
FSA	Chinese Academy of Forestry
FSP	Food Security Programme
FSTP	Food Security Thematic
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
FWC BENEf	Framework Contract for Beneficiaries
FWP	Framework Programme
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEM	Globalisation, the EU & Multilateralism
GFTN	Global Forest Trade Network
GHS	UN Globally Harmonised System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GMP	Good Manufacturing Practice
GMS	Greater Mekong Sub-region
GRAI	Global Response to the Avian Influenza Crisis
GSO	Global Standards Organization
HDI	Human Development Index
HE	Higher education
HEI	Higher Education Institutions
HH	Human Health
HNUE	Hanoi National University of Education
HOM	Head of Mission
HPAI	Highly pathogenic Avian Influenza
HPED	Highly Pathogenic and Emerging Disease
HQ	Headquarters
HRG	Human Rights and Governance
HS	Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System
HUST	Huazhong University of Science and Technology
IAI	Initiative for ASEAN Integration
IBMS	Integrated Border Management System
ICLA	Information counselling and legal assistance
ICPO	International Criminal Police Organization
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
ID	Identity Card
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IIS	Instrument for Stability
IL	Intervention Logic
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMTS	International Merchandise Trade Statistics Yearbook
INAP	Integrated National Action Plan
IP	Intellectual Property

IPR	Intellectual Property Rights
IPR	Intellectual Property Rights
IRAP	International Relativistic Astrophysics
ISEKI_MUNDUS	Internationalisation and Sustainability of ISEKI_Food Network
ITS	international trade in services
JC	Judgement Criteria
JCC	Joint Co-operation Committee
JEM	Joint Expert Meeting
JICA	Japanese Development Agency
KAS	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
LDC	Least Developed Country
LEAN-CC	Linking European, African and Asian Academic Networks on Climate Change
LEANES	Linking European and Asian academic networks in the field of Environmental Science
LLDC	Landlocked Developing Countries
LPI	Logistics Performance Index
LRRD	Linking relief, rehabilitation and development
MCH	Maternal and child health
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MERCOSUR	Mercado Comun del Sur, English: Southern Common Market
MIP	Multiannual Indicative Programming
MoRR	Ministry of Refugees and Repatriations
MR	Monitoring Report
MRA	Mutual Recognition Agreements
MS	Member States
MTE	Mid-term Evaluation
MTR	Mid-term Review
MUTRAP	Multilateral Trade Project
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission
NF	Network Facility
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIP	National Indicative Programmes
NMDO	National Disaster Management Organisation
NOE	Non-Observed Economy
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NREN	National Research and Education Network
NRS	Northern Rakhine State
NSA	Non State Actors
NSA-LA	Non-State-Actors Latin America
OCHA	UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHIM	Office of Harmonization for Internal Markets
OHS	Occupational Safety and Health
OIE	World Organisation for Animal Health
OVI	Objectively Verifiable Indicators
PDR	People's Democratic Republic
PDSF	Policy Dialogues Support Facility
PLHA	Persons Living with HIV/AIDS
PMC	Post Ministerial Conferences
PP	Project Purpose
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PROMODOC	Promotion of European doctoral programmes in industrialised countries
PSC	Policy Support Component
READI	Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument
RG	Reference Group
RGC	Royal Cambodian Government

RNA	Ribonucleic Acid
ROM	Results-oriented monitoring
RoO	Rules of Origin
RSE	Regional Strategy Evaluation
RSP	Regional Strategy Paper
RTD	Research and Technology Development
RUPP	The Royal University of Phnom Penh
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation
SACEP	South Asia Co-operative Environmental Programme
SAFTA	South Asian Free Trade Area
SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SCEE	Founding the Siberian Centre of European Education
SCP	Sustainable Consumption and Production
SG	Sectoral Group
SGBV	Sexual and Other Form of Gender-Based Violence
SME	Small and Medium Enterprise
SOM	Senior Officials Meeting
SOMTC	Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime
SPS	Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards
STMOD	SAARC Terror Offences Desk
StRIDE-Mindanao	Strengthening response to internal displacement in Mindanao
SuPP-URB	Sustainable Public Procurement in Urban Administrations in China
SWITCH	EU funded Asia Programme to promote Sustainable Consumption and Production (SCP)
TA	Technical Assistance
TAC	Technical Advisory Committee
TBT	Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
TEIN	Trans-Eurasia Information Network
TG	Target Group
TLAS	Timber Legality Assurance System
TOR	Terms of Reference
TRA	Trade Related Assistance
TREATI	Trans-regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative
TRIPS	Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
TRTA	Trade Related Technical Assistance
TWG	Technical Working Group
TwoEA-M	Enhancing Attractiveness of Environmental Assessment and Management Higher Education
UCTS	University College of Technology Sarawak
UK	United Kingdom
UKM	Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Education Programme
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States for International Development
USD	United States Dollars
UV	Ultraviolet
VET	Vocational and Educational Training

VPA	Voluntary Partnership Agreements
WAPDA	Water and Power Development Authority
WASH	Water, sanitation, and hygiene
WCO	World Customs Organisation
WHO	World Health Organization
WRF	World Resource Forum
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature

1 EQ1 on strengthening inter-regional dialogue & partnership

EQ1: To what extent has regional-level EU support to Asia broadened and deepened the dialogue between the two regions and encouraged greater integration and co-operation on political, economic, social and environmental matters?

1.1 JC 11: Degree to which regional-level EU support to Asia has deepened the inter-regional exchange of information and analysis

1.1.1 Indicator 111: Evidence of effective, results-oriented mechanisms for inter-regional consultations in key policy areas

1.1.1.1 ASEAN

The strongest evidence for effective policy dialogue is found in the case of ASEAN. The draft final report of the *Thematic Global Evaluation of European Union's Support to Trade-related Assistance in Third Countries*, vol. 1. (2013) describes ASEAN as "a model case": "Among the desk phase and field phase countries and regions scrutinised, the strongest evidence for the successful embedding of TRA in policy dialogues was found for ASEAN (a model case in this regard), Vietnam, the MEDA countries, Ukraine, and Uruguay" (p. 26).

Box 1 Policy dialogues on Trade Related Assistance

"It is a particular strong feature of the [EU-ASEAN] co-operation that TRA projects run in parallel, and are coordinated with, a high-profile political dialogue on economic co-operation. The EC participates in a series of consultative meetings with ASEAN which includes the ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting (AEMM), ASEAN-EU Economic Ministers Meeting, ASEAN-EU Senior Officials Meeting, the Post Ministerial Conferences (PMC) and the Joint Co-operation Committee (JCC) Meeting. These meetings offer opportunities for the EU and ASEAN to review their relations in the fields of economic and development co-operation affecting the two sides. ... The ASEAN-Brussels Committee, ASEAN-Berlin Committee, ASEAN-London Committee and ASEAN-Paris Committee also assist in conducting and maintaining the dialogue with the EU. At the apex of the dialogue process is the AEMM which sets the direction and pace of the dialogue and reviews, inter alia, the economic and functional co-operation between the two sides."

Source: *Thematic Global Evaluation of European Commission's Support to Trade-related Assistance in Third Countries, Field visit report ASEAN, July 2012, pp. 19, 21.*

The Evaluation of the EC's co-operation with ASEAN of 2009, vol 1, had arrived at similar conclusions: "EC support for participation in ASEAN policy dialogues has increased [the] capacity of poor countries to deal with regional economic integration" (p. 30). Furthermore, "Policy dialogue with ASEAN [...] has proven to be a nimble instrument for incorporating emerging issues" (Vol. 2, p. 87).

The existence of mechanisms which potentially allow for strong results-oriented inter-regional policy dialogues goes beyond TRA and is evident across the entire portfolio of EU-ASEAN co-operation as confirmed, for example in the case of READI. The EAMR Indonesia 12/2012 states, "... EU ASEAN Policy dialogue has really taken off in 4 sectors: Science and Technology, Energy, Disaster Management and ICT. In Science and Technology the EU-ASEAN year of Science was supported together with DG RTD. Co-operation on Disaster Management intensified during 2012 not the least as result of the visit of Commissioner Georgieva in 2011 to ASEAN and the visit of all ASEAN Disaster Management Agencies to Brussels in 2012. Further areas such as climate change and maritime issues but also higher education are being discussed."

Similar assessments are available for bilateral relations with individual Asian states. For instance, according to the EAMR Thailand 06/2011, "Bilateral co-operation with Thailand is shifting to policy dialogue in the areas of strategic importance (TEC II and PDSF)."

Overall, there was broad agreement among both Asian and European stakeholders interviewed during the field phase that the embeddedness of development co-operation in well-established political dialogue mechanisms has increased the EU's weight and leverage in Asia particularly with regards to key EU agendas such as good governance and human rights and strengthened the EU's visibility in Asia. For example, the fact that ASEAN officials consider the EU as ASEAN's most relevant and trusted partner is not only the result of the sizable development co-operation programme but to a large extent also a reflection of the long history of regular high-level political exchanges and especially the way that the EU has been consistent in its strategic approach towards ASEAN. Development co-operation and policy dialogues have been treated as the two sides of the same coin to promote a multi-level and holistic

agenda in inter-regional relations, which – in this breadth – is second to none among ASEAN's partners, including inter alia the US, Canada, Australia, Japan, China and Russia. By that the EU has also successfully promoted European “*best practises*” in areas such as regional economic integration, climate change, environmental sustainability and disaster preparedness.

However, in most cases comprehensive evidence is mainly available for the existence of well-established policy dialogue mechanisms but not always for the actual outcomes and effectiveness of these dialogues. ASEM is a case in point.

1.1.1.2 ASEM

The *ASEM III* logframe outlines the following specific objectives: “*Enhance result oriented political dialogue and co-operation in the framework of ASEM process in the priority areas:*”

- *Economic and financial matters;*
- *Environment, energy security and sustainable development;*
- *Employment and social matters;*
- *Education and intercultural dialogue”.*

However, the related “*objectively verifiable indicator of achievement*” is simply: “*Outcomes of the ASEM dialogue and their relevance*”. This indicator is not fit for purpose as it is too general to allow for any deeper assessment of effectiveness.

Information is mainly available with regard to outputs. According to the Mid-term Evaluation (MTE) of ASEM Dialogue Facility (2010), “*The Facility is one of a number of complementary tools to promote and stimulate EU-Asia dialogue (...) There is quite a lot of exchange of ideas between Asia and the EU. Ideas of Asian integration can be borrowed from the EU experience*” (p. 33). Under the *ASEM Dialogue Facility I*, 13 meetings/seminars/conferences have been financed and implemented by different DGs, bringing together an average of 150 high-ranking government officials from the EU and Asia to each event. Government officials are normally from a very high level, particularly from Asia, facilitating the transfer of know-how acquired into policy (pp. 34-35).

The MTE concludes, *inter alia*, that “*The ASEM Facility is considered to be most effective when it is integrated into the DG’s strategic planning. This facilitates a more coherent and systematic programme of engagement with the EU and Asian civil servants and experts on relevant issues, thereby strengthening networks and deepening trust, which is likely to be more effective in delivering desirable outcomes in the medium to long term*” (p. 34).

More detail is provided in the “*Interviews with Participating DGs*” as summarised by the MTE:

- “*The ASEM Dialogue is complementary to bi-lateral relationships. Although, the inter-regional dialogue requires more resources than the bi-lateral, the inter-regional approach is more economical. It’s more efficient for international regional topics to be discussed at the EU/Asia level because of economies of scale – “more bang for buck”. Also, in inter-regional relations, the EU experience is central to discussions on, for example, regional integration, common regional currency, convergence of financial systems, balance of payments system* (p. 21).
- “*Increased partnership between the EU and Asia leads to increased trust and cooperative relationship, which could not be achieved at the individual country bi-lateral or the EU/Asian countries bi-lateral levels. However, better co-ordination with member states could realize even more significant outcomes*” (p. 21).
- “*The ASEM Dialogue Facility is one of a number of tools to encourage political dialogue in the ASEM process, for example the budgets of other ASEM members, DG’s own budgets, EU bi-lateral programmes and Member States bi-lateral programmes. All these tools complement one another, although they are not sufficiently integrated or co-ordinated to achieve maximum efficiency.*” (p. 25).

While the findings of the MTE allow for a glimpse into the effectiveness of policy dialogues under the ASEM umbrella, very little assessment was available for the specific case of ASEM’s contributions to these dialogues before 2011. According to the ASEM Evaluation (2011), this problem was a systemic one: “*There is an almost appalling lack of result information available within ASEM on the outcomes and impact of its projects and of its project portfolio in general. There is an overall need for enhanced performance planning, management and monitoring systems and tools, both organisationally and for the portfolio of projects, and for strengthening capacities. There are significant challenges still to be met in enhancing the overall visibility of the ASEM programmes and projects and in strengthening synergies and complementarities with other key stakeholders and programmes supporting the ASEM dia-*

logue process. (...) There is a disconnect between high-level political dialogue and implementation and the ASEM work programme 2008-2010 (endorsed by ASEM 7) is not used as reference to orient the ASEF strategy and especially its operationalisation. An ASEM-ASEF centre of gravity is missing." (p. iv).

While the findings and recommendations of the ASEF evaluation were duly considered and implemented in many cases, it should be pointed out that the evaluation failed to take full account of ASEF's mandate, prescribed organisational and management structures and broad scope of the ASEF/ASEM constituency. ASEF was established with the clear mandate to promote "*intellectual, cultural and people-to-people exchange*" and not designed as – and never intended to be – a clearing house or secretariat for ASEM that acts as a coordinating body in a sense that all civil society processes emanating from the ASEM dialogue would be steered and managed through ASEF.

ASEF has been effective in focussing its activities on issues where there is scope for civil society complementarity to the priorities set by ASEM. This is reflected by recent adjustments to the six specific thematic areas which mirror or complement ASEM's co-operation agenda at the inter-governmental level: Economy & Society; Sustainable Development & Environment; Academic Co-operation & Education; Arts & Culture; Governance & Human Rights; and Public Health.

As a highly heterogeneous forum with currently 51 members, ASEM finds it difficult to develop a coherent and comprehensive strategy with which ASEF could be logically and clearly aligned. In reality ASEF activities are often shaped by the input of individual ASEM members who try to promote their respective national priorities in their external relations. This can be, for example, a human rights agenda or a focus on economic development or environmental sustainability. While the different members are active to varied degrees, most try to put their mark on ASEF, particularly in those cases when these members contribute to the funding of ASEF. Yet, in many cases the "*wish lists*" submitted by ASEM members often overestimate ASEF's financial scope.

The European Commission is only one of 51 members. While the Commission is the top contributor to ASEF in financial terms, it cannot be expected that the backdrop against which ASEF's activities are assessed is solely defined by the Commission. It was therefore surprising that the 2010 "*Institutional Evaluation of ASEF*" entirely followed Commission criteria.

Non-European members, particularly China, have recently increased their funding for ASEF – while European members have reduced theirs – which is likely to result in a more active contribution of China as an agenda-setter in ASEF.

Last but not least there is common misunderstanding about ASEF's nature. The Foundation is not in itself a civil society organisation as directors are government officials who are seconded by their national Foreign Ministries. The governmental nature also prescribes specific management and organisational structures. The ASEF Board comprises mostly either active or former government officials, many of Ambassadorial rank. (Field mission interviews in Singapore; "*ASEF Reply to Institutional Evaluation of ASEF of Third Support Phase Draft*", 23 August 2011).

1.1.1.3 EU-Asia Dialogue

A new project "*Shaping a Common Future for Europe and Asia – Sharing Policy Innovation and Best Practices in Addressing Common Challenges*", or short: "*EU-Asia Dialogue*" (January 2012-December 2014) is worth mentioned here because despite its small size (EU funding EUR 1 million) it aims to fill the gaps of the existing interventions, particularly in terms of bridging inter-regional research collaboration and policy dialogues. The project is co-funded by the EU (currently the only intervention under the budget line *Pilot Actions and Preparatory Action*) and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) of Germany with funds originating from the German Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development (BMZ). All activities are implemented by KAS, the East Asian Institute of the National University of Singapore, and the European Policy Centre in Brussels and the European Union Centre in Singapore, with KAS being by far the most active of the partners.

The *EU-Asia Dialogue* "*aims to enhance exchange and understanding between policy-makers, non-governmental organizations and researchers from Europe and Asia. Seven topics will be discussed and research periods taking a rather practical than theoretical approach will help to formulate policy-recommendations. (...) A number of conferences, policy dialogues and briefings will take place in various countries of both continents to disseminate the results of these research studies. Exchange shall be fostered not only between both regions but also the two key target groups – policy-makers and researchers.*" According to the project's Inception Report (2012), "*the overall objective of the EU-Asia Dialogues is to "contribute to the formulation of relevant sustainable development policies for framing of a comprehensive and constructive partnership between Asia and the EU. It is undertaken to pro-*

mote and disseminate knowledge and awareness of what Asia and European Member States, or respectively the EU, are doing in their regions to confront the challenges of climate change, demographic and social changes, and emerging security challenges of globalisation. Thereby dialogue and exchange on policy and research level between the two regions is encouraged."

The specific objective is to *"strengthen, deepen and share the knowledge and understanding of selected common sustainable development challenges across the EU and Asia, therefore increasing the relevance of the policies formulated in the two regions to tackle these issues"* (pp. 9-10)

In particular, the project envisions to be *"relevant to current policy making processes and will generate implementable policy recommendations through an exchange of best practices between policy makers and researchers"* (Annex I, Contract PP-AP/2011/273-733).

In its first year the project mainly focussed on the topic *"Maritime Piracy and Security"* and – given the participation and involvement of government officials at a middle level of responsibility in activities – there is a possibility that the EU-Asia Dialogue makes a contribution to policy formulation in EU-Asia relations. The project has followed a *"track two"* approach (which also characterises ASEF and many individual projects funded under the *ASEM Dialogue Facility*) of funding and facilitating academic research and conferences. The resulting research papers and findings are then disseminated in joint events with the policy-making community. The project leaders claim that activities have made a contribution to the enhancement of enhanced policy learning across the two regions.

Since *READI* has also addressed maritime security and involved similar stakeholder groups in its activities it should be expected that some exchange and communication takes place between the two projects to avoid overlap or even to create synergies. However, KAS and *READI* have not been aware of each others' activities in this area (Field mission interviews in Singapore and Jakarta, August 2013).

1.1.1.4 SAARC

The EU has SAARC Observer Status since 2006 but a policy dialogue comparable to the one in EU-ASEAN relations does not exist. The 2010 MTR of the EU-Asia RSP 2007-2013 simply states: *"The policy agendas and sectoral dialogues with individual countries, ASEM, ASEAN and SAARC cover all themes and strategic EU priorities"* (p. 7) but also notes that *"...our direct co-operation with SAARC is seriously hampered"* (p. 9, see also EQ2).

There is some mentioning of policy dialogues in bilateral relations with SAARC Member States but no assessment of results and effectiveness is available:

Policy dialogue in Pakistan:

- *The EU and Pakistan will swiftly establish a regular counter-terrorism dialogue and co-operation to enhance counter-terrorism capacity* (Council of the European Union. Strengthening EU Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2971st EXTERNAL RELATIONS Council meeting, Luxembourg, 27 October 2009, Council conclusions, p. 3).
- *In order to support Pakistan's economic development, the EU has agreed to step up a dedicated dialogue in order to significantly enhance the bilateral trade relationship, including through a possible free trade agreement in the long term* (ibid).

Policy dialogue in Afghanistan:

- *Human rights, in particular women's and children's' rights, are at the centre of a strengthened EU political dialogue with the Afghan Government* (ibid, p. 11)

Policy dialogue in Nepal:

- *The EC has actively participated in the policy dialogue with the Government of Nepal in line with the size of its support* (the EC is a relatively small Development Partner in Nepal) (Nepal CSE, vol. 1, p. vii)

Policy dialogue in India:

- *Policy dialogue between EU and India is on-going in the framework of the JAP, which is highly relevant to the achievement of the MDGs and the targets defined in the Eleventh Five Year Plan* (RSP MTR, p. 9).

1.1.2 Indicator 112: Formation of joint policy positions on key development agendas (environment, education, socio-economic development) in EU-Asia relations

1.1.2.1 EU-ASEAN

The multilevel nature of the *EU-ASEAN dialogue* provides a suitable and tested framework for an effective discussion and partly harmonisation of policy positions in relations between EU and ASEAN stakeholders. Higher education is case in point:

“The policy-making and policy dialogue instruments are creating spaces for HE policy-makers from both [the EU and ASEAN] to deliberate about pressing HE issues. Overall, the EC’s HE programmes have been very effective conduits for transporting European best practices in research, teaching and HE administration into ASEAN HE policy landscapes” (Evaluation of EC co-operation with ASEAN, Vol 2, 2009, p. 62).

In the trade sector, the *Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative (TREATI)* follows a holistic approach that also takes political and governance aspects into account and has resulted in the formulation of joint policy positions (Thematic Global Evaluation of European Union’s Support to Trade-related Assistance in Third Countries, Vol. 2, 2nd final report, April 2013).

An example from the environment sector includes, *“an important breakthrough in the Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) policy dialogue, as the RGC [Royal Cambodian Government] agreed in late 2012 to conduct a joint study to understand timber flows and control in Cambodia. This study will include the very sensitive issue of trade in ‘conversion wood’ from Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) and will feed into a number of policy discussions on the potential for a well regulated timber trade (Cambodia EAMR, 2/2012).”* In the trade area, *“The EU Delegation is more and more perceived by the [Cambodian] Ministry of Commerce as the main interlocutor and partner to jointly drive the trade development policy agenda forward”* (Cambodia EAMR, 6/2012).

For example, with regards to Malaysia, *“The dialogue between the Malaysian government and the EC has different contexts and locations: Consultations were in many cases also taken in the context of ASEM, of EU-ASEAN or of meetings of the Malaysian Ambassador with his counterparts in the EC. Many important decisions concerning trade were taken in the context of ASEAN meetings with dialogue partners”* (CLE Malaysia, 2009).

In Thailand, the environmental policy dialogue between the EU and the RTG has made deft use of synergies at regional and thematic level. In its policy dialogue with the RTG -- in the form of regular Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) -- the EC has concentrated in focal priority issues (i.e. trade and investment, public health, peace and security). Both, the EU-ASEAN policy dialogue and the ASEM dialogue process, provide the two fora in which environmental issues relevant to Thailand are discussed. The so-called EU-ASEAN Joint Co-operation Committee (JCC) offers the EU and ASEAN members the institutional space to discuss co-operation on, among other things, the environment. The ASEM process, in turn, offers a policy space for discussion of environmental policy at official, ministerial and summit level. (Thailand CLE, 2009)

Overall, it seems that the emergence and formulation of joint policy positions with Southeast Asian governments has been particularly successful when synergies between bilateral and multilateral policy dialogues could be achieved and the two approaches mutually reinforced each other.

1.1.2.2 ASEM: policy dialogues

There can be no doubt whatsoever that *ASEM* as the only inter-governmental forum in relations between Europe and Asia has provided a relevant and effective framework for the identification and discussion of key development agenda. Joint policy positions are customary presented in ASEM chair’s statement at the conclusion of the summit meetings (see http://www.eeas.europa.eu/asem/docs/index_en.htm for the ASEM Chair’s statements for all nine summit meetings to-date and other key ASEM documents).

Box 2 Joint Policy Positions at ASEM9

The 9th ASEM Summit November 2012 in Vientiane formulated policy position in the following issue areas:

- MDGs;
- Climate Change,
- Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
- Nuclear Security, Nuclear Safeguards and the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Safety
- Counter Terrorism
- Piracy at Sea
- Food and Energy Security and Water Resources Management
- Disaster Management
- Mitigation and Emergency Response
- Transnational Organized Crime
- Including Trafficking in Persons and Illicit Narcotic, Drug Trafficking
- Human Rights
- Interfaith Dialogue

Source: Chair's Statement of the 9th ASEM Summit 5 – 6 November 2012, Vientiane, Lao PDR, <http://www.asem9.la/files/files/Chair's%20Statement%20as%20of%206%20November%202012.pdf>

ASEM Chair's Statements are of a general and declaratory nature and, while they outline a common agenda in relations between European and Asian governments they do not necessarily set a framework for actual policy responses to the identified challenges. The shaping of a more specific and implementable policy agenda takes place at sub-ordinated meeting, including meetings of line ministers. Each year over 50 ministerial and officials' meetings occur, covering topics such as finance, trade, culture, education, disaster preparedness, transport, immigration, climate change, piracy at sea, information technology, food security, development, employment, energy security, global governance and others (EU Involvement in ASEM, <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/asem/>)

For example, according to the *ASEM Dialogue Facility MTR (2010)*, "ASEM finance ministers reached a consensus on main agenda items at a meeting in Jeju, Korea in June 2008 joint policy responses to global economic conditions, Europe's economic integration and its implications for Asia, infrastructure finance and microfinance, market-oriented approaches toward climate change, and a cooperative partnership between Asia and Europe. Through the Jeju Initiative, ASEM members will initiate various programs including information and knowledge sharing, education and training programs, technology assistance and expert exchanges."

"Away from the urgency of Summits and Inter-Ministerial meetings, a common position can be arrived at by senior officials from the EU and Asia, with the assistance of scientific experts and learned background papers, in preparation for Ministerial and Summit meetings" (pp. 33-34).

The case of Laos illustrates this point. According to the Lao PDR EAMR (12/2012), "The Delegation has developed its Policy Dialogue Framework quite extensively over the last year through multiple occasions and at different levels: -Institutional level: The preparations for the ASEM meeting (and the Summit itself) as well as the associated side-events (Parliamentary Forum, Business Forum and Peoples Forum) provided a unique opportunity for the EU to put forward its political agenda at the highest level of the Lao Government in terms of fundamental values (human rights, democracy and rule of law) but also in terms of governance, socio-economic and trade developments. Presidents Barroso (Commission) and Van Rompuy (Council) and senior EEAS staff participated in the ASEM Summit on 05/06 November 2012. President van Rompuy also had a bilateral meeting with the Lao Prime Minister – the most senior encounter since the beginning of diplomatic relations between the EU and Lao PDR".

Given ASEM's heterogeneous membership structure and inevitably diverse interests of the member states, agreement on joint policy positions is usually not a straightforward process. Several academic studies have analysed ASEM and complement the information available in official documents and evaluation reports. Academic studies also tend to take a more critical perspective as to what ASEM can achieve with regards to the setting of a joint European-Asian Policy Agenda.

Two studies provide particularly useful insights:

- Evi Fitriani. Asian perceptions about the EU in the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM), *Asia Europe Journal*, Vol 9 (2011), pp. 43–56: The research uses qualitative data, gathered from various sources and 82 in-depth interviews with diplomats, scholars, journalists, business peoples and civil society representatives in five Asian countries.

Box 2 *Extraction from: Evi Fitriani: Asian perceptions about the EU in the ASEM*

This study finds that some behaviours of EU participants at ASEM or ASEF interregional forums are counterproductive for EU efforts to develop robust relations with Asian countries. The polarization between Asian and European groups in the ASEM or ASEF meetings, caused by political issues and colonial memory, contributed to the difficulties in trust-building between Asian and European participants. In addition, by their frequent absence from ASEM Summits, EU leaders squandered rare opportunities for a 'meeting of minds and hearts' with their Asian counterparts.

The lack of inter-subjective understanding and trust between the Asian and European participants in the ASEM process have arguably hindered the development of the ASEM in delivering a more substantive co-operation among its partner countries.... the most difficult issue in the interactions was the difference in political values especially in the reference to human rights and democratization. This issue appeared to hamper not only the relations at government-to-government level but also at people-to- people level (p. 54).

Source: Evi Fitriani 2011.

- Naila Meier-Knapp: ASEAN-EU and Non-Traditional Security Of Crises, Culture and Co-operation Or Of Identity, Interdependence and Interaction, A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in European Studies at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, 2011: A total of 77 interviews were conducted with government officials in Asia and Europe between 2008 and 2010.

Box 3 *Extraction from: Naila Meier-Knapp: ASEAN-EU and Non-Traditional Security Of Crises, Culture and Co-operation Or Of Identity, Interdependence and Interaction*

Approximately six months before the ASEM summit a chairman's statement is circulated. It starts out as a draft statement on general issues which is then passed to the participating countries and the Commission and the ASEAN Secretariat. Corrections are made and the EU members regularly attempt to include more political issues. In most cases they are controversial and dismissed in the final version. Myanmar has since its admission to ASEM been a common target of EU criticism. For 2008, Myanmar insisted again that the statement should not comprise of Myanmar's internal affairs. In the end, Myanmar compromised and agreed to the humanitarian assistance following cyclone Nargis being mentioned. By the time of the summit the final draft has been approved by all ASEM participants. This planned procedure makes one wonder about the purpose of the actual summit. The interaction is prepared and remains symbolic. It reminds of the meeting to celebrate the agreement whereas European-style negotiations are associated with the final meeting being the last opportunity to bargain definite outcomes (p. 82).

The ASEAN-EU dimension is reinforced by ASEM. And within ASEM, there is direct reference to the ASEAN and ASEAN-EU level. For instance, ASEM's recognition of ASEAN as a region in need of environmental disaster management support. ASEM's topics are not unique and the outcomes to tackle the discussed issues do not provide an added value in global governance, but may be beneficial for the ASEAN-EU level. In fact, ASEM's stimulus of an East Asian identity is increasingly proving to be hindersome for ASEAN-EU consensus. This was, for example, manifest at the AEMM in 2009 on climate change. The ASEAN side seemed less open to talk about this than within the preceding ASEM Foreign Ministers Meeting that same month. Southeast Asian CDMs referred to this meeting and reaffirmed the stance taken by the ASEM Asian side on this as the official ASEAN position. EU officials have found this frustrating and have expressed concerns that on some issues ASEAN may have become less open and use the ASEM Asian stance to avoid having to formulate an official opinion" (p. 80).

Source: Naila Meier-Knapp, 2011.

1.1.2.3 ASEM Dialogue Facility

The ASEM Dialogue Facility MTE finds, "There is a strong view expressed by all DGs, who participated in the Facility, of the importance of the Facility for EU-Asia dialogue, but especially the more strategically engaged DGs, namely, DG ECFIN, DG EMPL and RELEX" (pp. 33-34).

By and large, The MTE's survey on "Value Judgments on the Usefulness of Facility Events" confirms this assessment: "There is a strong positive response overall and among both European and Asian attendees to the usefulness of the ASEM Dialogue Facility events. A judgment on the usefulness of these events was solicited from attendees through asking them to allocate marks, on a scale of 1-10 (1 is a low value (Poor) and 10 is a high value (Excellent)) to each of 10 different value criteria....The criterion allocated the highest 'mean' mark (8) across all attendees and in each region was 'They help Asia/Europe understanding on issues that affect both region'. Three further criteria were allocated a 'mean' mark of 8 by Asian attendees:

1. 'They facilitate discussion of issues relevant to the development of the ASEM process'
2. 'They enhance long term co-operation through building trust between European and Asia ministries, public servants and expert'

3. *“The event and the topic being discussed have influenced your thinking on the issue”* (pp. 28-29)

However, with regard to the actual policy impact, the views were rather pessimistic. *“The criterion with the smallest overall ‘mean’ mark was ‘What is the likelihood of you introducing an idea/best practice emerging from the event into policy initiatives in your ministry?’”*

Furthermore, the MTE notes that *“there are certain reservations expressed, through notes added to the questionnaire and through telephone conversation:*

- a) *There is inadequate real debate at the events; mainly they consist of a series of papers presented and speeches made with few opportunities for dialogue;*
- b) *There is lack of clarity in the long-term vision of what the Facility wants to achieve with the different events;*
- c) *The ASEM Dialogue Facility is not closely aligned with other ASEM facilities, for example ASEF; if these different facilities were more aligned, much more could be achieved.”* (pp. 30-31).

The MTE also finds a certain mismatch between the Asia strategy and its implementation. The Regional Programme for Asia Strategy Document 2007-2013 states that *“The ASEM Dialogue Facility will support ASEM dialogues in areas selected at the request of Asian countries”*. *The actual practice is that projects are selected by the DG in consultation with Asian ASEM partners. This gives rise to the concern that the focus of ASEM Dialogue Facility financed activity is not sufficiently closely aligned to Asian needs; it depends on the DG taking the initiative to address the Asian needs”* (p. 34).

1.1.2.4 ASEF

ASEF’s mandate, as defined by the Dublin Principles¹ does not explicitly include a contribution to the formation of policy positions but the Foundation’s opportunities to provide some input have increased in recent years. A practise to invite the ASEF Executive Director to ASEM Summits and ministerial meetings and to include ASEF representatives at the ASEM Cultural Ministers Meeting has been established over the past five years. It is however, impossible to quantify ASEF’s contribution to the formation of policy positions (Interviews at ASEF, August 2013). EU-SAARC

Given the different nature of EU-SAARC relations as opposed to EU-ASEAN and the former’s lack of institutionalised policy dialogue mechanisms as well as the fact that SAARC members are relative late-comers to ASEM (not all are members yet) joint policy positions are rare if at all existent. No evidence could be found. The EAMRs for South Asian countries do not mention the role of SAARC at all with the only exception of the Aviation safety project, which, however, is not a policy dialogue.

1.1.3 Indicator 113: Evidence of coherent and coordinated positions of the EU and MS in inter-regional dialogues between Europe and Asia

For all inter-regional policy dialogues in EU-Asia relations at the inter-governmental level (ASEAN-EU, ASEM, EU-SAARC, ARF) applies that the views and positions of all participating European stakeholders, including the Commission and Member states are harmonised ex ante (see for example ASEM Dialogue Facility MTE, 2010). The EU generally speaks with one voice in inter-regional meetings. Resulting statements, declarations and other official documents, which are usually coordinate by the Commission, always refer to EU positions rather than individual positions of the Commission and/or Member States. Seen from this angle, there is ample evidence of a coordinated EU position in every official document and this was also confirmed by interviews with the EU Delegations and EU MS Embassies in all countries visited during the field phase). Ambassadors and other high-ranking diplomats of EU MS as well as government officials of the respective host countries stated that the EU’s ability to speak with one voice has greatly increased the EU’s leverage and visibility in EU-Asia relations.

As an informal process, ASEM has no secretariat. Foreign Ministers and their senior officials (SOM) have an overall coordinating role within the ASEM process, and are assisted by a group of four Coordinators. The fact that the European Commission is the only permanent coordinator of ASEM has also contributed to an efficient and effective coordination of intra-EU positions. The *ASEM Dialogue Facility* MTE suggests that through the coordination of EU positions, the European viewpoint and the EU *“analysis of current economic and regional trends has more weight”*; the EU *“can really come up with a ‘regional perspective’ on certain issues”* (p. 52).

¹ See http://www.asef.org/images/stories/aboutus/080501_asef%20dublin%20principles.pdf

This does not mean that all EU MS follow the same policies and interests in Asia-Europe relations. There is no recent comparative analysis of EU MS's positions towards, and in, the EU-ASEAN dialogues and ASEM available (evaluations have not elaborated on this aspect). However, one of the most comprehensive studies on ASEM, a "*European Background Study*" which was commissioned in preparation of the 2006 ASEM Summit in Helsinki is still valid and current in many of its findings.

Box 4 *EU Member States in ASEM*

In spite of all the progress achieved in integrating the EU members' external policies national differences still clearly come to the fore as far as the key orientations and points of emphasis in their foreign policies are concerned. These differences are reflected also in the role ASEM takes in the policies of various European partners. In general, France and Germany are of the EU's large member states seen to be most committed to the ASEM project whereas the three others, the UK, Spain and Italy have been argued to adopt a more ambiguous policy. Many of the EU's smaller member states have lacked strong Asian policies with the exception of Portugal and the Netherlands which due to their histories have strong connections to several Asian countries. (...) Both Germany and France were the important driving forces on the European side behind the establishment of ASEM. Germany was responsible of the original initiative for the intensification of relations with Asia by issuing its "Asienkonzept" in 1993 (...) France again gained a key position as the idea of launching ASEM was advanced with the support of the French government and during its EU presidency. (...) This very quality of ASEM, i.e. the capacity of bringing Europe closer to Asia has been seen behind the more reluctant British attitude towards this co-operation (...). Only a few of the smaller EU members had a well-established Asian policy before ASEM was launched (...) ASEM has contributed to a stronger emphasis placed on the Asian policy of many smaller EU members.

Source: *ASEM in its Tenth Year Looking Back, Looking Forward. European Background Study, University of Helsinki Network for European Studies, March 2006, pp. 147- 148.*

1.2 JC 12: Extent to which regional-level EU support to Asia has strengthened the problem-solving capacities of Asian partners in economic, socio-political and environmental fields

1.2.1 Indicator 121: New or improved inter-regional and regional mechanisms in place to address economic and financial challenges

1.2.1.1 ASEAN

The "*Plan of Action to Implement the Nuremberg Declaration on the EU ASEAN Enhanced Partnership*" (2007), which has guided EU-ASEAN political relations during the evaluation period, itself, did not establish new approaches which aim at the improvement of regional mechanisms in economic areas. Instead, the Declaration reemphasises the centrality of existing and new programmes in support of capacity building: *APRIS*, *READI*, *TREATI*, EU-ASEAN Standards, Quality and Conformity Assessment Programme etc. One of the proposed pillars, the *ASEAN-EU FTA* ("*Negotiate and conclude the ASEAN-EU FTA aiming at mutually beneficial FTA while taking into account the different levels of development and capacity of the individual ASEAN Member Countries to carry out comprehensive trade and investment liberalisation and facilitation*") eventually did not materialise but resulted in the intervention "*Enhancing ASEAN Free Trade Agreement Negotiation Capacity*", which began its work in early 2012 and was completed in October 2013. Some 800 mid-career government officials, representatives of the private sector and academics were trained in a total of nine regional workshops on matters related to global and regional economic integration, free trade and related aspects. Participant evaluations were generally very good but only time will tell to what extent the training has indeed increased capacities in the respective national agencies (field mission interviews in Indonesia, August 2013)

Reports or studies on the implementation of the Nuremberg Declaration and its Action Plan are not available. The ASEAN Annual Report 2010-11, published by the ASEAN Secretariat, simply notes, "*ASEAN and the EU are continuing to make good progress in implementing the Plan of Action to Implement the Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership*" (p. 6). However, senior officials interviewed during the field phase almost unanimously identified the *Nuremberg Declaration* as the most significant milestone of recent dialogue relations which has provided a solid basis for EU-ASEAN co-operation.

In May 2010, the 18th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, under the theme of "*Partners in Regional Integration*", held in Madrid, agreed upon a new indicative list of activities to further implement the Phnom Penh Agenda, an action programme for closer ties between ASEAN and the EU which was agreed at

17th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting in 2009. The Phnom Penh Agenda calls for, inter alia, EU support to ASEAN “to overcome the global financial crisis and restore economic growth”.

Clear evidence for improved mechanisms in response to economic and financial challenges are available for individual ASEAN members.

In the case of Laos, “There is evidence of some EC-sponsored contributions to the strengthening / capacity building of Lao participation in regional and global trade-related dialogues. Lao PDR participated in the EC/ASEAN Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) programme and EC/ASEAN Standards programme with the general objective to enhance EU/ASEAN investment and trade. However, apart from a general assessment that the EC “contributed to trade promotion and trade facilitation”, government officials did not have any specific views on how Lao PDR had benefitted from EC-ASEAN projects. In interviews made it is apparent that among Lao stakeholders the knowledge of participation in EC-funded ASEAN programmes is low” (Laos CLE, 2009).

As for Thailand, “Policy Dialogue on Sustainable Consumption and Production (SCP) has been intensified. Policy dialogue on forestry issues has increased substantially as the DELTH took a leading role in policy dialogue on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) with the Government through the ASIA FLEGT regional co-operation Programme” (EAMR Thailand, 6/2011).

1.2.1.2 ASEM

There is no detailed assessment available for the potential enhancement of regional and inter-regional response mechanisms through ASEM policy dialogues or projects implemented under the ASEM dialogue facility. Existing reports mainly disseminate information about discussions held.

Box 2 The 9th ASEM Foreign Ministers Meeting, 25-26 May 2009, Hanoi

The meeting was held with the theme “Forging Closer Asia- Europe Partnership to Address the Financial and Economic Crisis and Other Global Challenges”. The discussions focused on a broad range of issues such as co-operation to address the global financial and economic crisis, joint efforts to tackle global challenges, regional and international developments, dialogue among cultures and civilisations and the future of ASEM.

According to media reports, “ministers agreed that the on-going global financial crisis has resulted in sharp reduction in capital flows and negatively affected economic development, particularly that of the developing countries. However, protectionist measures, increasingly seen as introducing or raising barriers to trade and investment by some countries, may provoke “retaliatory actions” and further harm world economy and delay its recovery, said ministers in the statement. During a closed session on strengthening co-operation to address global financial and economic crisis, ministers agreed to promote the international efforts towards an open and equitable multilateral system of trade and finance, according to a press release of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry. Ministers at the meeting also called for enhancing market access for the exports of developing countries and promoting regional and inter-regional integration, said the statement. Ministers supported international financial institutions to create further lending capacity with more flexible financing policies to effectively assist countries affected by the crisis and prevent capital outflow of developing countries.”

Sources: Foreign Ministry of Singapore, http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/international_organisation_initiatives/asem.printable.html?status=1; China-view, 9th ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting tackles global challenges, 26 May 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-05/26/content_11439243.htm

The approach of addressing economic and financial challenges through political and policy dialogues is best summarised by the Co-Chairs’ Statement of the 19th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting 26-27 April 2012: “The Ministers welcomed further engagement to enhance this relationship through the ASEAN Economic Ministers and the EU Trade Commissioner Consultations and the ASEAN-EU Business Summit. The Ministers looked forward to further implementation of the Trade and Investment Work Programme endorsed by Economic Ministers in May 2011, to complement ASEAN’s efforts to realise the ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. Recognising that a region-to-region FTA would deepen the trade and investment links between the two regions and strengthen their respective economies, the Ministers reiterated the importance of the bilateral FTAs between individual ASEAN Member States and the EU as ‘building blocks’ for a region-to-region FTA” (p. 3).

At this stage the evaluation has not been able to find any linkages between ASEM political / policy dialogues on the one hand and the ASEM Dialogue Facility and ASEM on the other to follow-up and strengthen collaborative approaches to economic and financial challenges as envisioned at the 9th ASEM Foreign Ministers Meeting and other forums. In very general terms the ASEM Dialogue Facility MTE finds, “ASEM DF activities implemented by DG ECFIN have led to more intensive co-operation between Asian countries. As people meet more frequently, sometimes at high level (attracted by the

regional dimension of the projects), regional integration is specifically addressed in this framework and exchanges of views have intensified in more specific sub-fields.” (p. 27).

1.2.1.3 SAARC

There is no evidence for the strengthening of regional response mechanisms due to the functional limits to regional co-operation in South Asia.

1.2.2 Indicator 122: Effective inter-regional and regional consultation processes to respond to socio-economic challenges

1.2.2.1 ASEAN

The evidence for consultations on socio-economic challenges is similar to the previous indicator on the economic and financial agenda. There is ample proof that socio-economic issues have extensively been discussed in EU-ASEAN meetings at different levels but effective, i.e. results-oriented collaboration leading to actual solutions in response to challenges is only in its infancy and perhaps most promising in the areas of disaster preparedness and responses, human and animal health and climate change/environment (field mission interviews in Singapore, August 2013).

The New Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to Strengthen the ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership (2013-2017), which was adopted at the 19th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting on 26-27 April 2012 in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, implicitly suggests that EU-ASEAN meetings have not yet lived up to their full potential: *“The Plan of Action aims to give a more strategic focus to co-operation and dialogue at regional level in a wide range of areas – political-security, economic and socio-cultural. However, it is too early to assess if steps have been taken towards achieving this objective.”*

1.2.2.2 ASEF

ASEF did not originally have a socio-economic focus but has developed such a thematic agenda since 2011 under the heading *“What Challenges Face Asian and European Economies?”*

ASEF has linked up with a consortium of leading think tanks in Asia and Europe to organise the Asia Europe Economic Forum (AEEF) programme. ASEF has supported three conferences in 2012 and 2013.

1.2.2.3 ASEM Dialogue Facility

Like in the case of ASEAN, there are only implicit hints which allow for some assessment of effectiveness. The ASEM Dialogue Facility MTE recommends awarding Framework Contracts to the maximum of EUR 200,000 to cover the cost of more than one activity in order to reduce the number of contracts and raise the efficiency and effectiveness of the programme (p. 37). This suggests that projects under the Dialogue Facility, which tend to have a strong focus on socio-economic agendas in many cases, have not achieved a high degree of effectiveness in advancing the inter-regional collaboration on these issues.

1.2.3 Indicator 123: Institutional deepening of regional co-operation in response to environmental challenges

1.2.3.1 VPA & FLEGT

According to the EAMR Indonesia 06/12. the **Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPA)** *“negotiation provided a framework for policy dialogue on timber trade, illegal logging and sustainable forestry with the government but also with the private sector and civil society. With the establishment of a Joint Preparatory Committee which will meet on a regular basis, a new framework has been agreed to maintain policy dialogue during the pre-implementation phase of the VPA.”*

1.2.3.2 ASEF

The evaluation of ASEF comes to positive assessment of the Foundation’s contribution to advancing the environmental agenda. *“Reportedly ASEF events through ENVforum were able to set ‘clear policy recommendations and high practical and theoretical approaches to be used as reference for ASEM and international think tanks’. This thematic area also succeeded in organising internal strategic and operational planning as well as institutionalised internal quality control through a quality control group, a technical advisory / supervisory committee.” (p. 18).*

1.2.4 Indicator 124: Evidence for growing cross-border co-operation on research & education matters

1.2.4.1 ASEAN

The ASEAN Annual Report 2008-2009 includes a general statement on the importance of research collaboration with external partners but does not provide any evidence for growing EU-ASEAN co-operation on research matters. *“Collaboration with ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners play an important part especially in research and development. In this regard, both ASEAN on one side and its partners in the S&T sector, namely, Australia, China, the European Union (EU), Japan, India and the ROK, have agreed that access to facilities or research laboratories in the Dialogue Partners’ industry or private institutions and expertise would facilitate research and technology development. A mechanism by which such resource could be tapped by ASEAN is envisaged to be developed. Specific guidelines on sharing Intellectual Property (IP) in ASEAN to promote technology transfer have also been advocated.”* (p. 23).

The Thailand EAMR 12/2012 mentions, *“In Science and technology, momentum generated by ASEAN-EU Year of Science, Technology and Innovation 2012 and Thailand’s successful participation in FP7 has led to a survey on mechanisms and thematic priorities in bilateral research co-operation and science for the public and youth. A conference cum workshop is in the pipeline for May 2013 to enhance further stake-holder co-operation, networks and innovation. Policy level dialogues were also advanced in context of participation in the SOM-ED meeting in Bangkok 29th November 2012 and the 3rd ASEAN-EC Dialogue Meeting on Science and Technology, 18 May 2012, later followed up by meetings in Bangkok on the launch of two Pilot Networks of Excellence in green technology and in food security research (READI funded).”* There is currently no information available on the results of these initiatives.

1.2.4.2 TEIN

TEIN is the main pillar of the EU’s inter-regional approach – in the context of ASEM - to co-operation on research and, partly, education. According the intervention’s self-assessment, *TEIN* “is highly regarded by ASEM partners as a major success story that should continue to be supported” (<http://www.teincc.org/teincc/c/about>) The *TEIN* Initiative was first endorsed by *ASEM III* (Seoul, October 2000) to connect ICT infrastructures between Asia and Europe. *ASEM* leaders in *ASEM VI* (September 2006, Helsinki) acknowledged the important role of the *TEIN2* in extending connectivity between Asia and Europe in the fields of research and education, and supported its application into broader areas, and *TEIN3* was launched at *ASEM VII* (October 2008, Beijing).

TEIN aims to increase the interconnectivity of the EU-Asian research and education communities, create an environment for joint international research projects and support innovative joint EU-Asia applications. In this way, it aims to contribute to the regional co-operation and development of the Asian region as well as to decrease the digital divide in Asian countries.

The Evaluation of *TEIN 2 and 3* arrived at very positive findings overall: *“The Trans-Eurasia Information Network (TEIN) is a high capacity network that now connects 19 countries in Asia and Pacific. The publicly funded network is provided for the sole use of education and research institutions in the connected countries. It excludes commercial internet (...) It is evident (...) that TEIN3 is an important part of the EU’s dialogue with Asia under the ASEM framework. (...) TEIN2 was successful in providing a network for Asia-Pacific research and educational communities to engage in inter-regional and intra-regional projects’ and under TEIN3, the Trans-Eurasia Information Network (TEIN) was one of the new initiatives endorsed by ASEM III (October 2000, Seoul, Korea) to connect research networks in Asia and Europe by linking EU’s GEANT, the pan-European gigabit research network, with Asia’s research networks in order to promote information exchanges in research and development and education. This initiative aims thus to enhance exchanges and co-operation between Asia and Europe. This will contribute to reducing the digital divide in Asia, in particular benefiting Least Developed Countries (MDG N°8, target 18)”* (p. 16).

TEIN3 operationally replaced *TEIN2* network in January 2009. The objectives for *TEIN3* were broadened to include expanding the network to South Asia. However, there is currently little information available on the way South Asian countries benefitted.

In terms of impact, *TEIN* “has given impetus to creation and expansion of national R&E networks; it has had broader impacts on telecommunications policy, cost and coverage in the countries where it has operated; and it has had a generally beneficial impact on cross-cutting issues such as gender (through making information available equitably), environment (both directly through improved com-

communications reducing physical travel and indirectly through environmental applications), and climate change (through applications in climatology and related areas, including disaster mitigation and preparedness)."

The Evaluation also points out that *TEIN2* and *TEIN3* "have had high visibility at ASEM meetings". Equally important, the Asian National Research and Education Network (NREN) – through which each partner country participates in TEIN – "have close links to their national governments and are therefore in a position to influence decision-making". The evaluation concludes that TEIN fits well into the third, fifth and six objective of the RSP, namely to

- promote the development of the less prosperous countries of Asia, addressing the root causes of poverty;
- build global partnerships and alliances with Asian countries to help address both the challenges and the opportunities offered by globalisation and to strengthen joint efforts on global environmental and security issues; and
- help to strengthen the awareness of Europe in Asia and vice versa.

1.3 JC 13: Degree to which regional-level EU support to Asia has strengthened links between civil societies and Governments in Asia and civil society exchange between Asia and Europe and within Asia

1.3.1 Indicator 131: Increased voice and participation of Asian civil society organisations on key development agendas in Europe-Asia dialogues, and Indicator 132: Effective contribution of civil societies to overcoming cultural diversity & intercultural challenges

1.3.1.1 ASEAN

In ASEAN, "consultations with private sector actors (mainly business organisations) took place in the process of drafting and implementing new regional standards such as the Cosmetics Directives. Generally, however, institutionalised effective mechanism for regional consultations with non-state actors do not exist on a permanent basis and are not a default approach for EU projects" (TRA Evaluation, Vol. 2a, 2013, p. 150).

This finding is largely confirmed by the *APRIS II* evaluations which suggest that civil society (including the private sector) participation had been limited.

The MTR of *APRIS II* (2008) notes, "There has been very limited direct impact on secondary beneficiaries such as the private sector or civil society; though it is envisaged they are the ultimate beneficiaries of a successful regional economic integration process... It has been stated to the MTR team by a number of stakeholders that the direct involvement of the private sector should be higher in the programme implementation. This is somewhat problematic for a regional programme mostly working through public sector institutions, and where there is no clear private sector counterpart with a regional mandate in many of the sectors in which *APRIS II* is working." (ASEAN Programme for Regional Integration Support II (*APRIS II*), Mid-term Review September 2008. p. 10, 17)

The *APRIS II* Final Evaluation (2011) recommends: "Do more in terms of socialising ASEAN's integration objectives and its benefits for the people. In the same way as European people are not sufficiently aware of the concrete benefits of EU policies, ASEAN civil society organisations and people in general need to be better informed of the objectives and benefits of regional integration" (p. 38).

However these recommendations have now been addressed and there is a much stronger focus on civil society participation in *ARISE* than it was in *APRIS II*. Although the First Six-Month Report (April to September 2012) of *READI* does not mention civil society involvement or participation in any activity, interviews demonstrated that project activities in most of *READI*'s nine focal areas have had input from non-state actors.²

1.3.1.2 ASEM/ASEF

The *ASEM Dialogue Facility* MTE (2010) mentions civil society participation in general terms but does not elaborate: "ASEM Summits have been held every two years, starting in 1998. ASEM Summits and Ministerial Meetings (across various sectors) address global issues of common concern and are supported by regular meetings of senior officials. Apart from the summits and ministerial meetings, a total

² see <http://readi.asean.org/>

of 188 ASEM events have taken place between 1997 and 2009, across three pillars, political, economic and social/cultural, including numerous expert-level, thematic working meetings and symposia, often involving the business communities and civil society groups of the two regions” (p.7)

As the civil society arm of ASEM, the strengthening of civil society participation in Europe-Asia relations is at the core of ASEF’s mandate as clearly outlined in the RSP (p. 10): *“The support to the work of the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) is aimed at enhancing ASEF’s role as an effective institution promoting intellectual, cultural and people-to-people exchanges between Asia and Europe. This will allow the ASEF to build on its current programme to promote exchanges between the civil societies in Asia and Europe, foster links between governments and civil society groups, contribute to policy dialogues and academic debates on themes of inter-regional importance, and complement and support the official ASEM dialogues and events”.*

More specifically, the first ASEM resolved that *‘an Asia-Europe Foundation would be set up in Singapore with contributions from Asian and European countries, to promote exchanges between think-tanks, peoples, and cultural groups.’* The nature and scope of ASEF’s mandate is defined in the Dublin Agreed Principles (DP) of the Asia-Europe Foundation as *‘to promote better mutual understanding between Asia and Europe through greater intellectual, cultural and people-to-people exchanges’* (ASEF Evaluation, 2011, p. iii).

The ROM of the Third Phase of Community Support to ASEF, 2009 (p.4), finds, *“ASEF is providing a neutral platform for civil society dialogue in the complex cultural framework of Asia-Europe relations. Awareness and project impact are limited to stakeholders and project participants but this is contributing to inter-regional exchange (at least on the level of individual projects).”*

Furthermore, especially on the aspect of gender, *“ASEF project activities in the field of civil society and governance intend to contribute to the achievement of the so-called DCI Regulation (2006) with regards to integrating gender equality issues in co-operation activities. Project activities however have not explicitly addressed gender issues, despite this intended aim. Neither the civil society conference (Beijing, October 2008), nor the ASEM Informal Seminar on Human Rights (Strasbourg, February 2009) appear to have raised gender specifically. These project activities are therefore classified as “0” on the OECD GPM. The absence of explicitly addressing gender in this third tranche component or in any of the other components (education, environment) represents a thematic gap in ASEF’s main purpose to cultural rapprochement between Asia and Europe. It is probably useful to review this issue as ASEF is now focusing operations on potentially gender-sensitive thematic priority sectors (economy and society, environment, and health, in particular)”.*

The ASEF Evaluation of 2011 also expresses a certain criticism of ASEF’s approach: *“As concerns the role of ASEF as an organisation to facilitate civil society dialogue and networking, the fact that no less than 42.5% of all the co-organising partners are in the education sector suggests, that ASEF is not covering its whole mandate. Indeed, there is a non-existence or quasi non-existence of partnerships in the key thematic / result area of Economy and Society (business organisations and labour organisations) even though large networking multiplier effects can be materialized and sustained through these organisations”* (p. iv). The latter point has been addressed since 2011 and economy and economy & societies has now been established as one of ASEF’s thematic pillars.

At the same time, the ASEM evaluation indicates that civil society participation has been successful in cases in which ASEM and ASEF have interacted: *“The Asia-Europe People’s Forum and Business Forum: Alongside the ASEM intergovernmental dialogue process, similar dialogue processes take place between civil society stakeholders of Asia and Europe (for example the Asia Europe People’s Forum) and the non-state actors in the economic and socio-economic sectors (for example the Asia Europe Business Forum). During the ... 8th ASEM Summit held in Brussels on 4-5 October of ... 2010, a prominent place was reserved for People’s Forum and Business Forum dialogues. Pro-actively enhancing the interactions between ASEM, ASEF and these two fora in an effective, sustainable, complementary and mutually reinforcing manner remains a crucially important challenge as evidenced by the different evaluation interviews.”* (ASEF Evaluation, 2011, E-Annex 2.2., p. 1).

Generally, as already mentioned under Indicator 111, ASEF cannot be expected to function as a coordinating body in a sense that all civil society processes emanating from the ASEM dialogue would be steered and managed through ASEF-

1.3.2 Indicator 133: Increased quantity and quality of research collaboration

Research collaboration essentially takes place at the level of civil society within the framework of EU-funded activities in the higher education sector, as elaborated on in detail under EQ6. At the same time, interventions in other sectors can potentially play a contributing role. However, *APRIS, ARISE,*

ECAP, and most other interventions in support of ASEAN and SAARC have not strongly encouraged or fostered research collaboration between Europe and Asia. The exceptions are the *ASEM Dialogue Facility* and *ASEF* and also – to some extent *READI*, especially in its focal area “Science and Technology”

The *ASEM Dialogue Facility* Action Fiche states, “*The dialogue initiatives will be developed with the participation of academic and research society, policymakers, business and civil society and social partners from both the EU and Asia*” (p. 4). However, the *ASEM DF MTR* does not answer the question if this has actually been the case; nor is there information on the fostering of research collaboration through the *Dialogue Facility*.

The *ASEF* Evaluation is equally silent on achievements towards the strengthening of inter-regional research collaboration. However, the evaluation implicitly suggests that “*Education and Academic Co-operation*”, which has surely included research collaboration, has been the main focus of *ASEF*:

“The inventory table shows a total of 619 ASEF partners over the period 1997-2011, of which 51.7% are located in Asia, 47.0% in Europe and 1.3% in other continents. A breakdown of the partners list by ASEF key result areas shows that by far the largest number of partnerships are in the thematic areas of Education and Academic Co-operation (36.9% of the total number of ASEF partners), and of Arts and Culture (with 33.8% of the total). Together these two thematic areas cover more than two thirds (70.7%) of all ASEF partners. Human Rights and Governance (HRG) is a far third with 15.3% of the partners, followed by Economy and Society (ECS) with 7.8%. Five thematic areas cover less than 5% of the partnership network. The ASEF network has kept expanding over time in quantitative terms. However, ASEF does not have a clear-cut definition of what exactly qualifies an organisation as an ASEF partner.” (p. v)

1.3.3 Indicator 133: Evidence of increased awareness of Europe in Asia and vice versa as the result of civil society interactions

Neither the *ASEF* evaluation nor any other studies and documents provide hard evidence for increased awareness. The *ASEF* evaluation of 2011 includes some generally relevant observations:

“Generally, ASEF’s uniqueness, continued relevance and strong potential added value as a facilitator of bi-directional civil society policy dialogue between Asia and Europe and within these continents, and alignment of this dialogue with the overall intergovernmental ASEM dialogue process, and with its own projects portfolio, are confirmed by the partner survey as well as by the interviews. This satisfaction, however, is more related to the quality of the events stricto sensu rather than to their results and impact. Moreover, this appreciation is of a general nature and does not appear to be emanating from objective performance accomplishments. While the survey with ASEF partners indicates that partner organisations are in general from quite to very satisfied with ASEF activities, only one of them managed to report explicitly on a specific indicator of achievement to gauge ASEF thematic area progress and results in relation to the ASEM process. The result dimension of the ASEF initiatives generally scored lower than the quality of the events and project activities themselves” (pp. vi-vii)

The evaluation also finds that *ASEF*’s visibility among EU Delegations is rather limited while expectations are high as to what *ASEF* can deliver in terms of increasing awareness of Europe and Asia respectively: “*Apart from the EU Delegation to Singapore which is highly appreciative about ASEF’s visibility, added value, quality of collaboration and co-operation, the other Delegations appear hardly involved or in some cases even hardly aware of ASEF’s initiatives and projects. But on the other hand (strong) interests in strengthening the relationships / partnerships are reported, including the belief of the strong potentials of ASEF in increasing the visibility of the EU and as vehicle for the promotion of the Asia-Europe Dialogue process under ASEM. Needless to point out that this main finding signifies a special appeal and concrete invitation to ASEF to strengthen its networking relationships and partnerships with the EU Delegations to ASEF Asian Member Countries to enhance the relevance, effectiveness, impact and multiplier effects of its civil society dialogue programmes, projects and initiatives within and amongst these ASEF Member Countries. ASEF may consider developing and effectively implementing a special networking (sub-)strategy targeting the EU Delegations (and with them the EU Centres) as priority, high potential networking partners and programme conduits. Vice versa, the EU Delegations may consider giving ASEF a more prominent place in their civil society dialogue strategies and programmes”*. (*ASEF Evaluation, 2011, Annex 5.2 p. 3*)

However, the *ASEF ROM, 2009*, does not refer to any strong evidence in support of *ASEF*’s contribution to increased mutual awareness in EU-Asia relations: “*Official publications and ASEF project activities (...) acknowledge EC funding, but no deeper insights on EC funding (mechanisms, purpose ..) has been provided. As target groups are clustered, it may be possible and useful to provide further rele-*

vant information on EC missions to schools, universities, art communities, etc. It has been noted however that event summarising publications such as the Roundtable Papers have not systematically acknowledged EC funding.”

2 EQ2 on regional added value to economic integration

EQ2: To what extent has EU support in Asia contributed to progress towards regional economic integration?

2.1 JC 21 Degree to which regional EU-level support facilitated the development and conclusion of regional legal and institutional architecture, addressing key issues for economic integration

2.1.1 Indicator 211: EU-supported regional trade and investment policy strategies in place and embedded in a coordinated agenda for implementation

A comparison of the framework conditions for regional economic integration in Southeast Asia and South Asia reveals striking differences.

ASEAN has stepped up its integration efforts over the last few years. With the entering into force of ASEAN's Charter at the end of 2008 and the adoption of the economic community blueprint, a detailed strategy for the implementation of a fully integrated economic community by 2015, ASEAN has a clear roadmap for the deepening of economic integration in Southeast Asia.

With regard to SAARC, the 2010 MTR/MIP (p. 9) concluded, “*in contrast [to Southeast Asia], South Asia is characterised by a low level of regional integration, and our direct co-operation with SAARC is seriously hampered. Although some EUR 2.6 million were committed in 2007 for EU-SAARC Economic Co-operation, and tremendous efforts were made by the Commission to safeguard the project, the funds are now lost because SAARC Member States did not empower the SAARC Secretariat to sign the Financing Agreement.*” Overall, ASEAN is the only EU-supported regional organisation in Asia with a comprehensive agenda for the regional integration of trade and investment regimes, embedded in the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint. Inevitably, ASEAN has taken centre-stage in the actions in support of regional trade and investment, as well as generally TRA, under the RSP.

Box 5 Example of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint

Signed by the ASEAN Leaders at the 13th ASEAN Summit on 20 November 2007, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint lays the foundation for realising the goal of ASEAN as an integrated economic region by 2015. The AEC is based on four pillars:

- **Single market and production base**, which comprises five core elements: (i) free flow of goods; (ii) free flow of services; (iii) free flow of investment; (iv) free flow of capital; and (v) free flow of skilled labour. In addition, the single market and production base also include two important components, namely, the priority integration sectors, and food, agriculture and forestry.
- **Competitive economic region**: The main objective of the competition policy is to foster a culture of fair competition. Institutions and laws related to competition policy have recently been established in some (but not all) ASEAN Member States (AMS). There is currently no official ASEAN body for cooperative work on Competition Policy and Law (CPL) to serve as a network for competition agencies or relevant bodies to exchange policy experiences and institutional norms on CPL.
- **Equitable economic development**, which covers SME development as well as collective efforts to narrow the development gap within ASEAN and between ASEAN and other parts of the world as expressed in the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI).
- **Integration into the Global Economy** to enable ASEAN businesses to compete internationally, to make ASEAN a more dynamic and stronger segment of the global supply chain and to ensure that the internal market remains attractive for foreign investment.

Each pillar is defined by various detailed implementation objectives and timelines and related specific action points. The 19th ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting, held in Hanoi on 8 March 2013, reaffirmed ASEAN's determination to establish the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 31 December 2015.

Based on the Blueprint and forming an important core of the AEC is the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), which entered into force 17 May 2010. On paper ATIGA is comprehensive in its scope and aims at bringing transparency to regional trade liberalisation, thereby consolidating all commitments related to trade in goods. It focuses not only on tariff liberalisation and non-tariff measures, but also includes matters related to simplification of rules of origin and its implementation.

Source: ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint (AEC), <http://www.asean.org/archive/5187-10.pdf>

2.1.1.1 ASEAN

The EU has followed a comprehensive multi-level strategy to trade related assistance for ASEAN. Of particular importance was *APRIS II*, which, according to the *APRIS II* final evaluation, the TRA Evaluation, Vol2a, 2013, and interviews conducted at the ASEAN Secretariat, made important contributions to:

- The adoption of harmonised ASEAN standards, conformance measures and regulations in specific sectors;
- The harmonisation of ASEAN standards with international standards, guided by EU standards where relevant;
- The development of common post market surveillance systems in ASEAN Member States (AMS);
- The development of ASEAN Reference Laboratories and improved knowledge of Good Manufacturing Practise;
- The gradual implementation of the ASEAN Single Window (ASW) and ASEAN Customs Declaration Document (ACDD) and Certificates of Origin (particularly the CEPT Form and preferential Certificates of Origin);
- The harmonisation of data in other trade documents as an input to the envisaged ASW. In this regard, the ASEAN Single Window Technical Working Group (TWG) agreed to attach priority to Certificates of Origin, including Form A for GSO and Form D for CEPT/AFTA, in pursuing its data-harmonisation agenda.
- However, the two year gap between the completion of *APRIS II* in 2010 and the beginning of the succeeding project *ARISE* in 2012 resulted in delays or even a standstill in the process of implementing the above mentioned actions. According to ASEC stakeholders, in the case of the ASW, USAID de facto took over ASW with the result that the Single Window is now widely perceived as a US initiative.

The evaluations of *ECAP II* and ASEAN also agree that EC support has contributed to put in place harmonised (investment) strategies and policies:

The Evaluation states that that *ECAP II* paved the way for regional harmonisation and became “a reputed authority and a reference point for IPR development in ASEAN. The most visible result was that the EU approach to Geographical Indications (as opposed to the US favoured brand marks approach) has been widely adopted and forms the main pillar for regional harmonisation in ASEAN. Overall, *ECAP* has established the basic foundations for IPR systems to be conducive to trade, investment and technology transfer in the future. Furthermore, *ECAP II* strengthened interactions among IPR actors i.e. between private sector enforcement agencies and between academic institutions and administrative bodies in areas where this interaction did not exist” (p. 136).

The Evaluation of the EU’s TRA found that multiple channels to promote regional integration and trade were used in the case of ASEAN.


While several CLEs have come to similar findings and stressed the effectiveness of EU TRA, they also identified shortcomings regarding the embeddedness of regional- and national-level strategies in co-ordinated agenda for implementation. For example, in the Philippines: in addition to the bilateral project TRTA 2, the *ECAP III* and *APRIS II* also made a contribution to “further integrate ASEAN countries into the global economy and world trading system to promote economic growth and reduce poverty in the region” (*ECAP III*) and “to further the process of ASEAN integration, with specific focus on supporting the realisation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and strengthen EU-ASEAN relations as a whole, including through and the *TREATI* and *READI*”. The Philippines participated in both projects. “As in the earlier case of TRTA 1, *ECAP II* and *APRIS I* there is a clear overlap among the three intervention’s objectives, outputs and expected results. However, aspects of coordination among these interventions and potential synergies (or potential conflicts) are not addressed in the project documentations. ...information sharing and consultation between TRTA and regional projects take place on a regular basis. The EU Delegation in Manila is regularly briefed by project officers and experts who are associated with regional EU-ASEAN projects. Overall, however, coordination takes place on an ad hoc basis and is not formalised or institutionalised” (Philippines CLE, vol. 2p. 182-183). Earlier, the Evaluation of EC co-operation with ASEAN recommended to strengthen mutually reinforcing linkages between regional and bilateral support: “The EC should redouble efforts already underway to improve the coordination of the pillars of support – bilateral projects and technical assistance, country-based ASEAN projects, and support to the ASEC, to ensure that synergies are achieved.” (Vol. 1, p. vii). Interviews conducted during the ASEAN field mission demonstrated that lessons from previous projects

and the early phase of the EU Asia Strategy have been learnt. Regional and bilateral programmes directed at fostering regional integration are now much stronger intertwined than in the past and communication and exchange among the respective projects has become a standard approach. For instance, the *ARISE* project team and the EU Delegation in Jakarta spoke of an increasingly pro-active approach to linking the national and regional levels of support. Regular interaction between *ARISE* on the one hand and national TRA projects, such as TSP II and TSF in Indonesia, on the other, is now the norm.

2.1.1.2 ASEM

It is important to re-emphasise the fact that although ASEM is an inter-regional forum, the Asia Strategy nevertheless subsumes ASEM and consequently the ASEM Dialogue Facility under the stream “*support for regional integration*”. The RSP envisions that both the ASEM Dialogue Facility and ASEF would contribute to progress regional trade and investment strategies,

Figure 1 ASEM Dialogue Facility within the EU Regional strategy for Asia



Source: ASEM MTE, 2010, p. 11

The Mid-term Evaluation of the *ASEM Dialogue Facility*, 2010, confirms the centrality of “*global economic issues and issues relating to Asian integration*” in the ASEM dialogue. To this end, the ASEM Dialogue Facility is described as “*the principal instrument for facilitating the necessary dialogue on international reports on macroeconomic issues. Also ideas of Asian integration can be borrowed from the EU experience*” (p. 20). However, the list of projects funded by the *ASEM DF* does not point to Asian economic integration, including trade and investment, as a central focus. Only two conferences, both organised in 2008, explicitly addressed regional economic integration: “*Asia, Europe and the Future of Regional Economic Integration*” and “*Economic and financial integration in the EU and Asia a decade after the Asian financial crisis and the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union*”. None of the titles of activities funded under the *ASEM DF II, III and IV* suggest any direct relation with regional economic integration or even macroeconomic issues in general. This finding should not be read as an indication of the dialogues facility’s failure to achieve its objectives, but it shows that the original thematic “*wish list*” for projects funded under the DF did not fully anticipate the actual demand from stakeholders in ASEM MS, which has been overwhelmingly in non-economic areas.

ASEF’s original agenda did not include an explicit economic focus. ASEF was established to promote “*better mutual understanding between Asia and Europe through greater intellectual, cultural and peo-*

ple-to-people exchanges” in general terms, according to the “Dublin Agreed Principles of the Asia-Europe Foundation” (Attachment A of ANNEX 1 – 5th Asia-Europe Meeting, Hanoi, Vietnam 2005)³

However, since about 2011 and responding to ASEM member states’ interests, ASEF has developed a stronger emphasis on economic fields which were identified as joint Asian and European interests. Following the Dublin Principles, ASEF can be asked to implement “any project assigned by meetings of ASEM leaders or Ministers and the relevant member of the European Commission”. Under the new thematic area of “Economy & Society”, ASEF focuses on examining the impact of the post-2008 economic crisis on society. The objective is to engage representatives from government and civil society in a collective reflection, and to give inputs for innovative and integrated policy recommendations. Yet, it would be an exaggeration to say that ASEF actively contributes to trade and investment agendas in Europe-Asia relations. While ASEF sits at the same table with ASEM education ministers there is no direct ASEF representation at ASEM economic ministers meetings (interviews at ASEF, August 2013).

2.1.1.3 SAARC

SAARC Member States have not received EU support to foster regional integration given the limited significance of SAARC. The EU Delegation in Bangladesh “ (TRA Evaluation, 2013, field visit report Bangladesh) and the EU Delegation, EU MS Embassies and government stakeholders in Nepal stressed the low significance of attempts at regional economic integration due to the existing structural problems and challenges. These are characterised, inter alia, by India’s overwhelming economic and political dominance, prevailing security conflicts in the region, which restrict the potential for cross-border trade, and substantial infrastructure bottlenecks.

The South Asian region has attempted to intensify regional economic integration since the mid-1980s through regional, subregional and bilateral arrangements. There are currently more than 25 signed or proposed FTAs in the region; one is a subregional trade grouping, the Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Techno-Economic Co-operation (BIMSTEC), and one is a regional trade agreement (SAFTA) – under SAARC - while the other are bilateral trade agreements. Unlike many other regional schemes in different parts of the world, attempts at regional economic integration in South Asia has made little headway in expanding trade within the region. The region has maintained a high growth rate in its external sector performance but growth in intraregional trade is a relatively recent phenomenon. Inter-regional trade accounts for less than 5% of South Asia’s overall trade. By comparison, inter-regional trade in ASEAN currently stands at 25% (see below) (Sachin Chaturvedi. Trade Facilitation Measures in Southeast Asian FTAs: an Overview of Initiatives and Policy Approaches).⁴

The European Commission has been providing financial assistance to SAARC since 1996. In particular, after the adoption of the South Asian Free Trade Agreement in 2004, the EU concentrated on assisting SAARC countries in regional capacity-building. Results, however, are limited. The MTR of the Asia Strategy, 2010, found “*Although some € 2.6 million were committed in 2007 for EU-SAARC Economic Co-operation, and tremendous efforts were made by the Commission to safeguard the project, the funds are now lost because SAARC Member States did not empower the SAARC Secretariat to sign the Financing Agreement. Alternatively, the € 5.2 million EU-South Asia Civil Aviation Programme, Phase II has been formulated with direct involvement of the civil aviation authorities of each SAARC Member States, but without any provisions for contractual involvement of the SAARC Secretariat. It is therefore clear that our direct co-operation with SAARC will have to be more modest*” (p.10).

SAARC officials suggested that the initial initiative to strengthen economic co-operation failed because the “*the EU wanted to start too big*” (interviews in Kathmandu, August 2013). They also explained that the EU tried very hard to convince SAARC of the project’s benefits “*but SAARC member states were not ready yet*”. Other stakeholders pointed out that the SAARC Secretariat also shared some responsibility by failing to anticipate the member states’ resistance. While the Secretariat is empowered to negotiate co-operation agreements with external stakeholders, such agreements need the approval of the member states which meet in the SAARC Standing Committee. However, the Standing Committee comes together only once a year making it difficult and challenging to achieve political consensus in a timely manner (interviews in Kathmandu, August 2013).

The substitute *EU-South Asia Civil Aviation Project* aimed specifically to strengthen the institutional capacity of civil aviation regulators, accelerate the integration of the air transport sector, and ensure a

³ http://www.aseminfoboard.org/2011-12-22-06-12-20/item/download/173_5e4c5bf9829d6f8ccea07cb3b88e2a3b2.html

⁴ <http://e.unescap.org/tid/artnet/pub/wp2807.pdf>

safe and secure aviation environment in the region, by harmonising standards and practices and by making them compatible with EU and International standards. However, the project was terminated in 2012 (see under Indicator 224).

2.1.2 Indicator 212: New protocols, framework agreements or harmonised regulations agreed and implemented

Only EU regional-level support to ASEAN has made a contribution in this area. Neither the *ASEM DF* nor support to SAARC has resulted in new protocols, framework agreements or harmonised regulations.

Both the TRA Evaluation, 2013, and the Evaluation of EU-ASEAN co-operation, 2009, stress the significant role of the EU in facilitating the negotiation and implementation of a wide range of relevant regional agreements.

According to the TRA Evaluation, vol 2, “*ASEAN has to be considered the greatest success story in terms of the number of outputs and the most targeted and streamlined approach, as all interventions took place under the umbrella of APRIS II.*” APRIS contributed to the preparation of common regulatory regimes, such as in cosmetics and electrical and electronic equipment (EEE), as well as to the preparation and adoption of common trade documents – for example, ASEAN Harmonised Tariff Nomenclature (AHTN) and ASEAN Customs Declaration Document (ACDD). Several legal and regulatory adjustments resulted from the EU’s interventions, and these have been pivotal in developing an improved and modernised operational environment for trade at national or regional level. (p.37).

Overall, however, not all agreements have been implemented according to schedule: The obligation to comply with SPS and TBT measures has strengthened regional trade regimes in some regions, and intellectual property rights have been a major success in the specific case of ASEAN. Progress has often been slow due a lack of political will (partly related to national protectionism) or low technical capacity, expectation-capability gaps in regional economic integration processes, and the inter-governmental nature (as opposed to supra-national structures) of ASEAN (TRA Evaluation, 2012, vol 1, p. iv; interviews at ASEC, August 2013).

2.1.3 Indicator 213: Increased reliability and accurateness of statistical data

As the only non-European regional organisation ASEAN has established its own monitoring system to keep track of the progress towards regional economic integration. This system is based on two institutional pillars: the ASEAN Integration Monitoring Office (AIMO) and its subordinated statistical unit (ASEANStats). Both AIMO and ASEANStats came into being and have been funded with the substantial financial assistance from international donors, including the European Commission, AusAid, the German agency GIZ, the World Bank and the IMF. The European Commission alone committed nearly EUR 5 million for the development of ASEANStats through the EU-ASEAN Statistical Capacity Building Programme (2009-2013). In fact, both AIMO and ASEANStats are dependent on external funding as the ASEC would not be able to fund the work of these offices from its own budget. Generally, external support for the increasing tasks and workload of the ASEC in the economic community-building process is crucial as ASEAN’s official annual budget of USD 15.76 million in 2012 – slight increased to USD 16.2 million in 2013 – covers little more than the operational costs of the ASEC (TRA Evaluation 2013, Field Visit Report ASEAN; interviews at ASEC, August 2013).

Box 6

EU-ASEAN Statistical Capacity Building Programme: Background

In 2001, the third ASEAN Heads of Statistical Offices Meeting (ASHOM) adopted a “Framework for Co-operation in Statistics” to harmonize and improve the quality and timeliness of regional statistics. The importance of statistics was further reinforced in the Vientiane Action Plan for the ASEAN Community in 2004, setting out the intention to “provide the necessary statistical support for ASEAN initiatives, planning and policy making through improved quality and availability of important statistics, adoption of international good practices, promotion of greater awareness of statistics, enhanced networking and close partnerships between users in policy areas and statistical systems, and wider dissemination of ASEAN statistics through the annual publication of the ASEAN Statistical Yearbook and a continuous expansion of statistical coverage on member countries websites”.

The EU, together with EuroStat, had for some time been discussing a support action in this field and following an identification mission in 2005, “Statistical Capacity Building” was identified to support ASEAN’s regional integration objectives in its 2007 Action plan for regional co-operation in Asia.

The Overall Objective of the project is “to support ASEAN integration through more accurate and relevant statistics which facilitate decision-making”. The project has three Project Purposes or Specific Objectives:

- 1. To improve the capacity of ASEAN Secretariat for greater comparability of official statistical data among AMCs as well as between ASEAN and the EU.
- 2. To improve production, compilation, dissemination and use of better quality statistical data on international merchandise trade (IMT) and relevant components of international trade in services (ITS) and foreign direct investment (FDI), other Non-Observed Economy (NOE), selected health and education statistics as well as to lay down the necessary foundation for the development of ICT and forestry statistics within AMCs.
- 3. To strengthen statistical capacity of those ASEAN countries that need most support, particularly Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam (CLVs)

Source: *EASCAP, Project Synopsis, Title: EU-ASEAN Statistical Capacity Building Programme, Project Number: CDI-ASIE/2007/018-383.*

The assessment of *EASCAP* is generally positive: *EASCAP* has made substantial contributions in the following ways: Despite being a very small and understaffed unit, ASEANStats has been able to generate important and useful regional statistics, including core trade data such as 8 digit merchandise trade data, which is available from the ASEANStats Database. Until 2012 this data had only been used for internal purposes (for ASEAN officials) and were not publicly available. However, an agreement among AMS on data dissemination was eventually reached. The delay was related to confidentiality issues as some AMS consider trade data in specific sectors (for example telecommunications) as sensitive or because trade data is sold commercially by some national statistical agencies.

Country statistics are available since early 2012. In the same year ASEC published the ASEAN International Merchandise Trade Statistics Yearbook (IMTS). It presents time series data and trends on ASEAN international merchandise trade covering the period from 1993 to 2011 at HS 6-digit level. The assistance of *EASCAP* is prominently acknowledged in the Yearbook. Data on trade in goods and services and regional FDI is now also aligned with the AEC to facilitating easier monitoring of AEC implementation (TRA Evaluation, Field Visit Report ASEAN; interviews at ASEC, August 2013; IMTS Yearbook, 2012⁵), “Throughout the region, the stakeholders seen appeared very enthusiastic and committed to the development of statistics both for national and regional purposes. *EASCAP* is acting as a catalyst and is leaving in the region a legacy of awareness and ownership that has the momentum to continue long after the programme has expired” (*EASCAP MTE*, 2011, p. 11). “*EASCAP* was clearly greatly appreciated by the ASEAN Member States. Each country gained greatly from the programme. Considerable capacity in the ASEAN Member States statistics offices was built by *EASCAP* in relation to the ability to compile statistics in the three core areas and also, to an extent, in MDG indicators. *EASCAP* also helped build an understanding within AMS of the usefulness of adopting international statistical standards and of how to work in international co-operation. The regional statistics standards have been substantially established in the key areas. Staff have been trained. Regional statistics systems, such as REXDBS, have been developed. The means of regional statistical co-operation through the ACSS is an enormous benefit to the participants that is a direct result of the *EASCAP* project. In contrast, the human capacity built at ASEAN Secretariat is relatively limited” (Formulation mission for the follow-up *Institutional Capacity Building for ASEAN Monitoring and Statistics*, FWC BENEf 2009 Lot 11 2011/276286, Final Report 09/04/2012, p. 22). A valuable contribution of the EU support to ASEAN statistics was that it has instigated an “*ASEAN helps ASEAN*” system in which stakeholders from more advanced AMS provide capacity building for those from less developed AMS. For example, the Bank of Thailand has provided training on statistics for the national banks of the CLMV countries.

⁵ http://eascap.asean.org/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&Itemid=8&view=finish&cid=528&catid=3&m=0.

However, shortcomings are also identified which are partly related to the nature of ASEAN and the structural constraints to the regional economic integration process. *“There are limitations on what ASEC can achieve with respect to its mandate to monitor integration policies, as a consequence both of the scale of the institution, given its limited staffing, and its existing working procedures with ASEAN Member States. However, both ASEC and AMS national statistics offices are well aware of these limitations and have been working towards overcoming these challenges.”* (Formulation mission, p. 18; interviews at ASEC, August 2013). There was no support to regional statistics for SAARC or through ASEM.

2.1.4 Indicator 214: Approaches to IPR strengthened and implemented at regional and national levels

As in the case of the previous indicators, EU regional-level support has been restricted to ASEAN. *ECAP* has been at the core of regional approaches to IPR. *ECAP II* succeeded in bringing most national IP legislations in with:

TRIPS requirements. However, the *ECAP II* Final Evaluation, 2008, found that *“despite some noticeable progress, much remains to be done to bring the enforcement system of most countries in line with TRIPS requirements... There is still a high degree of lack of awareness and professional education on IP among mid-level government officials, consumers, research institutes, universities and private companies, even of officials that are directly in charge of enforcing IPRs. IPRs are still widely perceived as serving foreign at the detriment of local interests.”* A key conclusion of the Evaluation was: *“Integration in terms of harmonized legislation, common structure structures or co-operation between national IP administration and enforcement authorities remains very limited.”*

The Vietnam CLE, 2009, confirmed this finding: *“The positive impact of ECAP II has been limited to supporting sharing of experiences between IPR professionals across all ASEAN nations. There is little evidence of ECAP II contributing to establish any IPR structures or policies at the regional level”* (Vol. 2, p. 105).

ECAP III was designed to address the weak points as identified by the *ECAP II* Evaluation: improvement of the legal context and administration (improvement of registration systems, civil, criminal and customs enforcement, court rulings etc...), harmonisation and enhancement of IPR enforcement systems (specific trainings such as how to distinguish genuine from fake products such as pharmaceuticals and drugs), increase of awareness of high-level officials and general public (dissemination should target also provincial branches of enforcement bodies), enhancement of IP education. (p. 7). However, implementation proved to be a difficult and challenging process.

At a regional level, policy dialogue under the framework of *ECAP III* was complicated mainly due to ASEAN's perceived problems in *ECAP III* implementation. ASEAN requested the replacement of both, the Director and the Deputy of the Bangkok-based PMT and the realignment of *ECAP III* with the ASEAN IPR Action Plan 2011-2015. The Bangkok Delegation organised a meeting with all parties in September 2011 to jointly resolve pending issues, especially with regard to any adjustment of the programme to meet ASEAN's demands. (The EAMR Thailand 6/2011)

However, further complication was added in 2012 after the European Patent Office (EPO) terminated the contract. Subsequently the Bangkok Delegation started negotiations with the Office of Harmonization for Internal Markets (OHIM) – an EU agency willing to take over *ECAP III*. A proposal for the new phase of *ECAP III* was received in June 2012, and was used as a basis for an amendment of the Financing Agreement with ASEAN. The contract was finalised and signed by 21 October 2012 (EAMR 6/2012) In November 2012, *“ECAP III Phase II was re-started with a meeting of the ASEAN Working Group on Intellectual Property Co-operation (AWGIPC) meeting in November 2012. At the meeting, OHIM presented to ASEAN the preliminary outline of the project's activities in Phase II, which were well-received by ASEAN. The OHIM team began the Inception Phase by visiting all ASEAN countries in January 2013.”* (EAMR 12/2012)

2.1.5 Indicator 215: Role of EU as important source of expertise on regional economic integration acknowledged by Asian partners

2.1.5.1 ASEAN

There is ample evidence from a range of sources that the EU is perceived as an important source of expertise, reference or even model for ASEAN. This point was made in several interviews with ASEAN stakeholders and also in contexts unrelated to the evaluation. For example in a Roundtable Discus-

sion on ASEAN in Berlin it was highlighted that, “in ASEAN we want to learn from the EU experience” (evaluator’s transcript).

The “*Masterplan on ASEAN connectivity*”, published by the ASEAN Secretariat in December 2010 makes explicit reference to the EU: “*Sub-regional initiatives also contribute to ASEAN efforts in improving cross-border facilitation and institutional connectivity. Of particular importance is the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) Cross-Border Transport Agreement (CBTA), which emphasises key issues such as exchange of commercial traffic rights, single-stop inspection and single-window inspection at key border checkpoints. Such initiatives, together with international efforts such as the EU experience, offer useful lessons for efforts to enhance ASEAN connectivity through improved cross-border facilitation and management*” (p. 26).

Generally, however, the EU is seldom mentioned in key ASEAN documents, except those on ASEAN-EU relations itself. The following EU-commissioned evaluations are more explicit in this regard.

- The Evaluation of EU-ASEAN co-operation, vol. 1, 2009, outlines, “*While it is clear from project documentation and interviews that neither APRIS nor other EC interventions want to ‘sell’ European models, EC interventions meet ASEC’s explicitly expressed interest in familiarizing itself with structures, processes and agencies of the European integration process. The EC was able to offer specific experience and, by, exploiting its comparative advantage in the area of economic integration, added value. The close integration of APRIS consultancy and technical studies into the ASEAN Secretariat work agenda is adequate evidence of the relevance of the work to the ASEAN Secretariat’s needs*” (p.17). and
- “*All EC-ASEAN projects (particularly the standards programme, ECAP, and APRIS) contributed to an increase in knowledge regarding Europe and the shaping of positive opinions towards the EU and EC among project participants. However, increased visibility does not seem to go much beyond the groups of stakeholders who are directly involved in project implementation. The impact of EC-ASEAN programmes was very limited in terms of the dissemination of information about the EC/EU to the broader audiences* (p. 18).
- “*Despite occasional frustrations (the EU’s focus on Burma / Myanmar; the tendency to view EU-ASEAN relations as a bundle of bilateral relationships rather than an integrated relationship between two regional bodies, irritation with the relatively low level of European representational regional meetings), the EU is viewed as a valuable partner and one with a great deal to offer. While Europe is not seen to be a provider of models to be imitated, it is seen as a reference point, a source of concrete experiences to be examined. However, this view is more widespread among ASEC officials than in the ASEAN member states, particularly in Malaysia and Thailand where governments generally tend to take a sceptical view on the suitability of European models for ASEAN*” (p. 19)
- The APRIS II final evaluation, 2011, concludes in a similar vein, “*APRIS II has been able to deliver qualitative information on EU regulations, processes, techniques and know-how in general, which participants in workshops have highly praised and will continue to welcome in the future, as the EU remains a true model of integration, even though the ASEAN integration may follow different ways*” (p. 34).
- The TRA Evaluation, ASEAN Field Mission Report presents essentially the same finding, “*Interviewees almost unanimously confirmed that the EC is seen as the most relevant and trusted partner in the area of economic integration. Given the EU’s long history of forming an economic community, projects related to regional integration and TRA in general enjoy an especially high degree of legitimacy in the eyes of ASEAN stakeholders*” (p. 21).
- The READI “First Six Months Report”, 2012, explains, “*The main objective here is to support regulatory exchanges aiming at improving the regulatory framework for the telecom sector. The EU experience can be useful to the ASEAN: i) ASEAN Member States having studied the EU regulatory approach and related lessons learned when adopting / updating their regulatory framework for electronic communication, and ii) An improved performance of ASEAN National Regulatory Authorities in view of fostering innovation and competition.*” (p. 14).
- Last but not least, the Formulation mission for intervention “Capacity Building for ASEAN Monitoring and Statistics”, 2012, notes, “*The on-going EASCAB programme provides valuable lessons for future co-operation: ‘The EU model for monitoring, despite significant institutional differences, has been a valuable source of inspiration for ASEAN; the close collaboration with*

Eurostat should be continued to enable effective coordination with the European Statistical System” (p. 22).

2.1.5.2 ASEM

Increasing Europe’s visibility in Asia (and vice versa) is a key objective of both ASEM and ASEF. The latter in particular has conducted several activities to this end, including the programmes “*EU through the Eyes of Asia*” and “*Culture 360*”, an online platform connecting both regions through arts and culture – both “high impact projects” according to the ASEF MTE. Since 2008, ASEF Departments have put strong emphasis on visibility and public outreach in all activities. There are no explicit surveys to confirm that these activities have also strengthened the EU’s credibility an important source of expertise but – given the well developed focus on EU visibility – it can be assumed that this has been the case (The MTE of the ASEM DF also elaborates on this aspect: “*The ASEM Dialogue is complementary to bi-lateral relationships. Although, the inter-regional dialogue requires more resources than the bi-lateral, the inter-regional approach is more economical. It’s more efficient for international regional topics to be discussed at the EU/Asia level because of economies of scale – “more bang for buck”. Also, in inter-regional relations, the EU experience is central to discussions on, for example, regional integration, common regional currency, convergence of financial systems, balance of payments system*” (p. 21).

2.1.5.3 SAARC

There is currently no documented evidence available to assess the role of the EU as a source of expertise in relations with SAARC.

2.2 JC 22: Extent to which regional-level EU support to Asia has facilitated the regional flow of goods and services

2.2.1 Indicator 221: EU-supported regional trade agreements implemented and utilised

2.2.1.1 ASEAN

The Indonesia EAMR 01/2008, the first EAMR that reports on EU-ASEAN relations, aptly summarises the EU approach: “*A key objective of the EC support to ASEAN is to support the economic integration of the ASEAN Countries. With the adoption of the ASEAN Charter and the adoption of the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint at the ASEAN Summit in November 2007, the institutional framework for this integration process has been strengthened.*”

At the same time the TRA Evaluations cautions in general terms but also with specific reference to ASEAN, “*The examples especially of ASEAN, ECOWAS and COMESA show that **it is not enough to support the establishment of free trade areas (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs) on paper.** In almost every region where the EU has supported regional economic integration, at least one of these two is formally in place. At the same time, nowhere are FTAs or CUs fully implemented or utilised due to, inter alia, complex procedures regarding rules-of-origin and value-added rules, or discordant customs systems and procedures. These hurdles have not been fully anticipated and addressed by EU interventions. The EU needs to develop a better understanding and appreciation of the political framework conditions that determine the success or failure of regional integration.*” (p. 45).

Box 7 *The ASEAN Free Trade AREA (AFTA)*

In 1992, the ASEAN Heads of State and Governments agreed on the gradual implementation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). The main objective was to increase ASEAN's competitive edge as the production base for the world market by decreasing intra-regional tariff rates to 0–5% through the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme within a 15-year period. The completion date was, however, progressively advanced. AFTA succeeded in lowering the average tariff rates from 11.44% in 1993 to 2.39% in 2003 for the ASEAN-6 countries. In 2000, the original goal of 0–5% was changed to zero tariff on all products by 2010 for the ASEAN-6 and 2015 for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV).

By 2010, the ASEAN-6 had eliminated the import duties on 99.65% of their traded tariff lines under CEPT, bringing their average tariff rate to 0.05%. At the same time, 98.86% of the tariff lines of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) have been reduced to 0–5%. The ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint – which forms the basis for the implementation of the ASEAN Economic Community 2015 - stipulated a review and enhancement of the CEPT-AFTA Agreement “to become a comprehensive agreement in realising free flow of goods and applicable to ASEAN needs for accelerated economic integration towards 2015.” To this end, the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) was signed in 2009. ATIGA consolidates and streamlines all provisions in CEPT-AFTA and other protocols related to trade goods into one single legal instrument. It was entered into force in 2010 and supersedes CEPT-AFTA.

Source: Compiled from ASEAN Secretariat source

The EU's main contribution to the implementation and utilisation of CEPT-AFTA and ATIGA has been through *APRIS II*. A main focal point had been the improvement of the ATIGA rules of origin (RoO).

There can be no doubt about the relevance of this intervention as RoO are considered the most decisive bottleneck to regional free trade in Southeast Asia. RoO are the criteria used to define where a product was made, and are essential to any FTA. Their importance stems from the fact that duties and restrictions are often determined based on the country of origin. RoO have been recognised by ASEAN as an important and challenging issue with considerable impact on business activities and regional economic integration efforts. Almost a decade ago, a study found that uncertainty about the RoO hindered businesses from taking advantage of AFTA (Rajan 2004). A more recent analysis still comes to the same conclusion: The cost of proving origin is high—computation of costs, invoicing, and other documentation demands inherent in Value added (VA) rules are complex, especially for SMEs from less developed economies. The VA rule is simple in principle but difficult to comply with and AMS, especially CLMV, are often unable to cumulate the necessary local/regional content, partly due to the high degree of production fragmentation, with half of its trade in electronics and machinery where production networks are widespread. The import content (from non-ASEAN sources) of exports is high, making it difficult to comply with the 40% VA rule (Chia 2010). The scheme for exporters to prove RoO and to benefit from preferential tariff treatment is called “Form D”. However, as confirmed by the Malaysian Ministry of International Trade and Industry, “*most the business sectors are unaware of the existence of this scheme*”⁶

APRIS Pilot projects for a Regional Self-Certification System were launched in Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei with the aim of simplifying documents needed for claiming preferential tariff treatment and improve utilisation of tariff concessions offered under ATIGA.

The final evaluation of *APRIS II*, 2011, concludes, “*The support provided by APRIS II in the effective realisation of the Self Certification Scheme by the three pilot countries has been rated as a key contribution by ASEC and the concerned bodies in AMS. The success can also be attributed to (i) the fact that, for the first time, ASEAN used the “ASEAN minus X rule”, which allows a group of countries to go ahead and implement a measure without waiting for all AMS to be ready, and (ii) the fact the “pilot country group” gathers three among the most developed ASEAN countries, equipped with the financial means and institutional capacities to carry a project through finalisation in a timely fashion.*”

The MTR of the regional strategy, 2010 praises EU-support in the process of implementing regional trade agreements but also points to the hurdles: “*ASEAN's performance in strengthening regional integration has been quite impressive, and has been successfully supported by technical assistance and dialogue under the current MIP. Still, it has become evident that one of the weakest points of ASEAN is the lack of implementation of regional agreements at national level – i.e. enforcement at ASEAN Member State level, as well as capacity constraints in the Secretariat*” (p. 9).

This assessment is mirrored in almost every EAMR on ASEAN (which is covered by the Indonesia EAMR), for example:


⁶ http://www.miti.gov.my/cms/content.jsp?id=com.tms.cms.article.Article_206eda33-c0a8156f-50c650c6-5087b3c5

- 01/2008: “Our support to regional integration agenda may be hampered by weak capacities at the AMS national level: while there are many broad regional agreements, implementation is often delayed due to difficulties in agreeing on implementation modalities, or in transposing them into national legislation for effective entry in force.”
- 01/2010: “While the ASEAN member states have agreed to an ambitious economic integration agenda, the actual implementation and follow-up by the individual member states does not entirely live up to these commitments. . The ASEAN Secretariat is not sufficiently capacitated to effectively support the ambitious integration agenda”.
- 01/2011: “The ASEAN Secretariat is still seriously under resources to be able to effectively support the ambitious integration agenda.”
- 06/2011 point to progress: “The debate of adequate resource mobilisation for ASEC has entered higher level of policy dialogue. Indonesian FM Marty and SG Surin, have recently brought new momentum to this debate to when raising the importance of resources for ASEC during the 44 AMM.”

If, as claimed, *APRIS II* had any significant effect on the implementation and utilisation of CEPT-ATIGA, it does not show in quantitative terms.

Intra-ASEAN trade (as a percentage of the overall trade of the AMS) has not increased markedly since 2003 and only by a mere 4.4% since 1998. While official statistics on intra-ASEAN trade in 2012 are not yet available, national trade data for the AMS suggest that the figure is still in the region of 25%. It is also important to note that two AMS account for roughly 60% of the intra-ASEAN trade volume. Singapore’s exports and imports within ASEAN represent about 40%, while Malaysia’s trade makes up 20%.

Figure 1 Intra-ASEAN Trade 1998-2011



Source: Data compiled from ASEAN Secretariat 2012, *ASEAN Community in Figures 2011*, Jakarta, p. 15; ASEAN Statistics Leaflet, *Selected Key Indicators 2012*.

Not only has the relative volume of intra-ASEAN stagnated. The ASEAN-BAC survey⁷ finds that the utilisation of the free trade agreement remains low. Only 29% of respondents indicated that their organisations used preferential provisions in ASEAN and/or ASEAN-plus economic agreements (ASEAN agreements with other economies such as the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area or ACTFA). This value was higher than the 22% in the 2010 Survey but still a low figure given that ASEAN claims the virtually full implementation of AFTA (AFTA Council 2010, p. 3). However, particularly striking is the fact that nearly half of the survey firms (46%) stated that they were not planning to use preferential provisions in the future (p. 11).

⁷ The 2011-12 ASEAN Business Advisory Council (ASEAN-BAC) Survey on ASEAN Competitiveness – the second of its kind; the first was published in 2010 – collated responses from businesses across all ten ASEAN countries, comprising a mix of small, medium and large firms. They survey is based on 405 “usable responses”. A majority of the surveyed businesses had been in operation for more than ten years, had trade/investment linkages within ASEAN and had at least general knowledge of ASEAN policy initiatives.

2.2.1.2 SAARC

As already outlined under Indicator 211, free trade has not taken off in South Asia. South Asia made significant progress in integrating with the global economy. South Asia is the least integrated region in the world. Intraregional trade is less than 2% of GDP, compared to more than 20% for East Asia. Poor connectivity, cross-border conflicts, and concerns about security, have all contributed to this situation. The rapid growth experienced by South Asia has, however, generated interest in increased regional integration to further support economic growth, better political relations and thereby reducing conflicts (EU-SAARC Civil Aviation Programme, Action Fiche). There has been no direct EU regional-level support to regional trade integration. Instead, the EU-SAARC Civil Aviation Programme (planned for Jan 2011 – December 2013, but terminated in 2012) was supposed to “contribute to sustainable economic growth and economic integration in South Asia with focus on the air transport sector. The Project objective is the integration of the SAARC region’s Air Transport best practices and infrastructure to become the key to economic growth and prosperity for the whole region” (Project Inception Report).

The facilitation of closer co-operation between the EU and SAARC on economic and trade matters has potentially become easier since August 2012, when the Head of Delegation to Nepal was designated as the EU representative to SAARC providing the EU with an institutionalised entry point. Senior officials at the SAARC Secretariat confirmed the view of the Delegation that it would be more efficient to manage future EU-SAARC programmes at the Delegation in Kathmandu rather than New Delhi because of the location of the SAARC Secretariat as well as Nepal’s neutral position within SAARC and status as a preferred meeting place. Officials also expressed a strong interest in EU-supported programmes which link ASEAN and SAARC. “We see the EU as an important reference point but the reality and experiences of other regional organisations, especially ASEAN, are more relevant for SAARC. There is a strong interest among SAARC members for more exchange with ASEAN but also MERCOSUR”. Officials described EU-SAARC relations as being of a low profile as compared to relations with the “very active” partners China and Japan. “There are regular meetings with Japan. And there is a concrete agenda to be discussed. There is currently no agenda with the EU” (interviews at EU Delegation and SAARC Secretariat, August 2013),

2.2.2 Indicator 222: Progress towards harmonised customs clearance procedures

The sole focus on customs under the Asia Strategy has been ASEAN. Progress towards harmonised customs clearance procedures has neither been supported in relations with SAARC nor under the ASEM umbrella.

According to the expert’s estimate, which is based on meetings at the ASEAN Secretariat and with national ASEAN officials as well as past interviews with all donor organisations present at the ASEAN Secretariat, since 2005, up to 2000 technical assistance and capacity building projects in about 50 different sectors have been implemented to achieve the customs-related goals as set out in the AEC Blueprint and related agreements. Virtually all of these interventions have been funded through multi-million donor programmes, including *APRIS II*, the *ASEAN Trade Pilot Program: Single Window* (USAID), the *ASEAN-Australia Development Co-operation Program Phase II* (AusAid) and *Support for ASEAN Integration* (JICA).

- This is also confirmed by the ASEAN and TRA evaluations: “No other aspect of economic integration has attracted more donor attention than customs harmonization as it is in the natural interest of donors to ease the access of exporters to the Southeast Asian markets and thereby strengthen trade relations.” (Evaluation of EC co-operation with ASEAN, Final Report, Vol. 2, June 2009, p. 22).
- The TRA evaluation, 2013, finds that while donors have engaged in information-sharing on their customs-related interventions, often this has not resulted “in a formal division of labour, which, in turn, led to overlapping TRA interventions ... with regard to customs reforms” (vol. 2, p. 27).

Regional integration in the customs sector is guided by the *AEC Blueprint*. The central measure is the gradual implementation of an *ASEAN Single Window (ASW)* to expedite customs procedures within ASEAN by setting-up a single clearance channel for goods. Of particular importance are the ASEAN Customs Declaration Document (ACDD) and Certificates of Origin as the steps on the way of a fully computerised ASEAN Customs Transit System (ACTS) under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in Transit. The development of the ACTS “will provide a regional customs procedure that will enable traders to move goods seamlessly across multiple ASEAN member states using a single regional customs document and single guarantee for transit. This will reduce the hassle

of having to negotiate multiple national-level customs procedures and paperwork to clear goods along the ASEAN supply chain” (Singapore Customs 2010).

This is where *APRIS II* has tried to make a contribution: According to the *APRIS II* Final Evaluation, 2011, *“The main focus areas of APRIS II have been the establishment of improved customs clearance systems through the adoption of harmonised and simplified procedures (in particular the adoption of the ACDD), the design of a regional transit system and the enhancement of skills transfer between AMS and EU customs authorities and experts. The various activities implemented by APRIS II with regard to improving customs clearance consisted of providing information and recommendations, training and facilitation of technical discussions as well as producing technical documents.*

In terms of results concerning the implementation of custom procedures, instruments and transit systems the final evaluation *ARRIS II* states the following:

“Although substantial progress has been achieved, AMS have not been able yet to reach agreement on certain features of the ACDD and its final implementation is likely to require some more time. APRIS II has adequately supported the process, but decisions are to be made by member states” (p. 6), and: “With regard to the regional transit system APRIS II was instrumental in providing support aimed at establishing the legal, procedural and technical basis for the implementation of an ASEAN-wide Customs Transit System. The objective of adoption of the technical and legal documents (Protocol 7) for the creation of the ACTS can be considered as having been achieved. However, customs officials met by the evaluation team consider the 2015 objective for full implementation as too early” (p. 7)

The TRA Evaluation confirms overall *“that customs administrations, procedures and systems have been strengthened through the EU’s support to TRA. Examples of successful interventions deal with different aspects of trade facilitation – namely, automation of systems, setting up one-stop-shop/single windows, single-stop controls, use of risk management for inspection, and post-clearance systems audits carried out at authorised economic operators.” (Vol. 2, p. 39).*

At the same time, however, since ACDD was entirely driven by *APRIS*, ASEAN does not seem to have developed much ownership of the programme. Even today, more than two years after the termination of *APRIS II*, the only information available about ACDD on the ASEC website, is the *APRIS* project flyer for ACDD. No information could be obtained on progress towards ACDD target of reducing the average clearance times per container to less than 30 minutes.

In a similar vein, ACTS, also significantly supported by *APRIS II*, has not taken of the ground due to delays in the signing of protocols, which form the legal framework for ACTS, and the implementation of pilot projects. As of mid-2013, protocol 7 (on the procedure and technical aspect of ACTS) had been finalised but only been signed by eight of the ten AMS. Protocol 2 (on the Designation of Frontier Posts) had not yet been finalised, as the discussion on what customs houses should be included was still on-going but the “legal text was almost ready”, according to a high-ranking ASEAN official. Since the end of *APRIS II* (December 2010) only two special meetings of the Customs Procedures and Trade Facilitation Working Group (CPTFWG) on ACTS took place and no major developments were reported (TRA Evaluation, Field Visit Report ASEAN; interviews at ASEC, August 2013)).

Overall little progress appears to have been made on the ACDD and ACTS during the two years between the end of *APRIS II* and the start of *ARISE* in 2012. However the USAID-funded ASEAN Single Window project has made extensive use of the ACDD in its pilot system. ACDD will now have to be aligned with the World Customs Organisation (WCO) data model whereas under *APRIS II* most ASEAN Member States accepted the ACDD should be aligned to the ASEAN data model as the WCO data model was not then completed. The differences between the two data models are not significant. ASEAN Member States have yet to agree a fully-standard version among themselves.

ARISE builds on *APRIS II* – clearly based on lessons learnt - but has also started some new activities. For example, *ARISE* funds pilot projects in support of the harmonisation and increased efficiency of customs transit systems involving initially Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, Full implementation is expected to be achieved before the AEC comes into effect at the end of 2015. The groundwork for these pilots had been laid by *APRIS II*.

According to both, EU and ASEAN views, it was a good decision to separate support for economic integration (*ARISE*) and support to regional integration in non-economic areas (*READI*) which has not only strengthened the efficiency of implementation but also increased EU visibility. As one official put it *“EU-ASEAN co-operation is now significantly better than under APRIS II”*. A shortcoming of *APRIS II* mentioned in interviews was that ASEC staff had not been given sufficient time to implement activities under *APRIS II*. At the same time criticism expressed at ASEC about the two year gap between

APRIS II and *ARISE* (“*this created major problems for ASEAN*”) shows ASEAN’s donor dependency or unwillingness to increase funding from member states in support of fostering regional economic integration and AEC implementation. ASEC officials agree that some of the richer member states would have been in the position to provide funding for the continuation of *APRIS II* activities once the project had ended. However, they also pointed to political sensitivities and the strict equality principle within ASEAN which prevents individual member states from unilaterally increasing their funding (interviews at ASEC, August 2013).

1) Customs procedures

While developments towards customs integration have been slower than anticipated, some progress should be expected in view of the magnitude of activities in this area. However, all evaluations of donor support to the customs sector in ASEAN lack data to assess the effectiveness of interventions. Judgements on the success or failure of projects are almost exclusively made on the basis of a qualitative interpretation of documents and other sources, including stakeholder interviews. This applies to evaluations of EU projects, including *APRIS II*, as much as the interventions of other donors. Neither *APRIS II* nor ASEC have so far made effort to generate data on customs procedure. However, *ARISE* hopes to collect data on border crossing times and costs “in the near future”. ASEC has also been trying to obtain more detailed data on border crossing times, thus far without success (interviews at ASEC, August 2013).


Hence, in the following the report will present and discuss data from other sources to assess as to whether and what extent donor support to customs harmonisation in ASEAN has led to tangible results. Any potential improvements to customs procedures are likely to be partly the result of *APRIS II* as one of the largest and most comprehensive interventions in this field. It would not be possible to conclusively prove *APRIS II* attribution, but contribution could be assumed if there had indeed been measurable advances towards regional customs integration.

- A useful tool for measuring the effectiveness of customs procedures is the **World Bank Logistics Performance Index (LPI)**. The international score uses six key dimensions to benchmark countries’ performance and also displays the derived overall LPI index. The first key dimension is the *efficiency of the clearance process* (i.e., speed, simplicity and predictability of formalities) by border control agencies, including customs. For ASEAN the results are inconclusive. The following AMS were able to improve their LPI scores for customs between 2007 and 2012 (in some cases only marginally though): Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar and Singapore (the global top performer in 2012). However, the following countries showed a slight decline of their customs scores over the 2007-2012 period: Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Thailand (<http://lpiurvey.worldbank.org/>).
- Data provided by the **Global Enabling Trade Report (“The Enabling Trade Index”)**, which has been published by the World Economic Forum since 2008, allows for a more detailed assessment. Of particular interest is the *Border Administration Subindex*, which assesses the extent to which the administration at the border facilitates the entry and exit of goods through the following pillars:
 - Efficiency of customs administration
 - Efficiency of import-export procedures
 - Transparency of border administration

2) Border Administration

A comparison of the scores in the 2009 and 2012 reports (based, in most cases, on 2008 and 2011 data respectively) for overall border administration efficiency and transparency shows improvements for Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Malaysia and Singapore maintained their scores. Only Thailand’s 2012 score was slightly lower than in 2009.

Figure 2 Level of transparency of Border administration, selected Asian countries, 2009-2012



*Data for Brunei, Laos and Myanmar were not available

Note The higher the score, the more efficient and transparent is the respective border administration

Source: Data compiled from World Economic Forum: The Global Enabling Report 2009 and 2012

All ASEAN states included in the index were able to improve the efficiency of customs administration (the first pillar of the *Border Administration Subindex*). Cambodia and Indonesia registered the most notable progress.

Figure 3 Degree of efficiency of customs administration, selected Asian countries, 2009-2012




*Data for Brunei, Laos and Myanmar were not available

Composite index of "Burden of customs procedures" (1 = extremely inefficient; 7 = extremely efficient) and "Customs services index" (Extent of services provided by customs authorities and related agencies, maximum score 12)

Source: Data compiled from World Economic Forum: The Global Enabling Trade Report 2009 and 2012

Overall scores for the pillar *efficiency of import-export procedures* do not show any significant changes between 2009 and 2012.

Figure 4 Degree of efficiency of import-export procedures, selected Asian countries, 2009-2012



*Data for Brunei, Laos and Myanmar were not available

Source: Data compiled from World Economic Forum: The Global Enabling Trade Report 2009 and 2012

However, a closer look at the individual indicators under this pillar (table below) demonstrate significant improvements (green fields) or slight improvements (yellow fields) in many areas, while standards dropped only a small number of instances (orange fields). There is no evidence of any significant worsening of conditions. At the same time, the time and cost of doing business across borders still varies significantly within ASEAN. For example, the cost of importing one container ranges from USD 435 (Malaysia) to USD 872 (Cambodia).

Table 1 Efficiency of import-export procedures, detailed indicators

Year	Efficiency of clearance process 1-5 (best)		No. of days to import		No. of documents to import		Cost to import, US\$ per container		No. of days to export		No. of documents to export		Cost to export, US\$ per container	
	2009	2012	2009	2012	2009	2012	2009	2012	2009	2012	2009	2012	2009	2012
Cambodia	2.2	2.3	30	26	11	10	872	872	22	22	11	9	732	732
Indonesia	2.7	2.5	27	27	6	7	660	660	21	17	5	4	704	644
Malaysia	3.4	3.3	14	14	7	7	450	435	18	17	7	6	450	450
Philippines	2.6	2.6	16	14	8	8	819	730	16	15	8	7	816	630
Singapore	3.9	4.1	3	4	4	4	439	439	5	5	4	4	456	456
Thailand	3.0	3.0	13	13	3	5	795	750	14	14	4	5	625	625
Vietnam	2.9	2.7	23	21	8	8	901	670	24	22	6	6	734	580

Legend:


	Significant improvements
	Slight improvements
	Slight worsening
	worsening

*Data for Brunei, Laos and Myanmar were not available

Source: Data compiled from World Economic Forum: The Global Enabling Report 2009 and 2012 (colour codes added by the authors of this report).

Striking differences also characterise the pillar *transparency of border administration*, which measures the degree of corruption and bribery involved in customs procedures. Most AMS achieved rather low scores by international comparison – except for Singapore, which has one of the most transparent border administrations in the world, and to a somewhat lesser extent Malaysia – and there was no visible trend of improvement between 2009 and 2012.

Figure 5 Transparency of border administration - degree of corruption and bribery involved in customs procedures, selected Asian countries, 2009-2012



*Data for Brunei, Laos and Myanmar were not available

Composite index of "Irregular payments in exports and imports", 1–7 (best); and Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 0–10 (best)

Source: Data compiled from World Economic Forum: *The Global Enabling Trade Report 2009 and 2012*

2.2.3 Indicator 223: Progress towards agreement on shared standards and sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS)

Again, only ASEAN has benefitted from regional-level funding in this area under the Asia Strategy. According to the TRA Evaluation, "the EU has spearheaded the process of establishing and implementing regional SPS and TBT regimes, particularly in ASEAN" (Vol. 2, p. 38). ARIS II had a focus on standards and ARISE has further intensified activities in the area and works towards standards and conformity agreements for food, electrical and pharmaceutical products.

The 2009 ASEAN **Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA)**, which was developed with strong EU support, contains new obligations in both the TBT and SPS areas. The process towards ATIGA was supported by the standards and SPS component of APRIS II, building on the achievements of the EU-ASEAN Regional Economic Co-operation Programme on Standards, Quality, and Conformity Assessment (1998-2005) (pp. 44-45).

Box 4 EU support to regional standards

The ASEAN states did not have generally applicable obligations in respect of SPS and TBT amongst them apart from the WTO Agreements and have relied instead on the negotiation and implementation of sectoral mutual recognition agreements (MRAs). This changed with the implementation of the new ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) which entered into force in 2010 and contains new obligations in both the TBT and SPS areas.

However, even before the signing of ATIGA significant progress – supported by the EC - had been made in the following areas:

a) Cosmetics: The cosmetics sector is the only sector in ASEAN to have introduced a common regulatory framework in the form of a Directive (closely modelled on that of the EU) requiring formal "transposition" into the law of participating states. **The ASEAN Cosmetics Directive (ACD)** aims to limit restrictions on the trade of cosmetic products by streamlining technical controls (based on common lists of banned ingredients, and the way in which products are registered, manufacturing undertaken and information on products presented), promoting mu-

tual recognition in terms of product notification and labelling, and establishing co-ordinated market surveillance systems to ensure the safety, quality and claimed benefits of products that are sold. Especially APRIS II made a strong contribution to the implementation of the Directive, namely :

- supported the transposition process with TA, together with training for regulators and industry on how to develop Product Information Files, product safety and post market surveillance,
- Supported the development of the ASEAN Cosmetic Testing Laboratory Network (ACTLN);
- For the industry, APRIS II provided training on the implementation of Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP), producing a set of Guidelines on GMP, and helped SME (via their national regulatory authorities) to understand the essential requirements of the Directive.

b) Electrical and electronics sector: the **ASEAN Harmonised Electrical and Electronics Equipment Regulatory Regime** (EEERR) was signed in December 2005 and has resulted in 139 harmonised standards for electrical appliances, electrical safety and electromagnetic components. EC-ASEAN Economic Co-operation Programme on Standards and Conformity Assessment, which was implemented by the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN), was instrumental in supporting the establishment of the EEERR, while APRIS II supported its implementation, mainly through training and study tours.

c) Harmonisation of technical regulations is also underway for rubber-based, automotive, medical devices, pharmaceuticals, traditional medicine and health supplement sectors.

d) UN Globally Harmonised System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS): GHS is a system for standardising and harmonising the classification and labelling of chemicals. Within ASEAN, since 2005, GHS implementation support has taken place within the framework of the "Strengthening National and Regional Capacities to Implement the GHS in ASEAN" project (phase I 2005-2007; phase II since 2010), which has mainly funded by the EC with additional contributions from UNITAR.

In sum, there is evidence for EC attribution to the ASEAN Cosmetics Directive and GHS and evidence for (strong) contribution in all other sectors. ASEAN countries that need most support, particularly Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam (CLVs)

Source: TRA Evaluation, Field Visit Report ASEAN, 2012.

Effectiveness of EU support is also reported in the case of member states. For example, the Philippines CLE, 2011, states: *"Given that the co-operation programme pays particular attention to helping Philippine exporters meet EU technical and regulatory standards, including a strong focus on SPS measures, one would expect to see an increase in Philippines exports to the EU market in the food sector where SPS are a trade hurdle, e.g. fishery products and fruits/vegetables. Indeed, Philippine food exports to the EU have increased markedly between 2003 and 2008, with an average annual increase of almost 15%, reaching around EUR 265 million in 2008 (PhP 18.5 billion, or about 5% of total RP exports to the EU). This can be seen as evidence for effectiveness in the enhancement of standards in Philippine exports. ... Overall, there can be little doubt that trade-related projects or components of broader defined interventions at both the bilateral level (TRTA, SPF) and within the regional context (ECAP, APRIS, EC ASEAN Regional Economic Co-operation Programme on Standards, Quality, and Conformity Assessment, etc.) have achieved their objectives to a great extent. Today the Philippines is in a better and stronger position to participate in international trade (not at least with the EU) and deal with the challenges of regional and global integration than at the beginning of the evaluation period in 2002."*

2.2.4 Indicator 224: EU contribution to the regionalisation of civil aviation and establishment/implementation of regional safety standards

The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) blueprint includes the ASEAN Open Skies agreement, which is to be fully implemented in 2015. The agreement is intended to boost connectivity and increase traffic growth by granting open market access to all international airports in Southeast Asia to any airlines of the 10-member states. In support of ASEAN Open Skies, the EU funds the ASEAN Air Transport Integration Project (AATIP). The addendum No.2 of Financing Agreement was signed by the ASEAN and the 48-month service contract with EASA was signed in October 2012. Meetings with senior officers of Department of Civil Aviation in ten ASEAN Member States will be conducted during the first 6-month inception period to explain how AATIP will support the ASEAN Single Aviation Market (EAMR 12/2012). It is too early for any assessment of AATIP.

The "EU-South Asia Civil Aviation Co-operation Project" (financed under SAARC) emerged as the main focus of EU support to SAARC under the Asia Strategy after the initially planned EU-SAARC Economic Co-operation did not materialise (see Indicator 211). The Final Formulation Mission Report, 2009, outlines, *"In line with ...DCI, the project targets sustainable development in the aviation sector in South Asia which, through its direct impact on economic growth. The EC's assistance in the civil aviation sector in South Asia will seek to contribute to regulatory harmonisation, policy reform and capacity building at the regional level to support a safe, secure and sustainable regional air transport environ-*

ment and assist South Asia in gradually harmonising their national systems, thus promoter air transport growth. The specific objective is to strengthen the institutional capacity of the civil aviation regulators in South Asia in order to help accelerate the integration of the air transport sector and to ensure a safe, secure and sustainable aviation environment in the region, through harmonisation of standards and practices that are compatible with the EU and international standards and enhanced technical regulatory co-operation” (pp. 17-18).

The project’s Action Fiche adds, “There is (...) considerable variation among aviation safety regulatory frameworks among countries in South Asia, with some Directorates General of Civil Aviation (DGCAs), or Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs), basing their frameworks on the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) standards, and others applying US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) standards. Therefore there is a need to improve regional convergence of standards and gradually move towards a harmonised system. The differences in the stage of development of the aviation sector, technological advancements and competitiveness in South Asia also require enhanced capacity building in the less advanced countries in order to stay competitive and to be able to comply with international safety and security standards”.

The project enjoyed the support of all SAARC member states and went off to a good start with a launch meeting in mid-2011 which was attended by representatives of all member states. However, the project had to be terminated after around one year of implementation (in 2012), because the selected consortium was not able to obtain partnerships with others that were needed and eventually withdrew. Following extensive but ultimately unsuccessful consultations with potential project partners, including AIRBUS (which initially looked promising) contractual issues prevented agreement on an acceptable solution. The funds could not be used for other interventions and have been lost. However, an unrelated bilateral EU-India civil aviation project continues and has so far achieved its objectives. (interviews at DEVCO in May 2013 and telephone interview with the EU Delegation in New Delhi in October 2013).

3 EQ3 on added value to regional integration in non-economic fields

EQ3: To what extent has EU support to human security challenges strengthened regional problem-solving capacities?

3.1 JC 31 Extent to which regional-level EU support to Asia has contributed to developing a regional response mechanism towards highly pathogenic and emerging diseases (HPED) and other health-related challenges

3.1.1 Indicator 311: Effective contribution to the development of regional structures to prevent and control HPED via improved cross-border co-operation and sharing of information

The EU was a key instigator of and partner in the global response to Avian Influenza, a response that gradually broadened to cover the entire range of highly pathogenic and emergent infectious diseases or HPEDs. The framework was set forth in the International Meeting on Avian Influenza and Human Pandemic Preparedness in Geneva on 7-9 November 2005 and confirmed at the International Pledging Conference on Avian and Human Pandemic Influenza in Beijing on 17-18 January 2006. By December 2009, cumulative pledges for supporting avian/animal and pandemic influenza were at USD 4.3 billion. The EU, having committed Euro 413 million, Euro 245 million of it from the EU, was the second largest donor. Goals of the support were to increase countries’ and regions’ capacities to plan and develop sustainable approaches to surveillance, response, information exchange, development and implementation of appropriate technical answers. Initial EU support aimed at strengthening national level development, increasing coordination between sectors (especially human and veterinary), and financing integrated national action plans (INAPs) in human and animal health, including the communication aspects. Since the second half of 2007, in the context of the 2007 - 2013 Asia Regional Strategy, the emphasis shifted to cross-border co-operation in animal and human health.

The three signature actions of the EU’s involvement in the fight against emergent infectious disease in Asia were the Avian and Human Influenza Facility. Managed by the World Bank and mostly making country grants and loans, the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) and Emerging diseases Preparedness and Control in Asia project (DCI-ASIE/ 2007/019-209 and 2007/140-807, Euro 25 million,

implemented by Highly Pathogenic and Emergent Diseases project aimed mostly at strengthening the ASEAN and SAARC secretariats.

The AHI Facility

The EU was the principal contributor Facility managed by the World Bank. The EU provided Euro 70.9 million of which the AHI project portfolio for the East and South Asia regions (nine countries) received Euro 51.4 million. Euro 30.8 million was committed for nine AHI projects in East and South Asia by end-March 2009, of which only Euro 2.9 million had been disbursed. Central to the overall direction of the project was filling financing gaps so that countries could produce Pandemic Preparedness Plans.

The Mid-term review of the contribution of the European Commission to the *Avian and Human Influenza Facility in East and Southeast Asia* (August 2009) characterised the effort (despite its slow start) as having been “*responsible for generating the single largest, integrated regional capacity building exercise in animal health infrastructure, and possibly in human health as well.*” Marginal gains were felt to have been high because of the very poor initial conditions. The animal health component was considered to be proceeding well with progress in capacity building, but more attention to village-level activities was called for. The human health component was seen as less successful but building on gains from previous projects and lessons learnt in HIV/AIDS. Pandemic preparedness was characterised as requiring “*substantially more work.*” Summarising, the mid-term review found veterinary and medical diagnostic services were capable of addressing HPAI; surveillance capacity was weak and in need of continued strengthening; and cross-border co-operation remained largely in the hands of the international organizations.

Thus, the MTR found that the EU's contribution to AHIF was making a significant impact in building national veterinary and medical capacity building, but that at the regional and sub-regional levels, of most relevance to this Indicator, the only impact was through support to the UN partners and other development agencies, placing the sustainability of national-level gains in doubt, To quote,

Far more cross-border and sub-regional collaboration between animal and human health services will be required than is presently the case, but neither sustained funding nor inter-governmental commitment on how to share costs have been agreed upon. Instead, most governments rely on national border quarantine which is very porous - and thereby ineffective - in many of the poorer Asian countries. Sub-regional collaboration in avian influenza control is not so much initiated by individual countries as by the international technical agencies involved in sub-regional and regional avian influenza control. Most countries in the East and South Asia regions operate their own disease reporting databases, access to which is frequently mutually incompatible, and hamper inter-country information sharing. The most frequently used avenue to report avian influenza infection or re-infection from which sub-regional countries obtain information about each other's disease status are the outbreak reports issued on the OIE, WHO and FAO websites.

The HPED initiative

The Regional Strategy for Asia 2007-2013 included a specific item on “*cross-border co-operation in animal and human health*”, addressing Highly Pathogenic and Emerging and Re-emerging diseases (HPED). While clearly health oriented, the project goal was placed in the broad perspective of improving food security, preserving human health and nutrition, alleviating poverty and reducing impacts on trade in South-East and South Asia. The programme built on the earlier funding (EUR 30 million committed in 2006) for Avian Influenza in Asia and 2007 HPAI programme (EUR 25 million). Most of this funding was channelled through the AHIF. The agencies selected to implement the project were FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations), WHO (World Health Organisation of the United Nations) and OIE (World Organisation for Animal Health). The specific reference is *Regional co-operation programme on highly pathogenic and emerging and re-emerging diseases in Asia* (DCI-ASIE 2009/019-717 and 153-928 and 153-937 and 153-878, EC contribution Euro 20 million).

Specific goals were at ASEAN Secretariat and in member countries, enhanced capacities and capabilities of ASEAN Secretariat and Member countries to prevent, control and eradicate HPED. Activities were designed to strengthen regional co-operation, disease response capacity and policy development. Specifically, ASEAN Secretariat was to be supported by WHO and FAO to:

- Establish a Regional Support Unit to promote regional co-operation in the area of HPED control in AH and HH.
- Establish a Regional Epidemiology Network.
- Establish a Regional Laboratory Network.

SAARC Secretariat was to be supported by WHO and FAO to:

- Establish a Regional Support Unit to promote regional co-operation, in the area of HPED control in AH and HH.
- Establish a Regional Epidemiology Centre.
- Establish 3 Leading Diagnostic Laboratories.

In addition, OIE was to:

- Establish and manage a Regional Vaccine Bank in regard to HPED.
- Carry out Evaluation of the Performance of Veterinary Services).
- Carry out National and Regional seminars and workshops on Good Governance of Veterinary Services, as a support to control Animal diseases and capacity building.

According to the December 2008 Expertise in cross-border co-operation in animal and human health in Asia, the project, still in development stages, needed strengthened coordination efforts from all agencies to prevent the project from splintering into sub-projects each identified with one agency.

To sum up, a recent overview of all EU activities related to Avian Influenza (December 2010 *Impact Assessment of the Global Response to Avian Influenza*) concluded that the strengthening of preparedness at the regional level has been less successful than improvements at the national and global levels. Specifically, few national pandemic preparedness plans sufficiently took into account cross-border aspects. The assessment judge that, in Asia, ASEAN and SAARC lacked management capacity; nor did member states have much interest in cooperating in the regional context. Lack of regional management capacity encouraged international organizations, with their own skills, interest, and mandates, to go their separate ways rather than achieving harmonized, multi-dimensional regional strategies. This opened the door for confusion and overlap at the country level.

In South East and South Asia cross-border and sub-regional collaboration between AHI-affected countries was judged by the Impact Assessment to be "limited" and consist mostly of initiatives launched by international organisations. In part because the AHIF focuses on country-level interventions, regional and sub-regional information exchange and coordination were not sufficiently addressed by the instrument. The report stated, however, that cross-border co-operation and information sharing were in the process of developing, e.g. through regional meetings in Bangkok.

During the field mission, Ministry of Health officials interviewed were aware of the large international aid programs devoted to HPED and had engaged in regional networking activities, but concrete steps taken remained limited. International experts had much more confidence in the ability of aid dollars to contribute to the fight against drug-resistant tuberculosis and malaria, both with strong cross-border aspects, than against HPED, which by its nature is a fast-moving crisis. The EU has been active (for example, at Mahidol University in Thailand) in supporting clinical research on malaria. AUP projects in the Thai-Myanmar border area dealt with problems of tuberculosis and malaria in a cross-border setting.

3.1.2 Indicator 312: Strengthened capacities of regional & national institutions to cooperate and coordinate in the field of animal health, food safety and human health crisis response

The AHIF Mid-term Review discussed above admits that no country was in a position to deal with a massive disease outbreak or even a moderately scaled outbreak and strongly implied that most Pandemic Preparedness Plans were inadequate. The HPED *Expertise and Global Response to Avian Influenza Impact Assessment* both concluded that capacities of national institutions had been strengthened. According to interviews conducted in Jakarta and Kathmandu, In the case of ASEAN the HPED strengthen the ASEAN HPAI Task Force and Asian Transboundary Animal Disease Coordination. More specifically, the HPED built the capacities of the ASEAN HPAI Task Force, ASEAN Food Security Coordination Platform and built national Health Research and Development as well as Animal Disease National Laboratory to share disease outbreak information, and genetic information. The Delegation in Kathmandu also stated that HPED had worked well in SAARC. Overall, however, national interest in cross-border co-operation, including the introduction of cross-border aspects into Pandemic Preparedness Plans, remained weak. This impression was strengthened during the field phase. Indicator 313: Strengthened capacity at national level to take into account the interface between animals, humans and ecosystems and its role in disease emergence

The 2009 MTR of the AHIF identified three areas in which EU support had strengthened national collaboration:

- Establishment of multi-ministerial national committees for AI and pandemic preparedness,
- The process of developing Pandemic Preparedness Plans, and
- The jointly prepared AHI projects implemented by FAO, WHO, and OIE, which were conditional on acceptance of a joint Ministry of Agriculture-Ministry of Health National Integrated Avian Influenza Action Plans (INAP).

The inter-ministerial development of country INAPs, linked to stakeholder consultations showed signs of sustainability, inter-ministerial collaboration under INAPs was judged to hold promise. Yet, as found in the field mission and mentioned several times below, the concrete cooperative links between animal and human health agencies remain weak.

As described above, the MTR is less favourable in its assessment of regional and cross-border co-operation, nor was it under any illusion that any national health system was prepared to cope with a significant disease outbreak. WHO and government officials interviewed in Thailand and Myanmar were also doubtful of the capacity to respond to a truly significant outbreak, although the capacity to respond to limited outbreaks, e.g. of avian influenza, have been strengthened.

The December 2012 *Impact Assessment* of the Global Response to Avian Influenza found that the programme contributed to achieving “*unprecedented collaboration between the animal health and the public health sectors.*”

The compartmentalization of health into human and animal components remains strong in the region. This emerged especially in Myanmar, where the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, and Ministry of Livestock do not coordinate activities.

3.1.3 Indicator 314: Improved epidemiological surveillance and control (both human and veterinary) at national level

EU support to the Global Response to Avian Influenza strengthened human influenza surveillance systems in Asia by strengthening routine grassroots surveillance and setting up sentinel sites. The December 2012 *Impact Assessment* commented that there was only limited interface between human and animal surveillance systems, typically only at times of outbreak rather than on a routine basis, and that electronic data collection and analysis systems in some Asian countries proved impractical. The field mission, in particular the Myanmar component, confirmed that, despite EU-financed efforts to improve coordination, human and animal health agencies still act mostly in isolation. Noting the extremely low baseline level of surveillance, the assessment questioned the extent to which surveillance adequate for pandemic preparedness had really been developed.

Similarly, the AHIF Mid-term Review characterised epidemiology as the most important and weakest tool in countering existing and new disease threats. AHI –financed training consisted mostly of short-term workshops, while the basic scientific training of medical and veterinary graduates in epidemiology was weak in Asian countries. WHO officials interviewed in the field, confirmed that the weakest element in the HPED response system was epidemiology. Yet, the initial conditions were extremely poor, so this needs to be taken into account when looking at the accomplishments.

3.1.4 Indicator 315: Influenza scientific research strengthened

According to the Outcome and Impact Assessment of the Global Response to the Avian Influenza Crisis (December 2010), GRAI encouraged and financed research, in particular by forming developing-country research networks on epidemiology, diagnosis, vaccination, control of outbreaks in animal populations, and case management in humans. Much research focused on the animal aspect of the problem. Concrete outputs included improved diagnostic tests. Improved epidemiological modelling to strengthen surveillance and new approaches to Information, Education, and Communication based on behavioural research. There was judged to have been significant capacity building and sharing of resources between national institutions.

Under the Fifth Framework Programme for Research (FP5), 1998 – 2002, Euro 6 million were spent on avian and pandemic influenza in European research institutions. In the sixth Framework Programme (FP6), 2002 - 2006, almost Euro 100 million) was spent. Specific subjects included vaccine development, improved diagnosis and early warning systems, ecology and pathogenesis of HPAI infections, studies of migratory birds, HPAI (H5N1) virus survival, reinforcement of the laboratories network for avian and human influenza, virus virulence, pathogenicity, replicability and transmissibility, on drugs resistance and new drugs against RNA viruses and transfer of technology and training. In the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7), 2007 - 2013, a new heading on increasing risk of epizootic

and zoonotic diseases was introduced to generalise the field of potential projects qualifying for funding.

3.2 JC 32: Degree to which regional-level EU support to Asia has contributed to border management and disaster risk reduction through regional co-operation approaches and mechanisms

3.2.1 Indicator 321: Institutionalised regional mechanisms for disaster risk reduction within ASEAN and SAARC established or strengthened

It is noteworthy that EU support to the area of disaster risk reduction in Asia during the evaluation period has been delivered via many instruments and programmes. For instance, specific programmes to tackle resilience to climate change have been implemented via the thematic programme for Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources including Energy (DCI-ENV).⁸ Moreover, through its Disaster Preparedness Programme (DIPECHO), the European Commission Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO) aims at building the resilience of communities that face repeating natural disasters. DIPECHO also works with regional entities and inter-governmental organisations such as the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC).

The Asian region remains one of the most vulnerable regions of the world to natural and man-made disasters. Between 1970 and 1979, there were 138 occurrences of disasters in the region while between 2000 and 2009, 508 disasters were counted, an increase of 368% when compared with the earlier period.

Asia experienced the largest share of the global disaster occurrence over the last decade. In fact, seven out of the ten deadliest disasters worldwide of the last decade occurred in South, Southeast and Northeast Asia. In 2012, natural disasters in Asia claimed more lives here than anywhere else in the world. Countries in the region reported 83 disasters – mostly floods – in 2012. The disasters killed some 3,100 people, affected 64.5 million and left behind USD 15 billion in damage. Between 2002 and 2011, eight of the most devastating natural disasters occurred in Asia; five happened in countries included in the list of 19 countries of the RSE. The situation is even more dramatic when looked at from a long-term perspective: From 1950 to 2011, nine out of 10 people affected by disasters worldwide lived in Asia.⁹

Table 1 Top 10 of worldwide deadliest disasters: 2002-2011

Disaster	Date	Country	Number of deaths
Earthquake	Jan. 2010	Haiti	222,570
Earthquake/ Tsunami	Dec, 2004	Indonesia	165,708
Tropical cyclone "Nargis"	May 2008	Myanmar	138,366
Earthquake	May 2008	China	87,479
Earthquake	Oct 2005	Pakistan	73,3338
Heath wave	Summer 2010	Russia	55,736
Earthquake/ Tsunami	Dec. 2004	Sri Lanka	35,399
Earthquake	Dec. 2003	Iran	26,796
Heath wave	Summer 2003	Italy	20,089
Earthquake/ Tsunami	March 2011	Japan	19,846

Source: USAID, CRED Crunch, Issue No. 30, "Disaster Data: A Balanced Perspective", January 2013, p. 2.

It is projected that there will be some 1,000 disasters in the next decade, with an average of 100 per year (Maramis, ASEAN Regional Co-operation).

While numerous EU funded interventions targeting disaster risk reduction (natural and man-made) have been implemented via national programmes, thematic instruments or via ECHO, the regional-level EU support provided via the RSP appears to be relatively modest.

Already the ASEAN evaluation (2009) highlighted a need for the EU "to expand its view of ASEAN-level policy dialogues and technical assistance / capacity building to encompass a broader range and

⁸ For instance, several contracts under the decision *Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources (ENRTP)* deal with building resilience to climate change impacts in Asia.

⁹ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIC) (2012): Conflict Barometer 2012.

a more heterodox group of subjects". More precisely, "specific areas of interest include climate change, science and technology, civil society development, the closing of welfare gaps, and humanitarian assistance." The report noted that the recommendation has been partly addressed by the *Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument (READI)*.

In general, at the time of the progress report the implementation of the Disaster Management component of *READI* went relatively smooth and was considered as being effective. The outputs of the programme are expected (amongst others) to improve delivery of disaster management services and increase the awareness by ASEAN participants of alternate policies and priorities in managing disasters. EU Delegation, ASEC and national officials interviewed during the field phase drew attention to the fact that natural disaster response is a relatively "safe zone" for regional dialogue, network formation, and sharing of expertise. The political dimension is minimal and issues of blame-casting and scapegoating do not arise in the same way.

In the context of South Asia and specifically the SAARC, the MTR Document, Regional Strategy for Asia, 2007-2011 and MIP 2011-2013 notes that "South Asia is characterised by a low level of integration and our direct co-operation with SAARC is seriously hampered", "will have to be modest" and that "our direct support to SAARC has to be scaled down" (pp. 9, 12). This is confirmed by another document which states that "while the EC took the initiative in 1996 to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the SAARC Secretariat offering them technical assistance, co-operation has so far been very limited. The internal problems of the SAARC have largely prevented any effective implementation of the MoU and direct co-operation with the SAARC in the period 2011-13 will be scaled down" (Factsheets on the EU, 2013: pp. 1-2).

Nonetheless, the MTR also mentions that "we still aim at supporting integration of South-Asian partners, and include in the forthcoming MIP provisions, whereby initiatives and/or cross-border co-operation of two or more South-Asian partners may also be supported" (MTR Document, pp. 12, 16). In line with this and taking into account the high vulnerability of the region to natural disasters, the report highlighted that the EU's efforts would focus on capacity-building at the regional level which would include research, training, system development and exchange of information. It also notes that "an important stakeholder to be involved in the preparation of this action will be the SAARC DMC" (Ibid., p. 16).

However, the field phase confirmed the finding of the desk phase that currently the regional-level EU support to disaster risk reduction funded via the RSP within ASEAN and SAARC remains very limited. The reasons for this need to be investigated in further phases of the analysis. Some visible steps¹⁰ - as part of bilateral co-operation but not regional-level support - that have been undertaken are summarised in the box below.

Box 1 *EU's Activities for Disaster Risk Reduction and Prevention in Asia*

Afghanistan: The EU supported Border Management Central Asia (BOMCA) and Border Management in the North of Afghanistan (BOMNAF) programmes provide the opportunity to promote a stronger regional co-operation between the participating countries and to establish clear and coherent synergies in particular by promoting Tajik-Afghan (and other countries in the region) joint capacity building events, exchanges and lessons learnt. Linking with border management, UNODC (under BOMNAF) has assisted in the establishment of several border posts as well as selected Border Liaison Offices and plans to extend this technical assistance along the Afghan border. Strengthening the Afghan Border Police is a key part of UNODC strategy to link national capacity with regional operations (EU Delegation to Afghanistan according to the Delegations Survey).

China: In December 2012, contacts were consolidated by the EU with the International Federation of the Red Cross for matters relating to DRR in China (EAMR China and Mongolia), 6/2012).

Bangladesh: In 2011, it was noted that the Instrument of Stability had been an important link between relief (ECHO-funded) and development (DCI-funded), especially through the funding of rehabilitation and reconstruction in highly vulnerable areas (EAMR Bangladesh, 6/2011).

Cambodia: The EAMR Thailand, 6/2011 notes that "while overall co-operation with UNDP under the Cambodia Climate Change Alliance (CCCA) has remained good and highly visible (e.g. EU is well represented in the CCCA governance structure) the CCCA partners (Denmark, EU and Sweden) are concerned about the slow progress of the "coastal zone component" due to internal UN procedures/rules on sharing of indirect costs and procurement."

Indonesia: In relation to the programme on "Support to Indonesia's response to climate change", in late 2012 it was reported that two contracts had been finalised by the EU with civil society groups for local intervention in Aceh and Papua. The FA with the Government of Indonesia (Gol) for technical assistance for the project was signed in December 2012 (EAMR Indonesia, 12/2012).

¹⁰ It should be noted that the steps highlighted below did not necessarily take place under the umbrella of the RSP for Asia.

Mongolia: It was reported in June 2012 that the SWITCH Asia enable the EU to pilot project in the field of Climate Change and Environment (EAMR China and Mongolia, 6/2012).

Myanmar: In late 2012, it was noted that the Myanmar Climate Change Alliance Programme was under preparation, jointly undertaken between the EU and UN-Habitat as well as UNEP. It was also reported that the UN-Habitat and UNEP had rendered excellent co-operation and string commitment to the design of the programme and showed great willingness to discuss technical matters pertaining to the programme (EAMR Myanmar, 12/2012).

Pakistan: In the area of Linking Relief and Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) intervention in the Sindh province, regular consultations with the ECHO staff enabled timely identification of potential LRRD intervention. This is a massive ECHO-funded post-flood intervention programme and is also aimed at addressing severe malnutrition problems during humanitarian interventions which require long-term solutions as the causes are structural. The EU's work, recognised as an important pilot, also complements other measures undertaken by the Sindh provincial authorities, with assistance from the World Bank and other donors. It was reported that a €1 million contract was commissioned to conduct extensive Climate Change proofing as well as an Economic and Environmental Impact study. This compliment an additional EUR 10 million AFD-sponsored loan to the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), Pakistan, for a full-fledged feasibility and design study in preparation for decision-making on the construction of the Munda dam in the Swat basin. The primary consideration for the programme was to ascertain the potential role of the dam in controlling flood in the Charsada and Nowshera areas in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region – both being areas badly affected by the 2010 floods. Other examples of the LRRD include the EUR 18 million IFS-funded early recovery programme; the EUR 30 million FSTP in Southern Punjab and Sindh flood-affected areas; and school rehabilitation in the 2005 earthquake-affected areas (EAMR Pakistan, 6/2011 and EAMR Pakistan, 12/2012).

Thailand: In 2012, it was reported that the Asia Investment Facility (AIF) will complement as a financing mechanism in clean energy (RE and EE) and climate change mitigation (EAMR, Thailand, 12/2012).

3.2.2 Indicator 322: Institutionalised regional mechanisms to facilitate regional coordinated responses to natural and man-made disasters established or enhanced

As for institutionalised regional mechanisms, it was found that at both the ASEAN and SAARC levels, mechanisms for regional coordinated responses to disasters (natural and man-made) had been well established as early as 2003. These are explained below. Nonetheless, while there was some EU activity and effort in the said direction at the ASEAN level, no evidence was found of the same at the SAARC level. Similarly and on the lack of coordinated regional responses to disasters in the ASEAN region, one report even acknowledges that *“each individual nation is responsible for managing its own disaster in a sovereign manner”* (READI, *First Six-Month Report, April-September (2012): 27*). Yet, interviews at the ASEC pointed in the direction for increasingly coordinated, EU-supported regional response mechanisms. In this context, the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) was created in early 2003 based on the decision of the ASEAN Standing Committee. Aimed at pursuing a region of disaster-resilient nations and safer communities, the ACDM developed an ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPD) mainly to provide a framework for co-operation for the period between 2004 and 2010. The ARPD serves as a platform for co-operation with ASEAN's Dialogue Partners and relevant international organisations. Some of the partners of the ACDM, amongst others, include the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Pacific Disaster Centre and Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC). Furthermore, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) was established for the purpose of facilitating co-operation and co-ordination among the parties, and with relevant UN agencies and international organizations, in promoting regional collaboration. Interviews at ASEC identified AHA Centre as one of ASEAN's most visible success story in terms of establishing effective regional institutions. There have been on-going and regular consultations between the EUD in Jakarta and the AHA Centre but as of August 2013 no funding contribution was made by the EU to support the AHA Centre. However, the upcoming IfS funding will aim to provide a limited interventions to AHA Centre for 18 months period.

Box 2 ASEAN - Milestones in Disaster Management Initiatives/Programmes

- 1971: ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM) created.
- 1976: ASEAN Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters.
- 2003: ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) established to replace the AEGDM.
- 2004: ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPD) launched.
- 2009: ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Responses (AADMER) enters into force.
- 2011: ASEAN Co-ordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) established.

Source: Collins, *Building a People-orientated Security Community the ASEAN-Way*, pp. 131-137.

Further, and as a response to the 2004 tsunami, ASEAN initiated the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) in July 2005. The AADMER came into force on 24 December 2009. Aimed at minimizing disaster losses and jointly responding to disasters, the AADMER is a legal framework for all ASEAN member states and serves as a common platform for responding to disasters in the region. The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) serves as the operational coordination body and engine for the AADMER. The ACDM oversees the AADMER. The AADMER work programme is implemented in two phases (Phase 1 - 2010-2012) and (Phase 2 - 2013-2015) and focuses on six core areas namely preparedness and response, risk assessment, early warning and monitoring, prevention and mitigation, recovery, outreach and mainstreaming, and lastly, training and knowledge READI, 2012: 27).

In April 2012, it was also reported that the AHA Centre was working with a team of international specialists, supported by the US Government, for the establishment of an ASEAN Disaster Monitoring and Response System (DMRS).

With the framework of the READI, one major core area pertains to disaster management (Component 4) where READI, together with the DIPECHO, assists the ASEAN Secretariat in implementing the AADMER Work Programme. The READI's efforts are twofold, firstly, to develop a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) System for the implementation of the AADMER, and secondly, to develop a strategy for knowledge exchange within ASEAN on DM as well as between ASEAN and other regional organisations and national governments. Several major outputs have been achieved at the time of the progress report (2012). For instance:

- A draft paper comparing EU and ASEAN DM systems as a basis for enhancing information transfer and knowledge development;
- A study tour of senior ASEAN officials to the EU in Brussels and to national DM agencies in Belgium and Italy; and
- The drafting of an indicator framework as the first real step towards an M&E System for assessing the progress of the AADMER (READI, Disaster Management).

According to the EU Delegation in Jakarta, under READI a limited but targeted support is provided comprising support to M&E Development to track down the achievement of ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management, facilitation of knowledge exchange in areas of Disaster Management, a Comparative study between EU and ASEAN Disaster Management Structure is ongoing and support to program development is also foreseen in the upcoming future.

In line with this, in July 2012, 13 senior government officials from the National Disaster Management Organisations (NMDO's) of the respective 10 ASEAN member states visited Brussels and Rome as part of the "EU-ASEAN Knowledge Exchange Activity" funded by the READI. The said programme was aimed at exchanging knowledge on disaster management in ASEAN and the EU (READI, 2012: 26). Further to this, on 7 January 2013, the READI conducted a Monitoring and Evaluation Development workshop aimed at monitoring the progress of the AADMER in Chiang Mai, Thailand (READI, 2013).

The SAARC Disaster Management Centre (DMC), based in New Delhi, was established in October 2006 and provides the institutional framework for disaster risk reduction in the region. It provides policy advice and capacity development services. The latter include learning, research, training, system development, expertise promotion and exchange of information for disaster risk reduction and management. The DMC collects, compiles, documents and disseminates data, information, case studies, indigenous knowledge and good practices pertaining to disaster management, especially of SAARC member states. It also collaborates with the SAARC Meteorological Research Centre, SAARC Coastal Zone Management Centre and SAARC forestry sector (<http://saarc-sdmc.nic.in/index.as>). Further, in 2011, the SAARC member states signed the Agreement on Rapid Response for Natural Disasters (ARRND) which reinforces existing mechanisms for rapid response to disasters (Disaster Response, 2013: 9).

According to the "SAARC Road Maps on Risk Management in South Asia, SAARC's approach to Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM), is by far the most comprehensive. Regional co-operation on specific areas of DRRM are addressed, namely: application of science and technology for DRRM; coastal and marine risk mitigation plan; climate change adaption and DRR; mainstreaming DRR in development; community-based disaster management; earthquake risk management; landslide risk management; urban risk management; and drought risk management (*International Dialogue* (2011) pp. ii-iii).

3.2.3 Indicator 323: Border control efficiency (e.g. the operational, institutional and professional ability of border authorities) improved

Tackling border management at a regional level seems to be obvious when looking at the nature of international borders. Nevertheless, the EU support to this area via the RSP appears to be relatively modest. The EU has mainly provided support to this area at regional level through two programmes; APRIS II and the EU-ASEAN Migration and Border Management Programme (EAMBMP).

APRIS II was already launched before the temporal scope of this evaluation and concerned the harmonisation for the ASEAN Single Window. Studies on data harmonisation for the ASEAN Single Window and a review on human resources development and training practices within ASEAN Customs as well as identifying training needs were conducted and discussed during working group meetings. As of December 2008, the ASEAN Data Model for Customs Data harmonisation had been completed. In addition, the principles for ASEAN Customs Transit System were also agreed by the ASEAN Customs and Procedures and Trade Facilitation Working Group and a Customs Training Blueprint was adopted by the ASEAN Director General of Customs (EAMR ASEAN, 12/2008), thus paving the way for more efficient control systems at ASEAN borders.

The EU-ASEAN Migration and Border Management Programme (EAMBMP), costing EUR 4.7 million, has started in January 2009. It is aimed at developing a more efficient and coherent Integrated Border Management System (IBMS) at selected main border crossing points in the Southeast Asian region. Moreover, it aimed at facilitating the legal movement of goods and people, it also functions to combat transnational crime, illegal migration and human trafficking. The programme comprises three major components aiming at strengthening regional institutional framework in the area of border management, increasing the sharing of information between Interpol National Central Bureaus in the ASEAN capitals and ICPO-Interpol headquarters and enhancing the capacity of selected border crossing points.

While the programme was found to be very relevant for both ASEAN and the EU and seen as “a *flagship of EU-ASEAN Co-operation by the ASEAN Secretariat, able to lead to wider and more comprehensive interventions in the sector to achieve the respective ASEAN policy objectives*”, information points to a lack of “*strategic focus in the programme and the number of prevailing BM issues to be covered are too many and too wide in scope to be realistically dealt with in a three year period and with the allocated resources.*” (EAMBMP Monitoring Report, 2010). Moreover, it seemed as if ambiguity between the different stakeholders in terms of project implementation led to severe delays at the beginning of the project, thus significantly limiting the potential impacts of the intervention. While the project started in 2009, at the time of the monitoring report (in 2011) less than 10% of the human resources had been mobilized. Moreover, “*no consensus was reached about the implementation of activities.*” However, the potential impact of the EAMBMP is considered as relatively high, “*If progress can be demonstrated even in one Border Crossing Point (Component 3), e.g. that the frequent long queues can significantly be reduced, fake documents identified and annulled and ultimately be centrally registered in a database accessible to all law-enforcement institutions, then prospective positive reactions from the policy level and wider public could encourage the adoption of the system for all border crossings and raise the interest of other ASEAN Member States to learn from these good practices and to liaise and discuss the approaches within their hierarchy and the various ASEAN forums.*”

As to the problems pertaining to the project upon its inception, the MR-126060 (2010) however notes that the programme contained “*serious weakness as it does not establish an intervention logic*” which was mainly due to the fact that “*the implementation strategy is not well described in key document.*” This is because the OVIs were considered “*unrealistic given the three year project lifecycle*” coupled with the “*limited range of activities.*” The main problem pertained to the fact that “*the project does not tackle the diverse border management practices currently existing in ASEAN nor the need to achieve a common understanding among the many stakeholders on what strategy to pursue.*” In addition, other problems were related to “*the issue of real ownership and willingness among ASEAN member states to implement action and to share potentially sensitive information.*”

Some visible steps that have been undertaken are summarised in the box below.

Box 8 Milestones of the EU-ASEAN Migration and Border Management Programme

January 2009: the Crown Agents (CA), in partnership with International Centre for Migration Policy (ICMPD) were awarded three year project for Technical Assistance for the EAMBMP. The aim of this project is three-fold namely, to strengthen regional institutional network; enhance the exchange of information between Interpol's National Central Bureaus and the ASEAN region; and enhance the capacity of selected Border Crossing Points by providing the necessary equipment.

For the first aim, the CA are to organise awareness raising seminars and study tours to Singapore and Europe, standardise operating procedures for travel documents and ID control at the border as well as implement a Pilot Secure Cross Border Pass (smart card) for regular border communities in pilot zones. For the third aim, the CA are to provide selected Cross Border Crossing Points with equipment such as national databases on travel documents, UV lamps and electronic Cross Border Passes and training to namely the customs and immigration authorities in the region.

July 2009: the governing body of the EAMBMP, the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC), endorsed and expressed their support for the project's major outputs. In addition, the SOMTC also agreed to conduct consultations on regular basis with the EUD through-out the duration of implementation of the EAMBMP and, in turn, requested the EUD and Interpol to regularly update it on the status of the EAMBMP

June 2012: EU-funded and ASEAN supported programme on an Interpol project on migration and border management was held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. This led to expansion of access to Interpol's tools and services to frontline police in Cambodia and Vietnam. Eight key locations in Cambodia and eight sites in Vietnam are now allowed to access the Interpol's secure global communications, the I-24/7. The Contribution Agreement, valued at EUR 630,000 with Interpol was signed in December 2009 for the implementation of the Component II of the EAMBMP (EAMR

Source: EAMR 02/2010

Over the past decades, SAARC managed to advance in the area of border management. Some of the regional instruments/initiatives concerning integrated border management in the SAARC region are as follows:

Box 9 SAARC – Milestones in Border Management

- 1987: Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
- 1987: Regional Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution
- 1990: Convention on Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
- 1992: SAARC Drug Offences Monitoring Desk
- 1995: SAARC Terror Offences Desk (STMOD)
- 1996: SAARC Conference on Police Matters
- 2002: Additional Protocol on Financing of Terrorism
- 2008: Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters

Source: South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) – Secretariat, <http://www.saarc-sec.org/>

While EU support to border management features quite prominently in some countries (i.e. Border Management for Northern Afghanistan – BOMNAF), the regional strategy did not cover support to border management in SAARC.

4 EQ4 on environment, energy and climate change

EQ4: To what extent has the regional EU support to Asian key stakeholders contributed to enhancing the adaptation to and mitigation of climate change and the promotion of sustainable growth?

4.1 JC 41: Level to which EU support has helped improving the policy framework for the uptake of SCP practices and systems

4.1.1 Indicator 411: Establishment of stakeholder networks and platforms and workshops to increase the policy dialogue on SCP related policies and policy instruments

Regional PSC: The UN 10 Years Framework on SCP that was readopted in the RIO+20 Conference forms the main reference for UNEP's work. UNEP uses its regional and national network on SCP in developing the PSC. Regional partners are UNIDO, ESCAP, AIT-UNEP Regional Resource Centre for Asia and the Pacific and sub-regional partners, the ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity (ACB), Manila; South Asia Co-operative Environmental Programme (SACEP), Sri Lanka; NE Asia; National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Beijing. These partners are involved as hosts for Conferences and Workshops and representatives of these organizations participate in the events, as well. UNEP has been able to reinforce their Asian networks through the *SWITCH-Asia* financing. For instance, it is closely collaborating with the Asia-Pacific Round Table on SCP (APRSCP). The APRSCP is participating in all regional consultations and it provides the main policy links with non-public agencies. During the 2012 Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) meeting, this partnership was formalized through the signing of a MoU between UNEP and the APRSCP "to facilitate collaboration between the Parties to

further their shared goals and objectives ... through Sustainable Consumption and Production and green economy activities in the Asia-Pacific region”.

The box below presents an overview of the regional consultations, workshops and conferences (co-) organized by the UNEP PSC programme.

Box 10 Overview of UNEP organized workshops and conferences in 2011 and 2012

- 10th Asian Pacific Roundtable on Sustainable Consumption and Production (APRSCP), Yogyakarta (November 2011), hosting 3 workshops and 2 plenary sections on *SWITCH-Asia*;
- The “ASEAN Forum on SCP” was established during 2 meetings in Jakarta (25-26 April and 23-24 November 2011);
- Ad-hoc consultations during the Asia Pacific Urban forum (APUF meeting, 22-24 June, 2011 Bangkok) with representatives from 7 countries;
- Regional consultation workshops Yogyakarta 7-8 November 2011, back to back with the 10th Asia Pacific Roundtable on SCP;
- Participation in the Rio+20 Preparation Committee negotiations in New York (December 2011): to present the *SWITCH-Asia*-PSC and develop linkages between this programme with the global Ten Year Framework of Programmes on SCP, then under negotiation.
- 1st International Seminar on Resource Efficiency and Decoupling Approach “Scientific findings from the International Resource Panel: Creating Opportunities for a Sustainable Tomorrow”, Bangkok, Thailand, 3-4 April 2012;
- International Conference “The Post-Rio Future We Want in Asia: the SCP Engine”, 12-13 November, Bangkok, Thailand;
- Workshop at the World Resources Forum - Special Briefing on UNEP’s latest findings in Resource Efficiency, April, Beijing: UNEP held a one day workshop at the World Resources Forum together with the International Resource Panel. The workshop linked the practical policy work of *SWITCH-Asia* PSC with the science-policy work of the International Resource Panel.

Source: Network UNEP, Annual Report 2011 and 2012.

In addition, UNEP has also established a network of “focal points” or liaison persons in Asian countries. These focal points are the main target group for UNEP’s capacity building activities, see Indicator 412. A weakness of these focal points is that they are all from the Ministry of Environment, whereas SCP requires the involvement of many sector ministries. Currently, these focal points do not play a supporting role to *SWITCH-Asia* projects. First steps are being made to establish these links, as it is realized that only when results of grant projects are widely disseminated at policy level this would lead to an enabling policy environment for SCP (presentation UNEP programme by Janet Salem, Kathmandu Networking Event, June, 2013), see also *Indicator 413*.

National PSCs: Three of the four *national PSCs* (Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines) primarily provide direct policy support to a selected number of concrete policy areas identified by the national counterparts (one or more Departments of the Ministry of Environment), such as Green Procurement, Green labelling, SCP monitoring, SCP awareness. In developing these policy areas, they regularly organize workshops and meetings with stakeholders in the implementation of these specific projects. Consequently, broad-based workshops or meetings on overall SCP policies, strategies and instruments are not being organized.

Another approach is followed by the *Malaysian PSC*: instead of focusing on specific direct policy support to a selected number of ministries or departments, the PSC has set-up an effective coordination mechanism, i.e. a multi-stakeholder consultation to formulate SCP related policies for the 11th Five Year Plan, 2016-2020. The PSC is in the position to do this, as it is located in the Economic and Environment and Natural Resources Economics Section of Economic Planning Unit (EPU) of the Prime Ministers’ Office, and responsible for the formulation of the Five Year National Plans.

Network Facility (NF): One of the expected results of the *NF* directly refers to enhancing the policy dialogue in Asia, supporting national action plans on SCP and supporting Asian policy makers in: “making the link between results of funded projects and climate change policy-making and implementation” (EU-TOR *SWITCH* Networking Facility, 2008). The *Network Facility* has been very active in numerous conferences and workshops to introduce the *SWITCH*-programme and has highly increased its visibility. In view of the establishment of the *PSC* the *NF* did not prioritise a role in enhancing the policy dialogue on SCP at the regional or national level. The box below provides an overview of SCP stakeholder workshops held or attended by the *NF* from 11/2011 – 11/2012.

Box 11 Overview of SCP stakeholder workshops held or attended by the NF from November 2011 – November 2012

- 10th Asian Pacific Roundtable on Sustainable Consumption and Production (APRSCP), Yogyakarta (November 2011), hosting 3 workshops and 2 plenary sections on *SWITCH-Asia*;
- *SWITCH*-Conference ‘Successes of *SWITCH-Asia* and the potential applicability in the other regions’, Brussels (February 2012); participation at the African Roundtable on SCP at May 21-23 in Accra (Ghana) on the same issue;
- ADFIAP (Association of Development Financing Institutions in Asia and the Pacific) conference in Istanbul (April 2012), hosting a workshop on Access2Finance;
- European Roundtable on SCP in Austria (May 2012) and hosting a specific *SWITCH-Asia* workshop to give visibility to the programme and discuss Sustainable Supply Chain Management (in the context of trade relations between Europe and Asia).
- World Resource Forum (WRF) on Resource Efficiency, Beijing (October 2012), hosting a workshop on scaling-up SCP actions. Back to back mini workshop for all Chinese grant projects. A similar mini workshop was organized in India for all grant projects in Indian, Nepal and Bhutan (September 2012).
- Annual networking event in Thailand (November 2012).

Source: Network Facility, Annual Narrative Report, 2012.

Grant Projects: SWITCH-Asia grants projects¹¹ themselves are expected to play a role in engaging policy makers, and in enhancing national policies and instruments that encourage SCP. Projects require enabling policies and regulations to be in place (for instance, access to credit, appropriate prices of energy and water, waste fees, required standards, official acknowledgement of certification schemes) to make it feasible and/or attractive for SMEs to adopt SCP practises and/or NGOs to influence consumption behaviour. The policy aspect was also stressed in the first Guidelines for Applicants of the Call for Proposals (CfP). Consequently, most projects have included a specific policy component or “*work package*” in their overall work plan.

The evaluation made an analysis of available ROM reports¹² that shows a varying outcome regarding its role in engaging policy makers and trying to increase the enabling policy framework:

- Projects in the larger emerging economies (China, India, Vietnam) are implementing already existing policies, demonstrating ways how to implement them. These projects (energy efficiency, E-waste) are broadly supported by local government, whereas communication to the central level is non-existing; Only in the smaller and lower income countries, SCP related policies may still be partially lacking;
- Projects implemented at national level with semi-government agencies as partners had an enormous outreach and adoption nationwide, related to topics such as standards for electrical motors, efficiency of transformers (both in China);
- When grant projects pay specific attention to policy-related work they usually organize study tours for policy makers to Europe or Asia and inviting policy makers to key project events. A few projects manage to conduct dialogues and organize workshops and seminars with policy makers. Other projects are vague on what they intend to do, or claim to contribute to policy making and legislation, whereas actually these policies are already in place;
- A number of projects, especially those implemented by large international and regional organisations appear to be less interested in involving national policy makers as they pursue their own policies and trademarks, for instance forestry certification schemes. In addition, some national governments see the project as competitive to their own policies (The ASEAN Energy Accreditation Scheme¹³).
- Overall, coordination mechanisms are usually in place (advisory and steering committees), but the composition of these committees usually typically reflects the composition of the project partnerships. This lack of external accountability partly explain why projects may be failing in providing more strategic inputs, and why involvement of policy makers becomes more cum-

¹¹ Five successful Calls for Proposals -with a total of more than 1500 proposals received - were launched in 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011 and 2012; as a result 64 grant projects were selected for funding, and an approximately 16 more will be contracted before the end of 2013 with an EU contribution of about EUR 128 million (information provided by EU C2, Brussels).

¹² A total of 32 ROM reports, covering 28 projects in the following countries: Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Vietnam

¹³ Report on 5th project Partners Meeting, 27 February, 2013; interview with Executive Director of the Energy Center of ASEAN conducted during field work.

bersome (except for partnerships that include semi-governmental or local government agencies). When projects are accountable to government and civil society, the policy take up and replication of the project results is being enhanced.

4.1.2 Indicator 412: Enhanced institutional capacity of key governmental institutions and organisations to formulate and implement SCP related policies and policy instruments

The regional PSC programme: Capacity building for SCP planning, Sustainable Public Procurement and Sustainable Ventures are key intervention areas of the UNEP-implemented *regional PSC*. Capacity building in SCP was preceded by a Policy Needs Assessment on SCP at country level. The study identified what needs to be done to support the development of policy tools at the national level (e.g. regulations, laws, frameworks, standards). This resulted in a publication on country capacity needs for SCP, and a SCP Handbook for Policymakers. The Needs Assessment Review and the Handbook are posted on the *SWITCH-Asia* website, and a limited number of hard copies have been distributed. In terms of training, UNEP has organized three regional technical workshops for trainers of trainers and policy makers. The workshops typically were attended by UNEPs focal points for each Asian country, and APRSCP representatives (SCP researchers and advocates). The focal points work mainly in Environmental Ministries or Departments, and their positions range from Principal Secretaries, to Department Directors and Senior or Junior Officers. How and if the participants used the workshop outcomes in their respective countries is not followed-up or monitored by UNEP. The training provided at different levels (regional, sub-regional and national) has generated the interest of governments, but UNEP acknowledges that the impact of capacity training has been constrained by changes in senior level focal points and by the time needed for consultations. UNEP stresses that the *PSC* has run for only two of the four years operational period, and that more impact is expected in the coming years (Final Evaluation *SWITCH-Asia*, June 2013).

The national PSC programmes: The *national PSC* have integrally incorporated capacity building in their work plans. Most capacity building is realised by joint working of contracted experts (TA) and government officials. The institutional set-up of the four programmes is country specific, and results differ as well. The starting dates of the *PSCs* in the Philippines and Indonesia were delayed, as it was difficult to find a national entity that was interested in implementing the programme.

SWITCH-Asia grant projects have done little on capacity building related to policy making, except a few projects that had government agencies or departments as partners. Grant projects focused on technical and managerial capacity building related to SMEs and their organizations.

4.1.3 Indicator 413: Evidence of an improved mix of SCP-related policy instruments (regulatory, economic and market based, voluntary agreements) being applied in selected countries

The *regional PSC* aims to support the formulation and implementation of SCP-related policies and policy instruments, and also is expected to “*harvest the results of SWITCH grant projects*” to enhance the policy take-up (Description of the Action, regional level, CRIS 235-650).

The study conducted by the *regional PSC* of UNEP on the status of SCP in Asian countries (UNEP, 2011) concluded that overall Asian countries already have formulated plentiful national policies, laws, regulations and programmes that are supportive to SCP. Consequently, there is a larger need to support the formulation of tools that will reinforce the implementation of existing SCP related policies than to promote the formulation of new policies. This conclusion underpins the relevance of *SWITCH-Asia* grant projects, as they are actually developing and implementing SCP tools. It also reinforces the importance of making use of the results of *SWITCH-Asia* grant projects. However, UNEP did not yet establish contacts with grant projects, at the same time grant projects do not know the UNEP-PSC focal points and UNEP-PSC staff.

Whereas the overall conclusion to concentrate on SCP tools instead of SCP policies- certainly holds for sustainable production, UNEP also seeks to further sustainable consumption policies and strategies, as these are not yet widely formulated and applied in the region (Kathmandu Networking Event, June 2013).

UNEP categorizes the workshops they organized (see Indicator 412) as “*SCP policy dialogue*”. However, there are no direct links to existing regional or national policy dialogues. It is entirely left to the participants how they will use the gained insights and received information during the workshops. Consequently, the impact of this “*regional dialogue*” is considered to be low.

The Technical Advisory Committee of the *regional PSC* wants to see more outreach of policy support to the Asian countries. So far, the *regional PSC* has provided “*direct policy support*” to only 3 coun-

tries, i.e. China (SCP indicators, carbon labelling, NDRC); Pakistan (establishing a SCP centre, Ministry of Commerce); and India (sustainable procurement, railways). Another outreach activity is planned for 2014, the SCP summer school organized by UNEP and UNIDO in Thailand (4 weeks). Whereas these actions may be useful, they appear to be ad-hoc and too small to make an impact, especially in large countries like China and India.

Based on the assessment of Project Progress reports of the UNEP Switch Asia programme, and interviews during field work this Evaluation notes that impact is low. This assessment concurs with the Final Evaluation of *SWITCH-Asia* (June, 2013) concludes: “Overall, the impact of the Regional Policy Support Component at this stage of implementation is very limited and likely to remain so if closer co-operation is not developed with the other components of the Programme”.

The National PSCs: A basic assumption underlying the *national PSC* is that the recipient countries will create national SCP plans. The implementation of these national SCP plans would require one single coordinating body at supra ministerial level, however most Asian countries prefer that key ministries and agencies themselves take responsibility for resource-efficiency and greening of the economy. And this is what is happening, key ministries such as Industry and Commerce, Energy, Water, Transport, Agriculture and Natural Resources have developed their own specific resources efficiency and greening strategies and action programmes. This is also the situation in most European countries (ETC-SCP-eionet-europe). The *national PSCs* primarily provide direct policy support to a selected number of SCP policy areas identified by their national counterparts (one or more Departments of the Ministry of Environment), such as Green Procurement, Green labelling, SCP monitoring, SCP awareness. Like the *regional PSC*, so far, the *national PSCs* have not established links with grant projects, although initiatives are underway in Indonesia (field mission interviews).

The *national PSC programmes* are useful in terms of the EU having presence at national policy making level related to SCP. However, given the small budget (EUR 2-3 million), the short duration, many different activities and projects and their limited leverage over the main implementing partners, their contribution to creating a strengthened policy framework and to an improved mix of SCP related policies and policy instruments has been very modest. The current design is over-ambitious. In addition, the PSCs have only a mandate in their respective countries, limiting exchange of experiences and multi-country collaboration. (*Indicator 413*)

4.2 JC 42: Degree to which the EU support contributed to the adoption of wide-scale application of SCP practices

4.2.1 Indicator 421: Increase in number of companies (SMEs and large companies) that apply resource efficient production methods, improved technology and higher quality products (less demanding during production process, use and end of pipe waste)

Most grant projects are typically sector-based: the major sector is agro-processing and wood processing (wood, textiles, rattan, bamboo, leather, food and biomass), i.e. 26 projects (40%), followed by the electrical and electronic sectors (nine projects, 14%) and construction (eight projects, 13%). The service sector (tourism) and the chemical sector (paint) have only 5% each, but they are partly included in other projects that have some kind of supply chain management. Cross-sectoral projects that, besides promoting resource-efficiency, often address CSR, environmental management systems and certification account for 20%.

Overall grant projects are relevant and efficient, criteria that need to be met for the project being able to reach their objectives, improvement in SCP (see the Introduction to JC 42 for the scoring of ROM reports).

- **Relevance.** All grant projects score well on relevance, and address the policies and needs of the EU and the recipient countries. However, as there is no process of priority setting for the (sub-) sectors and/or topics/themes to be addressed, it is not known if other actions would have had a higher relevance. Moreover, it is entirely open where and what the applicants choose to do, so there is wide variation of projects with few possibilities of creating synergy or jointly undertaking actions for improving the enabling policy environment and/or regulatory framework; Projects with a low score often have design weaknesses, such as poorly designed logical frameworks¹⁴. Often there is no distinction between the Overall Objective and the Project Pur-

¹⁴ In ROM methodology, the design is part of the relevance criterion.

pose and Expected Results are often Outputs. This leads to confusion of what the project actually seeks to achieve. An improper definition of results and the lack of realistic and verifiable indicators complicate the monitoring of outputs and results.

Grant projects are not obliged to conduct a baseline and conduct monitoring of results. Only very few projects have established a baseline and if they have they are often delayed and/or too general and not directly useful for measuring results and impact of the project;

- **Efficiency.** Generally, project inputs have been provided as planned. During the course of implementation some projects had occasional delays in the start-up phase and various difficulties related e.g. to changes in the management team, communication problems among partners, administrative issues, etc. The performance of the grant contractors has been judged satisfactory by all Delegations and the compliance to the visibility policy of the EU has been confirmed (field mission interviews, *SWITCH-Asia* Final Evaluation, June 2013);
- **Duration and budget.** With a larger budget (up to EUR 2 million) and a longer implementation period (48 months) than predecessor regional programmes (e.g. Asia Pro Eco and Asia Invest) *SWITCH-Asia* grant projects can achieve wider and sustained results. Most of the projects have a planned duration of 48 months and this timescale seems to be appropriate to build enough critical mass to secure the potential for replication. About six projects were scheduled to run for 36 months and this is proving to be seriously constraining, most of them require an extension, which was often provided (budget-neutral). The low efficiency of seven projects (25%) is mainly related to delays due to partnership and management issues, particularly the more complex projects (multi-country, regional and those which large partnerships).

According to ROM, two-thirds of the project will achieve their objectives. This includes a number of intermediate results, such as capacity built, voluntary agreements signed, efficiency performance plans achieved, etc. ultimately leading to the uptake of SCP practises. The Final Evaluation *SWITCH-Asia* (June 2013) arrives at the same outcome, it concludes: "*six out of the eight projects assessed have implemented environmental focused activities and delivered results which are directly supporting the development of a green economy and mitigate climate change*". However, due to lack of SMART indicators and especially the lack of monitoring or feed-back mechanisms, is it impossible to show how many SMEs have actually implemented SCP practices, and how many of the technical recommendations they have applied.

Most monitoring reports, therefore, count on anecdotal evidence. Prospects for achieving results are often promising. However, several barriers restrict the realisation of results:

- Access to credits/loans is a recurrent issue for the adoption by SMEs of measures requiring investments. SCP practises that provide an immediate return (economic benefits) or do not affect negatively the finance of companies are reported to be swiftly adopted;
- A common issue is pricing of resources. In many countries, energy and water is subsidized, making clean alternatives less attractive.
- A well-functioning regulatory framework is key. Without the enforcement of stringent standards and other regulations, only those companies that have to meet severe international customer standards demanding strict supply chain management are willing to make the necessary investments. SMEs that are mainly active on the local market do not have such an incentive.
- Ultimately, market conditions (demand, competitiveness) determine the companies' choice of production technology. There may be adverse effects at the global level that affect local markets and therefore project performance. An example: Due to exploitation of USA of shale gas and extremely low emission rights in the EU, the USA as non-signatory of climate change agreement is much less polluting, than Europe that is increasingly using cheap coal for electricity generation (brand-new gas plants in Rotterdam are standing idle). Similar effects may also occur in Asia.
- The more focused projects were more effective and successful compared to broadly defined projects. For example, working with a subsector (electrical transformers) and having as one key target increased energy efficiency, compared to multi-sectorial, CSR and multi-stakeholder projects (Field work, interviews EUD project managers environment).

Box 12 *Example of potential and realised impact*

CSR in Vietnam: The project aims at bringing services to SMEs, which will support the process of development, appropriation, adoption and implementation of CSR policies. SME representatives (managers) have expressed a keen interest for direct intervention in their enterprises as a result of CSR awareness activities; these demands tend to confirm that the potential for impact is substantial. However, compliance with the labor code and other regulations was reported to be unsatisfactory, partly because there is little enforcement of the regulatory framework but also because the fines for breaches are often ridiculously low.

Source: *CSR in Vietnam Monitoring Report*

4.2.2 Indicator 422: Sustainable consumption effectively promoted

The large majority of grant projects focuses on resources-efficient and cleaner production and a few are including consumer aspects, whereas only four out of 64 grant projects¹⁵ funded by *SWITCH* are specifically addressing consumers and green procurement. The projects that seek to address consumers usually implement various communication instruments to convince the consumer to buy eco-efficient or green products, or actually seek to ensure a market for the products the projects produce. Examples are the brick-kilns project in Nepal, Fair Trade Promotion and E-waste project (collection) in India, Soya Bean Processing (energy-saving production) and Clean Batik in Indonesia. These projects use a wide range of communication instruments (road shows, street theatre, electronic mass-media, community schools, directly approaching whole sale buyers) most of them showing some good results. However, in these cases they represent “niche markets” representing 1% or less of the products market (field mission interviews).

Budgets of grant projects are not sufficient to make a real impact on overall consumer behaviour and demand. These projects on their own cannot make the difference; complementary legislation is needed by banning key polluting elements (for instance some chemicals in textiles) or banning some outdated technology with high energy losses (traditional kilns Nepal). Two grant projects focus on private-sector green procurement working with large supermarket chains (India, China); the projects appear to be very ambitious covering a wide range of products and suppliers; it is too early to assess how successful they will be, as these projects started recently. Only one grant project was targeting green public procurement. The project has been very successful (SuPP-Urb, China, see box below) and forms a good case study for other projects.

Box 13 *Green Public Procurement, the SuPP-URB project in China*

The SuPP-URB project focused on energy efficient procurement and water saving procurement for administrations, schools and universities while at the same time encouraging SMEs to produce more eco-friendly products. In 2004 the National Development Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Finance initiated energy-efficient procurement. In 2006 the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry for Environmental Protection issued a directive fostering green public procurement.

Capacity building activities organized by the project have allowed increasing the level of awareness and understanding of good practices in sustainable public procurement among local authorities; they also increased the technical knowledge on sustainable procurement procedures and tools (tender design, evaluation criteria and indicators for sustainable products) and the understanding of the benefits of sustainable procurement. Upon completion, the project reported a strong increase in the proportion of sustainable procurement in the total procurement budget of the targeted product groups in the three cities, i.e. 86% which compared to a national average of 65%.

Source: *Summarized from Final Evaluation SWITCH-Asia, June 2013.*

Both the *regional and the national PSC programmes* are also addressing sustainable consumption. UNEP prioritised sustainable consumption as much less progress has been achieved in this area, compared to sustainable production. At the same time, when determining the activities of the *national PSC*, all recipient Asian countries prioritised sustainable consumption and green procurement, as they considered that in this area much was to be learned from European experience (Interviews with EUD project managers, field work). Whereas the *national PSC programme* budgets are very limited, the support they provide may be able to mobilize large scale government funding for laying out sustainable consumption strategies and consumer awareness campaigns.

¹⁵ No including the projects of the last (5th CfP) that will be contracted in 2013.

4.2.3 Indicator 423: Estimation of the eco-efficiency and pollution reduction generated by SWITCH-Asia projects (i.e. savings made in use of energy, materials and water, and reduction in green-house gases and liquid and solid waste)

As no overall impact study is available no aggregated quantitative answer can be given to this indicator. Many projects are still on-going, so the final impact in terms of environmental gains cannot be assessed. The first batch of grant projects has been completed. However, so far their results have not been disseminated at a wider scale. The main sources that provide indications for impact remain ROM reports (see introduction to JC42) and the Impact Sheets prepared by grant projects on initiative of and in consultation with the *NF*. These are further detailed below.

The ROM exercise concludes that the prospects for impact are good. Two-thirds of the projects are assessed as good, whereas in one third of projects some issues were identified, albeit they were considered not critical. The extent to which grant projects have resulted in concrete environmental gains, such as decreased emissions, reduced use of materials, energy and water, reduced waste is difficult to assess, as projects do not monitor project results and impact. Only a few projects implement baseline studies, which are essential to assess the conditions and needs of the target groups and to be able to monitor results and impact. Often the targets are incomplete and therefore their aggregation is not feasible. They are either provided in terms of percentage (for instance 10% less energy) or only in absolute numbers (400,000 MT of CO₂), without knowing the reference (total volume), which may even be increased to the rebounding effect).

In a number of cases, some over-rating may have taken place, because the ROM assesses potential impact for on-going projects. Usually, there is a huge potential, and as many projects are in the first years of implementation it is assumed that that potential will be realised. However, whereas the projects may reach targets in attending to the targeted SMEs, only a portion of SMEs finally adopts SCP practices as it takes time to create enabling market conditions (examples Biomass project, Malaysia; AEMAS, energy-efficiency certification scheme (regional, ASEAN), soya bean processing and clean batik processing, Indonesia). These projects were mostly able to provide technical support to the targeted number of SMEs, but only a small portion of them actually applied the full recommended technical package (Field work results).

All projects are relevant to the general objectives of the programme –sustainable consumption and production are mostly in line with the overall policies of the recipient countries, but not necessarily the sectors, where most environment gains could be realized (see Indicator 421). Not necessarily the most polluting industries are being addressed by *SWITCH-Asia*. For quite a number of projects, particularly in the rural and agricultural areas, poverty alleviation -specifically work with the marginalised and poor segments of the population - appears to be the main driver with relatively little environmental impact. For instance:

- The Fair Trade project in India: Many cotton farmers in India already work already work with low-input agriculture, whereas most environmental damage is done during processing, not during production;
- Electronic Waste in Pune, India: the house-to house waste collectors in Pune, India are the key target group of the project, whereas the (informal) scrap dealers are doing dismantling and re-use of electronic waste in an unsustainable manner are not being addressed by the project;
- Other examples are Soya Bean Processing project (cottage industry) and the Clean Batik project in Indonesia.

Whereas the technical impact in terms of less pollution and more efficient use of resources may be estimated relatively easy, no systems are in place to check to what extent the mind set and capacities of managers and technicians have been enhanced.

The *Network Facility* (NF) has published so-called project impact sheets on a case by case basis. These are based on the project log frames and additional information provided by the respective projects, and not on actually conducted impact studies. The impact sheets actually provide the logic reasoning of expected effects and the set targets are assumed to be achievable.

In summary, *SWITCH-Asia* grant projects have generated environmental gains, but it is difficult to quantify.

4.2.4 Indicator 424: Evidence for likelihood that target groups will continue to make use of delivered goods and services, once the EU support is finalized

The analysis of ROM reports shows that the scoring on sustainability was the highest of all DAC evaluation criteria (see introduction to JC42). A total of 24 out of 28 projects (85%) were assessed to have good (prospects) of sustainability.

The level of interest shown by the main beneficiaries of the different projects provides the main basis to sustain the results of the projects. Awareness of more economical and more ecological ways to produce, construct and/or consume has been created and technical reference materials have been developed and made available in all projects. It largely depend on the SMEs themselves if they are able to continue to apply SCP practices. The Final Evaluation of *SWITCH-Asia* found that in some projects SMEs allocated dedicated human resources and own budgets in order to make a substantial change in their business process towards effective sustainable production. This has for example resulted in ISO 14001 certifications being obtained, which ensures a long-term commitment to sustainable practices. SMEs have also sometimes gone beyond the project's scope by forming informal working groups among themselves so they can learn from each other. Yet, the more marginal SMEs have much less possibilities (cottage industries) to do the same as evidenced during field work.

The political will of government authorities to further promote SCP, mainly at local level, also provides a sound basis for sustainability. Other grant projects build on earlier implemented projects in the same field. Implementing agencies, often NGOs, are keen on ensuring continued funding from other sources, once the EU contribution ends (examples are Fair Trade India, Mercycorps with soybean processing Indonesia, German Chamber of Commerce, Clean Batik, WFF certification schemes on timber projects).

Some projects actively plan for post-project sustainability. A good example of sustainability is the Re-Tie project in Bangladesh (leader industry). The project developed skills of 21 young experts on cleaner technology, safety (OHS), energy and mechanical issues, of which 17 have formed the UNIDE Group to provide technical support to the tanneries after the project has ended. Projects that score low on sustainability often have not well-functioning project partnerships, particularly projects with many partners appear to be most problematic (Final Evaluation *SWITCH-Asia*, June 2013).

But how much the interest is, the final determining factor in sustainability is the financial viability of SCP practises and subsequent market acceptance of sustainably produced goods and services. SCP best practices will continue and SMEs will be willing to pay for the related services as long as they remain profitable. Marketability is considered as the underlying principle on which the viability of the “*after-project*” delivery/continuation can be designed. Other key conditions are the affordability of sustainable products and services for consumers and access to finance for SMEs. Access to “*investment funds*” at a preferential rate and with limited “*red tape*” is a recurrent demand from SMEs, which are not meeting minimal requirements of the banking establishment.

4.3 JC 43: Degree to which the EU regional support has facilitated a reduction in illegal logging and an increase in potential trade of legal timber products

4.3.1 Indicator 431: Progress in development and implementation of Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) in Asia

The box below provides an overview of the Regional Support Programme for the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan in Asia.

Box 14 Overview of the Regional Support Programme for the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan in Asia

The Regional Support Programme for the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan in Asia, FLEGT-Asia is implemented by the European Forestry Institute (EFI) and started to operate in November 2008. The first phase of 4 years ended in June 2013 (EUR 6.3 million from which EU contribution EUR 6 million), including an extension of 7 months (FLEGT-I), the second phase (FLEGT-II) has 3 years (EUR 5.2 million from which EU contribution 5 million). The overall objective is “to improve forest governance, and contribute to poverty eradication and sustainable development of natural resources”. The project purpose is: “Increased regional co-operation on trade of legal timber and forest governance within Asia region and between Asian countries and the EU and other major timber trading partners”. In the first phase of FLEGT Asia, the key programme activities were: (i) to address gaps in current information collection and provision networks in Asia; (ii) to strengthen key institutions for improved forest governance at the regional level; and (iii) to invest in customs capacity to

efficiently manage regional trade in legal timber and exclude illegal timber from the legitimate trade. Its services mainly concerned: (i) information provision (on FLEGT, studies of timber flows, customs); (ii) technical advice (legality definition, TLAS); and (iii) facilitation (stakeholder processes, policy dialogue). In the second phase of FLEGT Asia, the specific objectives of the programme are: (i) to increase FLEGT engagement and disseminate EU FLEGT Action Plan information in the Asian region; (ii) to improve forest policies, governance & regulatory frameworks in Asia; (iii) to increase regional and global trade of Asian countries in legal forest products, compliant with new legality requirements. Out of the 19 eligible countries, *FLEGT-Asia* has focused so far on eight main producer and processor countries, i.e. ASEAN countries and China and India. Each country has specific 'FLEGT' realities and requires tailor-made approaches. *FLEGT-Asia* is providing these services by a small team, supported with short term experts and a number of liaison persons in a number of countries, such as Indonesia, China and Vietnam).

The process leading to negotiation, concluding and ratifying VPAs started in 2007. Currently, Indonesia has signed a VPA with the EU (May 2011) and is setting up the surveillance system; two countries are in the negotiation phase, i.e. Malaysia and Vietnam; Four other countries have expressed interest, i.e. Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Laos and Thailand.

The EU Timber Regulation (EUTR) that came into force on March 1, 2013 implied a renewed interest of both timber producing and timber processing countries to understand and adapt themselves to the new market conditions. As regards volumes of trade, the Asian region comprises four of the ten most important exporter countries, in terms of value of timber to the EU; China tops the list, with an estimated value of EUR 4.5 billion, followed by the USA, Russia, Brazil (EUR 3-3.5 billion), Switzerland, Norway, Canada (EUR 1.5-2 billion), Indonesia and Malaysia (EUR 0.9-2 billion) and Chile and Vietnam (EUR 0.75 billion). Globally, between 20% and 40% of industrial wood production, valued at an estimated EUR 7.5 billion a year is still derived from illegal sources. The flow of illegally harvested timber from Indonesia recently represented approximately 50% of all timber exported from Indonesia, of which up to 20% finds its way into the EU.

Source: Formulation Report *FLEGT-II*; CPET, UK

FLEGT-Asia has developed activities in the various stages of the VPA process in the respective countries as follows:

- (1) Information and awareness raising - Philippines, China, India and Myanmar;
- (2) Pre-negotiation consensus building - Laos, Cambodia and Thailand;
- (3) Negotiation in Vietnam and Malaysia; and
- (4) Systems development – Indonesia. *FLEGT-II* is expected to continue current activities in the mentioned countries, and initiate activities in additional countries, such as Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka (Action Fiche, *FLEGT-Asia-II*, 2012).

FLEGT-Asia has contributed significantly to the *FLEGT* process in Asia, and in particular to Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) dialogues and “pre-negotiating consensus building” in the various targeted countries. The large variety of awareness raising activities - based on a well-defined communication plan - has resulted in a good level of understanding of *FLEGT*, the EU Timber Regulation (EUTR) and the VPA process. Local capacities are clearly building up, through a large range of *FLEGT-Asia* supported meetings, events and courses. However, much is still left to be done to increase awareness among civil society actors and the general public. *FLEGT-Asia* has an important role to play here, but obviously the respective Asian stakeholders have to do their part and speed up actions. The global *FLEGT Facility* was more heavily and directly involved in the negotiation stages of the VPA process.

The VPA negotiation process in Malaysia has been in a stand-still for a long time, due to different views of the Federal and State Governments on benefits and implications of *FLEGT*. The most forested state (Sarawak) is only exporting a few percentages of its timber to the EU, and does not want to enter *FLEGT* from its beginning. In such a context, *FLEGT-Asia* (or EFI as called by Malaysian stakeholders) is playing an important role in sharing informal information and expectation management of both, the EU and the Asian partners. EFI is “providing assistance as a mid-wife in delivering a difficult baby. EFI has strengthened us in meaningful negotiations, to develop proposals, to prepare documentation. EFI is the interface between us and the EU.” (Field mission interviews, Malaysia, July 2013).

Until 2013, *FLEGT-Asia* has not done much in Indonesia, as there were already two important *FLEGT* projects being implemented (one EU-funded and one DFID-funded) with an excellent collaboration with the Ministry of Forestry. In addition, there was a highly competent EU project officer in charge of *FLEGT*. However, since 2013 as the EU project was finalized, and capacity on *FLEGT* in the EU Delegation has to be built up again due to personnel changes, *FLEGT-Asia* is now prioritising activities in Indonesia. For instance, the regional advisor of *FLEGT-Asia* plays a key role in supporting the EU Delegation in assessing the progress made in the regular joint Indonesia-EU TLAS evaluations (field mission interviews, Indonesia, July 2013). Since the end of 2012 *FLEGT-Asia* was merged with the

global *FLEGT* Facility following recommendations of a MTR of December 2010. Therefore, *FLEGT-Asia* is playing now the same role in Indonesia as did the global EU *FLEGT* Facility before. Its role may also change in Malaysia, whereas in other countries *FLEGT-Asia* is expected to maintain the role of facilitator of the initial stages of the VPA process.

The *FLEGT* process turned out to be comprehensive, but therefore also a very complex, involving many stakeholders, implying new regulations and reforms rendering it a time-consuming and long process. It is something new, with no models or examples to follow. Moreover, experiences in particular countries may not apply as national conditions differ a lot. No *FLEGT* licenses were available when the EUTR started to apply in March 2013. This is putting pressure on the delivery of the first *FLEGT* licenses to VPA countries (including Indonesia). In view of this situation the *FLEGT* Steering Committee called the *FLEGT* Facility to prioritize supporting effective implementation of VPAs in 2013 (*FLEGT*, Work Plan 2013). Support to the development of comprehensive and operational timber legality assurance systems (TLAS) by advising the EU on the suitability of the TLAS arrangements and support to the EU in negotiations with the Asian stakeholders has become the key task for the *FLEGT* Facility and de-facto for the *FLEGT-Asia* Facility. Increasingly, *FLEGT-Asia* responds to an EU felt need for flexible support in the management of the VPA dialogues and negotiation processes.

The EUTR that came into force on March 1, 2013, was meant to be an additional incentive for countries, such as Indonesia that decided to go for *FLEGT* licencing. So far, none of the Asian countries that signed or are in the process of signing the VPA have completed the process and obtained the *FLEGT* licence.

4.3.2 Indicator 432: Evidence of improved management of forestry resources, such as improved legal instruments and more effective control

FLEGT-Asia Strategy uses trade as an entry point for enhancing the policy dialogue on governance issues, and to bring government and private sector stakeholders together (*FLEGT-Asia* Strategy paper, 2010). The MTR of *FLEGT-Asia* (Soges, December 2010) concluded that “the programme clearly supports regional efforts to tackle illegal logging, which is a persistent problem despite significant achievements in recent years”. Information on the Effectiveness of the Global Response Strategy against Illegal Logging showed that, while Illegal logging has fallen substantially, it remains a major problem (Chatman House, July 2010).

FLEGT-VPA is a powerful instrument to fight illegal logging. In VPA the key mechanism to address issues of governance safeguards and independent verifications is the Timber Legality Assurance System Timber (TLAS). Although the legality as such does not cover all forestry governance issues, it certainly is one of the most important ones with wide implications for the whole forestry production and processing sector.

Malaysia seeks to formulate its own TLAS that allows access to these schemes. Indonesia has already developed its own TLAS for all exported timber and synchronised it with customs and the Ministry of Commerce (on-line interconnected system). This system is already into operation for all exported timber and will shortly also include timber products. That the system works in combatting illegal logging is shown by export statistics; the export of timber decreased by 20% after the system came into operation (field mission interviews, July 2013).

There is a proliferation of large timber importing countries (USA, Australia, Japan) with similar regulations. On the one hand this complicates the administrative compliance for the producer countries, but on the other hand –and more importantly -this reinforces the need for forestry and legal reforms in the production countries. Harmonization among the various systems will occur over time.

To increase effectiveness of TLAS and avoid that timber leaves the country unregistered by illegal channels, it is important that major importing countries, such as China, India and Korea change their policies. Currently they buy any amount of timber without asking any questions on its precedence. In China, *FLEGT-Asia* is supporting the EU in the framework of the Bilateral Coordination Mechanism (BCM), which was signed between DG Environment and the Forestry Administration, of the Chinese Academy of Forestry FSA in 2009. Once a year, a policy dialogue is held. So far four EU-China dialogue meetings were held. These meetings are used to inform China about the EUTR (EU Timber Regulation, EUTR) and the process of progress in the *FLEGT* Action Plan and negotiation on VPAs. China’s concern is how the EUTR may impact on Chinese SMEs.

In India, *FLEGT-Asia* organised three workshops explaining the EUTR and analysing the implications for exporting SMEs in relation to India’s timber import policy. It has to be decided, if the *FLEGT-Asia* Facility should exclusively focus on *FLEGT*-related issues and leave demands from Asian SMEs and governments in non-*FLEGT* countries to help them preparing for the trade in legal timber to other pro-

grammes, such as *SWITCH-Asia*. For instance, in Indonesia, WWF is implementing such a programme with the National Association of Timber Processors funded under *SWITCH-Asia*.

The original design of *FLEGT-Asia* included a specific objective to support regional customs collaboration. However, this was not realistic, as such technical support requires a different institutional set-up, such as a specific support programme with the ministry or agency in charge with customs, such as the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Commerce. Furthermore there is a time issue; capacity of customs to identify illegal timber should be addressed once the respective country has developed its TLAS, and this is done in the last stage of the VPA negotiation process. The *FLEGT-Asia* team does not deny the importance of customs support, but it should not have been formulated as a component. A study was done on regional timber trade flows. *FLEGT-Asia* collaborated with ASEAN and built up a network to put illegal logging and legality issues on the agenda. Three regional workshops were organized that encouraged six out of the ten ASEAN countries to develop their own TLAS. Foresters at ASEAN sought the interest of their colleagues in charge of trade harmonization and customs, but timber is not yet a priority in trade harmonization-single window systems. The idea is that ASEAN builds on the bilateral processes, but its capacity remains a challenge, particularly the frequent changes of staff.

4.4 JC 44: Degree to which the regional EU support has been designed and used impel-mentation modalities to facilitate the generation of the desired impact and synergy in the areas of climate change adaptation and mitigation and green growth

4.4.1 Indicator 441: The SWITCH-Asia Network Facility (NF) has improved the visibility of the programme and generated synergy among the various projects

Regular activities of the *Network Facility (NF)* are dissemination of information on *SWITCH-Asia*, such as:

- (i) Updating and improving the website, including outreach materials on grant projects, such as impact sheets, fact sheets, brochures and posters;
- (ii) Conducting information sessions for potential applicants for CfP; and
- (iii) Regular field visits to discuss scaling-up mechanism of project results; (iv) organizing dissemination workshops and conferences and participating in other SCP conferences (see I-411); and organizing annual *SWITCH-Asia* networking events.

Various thematic studies, such as SCP replication approaches, SCP tools and concepts, Development Financing and SCP, Poverty and SCP have been prepared and disseminated, i.e. posted on the website and distributed during events. From all sides the good work done has been confirmed (interviews at EU-HQ, EUD task managers, project staff). These activities are the most successful tasks of the *NF*. The Final Evaluation of *SWITCH-Asia* (June 2013) concludes: “*The visibility of the SWITCH-Asia Programme has been efficiently promoted by the Network Facility, which has throughout implementation defined and implemented adequate communication and visibility plans under responsibility of a dedicated communication expert*”.

The role of information-sharing among projects has so far mainly taken place during workshops and the annual networking events. A more permanent exchange among grant projects does not yet take place. Interaction and links between *grant projects* and the *policy support components (PSC)* have not yet been established.

Except a few cases, so far not much synergy has been created: the diverse and wide coverage of sectors and topics covered by *SWITCH-Asia* grant projects (see Indicator 421) makes it difficult to create synergy among projects. Obviously, green tourism projects in the Philippines and Sri Lanka can learn from each other, or projects in various sectors that apply supply chain analysis. Only by the end of the first phase there is a ‘critical mass’ that could be exploited in the next phase.

The *NF* could have been done more in dissemination of project results and lessons learned. The Evaluator expected that part of the sessions of the 4th annual networking event in Kathmandu (June 2013) would have as topic “*lessons learned*” and be guided by representatives of mature projects or completed projects (most of the projects of the 1st CfP have been completed). However, such sessions were not held, as –like in earlier years – introduction of concepts and tools (a one-day lab on communication tools - was given priority. These large annual networking events where all projects have to attend are certainly of interest and benefit for newcomers, but those who attended several of them affirmed that they did not benefit from it anymore (field mission interviews Kathmandu, June 2013). Whereas, all stakeholders praise the achievements of the *NF* (see also the Final Evaluation *SWITCH-*

Asia, June 2013) the EU Project managers for the environmental sector affirmed, that so far the impact of the *NF* has been limited (field mission interviews). It is expected that the *NF* would focus on this aspect in its second phase.

There is a considerable overlap between the objectives of the *PSC* and the *NF* in terms of enhancing the policy framework for *SCP*. Since the start of the *PSC*, grant projects and other *SWITCH-Asia* stakeholders are confused on what the *NF* and what the national and regional *PSC* would do and how they would cooperate, see more on this Indicator 442.

Another set-up of the Annual Networking Event (smaller audiences, i.e. by sub-region, and focus on learning from mature and completed projects in similar sectors or addressing similar subject areas) would improve the impact of the *NF*.

4.4.2 Indicator 442: The regional and national policy support programmes of SWITCH-Asia have fulfilled a complementary and facilitating role for the grant projects

For the *regional and national PSC programmes* to be able to fulfill a complementary and facilitating role for the grant projects it is important that they coordinate activities which each other, as well as with the *Network Facility*. Secondly, it assumes that the *PSC programmes* have established close links with the grant projects. As will be shown in this section, unfortunately this is not happening.

The interaction of the *regional PSC* and the *national PSC* is formally based on the participation EU Delegation project officers in charge of the *national PSC* in the Technical Advisory Committee Meetings of the *regional PSC* and in the regional/sub-regional events at which they are invited. However, the EU project managers mentioned the lack of co-operation between the *regional and the national PSC*, as UNEP is not sharing information on its work plan and planned activities with them. The Final Evaluation of *SWITCH-Asia* (June 2013) comes to the same conclusion, based on a questionnaire sent to all EUDs.

The policy uptake of successful implementation models and tools developed and implemented by *SWITCH* grant projects should form a key input for the *PSC programmes*. However, there are only links between the *NF* and the *grant projects* and *national PSCs* related to exchange of experience and dissemination of results, whereas neither the *national PSC* nor the *regional PSC* have contacts with the *grant projects*. The *PSC* is working at the supra-macro level (regional and at the national level in a few countries), whereas *grant projects* mainly operate at the sub-national level. In absence of a connection between the *PSC programmes* and *grant projects*, little impact will be achieved at the national level. This specifically applies for large countries, but even in smaller ones the highest political level needs to be connected with the industry (public-private policy dialogues on *SCP* via formal platforms is one of the four main areas of intervention initially defined). So far, the *PSC programmes* have not been able to link the policy level with the private sector, despite the fact that both grant projects and the *Network Facility* could have provided adequate support in this respect.

Rather than acting as partners, the *NF* and UNEP that implements the *regional PSC* have developed very limited initiatives to cooperate. There are external signs of co-operation (website, back-to-back events) but the relationship between the two components is not in line with the intended "*modus operandi*" saying that the *regional PSC* and the *NF* require a good coordination in order to secure the uptake of project results and provide a joint added value to the overall *SWITCH-Asia* programme. A main reason for the limited collaboration appears to lie in the contractual basis for both components. Whereas the *NF* is being implemented under a Service Contract with EU-Brussels, which requires detailed work plans, approval of budgets by EU Brussels, the UNEP- *PSC* is being implemented under a general agreement for UN organisations (Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement, FAFA), which only requires UNEP to conduct activities under the agreed objectives. There are no obligations for planning or forecasting of expenditure. Annual progress reports are sufficient, and should prove the Agreement is being implemented satisfactory. Secondly, the *regional PSC* is embedded in the overall orientation and networks of UNEP and steered by UNEP headquarters in Paris. Whereas this is certainly a strength of the *regional PSC* and it supports the promotion of *SCP* in the Asian region, at the same time the *regional PSC* remained a rather independent component of *SWITCH-Asia*.

There appears to be some improvements in this respect; in the Regional Workshop on Sustainable Consumption that was organised by UNEP's *PSC* (Kathmandu, June 2013), a number of *SWITCH-Asia* grant projects could present the way they are addressing the topic and how they seek to involve policy makers.

4.4.3 Indicator 443: The FLEGT-Asia support programme has implemented an appropriate mix of VPAs and “non-VPA” interventions

The issue of an appropriate mix of VPA and non-VPA actions implemented by *FLEGT-Asia* was particularly relevant in the early years of implementation, as its objectives were broadly defined and specific expected results were not being defined, as shown by the initial logical framework. Clearly, the situation countries find themselves in, in terms of *FLEGT/VPA* action, is highly diverse; some are in an advanced stage of VPA development, some have just started negotiations. The VPA development process is clearly structuring and guiding *FLEGT* support needs and activities, whereas for non-VPA countries support needs are more diverse.

It is a challenge to identify the “common issues” a regional programme should address, and to avoid engaging in a multitude of less coherent activities. Today all countries are faced with similar challenges due to the adoption of the EU Timber Regulation, the US Lacey Act and the upcoming Illegal Logging Bill (Australia), which will eventually lead to convergence of action undertaken by each of the countries (Formulation Report *FLEGT-II*, March 2012).

Participation in regional joint expert meetings and meetings of the “Regional Advisory Group” were mentioned as important tools to create a regional platform. The Regional Advisory Group played an important role in identifying common regional issues and setting priorities for *FLEGT Asia*’s regional dimension. With the merger of *FLEGT-Asia* with the global facility, the future of the Regional Advisory Group had become unclear. The Malaysian chairman strongly supports the reactivation of the Advisory Group, that maybe a continuation at the Asian level, or at the world level. Like the coordinator and staff of *FLEGT-Asia*, the EFI Director of the global EU *FLEGT* Facility expressed the importance of a regional dimension, pointing at the experience of *FLEGT-Asia*; a similar approach could be followed in other regions, as well. The involvement of regional consultants next to European consultants is also very important to feed in the realities on the ground.

Another important role of EFI is to work closely with civil society organisations, build their capacity, and very important in helping them to manage their expectations. Generally, *FLEGT-Asia* has maintained a good balance in working in both VPA and non-VPA countries; the entry point of timber trade to discuss governance issues proved to be useful.

4.4.4 Indicator 444: The Asian Investment Facility (AIF) is a logical part of the overall regional support to the sector, stressing a key issue of access to finance

Access to finance has been reported in many instances as a bottleneck for the application of SCP measures, particularly those involving substantial part of investment, particularly for micro and small enterprises. The Brussels *SWITCH-Asia* management (EU C2) has examined the inclusion of a specific financial component within *SWITCH*, but this was not found to be justified (Formulation of a Financial Component in *SWITCH-Asia*, Mission Report, 2011). However, under the Regional Co-operation another credit facility has been established, i.e. the *Asian Investment Facility (AIF)*

The *AIF* is a so-called regional blending mechanism for leveraging funds for climate change in developing countries¹⁶. The added value of blending is that a strategic use of a grant element can make projects and initiatives by public or commercial financiers financially viable and thereby exerts a leveraged policy impact. The share of the grant is usually a minor part of the total investment (10-25%), but it has more favourable conditions and it used to reduce risks, so as to attract other lenders and complement the contribution of the beneficiary. The *AIF*’s main purpose is to promote additional investments and key infrastructure with a priority focus on climate change relevant and “green economy” investments in areas of environment and energy, as well as in SME’s and social infrastructure. A later extension to the transport sector could be envisaged. Potential beneficiaries are private and public sector companies, central government, local authorities, public administration (including municipalities) and Public-Private Partnerships (EU, Action Fiche *AIF*, 2011).

An *AIF* Strategic Board has been established that meets once or twice a year and defines the strategy and sectoral priorities for the Facility; the selection criteria for the *AIF* interventions and verifies the consistency and compatibility of *AIF* operations with the Commission Regional Strategy Paper for EU-Asia Co-operation for the years 2007-2013 and its related multiannual indicative programmes (EU-*AIF*

¹⁶ Currently there are 7 of such regional funds. The Neighbourhood Investment Fund (NIF) launched in 2007 by the EU served as example.

Strategic Orientations 2012-2013, June 5 2012). So far, a few contracts have been signed, and implementation is yet to start or has just started.¹⁷

The *AIF* responds certainly a need and encourages green investments. Due to its recent start, it is too early to assess effectiveness and impact. The Strategic Board ensures that projects are in line with EU strategies and policies. Direct links with the other regional programmes, such as *SWITCH-Asia* or *FLEGT-Asia* were not envisaged. Instead, the *AIF* is complementary to *SWITCH-Asia* as it focuses on much larger scale mainly infrastructural projects. SMEs may indirectly benefit by improved access to more affordable resources, such as energy, water, transport, communication and credit.

4.4.5 Indicator 445: The regional support provides complementary support and is coherent with other thematic environmental programmes

When *SWITCH-Asia* was designed, it was expected that the programme would primarily address SMEs in the industrial and urban sector; apparently the demand-driven approach and high participation of (international) NGOs following a poverty alleviation approach favour rural areas. A large number of *SWITCH-Asia* grant projects (40%) are agriculture and forestry-based. They are being implemented in lower, middle and higher income Asian countries, as all these countries low-income rural areas. There are three broad clusters in this group of equal size:

- (i) Textile and leather processing;
- (ii) Supply chain in food products;
- (iii) Wood and NTFP-based.

Projects related to sustainable construction and buildings are also found in poor and emerging economies. Projects related to energy-efficiency, electrical and electronics are mainly located in China and India, as well as covered by regional or multi-country projects.

The large variation in (sub-) sectors and themes addressed by the grant projects decrease the possibility of creating synergy and a joint approach to improve the enabling policy environment. In addition, the projects are not necessarily the highest priority in the respective countries, as such priority-setting is not taking place at programme and/or country level (see also Indicator 421).

A key feature of *SWITCH-Asia* is its focus of working with the private sector. The programme has opened up a new target group and network for EU co-operation. Another well-appreciated feature of *SWITCH-Asia* is its high visibility. Many grant projects have been visited and workshops, seminars have been attended by national and local government officials and other development partners. The *Network Facility (NF)* with its highly professional communication approach and networking events and the *regional PSC* made the programme widely known.

The four-year Thematic Strategy Paper for the Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources, including Energy¹⁸ (ENRTP) for the period 2007-2010 was adopted by the Commission on 20 June 2007. The basic act for this programme is the Development Co-operation Instrument¹⁹ (DCI) Regulation adopted on 18 December 2006, in particular Article 13. The ENRTP addresses challenges which have a profound effect on the lives of poor people: rapidly degrading key ecosystems, climate change, poor global environmental governance and inadequate access to and security of energy supply (EU, Action Fiche ENRTP, May, 2009). The ENRTP is a world-wide thematic programme and funds the development of instruments to enhance a sustainable use of natural resources, such as water, renewable energy, climate change, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).

The ENRTP also funds the global *EU-FLEGT Facility*, which is implemented by the European Forestry Institute (EFI) and directly supports the EU in the implementation of the *EU FLEGT Action Plan*. The regional support to *FLEGT*, i.e. *FLEGT-Asia* was added in 2008, as at that time there was slow progress in the *FLEGT* process in Asia. *FLEGT-Asia* first operated rather independently from the global EU *FLEGT* Facility, but, based on recommendations of the 2010 MTR, *FLEGT-Asia* has been integrated within the Global Facility²⁰ in terms of strategy, planning and reporting²¹. Since 2013, there is

¹⁷ The following *AIF* grants are awarded: KfW-microfinance Asia, 9 out of EUR 81 million; Government of Indonesia, Carbon linked incentive scheme for energy efficiency and renewable energy, EUR 7 million out of EUR 27 million, and Development Agency of France (AFD), Capacity Building hydroelectricity, Pakistan, EUR 2.5 million out of EUR 4 million.

¹⁸ C(2007) 2572.

¹⁹ Specifically Articles 13 and 38 of the DCI.

²⁰ The Global *FLEGT* Facility is funded by the European Union, the Governments of Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom, and the European Forest Institute.

one general Work Plan and one Steering Committee. Whereas, this certainly makes the support to the EU *FLEGT* Action Plan more efficient and effective, it should not lead to a weaker regional dimension. The Steering Committee consist of representatives of EU-DGs. The participation of EUDs en regional experts and advisors should be enhanced.

Opportunities to create synergies between *SWITCH-Asia* and *FLEGT* exist, especially in the WWF-led Global Forest Trade Network (GFTN): ‘Establishing a Sustainable Production System for Rattan Products in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (EUR 2.4 million) and ‘Sustainable and Responsible Trade Promoted to Wood Processing SMEs through Forest and Trade Networks in China, India and Vietnam” (EUR 2.5 million). Since early 2013, WWF is implementing a grant project with the National Association of Wood processors in Indonesia preparing SMEs to acquire the status of “legal wood” by complying with the national TLAS and subsequent *FLEGT* license. Similarly, there is a huge potential for *SWITCH* grant projects to assist governments and SMEs to prepare for exportation under the EUTR.

In conclusion, the regional support to environment, climate change and energy is complementary and coherent with other thematic programmes on environment and climate change.

5 EQ5 on higher education

EQ5: To what extent has regional-level EU support to higher education institutions and networks in Asia and between Asia and Europe contributed to enhancing academic and research standards and to the internationalisation of universities in Asia?

5.1 JC 51: Degree to which regional-level EU support to Asia strengthened interconnectivity between research and education networks between Asia and Europe and within Asia

5.1.1 Indicator 511: Increased access to world-class research and teaching resources for both students and faculty

The mid-term evaluation, the monitoring evidence, and fieldwork data indicate that the *Erasmus Mundus* programme (particularly Actions 1 and 2) increased the access of students and faculty in Asian HEIs to high quality teaching and research resources. Evidence from the fieldwork suggests that Asian HE actors value the *EM programme* because, unlike other mobility programmes, it specifically opens up the wider European field of resources for teaching and research. The table below shows the absolute numbers of masters and doctoral scholarships as well as scholars from Asian countries funded by the *Erasmus Mundus* programme from 2004 to 2012.

Table 2 Total Scholarships Funded by the Erasmus Mundus Programme (2004-2012)

	Asian Countries	All Countries	%
EMMC (2004-2012)	6010	13957	43.1
EMJD (2010-2012)	242	644	37.6
EM Scholars	526	1614	32.6

Source: EM Website

(http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/erasmus_mundus/results_compendia/statistics_en.php)

In each category, Asian students and academics account for over a third to 40% of the scholarships. If we exclude so-called category UKM scholarships (granted to students from the EU and third-country students not eligible for Category A scholarships), it would seem as if Asian students profit disproportionately from the EM 1 and EM 2 interventions: the EM MTE 2012 points out that more than half of the Action 1 category A students originated from Asia compared to about 25% from the Americas and an eighth from Europe (p.62). Policy-makers and evaluators note this imbalance with mild concern which may suggest corrective action to strengthen Latin American and African involvement in future (EM MTE 2012).

²¹ The *FLEGT-Asia* Work Plan of 2013 is fully integrated in the overall *FLEGT* work plan.

5.1.1.1 Budget and output of EM

In term of budget and output the EM is broadly comparable to other exchange programmes such as Fulbright or the DAAD (EM MTE 2012, p.87). The table below, taken from the MTE 2012, suggests that the EM grants are comparable to and can easily compete with mobility schemes from other organisations.

Table 3 A Comparison of Scholarships and their Benefits

Scholarship scheme	Duration	Award
Rotary Ambassadorial scholarship	1 academic year	A flat grant amount of USD 26,000 (approx. EUR 19,000)
DAAD Graduate study scholarship	10 months	Monthly stipends and a subsidy for travel costs in aggregate amounting to EUR 8,350-8,800
Chevening scholarship	1 academic year	Tuition fees not exceeding GBP 10,000 per year (approx. EUR 11,500) + travel costs, a monthly stipend and allowances)
Fulbright Postgraduate Student Awards	1 academic year	Periodic instalments in aggregate amounting to GBP 20,000 (approx. EUR 23,000)
Erasmus Category A scholarship Mundus	10-24 months	Depending on the contribution size and length of studies the scholarship amount might range from EUR 10,000 to EUR 48,000
Erasmus Category B scholarship Mundus	10-24 months	Depending on the contribution size and length of studies the scholarship amount might range from EUR 5,000 to EUR 23,000

Source: MTE 2012 p.88

Moreover, survey data suggests that applicants perceived the EM as a comparable alternative to other schemes. In this sense, then, the EM increases access to teaching and research resources.

Nonetheless, Asian beneficiaries also noted that other mobility programmes, such as Fulbright or DAAD programmes, as well as long-standing bi-lateral agreements with specific European HEIs also enable access to research and teaching resources. Often these other mobility programmes also provide much higher levels of financial commitment per institution (field mission interviews, August 2013). The considerable value added of EM, all respondents agreed, is that its European dimension significantly expands and widens the spectrum of options of HE resources, teaching and experiences. Asian beneficiaries perceive EM to expand choice both quantitatively (i.e. a wider choice of essentially similar research and teaching resources) (field mission interviews, August 2013) and qualitatively (i.e. a wider choice of different research and teaching experiences) (field mission interviews, August 2013). Asian institutional and individual beneficiaries interviewed placed considerable value on the wide diversity of teaching, research and cultural experiences that EM offers (field mission interviews, August 2013).

5.1.1.2 Access to HE excellence

What do these teaching and research resources comprise? Interviews with institutional and individual beneficiaries suggest that Asian HEIs are mostly interested in the opportunities for post-graduate study and research EM. Here, almost all respondents in the countries covered in the fieldwork pointed out that the *EM programme* provides access to high quality research resources (i.e. laboratories and other research facilities), the opportunity for supervision by world-class scientists (field mission interviews, August 2013) as well as access to databases of scientific publications (field mission interviews, August 2013). Here, respondents emphasise that mobility of post-graduate, PhD, post-docs and younger faculty to European HEIs provides them with the opportunity to forge new research collaboration with top scientists in Europe (field mission interviews, August 2013). Similarly, visiting professors from Europe primarily use their stay to discuss research issues with younger Asian scientists (field mission interviews, August 2013). What is more, respondents argued that EM provides their students with access to high quality courses both in terms of substance as well as in terms of delivery (field mission interviews, August 2013).

Evidence suggests that the *EM programme* provides access to higher education excellence, however problematic the definition may be. What also emerges from the evidence is that EM has been less successful in attracting prestigious European HEIs with a world class reputation for excellence (EM MTE 2012, p.64, field mission interviews, August 2013): with the exception of Cambridge University,

none of the prestigious world class European universities and research institutions participated in the EM II. Indeed, an Asian institutional beneficiary pointed out that EM was not “automatically a gateway to excellence” since many of the top European scientists and HEIs tend not to participate in EM (field mission interviews, August 2013). Similarly, another beneficiary pointed out that the EM Action 2 project they were involved in (TECHNO II) did not provide them with access to excellent facilities for chemistry in Germany or Hungary (field mission interviews, August 2013). That said, the degree of competition for the grants, the assessment of Third-Country partners and recognition of degrees outside the consortia indicate that participating HEI units certainly offered some degree academic excellence in teaching and research in their specific fields (EM MTE 2012, p.64). The table below, compiled by the mid-term evaluation of EM, points to the high degree of competition among institutions for EM grants.

Table 4 Success Rates of Applications for Erasmus Mundus Projects During the 2009-2011 Period

	2009			2010			2011		
	Recei-ved	Accep-ted	Suc-cess rate	Recei-ved	Accep-ted	Success rate	Recei-ved	Accep-ted	Success rate
Action 1 Mas-ter's Courses (EMMC)	184	51	28%	181	29	16%	177	31	18%
Action 1 Doctor-al Courses (EMJD)	136	13	10%	148	11	7%	140	11	8%
Action 2 Part-nership applica-tions (ECW)	111	43	39%						
Action 2 Part-nership applica-tions (strand 1)				98	36	37%	91	36	40%
Action 2 Part-nership applica-tions (strand 2)				19	5	26%	12	4	33%
Action 3 Project applications	3	2	67%	44	11	25%	37	9	24%

Source: MTE 2012, p.93

Similarly, Asian beneficiaries used a range of methods for assessing the academic excellence of their European EM partners. For one, respondents argued that the partners were academically excellent in selected areas and specialisations (field mission interviews, August 2013). Some Asian partners trust the European Commission's evaluation process (Interviews at Council of Ministers), others look at the feedback and formal reports from returning students and faculty (field mission interviews, August 2013), other still directly based their judgement on an assessment of the academic output of EM partners (field mission interviews, August 2013). For two Malaysian universities, the EM brand itself is an expression of excellence that they use to leverage resources locally (field mission interviews, August 2013).

5.1.1.3 Quality of HE

The quality of higher education, particularly at post-graduate level, depends not only (or not even primarily) on faculty and staff but rather on the academic qualities of fellow students. While conceding that qualities of students are difficult to measure, evaluators for the EM II argue that the competition for scholarships is a good indicator for quality. The table below suggests that the competition for EMMC and EMJD scholarships is high.

Table 5 Applications to EMMC and EMJD Scholarships 2010-2012

	2010/ 2011	2011/2012	2012/2013
Applications EMMC	24,666	34,700	30,167
Applications EMJD	1,971	3,335	4,226

Source: EM Website

(http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/erasmus_mundus/results_compendia/statistics_2012_en.php)

This means that 6-9% of applicants received an EMMC scholarship between 2010 and 2012. Similarly, only about 7% of the applications to the EMJD programme were successful. Additionally, survey data from the MTE suggests that co-students and faculty rated the quality of EM scholars highly. In general, the awards granted in all three Actions of EM were close to or even exceeded projections. The EM MTE reports that for Action 1, the number of EMJD courses chosen exceeded expectations (p.34). The growth of applications to the EMJD programme documented in the table above underlines this trend.

By and large, the field data corroborates this impression. Institutional and individual beneficiaries report of considerable competition among students for grants for degree courses and mobility to Europe (field mission interviews, August 2013). While the *EM programme* is attractive for students at undergraduate levels, institutional beneficiaries report of difficulties of recruiting students to fill the allocated mobility slots (field mission interviews, August 2013). On the one hand, a Malaysian respondent pointed out that the top students have little interest in attending EM partner universities, aiming instead for schools such as Oxford, Stanford or Harvard (field mission interviews, August 2013). On the other hand, the grants for post-graduate and post-doc work are insufficiently attractive for students and faculty with families (field mission interviews, August 2013).

5.1.1.4 Barriers to the participation in joint HE programmes

Despite generally favourable evaluations and monitoring reports, commentators and beneficiaries in the field also pointed to a number of barriers. Survey data compiled for the MTE 2012 (See Table X above) suggests that a significant proportion of beneficiaries believe to have encountered barriers to participation in joint HE programmes. Notwithstanding this data, field research suggests that not all of these barriers may be acutely relevant to Asian students and faculty.

First, differences in practices of levying tuition fees hampers internationalisation in the *EM programme* (*Erasmus Mundus* MTE 2012). Evaluators found some evidence of convergence of practice due to EM requirements. While institutional beneficiaries in Malaysia and Vietnam certainly point to the high costs of sending students to Europe, this referred to the overall costs – particularly the rather large differential in costs of living – that the EM mobility grants did not cover (field mission interviews, August 2013). Individual beneficiaries point out that grants do not or do not sufficiently adjust for the large differences on living costs in Europe: for example, the same grant takes a student a lot further in Berlin than in Göteborg (field mission interviews, August 2013). The costs of mobility to Europe in general rather than tuition fees of specific HEIs in particular, certainly are a significant issue for Asian students and faculty. Indeed, Malaysian beneficiaries pointed out that the continental European universities made accessible by EM could become a less costly and attractive alternative to the expensive HEI destinations in Australian, New Zealand and the UK traditionally targeted by Malaysian students (field mission interviews, August 2013).

Second, although evaluators point out that diverging legal and administrative regulations at national and institutional level are a significant barrier to internationalisation and the mobility of students and faculty (*Erasmus Mundus* MTE 2012), this was only partly corroborated in the field. Commentators point to issues such as the recognition of degrees, the portability of grants as well as, significantly, problems with obtaining visas (*Erasmus Mundus* MTE 2012, p.29). The mid-term review of the EM project found the difficulty for non-EU students to obtain visas a particularly imposing barrier to mobility (*Erasmus Mundus* MTE 2012, p.30). While this seems to have affected all three actions in the EM framework, survey data collected for the MTE suggests that Action 2 suffered disproportionately (*Erasmus Mundus* MTE 2012). The monitoring reports also frequently point out visa issues as a significant barrier to the effectiveness and efficiency of individual programmes in the EM framework (c149673 - MR_201012, MR-137761.03, 2010, MR-137761.06, 2010, MR-137761.09, 2011, MR-137761.08, 2011). For faculty, timing and capacity issues exacerbated these barriers: grant starting dates and capacity shortfalls did not harmonise with the cycles of the respective academic calendars (MR-137761.03, 2010, p.2). In interviews, individual beneficiaries reported some difficulties with ob-

taining housing, particularly for short-term faculty mobility (field mission interviews, August 2013). Similarly, evaluators discovered that individual European HEIs were in part unwilling to adapt their practices to the EM rules or, when they did, that these changes were of a temporary or opportunistic nature (e.g. providing scholarships rather than employment contracts for PhD students) (EM MTE, p.41). The evaluators point out that practices within European HEIs are as divergent as practices across European and Third Country HEI's (p.41). For EM Action 2, formal regulations and more informal conventions (as in grading) in specific thematic fields or disciplines made the qualifications less portable across universities. This led to significant costs for students in terms of having to repeat exams (field mission interviews, August 2013) or even entire course units (EM MTE 2012, p.41). Evaluators noted that performance and grading expectations between different regions diverged considerably.

Again, the fieldwork in Malaysia, Cambodia and Vietnam only partly corroborates these findings. On the one hand, beneficiaries in Malaysia remarked that EM grants for faculty and, to a lesser degree, student mobility have few takers although they provide better benefits (field mission interviews, August 2013). For one, institutional beneficiaries argue that faculty mobility better funding opportunities in Malaysia (field mission interviews, August 2013). One of the possible reasons is that, other thing being equal, the application process seems "tedious" (field mission interviews, August 2013). On the other hand, while a range of legal, administrative and organisational problems undoubtedly exist (field mission interviews, August 2013), Asian beneficiaries also point out that the EM consortia were mostly able to overcome these problems (field mission interviews, August 2013). Indeed, the way in which European and Asian HEI partners found solutions to these problems significantly contributed to the overall EM experience for administration as well as students and faculty (field mission interviews, August 2013). Common problem solving, Asian beneficiaries argue, has strengthened interorganisational ties and has contributed to the sustainability of these networks (see I512 below).

Third, survey results suggest that language barriers remain a problem for the mobility of student and faculty (EM. A monitoring report found, for example, that in the Universities of Minho and Torino, the lack of English-language tuition hampered mobility and exchange. Insights from the field research seem to provide support for this finding. Similarly, Asian beneficiaries point out that the lack of English language competences among Asian students in poorer countries is probably the most significant barrier to mobility (field mission interviews, August 2013).

These barriers have contributed to a shortfall, albeit slight, in the expected and actual disbursement of grants across all actions. In Action 1, due to unforeseen implementation costs, the EM MTE forecast that the target of 440 grants was probably out of reach. They point to difficulties with scholarships to Europeans and Third Country PhD students (EM MTE, p.34). In the case of the mobility of scholars, EM Action 1 only managed to mobilise 10% of the projected number (EM MTE, p.34).

5.1.1.5 TEIN: Complementing institutional and mobility programmes

TEIN is an enabling infrastructure project. As such, the intervention supports and complements institutional and mobility programmes such as *Erasmus Mundus*. The evaluations of the *TEIN 2* and *TEIN 3* projects suggest that the successful provision of a non-commercial, high-quality data network between European and Asian HEIs has expanded and facilitated the access to European HE and research resources (Evaluation *TEIN 2* and 3, 2010).

TEIN4 has endeavoured to content oriented "innovative applications" such as telemedicine or, significantly, e-learning. Of particular note here is the ASEAN Cyber University (see I521 for more details). However, apart from the ASEAN Cyber University, interviews with institutional beneficiaries suggest that the development of applications for the *TEIN* network is somewhat sluggish. For example, HE actors in Vietnam point out that the *TEIN* network is potentially highly attractive for the type of uses at that university (e.g. real-time diagnostics, e-learning, video conferencing). However, since the *TEIN* network provides little in the way of applications and, more importantly, services, these HEIs have opted out of *TEIN* and are relying on commercial internet providers for a multiple of the cost of *TEIN* (field mission interviews, August 2013).

5.1.2 Indicator 512: Increase in the number and quality of sustainable research and teaching networks between Asia and Europe.

The *EM programme* has extended existing and generated new sustainable networks in teaching and research between European and Asian HEIs. Evidence from both desk and field research indicate that the *EM programme* has become a central element of overall internationalisation strategies implemented by Asian HEIs. Again, Asian HEIs value the *EM programme* because it not only allows the formali-

sation and deepening of existing HE ties to Europe, the European dimension of the *EM programme* also enables the forging of new ties with a wider spectrum of European partners.

The overall share of Asian HEI participating in EM projects has slightly increased in the reporting period. Participation in Action 1 (masters and doctoral programmes) has decreased from 30% to about 15% from 2009-2012 (the duration of EM II). In Action 2, however, Asian HEIs have retained an almost stable participation rate of about 50-60% of all the partnerships funded by the programme. Apart from the 161 consortia with HEIs from Asia it has funded, the EM Programme has set up an EM Alumni Association (EMA) which now numbers 5000 people who are involved in promoting the programme using the strategic network they have forged (EM MTE 2012).

5.1.2.1 Structure of the EM consortia

Preliminary analysis of the data drawn from monitoring reports, interviews with Commission officials and Asian beneficiaries, as well as published data on partnerships reveal that many consortia remained stable across different calls (c144034 - MR_201012; EACEA, 2013; field mission interviews, August 2013). This is particularly evident in Action 2, Strand 1 partnerships. Here we can find core consortia that not only are successful across different lots of the same call (e.g. EMMA-WEST, EMMA-EAST, LOTUS,) but that have retained a core membership across different calls (e.g. JOYSELEEN, AVEMPACE I and II, EURASIA I and II, EXPERTS I and II, LOTUS). Monitoring reports note at several occasions that observed good communication structures and consortium cohesion derive from institutional co-operation sustained over several calls (c144034 - MR_201012, c149673 - MR_201012).

Evidence from the fieldwork suggests that one reason for this stability may be that EM consortia are based on long-term relationships between Asian and European HEIs. The fieldwork uncovered three interrelated pathways for Asian HEIs into the *EM programme*. First, and most prominently, Asian HEIs enter the *EM programme* through long-standing institutional ties with European universities (field mission interviews and interviews at HQ, August 2013). These inter-university links – usually in the form of Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) or similar bilateral agreements – generally follow pathways of colonial association: so, the commonwealth countries of South Asia and Southeast Asia generally enjoy ties with UK universities while countries with a francophone colonial background – Laos, Vietnam or Cambodia – look to French or Belgian universities for co-operation. Through these long-standing ties to universities in France, Belgium and the UK, Asian HEIs are introduced to EM project consortia. Second, Asian HEIs may have had some exposure to other European HE policy instruments such as AsiaLink, the FWPs or, specifically in Malaysia, MYEULink. Last, a relatively small proportion of representatives of Asian HEIs are approached at international conferences or, in cases of prestigious universities such as the University of Malaya or Chulalongkorn University, directly through their internationalisation offices. A significant proportion of the EM participation of Asian HEIs, then, emerges from ties to European universities that exist prior to joining an EM consortium.

This seems to lend credibility to the survey data from the EM MTE 2012 that reports how respondents within national science administrations (National Structures) believe that EM II not only shapes “attitudes, views and dispositions” concerning internationalisation but also helps formalise (existing) research and teaching networks (p.48). Part of this formalisation process includes strengthened research networks: monitoring reports tell of grant holders that often become faculty members in Asian HEIs or deepen as well as instigate new research collaborations (MR-137761.07, 2011, c149673 - MR_201012, c144034 - MR_201012). This is a theme features consistently in the fieldwork data: the pivotal benefits of the EM emerge from the opportunity for post-graduate, post-doc or faculty researchers to institutionalise existing as well as forge new research ties with researchers at European universities (field mission interviews, August 2013).

5.1.2.2 Extension of existing HE networks as added-value of EM

While the formalisation and deepening of existing ties is a strong driver of Asian HEIs participation in the *EM programme*, it represents only part of the value of EM for Asian HEIs. The real value added of the *EM programme* for Asian HEIs lies in the relative ease with which it enables the extension of existing HE networks. This process operates in two directions. First, the consortium structure of EM projects provides access to a much wider range of European HEI than the traditional ties along colonial pathways. EM Action 2 projects enable universities in Malaysia, Vietnam and Cambodia to explore potential partnerships with universities in Italy, Spain, and Portugal but also in Hungary, Romania and Poland (field mission interviews, August 2013). Interviews suggest that universities in Southeast Asia are seizing these opportunities to explore new relationships (field mission interviews, August 2013): all HEIs surveyed in the fieldwork period had sent post-graduate and post-doctoral students as well as faculty to locations such as Italy, Portugal, Spain, Romania and Poland. Second, the *EM programme*

has also extended regional HEI networks in Asia. Evaluators point out that involving third country institutions as full partners opened new co-operation and mobility pathways (EM MTE 2012, p.106). By making third country institutions targets for exchanges, the policy change had enabled new pathways of inter-regional or South-South mobility. Interview data from the fieldwork provides supports this. Respondents argue that EM has enabled Asian HEIs to become local and regional hubs for research and teaching mobility. In the former case, Asian EM partners function as gateways to Europe for universities in the country: for example, despite the relatively small number of mobilities, both UPM in Malaysia and HNUE in Vietnam funded TG2 grants (field mission interviews, August 2013). In the latter case, EM projects created new mobility pathways in Asia: for example, in Southeast Asia, the EM project created new ties between universities in Myanmar and Vietnam (field mission interviews, August 2013).


5.1.2.3 Factors for sustainability of networks

What makes these networks sustainable? The fieldwork revealed three factors of network sustainability important to Asian HE actors. First, beneficiaries at Asian universities argue that networks are sustainable the more they enable effective communication (field mission interviews, August 2013). Communication, they continue, is a function of effective network management and governance (field mission interviews, August 2013). Interviews revealed that Asian HE partners appreciated the way they were involved in the different stages of the EM project (i.e. proposal writing and evaluation) (field mission interviews, August 2013). Other beneficiaries pointed out that the management of tensions between partners – often about the allocation of mobilities – has also contributed to the sustainability of networks by creating constructive working practices based on trust and respect (field mission interviews, August 2013).

Second, Asian HE actors argue that the HEI networks and ties are sustainable if they manage to generate viable output either in terms of research or in terms of teaching. The EM networks will remain sustainable only to the extent to which HEIs can develop collaborative research projects or joint training programmes (field mission interviews, August 2013). This, in turn, depends on the way students and faculty can be mobilised to participate in these programmes (field mission interviews, August 2013). While some respondents can point to outputs of this sort (field mission interviews, August 2013), this remains an aspiration for others (field mission interviews, August 2013).

Third, the financial sustainability of the networks established by the EM remains a central issue. Financial sustainability, defined in terms of the likelihood of a programme continuing in the absence of EU funding, differs from one action to another (EM MTE 2012, pp.74-76). For Action 1, survey results suggest that only 37% expected to continue their activities beyond the funding period and 9% of respondents believed that they could continue their programmes without any funding. Others sought a mix of national (34%) or other EU mobility funds (38%) or continuing activities at a lower level of involvement (33%) (EM MTE 2012, p.75). For Action 2 the survey data indicate that sustainability will be somewhat lower than for Action 1: 11% would cease the co-operation after funding ends, 52% expected to continue at a lower intensity and 30% of “institutional beneficiaries” surveyed expected to continue operations at a similar level of commitment (EM MTE 2012, p.75).

Figure 6 Opinion of Institutional Action 1 and Action 2 Beneficiaries Regarding Category UKM Scholarship Attractiveness to European Students



Source: MTE, 2012, p.90

The MTE found that financial constraints of universities and therefore continued EU funding determined sustainability of networks. Some 60% of respondents surveyed for the MTE see EU funding as a crucial factor in sustainability of networks in the short and medium term. Not least because business and public sector involvement has been low in some regions (see I533 and I534). However, the fact that the MTE survey data suggests that 53% would continue bilateral co-operation and 37% planned to apply for national/ regional funding points to the durability of HEI networks formalised by the *EM programme* (EM MTE 2012, p.75). Some respondents during the field phase also doubted that the networks initiated by EM would prevail without European funding (field mission interviews, August 2013). Yet most of the respondents, particularly those with considerable experience with the *EM programme*, preferred to emphasise the other two factors.

The evaluation of *TEIN2* and *TEIN3* suggests that these two projects have been successful in generating effective HE networks between Europe and Asia. This seems to be true both in a technical sense (i.e. building the physical infrastructure for the data network) as well as in an institutional sense (i.e. building and maintaining a transnational and transregional management regime to govern the network) (Evaluation of *TEIN2* and *TEIN3*, 2010). The evaluators of the *TEIN 2* and *TEIN 3* projects summarise this as follows:

„In terms of effectiveness and efficiency, TEIN2 has fully delivered its results through: (i) strengthened interconnectivity between the existing research and education networks in Europe and Asia, and within Asia; (ii) increased ICT co-operation between eligible research and education organisations in Europe and Asia which has allowed, and fostered, increased co-operation between the participating research and education organisations, both in Europe and Asia; (iii) formation of long lasting research and education partnerships, many of them between multiple institutions; (iv) further integration of Asian countries into the information society through increased international links between national research and education networks and improvement of national networks; (v) removing the necessity for the target groups to exchange their traffic through the commercial Internet via North America with the opening of the main high-speed links between Beijing and Co-

penhagen in March 2006 and between Singapore and Frankfurt in April 2006” (Evaluation of TEIN 2 and TEIN 3, 2010).

Parenthetically, the TEIN 2 and TEIN 3 Evaluations points out that same is true for TEIN 3 at the technical level: the new social and economic goals adopted for TEIN 3, however, require a different set of evaluative criteria.

While the evaluation argues that the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency (in terms of the original, more technical goals of TEIN 2) of TEIN 2 and TEIN 3 are very high, the sustainability of the network (in the governance sense) remains an open question. While stakeholders seem to agree that the governance and management of the TEIN network should be eventually transferred to Asia HEI actors, there seems to be little agreement how this can be done (Evaluation TEIN 2 and TEIN 3, 2010). Indeed, the evaluators of the TEIN 2 and TEIN 3 projects warn that there are no obvious institutional solutions for the management of the TEIN network:

„If there had been a simple institutional solution, it would have been found by now. Instead, different options have been presented over the years, but they all suffer from a fundamental flaw: either they are technically acceptable but geo-politically unsuitable (e.g. the current arrangement with DANTE and the proposal recently submitted by AARNet), or they are more geo-politically acceptable but technically questionable (e.g. the counter-proposals submitted at the recent Kuala Lumpur meeting by Korea and by APAN). There is even a risk that the good work that has been achieved by TEIN to date will be undone by the divisiveness of trying to force a rushed solution.“ (Evaluation of TEIN 2 and TEIN 3, 2010).

5.1.3 Indicator 513: Increase of sustainable mutual learning between European and Asia on higher education issues.

Evidence from both desk and field research indicates that the EU’s regional HE interventions have contributed to mutual learning. The EM programme in particular enabled learning at two levels. First, participating HEIs learnt about universities and HE systems in Europe and Asia. Second, the EM programme facilitated participating HEIs to exchange teaching and research practices.

The EM programme provided an effective means for Asian HEI actors to learn about European HE systems and other Asian universities. European HEIs face intense competition from US and Australian universities as targets for Asian student mobility and degree-seeking (EM MTE 2012, p.40;). Since Asian students in general still prefer English-speaking universities (US, UK and Australia top foreign enrolments from Asia followed by Germany and France), there is a need for raising the visibility and awareness of European universities as an attractive alternative to Australian and US HEIs. Indeed, in the reporting period, the EM programme funded 14 projects specifically aimed at enhancing European HE in Asia.

Table 6 Action 3 Projects Relevant to Asia

Year	Name
2011	SCEE: Founding the Siberian Centre of European Education
2011	LEAN-CC: Linking European, African and Asian Academic Networks on Climate Change
2010	PROMODOC: Promotion of European doctoral programmes in industrialised countries
2010	Euro-Asia.net: Preparatory networking tool to enhance European-Asian higher education co0peration
2010	CODOC: Co-operation on Doctoral Education between Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe
2009	ASEMUNDUS
2008	ISEKI_MUNDUS 2: Internationalisation and Sustainability of ISEKI_Food Network
2008	SDPROMO II Promoting European Education in Sustainable Development
2008	TwoEA-M: Enhancing Attractiveness of Environmental Assessment and Management Higher Education
2008	EACOVIOE: Enhance the Attractiveness of Computer Vision and Robotics in Europe
2008	LEANES: Linking European and Asian academic networks in the field of Environmental Science
2008	ACCESS: Academic Co-operation Europe South-East-Asia Support
2007	ACTIVE ASIA: Asia – Europe Credit Transfer in Virtual and Distance Education
2007	E4DCs: European Environmental Engineering Education for Developing Countries

Source: EM Website

(http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/erasmus_mundus/funding/2009/selection/selection_action_3_2009_en.php)

5.1.3.1 Awareness and visibility raising of European HEIs in Asia through EM

Evidence from MTE and monitoring reports, earlier evaluations as well as the field work indicate that the *EM programme* has raised the awareness and visibility of European HEIs in Asia. First, monitoring reports of Action 3 projects generally show these projects to have been effective and efficient. Second, the EM MTE 2012 points out that high level of competition for Action 2 projects – which is also an indicator of excellence – acts as an effective means of increasing and communicating the attractiveness of European universities. However, the evaluators point out that increasing costs for studying at European universities as well as an uneven quality of European HE undermine attractiveness and visibility. Third, participation in Action 2 projects not only allows Asian HE actors to confirm their (often) high expectations of European HEIs (field mission interviews, August 2013), the large European EM networks also allow them to learn about a larger spectrum of European HEIs (field mission interviews, August 2013). However, this also includes rather sobering experiences such as realising that European HE is “almost as bureaucratic as in Asia” (field mission interviews, August 2013). A senior HE actor in Malaysia pointed out that the EM consortium kick-off meetings provide a useful overview of the specialisations and areas of expertise of different European HEIs (field mission interviews, August 2013). This may go some way towards explaining why delegations report an increase in interest in European HEIs beyond the traditionally popular countries (UK, Germany and France) (EM MTE 2012, p.34). Last, all participating HEIs learnt about adopting transnational quality standards and credit transfer systems, specifically the ECTS. It is interesting to note that as much of the learning for European HEIs was about the HE practices in other Member States (EM MTE 2012, p.46, c149673 - MR_201012) as it was about Third Country HE structures and practices. Interviews with Asian institutional beneficiaries show that the EM experience was an effective means of learning about aspects of the Bologna Process salient for Asian HEIs: these include the Bachelor/ Masters structure and credit transfer systems (field mission interviews, August 2013).

5.1.3.2 What do European partners learn about Asia and Asian HE systems from the EM experience?

The data suggest that the *EM programme* offers European HEIs and beneficiaries the opportunity to learn about the Bologna Process, as well as aspects concerning the internationalisation of research and teaching. But that is only part of the story, many Asian institutional beneficiaries interviewed during fieldwork argue. Providing attractive courses for the Asian market requires that European HE actors learn more about Asia and Asian HE systems (field mission interviews, August 2013). The EM projects, they contend, has provided an opportunity for European HE actors to challenge and revise prevalent (mis)perceptions about Asia and Asian universities. Many Asian HE actors observed that their European colleagues were surprised at the level of development and potential in HE sectors of countries such as Malaysia, Cambodia or Vietnam (field mission interviews, August 2013). The in-bound faculty and researcher exchanges, they argue, allowed the top universities of the region (for example UPM, UM, HUST, RUPP, AIT, Mahidol, Chulalongkorn, etc.) to demonstrate their strengths and gain visibility (field mission interviews, August 2013). Moreover, the EM experience has enabled European universities to structure courses for East and Southeast Asian students: these, one observer argued, need to be activated more than students from other regions (field mission interviews, August 2013). EM faculty and research exchanges also help Europeans overcome attitudes towards Asia and Asian HEIs that Asian beneficiaries perceive to be “paternalistic” (field mission interviews, August 2013)

Institutional and individual beneficiaries as well as policy-makers interviewed for the EM MTE 2012 also point to the profound impacts of the *EM programme* on attitudes towards international co-operation and mobility. Based on survey data and case studies, the EM MTE shows that a large majority of respondents believes that the EM II programme contributed significantly to strengthening attitudes towards international co-operation and mobility among students, faculty and staff in all involved HEIs. Here Action 2 respondents see the strongest influence (73% strong and 23% of respondents report some influence among students, 67% and 28% among scholars) followed by Action 1 students (61% and 32%) and scholars (51% and 40%) (EM MTE 2012, p.48). The evaluators also point to what they call multiplier effects of EM projects: interest in mobility and, for example, learning another language increased with the availability of mobility from the *EM programme* (EM MTE 2012, p.48). The interview data from the fieldwork clearly supports this finding: the Asian institutional and individual beneficiaries interviewed were not only well aware of the benefits (but also risks) of internationalisation in general and EM in particular, all of the HEIs covered in the fieldwork phase had formulated and were pursuing an explicit internationalisation strategy (field mission interviews, August 2013; see I521 and I522 below).

Second, the *EM programme* also offered the opportunity for some consortia to exchange experiences about teaching and administrative practices. Case studies conducted for the MTE 2012 as well as interviews conducted during the field phase suggest that EM II contributed to capacity-building at all involved HEIs.

Consortia not only learned from each other's teaching and research practices, they also devised common approaches to project governance and management. Asian HE actors interviewed during the fieldwork report that the experience of participating in the *EM Action 2 programmes* provided an opportunity to closely observe European HEIs management practices (field mission interviews, August 2013). These range from interorganisational tasks such as a managing multilateral mobility programmes over institutional challenges such as setting up and operating training programmes to everyday HE admin tasks such as conference organisation (field mission interviews, August 2013). At a basic level, Asian institutional beneficiaries interviewed appreciated the chance to experience European HEIs communication, management and networks practices (field mission interviews, August 2013). Evidence from interviews monitoring reports suggests that mutual learning required specific organisational measures, most prominently staff exchanges as well explicit sharing and learning events (field mission interviews, August 2013). The monitoring reports also suggest, albeit indirectly, that where this was not the case, mutual learning did not reach its potential (c155747 - MR_201113, MR-137761.06, 2010, Report geninfo). Furthermore, EM consortia also devised innovative common governance structures and practices in order to manage cooperative mobility projects. In this context, the MTE states that an analysis "...of the survey data [...] indicates that the majority of Action 1 and Action 2 projects applied joint admission, selection, supervision, monitoring and assessment procedures (94% of the respondents strongly or rather agree) and involved joint governance arrangements (committees or boards) where all partners were represented (92% of the respondents agree). According to 77% of the respondents, the governance model represented an innovation that could be promoted to other higher education institutions. A total of 92% of the respondents were satisfied with the co-operation arrangements and the sharing of responsibilities with consortium partners" (p.96).

Significantly, interviews revealed that the EM experience allowed Asian participants to explore and adopt management and communication practices that make these governance structures come to life (field mission interviews, August 2013).

Asian HE actors pointed to the lack of two-way mobility as a distinct weakness of many *EM Action 2 projects* (field mission interviews, August 2013). For many Asian HEIs, particularly in countries such as Cambodia, Laos or Myanmar, the lack of HEI capacity limits the potential of receiving students from Europe or other Asian countries. Yet many Asian institutional beneficiaries in countries such as Malaysia or Vietnam argue that the uni-directional flow of mobility is hampering learning effects in two ways (field mission interviews, August 2013). First, students in Asian countries, particularly in more affluent countries, greatly benefit from exposure to foreign students. For one, high expectations of incoming students put pressure on host faculty to consolidate and implement effective teaching methods and innovative content (field mission interviews, August 2013). Further, it would enable Asian students less likely to take advantage of a mobility programme to experience European study and research practices (field mission interviews, August 2013). Here, respondents pointed to the Mevlana programme operated by Turkish universities as an example of a bi-directional mobility programme (field mission interviews, August 2013).

5.2 JC 52: Extent to which regional-level EU support to Asia has enabled an increase in quality in teaching, research and governance in Asian higher education systems

5.2.1 Indicator 521: Increase in teaching capacity and quality brought about by regional-level EU interventions in Asian HE sectors

Both the *Erasmus Mundus* and the *TEIN* programme have expanded the potential for expanding the capacity and improving the quality of teaching at Asian HEIs.

5.2.1.1 Increased scholarship to conduct research or teaching activities in co-operation with another HE institution

The *Erasmus Mundus* programme expands the potential for contributing to teaching capacity and quality in two ways. First, since 2004, the interventions have increased the supply of and access to excellent HE programmes for Asian students. Since the inception of the programme, 25 000 students – three quarter from outside the EU – have received a scholarship to study abroad. 3000 academics

have been funded to conduct research or teaching activities in co-operation with another HE institution (EM MTE 2012, AF4 Asia Regional). The numbers of students and scholars from Asia have developed as shown in the table below.

The *EM programme* has also expanded the scope of Asian countries included in the programme. By 2012, masters students from 52 Asian countries (including countries in the Middle East as well as the South Sea) had received a scholarship from the *EM programme*. By 2012, a cumulative of 242 students from 26 Asian countries received funding for their doctoral research. Similarly, academics from 29 Asian countries profited from an EM mobility grant. The following table provides an indication of how the numbers of countries grew from the original 18 countries in 2004.

This expansion has occurred despite problems with timing and capacity that monitoring reports pinpoint throughout the process (c144034 - MR_201012 p.2-3, MR 201013). In terms of quality, the evaluators of the MTE 2012 point both to the survey data on how participants perceive the excellence of EM HEIs as well as the high degree of competition for Action 1 and Action 2 funds (EM MTE 2012). For Action 2, survey data indicate that 85% of respondent believe to have benefited from “*outstanding quality in teaching and research*” (p.65). The MTE evaluators report that about 70% of scholars assess the HEI they visited to be strong and academically excellent (p.65). Asian students in particular targeted specific departments and programmes due the perceived academic excellence (EM MTE 2012,)

Table 7 Overview of the First Scholarship Awarded to a National of an Asian Country

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
EMMC	Bangladesh, China, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam	Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mongolia, Samoa, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Syria, Taiwan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan	Afghanistan, Fiji, Myanmar, Oman, Yemen	Macao, Maldives, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Papua New Guinea	North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Timor Leste, Vanuatu		Tonga		
EMJD							Armenia, Bangladesh, China, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam	Cambodia, Jordan, Japan, Mauritius, Mongolia, Myanmar, Philippines, Turkey	Uzbekistan, Vanuatu
Scholars		China, Georgia, India, Israel, South Korea	Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines, Singapore, Syria, Thailand	Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Pakistan	Armenia, Cambodia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan, Vietnam	Lebanon, West Bank & Gaza Strip	Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan		

Source: EM Website (http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/erasmus_mundus/results_compendia/statistics_en.php)

5.2.1.2 Improved teaching capacities through EMJD

Second, the *EM programme*, particularly the doctoral degree courses have contributed to improving and upgrading teaching capacities in Asian HEIs. The table below shows the distribution of EMJD grants since the inclusion of doctoral research into the *Erasmus Mundus* programme in 2010.

Table 8 *EM Joint Doctoral Programme – Students selected per Year*

Student Nationality	Total 2010-2012	2010	2011	2012
Uzbekistan	1	0	0	1
Armenia	4	0	2	2
Iran	30	7	11	12
Israel	1	1	0	0
Jordan	4	0	3	1
Turkey	21	0	8	13
China	42	11	9	22
Japan	3	0	1	2
Mongolia	2	0	2	0
South Korea	3	1	0	2
Taiwan	5	2	1	2
Bangladesh	11	3	1	7
India	54	14	13	27
Mauritius	1	0	1	0
Nepal	9	1	2	6
Pakistan	18	5	5	8
Sri Lanka	3	0	0	3
Cambodia	1	0	1	0
Indonesia	7	2	3	2
Malaysia	3	1	1	1
Myanmar (Burma)	1	0	1	0
Philippines	3	0	2	1
Singapore	1	1	0	0
Thailand	3	1	1	1
Vietnam	9	1	3	5
Vanuatu	2	0	0	2
Total South Sea	2	0	0	2
Total NEA	55	14	13	28
Total Southeast Asia	28	6	12	10
Total South Asia	96	23	22	51
Total Central Asia	1	0	0	1
Total Middle East	60	8	24	28
TOTAL Asia	242	51	71	120
Total Global	644	130	216	298

Source: EM Website

(http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/erasmus_mundus/results_compendia/statistics_en.php)

While the Asian beneficiaries of the EMJD programme make up about 30% of the total – a proportion that has remained constant over three rounds – both the absolute numbers of PhD grants as well as the scope of countries remains relatively small. For example, since 2010, only 28 doctoral scholarships were awarded to students from Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar, Singapore and Vietnam). What is more, the numbers point to an imbalance across sub-

regions. South Asian countries – predominantly India, Pakistan and Bangladesh – received almost twice as many EMJD grants as the Northeast Asian region (China, South Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Taiwan). Almost three times as many students from Middle-Eastern countries received doctoral grants than students from Southeast Asian countries. EMJD grants went to students from less than half of the Asian countries (48%) that participate in the *EM programme* as a whole.

Table 9 Total mobility of scholars funded by the EM programme from 2004-2012

Erasmus Mundus Scholars from Asian Countries in 2004-2010	
Country	Total
Armenia	4
Azerbaijan	1
Bangladesh	7
Cambodia	1
China	159
Georgia	5
Hong Kong	4
India	129
Indonesia	16
Iran	15
Israel	39
Japan	49
Jordan	2
Kazakhstan	1
Kyrgyzstan	2
Lebanon	3
Malaysia	13
Nepal	6
Pakistan	6
Phillipines	7
Singapore	5
South Korea	8
Sri Lanka	2
Syria	6
Taiwan	6
Thailand	15
Turkmenistan	1
Uzbekistan	3
Vietnam	10
West Bank & Gaza Strip	1
Total Asia	526
Total	1,614

Source: EM Website

(http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/erasmus_mundus/results_compendia/statistics_en.php)

The figures for scholar mobility sketch a similar picture to the distribution EMJD grants. For one, mobile scholars originate from just over half (57%) of the Asian countries that participate in the *EM programme* as a whole. Further, the distribution of scholar mobility (unsurprisingly) reflects similar sub regional imbalances as do the figures from EMJD grants. Again, reflecting the relative strengths and weaknesses of HEI systems across and with regions, some countries (India, Israel or Thailand) are more successful in attracting funds for scholar mobility than others (Cambodia, Sri Lanka or Kazakhstan).

5.2.1.3 Acquiring new methodologies, research skills and networks through EM

Case studies shows that coordinators, prospective faculty (currently PhD students) and visiting professors felt that they profited from the *EM programme* in terms of acquiring “new methodologies, research skills and networks” (p.53). In this case, many of the students were lecturers looking to obtain a de-

gree in Europe (p.67). Monitoring data also points to these types of doctoral students remarking that they not only bring home research networks but also apply new methods and skills (MR-137761.07, 2011). Similarly, stakeholders and beneficiaries all agreed in interviews that the EM mobility at all levels enables Asian students and researchers to acquire excellent teaching skills. Not only does the exposure to European HE teaching and study practices equip future teachers in Asian HEI with an in-depth understanding of their fields (field mission interviews and interviews at Council of Ministers, August 2013) and with cutting edge teaching skills (field mission interviews and interviews at Council of Ministers, August 2013) but also with a wide range of soft skills (i.e. public speaking, work organisation). Moreover, the attractiveness of the *EM programme* itself, respondents pointed out, encouraged younger faculty to seek training abroad: many EM Masters students are highly motivated to look for further opportunities for post-graduate and PhD studies in Europe (field mission interviews, August 2013).

For this reason, some Asian HE actors are optimistic about the impact of EM graduates in particular (and graduates of foreign universities in general) on teaching capacity and quality (field mission interviews and interviews at Council of Ministers, August 2013). Respondents in a case study conducted for the EM MTE (EM2-STEM) pointed to the importance of PhD-level training for the development of universities in both inside and outside Europe (EM MTE 2012). Since in many third country HEIs, university instructors do not as a rule hold higher university degrees, the EM post-graduate programme (particularly at PhD level) potentially contributes to upgrading HE teaching capacities in Asia HE systems (EACEA, 2013; EM MTE 2012, p.53). Here, stakeholders hope that EM alumni can import and adapt the European HE teaching practices to local contexts (field mission interviews and interviews at Council of Ministers, August 2013). Asian HE actors identify concepts such as problem-based learning (implemented at UPM in Malaysia), e-learning systems (in the process of being implemented at the University of Battambang in Cambodia), or the general habit of 'thinking out of the box' (Interviews at Council of Ministers).

Others, however, are more sanguine about the actual impact of EM on teaching quality for two reasons (field mission interviews, August 2013). First, and most significantly, at both the level of the country and the level of the institution, the *EM programme* funds far too few mobilities to make an impact on teaching capacity and quality within the individual university let alone the HE system as a whole (field mission interviews, August 2013). Second, institutional factors at country level often hinder multiplier and leverage effects from occurring (field mission interviews, August 2013). In particular, hierarchical structures at universities in which position and advancement are only very vaguely related to merit and performance provides little in the way of incentives for young researchers and faculty to introduce new methods (field mission interviews, August 2013). Others point to large class sizes and missing IT infrastructure to apply group-based learning and study processes (field mission interviews, August 2013). Asian HE actors also remark that Asian students themselves may not yet be ready for more independent modes of teaching and studying (field mission interviews, August 2013). What is more, the interviews suggest that there is little institutional support for young faculty to pass on the skills they have learned in their time abroad (field mission interviews, August 2013). As a result, the EM alumni cannot seem to create the resonance and act as multipliers for new skills and methods acquired in Europe. Indeed, it would seem that where this institutional support is forthcoming, teaching skills and methods have more readily disseminated (field mission interviews, August 2013). For example, a Vietnamese PhD candidate studying at Murcia University with an EM grant returns during her summer break to instruct undergraduates in laboratory practices acquired in Europe (field mission interviews, August 2013). Similarly, ITC in Cambodia also attempts to support its faculty to adapt and implement European teaching skills and expertise (field mission interviews, August 2013). Nonetheless, the interviews with individual and institutional Asian beneficiaries strongly suggest that the translocation and institutionalisation of European HE teaching practices is not an automatic process.

5.2.1.4 TEIN as complement to EM on IT infrastructure

The *TEIN* programme has provided a high IT infrastructure capable of delivering e-learning content. In 2009, the AUN and the Republic of Korea launched a regional e-learning platform – the ASEAN Cyber University Project (ACU) – which entered the pilot phase in 2012. The pilot stage will cover four ASEAN countries: Cambodia (ITC), Laos (National University of Laos), Vietnam (Hanoi University of Science and Technology) and Myanmar (University of Technology). The ACU utilises the *TEIN* network to provide on-line courses in a number of fields (Business, Engineering, Languages, Korean Studies). While the results from the pilot seem promising (despite the high costs for, interviews with stakeholders also suggest that specific institutional and legal within individual barriers may hamper rolling out the initiative. For one, Asian HEIs do not yet possess the hardware required for delivering and using e-learning contents (field mission interviews, August 2013). Furthermore, and more signifi-

cantly, actors from HUST, in charge of the ASEAN Cyber University in Vietnam, point out that there is no legal and regulative framework for awarding credits and degrees from virtual courses (field mission interviews, August 2013). Furthermore, Vietnamese HE actors point to the lack of policy commitment and deliberation on part of national HE policy-makers for *TEIN* in particular and e-learning in general (field mission interviews, August 2013).

There can be little doubt, then, that both the EM and *TEIN* programmes expand the potential pathways for acquiring relevant teaching skills. Significantly, interviews with Asian institutional and individual beneficiaries show that Asian HE actors are fully aware of this potential (field mission interviews, August 2013). However, the fieldwork shows that benefits to teaching capacity and quality have been highly localised and that multiplier effects have been modest. While it may be too soon to judge whether the ACU can fulfil its considerable potential, Asian HE actors are already pointing to potential administrative, legal and policy barriers for the provision of e-learning content (field mission interviews, August 2013).

5.2.2 Indicator 522: Increase in volume and quality of research output brought about by regional-level EU interventions in Asian HE sectors

Similarly, regional level EU interventions in HE expanded the opportunities for increasing volume and quality of research output. However, the impacts of regional level EU interventions on research output of Asian HEIs are as localised as the impacts on teaching.

Qualitative, case study and fieldwork data provide indication that EM partnerships and degree-seeking mobility have contributed to strengthening skills, networks and publication opportunities. Visiting professors and researchers from Europe, Asian HEI actors argue, predominantly spend their time in Asia discussing research with junior faculty at Asia HEIs (Interviews at UKM in August 2013). These case studies report on the way EM mobility of doctoral students and scholars has enabled individual researchers to hone research skills and learn new methods (EM MTE 2012, p.40, MR-137761.03, 2010 p.3).

Case study interviews as well as interviews conducted for this evaluation suggest that many doctoral students return to their home countries with research networks that they put to use (EM MTE 2012; field mission interviews, August 2013). Visits and exchanges by scholars often led to the drafting of joint papers and publications which increased the global visibility and awareness of all scholars involved (EM MTE 2012, p.41; field mission interviews, August 2013). A monitoring report quotes that a research partnership that emerged from an EM project generated 40 publications and 3 best paper awards with a total of 100 publications expected (c144034 - MR_201012 p.3). Similarly, interviews with institutional beneficiaries suggest that in some individual cases, EM mobility (even rather short-term scholar exchanges) leads to some form of research output. Examples include: the UM-Link project (with UPM) which has generated five publications four months (field mission interviews, August 2013), 10 publications since 2009 at the RUPP (field mission interviews, August 2013) or a joint research paper in bio-informatics authored by a Vietnamese post-doc and a professor at Kent University during a EM 10 month stay (field mission interviews, August 2013). Similarly, at least four different monitoring reports emphasise the benefits for research of the *EM programme* at both personal (see also I537) and institutional level. Indeed, the horizontal summary monitoring report concludes that *“Research co-operation is already flourishing by means of publications and joint diplomas are also being developed. Co-operation in Higher Education is being promoted leading to cultural, scientific, technological and academic exchanges”* (MR-137761.01, 2011). In a similar vein, a Malaysian HEI actor argued that they used the EM mobilities and funds to make the ‘invisible colleges’ in bio-tech and engineering more tangible and personal for Malaysian researchers (field mission interviews, August 2013).

The monitoring reports repeatedly draw attention to the inflexibility of doctoral EM grants concerning travel particularly back to the home country. This significantly impedes doctoral students fieldwork, data collection or internships (MR-137761.08, 2011). Similarly, Malaysian HE actors point out that the EM post-doc and faculty mobility grants are not attractive for faculty members with families (field mission interviews, August 2013)

Due to the absence of bibliometric data, how all this translates into measurable research output remains an open question. Yet, even if bibliometric data were available, commentators agree that potential impacts of EM are limited by the small number of exchange per institution and per country (field mission interviews, August 2013). While the local impacts – i.e. on researchers and their immediate environments – is likely to be significant, the few research-relevant mobilities available are unlikely to make a measurable impact on research output at institutional, let alone national level. However, field-

work data suggests that despite the limited resources and small number of mobilities per institution (field mission interviews, August 2013), EM is highly valued by because it opens access to wider range of European and regional HEIs – meaning potential research partnerships -- than other mobility programmes.

5.2.3 Indicator 523: Proportion of beneficiaries of regional-level EU interventions in Asian HE sectors that remain in local HE sectors

EU policy makers have been acutely aware of the potential for brain-drain implicit in the *EM programme*. Here brain drain refers to the diversion of human resources away from Asia thus preventing sustainable development in countries of Asia. For Asian HEIs, the issue of brain-drain disaggregates into two questions: first, at a fundamental level, to what extent is the movement of academic capability a problem and, second, in what ways does the *EM programme* contribute to this movement the evidence from both the EM MTE, the monitoring reports and other sources is inconclusive at both levels. However, the data from fieldwork interviews strongly suggests that Asian institutional and individual beneficiaries do not perceive brain-drain to be a problem and, even if it were, that the *EM programme* had not contributed to the diversion of HE capacity from Asia.

Interview data and survey results provide no reason to believe that Asian commentators see brain drain as a problem of EM or other mobility programmes (EM MTE 2012, field mission interviews and interviews at Council of Ministers and HQ, August 2013). Of 15 interviewees that expressed an opinion on the issue during fieldwork, 13 unequivocally argued that brain drain is not at problem in their country. Significantly, these were HE actors with considerable experience in EM in particular and internationalisation efforts in general. Indeed, the sceptical voices belonged to Asian institutional beneficiaries new to the *EM programme* as well as past and prospective individual beneficiaries. In particular, many observers agreed that fostering HE excellence in Europe is not inherently in conflict with sustainable socio-economic development in Asia (EM MTE 2012, p.67). Survey data from the MTE and interview data from the fieldwork suggest that most beneficiaries aimed to return home after their exchanges. (field mission interviews, August 2013) The decision to pursue a career in the home country depended on the career prospects graduates find there (field mission interviews in August 2013). Indeed, respondents point out that the most talented students will not be drawn towards Europe but the US since at that level “research is global” (EM MTE 2012, Interviews at UKM in August 2013. Just over half of Action 1 beneficiaries and about 61% of Action 2 beneficiaries surveyed agreed that promoting excellence in Europe and attracting students undermined development goals in third countries (EM MTE 2012, p.67). The MTE survey of institutions found “moderate views” on brain-drain: no one either strongly disagrees or agrees with statements that EM contributes to brain-drain. One interpretation of this result, borne out by interviews with the EACEA as well as Asian institutional beneficiaries, is that stakeholders see some degree of brain-drain to be an inevitable, even desirable aspect of global HE (field mission interviews, August 2013). Significantly, the Asian institutional beneficiary continues that preventing this type of mobility is impossible (field mission interviews, August 2013).

Similarly, data from fieldwork interviews supports the findings of surveys cited in the MTE in that beneficiaries do not perceive EM to be contributing to brain-drain that depletes human capital and hampers development (EM MTE 2012, p.67). Again, with the exception of a single respondent, Asian institutional and individual beneficiaries agree that EM does not contribute to deleterious mobility of academic capabilities. In that vein, respondents pointed out that the decision of where to work is a question of individual choice not to be constrained by policy goals concerning brain-drain (EM MTE 2012). The EMA representative pointedly remarks that if the *EM programme* is concerned with promoting individual careers, it should also enable EM graduates from Asia to pursue their careers in Europe (EM MTE 2012, p.67). The MTE concludes that brain-drain is far more complex than merely a professional relocation decision for outstanding students:

“There were several outcomes of their mobility: staying in/returning to Europe, returning to home countries and starting a career in the local market, starting an international career, starting a career in Europe oriented towards the development of the home country, or starting a career in the home countries oriented towards co-operation with Europe. Brain drain was a macro phenomenon consisting of individual decisions, which may be motivated by a variety of factors: family, social reasons, employment opportunities, etc.” (EM MTE 2012, p.111).

Significantly, several respondents during the fieldwork phase critically noted the somewhat paternalistic and empirically unfounded assumption that Asian students will by default seek to stay in Europe (field mission interviews, August 2013).

At the level of specific programmes and projects, evaluators and monitors are equally equivocal and cautious. In general, however, surveys of participants and monitoring data suggest there is little reason to assume that promoting excellence in European HE conflicts with the promotion of sustainable development in Asia (EM MTE 2012, p.111). Survey data of beneficiaries indicates that 44% aimed to pursue their career in their home country compared to 26% that wanted to work in an EU country (EM MTE 21012, p.69). Motivations for seeking a career in Europe (EU environment, financial and social benefits as well as better job opportunities) differ markedly from motivations to return home to work (family reasons, desire to work/ live in home country and EU visa issues) (EM MTE 2012, p. 69). Interviews with Asian institutional beneficiaries as well as case studies for the MTE show that students from Southeast Asia aim to return home to work in HE as researchers and lecturers after their studies occasionally creating new employment opportunities (EM MTE 2012, p.53; the case cited here was in Algeria). Again, all institutional beneficiaries interviewed pointed out that postgraduates, doctoral students and post-docs return to work in the home countries HEIs system, not least for lack of alternative employment opportunities (field mission interviews, August 2013). Despite the lack of statistics, Asian beneficiaries estimate that about 30-50% of all mobile students return to work in the HE sector. This estimate is robust across several different HEIs in Malaysia, Vietnam and Cambodia (field mission interviews, August 2013). The interviews conducted for the MTE found that no one believes that EM harms third countries. Due to the complexities brought about by the interaction of disciplinary idiosyncrasies, comparative socio-economic conditions and personal circumstances, respondents argued that even if some brain-drain occurred, EM provided net benefits to all parties involved. This impression was amply confirmed by fieldwork interviews: all respondents argued that EM experiences had been beneficial to participating Asian HEIs. It is interesting to note that a US survey of foreign students finds that about 78% of foreign students list the prospect of an international career as one of the main motivators for choosing to study abroad (EM MTE 2012, p.69).

Despite the inevitability and, indeed, desirability, of human resource mobility, *EM programmes* have installed a number of effective mechanisms to prevent In order to prevent brain-drain. These mechanisms range from the use of programme specific tools (e.g. joint supervision instead of double degrees, learning agreements, adoption of credit systems, transcripts of records) to career services (e.g. associate partners providing employment and connection to industry in home country, alumni networks providing employment opportunities, inclusion of career plans in application process) and institutional measures (e.g. fostering of interinstitutional and interregional research networks for returning PhD students). In Action 2, evaluators found evidence of 75% of consortia applying measures of this kind.

Asian institutional beneficiaries interviewed during the fieldwork phase pointed out that these measures had been highly effective in preventing brain-drain (field mission interviews, August 2013): essentially, these measures prevented students and faculty from becoming “too comfortable” in their host countries (field mission interviews, August 2013). At a fundamental level, many Asian students may realise that the competition for employment is likely to be far more intense than it may be at home: with considerable irony, a senior official of the EACEA quipped that the current state of European labour market was very effectively preventing brain drain from Asia.

5.2.4 Indicator 524: Evidence of the adoption of European practices of HE governance

Evidence from desk and field research suggests that the regional level EU interventions in HE offered an opportunity for learning about European practices of HE governance. However, the data also reveal that while it is difficult to point to concrete European HE governance practices adopted by Asian HE systems, European HE practices have informed and influenced HE policy debates in Asia.

The MTE quotes 89% of Action 2 beneficiaries from third countries surveyed argue that EM II influenced national strategies, programmes and action plans for internationalisation (EM MTE 2012, p.36). Two thirds of EU Delegations claim to have observed an increased awareness of European standards in research and teaching excellence during the reporting period of the EM MTE (EM MTE 2012, p.54). Hence, the evaluators conclude that the EM II programme “... provides a unique framework for sharing and disseminating higher education standards, values and practices between European and third country participants” (p.37). In particular, the EM II programme transported the principles and practices of the Bologna process outside the EU (EM MTE 2012, p.55, field mission interviews, August 2013).

In terms of specific HE practices adopted by third countries in general and Asian countries in particular, there seems to be no general emergent pattern. Adoption of European HE standards and practices seems to predominantly follow the divergent logics of specific programmes (i.e. Action 1, 2 and 3) and specific project partnerships (e.g. adoption of the Europass CV for the Euroasia2 project). It would seem as if diffusion of individual measures and practices, perhaps unsurprisingly, is shaped by the interaction of specific institutional, national and regional demands (MR-137761.02, 2010). Monitoring

reports also point to patchy and occasionally poor implementation of coordination tools such as Scholarship Agreements, Transfer of Merits Agreements or Transcripts of Records (MR-137761.02, 2010, c144034 - MR_201012, c149673 - MR_201012). Data from fieldwork interviews lends support to these findings. Across Malaysia, Cambodia and Vietnam, HE actors have adapted and adopted a range of practices from the EM partners. These range from things as practical as a transcript template or learning agreements over the practice of using student feedback to structure curricula to the fundamental structure and spirit of a multilateral mobility programme (field mission interviews, August 2013).

The exception here seems to be the adoption of ECTS-like credit, mobility and recognition system across Asia. Indeed, eight monitoring reports point to the adoption of credit transfer systems – sometimes more, sometimes less successful – across Asia. Most prominently, ASEAN has adopted the UCTS system closely modelled on the ECTS system. Even here ASEAN policy-makers, very sensibly, adopted European standards and practices to perceived regional needs. Monitoring reports also point to the adoption of credit recognition and credit transfer systems in South Asia (Pakistan and Nepal). However, interviews with Asian HE actors suggest that while the Bologna Process and the ECTS system informed policy deliberation, many Asian HEIs and HE systems chose to adopt other credit and quality control systems (field mission interviews, August 2013). For example, the Malaysian credit transfer and quality assurance system is modelled on Australian HE practices (field mission interviews, August 2013).

5.3 JC 53: Degree to which regional-level EU support to Asia has helped Asian universities to increase and diversify the human capital for national development processes

5.3.1 Indicator 531: Improved access of students from disadvantaged groups to higher education

The *EM programme* aimed not only to foster academic excellence but also to promote equity in the access to an HE education in non-EU countries in general and Asia in particular (EM MTE 2012, p.55). Specifically, the *EM programme* aimed to generate equitable access to HE in terms of gender, social and disability aspects. Apart from a reasonable gender balance overall, desk and fieldwork data suggest that the EM measures have had little impact on helping disadvantaged groups overcome barriers to HE participation in Asia.

In terms of gender balance the MTE points out that flows were balanced across the project as a whole. While the proportion of female participants among students was higher for some regions (Brazil, the USA, Russia, China and Malaysia) than others (e.g. Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Pakistan), student flows were generally balanced. However, the MTE reports that the flows of scholars showed a marked gender imbalance. Here only about a quarter of the participating scholars were women, a trend that has continued (or only slightly abated) since EM 1 (EM MTE 2012, p.57). Action 1 mobile scholars were most gender based with only 28% female participation. This compares to the 44% female participation among students: Action 2 exchanges even featured a majority of female participants. The exception here is doctoral students and evaluators suspect a structural gender bias. The absence of explicit measures within EM II to assist in combining of multiple responsibilities – particularly of child care and research work – puts those charged with these responsibilities (typically women) at a disadvantage (MTE 2012, p.57). Also, the regulations make it difficult to disrupt studies in the case of pregnancy or parental leave; this exacerbates the structural gender imbalance. Yet, even given these difficulties, the programme and individual projects did not struggle to strike an adequate gender balance; indeed, evaluators note that, based on Eurostat data, “... *EM II courses and mobilities were somewhat more [gender] balanced, but still sensitive to the gender biases typical in the respective subject areas*“ (EM MTE 2012, p.57). For both Actions, the data suggest a slight gender imbalance. The MTE points out that while *Erasmus Mundus* reproduces discipline-specific gender patterns, the gender balance of EM flows is somewhat better than the gender-composition at European universities (EM MTE 2012).

In term of granting equitable access to socially disadvantaged groups, desk and fieldwork evidence indicates that the EM outcomes have been less successful (EACEA, 2013, EM MTE 2012). For Action 2, the Target Group 3 (TG3) was supposed to enable socially disadvantaged groups (such as refugees or immigrants) to take part in HE exchanges. The evaluators, monitoring reports as well as a senior EACEA official suggest that the programme has not been able to include a large number of TG3 students. The main reason is that participants and policy-makers have found it difficult to define and identify this group at country-level: institutional beneficiaries in Asia repeatedly reported of great difficulties in meaningfully determining the TG3 category for their country (field mission interviews, August 2013). What is more, applicants eligible for TG3 status would apply under TG1 and TG2 (MTE

2012, c144034 - MR_201012). Case studies and monitoring reports reveal that the grants issued for TG3 students were in single digit figures for individual projects: for example Eurasia2 reports of a single application from a refugee student from Myanmar and a monitoring report points to 4 TG3 grants (out of 25 applications) (MR-137761.09, 2011). Similarly, a monitoring report concludes that all “...target groups have access to the benefits of the project, even if, for Target Group 3, this is only in a minor proportion” (c149673 - MR_201012). Fieldwork evidence strongly suggests that this is due to the lack of suitable applications from members of potentially relevant social groups. On the one hand, Asian HE actors argue, members of these groups do not have access to the communication channels in which EM scholarships are advertised (field mission interviews, August 2013). On the other hand, members of these social groups often do not fulfil the minimal academic conditions for participating in an EM sponsored mobility. Here, Asian respondents point out that English language competence proves an almost insurmountable barrier (field mission interviews and interviews at HQ, August 2013). It would seem, then, that the barriers to HE for these individuals may be located further downstream in the education system (field mission interviews, August 2013): often the quality of primary and secondary education available to disadvantaged groups in Asia compounds (and even defines) socio-economic disadvantage.

In terms of disability, the only data available is on the preparedness and willingness to accommodate students with special needs. Of Action 1 institutional beneficiaries interviewed for the EM MTE, 75% agreed (either strongly or somewhat) that they were prepared to accommodate students with special needs (p. 60). The evaluators also report a willingness of universities to implement ad hoc measures. For Action 2, the willingness to accommodate disabled students was at 69%. The MTE here points to socio-cultural barriers (i.e. the stigma associated with disability) that prevent students with disabilities to participate fully in academic life offered by EM grants. An Action 3 project – AHEAD-EU – specifically thematises special needs and explored ways of integrating disabled people into university life (EM MTE, 2012, p. 61).

Neither the documentation nor the fieldwork provided evidence of an impact of the *TEIN* or the HE Fairs on the equity aspects of HE participation in Asia.

5.3.2 Indicator 532: Increase in Asian students, scholars and academics involved in research and studies of issues relevant to country needs.

The fieldwork showed that the EU's regional level HE interventions supported research relevant to Asian country needs. In a very real sense, this is true for the *EM programme* by definition. DG DEVCO - in close consultation with sector and country experts - determines the thematic areas in the EM calls. The EACEA can publish EM CfPs only after DG DEVCO has approved of the thematic areas (EACEA, 2013). So, ex ante, all the projects – but particularly Action 2 projects – in later calls reflect thematic areas relevant to country needs.

Additionally, data from the fieldwork interviews suggest that it is the European dimension – i.e. the access to a wider scope of European HE resources – that enable researchers in Asian HEIs to set up collaborative projects that are relevant to country needs (field mission interviews, August 2013). Here, differences in development between Asian countries are significant. In countries with more developed HE and RTD policies, policy-makers determine relevant research fields and provide financial resources to stimulate research projects in these designated areas. For example, the Malaysian government has defined 15 National Key Research Areas in its 10 year plan (field mission interviews, August 2013) and researchers looking for funds will need to devise projects within these areas. These researchers, Asian institutional beneficiaries argue, use the access to wider European networks provided by EM to find the European HE and research resources they require (field mission interviews, August 2013). This suggests that researchers in the more developed Asian HE systems are working on projects of interest to researchers (somewhere) in Europe. In less developed HE systems, the relevance of research resources and projects available will depend on the research field. In research areas such as agriculture and fisheries, tourism or SME research, many EM sponsored research projects are highly relevant (field mission interviews, August 2013). Here, respondents point to a fruitful division of labour where the Asian partner will cultivate biological samples that will be analysed using a method developed at a European HEI (field mission interviews, August 2013).

The table below provides an overview of the different EM Joint Doctorate programmes that feature Asian partners (which does not mean that Asian students and academics are not involved in relevant research in other JDs).

Table 10 EMJDs Featuring Asian Partner HEIs

Year	EMJD Programme Name	Field/ Area
2009	ALGANT-DOC	Algebra, Geometry and Number Theory
2009	EMJD-GEM	Globalisation, the EU & Multilateralism -- Governance
2009	INTERZONES	Cultural Studies in Literary Interzones -- Humanities
2009	IRAP PhD	International Relativistic Astrophysics
2011	Neuro-Time	Multidisciplinary Neuroscience
2012	Sustainable Management and Design for Textiles	Industrial Processing/ Engineering

Source: EM website (http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/erasmus_mundus/results_compendia/selected_projects_en.php)

Arguably, only the last EMJD on sustainable management addresses a perceived pressing need in Asia. By the same token, though, it is difficult to argue that neuro-scientific, humanities, governance, advanced astrophysics or pure mathematics are irrelevant to country needs. Indeed, Asian institutional beneficiaries from less developed Asian HE systems argued that this research and these types of degrees are relevant because they contribute to HE capacity development (field mission interviews, August 2013).

Being essentially an infrastructure programme, *TEIN* has expanded the opportunities for Asian HEIs to formulate research projects relevant to their needs. For example, the Vietnamese NREN reports that the *TEIN* network has enabled collaborative research in telemedicine and remote diagnostics (within Vietnam), weather forecasting and climate modelling (across Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and Australia), as well as grid computing (global) (VinaRen 2013). Again, however, interviews with Asian institutional beneficiaries suggest that the somewhat sluggish development of applications and services for the *TEIN* network means that Asian HEIs are not able to fully utilise potential of the network for relevant research projects (field mission interviews, August 2013). Again, interview data evidence points to administrative and legal uncertainties as well as a lack of policy-making commitment at national level as a barrier for the development of applications (field mission interviews, August 2013).

5.3.3 Indicator 533: Number and quality of research networks and teaching programmes that include public sector and government institutions

Data from desk and field research suggests that public sector organisations play a marginal role in EM teaching and research networks. Apart from public universities, EM projects feature public sector organisations as associate members. The existing documentation suggests that only about 15 partnerships in Action 2 and none in Action 1 have associate partners from the public sector. Senior EACEA officials point out that their specific role within the consortia is not always clear and will vary from project to project. In all EM projects and consortia investigated in the fieldwork phase, the public sector only played a conventional regulative and funding role with no direct part in shaping the research or teaching (field mission interviews, August 2013). In terms of research, some public sector research organisations participate in EM networks but act like other HEIs.

The *TEIN* programme explicitly aims to provide a public sector and non-commercial data network. As a result, *TEIN* research and teaching networks have successfully engaged and included research active public sector organisations and Asian HEIs. In Vietnam, for example, key research applications of the *TEIN* network are weather forecasting and climate modelling as well as telemedicine. Here, the *TEIN* network enables public sector organisations (such as met offices and hospitals) and universities to cooperate (VinaRen, 2013).

5.3.4 Indicator 534: Number and quality of research networks and teaching programmes that include firms and businesses

Private sector involvement in research and teaching is still in the process of development in many Asian countries. The desk and the field research indicated that neither EM nor *TEIN* had a noticeable impact on the involvement of business in research and teaching. The existing documentation provided no trace of firms and businesses in consortia for Action 1, 2, or 3. However, there is some indication in the data (see also I 523) that these firms are involved in providing employment opportunities for EM graduates in their Asian home countries (EM MTE 2012). However, the evidence on the financial sustainability of Action 1 research projects suggests that private sector involvement – in particular the financial commitment – is insufficient to enable research activities to continue without EU funding (EM MTE 2012, p.75). Asian beneficiaries of the EM project agree that business involvement in research is

a key weakness of RTD sectors in Asia. In less developed HE systems, respondents point out that firms are more interested in obtaining research results cheaply than committing resources to common exploration (field mission interviews, August 2013). While some businesses do investment in research, this will typically take the form of funding a specific Master's thesis (field mission interviews, August 2013). Respondents in Vietnam and Cambodia pointed to the business-university relationship as one of the areas that Asian HEIs could learn from European partners (field mission interviews, August 2013). In countries with more developed HE systems, such as Malaysia, businesses often invest in research by founding new private universities (field mission interviews, August 2013). These, however, are not necessarily aimed at increasing research capacity but rather at expanding business areas into the lucrative private HE sector (field mission interviews, August 2013,): commentators criticise that this dilutes research capacity in the country (Interview field mission interviews, August 2013).

Asian institutional beneficiaries interviewed during the research phase agree that neither EM nor *TEIN* encouraged more private sector involvement in research and teaching. A Malaysian HE actor pointed out that a bi-directional flow of students would make joint programmes more attractive to businesses and industry (field mission interviews, August 2013).

The *TEIN* programme sets up IT and data infrastructure in order to make universities independent of commercial internet providers (Interviews at HQ in September 2013, VinaRen, 2013). The programme, then, is not designed for encouraging and establishing research and teaching ties between business and Asian HEIs.

5.3.5 Indicator 535: Evidence of the adoption of European practices of HE governance concerning the protection rights of minorities and disadvantaged persons in HE


Neither the desk nor field research provides much reason to believe that Asian HEs have adopted EU practices for protecting minorities and disadvantaged persons in HE. Case study evidence for the MTE provides some indication that application processes and selection criteria for prospective students were designed to identify TG3 applicants as well as ensure a gender-balanced project. However, interviews conducted with Asian institutional and individual beneficiaries suggest that access and equity issues are a central and problematic issue in HE policy debates in Asia, particularly Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the question of granting access to HE to disadvantaged groups is a highly sensitive political issue in many countries of Southeast Asia (field mission interviews and interviews at HQ, August 2013): respondents noted that the EM measures did little to contribute to existing policies and deliberations aimed at equity issues in Asian HE sectors (field mission interviews and interviews at HQ, August 2013). The *EM programme*, respondents argued, is poorly situated to address equity issues in Asian countries because the basic requirements for participating in EM (most prominently English language competence) are often an insurmountable barrier for members of disadvantaged groups and minorities (see I 531).

5.3.6 Indicator 536: Development of the employment and income of graduates and Erasmus Mundus Alumni

Asian HE actors agree that the *EM programme* equips students and faculty with useful and career-relevant skills and knowledge. Apart from the hard, discipline-related knowledge, commentators and beneficiaries point to transferable skills (such as problem solving, critical thinking, communication and language skills), "soft skills" such as, most prominently, intercultural competence, and personality development as advantages of the *EM programme* (EM MTE 2012, MR-137761.02, 2010 p.3.) The monitoring reports as well as data from fieldwork interviews stress the advantages of the *EM programme* for the personal development of individuals by offering a "unique life experience" (c155747 - MR_201113, MR-137761.07, 2011, MR-137761.09, 2011, field mission interviews, August 2013). Institutional and individual beneficiaries interviewed during the fieldwork phase pointed out that the cultural and academic experience that EM mobility offers broadens the horizons of Asian students. For example, as the result of an EM exchange to Sweden, a Vietnamese student has radically reassessed her approach to studying and learning (field mission interviews, August 2013).

The figure below reflects predominantly positive assessment of Action 1 beneficiaries of the impact of EM joint studies and student mobility on individual employability.

Table 11 The Views of Action 1 Institutional Beneficiaries on the Benefits of Studying in More than One Country and in Joint Programmes



Source: MTE 2012, p.27

The fieldwork phase also revealed a wide-spread prevalence of similarly positive perceptions and assessments of the *EM programme* as a whole. All respondents who provided an opinion about employability of EM graduates agreed that the EM experience, like all foreign degrees or HE training, gave Asian EM graduates an edge on local labour markets (field mission interviews and interviews at Council of Ministers, August 2013).

Interestingly, this conviction does not seem to be reflected as strongly in the employment figures. In general, career returns to higher education is rather specific to a particular country and discipline. The MTE describes employment figures of EM graduates as “*satisfactory, marred by high unemployment rates due to the economic downturn*” (p. 49, whether EM graduates did disproportionately worse than others is not known). Surveys of earlier EM phases found that 80% of graduates found work with high social security 6 months from graduating. 40% of EM II graduates ended up in the academic sector (mostly science and engineering as well as social science and humanities) and 20% of graduates in the private sector (law, economics and business, informatics and mathematics, geography and environmental sciences) (EM MTE 2012, p.50). The evaluators point out that 41% of EM I graduates were not permanently employed two years after graduating (with a third continuing their studies): 58% of these unemployed EM graduates were from Asia. The new EM phase saw only 18% unemployed year after graduation and 4% three years after graduation (social science and business, economics, and law making up 14% and 13% of that figure respectively).

In terms of graduate income and earnings, no quantitative data is available. Interviews with institutional and individual beneficiaries provide reason to believe that EM alumni may earn no more (but certainly no less) than other graduates with some form of foreign HE experience (field mission interviews, August 2013). The MTE quotes data in which only 21% of employers surveyed believed that mobile graduates could expect higher salaries in the first five years of employment. The evaluators conclude that the “...*evaluation evidence shows that in the case of Erasmus Mundus, financial benefits were difficult to measure, but impact in the field of employability and job satisfaction was stronger*” (EM MTE 2012, p.50).

While commentators are overwhelmingly positive about the impacts of EM exchange for individuals, they are equally realistic about the impacts on the situation of graduates in their countries and the region as a whole (field mission interviews and interviews at Council of Ministers, August 2013). Quite apart from the fact that the position of graduates on labour markets in Asia is highly advantageous (field mission interviews and interviews at Council of Ministers and HQ, August 2013). the small volume of the EM sponsored exchanges at HEI and country-level precludes any wider impacts. As a Vietnamese HE actor noted, the HUST graduates 7000 students a year; 10 of these will have taken part in an EM-sponsored exchange (field mission interviews, August 2013). *TEIN* has had no discernible impact on the situation of graduates in Asia.

6 EQ6 on support to uprooted people

EQ6: To what extent has regional-level EU support to uprooted people contributed to reintegrating refugees, returnees, ex-combatants and internally displaced people into the socio-economic fabric?

6.1 JC 61: Degree to which foundation for sustainable livelihoods have been created for refugees, IDPs, returnees, and ex-combatants in the civil sector

6.1.1 Indicator 611: Legal and social barriers to local employment of refugees / IDPs, returnees and ex-combatants addressed in context of LRRD

Based on documents reviewed, the legal barriers to employment of refugees, returnees and IDPs were not on the table either in policy dialogue with authorities or specific actions. Refugee residents of camps in Bangladesh, Thailand, Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan are not permitted to seek employment outside the camps as a matter of law. Those who seek illegal employment outside the camps face stiff sanctions (see the case of Bangladesh). The field mission to Thailand confirmed this. Government officials interviewed were adamant that camp residents have no right to work outside the camps and, once return is possible, will need to apply for immigrant status like any other foreigner. The position is somewhat unrealistic. It is common knowledge that there is a great deal of informal illegal employment outside the camps, sometimes in factories, sometimes in seasonal agriculture. As discussed at several points below, it is also clear that the border region is an integrated economic region in which Burmese labour plays, and will play, a significant role.

There has been more success in promoting employment inside camps, for example, the provision of VET to Burmese refugees in Thailand, a move which required long negotiation with the Government. Large displaced non-refugee populations in foreign countries, such as Rohingya in Bangladesh, Karen in Northern Thailand, and Afghans in Iran and Pakistan, survive based on informal sector employment which is technically illegal but universal. Many actions listed below have sought to improve the social and, where possible, legal situation of such IDPs (for example, in Pakistan) but these have not specifically touched the difficult issue of employment. Most interventions, and all in Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Thailand, have included some component of livelihoods, which is closely related to employment. Women's concerns have been effectively incorporated into all livelihood-promoting actions. No reference was found to IDP employment, although it can be foreseen that difficulties with registration, loss of documents, etc. could significantly impair employment possibilities. Again, it is livelihoods that have tended to attract more attention than employment, if only because the legal issues are less serious.

Overall, there has been a strong effort to move actions in the direction of LRRD, often in the face of initial opposition by authorities. This was typified by the VET intervention in Thailand, initially resisted because it implied that refugees were being endowed with valuable skills that would encourage them to establish themselves over the long term. The EU and partner NGOs were successful in establishing an effective VET programme which has attracted widespread praise. In Afghanistan, skills training and social re-insertion programmes for returnees have included components dealing with employability. These are doubly effective in that they not only encourage re-insertion for those who have returned but, if information is properly disseminated, encourage additional voluntary return.

The subject of ex-combatants has received special attention (see Indicator 613). Initial document review, as well as the field missions, revealed no actions benefiting this target group in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Thailand. In response, an extended document search was made covering Philippines and Indonesia, both countries with regions in the post-conflict phase. Again, no mention of ex-combatants was found, nor was the phrase discovered in the EAMR and CSP review. This appears to point to a gap in the EU's approach to the conflict cycle. The *AUP programme* is aimed at, and justified by, the need for turning efforts to LRRD and the post-conflict longer term as areas enter the recovery phase. But this leaves a gap as conflict winds down and peace slowly becomes established. In addition, the insistent targeting of IDPs seems to ignore the fact that substantial numbers of persons in target areas were, in fact, involved in violence and conflict, even if only tangentially.

6.1.1.1 Detailed extraction of Myanmar programme

AUP interventions identified have focused on water and sanitation, health, livelihoods, and basic services / living conditions, not on legal barriers to employment. These are nowhere discussed, although

in theory, IDPs might face significant barriers to, e.g., registering officially. However, virtually all actions identified (many of them discussed below) incorporate the closely-related matter of livelihoods.

6.1.1.2 Detailed extraction of Bangladesh programme

The project description for the UNHCR-implemented action *Resolution of the protracted refugee situation for the Muslim refugees of Myanmar in Bangladesh* (reference DCI-ASIE/2007/139-375, EU contribution EUR 3.9 million, total programme cost EUR 4.8 million, 24 months 2008-2009) enumerated the risks faced by Rohingya camp residents who attempted to find (illegal) work outside the camp. These included not only legal action by local authorities, but the suspension of their camp ration card by camp management. One of the interventions of the project was to improve the distribution of food within the camp, including structural changes such as encouraging a camp market in food, limiting the power of surrounding villagers to commandeer food supplies destined for the camps, etc. The EU, together with other donors and UN agencies, made significant progress in easing official attitudes towards Rohingya refugees and displaced persons through policy dialogue, and this may well have resulted in some easing of Rohingya activities, not so much in the field of formal employment, but of obtaining modest cash income and improving the livelihood situation.

6.1.1.3 Detailed extraction of Thailand programme

No explicit reference to employment was found. However, actions identified and discussed below provided significant and sustained Vocational Education and Training in the camps, a move that required policy dialogue with government authorities fearful of encouraging long-term implantation of skilled workers. Most dialogue on the legal status of refugees focused on access to the health system, not the labour market. However, actions benefitting the large undocumented Burmese population outside the camps, which exists largely on the basis of informal sector labour, may have addressed legal barriers to employment. By generally addressing social integration, such actions presumably had some impact on possibilities for informal employment.

6.1.1.4 Detailed extraction of Afghanistan programme

Legal and social barriers to employment in Afghanistan were addressed largely in the context of return. For example, returnees to Herat Province from Iran face the twin barriers of a lack of employable skills and unfamiliarity with their home environment. The action *Repatriation, vocational and educational training (VET), and reintegration for 1,600 Afghan minors and destitute families from Iran*²² provided training at 7 VET centres in Herat (Interim Narrative Report, Final Narrative Report). MR-136906.01 of 28.10.2010 gave a favourable judgment on project performance. The project also produced three documentary films promoting return; these were exhibited among Afghan refugees in Iran. A continuation DCI-ASIE/2011/282547 totalling EUR 5.2 million planned to reach 5,000 families in 2012-14 (Interim Narrative Report, 26.09.2012).

In 2008-09, AUP through UNHCR supported staffing and operating costs of the Ministry of Refugees and Returnees, which coordinates and monitors the land allocation process. According to the February 2009 Mid-term Evaluation of AUP Activities in Afghanistan, the Land Allocation System suffered from a number of weaknesses and constraints, which support to the MoRR was only partially able to alleviate.

While the UNHCR intervention *Solutions for Afghans in neighbouring host countries* (2009-2010, EUR 1.5 million) provided technical support and capacity building to relevant Government of Afghanistan agencies to better incorporate returnees into their planning activities. It also aimed specifically to strengthen specifically the capacity to manage labour migration (Description of Action).

6.1.1.5 Detailed extraction of Sri Lanka programme

The action *Housing support to long-term conflict affected IDPs in Sri Lanka*²³ had as its main aim construction of housing. Originally targeting 39 villages, the target population was broadened with the end of the war (May 2009) and shifting Government priorities. Delayed government decision making led to an estimated 8 month delay in implementation, but MR-14262401 of 24.10.2011 gave the project high marks overall and specifically praised the ability of the implementing agency to shift in order to maintain relevance with Government priorities. Impact and, given the fact that the project basically provided

²² 01.01.2010,-31.12.2010, reference DCI-ASIE/2009/220048, continuation of 149708 and 172626, implemented by HELP-Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe, EUR 1.5 million

²³ Reference DCI-ASIE/2009/204503, EU contribution EUR 10.1 million, total programme cost EUR 11.2 million, implemented by Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund Deutschland e.V.

buildings requiring minimal maintenance, were not questioned. Beneficiaries received construction training and an unanticipated benefit of the project was that a large number of women received training and participated in construction (10th Quarterly Progress Report, 01.04.2012-30.06.2012)

A significant barrier that had to be overcome by the project was the fact that many IDPs have lost land ownership documents, precluding them from benefitting (*Mid-Term Evaluation, August 2012*). In addition, land registration offices have been destroyed, as well as boundary markers. ASB initially discovered that about 75% of the target households did not have legal proof of land ownership. ASB started the essential administrative process that will eventually lead to the provision of a legal land ownership document for the returnees. The 10th Quarterly Progress report was able to report significant progress in the land ownership proof situation, with some 45% of families in a regular situation.

The ZOA Refugee Care-implemented action *Construction of small-scale community infrastructure in Vavuniya district*²⁴ was complementary to the ASB housing project in that it provided small-scale infrastructure in the villages benefitting from the EU-ASB action. The goal was to address medium-term rehabilitation and development needs of a specific caseload of long term conflict-affected IDPs through small-scale infrastructure and improved access to public services, thus contributing to conflict mitigation (Interim Narrative Report, no date; Second Interim Narrative Report, no date). The beneficiary population was estimated to be 49 villages containing 3,100 families consisting of 10,000 individuals. ASB was active in 39 of these villages inhabited by "old" IDPs, the additional villages, by contrast, were occupied by recent IDPs and presented special challenges. Mid-project, there was an expansion to cover over 70 villages. The expansion increased the number of farmers covered, with challenges posed by the overlap of the construction and farming seasons, which made it difficult for families to devote themselves to construction work.

In addition to roads and drainage, the project furnished preschools, playgrounds and community centres, a primary health centre, and bathing and laundering facilities. The water and sanitation component provided water points and repaired tube wells. Plans to improve electricity supply ran into technical problems.

By involving the local population in construction activities via Cash for Work, the project promoted livelihoods and bolstered cash income. Priority was given to involving widows and elderly women. Limitations were the fact that not all communities were involved in CfW and many women, especially those with children, found it difficult to find the time to participate.

In part due to changes in project scope and targets, which involved qualitative as well as quantitative changes in target population and were beyond the control of the implementers, significant delays were encountered. MR-142622.01 of 24.10.2011, the final MR, found that the project was having an impact on conflict mitigation and beneficiaries' lives but questioned sustainability, in part because requisite community social support structures were not in place.

The UN-HABITAT action *Support to conflict-affected people through housing in Sri Lanka*²⁵ had as general objective is to contribute to a sustainable solution for the returnees in the North and specifically to improve the living conditions and social cohesion of displaced people, returnees and their host communities in the North through the provision of permanent housing (Action Fiche). The target was to construct roughly 5,000 houses benefitting 20,000 persons. UN-HABITAT, interceding with local authorities, significantly contributed to overcoming problems surrounding lack of land ownership proof, a pre-requisite for benefitting. This required extensive consultation and intercession with government at various levels and, eventually, over 4,000 persons were able to regularise their land ownership status. By the time of the sixth Quarterly Report (01.01-30.04 2011) over 3,000 persons, one third women, had received basic construction training. Women's village-level saving schemes were encouraged and families without bank accounts were assisted to open them. The Mid-term Evaluation of 08.2012 gave the project high marks overall but noted that the social infrastructure needed for sustainability, in the form of so-called Village Rehabilitation Committees, was weak and that complementary government actions to provide infrastructure had not been forthcoming by the time of the evaluation.

²⁴ EU contribution EUR 1.9 million, total programme cost EUR 2.2 million, reference DCI-ASIE/2009/224932, 01.02.2010-15.08.2011

²⁵ EU contribution EUR 11.8 million, total programme cost EUR 15.9 million, reference DCI-ASIE/2012256210

6.1.2 Indicator 612: Income-generating activities promoted for women and marginalised groups (the disabled, persons with HIV/AIDS, etc.) in context of LRRD

Almost all AUP actions aimed at promoting LRRD have included components promoting income generation. Exceptions are highly focused programmes such as those providing legal advice to uprooted Afghan people in Pakistan and Iran or promoting monitoring of human rights or community development in Afghanistan. In settings such as Myanmar, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, income generation was generally integrated into actions even when the main thrust was elsewhere, for example, on water and sanitation or on health. In most cases, project documentation made special reference to women and vulnerable persons and the need to provide them with means of earning income. A number of representative examples from Myanmar are given below. In Thailand, the EU financed an innovative vocational training project which was not directly tied to income generation, but has equipped young persons with job skills for when return becomes possible.

6.1.2.1 Detailed extraction of the Myanmar programme

A specific objective of the 2009 AUP programme, evidenced, in the Action Fiche, was improved livelihoods, particularly as related to access to and cultivation of land and acquisition and use of vocational skills. (2009 AUP logframe)

The EUR 2.5 million, 36 month programme *Supporting the sustainable recovery of livelihoods through water and sanitation – Hygiene (WASH), Food Security (FS) and Care Practices Program in Northern Rakhine State, Myanmar* was implemented by Action Contre la Faim starting in May 2009. Over 80% of the population of Northern Rakhine State (NRS) belongs to the Muslim minority and face exclusion and discrimination. The project built on the previous project *Promotion and Protection of Livelihoods of Marginalized Ethnic Groups*. By linking livelihoods to water and sanitation and food security, the project firmly grounded the project in the context of LRRD. MR-131960.01 of 23.04.2010 noted that explicit mention of women and children as the most marginalised and vulnerable populations would strengthen the project. According to an EU internal mission report dated 09.11.2009, as of early November, the project had experienced significant delays due to an extensive baseline survey, however, it was pointed out that the survey provided a solid foundation on which to design interventions to serve those most in need. While silent on the question of livelihoods, MR-131960.02 of 05.08.2011 found that the project had had significant impacts on income and nutrition.

Project interventions continued under *Improved access to and utilisation of primary health care services and WASH facilities for uprooted people in Northern Rakhine State* (EUR 1.4 million, implemented by Malteser Hilfsdienst). The project again was based on the tripod of water and sanitation, reproductive health services, and livelihoods. MR-140781.01 of 08.07.2011 was generally favourable in its ratings but warned that, as the Malteser had been providing services and drugs free of charge, prospects for sustainability were dim.

Poverty and hunger alleviation through support, empowerment and increased networking (EUR 8 million), implemented in NRS by CARE Deutschland-Luxembourg was another integrated project with a significant income-generation component. Due to insecurity, projects activities had to be suspended in September 2012.

The activity *Improvement of livelihoods and reinforcement of participatory development processes in re-settled villages* (EUR 1.8 million, reference DCI-ASIE/2008/187-080) was implemented in Shan State, Wa Special Region Number 2, Wein Kao District, Naung Khit Township by Welthungerhilfe. Beneficiaries were about 1,800 households (estimated 10,000 persons) in 27 villages (*Project Description*). These households had suffered the double shock of being relocated and then forbidden to cultivate opium, their traditional source of income. In the event, an unforeseen relocation prior to project start reduced the number of beneficiaries to approximately 1,500 households (*Interim Report*, 31.12.2009). The integrated project aimed to promote sustainable land ownership and train farmers in farming systems appropriate for income generation, promote village-level governance systems, facilitate market access, and promote access to basic social infrastructure (water and basic education, for both of which infrastructure was financed). Women and children were targeted for income generating activities. Environmental sustainability was incorporated not only in the land ownership and farming system components, but through advocacy of public officials to raise awareness of unsustainable Chinese rubber plantation practices in the region.

A similarly broad approach was taken in the intervention *Demsoe assistance to the uprooted* (DAU) implemented in 34 villages of Demsoe Township in Kayah State (EUR 1.9 million) by CARE Deutschland-Luxembourg. The beneficiaries were 2,000 families. While the intervention did not distinguish be-

tween IDPs and others, it was estimated that 60% of the beneficiary households were uprooted and 6-7% were headed by women. The project covered interventions in water and sanitation, primary education, health, and improving the production of marketable crops, the latter being the direct connection with income generation. The project included a significant community participation component and attempted to implicate the poorest households, including female-headed households, by permitting them to contribute labour rather than money (MR-135345.01 of 28.07.2010). MR-135345.02 of 05.08.2010 drew attention to the prominence given to women in the design of village projects.

The action *Support to the displaced people and their host communities in Dala and Seikyi Kha-naungdho Townships through the improvement of their health, water and sanitation and livelihood situations* (EUR 1.6 million), implemented in the outskirts of Yangon by *Aide Médicale Internationale*, was an integrated project integrating water and sanitation, health services, and income / livelihoods. The estimated 176,000 beneficiaries were uprooted people and members of their host communities. In the area of income / livelihoods, a specific result foreseen was increase access to income generating activities for Persons Living with HIV/AIDS (PLHA) and their families. Also targeted was an often-forgotten vulnerable population, highly indebted households. The Mid-term Evaluation Report for the period 01.2011-06.2012 found that the income-generating component was well designed and professionally implemented, but that financial illiteracy on the part of beneficiaries was a significant constraint.

6.1.2.2 Detailed extraction of the Thailand programme

Building on a previous project implemented by ZOA, the action *Vocational training for refugees from Myanmar* (EUR 0.8 million, implemented by ADRA International, 01.01.2011-31.12.2013, DCI-ASIE/2010/256896) provided VET to Karen refugees in camps. MR-144026.01 of 16.12.2011 and MR-144026.02 of 30.11.2012 both gave the project high marks for a smooth transition from the previous project (during which the project was financed out of community resources), effective delivery of training, and the maintenance of high relevance and community interest. During the field visit, this was seen as a flagship EU intervention. It required long preparation and discussion with Government, which was concerned that it would act as a pull factor attracting refugees into the camps. Participants are able to obtain certification in motorcycle repair, agricultural equipment repair, cooking, sewing, and other areas. The goal is to equip them with job skills for the outside world. Yet, as discussed below, one of the internal contradictions is that, having been so equipped, many may not wish to return to the areas which their parents fled many years ago.

6.1.2.3 Detailed extraction of the Bangladesh programme

The action Resolution of the protracted refugee situation for the Muslim refugees of Myanmar in Bangladesh action described in Section 1.1.2.1 highlighted, in particular, problems faced by women and the link between cash income and access to food supplies with the camps.

6.1.2.4 Detailed extraction of the Sri Lanka programme

See discussion of the three housing and infrastructure projects described under Section 1.1.2.1 above. All contained components favouring women and seeking to identify especially vulnerable persons. All were effectively oriented towards LRRD, including close and flexible coordination with Government policy.

6.1.3 Indicator 613: Policies designed and programmes implemented resulting in better re-insertion into the social fabric of ex-combatants into the gainful employment in context of LRRD

Despite appearing in RSPs as one of the components of support to uprooted people, project-level documentation has not revealed any specific reference to ex-combatants, nor did field mission interviews. Yet some actions, e.g. actions designed to address the problems of Hmong returning to Lao PDR from Thailand, would fall under this category. Following the initial review of Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan, a document review of the Philippines and Indonesia AUP programmes was undertaken with a focus on ex-combatants. In Mindanao, the EC supported a range of initiatives, some under the Instrument for Stability, some under AUP, some under thematic programmes, to address internal displacement, build trust, prevent escalation triggers, address human rights abuses, contribute to peace-building, and generally ameliorate the situation in a post-conflict context. However, a review of project documentation including mission and monitoring reports does not reveal a single use of the term "ex-combatant." According to the project Action Fiche, the UNDP-implemented action Strengthening response to internal displacement in Mindanao (StRiDe-Mindanao) (reference DCI-

ASIE/2008/150-080, EU contribution EUR 3 million) was specifically targeted at IDPs and no focus on ex-combatants was identified. The 2010 Terminal Report focuses exclusively on IDPs. In the Final Evaluation, apart from one lessons learnt on the important role of women, all of the Lessons Learnt are directly tied to IDPs. The project provided integrated rehabilitation interventions in 42 barangays across 30 municipalities and 10 provinces of Mindanao and was implemented under the umbrella of the 2005-2011 Action for Conflict Transformation (ACT) for Peace Programme to implement peace and development projects in the southern Philippines. The follow on action (2011-13) Early Recovery and Rehabilitation for Central Mindanao (ERRCM) Project provided shelter, sanitation, supported income generation activities, and promoted good governance and a broad range of “soft” activities associated with peace building – but made no mention of ex-combatants (Report, January 2011-December 2012).

Similarly in Indonesia, the 2009 Aid to Uprooted People 2009 programme (reference DCI-ASIE/2009/020-426, EC contribution Euro 5 million) focused exclusively on “ex-IDPs” (the government of Indonesia having removed the IDP label by fiat). In the Action Fiche, it is stressed that in many areas of potential interest for intervention, unresolved conflict issues and the threat of emerging conflict made it inappropriate to implement an AUP action which, thanks to the design of the funding line, is explicitly aimed at the recovery phase, not the pre-conflict phase or the conflict phase itself. Individual projects devoted to the rights of IDPs, supporting female-headed households, and monitoring early signs of conflict all concentrate on IDPs.

6.1.4 Indicator 614: Food security and environmental sustainability of refugee / IDP agricultural and forestry activities promoted in context of LRRD.

Document review suggests that there has always been due attention to food security and environmental sustainability in situations calling for them – mainly in the Myanmar, Thailand, and (to lesser extent) Bangladesh contexts. Sri Lanka interventions focused on housing and interventions regarding returnees in Afghanistan, while addressing problems with the Land Allocation Scheme, did not address food security per se.

6.1.4.1 Detailed extraction of Myanmar programme

All of the actions described under Section 1.1.2.2 contained components promoting food security and environmental sustainability. The same is true of most AUP actions in Thailand and Bangladesh. In the latter case, UNHCR-implemented activities in the refugee camps addressed serious barriers to access to food, including issues such as suspension of ration cards for refugees caught working illegally outside the camps, a dysfunctional food distribution system within the camps, and lack of a functioning camp market for food.

Similarly, all actions involving water and sanitation had an environmental sustainability aspect.

The field mission did not focus on food and environment, however, it was widely reported that predatory natural resource utilisation is widespread. As discussed below, the weak implementation of land law is a major problem in any areas.

6.1.4.2 Detailed extraction of Thailand programme

In Thailand, there is evidence that Burmese displaced persons outside the camps engaged in unsustainable agriculture and other environmental practices, but AUP cannot work effectively outside the camps. Inside the camps, actions sought to promote the sustainability of farming practices, and sustainable food production also figured in actions within the camps. This is largely due to the fact that in situations where formal employment was virtually impossible and income-generating possibilities were limited, own-account food production was a key element of livelihoods and sustainability.

To take a specific example, the action Livelihood improvement for uprooted people in Sangklaburi district, Kanchanaburi province (implemented by Pattanarak Foundation, EUR 0.7 million, reference DCI/2009/258120) aimed to improve food security through agricultural training and demonstration activities, promote income generating activities, and put in place saving groups, community shops, and market networks for 1,600 uprooted and ethnic Thai households (Project Description), MR-144034.01 praised the project for working well in a difficult environment and singled out its inclusion of both non-Thai and Thai beneficiaries. It judged that the training, materials, and follow-up provided were too meagre to be likely to have much impact.

Great controversy has attended the recent reduction in the monthly rice ration, which has been made necessary by a shortfall in donor funding. On the one hand, this has led to tension within the camps, where it is perceived as being perhaps the first measure in a series leading ultimately to closure of the

camps and return. On the other hand, some NGO representatives interviewed said that, frankly, the signal that the status quo will not continue indefinitely is a needed one.

As in Myanmar and Bangladesh, all water and sanitation activities incorporated an environmental sustainability component.

6.1.4.3 Detailed extraction of Bangladesh programme

One of the concerns of the UNHCR action supporting the Rohingya refugee population was dealing with (i) uncontrolled competition between camp resident and members of surrounding activities for fuel wood and (ii) the unsafe conditions faced by camp residents who left the camps to gather fuel wood. The project also contained a component providing improved water and sanitation and waste collection inside the camps.

6.1.4.4 Detailed extraction of Afghanistan programme

Food security, if it was addressed in the AUP actions aimed at re-integration of returnees, was not specified.

6.1.4.5 Detailed extraction of Sri Lanka programme

AUP activities in Sri Lanka focused on housing and infrastructure, with some involvement of livelihoods. Food security and environmental sustainability were not explicitly incorporated.

6.2 JC 62: Degree to which political dialogue on legal status and rights of uprooted people helped promoting durable solutions

6.2.1 Indicator 621: Inter-country political dialogue relating to repatriation issues promoted

Evidence has been found in *AUP project* descriptions, mid-term review, ROM reports, etc., of promoting dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan regarding (i) return), (ii) conditions of refugees, and (iii) migration. However, no reference to inter-country dialogue has been found in CSPs or regional strategy documents. No evidence of inter-country dialogue has been found in the case of the three countries primarily involved in the Myanmar nexus (Myanmar, Thailand, Bangladesh). To some extent, this may be because Myanmar was essentially closed until 2011. During the field visit, it was learned that there is limited, but not inconsequential, dialogue between the Governments of Thailand and Myanmar regarding cross-border issues and issues surrounding possible return of refugees. While this is no doubt encouraged by the EU in general terms, there is no evidence that AUP specifically contributed.

One especially important circuit of conversation in Myanmar and Thailand is between NGOs working in the two countries, often the offices of the same NGOs. These close communications, while informal, no doubt filter into conversations between NGOs and the Governments of the countries in which they work. In this way, EU assistance supports indirect communication between Governments. The close connections between the Yangon and Bangkok Delegations, and between ECHO offices in the two countries, also should not be forgotten in considering indirect Government to Government communication. Also contributing to successful integration of LRRD were good communications and exchanges taking place between the Yangon /Bangkok Delegation and ECHO field offices in the two countries

6.2.2 Indicator 622: Advocacy activities to promote integration of refugees and IDPs are implemented under AUP actions.

AUP project descriptions, mid-term reviews, and evaluations describe a number of advocacy efforts without giving much in the way of detail. Among these are:

- Advocacy vis-à-vis the Government of Afghanistan to allow the UNHCR to operate more effectively.
- Advocacy vis-à-vis the Governments of Pakistan and Iran to ease the conditions, legal and social, affecting Afghan refugees and uprooted persons in their territories.
- Advocacy vis-à-vis the Government of Bangladesh to soften its initial opposition to improving the conditions of Rohingya uprooted persons for fear of attracting more.
- Advocacy vis-à-vis central and local Thai officials to make it easier for refugees, uprooted persons, and migrants from Myanmar to obtain access to medical care.
- Advocacy vis-à-vis Thai officials to improve the conditions of detention of detained Rohingya.

- Frequent advocacy vis-à-vis local and regional officials in Myanmar to permit AUP actions to proceed in contested or unsettled areas.

Apart from finding strong evidence of vigorous political dialogue (see next two indicators), the field visits added no additional information.

6.2.3 Indicator 623: Cross-border refugee issues integrated into EU regional and bilateral political dialogues

Desk phase results regarding political dialogue were provocative. We wrote: A review of EAMRs reveals almost no reference to either programmes or policy dialogue related to uprooted people. The only relevant programme was the ASEAN Migration and Border Control project which commenced activities in 2009, aimed mostly at standardising and improving border control practices at major hubs and of limited relevance in the porous border areas where flows uprooted people are greatest. Member states are reluctant to allow ASEAN involvement in what they regard as a sensitive internal matter, so it is not surprising that EU involvement via ASEAN support has been limited.

References to bilateral policy dialogue regarding uprooted people in country Delegation EAMRs are rare and laconic. One example will serve: “*Within the framework of the AUP programme, policy dialogue initiatives can be summarised as follows: together with the ECHO regional office, the Thailand Delegation has actively participated in the dialogue relating to the assistance to the Burmese refugees in Thailand*” (EAMR Thailand 2011.06). This paucity of information persists even in situations (Thailand being an example) where a Policy Dialogue Support Facility was in place and where it is known, from other sources, that there was substantive and constructive policy dialogue (e.g., access to the national health system for uprooted Burmese in Thailand, treatment of returnees in Afghanistan).

It is also known that there was active policy dialogue in Pakistan and Afghanistan, both bilaterally and in a coordinated regional sense, aimed at resolving problems of uprooted people, but these do not feature in EAMRs (only Afghanistan consulted).

Regional policy documents related to ASEAN and SAARC, the ASEM and similar policy fora nowhere mention regional policy dialogue related to uprooted persons.

The field phase definitively established that there was full bilateral policy dialogue between the EU and the Governments of Thailand and Myanmar regarding issues related to cross-border refugees (and IDPs; see next Indicator). Why so little trace is left in documents is unknown.

The situation at regional level still appears to be disappointing, at least in the case of ASEAN. Every EU and national official interviewed was of the view that ASEAN was incapable of addressing regional refugee issues because of the divergence of interests among member states.

6.2.4 Indicator 624: IDP issues integrated into EU bilateral political dialogues

As indicated by information under Indicator 622, it is clear that there was policy dialogue and advocacy related to IDPs at bilateral level in the countries studied, documents consulted do not explicitly recognise this or give any details. Interviews at the EU Delegation in Myanmar, however, clearly indicated that displacement issues were a major source of discussion. In Bangkok, as well, political dialogue covers the entire range of issues related to uprooting.

6.2.5 Indicator 625: EU regional-level AUP support contributed to improving the migration policies and strategies at regional level

It is known, and stressed by receiving countries, that a substantial proportion of influx into host areas – Bangladesh in the case of the Rohingya, Thailand in the case of (mostly Karen), Pakistan in the case of Afghans – is actually economic migration, albeit often under the pressure of desperate circumstances. As an example of the explicit recognition of this, while maintaining a refugee component, the intervention *Solutions for Afghans in neighbouring host countries* (EUR 1.5 million, 01.01.2009-30.06.2010, implemented by UNHCR, reference DCISIE/2008/170266) recognised that cross-border movement in Afghanistan is now in large part migratory (*Project Description*). Maintaining an in-place partnership with ILO, the project aimed to provide TA and capacity building in return / reintegration with a focus on migrants. Through research and knowledge-building, it helped to develop a policy framework and implementation arrangements. The project worked with the Ministry of Return and Reintegration. While AUP activities in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Thailand sought to improve the welfare of uprooted people, it is not apparent from project literature that there was any specific focus on migration policy.

The field missions to Thailand and Myanmar perhaps raised as many questions as they answered. There are two essential problem areas. One is the exodus of Rohingya (the very use of the term is

contested; for example, Myanmar officials prefer “Bengali”) under push conditions of discrimination and violence. The problem is a truly regional one, as it encompasses Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia. As such, it cries out for a regional dialogue leading to a regional approach, but ASEAN has not proven equal to coming to grips with the issue in its Member States. The fact that both South and Southeast Asian states are involved makes the situation even more complex. As far as Bangladesh and Thailand are concerned, the Rohingya are illegal economic migrants. The field mission to Thailand revealed that, despite the lack of evidence uncovered in the desk phase, the EU Delegation has consistently raised the issue of Rohingya, and migration more broadly, with relevant officials in political dialogue. Concerns have, for example, been expressed regarding poor conditions of detention.

A broader issue is that of migration in general and, while there has been bilateral political dialogue on the part of the EU, for example in Thailand, labour migration issues have been little dealt with in the Asia regional programme. In the case of ASEAN, this gap is noteworthy because of the enormous emphasis on regional economic integration. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior officials interviewed in Thailand appeared to have in mind a sort of 1960s-vintage “*Gastarbeiter*” approach to immigration – an approach that, based on European experience, does not inspire confidence. The lump-of-labour fallacy; that one immigrant working equals one Thai unable to find a job, was clearly present.

EU Delegation officials in both Bangkok and Yangon are fully aware that the Thai-Myanmar border straddles an essentially integrated economic region, and one moreover that is rapidly developing (including Special Economic Zones to attract capital) on the Thai side. It is an open secret that many illegal Myanmar residents in Thailand are engaged in work in modern factories or in seasonal agricultural labour. Myanmar, as well, with the support of donors such as the Asian Development Bank, is developing its own regional growth poles. While full economic integration has its constraints – for example, the much vaunted East-West transport route linking Thailand and Myanmar will hardly be a super-highway – economic integration is sure to increase. With it will come inexorable pressure for integration of labour as well as capital markets.

The new EU Communication (COM 2013 (292) Final) on Maximising the Development Impact of Migration takes the welcome step of broadening the view of migration as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Yet, while recognizing special concerns such as human trafficking and climate change, it falls short of recognizing that migration is often, as in Afghanistan and Pakistan, closely associated with conflict and the uprooting of persons. The distinction between economic migration and displacement, far from clear in the real world, remains fundamental in EU policy and in the policies of most partner countries in Asia. The EU regional Border Management Project did not contain any aspects that could be considered of special pertinence in the context of uprooting. The fault lines are clear. Host countries have an incentive to consider uprooted persons as irregular migrants who have been attracted by economic opportunities, including the benefits of refugee camps. Uprooted persons have incentive to regard themselves as having been forced to flee their place of usual abode by extreme circumstances beyond their control.

According to the EUD survey, there is little effort at coordinating the DCI-financed migration and asylum budget line with the regional strategy. Such coordination might form an entry point for taking greater account of labour migration issues in the region, both from the management point of view and from the standpoint of dealing better with asylum seekers and persons in irregular situations.

6.3 JC 63: Degree to which EU support helped improving access to basic services

6.3.1 Indicator 631: Increased number of persons, including children and members of other vulnerable groups (disabled, elderly, single, mothers, etc.) receiving health, education, and psycho-social services

The mainstay of *AUP interventions* was improving access to health, basic infrastructure including clean water and basic sanitation, education, and social services, roughly in that order. In camp situations, the EU was, through NGOs and UNHCR, often the principal provider. In IDP and cross-border displaced population contexts, as well, health and access to education were main concerns. Health was almost always a central concern and, frequently, there was a specific focus on the reproductive health and maternal, child, and new-born health, including nutrition. In Thailand, there was an action specifically targeting malaria which, through a smaller component on MCH, succeeded in significantly reducing infant mortality in the camps. Camp health services covered psychosocial services and inter-

ventions necessary to reduce GBV were present. Also in Thailand, the EU engaged in long policy dialogue with Government about the problem of displaced persons who, having no national identity card, had no access to the national health system. While this problem has not been resolved, there has been progress and objections to promoting health among the population have been overcome by including host communities in such programmes.

There was also a major effort to improve health and other basic social services access for uprooted Afghans in Iran through the UNHCR-implemented CISAMAP intervention.

The EU has been a major provider of basic as well as secondary education in Thai refugee camps and, following policy dialogue with Government, was able to introduce a successful VET programme. This programme has taken on special significance as possibilities for eventual return to Myanmar apparently move closer to reality, yet there are concerns that young people graduating from the programme, with certification both in Thailand and Myanmar, may not wish to return to agricultural areas that they have never seen. In Sri Lanka, while the main concern of AUP was housing, basic community infrastructure provided in complementary actions included preschools, playgrounds, and water.

6.3.1.1 Detailed extraction of Myanmar programme

The action *Integrated non-formal education and livelihoods programme to aid the recovery and resilience of cyclone uprooted vulnerable people in the island of Pyinkaying* (01.01.2009 – 19.11.2011, EUR 1.2 million) implemented by Save the Children combined provision of basic education with promotion of livelihoods. It targeted children in particular and included components of psycho-social services to this vulnerable population uprooted by natural catastrophe (Grant contract DCI-ASIE/2008/106-067).

The action *Support to health community network in Buthidaung Township, Rakhine State* EUR 1.5 million, 36 months commencing 01.04 2009, Aide Médicale Internationale) was a broad Primary Health Care intervention providing basic medical services to a disfavoured region characterised by a mostly Muslim stateless population (Project Description, Contract, Reference DCI-ASIE/2008/157- 682). The project provided a full range of basic medical services, with emphasis on Community Health Workers and Auxiliary Midwives, as well as clinics, drugs, and training. The latter was impeded by the inability of government to identify suitable participants (Interim Report, August 2010). Basic psycho-social services were provided at the community level.

6.3.1.2 Detailed extraction from Thailand programme

Uprooted Burmese people living in Tak Province along the Myanmar border are among the most vulnerable to multiple-drug resistant malaria and other infectious diseases. The action *Providing diagnosis, treatment, and prevention measures against malaria and other infectious diseases in the uprooted Burmese population of Tak Province, Thailand* (EUR 3.2 million, 01.11.2008-31.10.2012, reference DCI-ASIE/2008/164106) sought to address this problem as well as delivering improved reproductive health (*Project Description*). The Mid-term Evaluation of 20.04.2011 found that substantial numbers of persons had been treated, some 20% of the under-five population had received malaria consultations and there had been effective large-scale delivery of ante-natal care consultations, there had been a large number of malaria screening consultations, ante-natal care consultations, etc., all at a very efficient cost.

The action *All-inclusive education programme* (EUR 2 million, ZOA, reference DCI-ASIE /2008/162313) provided educational facilities, staff, and materials in seven refugee camps as well as supporting educational institutions in surrounding villages (Interim Report of 15.06.2010). MR-127540.02 of 10.12.2010 praised the project for good implementation and impact but warned that, as time goes by, it becomes increasingly difficult to meet camp dwellers aspirations for higher education. MR-127540.03 of 10.12.2011 noted the difficulties of attaining sustainability when residents of the camp themselves are without the necessary resources.

The follow-on ZOA project was *Educational resourcing and institutional development* (EUR 2 million, 01.01.2011-31.03.2014, reference DCI-ASIE/2010/255863). Zoa had become virtually the only provider of education support in the camps, giving rise to concerns about sustainability. MR-144023.01 of 16.12.2011 and MR-144023.02 of 30.11.2012 both gave the project high marks for putting in place a well thought out exit strategy, with positive outlook for sustainability after ZOA withdraws.

Based on its long experience in the fight against malaria, Mahidol University implemented the action *Providing priority health care services to the uprooted population in Tak Province, Thailand* (EUR 2 million, reference DCI-ASIE/2010/256285). The main focus of the project was TB, a major and growing health problem in the area. MR-144024.01 of 16.11.2011 noted substantial progress against

TB due to the project as well as spin-off progress in the area of neonatal mortality. The project stressed community-based awareness raising, monitoring, and treatment.

During the field visit, WHO staff, Ministry of Health officials, and local and international experts all stressed the linkages between uprooting, the porous Thai-Myanmar border, the cross-border nature of infectious disease and, in particular, the problem of drug-resistant malaria. Malaria prevalence is low, but the rate of artemesian resistance is high. In the context of discussing the eventual scaling down of assistance to refugee camps in Thailand and return of refugees to possibly poor conditions in Myanmar, fears of an upsurge in drug-resistant malaria. One internationally-recognised expert raised the spectre of drug resistance spreading West across Myanmar, into Bangladesh, and thence into India, with disastrous global health consequences.

In Thailand, the EC has been a major provider of health services up to the level of tertiary-level treatment (and when needed, EU-financed services interceded with the Thai government to ensure that refugees receive needed care). In Mae Sot camp, the EC finances all health and education services. The camp hospital provides an integrated range of care, including care for patients suffering from multiple-drug resistant tuberculosis. There is good available of psychosocial care and services of relevance to women and children.

In the area of education, the EU has financed education through secondary level as well as vocational and technical training. In both areas, the quality of education provided has been high, but constraints have been experienced. It has proven increasingly difficult to attract and retain good teachers. Most discouraging, exceptionally gifted graduates were denied permission to attend Thai universities. The vocational training programme (with areas relevant to both young men and women) has proven very popular. The project has managed to negotiate certification agreements with both Thai and Myanmar officials. However, a fundamental conundrum is that, at least under current conditions, the expectation is that these skilled young persons will return to perhaps insecure, under-developed agricultural areas where the opportunities for exercising their skills will be limited. It is far from clear how their aspirations will be met.

6.3.1.3 Detailed extraction of Bangladesh programme

The UNHCR-implemented action supporting improved conditions in the Rohingya refugee camps contained a health component.

6.3.1.4 Detailed extraction of Afghanistan programme

Implemented under the umbrella of the UNHCR *Regional programme in support of Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan and of returnees in Afghanistan* (EU contribution EUR 3.5 million, 01.01.2008-31.12.2009, reference DCI/2008/147315) included the health and community services component *Community integrated social and medical assistance programme (CISAMAP) and support for community services* project was largely focused on providing access to basic medical care for refugees in Iran. However, it also provided social counselling, all within the framework of promoting and facilitating repatriation. According to the February 2009 *Mid-term Evaluation of AUP Activities Afghanistan* among the over 10,000 refugees benefiting in the first half of 2008 were those reached under community activities targeting disabled people, street children, women desiring skills training, and persons in need of psycho-social support. In close coordination with CISAMAP, the intervention *Support to improve self-sufficiency and training on SGBV, AGDM, HIV and AIDS* directly targeted HIV/AIDS and sex and gender based violence.

6.3.1.5 Detailed extraction of Sri Lanka programme

The ZOA infrastructure project complementing housing provision (see section 6.1.2.1) built pre-schools, playgrounds, and community centres.

6.3.1.6 EC support to Bhutanese refugees in Nepal

While it was not a focal area of the detailed review of AUP programmes made during the course of the evaluation, EU support to Bhutanese refugees in Nepal was another important programme component. It stands apart, among other things, because of its active programme of resettlement in third countries, and serves as a good example of the sort of integrated approach taken by programmes financed by the EU.

The European Union leads donors' efforts to support Bhutanese refugees currently living in camps in Nepal. Nepal has been hosting a large number of refugees and asylum seekers for the past few dec-

ades, the majority of whom entered into Nepal in early nineties (Interim Report On Contribution Agreement: DCI-Asie/11/281-601, 01-Jan-2012– 31-Dec-2012). The country currently hosts some 40,971 refugees from Bhutan in two camps. Through the three year project on International Protection and Assistance to Bhutanese Refugees (2011-2014) with a total budget of Euro 23,555,132.00, UNHCR (with EU as a major funder) has provided continued international protection and humanitarian assistance to refugees from Bhutan while promoting comprehensive durable solutions and sustainable developmental assistance to facilitate the local integration of the refugees who will remain in Nepal.

UNHCR's third-country resettlement programme for refugees from Bhutan in Nepal has supported over 75,000 refugees resettlement since the programme began in late 2007.

For those remaining in camps, UNHCR Nepal has continued to provide international protection and assistance. The assistance components include complementary food, health, nutrition, water, sanitation, community services, primary education, and domestic household items, as well as transport and logistics. Targeted interventions were sustained to reduce malnutrition and child mortality, improve maternal health services and maintain universal primary education. UNHCR implemented comprehensive and innovative activities under the High Commissioner's Special Project on SGBV to effectively address the issue of SGBV in the refugee camps. The projects encompass four major thematic areas – awareness raising, resilience of persons of concern, responding to specific needs, and legal support. In the camps, the community's engagement in protecting children-at-risk was strengthened through Child Protection Working Groups and community-based support activities such as a Mentor Program for vulnerable children.

Consultations with UNHCR's project implementing partners indicated that support to the remaining refugees in the camps was adding a lot of value to their efforts to improve their quality of life in the camps. Interventions ranging from supporting government's service delivery in health and education to legal support to psycho-social counseling, assisted the women and men in the camps to manage their lives and identify ways of living productively and without violence.

A key future challenge is the transition to a development assistance programme from a humanitarian programme for the refugees not opting for resettlement abroad. Advocacy is ongoing with the Government of Nepal and UN Country team for the implementation of the proposed five year Community Based Development Programme – Transitional Solutions Initiative worth approximately USD 37 million.

6.3.2 Indicator 632: Legal counselling services available for refugees and IDPs

The main effort to provide legal counselling services has been in the Afghanistan programme, which explicitly aims to promote voluntary return. In order to promote this, the EU provided significant legal counselling to refugees in Iran and Pakistan. In addition, a Norwegian Refugee Council-implemented action provided legal service centres serving returnees to Afghanistan and well as displaced persons abroad. An evaluation concluded that the project filled a significant gap and coordinated activities between Afghanistan and abroad well.

The EU engaged, as well, in policy dialogue with governments (especially Pakistan) about the legal status of refugees and displaced persons. In Afghanistan itself, it addressed, through dialogue, the issue that the GoA does not accord returnees refugee status, making it difficult for UNHCR to work. Through support to the Afghan independent commission on human rights, AUP supported the monitoring of human rights in areas of return, although an evaluation of the action concluded that the commission was largely ineffective.

The EC has not been involved in legal counselling in Myanmar, but has through policy dialogue expressed its concern regarding the Rule of Law in areas slated for the return of refugee populations now in Thailand if the peace process continues to advance. The situation is particularly fraught in the area of land law, where expropriation ("land grabbing") is an on-going phenomenon. Ministry of Agriculture officials admit that the implementation of land law reforms is spotty and presents enormous challenges.

In Thailand, the EC has financed legal counselling centres in refugee camps, and these have provided an integrated package of advisory services for residents, including mediating between them and the Thai justice system (e.g., arranging for legal representation for camp residents accused of crimes so serious that they cannot be dealt with by the camp justice system). Unlike in Pakistan, however, legal counselling projects have eschewed providing advice on legal rights following return. To do so at the present time would only add to an already fraught situation in which refugees fear precipitous forced return, a prospect that the Thai government assures will not happen.

In Sri Lanka, the two main IDP housing projects interceded with government officials at various levels to facilitate the process by which IDPS and returnees could establish or re-establish their land ownership rights, a prerequisite for securing housing and livelihoods.

6.3.2.1 Detailed extraction of Myanmar programme

There is no reference in documents consulted of the provision of legal counselling in Myanmar. The field mission also gave no evidence of this. The entire area is fraught. The weak rule of law in areas slated for the return of refugee populations in Thailand is acknowledged by all, including Government officials interviewed. This is particularly the case with regard to land rights. As the Ministry of Agriculture admits, while a land law reform is underway, implementation is difficult. Local strongmen continue to hold sway, to such an extent that more than one stakeholder interviewed suggested that de-mining be delayed because, once de-mined, land process soared inviting speculators and land-grabbers to the detriment of the former landholders. Most persons interviewed were of the view that, after security, the rule of law was the greatest issue in achieving return, well ahead of provision of basic social services.

6.3.2.2 Detailed extraction of Thailand programme

The UNHCR-implemented action *Protection assistance to Myanmar refugees in Thailand* (EUR 1.7 million, reference DCI-ASIA/2008/160498) provided support to asylum seekers, access to justice for refugees in camps, and protected unaccompanied and separated minors. MR-127261.01 noted that the logical framework provided by UNHCR was useless in assessing impacts. The International Rescue Committee and Catholic Office for Emergency Relief and Refugees were also involved and there was considerable confusion arising from the fact that each organisation used its own language. It proved difficult to encourage camp residents to report crimes to the Thai police, as traditional means of resolving disputes proved strong. The process of working with the Thai government to ensure a fair and speedy system for assessing asylum claims proved difficult. In Mae Sot camp, the EC financed provision of a range of legal services to residents via a legal counselling centre. The range of services was broad: GBV-related services, arranging for legal services for persons accused of offences serious enough to take them before the Thai justice system, providing mediation and dispute resolution services for minor disputes, etc. One area which the legal counselling centre has chosen not to enter is advising refugees on their legal rights if they choose to return. Two reasons were cited. The first was simply that, not knowing the state of the law in Myanmar and being unable to judge the situation, the centre was not capable of providing such advice. The second had to do with the current tense atmosphere in the camp. Residents are deeply concerned that they will be precipitously forced to return to Myanmar (a point vigorously denied by officials of the Government) and staff at the centre believed that providing advice about rights following return would add to the tension.

6.3.2.3 Detailed extraction of Bangladesh programme

No evidence has been found of provision of legal counselling in Bangladesh. However, there has been policy dialogue with Government on the legal status of refugees and displaced persons, as a result of which there was a significant evolution in the direction of LRRD.

6.3.2.4 Detailed extraction of the Afghanistan programme

A major activity related to basic legal services was the project *Information counselling and legal assistance (ICLA) for returnees and Internally Displaced People (IDP) in Afghanistan*, implemented in 2008-09 (EUR 1.5 million, 01.01.2008-31.12.2009, reference DCI-ASIE/2008/147257, continued through 2010 in 220049) by the Norwegian Refugee Council's Information and Legal Assistance (ICLA) Program. Quoting the *Description of Action*, ICLA at the time was active in 12 countries (i) to provide information and legal counselling, (ii) to monitor return and identify conflicts or problems facing returnees. (ii) To address legal obstacles, and (iv) to systematically document issues of concern and advocate for their solution. February 2009 Mid-term Evaluation of the *Aid to Uprooted People Activities* for Afghanistan praised the project for filling legal gaps, for being well connected to other NRC interventions such as shelter, and being well linked between activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The project was responsive to evaluation recommendations. With some exceptions, the project was on track in delivering results and was judged to have "strong potential for impact" as well as good prospects for sustainability. The unique niche filled by the project was that it specialised in land and property rights and specifically targeted refugees. The proportion of consultations which led to resolution of the problem was high (*Interim Narrative Report, Final Narrative Report* of 220049).

Under the UNHCR-implemented *Regional programme in support of Afghan refugees in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan and of returnees in Afghanistan* (01.01.2008-31.12.2009, EU contribution EUR 3.5 million), reference DCI-ASIE/2008/147315) Advice and Legal Aid Centres (ALACs) provided legal assistance to refugees in Pakistan (*Interim Report*, 2009). Some 21,000 persons received legal assistance and there was mass dissemination of information about voluntary repatriation programmes. The project also advocated with police authorities to respect refugees' legal rights. The February 2009 Mid-term Evaluation cited above noted that the project was able to project itself into insecure areas by working with indigenous organisations. Effectiveness and, ultimately, sustainability were judged to be limited by staff constraints.

The continuation of the same programme (01.01.2010-31.12.2011, reference DCI-ASIE 220046) supported human rights monitoring by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission as well as the operation of the Ministry of Return and Reintegration's Land Allocation Scheme. MR-13816201 of 29.12.2012 found the capacity and caseload of the Commission to be unacceptably low and commented that the Land Allocation Scheme was languishing. While the project was judged relevant and operated efficiently, it was achieving few results and having little impact. In the programme continuation (DCI-ASIE/283011, 01.01.2012-31.12.2014), UNHCR switched to a general reintegration effort including infrastructure, etc., in selected zones (Funding Proposal, March 2011).

6.3.2.5 Detailed extraction of the Sri Lanka programme

Both housing projects described in section 6.1.2.1) made a substantial contribution to reinforcing beneficiaries' legal rights by interceding with authorities to make it easier for IDPs to establish (or in most cases re-establish) land ownership title.

6.3.3 Indicator 633: Increased proportion of target populations with access to clean water and basic sanitation

From time immemorial, provision of access to clean water and basic sanitation has been a priority item, surpassed in importance perhaps only by shelter and housing, when coping with problems of displacement. Document review reveals many projects focusing on water and sanitation as their main concern, usually in a LRRD integrated approach that also includes health, livelihoods, community services, etc. In addition, integrated project approaches (for example in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh) as often as not included a water and sanitation component in a broader basket of community services provision. Substantial numbers of uprooted people improved their access to clean water and basic sanitation thanks to EU-funded actions. In selected settings, such as the Mae Sot camp with over 40,000 residents, the EC has essentially financed all water and sanitation services.

6.3.3.1 Detailed extraction of Myanmar programme

Water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) was invariably integrated with other foci such as livelihoods, food security, basic health (sometimes explicitly reproductive health or mother, child, and new born health). One such intervention was *Integrated Wash and food security project for uprooted communities in Kayah State, Union of Myanmar*, which targeted 4,000 households (estimated 22,000 persons) in Kayah State (EUR 2.5 million, *Project Description*). Kayah State has been the locus since 1948 of conflict between government forces and groups fighting for ethnic independence. Government development policy has been marked by land dispossession, resettlement, forced labour, etc. The implementing agency (Action Contre la Faim) was hindered by difficulties in procurement and government bans on access to some villages (*Interim Narrative Report*, no date).

6.3.3.2 Detailed extraction of Thailand programme

Starting in 1984 there was a massive influx of Karen refugees across the Burmese border into Thailand. The largest of the nine refugee camps built to accommodate them was Ma La camp. The action *Contribution to the improvement of living conditions of refugees and host villagers in the Mae Ork Pha Roo river water catchment area, Mae La sub-district, Thu Son Yong District, Tak Province, Thailand* (implemented by Solidarités, 2008-2011, EUR 2 million) was a traditional water and sanitation project, albeit with stand-alone agricultural and environmental components, aimed at benefitting 24,000 camp residents and surrounding villagers. MR-127501.01 of 18.12.2009 gave the project rather low marks, but this was not so much because the results were not being delivered as because the objectively verifiable indicators of success were not well defined, the project goals were broad, and sustainability was of limited relevance in the context of a refugee camp. A number of issues identified were addressed by the time of MR-127501.02 of 10.12.2010. MR-127501.03 of 16.12.2011 noted that there was a cholera

outbreak in the camp in 2010 and that a number of practical difficulties with running the water scheme persisted. The MR noted some progress in building ties with local administration.

The action *Community-based water, sanitation, and hygiene project for uprooted people in and around the camps Mae Ra Ma Luong and Mae La Oon, Northern Thailand* (EUR 0.8 million, implemented by Malteser Hilfsdienst, 01.01.2011-01.07.2013, reference DCI-ASIE/2010/256286) continued a long tradition of Malteser support to these two camps and surrounding villages. According to MR-145384.01 of 30.11.2012, the project emphasised self-help aspects of WASH and was producing solid results.

Implementing NGOs met during the Thailand field visit expressed concern at unpredictability in EC support – evidently, due to administrative error, there has been a recent interruption of AUP support which is expected to be resumed after the problem is resolved.

6.3.3.3 Detailed extraction of Bangladesh programme

AUP actions in refugee camps included improving water schemes.

6.3.3.4 Detailed extraction of relevant Afghanistan programme

The UN HABITAT-implemented intervention *Reintegration of returnees and IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) through policy, planning and targeted assistance* (EUR 5 million, reference DCIASIE/2008/147313; continued in 220050) was located in urban neighbourhoods and concerned itself not with water and sanitation per se as with land tenure, decent housing, urban infrastructure, and sustainable neighbourhoods (Interim Narrative Report, Final Narrative Report). The overall objective was sustainable return and re-integration of Afghan returnees and IDPs. Special emphasis was given to promoting the social infrastructure, in the form of community groups, consultative mechanisms (Community Development Councils or CDCs), etc. to promote sustainable reintegration. See also the continuation DCI-ASIE/2012/283010 (01.03.2012-28.02.2015).

Water and sanitation was often integrated with basic health services and livelihoods.

6.3.3.5 Detailed extraction of Sri Lanka programme

The ZOA infrastructure project described in section 6.1.2.1 contained a water component, although expected results had to be scaled back.

6.3.4 Indicator 634: Improved access to women's health services, including services related to sexual and other form of gender-based violence (SGBV)

Most interventions under AUP included health components, and in many cases, women's health was a special focus area, usually through improved access to maternal, child, and new-born health. Some projects explicitly dealt with sexual and reproductive health. Gender, including gender-based violence in camps, was well integrated throughout, according to evaluations' assessments of cross-cutting issues. HIV/AIDS was frequently highlighted. The provision of women's health issues in the Mae Sot camp visited in Thailand was of high quality.

6.3.4.1 Detailed extraction of Myanmar programme

Women's reproductive health, children's health, and the health of persons living with HIV/AIDS were particular concerns of the integrated programme *Support to the displaced people and their host communities in Dala and Seikyi Khanaungdho Townships through the improvement of their health, water and sanitation and livelihood situations* (EUR 1.6 million, implemented by Aide Médicale Internationale, reference DCIASIE/2010/289-181) which was implemented in Yangon City and its environs. Central to the project was the sponsoring of Self-Help Groups at the community level and the Community Action Cycle methodology (Mid-term Evaluation, 06.07.2012). M-144631.01 of 15.06.2012 gave the project relatively high marks across the board.

Maternal, new-born, and child health was the focus of the intervention *Providing essential health care to the uprooted populations of North-western Myanmar/Burma: a sustainable approach*, which targeted marginalized, vulnerable, and uprooted people of the Chin, Naga and Shan ethnicities (*Project Description*). With an EU contribution of EUR 2.2 million, the project was implemented by Merlin. Covering over 200 villages in the border area, the project served a remote population with poor access to medical services. MR 140782.01 of 08.07.2011 called attention to the limited success of behavioural change activities and the need for increased attention to promoting preventive care. Sustainability in the financial sense was unclear given the low government commitment to health care, but village financing schemes held some promise.

6.3.4.2 Detailed extraction of Thailand programme

Actions in the camps such as the UNHCR-implemented *Protection assistance to Myanmar refugees in Thailand* attempted to tackle problems of gender-based violence in the camps by encouraging its reporting.

During the field visit, it was learned that the EC-financed provision of health care in the Mae Sot refugee camp contained a full range of services related to HIV/AIDS, sexual and reproductive health, nutritional monitoring of children, and other areas of special concern and benefit to women. The camp hospital provides an integrated package of services related to GBV including counselling of both men and women. Legal services financed by the EC also deal with GBV, advising victims as well as perpetrators on their legal rights.

6.3.4.3 Detailed extraction of Bangladesh programme

The UNHCR action *Resolution of the protracted refugee situation for the Muslim population of Myanmar in Bangladesh* described above under Section 1.1.2.1 contained a substantial component dealing with gender-based violence. The Project Description noted that girls going outside the camps to collect firewood were subject to harassment and kidnapping for forced marriage, in addition to which GBV was endemic inside the camps.

6.3.4.4 Detailed extraction of Afghanistan programme

As discussed in the 2012 Thematic Evaluation of EU Support in Health, the EU was the principal financier of primary health care in some provinces, such as Herat, where many returnees live. However, there is no reference in returnees in documents related to AUP projects in Afghanistan. The CISAMAP project in Iran (see Section 1.1.6.2) focused more on refugees suffering from life-threatening conditions in the context of promoting return; however the related project *Support to improve self-sufficiency and training on SGBV, AGDM, HIV and AIDS* involved CISAMAP Community Services in SGBV.

6.3.4.5 Detailed extraction of Sri Lanka programme

No information available based on documentation consulted.

7 EQ7 on regional strategy

EQ7: To what degree has the regional-level EU support been responsive to the priorities and needs of the key partners in Asia and in line with the overall EU development and policy framework?

7.1 JC 71: Extent to which the intervention strategy responds to, and is coordinated with the agenda of key Asian partners, particularly ASEAN, SAARC and ASEM.

7.1.1 Indicator 711: Existence in the programming documents of an analysis of needs and challenges

All programming documents include some kind of a needs analysis which, however, varies in terms of depth and detail. The “*problem analysis*” of *ECAP III*, as outlined in the Identification Fiche, can be regarded as exemplary in this regard, reflecting best practise:

Box 15 *Needs Analysis in ECAP III*

The main problems which will be addressed by this project are as follows:

1. Lack of specific IP laws in some ASEAN countries, as regards intellectual property protection, encompassing patent, trade mark, geographical indications, means for private citizens to have intellectual property disputes adjudicated;
2. Lack of application of criminal sanctions for intellectual property violators or weak penalties and border enforcement of intellectual property rights,
3. Persistent large number of counterfeited and pirated goods.
4. Shortage of skilled human resources, know-how and technology to improve the administration of IPRs. Lack of progress to raise the quality of the work undertaken, weak enforcement of existing legal framework as well as arduous and time consuming registration procedures.
5. Lack of awareness among citizens and private companies
6. Absence of mechanisms of regional integration in terms of harmonised legislation, common structures (possibility of regional registration offices) or even co-operation between enforcement authorities

To overcome these difficulties there is a need for a continued EU-ASEAN co-operation and dialogue, focusing on the following main areas of intervention.

1. Improvement of legal context and administration
2. Enforcement of IPRs
3. Promotion of IP Education
4. Awareness campaigns
5. Capacity building at regional and national level

Source: EU-ASEAN Project on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (ECAP III), Identification Fiche for Project Approach, 2007.

A second example is the SWITCH-Asia programme. “Asia is fast becoming the world’s main manufacturing region and has an estimated 30 million small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) making up about 80% of the industry. Many of these rely on out-of date, inefficient and polluting technologies, which damage the natural environment and compound the problems of the poor by affecting their health and livelihoods. Middle-income consumers are often unwittingly, fuelling the situation with ever-growing demands. Consequently, a switch from unsustainable to sustainable patterns of production and consumption is needed to decouple economic growth from environmental degradation” (SWITCH-Asia Brochure, 2010). As both desk and field study show, this switch is encouraged by market demand from Europe, as European importers require high standards (e.g. ISO certification, Eco labels, carbon foot printing) not only from the exporters, but also from their respective suppliers, consequently a greening of the supply chain becomes a prerequisite.

A third example for a comprehensive needs analysis is FLEGT. The Action Fiche places the intervention clearly within the broader context of forest governance and law enforcement.

Box 16 *Needs Analysis in FLEGT*

“Problems of forest governance and law enforcement are symptoms of wider issues: deep-rooted systems of political patronage, corruption, inconsistent legal frameworks, weak law enforcement and poverty. These problems must be resolved by the governments and citizens of the countries with forest governance problems, as part of wider governance reforms and by specific actions related to forests.

Illegal logging, which takes place when timber is harvested in violation of national laws, continues to be a major problem for Asian countries. It is responsible for political, socio-economic and environmental problems, including vast environmental damage in developing countries, and impoverishment of rural communities. It is often linked to corruption and organised crime and is undermining the rule of law, principles of democratic governance and respect for human rights. As such, it weakens the competitiveness of legitimate forest operations and limits the ability of these industries to foster sustainable forest management and sustainable development, as well as it affects the poorest segments of society who live in remote forest locations. In short, illegal logging causes loss of state revenue, deforestation and loss of rural livelihood opportunities.”

Source: Abstracted from EU, Action Fiche FLEGT-Asia, 2010

A fourth example is the *Erasmus Mundus Programme*. The EACEA reports that the calls for proposals for all actions in the programme are formulated along the lines of specific country needs. These needs are determined by the Delegations in the relevant countries in conjunction with country and sectoral experts. The calls for proposals are then authorised by DEVCO before going online. In this sense, then, the Commission ensures that the Actions in the *EM* programme are oriented along the lines of needs.

Interviews with Asian HE actors indicated that the regional-level support for HE has enabled Asian researchers to undertake research relevant to country needs. Here, Asian institutional beneficiaries pointed out that the European dimension of the *EM* programme enabled Asian researchers to find suitable European HE resources for their research needs. Interviews suggest that this was easier for researchers in countries with well-defined and funded national research focus areas. That said, the direct impact of research and teaching programmes on the needs of any particular country is notoriously difficult to measure and a matter of considerable (legitimate) contention. For example, of the six *EM* Joint Doctoral programmes featuring HEIs from Asian countries, arguably only the programme aimed at “*Sustainable Management and Design for Textiles*” is directly relevant to perceived urgent needs. But that is not to say that the programmes in humanities and mathematics will fail to significantly contribute to satisfying country needs. Similarly, the indirect impacts of focused teaching and research programmes on the development of human capital are equally difficult to gauge. The available evidence –from desk and field research suggests that the mobility of students and scholars funded by the *EM* programme has equipped beneficiaries with a wide range of skills ranging from discipline-related methods and theories to more transferable skills such as language and intercultural competence. However, these impacts are highly elusive and difficult to quantify.

In the course of answering EQ 6 on *Uprooted People*, many country AUP Action Fiches were examined. These were all found to be of extremely high quality, with needs and challenges well analysed. The typical section covered historical and political context, lessons learnt, complementary actions, and donor coordination issues. The implementing NGOs and international agencies encountered during the field visit all had long experience in the region, in the countries concerned (Thailand, Myanmar and Nepal), and in the substantive areas of their interventions. So, too did ECHO.

Despite the fact that some AUPs were active in Asia since 2001, the 2005-2006 Regional Strategy Paper makes no reference to the problems of uprooted people. This is in contrast to the RSP 2007-13, which identified uprooted people as a focal area and devoted a short synthetic section (Section 4.3) to it. The need for a regional approach because of cross-border aspects was noted, as was the need for coordination with other interventions such as ECHO short-term humanitarian actions. RSP 2007-13 contained a substantial annex (Annex 23) describing and analysing the problem of uprooting in major affected countries in the region.

The issue of coordination with bilateral programmes raises the question of how uprooted people were treated in CSPs. In those countries where there are a significant number of IDPs or refugees, CSPs contained some reference to the problem, although detailed analyses were usually missing. In Afghanistan, the CSP recognised that the voluntary return of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran was a priority and that key to promoting this was improving the conditions of life for returnees. At the same time, it is worth noting that the CSP slightly mischaracterised the *AUP programme* (p. 14) in implying that it focused on rural areas and health. In fact, AUP in Afghanistan focused on urban areas, community development, legal aid, monitoring of human rights and capacity building for the MoRR. Other EU interventions did, however, focus on rural development and health. The CSP recognised the need for a regional approach and the coordination of efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While the CSP for Pakistan did not explicitly cite *AUP*, it described the difficult refugee problem and stated that EU rural development aid would try to concentrate on areas where the refugee situation was especially serious. Not surprising, the Myanmar CSP describes the problem of refugees and other uprooted persons in Thailand. Problems of IDPs in conflict zones were not explicitly mentioned and, in part because of the volatile nature of the situation and the unpredictability of Government attitudes regarding access to troubled areas, planning was difficult. The CSP mentions *AUP support* for refugees in Thailand but does not contain a detailed description or analysis of the problem. The problems of uprooted Rohingya were not discussed in the Bangladesh CSP. In Sri Lanka, stabilisation in the North and East was an EU focal sector and the role of AUP is described.

In Indonesia, the CSP highlights AUP projects that have contributed to stability in West Timor. In Lao PDR, the sustainable uplands development project had its origins in concern over government population relocation activities that, while technically considered resettlement, in practice amounted to uprooting. Not mentioned in the CSP was the sensitive issue of Hmong ex-combatants returned from Thailand. The Philippines CSP noted activities of AUP aimed at conflict prevention and LRRD in Mindanao.

The fact that problems are not treated in programming documents is not certain evidence that they are not being taken into account. In both, Myanmar and Thailand, the problems of the Rohingya are subjects of active discussion with Government and partner NGOs and agencies, as are issue surrounding the eventual return of Myanmar refugees currently in Thailand. At the same time, fundamental differ-

ences of vocabulary sometimes make discussions with Government difficult, for example, the fact that Thailand does not recognise camp residents as refugees.

7.1.2 Indicator 712: Degree to which Asian partners have been involved in the design of the strategy

Neither during the desk phase nor the field phase, did any hard evidence emerge that Asian partners had not been directly involved in the design of the RSP. However, according to some evaluation reports and interviews, Asian stakeholders participated in the design of individual programmes under the RSP. For example, the ASEM Dialogue Facility promotes and encourages initiatives put forward by Asian members of ASEM, “*thereby giving greater ownership of the Facility to the Asian partners to address their needs*”. Human Rights, Justice and Peace-Building are particularly mentioned in this context (ASEM DF Evaluation, p. 38).

In the case of ASEAN, EU support had maintained relevance over time because the EU had closely responded to ASEAN’s needs in the process of deepening regional integration. Interviews at ASEC reveal that EU strategies have well responded to changing circumstances, mainly with regards to ASEAN’s changing demands and needs in the context of deepening regional economic integration. EU support to ASEAN is rated as strongly aligned to the organisations policies and priorities. Simply put, EU TRA has ‘grown up’ with ASEAN. When ASEAN decided in 2003 to work towards the vision of a fully integrated economic community by 2015, EU interventions were gradually aligned with this objective.

ASEAN input into EU-regional programmes is also confirmed by the Indonesia EAMR 12/2012 which reports on progress achieved by the Joint Programme Design Team on Support to Human Rights. The JPDT includes representatives of all four ASEAN Human Rights bodies and “*is appreciated by ASEAN as the first forum to bring together all bodies to discuss structural issues of HR mechanisms and as such turns out to have policy dialogue quality.*”

The documentation for EU interventions in *Higher Education* – specifically the *Erasmus Mundus Programme* and *TEIN* – provide no indication that Asian partners have been involved in the design of these programmes. However, the *Erasmus Mundus Programme* features a high degree of participation of Asian HEIs in the design and implementation of teaching and exchange programmes funded by the *EM*. Both quantitative and qualitative data indicate that partnerships and networks between European and Asian HEIs have created stable patterns of co-operation that have spanned several project cycles. In this context, case study evidence compiled for the MTRs and MTE’s as well as interviews during the fieldwork phase point out that Asian partners have significantly shaped the exchange, teaching and research programmes in which they have been involved.

The *problem of uprooting* is identified in the 2007-13 RSP as inherently political, requiring that actions be closely coordinated with bilateral actions. This is cited as a reason for working with local partners in order to develop local capacities. While there is no documentary evidence, EU Delegation Officials in Myanmar, Thailand and Nepal, as well as Government officials in all three countries, confirmed that there is frequent bilateral political dialogue on problems of uprooting.

7.1.3 Indicator 713: Extent to which lesson-learnt of preceding strategies – and recommendations of previous Asia-related evaluations have been considered

Lessons-learnt of preceding strategies and particularly recommendations of past evaluations are customary referred to in the action fiches of individual interventions, evaluation reports and other documentation. The following table provides some examples. Field research confirmed that most of these lessons-learnt have been followed up during implementation. This has been particularly the case for the often-stressed lack of coordination between regional-level and bilateral projects in support for regional economic integration (see EQ 2 for details). Lessons-learnt have resulted in a much tighter alignment of both levels of intervention during the second half of the strategy.

Table 12 Examples of references in programmes’ action fiches to lessons learnt from former evaluations

Intervention	Reference to lessons-learnt in Action Fiches
ECAP III	The Mid-Term Review and the External Monitoring of ECAP II stressed the importance to capitalise on the experience and results achieved. Both reports agreed that the project has generally been perceived positively by the beneficiaries. Remarkable progress has been made in all areas. Some key lessons learnt remain to be addressed:

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional integration and enforcement of IPR are far from being achieved. • Progress still needs to be achieved in terms of enforcement of the legislation. • The establishment of the ASEAN University Network on IP presents a foundation for IP education and teaching in the region. • The programme planning and monitoring system should be strengthened.
READI	Lessons learnt through reviews, assessments, monitoring results (Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM)) and evaluations of previous actions, are taken into consideration for the elaboration of this action.
ASEM IV	<p>Lessons learned have been drawn from an evaluation of the ASEM Dialogue Facility concluded in February 2010, and a Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) report of the ASEM Phase III support in September 2009.</p> <p>With respect to the ASEM Dialogue Facility the external evaluation concluded that the facility had achieved very positive outcomes, but efficiency of project implementation could be improved, as well as the realisation of some objectives. On improving efficiency, the evaluation recommended that the management of the facility's activities could fall under one contract (rather than up to ten individual framework contracts each year); on realisation of certain objectives, improvements could be made by expanding the facility to cover the activities of a larger number of Directorate Generals as part of their strategic to engage with Asia (rather than seemingly ad-hoc events), and opening up the facility so that it could respond to the initiatives of Asian ASEM members (rather than Asian participation being co-sponsorship of initiatives resting largely with the Commission). For the future, it is proposed that the efficiency of implementation could be improved by launching one contract for the management of the programme, and using the current experience to put in place the ground rules for the use of the facility, perhaps in coordination with a "light" technical support to ASEM SOM that is currently being considered by ASEM partners.</p>
Erasmus Mundus	<p>The lessons learnt for the EM programme emerged from both the positive and critical findings of the Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) as well as the MTR in 2012. The AFs all stress the need to build on the successful extension of the scope of Asian countries included in EM during the External Co-operation Windows (ECW) in 2008 on the one hand and the positive experiences with similar programmes such as TEMPUS, ALFA, etc. Furthermore, the AFs stress the need to extend and consolidate positive impacts in HE capacity-building and mutual learning across European and Asia HEIS. In terms of targeting, the AF point to the need for calls and consortia to be more closely targeted at the region's needs. The AFs also pick up on critical issues identified in ROMs and evaluation reports. These include the problematic nature of short-term faculty mobilities, administrative and legal barriers to mobility, the inclusion of members of disadvantaged groups through the TG3 instrument as well as the promotion of a more proactive policy dialogue to institutionalise teaching and research networks. Desk and fieldwork evidence suggests that the EM programme addressed these issues, albeit with varying degrees of success. Interviews with institutional beneficiaries as well as case studies confirm that the extension of the programme and the consolidation of benefits in terms of access, mutual learning and capacity-building were largely successful. Similarly, the targeting of calls and consortia has led to the formulation of research relevant to country needs. Here institutional beneficiaries point to the European dimension as a particular value-added: for researchers from countries with well developed RTD policies, the wider scope of European HE resources available allowed them to more readily match their specific research needs with relevant European HE competences. However, evidence suggests that the TG3 instrument was less successful in helping members of disadvantaged groups overcome barriers to HE participation: first, Asian HE actors experienced great difficulty in defining these groups and, second, the disadvantage of members of these groups is often articulated as a lack of the minimal requirements for participating in an EM exchange, most prominently English-language competence.</p>
Aid to Uprooted People	All Action Fiches contain a substantial section on Lessons Learnt which describes how proposed actions are responding. Among these are the continuing need for an LRRD-oriented approach and the constraint to this which is posed by the failure to establish a common long-term view with national and sometimes local authorities. The importance of coordination with ECHO is also noted.

7.1.4 Indicator 714: Correspondence of the objectives of regional-level EU support with the strategic objectives of Asian partners

The assessment of the EU's regional-level programmes alignment with the strategic objections of Asian partners – and ultimately the question as to what extent interventions have been demand-driven – needs to begin with the question as to what extent such partner strategies exist.

Among the EU-supported regional organisations, ASEAN has the clearest and most comprehensive development strategy which finds its expression in three blueprints constituting the basis for the im-

plementation of the ASEAN Community 2015. By comparison, SAARC's strategic objectives are vague and significantly less comprehensive. Given its nature as a joint European-Asian endeavour, there are no explicit Asian strategies in ASEM and ASEF.

In view of ASEAN's well-articulated strategic goals, the EU has found it relatively easy and straightforward to align regional-level support with the objectives of the ASEAN Community 2015 and related sector action plans. All relevant evaluations, including for example *ECAP III*, *APRIS II*, TRA and EU ASEAN strategy, and stakeholder interviews confirm that interventions had been largely demand-driven.

No such finding is evident in the case of SAARC. SAARC's lack of clearly formulated strategies and/or the member states' lukewarm commitment to achieving the agreed objectives is a definite hurdle in process of framing EU interventions. This has been one – but not the only factor in the failure of regional-level support to SAARC under the RSP (see EQ1 for more details). Both, the MTE of the *ASEM DF* and the *ASEF* Evaluation are critical on the EU's support correspondence with the strategic objectives of Asian stakeholders and generally the level of Asian ownership. According to the *ASEM DF* MTE, "*Because the Facility is not accessible to all ASEM members, there is a lack of 'ownership' among national administrations*" (p. 29). Consequently, the MTE recommends, "*The ASEM Dialogue Facility should promote and encourage initiatives put forward by Asian members of ASEM, thereby giving greater ownership of the Facility to the Asian partners to address their needs. Given the heterogeneity of Asian issues, the Facility should be used to address issues that are pertinent to the poorer Asian countries only*" (p. 36). The *ASEF* evaluation speaks in general terms of an "*Ownership deficit*" in *ASEF*. However, at least with regard to *ASEF* this finding could not be confirmed. Interviews with *ASEF* senior officials in Singapore clearly painted a picture of strong Asian ownership - in terms of growing Asian input into *ASEF* agenda setting and the design and implementation of individual projects - which has also translated into increased funding for *ASEF* from Asian members, particularly China.

A lack of strategy at the level of regional organisations (and at country level as well) is clear in the case of *uprooted people*. A broad review of regional strategy-related documents fails to uncover any meaningful reference to uprooted people. These documents include, e.g., the Action Plans issued following ministerial conferences in Nuremberg (15 March 2007) and Madrid (26 May 2010), ASEAN Regional Forum Concept Papers, ASEM-related documents, ASEAN Plans of Action (e.g., for socio-economic development), etc. From all appearances, the Asian partners do not have long-term strategies for dealing with uprooted people, a problem identified above as a major roadblock to developing LRRD solutions, since it is difficult to reach a common strategic view with authorities. If they do, this has not been transposed to the regional level. The problem of the lack of a regional voice to discuss what is an inherently regional problem repeatedly emerged during interview in Myanmar and Thailand. There is limited dialogue between the two Governments on issues of the eventual return of refugees now in Thai camps, but the more complex and acute problem of the Rohingya is very difficult to discuss either bilaterally or and the regional level (note that this does form an important part of EU bilateral dialogue, however).


In the area of cross-border health, by contrast, there is good correspondence between regional EU strategies and country strategies, which focus in particular on improving cross-border co-operation in epidemiology, infectious disease control, and the like. The strong coordinating function of the WHO and the fact that much of this subject area is protocol- and good-practice based facilitates harmonisation of objectives.

Apart from the specific case of EU-ASEAN co-operation, the most positive findings are available for *TEIN 2* and *3*. The Evaluation states, "*At the national level, discussions with key stakeholders have confirmed that governments in Asia see TEIN as being highly relevant to their research and education networks, but also to their more general goals of developing their knowledge economies and extending the penetration of information society in their countries..*" (pp. 13-14). According to evidence from the fieldwork phase, the objectives of *TEIN* remain closely aligned with strategic HE objectives in Asia. However, the evidence also demonstrates that the same administrative, legal and policy barriers that are slowing the development of HE and RTD policy in Asia in general may also be hampering the development of attractive and relevant applications for the *TEIN* network in Asia (interviews at HUST, at Hanoi Medical University and at Hanoi Agricultural University August 2013).

The available documentation as well as the fieldwork data shows that the EM programme remains in line with broad HE objectives at both national and HEI level. Significantly, this seems to be true for HE systems at different stages of development. For HEIs and researchers in more developed HE systems (such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand), the European dimension of the EM project allows re-

searchers effectively to match specific local research needs with existing European HE resources. It also provides visibility not only to the top –tier universities of the region (for example, University of Malaya, Universiti Putra Malaysia, Mahidol University or Chulalongkorn University) it also enables upcoming institutions (such as UKM in Malaysia) to demonstrate their capabilities to potential European and Asian partners (interviews at University of Malaya, UKM and HUST August 2013).. For researchers and HEIs in less developed HE systems (e.g. RUPP, HNUE, or ITC) the EM programme still provides access to basic capacity-building teaching and research programmes (interviews at RUPP, ITC, Royal Institute of Agriculture in August 2013). Additionally, the increasing interest in the programme from Asian HEIs and students as it has scaled and developed suggests that, at the very least, the programme remains aligned with the perceived interests and needs of the stakeholders in Asian HE sectors. Between 2009-2012, the number of applications to the EMMC and EMJD scholarships as a whole grew by about 20% (EM Website). Institutional application for partnership grants in Actions 1, 2, and 3 remained more or less stable from 2009-2011 (EM MTE 2012, p.93). Furthermore, survey data gathered for the EM MTE 2012 suggests that the aims and goals of the programme remain acutely relevant to students and institutional beneficiaries. The table below shows how institutional beneficiaries of Action 1 (EMMC and EMJD) align their interests with the core objectives of the programme.


Figure 7 Matching of interest of institutional beneficiaries: with core objectives of Erasmus Mundus programme, action with 1 – “How important are the following issues in your institution?”



Source: MTE 2012, p.19

Similarly, the table below suggests that the same is true for individual beneficiaries (students, scholars and academic staff)

Figure 8 Matching of interest of beneficiaries: with core objectives of Erasmus Mundus programme, action with 2 – “How important are the following issues for you?”




Source: MTE 2012, p.18

About 80-90% of respondents understand the core objectives of the EM programme to be either very or rather important.

7.1.5 Indicator 715: Evidence of functioning dialogue mechanisms on strategy between the EU, sub-regional partners and partner governments

Of the 13 Delegations surveyed for this evaluation, only four stated that there were functioning dialogue mechanisms in place between the EU and the respective national government regarding the design and implementation of the regional strategy. In these four cases the existing dialogues covered most areas of the strategy, particularly regarding EU-ASEAN dialogues on regional economic integration and in selected areas of non-economic integration (environment, disaster preparedness, and human and animal health). However, not all Delegations were entirely positive about strategy dialogues with ASEAN. Furthermore, five Delegations confirmed that no dialogue with national partners on the regional strategy had taken place.

Figure 9 EUD survey results: Dialogue mechanisms between EU and the government of the EUD country



Source: EUD survey

Officials in both EU Delegations visited in Thailand and Myanmar were pessimistic on the prospects for ASEAN, a consensus-based organisation, playing a strong role in promoting dialogue on the problems of uprooted people, because national interests differ. This was reinforced by interviews with Government officials in Thailand, who saw only rather limited opportunity for coordinated regional response in the area of refugees and hence limited reason for dialogue. EU officials in both Myanmar and Thailand noted the paradox that, while *Aid to Uprooted People* is under the EU regional programme, there is no EC-ASEAN co-operation in the area of refugees. An official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Thailand attributed the fact that there is no real ASEAN dialogue on uprooted people to the fact that few member states are signatories to the Refugee Convention. There is, in his view, slightly more room for dialogue in the area of labour migration, but this was not confirmed in a subsequent interview with the unit of the Ministry of the Interior responsible for the camps.

On the other hand, in both Thailand and Myanmar problems associated with uprooting, refugees, and other distress movement were the subject of frequent discussions between the EU and Government.


In the field of HE, desk or fieldwork data provides no indication of strategic policy dialogues on HE policy. On the contrary, not only do the AFs point to the need for more policy dialogue, interviews with institutional beneficiaries of *TEIN* suggest that there is need for a HE policy dialogue about the use of the *TEIN* network for, most prominently, regional e-learning initiatives such as the ASEAN Cyber University (ACU). At present, administrative and legal barriers at national and HEI level may unduly slow and divert the development of e-learning content in particular and effective HE applications for *TEIN* in general (field mission interviews, August 2013).

7.2 JC 72: Degree to which regional level strategies are coherent with the overall EU policy and implementation framework.

7.2.1 Indicator 721: Coherence of RSP with thematic programmes under DCI

The general finding is that there is no evidence for any incoherence between the RSP and thematic programmes under DCI. Based on the survey of the Delegations the evaluation concludes that the coherence is most explicit demonstrated in the field of environment. FLEGT is coherent with some projects supported under the ENRTP. The same applies to SWITCH-Asia which has similar overall objective in the sustainable use of natural resources and energy and in response to climate change agenda as ENRTP.

Figure 10 EUD survey results: Coherence between regional strategy and DCI instruments



Source: EUD survey

Generally, however, most Delegations stated that there was no direct connection between calls for proposals on DCI thematic lines, which are demand driven, and the regional strategy.

At the same time explicit evidence for coherence is hard to come by in view of the broad approach of the Regulation.

The primary and overarching objective of co-operation under DCI is the eradication of poverty in partner countries and regions in the context of sustainable development, including pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), as well as the promotion of democracy, good governance and respect for human rights and for the rule of law. The interpretation of this objective in the thematic programmes is very widely cast; it embraces health, education, gender equality, employment and social cohesion, culture and youth and children. In the geographic programmes, and specifically with respect to Asia, it also covers the encouragement of greater regional integration and co-operation through support to different processes of regional integration and dialogue (Article 7 c). Thus despite the fact that the primary object of the Regulation is the alleviation of poverty, the factors influencing poverty are perceived as being so varied, extending from local factors to regional to international factors, that it allows for the broadening of the scope of issues that can be addressed within DCI. Against this backdrop, the MTE of the ASEM DF concludes, “*There is little difficulty in arguing that the initiatives of the ASEM Dialogue Facility can be located fairly within the scope of the regulation*” (p. 7). The same applies to other regional-level interventions under the RSP.

Yet, the MTR of the RSP makes only passing reference to cross-links with thematic programmes: “*A sizeable amount of funds has been invested in activities developed by (I)NGOs and other stakeholders for the thematic programmes such as NSA, EIDHR, SWITCH, etc.*” (p. 15) and “*Additional means of co-operation run through thematic programmes such as NSA and EIDHR, which benefitted the non-state actors and local partners, as well as a funds made available under the Instrument for Stability*” (p. 20). Note that EIDHR as a financing instrument is classified as ‘thematic instrument’.

The MTR generally concludes, in line with DCI, “*the Commission’s development strategy for the region aims at eradicating poverty by supporting broad-based sustainable economic growth, promoting an environment and conditions conducive to trade and integration within the region, enhancing governance, increasing political and social stability, and contributing to achievement of the 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Tackling poverty, climate change, weapons proliferation, drugs and other global issues will, however, also depend critically on forging effective alliances within the region*” (p. 3).

The consecutive *TEIN* programmes and their respective funding sources are an interesting example of internal coherence of EC objectives in the light of the change from ALA to DCI.

Box 17 *Real Coherence of Window Dressing? The example of TEIN*

“There is an important issue in terms of relevance, but it is one that does not directly result from the programme itself, but rather from the shifting emphasis of the EC’s funding instruments.
TEIN2 was financed through the Asia and Latin America (ALA) instrument, which allowed the programmes that it funded to have relatively broad developmental objectives. By the time that TEIN3 came on stream, the only available instrument for funding was the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI), which requires a much tighter focus on poverty reduction, societal benefits and the achievement of the MDGs. The implications of this major shift are immediately apparent from a comparison of the respective programme logframes. The Rationale in its Action Fiche states that ‘TEIN3 will contribute to poverty reduction’ and its overall objective is “to contribute toward the MDG goals’. Yet TEIN3 is essentially the same programme as TEIN2, with a predominant emphasis on ICT hardware, infrastructure and services. This creates an artificial tension, which means that TEIN3 is significantly less relevant to its stated objectives than TEIN2 was, even though it is inherently as good as its predecessor. The evaluation team makes some recommendations on how this conflict might be resolved in a future TEIN4 that placed greater focus on support to, involvement of, and applications for, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in Asia.”

Source: *Evaluation of TEIN2 and TEIN3, Draft Final Report, March 2010, pp, 2-3.*

With regards to the follow-up *TEIN4*, the evaluation claims, “*In keeping with the aims and objectives of the DCI instrument and acknowledging the evolution of TEIN from a largely technical to a more application-based programme, there is less need to focus on the technical (ICT) aspects of the network and more on end-user take-up and applications in TEIN4. It is of course important that TEIN4 remains at the cutting edge of technology and that the links are reviewed and updated on a regular basis, but the outputs of the programme should centre around the applications generated by TEIN and therefore the benefits to the beneficiary countries*” (p. 53).

However, the *TEIN* Action Fiche does not indicate that such a shift has effectively taken place: The principal activities to implement *TEIN4* will be i) the procurement of links from telecommunication service providers to upgrade and extend 3 and ii) network management. The *TEIN4* project will also promote network usage focusing on a broad range of user applications with societal benefits, and develop the human capacities of beneficiary partners, particularly their technical skills. As with the *TEIN2* and *TEIN3* projects, the Action will build and operate a high capacity internet network dedicated for research and education purposes.

There is no doubt about the relevance of *TEIN4*, but very broad interpretations of its objectives are still required to bring the programme in line with DCI and thereby the MDGs. According to the project website (<http://www.teincc.org/teincc/c/about>), “By contributing to ICT development *TEIN* activities and its applications are in line with the 1st goal of the MDGs contributing indirectly or even directly to “Eradicate Extreme Hunger and Poverty”, but may also focus on specific users and applications to contribute to others goals such as No 2 and 6 on Education and Health, 7 on Environmental Sustainability and 8 on Global Partnership for Development.” (emphasis added). *TEIN4* is still essentially a technical programme and even though “80% of co-funding will be maintained throughout *TEIN4* for the least developed countries not yet connected, i.e. Cambodia, Laos and any other new countries that join during *TEIN4*” (*TEIN 4*, Action Fiche, p. 12), it is difficult to see how exactly a *direct* contribution to MDG1 is made.

Given *TEIN4*'s stated explicit focus on Food Security, e.g. developing application for climate-proof rice crops/varieties, under WP2 (<http://www.teincc.org/teincc/c/about/01030000/01030200>) it is rather surprising that *TEIN* is not mentioned in the “*Food Security Thematic Programme, Thematic Strategy Paper (Update) and Multiannual Indicative Programme 2011-2013*” (Document C/2010/9263). If coherence exists, no effort has been made to elaborate on the cross-links.


The vast majority of programme and project documentations and evaluation reports refer only to coherence between and among different regional programmes and/or regional and national-level programmes (for example the evaluations of *ECAP III* and *APRIS II*) but are silent on the interventions' coherence with thematic programmes.

Sometimes links between DCI-financed programmes and the RSP were stronger than appears explicit on a reading of the RSP itself. The 2004 Evaluation of *Aid to Uprooted People* strongly identified the programme as relevant to needs and coherent with the EU's overall strategy, yet the 2005-06 Regional Strategy made no reference to it. Under the Asia Regional Strategy 2007-13, *AUP* serves an important function as the main vehicle to support needed support for LRRD in situations where proper dialogue may be difficult. For example, *AUP* was clearly vital to the 27 October 2009 Council Conclusions and Action Plan on Strengthening EC Action in Afghanistan and Pakistan – although the document did not make a single reference to uprooting or refugees. By contrast, in a different political context, the same document relating to Sri Lanka was heavily concerned with IDPs. Links between *AUP* and the Millennium Development Goals are clear, especially in the provision of basic services in health and education (*AUP* is the main provider in many focused settings) and, through its income generation, livelihoods, and nutrition components, in fighting extreme poverty.

7.2.2 Indicator 722: Coherence of RSP with other financing instruments, particularly EIDHR and IfS

As in the case of the thematic programmes under DCI, there no reason to believe that the RSP has been incoherent with other financing instruments. As one Delegation put it “there is no coherence but there is no conflict either”. Five out of 11 Delegations which answered the survey question related to this indicator stated a high level of coherence between both EIDHR and IfS with the RSP. The remaining Delegations thought that coherence was low or very low or that these instruments were not relevant for their respective countries.

Figure 11 EUD survey results: Coherence between regional strategy and IfS / EIDHR



Source: EUD survey

As the table below shows, the survey of the Delegations provides only a snapshot of views, which are useful but do not lead to a conclusive assessment.

Table 13 Delegation views on the coherence of RSP with EIDHR and IfS

EIDHR	IfS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No linkage between SWITCH projects and EIDHR-funded interventions Some EIDHR actions are coherent with the AUP programme. The regional programme does not focus on these themes for South Asia. The regional programme on resettling Bhutanese refugees is well in line with EIDHR objectives. no coherence but no conflict No coherence and it should not be treated and regional level, as it is a very sensitive and political issue. implementation of EIDHR at both local and global level address issues relevant to regional context. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Actions under the instrument for stability have just been launched at a regional level No linkage between SWITCH projects and IfS-funded interventions Some IfS projects are coherent with the Regional Integration programme. The regional programme does not focus on these themes for South Asia. The regional programme on resettling Bhutanese refugees is well in line with IfS objectives. There is currently no in-country IfS action. There is coherence the area of Disaster Management No coherence but no conflict

Source: EUD survey

Coherence issues are seldom addressed in monitoring and evaluation reports and, in most cases, programme and project documents fail to elaborate on coherence.

Explicit mentioning of coherence between programmes under the RSP with other financing instruments could only be found in the case of the *ASEM Dialogue Facility*: “There are no perceived incompatibilities between the goals being pursued in the ASEM Dialogue Facility and the mission of the DG ECFIN or the EU generally. The most important contribution to EU policy of the ECFIN Facility activities are the enhancement of dialogue at international level, promotion of the euro (international role) and regional integration.” (ASEM DF MTR, p. 27).

If coherence is addressed, it is usually done under synergies. For example, the Action Fiche of the *EU-ASEAN Migration and Border Management Programme* mentions that “other projects supported by thematic budget lines (EIDHR, AENEAS etc...) should be asked to regularly inform the proposed programme management team to ensure synergy.” However, there is no evidence in monitoring and evaluation reports other documents.

Despite the striking similarities in the thematic focal points of EIDHR, READI and the AESEM DF (see Table 2 below), project documentation or progress/evaluation reports of neither READI nor the ASEM DF mention potential coherence with EIDHR. Likewise, the EIDHR Strategy Paper documents do not include any references to regional programmes or ASEAN, SAARC, ASEM and ASEF as regional stakeholders. The list of EIDHR projects suggest that the instrument is purely bilateral in scope (European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) Strategy Paper 2007 – 2010, List of Projects financed under EIDHR 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/documents/contracts_table_2009_for_publication_for_website_en.pdf).

Table 14 Thematic priorities of EIDHR, READI and ASEM Dialogue Facility

EIDHR	READI	ASEM Dialogue Facility
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhancing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in countries and regions where they are most at risk; Strengthening the role of civil society in promoting human rights and democratic reform, in supporting the peaceful conciliation of group interests and in consolidating political participation and representation; Supporting actions in areas covered by EU Guidelines: dialogue on Human 	<p>Crosscutting issues like</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> good economic governance, gender impact sustainable development, good governance, human rights and rule of law <p>“will be elements that will feature in READI technical dialogue and subsequent activities and be incorporated in the activities of the project”</p>	<p>Subjects covered have extended from the initial emphasis on economic co-operation to include</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> human rights rule of law, global health threats, sustainable development, and intercultural and interfaith dialogues;

<p>rights, human rights defenders, the death penalty, torture, children and armed conflicts and violence against women;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supporting and strengthening the international and regional framework for the protection of human rights, justice, the rule of law and the promotion of democracy; • building confidence in and enhancing the reliability and transparency of democratic electoral processes, in particular through monitoring electoral processes. 		
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Source: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/eidhr_en.htm; READI Action Fiche, p. 6; ASEM DF MTE, p. 7)

Most situations involving *uprooted people* have overlap with human rights issues, but AUP has trod lightly in the area. Interventions examined, with the exception of human rights interventions in Afghanistan, were concerned with material quality of life and basic services, not with human rights per se.


The most detailed discussion of coherence is found with regard to *national-level programmes*. However, again, the lines between coherence, synergies and coordination are blurred and no clear picture emerges.

- In *Nepal* (CSE, 2011) synergies were found between bilateral, thematic and regional instruments. Horizontal and regional instruments, also referred to as thematic instruments were important in the overall composition of EC aid to Nepal. Yet, the mix of instruments that was applied in Nepal cannot be fully planned, as is the result of the action of many different actors. The EC funds going to Nepal through bilateral and thematic instruments are complemented by a number of regional co-operation programmes. However, the use of these so-called Asia-wide programmes has been limited. There were some projects in the field of environment (Asia Pro Eco and SWITCH), urban development (Asia-Urbs), but none in Education (Asia-Link). The EAMR Nepal 12/2012 further clarifies, *"the thematic projects under EIDHR and NSA have also contributed to enhance cross cutting issues of development as well as promoting the role of civil society to make co-operation effective."*
- In the case of the *Philippines*, the EAMR 6/2012 notes that *"EIDHR complements the governance portfolio"*.
- In *Thailand* (CSE, 2009), a clear-cut distribution of roles and functions was implemented between instruments, namely bilateral and regional programmes; the latter, less open to national issues and more focused on long-term SE Asia - EU relations, was focused on policy issues, while the former took on board some targeted aspects of their implementation. Budget lines were more solicited for sensitive issues along the lines of governance, gender, and other cross-cutting issues, as well as humanitarian issues. In the field of Higher education, EU support made good use of existing regional and global instruments to create a useful framework for cooperative and policy-relevant partnerships between Thai and European HEIs. Aid to Uprooted people was financed under the regional programme but, as an official interviewed put it, this appeared to be as much a matter of accounting convenience as a strategic choice.
- An interesting point is made with regard to *Malaysia* (CSE, 2009) where it is suggested that achieving coherence is not necessarily always based on a strategic approach: *"given the lack of coordination of predominantly regional instruments at national level in Malaysia, it is questionable whether the actual combination of instruments, approaches and financing modalities was the outcome of a strategic process. While almost all projects did achieve stated aims (some mutual understanding, transfer of European best practices and technology, insights in governance agenda, etc.), there is evidence to suggest that programmes did not manage to address intended goals adequately."*

7.2.3 Indicator 723: Consistency between EU development co-operation with Asian partners and other EU policies (e.g. in the area of environment, trade and health)

Regional-level EU support is generally characterised by a high level of coherence with EU policies. The majority of EU Delegations considered the degree of coherence between regional programmes under the RSP and EU policies in the areas of environment, trade and health to be high or very high.

Figure 12 EUD survey results: Coherence between regional-level EU support and other EU policies within the EUD country



Source: EUD survey

7.2.3.1 Trade

The design of the EU Trade related assistance (TRA) for ASEAN is coherent with the Commission's TRA objectives and key development and trade-related policies (TRA Evaluation, Vol. 2, 2013 and stakeholder interviews in Jakarta). In more specific terms, concerning the EU's support for trade integration the scope of activities has had a specific focus on regulatory issues and improvements of the customs and standards agencies supported by a few designated EC DGs (TRADE, TAXUD, ENTR, SANCO). *READI* aims at emulating this experience in the non-trade related sector by similarly focusing on regulatory and institutional issues and capacity building and drawing on support from designated sectoral EU institutions and European centres of expertise (*READI* Action Fiche). Both EU and ASEAN stakeholders stated in interviews that the separation of TRA (via *ARISE*) from non-trade matters (via *READI*) in the EU's support to ASEAN, had been positive and resulted not only in a more efficient and effective implementation of projects but also in stronger coherence between the EU-ASEAN co-operation programme and EU policies in trade and non-trade areas respectively.

7.2.3.2 Environment

The most detailed evidence is available for the environment sector.

The main regional environmental programme is *SWITCH-Asia*. *SWITCH-Asia* promotes the uptake of Sustainable Consumption and Production (SCP) practices and policies and is strongly supported by EU and MS policies. Most MS have SCP or resource-efficiency programmes that fit into EU strategies and policies. Resource efficiency is now a key priority for policymakers across Europe (European Environmental Agency (EEA) Survey on Resource Efficiency and Country Profiles of 2011). Below the concept and approach of SCP and the EU strategy and policy is elaborated. Firstly, a short background on its historic origin is provided.

Definitions and historic background. SCP dates back to 1994 and was defined as: "The use of services and related products, which respond to basic needs and bring a better quality of life while minimizing the use of natural resources and toxic materials as well as the emissions of waste and pollutants over the life cycle of service or product so as not to jeopardise the needs of future generations" (Ref: Norwegian Ministry of Environment, Oslo Symposium, 1994). SCP typically evolved from attention to cleaner production to green production technology to also include consumption, as it was realized that consumers are a major driver of resource use and associated environmental impacts. In operational terms SCP represents the practical, proactive means to realize Sustainable Development. It includes a broad range of technical and policy oriented instruments as well as information activities. SCP is an integrated approach, which aims to combine environmental improvement, social progress and green economic growth.

SCP networks, such as the European Topic Centre on Sustainable Consumption and Production, Eionet, the regional Round tables on SCP and literature typically evolves from the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, 2002). SCP has received strong support from the UN community (Marrakech Process) and was successfully promoted world-wide by institutions such as UNEP, and later by the EU, notably by its *SWITCH-Asia programme*. The definition is provided in the Box below.

Box 18 SCP Description of Sustainable Consumption and Production of EU SWITCH-Asia programme

Sustainable Consumption and Production is an attempt to reconcile the increased demand for goods and services that respond to basic needs and bring a better quality of life, while minimizing the use of natural resources, toxic materials and emissions of waste and pollutants over the life cycle, in order not to jeopardize the needs of future generations. Materials, Water and Energy are the three key elements. Sustainable Production concerns the supply side, focusing on the economic, social and environmental impacts of production processes while Sustainable Consumption addresses the demand side, focusing on consumers' behaviour and choices in use of goods and services, i.e. demand for products that are environmentally friendly both in their production and in their use, as well as by promoting a sensible consumption behaviour, avoiding spillage and waste.

Source: *SWITCH-Asia Brochure*, 2010.

SCP in EU strategies and policies. The Sixth Environment Action Programme of the European Community (6th EAP) identified the environmental goals for the period 2002-2012 and mandated seven thematic strategies relating to air, waste prevention and recycling, the marine environment, soil, pesticides, natural resources and the urban environment.

SCP was accorded full political recognition in 2006 in the EU Sustainable Development Strategy. The EU Sustainable Consumption and Production and Sustainable Industrial Policy (SCP/SIP) Action Plan (COM (2008) 397/3) is the major overarching SCP policy document at the EU level. It builds on the European Commission's 2003 Integrated Product Policy, which focused on minimizing the environmental impact of products by examining their life cycles and taking action wherever it can be most effective. The Integrated Product Policy uses both mandatory and voluntary tools, including "economic instruments, substance bans, voluntary agreements, environmental labelling and product design guidelines" (European Commission, 2010) while favouring market-driven approaches that take account of concerns over competitiveness. The Action Plan (AP) contains a diverse mix of instruments and activities with the feature that unites them being that they all relate to making production and consumption more sustainable, while ensuring the competitiveness of the European economy. The AP does not have a specific budget line. Rather funding for the various instruments and activities originate from a diverse range of Commission sources, across a number of Directorate-Generals (Environment, Energy, Enterprise and Health and Consumer Policy). The AP is essentially an umbrella programme, guiding the extension and development of other Directives and legislation, e.g. the Ecodesign Directive, Energy Labelling Directive and the Ecolabel Regulation, as well as overarching or setting up other voluntary and regulatory instruments, such as efforts to green public procurement and promoting the environmental technology sector²⁶.

SCP action at the EU level also relies and builds on regulatory frameworks such as the REACH regulation on chemicals and their safe use, the Energy Efficiency in Buildings Directive and the revised Eco-Design Directive for Energy-Using Products. Whereas the original 2005 Directive covered only products that used energy directly, the revised Directive 2009/125/EC applies to any product that "has an impact on energy consumption during use," thereby covering such things as insulation materials, windows, and taps and shower heads.

Stronger and more far-reaching ecolabelling and energy labelling, under the EU Ecolabel regulation were completed in 2009 (EC Regulation (EC) 66/2010) and the Energy Label Directive 2010/30/EU. The new EU Ecolabel regulation will include 40 to 50 product groups by 2015. It has a faster process for developing criteria and a simplified assessment procedure. Annual fees are reduced and there is more harmonization with other national and global ecolabelling initiatives.

The policy objective of the Communication on Public Procurement for a Better Environment (COM(2008) 400/2) is raising the average level of EU Green Public Procurement (GPP) to the standard achieved by the best performing member states in 2006 by 2010. Operational objectives include establishing a process for setting common GPP criteria in 10 priority sectors, providing information on the lifecycle costing of products, providing legal and operational guidance, and monitoring progress in terms of the percentage of public tenders that are green, aiming to reach 50 per cent by 2010. As of

²⁶ Ecorys, September, 2011.

October 2011, the European Commission had developed EU GPP criteria for 18 product and service groups.

The EU designated resource efficiency as one of seven flagship initiatives in its Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (European Commission, 2010).

The need for SCP in Asia is equally or even more important than in Europe: Asia is fast becoming the world's main manufacturing region and has an estimated thirty million small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) making up about 80% of industry. Many of these rely on out-of-date, inefficient and polluting technologies, which damage the natural environment and compound the problems of the poor by affecting their health and livelihoods. Middle-income consumers are often unwittingly, fuelling the situation with ever-growing demands. Consequently, a switch from unsustainable to sustainable patterns of production and consumption is needed to decouple economic growth from environmental degradation (SWITCH-Asia Brochure, 2010).

The progress of EU Sustainable Development Strategy was reviewed twice, in October 2007 and July 2009. Both documents arrived at the same conclusion: there have been significant policy improvements and SD remains a central objective of the EU; however, in relation to SCP, unsustainable patterns persist and policy needs to be translated into concrete action. Not surprisingly, the same situation applies for Asia.

The second regional environmental intervention is *FLEGT-Asia*. The programme directly facilitates the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan. The issues and synthesis of the FLEGT Action Plan is reviewed below (Action Fiche FLEGT-Asia, 2009). The programme is, therefore strongly supported by EU policies.

The EU developed and adopted an Action Plan on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) in May 2003. The FLEGT Action Plan proposes measures to increase the capacity of developing and emerging market countries to control illegal logging, while reducing trade in illegal timber products between these countries and the EU. The Action Plan introduces support for improved governance in timber producing countries, and a licensing scheme to ensure only legal timber enters the EU. Council Regulation No 2173/2005 of December 2005 builds on the FLEGT Action Plan and provides for the establishment of a licensing scheme for imports of timber into the European Community through Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPA) with timber producing countries. The development and negotiation of partnership agreements for FLEGT licensing is on-going. In 2010, the European Union created new legislation to ban illegal wood from being placed on the EU market. The "EU Timber Regulation (EUTR²⁷)" prohibits placing illegally harvested and produced timber products on the EU market, requiring operators to practice due diligence to minimise risk. It also has provisions to facilitate traceability of wood products within the EU back to their first placing on the EU market. The Regulation has been applied from 3 March 2013 onward, even though no FLEGT licenses have yet been awarded. The EUTR affects timber trade of all 27 EU Member States. It covers most wood products, including pulp and paper, and requires operators to have systems in place that assure that the timber is from legal origin – or face sanctions. The EUTR is a response to demands from a number of EU Member States and various stakeholder groups to prohibit the sale of illegal timber in the EU and to concerns of FLEGT partner countries to have a level playing field for timber trade with the EU.

7.2.3.3 Higher Education

The evaluators of the EM MTE discovered a high degree of congruence between the EM and other EU policy interventions in Higher Education. However, whether the *EM programme* resonates and harmonises with the goals of development policy is unclear (MTE 2012, p. 18). The central question here is whether academic mobility programmes divert human resources from development efforts in the particular country (so-called brain drain). In interviews conducted for the MTE as well as for the fieldwork phase, policy-makers, beneficiaries and stakeholders were sceptical of the claim that brain-drain is a problem in Asia. The migration of academic competence results from the interplay of macro-level push and pull factors, meso-level disciplinary and institutional conditions and, not least, micro-level personal circumstances. Asian HE actors remarked that some brain-drain, particularly of the brightest students to the best HEIs, is unavoidable (field mission interview in August 2013). In any case, Asian institutional beneficiaries interviewed during the field-phase agree that the EM programme did not unduly contribute to the pull factor (the push factor incidentally being a highly sensitive political issue in some Asian countries). This finding, however, must be weighed against the survey data gathered for the EM

²⁷ Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market

MTE that reports of just over half of the respondents believing that a programme like EM diverts human capital away from a developing country as opposed to just under half that disagree with that statement. Notwithstanding, Asian HE actors interviewed during fieldwork pointed out that measures implemented by the programme and individual project consortia effectively prevented “brain-drain” and promoted “brain-circulation” (i.e. joint supervision of students, employment programmes in the country of origin, etc.).

7.2.3.4 Health

EU global health policy contains two overlapping dimensions. The first is the MDG-related fight against diseases of poverty, with specific focus on improving maternal, new-born and child health, fighting infant and child mortality, reducing the toll of diarrhoeal disease by the provision of clean water and basic sanitation, and the fight against the three focus diseases HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. All Asia regional health programmes have been consistent with these goals, as have bilateral health programmes and the contributions of thematic programmes. The second main dimension of EU health policy, a response to developments in infectious disease over the last fifteen years, is the promotion of cross border human and animal health and the strengthening of regional capacity to detect and react to emergent infectious diseases. The Asia Regional Strategy 2007-2013 has made a leading contribution in these areas, for example, through the Avian Influenza trust fund. Less broadly appreciated, but worthy of being singled out, is the coherence between the regional avian and pandemic influenza policy and the very large framework research programme, which has supported not only new advances in basic research but also applied research to extend the availability of vaccines. At least along the Thai-Myanmar border, the EU has actively funded a range of cross-border activities implemented by the WHO, including the fight against drug-resistant malaria and health problems associated with the large uprooted population in the area.

7.2.3.5 Uprooted people

AUP support was entirely consistent with the EU’s overall poverty and vulnerability focus and with sector policies in health and environment, gender, etc. However, one striking lack can be cited. Related to uprooted people is the issue of labour migration. Not all labour migration involves uprooting, of course, but many uprooted persons come to rely on labour migration as a response strategy. While the EU regional programme is deeply involved in regional economic integration, integration of labour markets appears to be an area in which national interests hold sway and possibilities for reform are limited. This was clearly the case on the Thai-Myanmar border where *AUP*, while providing a large amount of support, is more or less barred from contributing meaningfully to promoting realistic labour market policies along what is effectively a porous border. This can lead to inconsistencies – for example, high performing vocational training programmes in the camps on the one hand producing young people with marketable technical skills, while at the same time official policy is that they are expected to return to agricultural areas across the border which many have not even seen. There is some leeway for bilateral and regional political dialogue on labour migration policy, but it appears to be limited and, perhaps, underutilised.

8 EQ8 on added value of the regional approach

EQ8: To what extent did the EU regional-level support add value to - and complement – its own bilateral co-operation and support of EU Member States?

8.1 JC 81: Regional-level interventions in the various sectors are designed and implemented so as to maximise the value added stemming from a regional approach

8.1.1 Indicator 811: Programming documents refer to a value added of regional approaches both at the overall level and with reference to specific sectors of the intervention

The EU uses the term “*Value added*” mainly as an evaluation criterion²⁸. It is not often used in programming documents. However, it is nevertheless possible to assess as to what extent the concept of value added, as defined above, has been taken into account.

²⁸ http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation/methodology/methods/mth_ccr_en.htm

Regional-level programmes (for example *APRIS*, *ECAP* or *TEIN*) seem to take the regional approach for granted and do not usually elaborate on the specific advantages, benefits and value added of a regional versus a national focus. Some programme documents implicitly suggest that the regional approach is the most efficient and effective one, particularly in cases when a regional organisation, such as ASEAN, is the partner; but no explicit references to the specific value added of the regional approach are made. The *ECAP III* Identification Fiche provides an example in this regard: “*The added value of an EU co-funded initiative is in the sharing of the EU’s experiences in harmonizing diverse national laws and regulations, which was necessary for the creation of the Single Market. ASEAN is highly interested in benefiting from the lessons learnt in the EU and to study the feasibility of applying these to their own integration process. The new project will be an accompanying measure to sectors.*”

AUP is a good example for the way the EU struggles to provide clear analysis of the comparative advantages of regional approaches. *AUP*, in a sense, is neither fish nor fowl as it consists of country-level interventions that are implemented under a regional strategy financed by DCI.

One EU Delegation official interviewed, was of the view that the only reason *AUP* was put under the regional programme, was that it had to find a home somewhere. As discussed at other places, in Southeast Asia it has proven impossible to develop a regional political dialogue of refugees and related problems of uprooting. Even bilateral talks, as between Thailand and Myanmar, are difficult. However, the RSP 2007-13, in its Annex 23 describing the problems addressed very sensibly does not proceed country by country but rather nexus by nexus: i.e. “The Afghan Crisis” is analysed at the level of Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran and “The Burmese Crisis” is analysed at the level of Burma / Myanmar-Thailand-Bangladesh. Where there is no cross-border dimension, as in Sri Lanka or the Philippines, of course, the analysis is country-specific. Section 4.3 of the RSP explicitly identifies the need for a regional approach. Perhaps strangely, Section 4.2 on co-operation in animal and human health alludes to the regional nature of the problem but does not take the next logical step of stating that the regional dimension calls for a regional response. Despite this, the regional health programme as actually implemented has clearly recognised the value added by a multi-country approach.

Lack of elaboration on the value added of regional approaches in programme documents does not imply the factual absence of such value added. In fact, the benefits of a regional approach are often not difficult to identify but some reconstruction of the intervention logic is required to make them visible.

While the documents for regional programmes are usually silent on the comparative value of the regional of intervention, the country strategies do not engage in this discussion either.

There is not any explicit discussion of the added value of a regional approach in any of the CSP, neither at overall level nor at the level of a specific sector. When CSPs discuss issues which are going to be addressed by regional (or thematic, for that matter) programmes, the funding source is stated matter of fact (e.g. *Erasmus Mundus* for higher education, cf. 2.1.5.3). Regional programmes are presented simply as additional funding source and not as a qualitatively different approach.

The CSP for Afghanistan which explicitly states the need for a regional approach to the co-operation, is an exception in this regard: “*Co-operation with Afghanistan’s neighbours will be critical in order to fulfil the development and state-building objectives [...]. One of the major examples of the need for regional co-operation is in the area of counter-narcotics. But regional economic co-operation will also be a key element in overall economic development. By way of example, the EC could support closer co-operation on issues of transit trade, regional economic infrastructure, migration, environment and natural resource management.*” (Afghanistan CSP, p.26)

Furthermore, the MTR for Afghanistan is the only one to explicitly refer to a regional forum for the co-ordination of bilateral and regional interventions, not limited to the EU, but also to other donors. “*The EU will concentrate on taking forward proposals from various regional forums, in particular the Regional Economic Co-operation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA), which held its third meeting in Islamabad in May 2009. Many problems in the area, in particular for landlocked Afghanistan, can only be addressed usefully at regional level, for example trade, transport and transit. Particular attention will therefore be paid to contributing to the general agenda for regional co-operation, more particularly in the areas of customs and border management, and to improving Afghan government capacity to address regional issues, including support for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to follow up on RECCA commitments.*” (MTR p.26)

The MTR are more likely to refer to specific regional and thematic programmes, but do not mention all which are implemented in the respective country. For example, the only regional programme, the Vietnam MTR refers to is *ECAP III* on intellectual property. In the MTR for Mongolia, there are only general statements on the existence and results of regional programmes (“*In addition to the two on-going*

bilateral programmes, there are a number of thematic and regional projects on-going in the social sectors (education, health), rural development, and trade and environment related aspects.” (Mongolia MTR, p.10).

The RSP is referred to only in four out of the thirteen MTR. In all but one case, this is done solely as programming reference and financing resource for regional programmes (India, Myanmar, Nepal). For example, the RSP is mentioned in Nepal MTR as complementary financial instrument: “Regional Country Strategy Paper for Asia: providing support for Nepal’s regional integration in South Asia in various sectors.” (Nepal MTR, Section on Indicative Programme 2011-2013, p.15). Similarly, the India MTR states: “The Regional Strategy Paper for Asia (DCI) also providing support for regional integration in South Asia in various sectors.” (India MTR, Indicative Programme for 2011-13, p.13)


The MTR of Bangladesh is the exception in providing a relatively long and detailed reference to the RSP and its rationale. However, this section is not discussing the relation between regional and bilateral programming levels either: “The EU’s Regional Strategy Paper (2007-2013) promotes regional co-operation in the SAARC area, South Asia being one of the least integrated regions in the world. In view of major challenges common to all countries in the area in fields such as climate change, security, uprooted people (Rohingya) and (illegal) migration, the EU will continue to support, to the extent possible, regional co-operation in both South and South-East Asia.” (MTR Bangladesh, p.8)

8.1.2 Indicator 812: Evidence that the regional level was the most appropriate level of intervention, overall and with reference to specific sectors of intervention.

In several cases, the appropriateness of intervening at the regional level is self-evident. Programmes in support of regional economic integration, for example, by definition and default have to operate at the regional level. The more important question in this regard is: has there been a good link between the regional approach and related intervention at the national level? This aspect is addressed under JC 82.

The survey of the Delegations shows that regional-level co-operation is most commonly managed in the area of environment, energy and climate change. 11 out of 13 Delegations were involved in the management or supervision of regional programmes in this field.


Figure 13 EUD survey results: Thematic area(s) in which EUDs manage and supervise the implementation of regional programmes



Source: EUD Survey

Eight Delegations rated the importance of region-level interventions within the respective Delegation's co-operation portfolio as very high or high whereas five thought that the importance of regional programmes as compared to bilateral programmes was low or very low.

Figure 14 EUD survey results: Importance given to regional programmes within the Delegation, compared to programmes implemented under the country strategy



Source: EUD Survey

While some programmes obviously call for a regional approach because they directly address regional issues – most prominently programmes in support of regional economic integration - an assessment of the appropriateness of regional-level interventions is most relevant for programmes that could potentially operate either as regional or national interventions. *FLEGT-Asia* is a case in point.

FLEGT-Asia responds to (i) an increasing need of target groups (timber export and timber-processing companies and governments to comply with requirements imposed by the new EU Timber Regulation (2010) that came into force March 1, 2013 and (ii) to similar policies in other main consumer markets (USA, Australia). The 'fit' with country strategies (CSPs) varies; in most, forestry is not a focal sector but *FLEGT* activities have ample linkages with sectors such as sustainable development, good governance or trade and economic development.

An effort is made to ensure *FLEGT-Asia* is not seen as a project (though in fact it is) but as a region-led process that *FLEGT-Asia* supports and facilitates. This is a challenge, as processes often do not move as fast as one would want, but it is resulting in a high sense of ownership. The action is well integrated into regional processes and institutions, in particular *FLEGT* work of the ASEAN Working Group on a Pan ASEAN Timber Certification Initiative, where *FLEGT Asia* provides the much needed support for capacity building. The EU is itself a major stakeholder (beneficiary) in these processes as they will help to create the supply of verified legal timber to EU markets.

FLEGT-Asia's main 'added value' as a regional programme is to learn and disseminate lessons from VPA processes, as well as from 'other pathways to good forest governance', to the benefit of overall governance of forests in the Asian region. The component to build capacity in customs has a strong regional component and needs strengthening and collaboration with the ASEAN secretariat.

Based on findings during the desk and field phase there is evidence of the HE interventions at regional level added considerable value. Although the EM programme is a global programme managed centrally from Europe, it contains a strong regional dimension that is highly valued by Asian HE actors. In particular, Asian beneficiaries point to the European regional dimension as a considerable value-added of the EM programme. The European dimension not only provides a access to wider scope of European HE resources, cultural and linguistic experiences and HE governance practices, it also opens up for Asian HEIs a wider field of potential research collaborators. Moreover, the EM programme has also enabled network building and deepening within Asia itself. The *TEIN* programme, in turn, is by its very nature regional or, more-precisely *inter-regional*. Evidence for the desk and field-work research indicate that the programme has successfully created the data infrastructure for the

provision of regional HE products, most prominently e-learning contents through the ASEAN Cyber University project. Data also suggest that administrative, legal and policy-making barriers at national or HEI level will need to be addressed within the context of regional strategic HE objectives.

In the area of *uprooted people*, interventions are by nature country-specific; however, the entire programme as implemented under the RSP has been explicitly cross-border in spirit where needed. Analysis of problems (in Action Fiches, for example) explicitly takes into account regional nexuses, for example, Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran and Burma-Thailand. While formal coordination and co-operation across borders is impossible in the strict sense, good informal coordination and complementarity have been observed. This was especially true in Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran, where the explicit aim of the overall basket of interventions, to promote voluntary return, required multiple coordinated interventions: improving returnees' conditions of life once they returned to Afghanistan, regularising and improving the treatment of refugees and undocumented uprooted people in host countries, disseminating information, etc. Sometimes difficulties were encountered, for example, under Afghan law, UNHCR has a hard time assisting returnees in Afghanistan because they are not legally refugees. In general, however, means of at least contributing to progress towards durable solution were found. The closed nature of Myanmar until recently limited the extent of time over which cross-border approaches would have been possible, and these still appear to be in their infancy. Policy dialogue with Thai authorities on obtaining national health cards for Burmese in an irregular situation is one example where, explicitly or not, the cross-border element has been incorporated. Some informal cross-border coordination is embedded in the fact that the same NGOs are implementing EU-funded interventions on both sides of the border. It should also be remembered that implementing partners are obviously in close touch with beneficiaries who cross the border frequently in order to assess the situation regarding return. Everyone interviewed, EU officials, Government officials, and NGO staff, emphasised the importance of carefully coordinating the hoped-for eventual winding down of assistance to the camps in the context of return. In general, the broader cross-border aspects of the refugee situation, such as the integrated Thai-Myanmar labour market, have not been very effectively taken into account, in part because the subject is not one which the Thai government desires to pursue. This is in contrast to the case of Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran, where strategy made it clear that, while there is a serious problem of refugees left stranded in camps, far more cross-border flows now consist of economic migrants (albeit often compelled by adverse circumstances).

In the area of *health*, the EU's regional-level support for cross-border animal and human health has recognised two crucial dimensions of emergent infectious disease: that it is veterinary, as well as human health systems which must be strengthened, and that cross-border co-operation is needed with special attention to the weakest links in the chain. Pandemic and avian influenza, as well as the emergence and transmission of novel viruses such as SARS, are classic global public good problems and the EU, as a supranational organisation, was uniquely suited to respond to them. To briefly allude to the familiar economic argument, national authorities will provide a less-than optimal response because of the temptation to free-ride on the efforts of others. The regional dimension in large part arises because of cross-border flows of people and, more important, animals. Somewhat less evident is the regional rationale for One Health, which is essentially an approach to health systems strengthening project in multiple countries.

8.1.3 Indicator 813: Evidence at implementation level overall and with reference to specific sectors of intervention (for selected programmes / projects) that anticipated value added has been reaped from the implementation at regional level

The evaluation did not find a "smoking gun" or, with the only exception of AUP, where evidence is nevertheless very thin. In AUP, the only case in which projects and programmes explicitly refer to the value of the regional (sub-regional, actually) nature of the response is Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran. Both at high strategic level (the RSP) and at lower level (Action Fiches, Project Descriptions), discussions explicitly refer to the fact that the overall goal of promoting safe voluntary return calls for coordinated interventions in the three countries. A small but telling example is the production of documentary films on improved living conditions in Afghanistan which were then disseminated in Iran. Documents also refer to the importance of improving the legal situation of Afghans in Pakistan as a prerequisite for moving towards durable return solutions. Policy dialogue between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan was encouraged.

This cross-border dimension is mostly lacking in strategic documents referring to the Myanmar crisis. The Thai government remains adamant that the long-term solution is return. As stakeholder interviews suggested, authorities do not wish to commit the same sorts of mistakes that were made in the repatriation of Hmong refugees in the south (back to Laos), a process that was broadly perceived as hasty.

No one, it is claimed, will be forced to return before ready. At the same time, there have been few realistic discussions concerning the fact that many current camp residents will not wish to return. In documents concerning Sri Lanka, not surprising, there was no sense of the value added of a regional approach.

8.2 JC 82: Regional-level EU interventions complement and add value to the EU interventions carried out at the bilateral level

8.2.1 Indicator 821: References to synergies and cross-references between regional and bilateral programming levels are present in strategic and programming documents

Such references, which are often made only in passing, could be found in a small number of cases:

- AUP: The presence or absence of references to in CSPs has been discussed under EQ 7. In general, such discussions are brief and in passing. Similarly, the RSP 2007-13 and lower-level strategic documents such as Action Fiches and Project Descriptions usually make no reference at all to bilateral co-operation programmes although they do identify complementary actions.
- TRA, ASEAN: The TRA evaluation finds a gap between the programming and strategies at regional and national levels in most regions but explicitly mentions ASEAN as a main exception. *“At programming level, regional and national programmes and projects are coherent.”* (TRA Evaluation, 2013, vol 1, p. 29).
- ECAP III: The Action Fiche elaborates on the “opportunity for the EC to make better linkages between its various regional and bilateral co-operation programmes on IP with ASEAN and with other donors’ initiatives” Several examples are given:

Box 19 *Potential linkages between ECAP III and Bilateral Programmes*

- In Cambodia, a new national trade capacity building programme with the World Bank, including an IP component is under preparation. The EC is contributing €7.5m. ECAP III will coordinate with it avoiding duplication.
- In Indonesia, a second phase of Trade Support Programme will likely start in 2009 for three years. ECAP III will coordinate with them through the Indonesia IP Office and other stakeholders.
- In Lao PDR, a Trade Facilitation Trust Fund has been set up, through which the EC, together with the World Bank and AusAid, will support, from 2008, the Government of Lao PDR’s effort to improve trade facilitation and to enhance capacity in related fields such as customs. The EC contribution is EUR 4.7 million. ECAP III will coordinate with it avoiding duplication.
- In the Philippines, The EU-RP TRTA is a EUR 3.92 million two-year programme, the programme will help the Philippines to participate fully in regional economic integration. ECAP III will coordinate with them, especially under the component “WTO Capacity Building” managed by Department of Trade and Industry. The programme intends to assist the Philippines in building an enabling economic environment and enhance the conditions for international trade and investment. And to advance the knowledge and capacity of stakeholders in dealing with WTO and other international trade related issues.
- In Vietnam, the MUTRAP programme has supported Vietnam’s international economic integration process over the past seven years, with a Preparatory Phase (1998-99), MUTRAP I (2001-03), Extension and Bridging Phases (2003-04) and the present MUTRAP II (2005-08). MUTRAP II component on AGRI-2 has built upon the work done on GIs with a view to prepare the first prospective application for EU registration of the first Vietnamese GI (Nuoc Mam of Phu Quoc are two examples). Furthermore, ETV-2 program on customs has coordinated successfully with ECAP II, with a view to deepen the understanding and strengthening customs IPR enforcement. ECAP III will capitalise on these experiences, making synergies with the programmes.
- In China the EU-China Project on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR II), which commenced in September 2007, will be thoroughly examined as a potential cooperative partner for ECAP III. An exchange of experts might also be envisaged.

Source: ECAP III Action Fiche

There is no explicit reference to the RSP – and hence to potential synergies between regional and national-level interventions in any country strategy. This is probably due to parallel drafting period of RSP

and CSP. The CSP for Mongolia for example was finalised end of February 2007, most of the others by April-June 2007 the latest. The RSP was finalised (1st Revision) by 31 May 2007, i.e. after the completion of the CSP. Even in the sections dedicated to “objectives of the EU as laid down in other applicable documents” (generally available in the Annex) the RSP is not mentioned at all. The latest document on EU-Asia relations mentioned in these sections is the EU-Asia communication of 2001 and the “*New Partnership with South-East Asia*” communication of 2003.

In the CSP main section on the EU response strategy, there is generally little to no references to regional programmes beyond limited standard phrases for example on *Erasmus Mundus*. Most CSP contain a section on “Thematic and Regional Programmes” which however focuses mostly on thematic programmes and instruments like EIDHR, NSA in Development, etc.

The CSP of most of the countries mention *Erasmus Mundus* using standard sentences and without further explanation how this relates to the country strategy.

Box 20 Erasmus Mundus in the Country Strategies

“The main objective of higher education co-operation in Asia is to enhance international co-operation capacity of universities in third countries by facilitating transfer of know-how and good practices in the field of student and academic staff mobility. The European Commission will contribute to financing a mobility scheme between European universities holding an Erasmus Charter and third country universities that will complement existing programmes in the field of higher education. [...] Higher education co-operation activities will be funded under the regional programming for Asia.” (Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Philippines, Vietnam)

Shorter variations thereof are used as sole reference to higher education programmes in the CSPs of Afghanistan, Cambodia, Lao and Vietnam.

Even in the case of countries with education as a focal area e.g. Bangladesh, the CSP does not provide details on how EU support to primary, secondary and higher education is interrelated: “Support under this strategy to the primary and secondary education sub-sectors is complemented by the Erasmus Mundus programme, aimed at enhancing the capacity of universities in third countries through the transfer of know-how and good practices from EU university partners.” (CSP Bangladesh p.16)

The CSP for China, India, Indonesia and, to a lesser extend Pakistan, where higher education is a (element of the) focal sector, provide more detail. They refer to specific outputs of previous programming periods and the interest of the partner governments in increasing co-operation in this regard.

In general, the country strategies seem to adhere to the clear division of labour regarding higher education between bilateral and regional level targeting this sector by the regional Erasmus Mundus programme. Only in the India CSP a bilateral intervention in the sector of higher education is suggested mentioned (“It is proposed that European Study Centres and Centres for Contemporary Indian Studies would be created in India and the EU (p.16). In the case of China, the EU engages in policy dialogue on higher education. The MTR for Thailand also mentions the complementarity of Policy Dialogue and the Erasmus Mundus Programme.

Source: *Particip, CSP Analysis*

However, synergies between regional and bilateral co-operation programmes are assessed in several country strategy evaluations.

Table 15 Examples of synergies between regional and bilateral co-operation programmes

Malaysia	The EU did not succeed in achieving a strategic response through Regional programmes in Malaysia. Horizontal and vertical dialogue processes are not tightly integrated. Horizontal and thematic dialogue processes in specific policy communities are linked to regional activities through the reliance on regional policy instruments (such as Asia ProEco, the EAEF, etc.). However, the integration and coordination of these thematic dialogue processes at national level has been conspicuous in its absence. For this reason, synergies between regional, national and thematic level have not been fully exploited. A good exception is the environmental sector, having both SCP grant projects and a national SCP Policy Support Programme, the potential for synergy is being explored (Field Work). Synergy was also found in the forestry sector, i.e. the SWITCH-Asia grant project on community capacity building and timber certification, and FLEGT- Facility operations, i.e. Malaysia is in the process of negotiating a VPA with the EU, which is complementary with the regional peat forest programme funded under ENRTP.
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Philippines	<p>Regional programmes in the Philippines have long benefitted not only from bilateral EU co-operation, but also regional programming. In the period between 1986 and 1999, such aid amounted to approximately €25 million. Most regional programmes are demand-driven, and up until the CSP 2002-2006, the Philippines has participated in programmes covering energy, environment, transport, education and communication technology. Furthermore, the Philippines was associated with EU-Asia horizontal co-operation programmes such as Asia-URBS, Asia-Invest and JEM, the training programme for Junior Managers.</p> <p>The CSP 2007-2013 states that there are 4 Asia-wide programmes and 4 ASEAN programmes that were operational alongside the CSP/NIPs. In terms of projects, there were 19 Asia-wide and 3 ASEAN projects amounting to approximately €15 million in total funds.</p>
Thailand	<p>At programmatic level, the EC has avoided duplication and redundancy by letting regional programmes carry much of the programming and funding weight of environmental policy interventions in Thailand. In particular, the Commission has used the synergies of the EU-ASEAN programmes (COGEN III, EAEF, ARCBC) and the Asia-wide programmes (Asia ProEco, Asia Urbs) to address Thai-specific environmental issues with a global dimension: these have included energy as well as biodiversity issues.</p> <p>Synergies between EC-Thailand thematic, regional and bilateral policy dialogue processes: The environmental policy dialogue between the EC and the RTG has made deft use of synergies at regional and thematic level. In its policy dialogue with the RTG -- in the form of regular Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) – the EC has concentrated in focal priority issues (i.e. trade and investment, public health, peace and security). However, sustainability, environmental and otherwise, suffuses and informs national policy dialogue on economic, health and security issues. Policy dialogue about the environment, then, takes place primarily in the context of the EU-ASEAN policy dialogue. The so-called EU-ASEAN Joint Co-operation Committee (JCC) offers the EU and ASEAN members the institutional space to discuss co-operation on, among other things, the environment.</p>

However in other cases, the country strategy evaluations did not find evidence for synergies. For example, in Nepal “achieving synergies among the manifold components of the EC-Nepal bilateral programme is less of a challenge than the quest for synergies between bilateral and regional instruments. Trade provides a good example in this regard. It is noteworthy that neither project documents nor project evaluation reports normally elaborate on the potential synergies between TRA and EU trade-related worldwide/ regional programmes in any empirically sound and robust way”.

8.2.2 Indicator 822: Formal and/or informal coordination mechanisms are in place to promote complementarities and synergies between regional and national interventions

Some EAMRs elaborate on such coordination mechanisms and tend to provide a positive assessment:

Table 16 Example of coordination mechanisms in EAMRs

ASEAN	<p>Complementarity of ASEAN programmes to the national programmes across the region but also with other Asia wide programmes will increasingly be a key factor for maximum impact. Presently, ARISE, the FTA programme (and the Bangkok managed ECAP III as well as ATTIP) complement the bilateral trade co-operation, specifically TSP II and TCF. READI, as a dialogue instrument covering non-trade related issues is complementary to bilateral climate change interventions and FLEGT and disaster management (MDF, GFDRR) as well as EIDHR (human rights). Future co-operation in statistics/integration monitoring foresees intervention at regional and national level, ensuring full synergy. Future ASEAN co-operation on Higher Education will also be complementary to bilateral programmes as well as global programmes (Erasmus for All). Health: Regional programmes (HPED & AHIF) have higher degree of complementarities with the bilateral INSPA in controlling Avian Flu epidemic, while the GFATM grant for HIV complements with the thematic programme on Adolescent Reproductive Health in Papua (EAMR 12/2012)</p>
Vietnam	<p>Regional and thematic projects are assigned to the Programme Officer in charge of the specific content area to ensure complementarity with the country programme. Yet, it remains challenging for the Delegation to ensure complementarity of instruments therefore the Delegation strongly welcome close involvement in the selection of thematic programmes in order to partially address this issue. Some regional projects in ASEAN are well coordinated and bring direct benefit to Vietnam, notably the regional statistics project and READI (Indonesia EAMR 6/2012)</p> <p>The design of recently launched projects (notably EU MUTRAP and ESRT) reinforces the efforts to support regional integration through the ASEAN projects. Efforts to ensure complementarity represent a challenge where regional and thematic programmes cover areas or sectors outside the scope of national projects (EAMR 12/2012).</p>

Evaluations, however, present a mixed picture. For example the TRA Evaluation, 2013, identifies a lack of coordination of EU interventions that are targeted at regional and national levels respectively. The strengthening of regional economic integration has suffered from this shortcoming, with the logical impact that potential synergies and high effectiveness of the EU's co-operation programmes could not materialise to the extent desirable.

According again to previous evaluation, formal mechanisms to facilitate systematic coordination of *TRA interventions* among the Delegations in the region are either non-existent or insufficient. The current situation is a compartmentalised approach which is characterised by the parallel implementation of:

- a) regional projects with ASEC as the main partner (*APRIS, EASCBP*);
- b) Asia-wide programmes which do not directly involve the ASEC but are implemented by other actors in several ASEAN countries (*Asia Invest, SWITCH, ECAP* etc.);
- c) the national components of projects under a and b; and
- d) major bilateral TRA projects which overlap with the objectives of projects under a, b and c (for example *MUTRAP* in Vietnam and *TRTA* in the Philippines). Some informal or ad hoc exchange takes place in some cases but the lack of a formal approach has resulted in missed opportunities in the creation of synergies and partly duplication of activities (TRA Evaluation, ASEAN Field Mission Report, p. 19).

In Malaysia, the EU Delegation's work on the *environment* has been hampered by the lack of bi-lateral instruments to coordinate and steer environmental policy interventions at the national level. While the flexibility of demand-driven, regional instruments is an advantage, the broad remit of these tools renders them too generic in cases. Synergies between the thematic, regional and national level could not be exploited to the full to provide any sort of strategic answer to climate change (Malaysia CSE, Vol. 1, p. 34). Yet, in Thailand, a clear-cut distribution of roles and functions was implemented between instruments, namely bilateral and regional programmes; the latter, less open to national issues and more focused on long-term Southeast Asia – EU relations, was focused on policy issues, while the former took on board some targeted aspects of their implementation. Budget lines were more solicited for sensitive issues along the lines of governance, gender, and other cross-cutting issues, as well as humanitarian issues. The EU strategy here is based on the combination of bilateral and regional programmes as well as projects supported under specific budget lines. *“This combination proved to be instrumental in achieving EC goals in Thailand, with synergies particularly in environmental advocacy, universal health coverage and refugees issues. Combinations reached less convincing results for the trade and higher education sectors. On trade, international regulations and EU unilateral requirements did not give much weight to projects on contributing but marginally to achieving EC goals”* (CSE, 2009). In Vietnam, in terms of complementarity between regional and national TA/capacity building needs and responses to these needs, Vietnam profited in particular from the *Standards programme* and *ECAP*, the latter of which dealt with Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). (CSE, 2010) However, a different picture has emerged during the field stay. Mainly as the result of lessons-learnt (see also EQ 7), more recent programmes, for example *ARISE* and *READI*, have a much strong focus on coordination between the regional and national level of intervention and project team leaders confirmed that they were in regular contact with both the team leaders of relevant bilateral projects in ASEAN member states and with the Delegations in which these projects operate. In a similar vein, officials of Delegations in the region notes that exchanges aiming at a better coordination between regional and bilateral programmes had increased over the past two to three years. The situation in South Asia is different as support to SAARC is currently provided solely through bilateral projects due to the difficulties in engaging SAARC as an organisation.

Indicator 823: Existence of operational linkages among projects/programmes undertaken in the same or in other sectors/areas so as to promote complementarities

Several programme documents address the promotion of complementarities and synergies but there is lack of evidence that this has gone beyond intention.

For example, according to the *SAARC Civil Aviation Action Fiche*, the project was supposed to build synergies with other donor- and EU- funded projects in Asia (notably the EU-India project but also the EU-China and EU-South East Asia projects) which will be implemented in parallel to the *SAARC Civil Aviation* project. In particular, the project aims to ensure close coordination with the South Asia Regional Initiative (SARI) Forum; Institutional Capacity Building for the Civil Aviation Sector in India (ICCA); ASEAN Air Transport Integration Project (AATIP); The CAO's COSCAP-SA project (Cooperative Development of Operational Safety and Continuing Airworthiness – South Asia Project). However, there is no documentation of actual collaboration available. Since the project was terminated after the

first year (see EQs 1 and 2), the anticipated promotion of complementarities could not materialise. But even if the SAARC aviation project had been more successful, the agenda for synergies as outlined above would have been very ambitious and reads more like a wish list. So far no attempts have been made in any area of co-operation to link, for example, regional-level projects in ASEAN with interventions in other regions.

Action Fiches generally tend to be rather optimistic about the synergies that can be created. For example, the *READI* Action Fiche stresses, “Whenever possible, synergies and complementarities will be sought within the context of the EU’s regional programmes in Asia, those under the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the EU’s bilateral programmes in Asia, notably those taking place under individual Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and National Indicative Programmes (NIP).” The project’s first six month progress report does not pick up the issue of synergies and complementarities. However, interviews confirmed that collaboration with other projects was actively and successfully sought in key co-operation areas such as disaster preparedness and management. However, no exchange has taken place under the ASEM umbrella and especially with ASEF, which focuses on similar co-operation agendas or other programmes designed to strengthen EU-Asia relations. For example, there has been no interaction between *READI* and the *EU-Asia Dialogue*, based in Singapore, although both have addressed food security as a key focal point. In fact, interviews revealed that *READI* and the *EU-Asia Dialogue* did not know of each other’s existence.

It is therefore not surprising that documents on the *EU-Asia Dialogue* do not mention links with *READI* although the overlap in the area of food security is obvious. The Inception Report simply notes, “The *EU-Asia Dialogue* tries to cooperate with other EU-funded projects to create synergy effects between the different initiatives. KAS Singapore has close connections to the Asia-Europe-Foundation (ASEF) and has already discussed possible ways of how to cooperate in the *EU-Asia Dialogue*” (p. 11).

Likewise the *ASEM IV* Action Fiche addresses potential complementarities but does not elaborate on how operational linkages will be achieved: “The *ASEM IV* Programme with its two components – one focusing on official inter-governmental dialogue through the *ASEM Dialogue Facility IV*, and the other focusing on non-governmental dialogue through *ASEF Support Phase IV* – can be seen as complementary to the more traditional regional and national projects and programmes that are implemented as part of the EU’s support in Asia. (...) In particular, the *ASEM IV* Programme can be seen as complementary to other approaches to regional co-operation between Asia and Europe that involve exchange through partnerships between Asian and European higher education institutions under the *Erasmus Mundus* programme or collaboration between *National Research and Education Networks* through the *Trans-Eurasian Information Network (TEIN)* now in its third phase. It is also complementary to the institution building through support to the *Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)*, the sponsorship of demonstration and pilot projects in the area of sustainable consumption and production through the *SWITCH* programme, or co-operation on issues of global concern such as the *Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT)*, and human and animal health” (pp. 4-5).

For Higher Education, evidence from desk and field research provides no reason to believe that synergies between *TEIN* and *EM* have been identified let alone addressed in policy practice.

The *EAMR Thailand 06/2011* is very specific on complementarities but, again, lacks information on how collaboration takes place: “Bilateral co-operation with Thailand is being complemented by other instruments such as regional programmes (*AUP*, *SWITCH Asia* and *FLEGT*) and thematic programmes (*NSA/LA*, *ENRTP*). *SWITCH-Asia*, *FLEGT*, and the thematic projects under *ENRTP* are complementing our efforts in addressing environmental issues in the areas of sustainable resources management, conservation and governance. ... The *IFS* projects have strong links and complementarity with *NSA/LA* thematic programmes. Support from the *AUP* Programme to improve the livelihoods, health status, and education of the refugees in the camps is complimented in particular by humanitarian support provided by *ECHO*. The regional programme on *Emerging Infectious Diseases* is complementary to nationally implemented thematic projects on migrant and border health, with has also major interest in infectious diseases. An element of the work to be carried out by *EABC* involves a setup of the intellectual property rights (*IPR*) help desk. This work can be well complemented by the *ASEAN IPR Project (ECAP III)*. Also, *ECAP III* can be complemented by other *ASEAN* regional programmes managed by *Jakarta Delegation*”.

In Myanmar, complementarity between the bilateral national programmes and the projects financed under the thematic budget lines is promoted. The education sector is a good example: the programme implemented by *UNICEF* (*Multi Donor Education Fund*) focuses on the public sector and is complemented by *NSA* basic education in hard to reach ethnic areas. In health, the link between regional networking, as supported by the *Regional ASEAN/SAARC* project on transboundary infectious diseases-

es (FAO-WHO-OiE), and the nationally executed projects on pandemic awareness and preparedness should be reinforced. Especially now that all nationally executed projects in Myanmar have come to an end, the link with budgets from the Asia Regional Strategy for infectious diseases should be exploited. EIDHR, NSA/LA and IFS projects have strong linkages. A common objective is to strengthen civil society actors in their respective areas of expertise and lay the basis for improved local governance and service delivery. AUP and NSA projects complement the multi donor programmes (LIFT, 3DF and MDEF) by targeting areas where these programmes are not operational (e.g. food security in Kayah and NRS) or covering activities not addressed by them (e.g. primary health care and reproductive health). (EAMR Thailand 06/2011).


In general, the degree of complementarity between *AUP* interventions themselves and between *AUP* and other humanitarian interventions has been good in Myanmar, Thailand and Nepal. This is, in part, because of the high quality of the implementing partners. The cycle by which ECHO provides emergency humanitarian aid while *AUP* steps in some months later to finance LRRD has generally worked well. Implementing partners complain, however, that in Myanmar the geographical availability of funding is sometimes skewed, with “hot” areas attracting so many resources that gains made in areas where NGOs have been longer active are imperilled.

8.3 JC 83: Degree to which regional-level EU support has been designed and implemented so as to complement and add value to relevant EU MS and other donors

The EU's regional programming documents do not customary make specific references to other donors' interventions, let alone discuss areas of overlap or potentials for collaboration. Yet, as some programmes, such as *AUP*, operate on a call for proposals basis, it would be unrealistic to expect project-by-project consultation with other partners. However, to judge by Thailand and Myanmar for example, the pool of implementing partners and active agencies is fairly small and informal communications are good. Regional animal and human health interventions is almost by definition complementary to MS interventions because they are explicitly grounded in and designed with regard to the public good problem. As found in the recent thematic evaluation on health, EU Delegations have generally been very active in MS coordination, but this appears to be mostly in the context of bilateral coordination, rather than coordination of regional interventions. Overall, neither documents nor interviews provide proof that regional-level support has been designed and implemented with the specific objective of complementing and adding value to the interventions of EU MS and other donors. There is, however, ample evidence for functioning coordination mechanism in relations between the EU and EU MS and other donors respectively. The EAMR for basically all countries covered by this evaluation, confirmed by interviews, stress the existence of such modalities at implementation stage. At the same time, approaches to coordination differ significantly across the region and depend on the structural framework conditions in the respective partner countries. (*Indicator 831 and 832*)

The EUD survey shows that formal and/or informal exchange mechanisms exist in the majority of cases and are considered useful.

Figure 15 EUD survey results: Exchange mechanisms between EU, other donors (incl. EU MS) and the government of the EUD country



Source: EUD Survey

The most comprehensive example for EU-MS coordination and an explicit approach to the strengthening of complementarities and synergies is the support to the ASEAN Secretariat. The TRA Evaluation and stakeholder interviews found clear evidence for synergies (and complementarity) between the EU projects (mainly *APRIS* and the *EU-ASEAN Statistical Capacity Building Programme/EASCBP*) and two GIZ-implemented interventions at the ASEC, funded by Germany. Generally GIZ concentrates on issues that are not (fully) covered by the EU projects, e.g. competition policy. Synergies particularly exist with regard to ASEAN's Research Information & Statistical Division (ASEANStats), funded mainly by the EU (*EASCBP*), and the related ASEAN Integration Monitoring Office (AIMO), which is supported to large extents through the GIZ capacity building project. ASEANStats, the statistical service of ASEAN modelled on EUROSTAT (as a much smaller version though), focuses on the development of regional indicators, data frameworks and systems for monitoring ASEAN Community goals and initiatives and more specifically the compilation, consolidation, dissemination and communication of statistical information about ASEAN and its Member States (Vol 2, p. 61). (*Indicator 832*)

Formal mechanisms for joint financing are not yet in place with the exception of ASEF which is based on complementary actions. Support to ASEF has typically been planned at around EUR 1 million per year which is sufficient to finance around 20-25% of the budgeted expenditure of ASEF, with other events being financed by other ASEM partners. Other large contributors to ASEF by EU MS include Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, and Luxembourg (ASEM IV Action Fiche, p. 5). (*Indicator 833*)

8.3.1 Indicator 831: Evidence of consultation with other donors (most notably EU MS) at the strategic and programming stages (e.g. Commission's regional programming documents make specific reference to other donors interventions)

EU regional programming documents do not customary make specific references to the interventions of other donors, let alone discuss areas of overlap or potentials for collaboration. Yet, as some programmes, such as *AUP*, operate on a call for proposals basis, it would be unrealistic to expect project-by-project consultation with other partners. At the same time, the pool of implementing partners for *AUP* is relatively small and both informal and formal coordination, including meetings with MS and other aid agencies, occurs on a regular basis. Regional animal and human health interventions is almost by definition complementary to MS interventions because they are explicitly grounded in and designed with regard to the public good problem. As found in the recent thematic evaluation on health, EC Delegations have generally been very active in MS coordination, but this appears to be mostly in the context of bilateral coordination, rather than coordination of regional interventions. All *AUP* Action Fiches contained a discussion of complementary activities, including those of MSs and other donors.


However, as *AUP* operates on a call for proposals basis, it would be unrealistic to expect project-by-project consultation with other partners. Regional animal and human health interventions is almost by definition complementary to MS interventions because they are explicitly grounded in and designed with regard to the public good problem. As found in the recent thematic evaluation on health, EC Delegations have generally been very active in MS coordination, but this appears to be mostly in the context of bilateral coordination, rather than coordination of regional interventions.

Data from desk and fieldwork research does not indicate that either the *EM* or *TEIN* programmes benefited consultation with providers of other HE mobility or hardware programmes.

A different picture emerges when EU stakeholders were asked about the existence and scope of consultations with EU MS. The almost unanimous view among Delegations and MS Embassies alike in all countries selected for the field phase was that exchanges on strategy has increased significantly in past years and had now reached a level of all EU actors in a given country speaking “with one voice”. This ability of the EU of harmonising strategic approaches and policies in relations with partners was also confirmed by government officials in most countries.

The graph below illustrates that formal and/or informal exchange mechanisms are functioning in the majority of countries included in the EU Delegation Survey and are seen as useful.

Figure 16 *EUD survey results: Exchange mechanisms between EU, other donors (incl. EU MS) and the government of the EUD country*



Source: EUD Survey

8.3.2 *Indicator 832: Existence and modalities of coordination of the EU with other donors (in particular EU MS) at implementation stage*

Based on documents, the Survey of the Delegations and stakeholder interviews in all 8 countries selected for the field phase the following general picture has emerged. Basically everywhere in Asia, coordination between the European Commission and EU MS takes place within the framework of regular meetings among officials which are steered by the Delegations. Responsibility for the organisation of coordination meetings had previously rotated among the respective EU Delegation and MS Embassies but Delegations have recently taken full and permanent charge of the facilitation of coordination. The number and frequency of coordination meetings depends on the size of the country and the complexity of issues involved in the co-operation programme. There are no set rules for the coordination with non-EU donors. Modalities differ from country to country but either formal or informal mechanisms are in place everywhere.

Table 17 Examples of coordination modalities reported in EAMRs

Afghanistan	<p>Where the EU contributes to multi-donor programmes managed by international organisations, it is represented in the formal structures overseeing these programmes, and is pro-active in donor coordination groups. The Delegation was instrumental in frequent donor and other stakeholder consultations concerning the functioning of the ARTF, which was under review during the reporting period.</p> <p>As concerns EU coordination, which is intended and formatted to be supportive of wider donor coordination and country-led coordination, some momentum was maintained during the first semester of 2012, despite major capacity constraints within the Delegation</p> <p>The possibilities for joint programming and co-financing amongst the EU Member States need to be taken further. This will be a complex endeavour, considering the diverging strategies of the Member States and the financial and political interests involved. Yet, significant steps have been taken in particular sectors in which EU has a leadership position, namely security sector reform, agriculture and sub-national governance. EU has been particularly active in donor coordination in the health sector as well, though few Member States are active in the latter sector.</p>	EAMR 12/2012
ASEAN	<p>On a quarterly basis major dialogue partners (EU, DE, US, AUS, CAN, JAP, UK meet in view of donor coordination. However, this process is not yet owned by ASEAN.</p> <p>As for co-operation with EU MS, co-operation has so far been primarily with Germany, but other member states are showing increased interests in the subject.</p>	EAMR 6/2011 EAMR 12/2012
Bangladesh	<p>The Delegation is adequately involved in the governance structures of its wide range of programmes jointly managed with IOs.</p> <p>Strong EU-internal coordination took place in social sector reform where during the reporting period new multidonor-trustfunds were set up (health, education), even if coordination did not always result in joint positions. [...]</p>	6/2011
Indonesia	<p>The Delegation is working closely with the member states on general development issues through the development counsellors working group, which meets quarterly. This co-operation is further deepened in the working groups on climate change where all MS are part of.</p> <p>Coordination with International Organisations remains very good, specifically with the WB and ILO. Relevant IO's are consulted during programme design. There is increasing willingness of IO's to have the EU play an active role in the governance structure of the respective programmes.</p>	EAMR 12/2012
Mongolia	<p>Regular meetings are held with both UN and IFIs, mostly for exchange of information and for coordination in programming and formulation of projects.</p> <p>While there is unfortunately no structured mechanism for donor coordination in place in Mongolia, the Delegation took the offer of the World Bank to participate at donor coordination meetings, via video conference facilities in Beijing, taking place on an ad-hoc basis.</p> <p>Informal meetings with EBRD take place regularly during missions and the Delegation valued very much the insights received through this mechanism. It is noteworthy to be mentioned that the Delegation has been invited and also provided comments to new EBRD projects in the country.</p>	EAMR 12/2012
Myanmar	<p>Given the monopolistic position of UN agencies in Myanmar so far, our relations are close, both at design and implementation stage. UN agencies in Myanmar suffer from a number of weaknesses and relations are at times difficult, notably because they object to the close monitoring by the Delegation</p> <p>The Delegation has a high profile role in the governance structures of the health and education multidonor funds. It held the Chair of the 3MDG Fund Board in its first year of implementation. In these governance structures we have been proactive on more transparency in the budget, a more strategic programming approach and a more efficient M&E system. Coordination with UNDP was ensured in view of the launch of the new UNDP country programme, covering similar thematic areas which are addressed under the civil service capacity building programme and the forthcoming GCCA.</p> <p>The EU attended the meetings organised by UNDP during the formulation of the country programme and established regular contacts with the project team to ensure synergies and prevent duplications. Excellent co-operation was experienced in the formulation of the Myanmar Climate Change Alliance which was undertaken jointly with UN-Habitat and UNEP. Both agencies demonstrated a</p>	Thailand EAMR 12/2012

	<p>strong commitment to the design of the programme and willingness to discuss technical matters.</p> <p>Delegation works systematically and closely with EU MS and other donors participating in trust funds for education (QBEP), health (3DF-3MDG) and livelihoods and food security (in LIFT, 5 out of 10 donors are MS).</p>	
Nepal	<p>Co-operation with UNHCR under the Aid to Uprooted People Programme (AUP) remained very good. Implementation of the project activities for the protection and assistance to refugees from Bhutan under this 4 year (2011-2014) project at the cost of €2.95million is proceeding smoothly.</p> <p>At the initiative of the EU Delegation, since January 2012 EU Development Counsellors meetings are now taking place on a regular basis, hosted by the EU Delegation. Discussions have covered a broad range of topics including governance issues and the impact on co-operation and implementation modalities, exchanges of information on the respective future country strategies, aid effectiveness and follow up of Bussan, the operating environment for our NGO partners, joint programming, etc. The coordinating role of the EU Delegation was further reinforced when we formally took over the local representation of the EU as from July 2012.</p> <p>Donor coordination is strong in Nepal, structured also around a well-functioning group that includes all like-minded donors and agencies (the International Development Partners Group, IDPG, formerly the "Utstein" group).</p>	EAMR 12/2012
Pakistan	<p>Increased co-operation with EU Member states was observed in the preparation of projects under the Annual Action Programme 2012. Co-operation with Denmark on future projects (Public Finance management and Support to the Democratic Institutions and promotion of Human Rights) was oriented towards Denmark contribution to these projects through Delegation Agreement. In addition close collaboration with UK/DFID was established for the preparation of KP District Governance and Community Development Programme.</p> <p>Another main theme of co-operation with Member States was the preparation of the EU 2014-2020 Programming exercise. Information on main priorities and portfolio of EU Member States was systematically collected to further strengthen complementarity and provide basis for the process of establishment of EU development co-operation priorities for 2014-2020.</p> <p>Strong coordination with Member States and the larger donor community intensified in areas of on-going support and in particular in Support to Border Regions: Post Crisis Needs Assessment (PCNA) and Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), Co-operation on Democracy and Human Rights (including in particular Electoral assistance); Education (including TVET) and Rule of Law.</p> <p>The EU supports various interventions being implemented by international organizations (UN agencies, WB, etc.). The degree of coordination depends on the specific area/ programme under discussion.</p>	EAMR 12/2012
Philippines	<p>Co-operation with international organisations is very good and a particular example is the co-operation with the World Bank in the MDTF for Mindanao. The World Bank has organised an EU HOM's visit and also provides a good platform for EU visibility as the EU is the largest contributor. The HoD was invited at the launching of the new work plan and contributed a quote to the press release. The EU Delegation signed a Contribution Agreement with UNFPA under the IP-MNCHN project which focuses on gender and reproductive health issues among the IPs.</p> <p>Co-operation with WFP is also exemplary in the preparation of the new AUP programme approved in 2012 and the launching event was attended by several Ministers and got excellent press coverage.</p> <p>The Delegation chairs the monthly EU MS Development Counsellors meeting. Themes discussed are on general development issues as well as on particular thematic issues, as relevant. Apart from coordinating current on-going programming or projects, topics frequently discussed are: Aid Effectiveness, Development Policy, Health, Governance, Human Rights, Migration, Environment, Mindanao, general information sharing etc. The most important and time-consuming topic in 2012 was the Agenda for Change and the next EU country strategy.</p>	EAMR 12/2012
Thailand	<p>The EU Delegation attends the Development Partners meeting organised regularly and contributes actively to the joint DPs statement communicated twice a year on the occasion of the MRC Informal Donors Meeting and MRC Council Meeting. AUP - the EU cooperates closely with UNHCR. UNHCR is also an implementing partner.</p> <p>Given the socio economic situation of Thailand and the level of industrial de-</p>	EAMR 06/2012and 12/2012

	velopment, most MS no longer have a development programme in Thailand. For those that do (e.g. Agence Francaise de Development, GIZ, SIDA), Environment, renewable energy/energy efficiency, climate change are the most frequent themes. The Delegation also participates in the Mekong River Commission (MRC) Development Partners coordination meetings which have since early 2012 been held every 2- 3 months.	
Vietnam	The main platforms of interaction with EU Member States are the EU Development Counsellor meetings, which are organised and chaired by the EU Delegation on a monthly basis.	EAMR 12/2012

Detailed assessments of existing coordination modalities is particularly available for ASEAN. The TRA Evaluation, 2013 and interviews at ASEC found evidence for efficient and effective efforts at coordination with other EU Delegations and other donors in the region – among the EU member states only Germany has trade-relevant projects at the regional level –both with regard to formal and informal coordination mechanism. However, more EU MS have recently indicated an interest in providing support to ASEAN. More specifically, there is clear evidence of synergies (and complementarity) between the Commission projects (mainly *APRIS* and the *EC-ASEAN Statistical Capacity Building Programme/EASCBP*) and the GIZ-implemented interventions, funded by Germany. Generally GIZ concentrates on issues that are not (fully) covered by the Commission projects, e.g. competition policy. Synergies particularly exist with regard to ASEAN’s Research Information & Statistical Division (*ASEANStats*), funded mainly by the Commission (*EASCBP*), and the related ASEAN Integration Monitoring Office (*AIMO*), which is supported to large extents through the GIZ capacity building project. *ASEANStats*, the statistical service of ASEAN modelled on EUROSTAT (as a much smaller version though), focuses on the development of regional indicators, data frameworks and systems for monitoring ASEAN Community goals and initiatives and more specifically the compilation, consolidation, dissemination and communication of statistical information about ASEAN and its Member States (TRA Evaluation, Vol 2, p. 61; interviews).

According to previous evaluations and stakeholder interviews, coordination of activities has also taken place with non-EU donors (*USAid*, *AusAid*, *JICA*) – mostly informally - for many years. Formal coordination meetings held monthly and chaired by the Commission Delegation in Jakarta have taken place since 2008. Generally, however, all donors have their own individual approaches to coordination and there is no harmonisation or even streamlining of the different mechanisms. Some EU projects overlap with the interventions of other donors, for example *APRIS* and “ASEAN Trade Pilot Program: Single Window” (*USAID*) in the customs sector; between *APRIS* and the ASEAN-Australia Development Cooperation Program Phase II (*AusAid*) on measures related to the general support of regional economic integration; and between *APRIS* and “Support for ASEAN Integration” (*JICA*) mainly regarding customs and standards. However, the partly similar programme objectives were neither pre-ceeded by, not have they resulted in, joint TRA strategies and programmes.

Over the past five or six years ASEC has become markedly more pro-active in coordinating donor-funded interventions at the regional level. *ASEANStats* has been a test case for a formal approach to coordination: working groups on statistics, involving all DPs, ASEC and AMS, meet regularly to coordinate programme- and project activities.


The *ASEM DF MTE*, generally highlights that “by harmonising EU Member States’ views ex ante, analysis of current economic and regional trends has more weight; it can really come up with a “regional perspective’ on certain issues” (p. 36). However, there is no elaboration. Some information on the mechanisms that allow for his harmonisation to this end is provided by the *ASEM IV* Action Fiche: ASEM partners take initiatives to support official inter-governmental dialogue between Asia and Europe. Complementary actions by other ASEM partners form part of the official inter-governmental dialogue. Around 40 events take place each year of which around 5-7 are financed through the ASEM Dialogue Facility. The Summits held every two years provide political guidance and are the main guarantee that actions are focused and complementary. They are de facto a forum for partner’s coordination. Furthermore, all events organised within the ASEM framework are approved by the ASEM Seniors Officials during their SOM meetings. This ex ante approval guarantees the consistency between the activities and the respect of the political strategies identified by the ASEM leaders (p. 5). Generally, as stakeholder interviews demonstrated, coo

8.3.3 Indicator 833: Existence of joint financing and/or task division with EU MS and other donors

Division of labour (DoL) processes can be described as operating on two levels: At the broadest level, the donor Harmonisation Agenda is defined by the Paris Declaration. Harmonisation materialises in programme-based approaches, joint missions and joint analytical work of donors at country level. The more narrow DoL agenda attempts to embrace all donors, working through lead donor arrangements.

The diagram below illustrates the perception of DoL agreed upon between the EUDs and EU member states or other donors in the EUDs countries. While 50% out of 12 EUDs see division of labour with EU member states as not existent (4 EUDs) or low (2 EUDs), 50% respondents describe it as very good (1 EUD) or good (5 EUDs). Regarding the division of labour with other donors, the observation can be made that the proportion of EUDs describing DoL as not existent or low is a bit higher (8 out of 13 EUDs or 62%). One EUD characterises the division of labour with other donors as very good and four EUDs perceive it as good.

Figure 17 EUD survey results: Division of labour with EU member states and other donors in the EUD country




Source: EUD Survey

The examples for coordinated support for ASEAN mentioned under the previous indicator also imply task division (as outlined in particular in the case of ASEAN statistics) and an agreement of who finances what. So far, however, joint financing or task division in an institutionalised sense is only available for ASEF. Complementary actions within the framework of ASEF also take place. Support to ASEF has typically been planned at around EUR 1 million per year which is sufficient to finance around 20-25% of the budgeted expenditure of ASEF, with other events being financed by other ASEM partners. Other large contributors to ASEF (above SGD 400,000 in 2009) from EU MS include Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, and Luxembourg (ASEM IV Action Fiche, p. 5).

Overall, however, the EUD survey demonstrates joint activities with other development partners take place only in the minority of cases. Six out of 11 Delegations stated that there were no joint activities with EU Member States. Six out of nine noted that no joint activities had taken place with non-EU donors.

Figure 18 EUD survey results: Joint activities with other development partners



Source: EUD Survey