GROUND TRUTH
SOLUTIONS

WORLD HUMANITARIAN SUMMIT

# FIELD SURVEY AND ANALYSIS

SURVEY OF AFFECTED PEOPLE & FIELD STAFF
IN IRAQ

31 OCTOBER, 2017

OECD
BETTER POLICIES FOR BETTER LIVES

Auswärtiges Amt

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# AFFECTED PEOPLE SURVEY

## Summary Findings

Overall, displaced people interviewed across ten governorates in Iraq express limited satisfaction with the humanitarian support they receive. That said, they feel respected by aid providers and share strong feelings of safety.

### Humanitarian Services
**Displaced people lack the information about services and support available to them (Q1).** Respondents voice the need for accurate and timely distribution of information.

**Current aid does not cover basic needs according to every second respondent (Q2).** The most pressing unmet needs are cash transfers, food, job opportunities, and medical services.

**Many respondents do not feel that aid is reaching those who need it most (Q3).** Many groups of displaced people are seen as excluded from support, among them are children and young people, disabled and people with chronic diseases, and the poor and weak.

### Engagement
**Respondents feel that aid agencies treat them with respect (Q4).** However, a majority of them do not know how to file a complaint (Q5) and do not believe their views are considered with regard to aid provision (Q6). Most say they would like to make suggestions or complaints by calling a helpline or submitting them at the complaints desk.

### Empowerment
**Most of those interviewed report feeling safe (Q7)**; those who feel unsafe cite the lack of stability and terrorism as main reasons.

**Respondents do not see how current support can empower them to achieve self-sufficiency in the future** because the aid is limited to specific goods and services, and short on financial assistance. The support they currently receive covers only certain emergency needs and is provided on a short-term basis which gives little assurance for the future (Q8).

**Most people interviewed do not feel that circumstances are improving for people in Iraq (Q9)**.

**OVERVIEW OF MEAN SCORES PER QUESTION***

| Question | Mean Score |
|---|---|
| Q1. Awareness | 2.3 |
| Q2. Relevance | 2.2 |
| Q3. Fairness | 2.9 |
| Q4. Respect | 3.9 |
| Q6. Participation | 1.9 |
| Q7. Safety | 4.2 |
| Q8. Empowerment | 2.4 |
| Q9. Progress | 2.4 |

NEGATIVE · · · POSITIVE

*Respondents answered questions on a scale from 1 (negative perceptions) to 5 (postive perceptions). The mean or average score is calculated for each question based on the given responses. Q5 is a yes/no question and is not included in this graph.

# FIELD STAFF SURVEY

## Summary Findings

The field staff interviewed are generally satisfied with the humanitarian response in Iraq. However, they call for greater efforts to collect feedback from affected people as the basis for more effective community based programming. Overall, staff from local organisations share with their international counterparts a rather critical view of how the humanitarian response is implemented on the ground and the role of local responders.

### Humanitarian services

**Funding is being used in accordance with current needs and demands in the field (Q1).** Nevertheless, some staff indicate problems with needs assessments and the lack of strategic projects. More consultation with local organisations and the targeted community is needed.

**Aid is considered well-managed by the humanitarian community (Q2).** However, some respondents see poor programme design which leads to wasted and duplicated resources, gaps in the response, and a lack of contextual knowledge and long-term impacts. Suggestions to improve program design include more local staff in the design phase, coordinated service mapping, timely assessments, and monitoring.

### Engagement

**International staff believe there is enough support for local aid providers while only 15% of local responders interviewed agree (Q3).** Barriers for localisation include limited resources, favoured treatment of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) over local organisations, government barriers, and corruption.

Combating this could be done through joint programme implementation, long-term partnerships, and investment in capacity building of local NGOs.

**Respondents feel well-informed about people's perceptions of aid programmes (Q4).** However, some respondents mention that there are insufficient evaluation efforts and feedback mechanisms, a scarcity of experienced staff with local knowledge and poor community involvement in the programme design. Perceptual surveys and direct involvement of communities in programme design could help to close the feedback loop.

**Staff interviewed feel that affected people are 'to some extent able' to influence programme design (Q5).** Voices of affected people are not considered because of a prevailing top-down approach and pre-designed programming which lack clear feedback channels to collect community perceptions (i.e. Monitoring Evaluation Accountability and Learning (MEAL) systems). Some field staff feel they have no time for community consultations in the project timeline.

**OVERVIEW OF MEAN SCORES PER QUESTION**

| Question | Score |
|----------|-------|
| Q1. Transparency | 3.9 |
| Q2. Management of aid | 3.8 |
| Q3. Localisation | 3.5 |
| Q4. Feedback | 3.9 |
| Q5. Participation | 3.4 |
| Q6. Cash | 4.2 |
| Q7. Flexibility | 3.7 |
| Q8. Reporting time | 3.9 |
| Q9. Cooperation Hum/Dev | 3.6 |

NEGATIVE — 1 2 3 4 5 — POSITIVE

## Outcomes

**Most respondents feel that cash programmes are more effective and lead to better outcomes (Q6).** Some staff see little advantage in cash transfer programming, seeing it as short-term, of limited sustainability and dependent on the market conditions. They call for more investment in infrastructure, market, and business structures; and better planning of exit strategies.

**Most respondents experience effective cooperation among humanitarian and development actors (Q9).** Cooperation could be further improved by jointly implementing programmes and through long-term strategies aimed at the root causes of the problems.

## Donor related

**The staff interviewed believe they are able to adjust programming to the changing needs on the field level (Q7).** However, there are several obstacles such as donor restrictions, overcomplicated and time consuming realignment processes, and predefined programmes.

**The amount of time spent on reporting is considered mostly appropriate (Q8).** The burden could be lightened by harmonizing reporting requirements, formats and timelines across donors, and by simplifying reporting templates. They call for an effective cluster indicator that clearly links to response activities as well as a single centralised web-based platform for reporting to all donors could streamline reporting activities.

# INTRODUCTION

## Affected People Survey

This report covers two separate surveys conducted in Iraq in the summer and fall of 2017. The first survey focuses on the perceptions of three distinct groups of affected people in Iraq: Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), returned IDPs[1], and refugees from Syria. It provides a baseline on how displaced people experience humanitarian aid by looking at programme performance against a set of themes related to the quality of services and engagement.

These performance dimensions link to affected people's views on progress in achieving the goals set out in the Grand Bargain and other efforts intended to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian action. Subsequent surveys will track how affected people's perceptions evolve over time. Data collection took place between July 9 and September 21, 2017. Face-to-face interviews were conducted in 11 regions of Iraq. For more details, see the section on methodology and sampling.

## Field Staff Survey

The second survey analysed in this report looks at the perspective of field staff on a range of topics linked to the performance of the humanitarian system. Some 382 humanitarian staff working in Iraq for UN agencies, INGOs

and local NGOs. It covers the perspective of field staff on a range of topics linked to the performance of the humanitarian system. Data was collected using an online survey tool between 1 August and 7 September 2017.

## Background

OECD donors and humanitarian actors made a series of commitments at the world humanitarian summit in May 2016 to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian aid. The OECD secretariat seeks to assess how policy changes in the global humanitarian space, including commitments made in the Grand Bargain, affect

the quality of humanitarian action. As part of this exercise, Ground Truth Solutions has been commissioned by the OECD, with the support of the German Federal Foreign Office, to track the way people affected by humanitarian crises and field staff experience and view humanitarian activities.



MAP OF LOCATIONS COVERED IN IRAQ

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[1] "Returned IDPs refers to internally displaced persons who have returned to their place of origin or habitual residence." (UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database)

# SECTION 1 - AFFECTED PEOPLE SURVEY

## Reading This Section

This report uses bar charts for both open and closed questions. Responses to closed questions are reported using a Likert scale from 1 to 5. The mean score is also shown for each closed question. The mean scores are weighted according to the population size of different groups of displaced people. The bar charts for closed questions show the percentage of respondents who selected each answer option, with colours ranging from dark red for negative answers to dark green for positive ones. For open questions, the bar charts indicate the percentage and frequency of respondents with answers pertaining to a particular theme. For these charts, percentages do not total 100% because respondents were given the option to provide multiple answers.

For each question, we indicate the main take-away or conclusion drawn from the data. We also indicate issues that require further exploration or inquiry. This can be done either by comparing the perceptual data with other data sets or by clarifying directly with people in the surveyed communities what lies behind their perceptions through, for example, focus group discussions, key informant interviews or other forms of dialogue.

# SURVEY QUESTIONS

### Q1. Awareness

## Do you feel informed about the kind of aid available to you?

| |
|---|
| 1 = Not at all |
| 2 = Not very much |
| 3 = I know about some services |
| 4 = I am informed about most services |
| 5 = I am well informed about the aid available |
| No opinion |
| Do not want to answer |

**(values in %)**                                                                 **Mean: 2.3**

| 31 | 26 | 9 | 20 | 5 | 9 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

**Most respondents lack information about the type of support available to them, with over half answering negatively.**

Awareness is lower among returned IDPs compared to IDPs and refugees.

| Affected population | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **IDP** | | | | | **2.4** |
| 34 | 22 | 12 | 22 | 6 | 4 |
| **Refugee** | | | | | **2.5** |
| 22 | 31 | 8 | 28 | 2 | 9 |
| **Returned IDP** | | | | | **1.9** |
| 29 | 33 | 2 2 | 7 | 27 | |

Information campaigns can be considered in both camp and private accommodation settings.

| Accommodation | | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Camp | | | | | | **2.2** |
| 29 | 24 | 12 | 25 | 3 | 6 | |
| Private | | | | | | **2.2** |
| 34 | 28 | 6 | 13 | 7 | 12 | |

Scores vary considerably across regions. IDPs in Dohuk and Babylon appear most informed. Returned IDPs in Diyala, refugees in Sulaymaniyah, and IDPs in Erbil report being poorly informed.

| Region | | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anbar | | | | | | **2.6** |
| 4 | 58 | 5 | 21 | 5 | 7 | |
| Babylon | | | | | | **4.0** |
| 3 | 93 | | | | 3 | |
| Baghdad | | | | | | **2.9** |
| 33 | 7 | 3 | 47 | 7 | 3 | |
| Diyala | | | | | | **2.1** |
| 34 | 33 | 23 | 5 | 3 | 2 | |
| Dohuk | | | | | | **4.2** |
| 3 | 57 | 26 | 14 | | | |
| Erbil | | | | | | **2.3** |
| 32 | 25 | 8 | 25 | 2 | 9 | |
| Kirkuk | | | | | | **2.9** |
| 16 | 26 | 14 | 16 | 16 | 12 | |
| Najaf | | | | | | **2.1** |
| 8 | 77 | 4 | 8 | 4 | | |
| Ninewa | | | | | | **1.9** |
| 45 | 22 | 13 | 10 | 2 | 8 | |
| Salah Al-Din | | | | | | **2.1** |
| 48 | 3 | 6 | 5 | 13 | 25 | |
| Sulaymaniyah | | | | | | **1.6** |
| 43 | 53 | 3 | | | | |

People who use smartphones every day indicate a higher level of awareness.

Our data suggests that a high level of awareness correlates with relevance and fairness of aid, as well as perceptions among respondents that their views are considered in decisionmaking.

| Do you use a smartphone every day? | | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No | | | | | | **2.2** |
| 38 | 20 | 9 | 16 | 6 | 11 | |
| Yes | | | | | | **2.4** |
| 25 | 31 | 10 | 22 | 4 | 7 | |

**Follow-up question to those who responded 1, 2, or 3 to Q1:**

# What information do you need?

| | |
|---|---|
| Distribution information (timing, location, share, agencies) | 38% (206) |
| Information on everything | 14% (77) |
| Information on donor organisations and NGOs | 12% (66) |
| Food | 9% (48) |
| Financial Assistance | 8% (43) |
| Types of support available and eligibility | 8% (42) |
| Medical Information | 4% (21) |
| Travelling to Europe/immigration | 4% (20) |
| Facebook page/mobile communication | 3% (16) |
| Electricity | 2% (12) |
| Don't need more information | 2% (9) |
| Water | 2% (9) |
| Employment | 1% (8) |
| Education | 1% (5) |
| Services | 1% (5) |
| Air Conditioning | 1% (4) |
| Clothes | 1% (4) |
| Not getting any information | 1% (3) |
| Other* | 3% (14) |

*"Other" includes information about employment, security, and contact information.

**Accurate and timely information about aid distribution emerge as the most frequently reported knowledge gap among displaced people.** Respondents also ask to be informed about all kinds of available support and the ways to receive it as well as information on organisations who provide it. People suggest introducing a unified information channel via a telephone number or Facebook page. Posters can be used for announcements and to share general information about aid.

The post-distribution monitoring (PDM) conducted by UNICEF in July 2017 with IDPs in several governorates in Iraq also found that communication with displaced people needs improvement, especially with regard to dissemination of information about distribution locations and timing. It was also suggested to enhance the visibility of funding agencies at the distribution sites.[2]

The chart shows the percentage and frequency of respondents indicating a certain answer to this open-ended question. Percentages do not total 100% because respondents had the option to provide multiple answers.

## Q2. Relevance

# Does the aid you currently receive cover your basic needs?

| |
|---|
| 1 = Not at all |
| 2 = Not really |
| 3 = Neutral |
| 4 = Mostly yes |
| 5 = Yes, very much |
| No opinion |
| Do not want to answer |

**(values in %)**      **Mean: 2.2**

| 29 | 30 | 18 | 13 | 3 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

**Most respondents feel that the services they receive do not cover their most important needs.**

Two out of three returned IDPs and refugees experience problems covering their needs with the available support. IDPs are slightly more positive about their needs being covered.

| Affected population | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDP | | | | | **2.4** |
| 25 | 27 | 22 | 16 | 4 | 6 |
| Refugee | | | | | **2.1** |
| 32 | 40 | 11 | 12 | 1 | 3 |
| Returned IDP | | | | | **1.7** |
| 41 | 29 | 11 | 4 | | 15 |

[2] UNICEF. "Post Distribution Monitoring Report. Rapid Response Mechanism". Iraq: UNICEF, July 2017.

Negative scores are most prevalent among returned IDPs in Diyala, IDPs in Erbil, all respondents in Salah Al-Din, and refugees in Sulaymaniyah.

| Region | | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Anbar** | | | | | | **2.5** |
| 1 | 44 | 29 | 9 | 18 | | |
| **Babylon** | | | | | | **2.7** |
| 43 | 43 | 13 | | | | |
| **Baghdad** | | | | | | **2.2** |
| 17 | 47 | 33 | 3 | | | |
| **Diyala** | | | | | | **1.6** |
| 59 | 21 | 16 | 3 | | | |
| **Dohuk** | | | | | | **3.5** |
| 9 | 37 | 51 | 3 | | | |
| **Erbil** | | | | | | **2.0** |
| 32 | 31 | 9 | 11 | 1 | 15 | |
| **Kirkuk** | | | | | | **3.3** |
| 14 | 10 | 14 | 40 | 14 | 8 | |
| **Najaf** | | | | | | **2.9** |
| 48 | 26 | 3 | 19 | 3 | | |
| **Ninewa** | | | | | | **2.3** |
| 28 | 35 | 18 | 16 | 21 | | |
| **Salah Al-Din** | | | | | | **1.4** |
| 68 | 5 | 10 | 3 | 14 | | |
| **Sulaymaniyah** | | | | | | **1.5** |
| 57 | 37 | 3 | 3 | | | |

Respondents who receive a combination of three different services or more feel better able to address their most important needs.

| Number of received services | | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **No support** | | | | | | **1.0** |
| 90 | 2 | 7 | | | | |
| **One type of services** | | | | | | **1.7** |
| 48 | 22 | 12 | 2 2 | 15 | | |
| **Two types of services** | | | | | | **2.4** |
| 19 | 47 | 12 | 15 | 4 | 3 | |
| **Three types of services** | | | | | | **2.8** |
| 7 | 34 | 26 | 28 | 3 1 | | |
| **Four types of services** | | | | | | **2.9** |
| 9 | 28 | 37 | 20 | 5 1 | | |
| **Five types of services and more** | | | | | | **2.7** |
| 9 | 31 | 29 | 21 | 3 | 8 | |

**Follow-up question to those who responded 1, 2, or 3 to Q2:**

# What are your most important needs that are not met?

| | |
|---|---|
| Cash | **79% (510)** |
| Food/Nutrition | **59% (376)** |
| Employment | **55% (355)** |
| Healthcare | **48% (306)** |
| WASH | **31% (200)** |
| Fuel/electricity | **31% (196)** |
| Education | **24% (152)** |
| Shelter support | **19% (120)** |
| Psychosocial support | **11% (69)** |
| Information counselling | **5% (32)** |
| Other* | **2% (15)** |

*"Other" includes social welfare salary, baby formula and sport activities.

The chart shows the percentage and frequency of respondents indicating a certain answer to this open-ended question. Percentages do not total 100% because respondents had the option to provide multiple answers.

**The most urgent immediate needs are found to be cash transfers, food, job opportunities, and medical services.**

Food insecurity remains a concern among displaced people even though the Comprehensive Food Security Analysis conducted in July 2017 found very low levels of food insecurity among most IDPs.[3] According to Humanitarian Needs Overview by OCHA more than three-quarters of displaced households report that they do not generate sufficient income to meet their basic needs and hence depend on external assistance.[4] Lack of employment opportunities along with inadequate water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) conditions, healthcare, and education contribute to rising vulnerability among displaced people.[5] All these areas need further attention from the humanitarian community.

Meanwhile multi-purpose cash assistance could provide the means to ensure that humanitarian needs are met, while avoiding coping strategies that potentially create further vulnerability, as most basic services are available once the financial means to access them are available.[6,7]

## Q3. Fairness

# Do you think the support reaches the people who need it most?

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 = Not at all | |
| 2 = Not really | |
| 3 = Neutral | |
| 4 = Mostly yes | |
| 5 = Yes, very much | |
| No opinion | |
| Do not want to answer | |

**(values in %)**                                           **Mean: 2.9**

| 13 | 18 | 10 | 21 | 9 | 29 |
|----|----|----|----|---|----|

**The data suggests a nearly even split between positive and negative perceptions on whether aid reaches those most in need. A large proportion are undecided.**

Female respondents are more sceptical about the fairness of aid when compared to perceptions among men.

| Gender | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Female** | | | | | **2.8** |
| 16 | 21 | 10 | 17 | 9 | 28 |
| **Male** | | | | | **3.0** |
| 11 | 16 | 9 | 25 | 8 | 30 |

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
[3] WFP. "Emergency Dashboard. August 2107". Iraq: WFP, August 2017.
[4] OCHA. "Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017". Iraq:OCHA, January 2017.
[5] IOM. "IOM Funding Appeal (January – December 2017)". Iraq: IOM.
[6] OCHA. "Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017". Iraq: OCHA, January 2017.
[7] REACH. "Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment (Iii) Of Internally Displaced Persons Outside Camps". Iraq: REACH, June 2016.

Most refugees and returned IDPs say the support is insufficient to address the needs of the most vulnerable in Iraq.

| Affected population | | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **IDP** | | | | | | **3.1** |
| 13 | 14 | 9 | 26 | 13 | 25 | |
| **Refugee** | | | | | | **2.5** |
| 14 | 29 | 9 | 21 | 27 | | |
| **Returned IDP** | | | | | | **2.4** |
| 13 | 20 | 12 | 6 | 4 | 45 | |

**Follow-up question to those who responded 1, 2, or 3 to Q3:**

# Who is left out?

| | |
|---|---|
| Poor/needy | **20% (66)** |
| Most people | **14% (47)** |
| Children/youth | **11% (36)** |
| People with chronic diseases/disabled | **10% (34)** |
| People without information/resources/connections | **9% (29)** |
| Elderly | **8% (25)** |
| Returnees | **7% (24)** |
| Far sectors in the camps | **6% (20)** |
| Chaos/discrimination during distribution | **6% (20)** |
| New/unregistered people | **5% (15)** |
| Women | **3% (11)** |
| Aid is not sufficient | **3% (11)** |
| Those with sufficient income | **3% (11)** |
| Widows/divorcees | **2% (6)** |
| No one is left out | **2% (5)** |
| Orphans | **1% (2)** |
| Others* | **2% (5)** |

* "Others" include widows, families, those who cannot stand in the queue for a long time, and those who are financially well off but might require other services.

**Many vulnerable groups are seen to be excluded from support, among them children and young people, disabled and people with chronic diseases, the poor and the weak.**

Some IDPs have problems getting support along with people who lack information, resources, and connections. Some people complain that aid does not reach remote areas in the camps or is distributed unfairly because of poor organisation.

The chart shows the percentage and frequency of respondents indicating a certain answer to this open-ended question. Percentages do not total 100% because respondents had the option to provide multiple answers.

## Q4. Respect

# Are you treated with respect by the aid providers?

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 = Not at all | |
| 2 = Not really | |
| 3 = Neutral | |
| 4 = Mostly yes | |
| 5 = Yes, very much | |
| No opinion | |
| Do not want to answer | |

**(values in %)**                                   **Mean: 3.9**

| 2 | 7 | 20 | 34 | 28 | 9 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

**Most displaced people interviewed feel that aid providers treat them with respect.**

Our data suggests that IDPs feel treated with more respect than refugees and returned IDPs.

**Affected population**                                        **Mean**

IDP                                                              **4.0**

| 2 | 7 | 15 | 31 | 38 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

Refugee                                                          **3.6**

| 4 | 9 | 24 | 44 | 12 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

Returned IDP                                                     **3.6**

| 1 | 4 | 32 | 34 | 7 | 23 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

## Q5. Awareness of complaints mechanisms

# Do you know how to make suggestions or complaints to aid providers?

| | |
|---|---|
| No | |
| Yes | |
| No opinion | |
| Do not want to answer | |

**(values in %)**

| 66 | 34 |
|---|---|

**A majority of respondents do not know how to file a complaint about the support they receive.**

Refugees interviewed appear more informed about the opportunity to voice their concerns and suggestions to aid providers compared to IDPs and returned IDPs.

**Affected population**

IDP

| 70 | 30 |
|---|---|

Refugee

| 37 | 63 |
|---|---|

Returned IDP

| 87 | 13 |
|---|---|

In Salah Al-Din and Najaf there seems to be a significant information gap about how to make suggestions and complaints.

Our findings are in line with the post distribution monitoring (PDM) conducted in September 2017 with IDPs that received RRM[8] Kits provided by a consortium of three agencies (UNICEF, WFP and UNFPA) in several governorates in Iraq. PDM also indicated low awareness on complaint mechanisms, with 61% of the families being unaware of the IDP call centre which is meant to register their complaints and to address their grievances.[9] The same issue was highlighted in the PDM from July 2017 in which 64% of the families were unable to identify the IDP call centre.[10]

**Region**

| Region | | |
|---|---|---|
| Anbar | 64 | 36 |
| Babylon | 100 | |
| Baghdad | 77 | 23 |
| Diyala | 87 | 13 |
| Dohuk | 31 | 69 |
| Erbil | 52 | 48 |
| Kirkuk | 49 | 51 |
| Najaf | 93 | 7 |
| Ninewa | 79 | 21 |
| Salah Al-Din | 100 | |
| Sulaymaniyah | 30 | 70 |

**Follow-up question:**

## How would you prefer to make suggestions or complaints about the assistance provided?

| | |
|---|---|
| Personally at a complaints desk | 39% (333) |
| Calling a helpline | 28% (238) |
| Via an app on a smartphone | 13% (111) |
| Anonymously via suggestion box | 12% (102) |
| Via SMS | 4% (32) |
| Other* | 5% (45) |

* "Others" include respondents not needing to complain, informing the Mukhtar of the sector, government officials, or direct camp management of any complaints.

Of all the available complaints channels that were prompted, respondents prefer personal interaction through a help desk or calling a helpline.

These findings support the work undertaken by the Iraq IDP Information Centre (Iraq IIC)[11] which appears to be a relevant channel for displaced people in Iraq which needs to be strengthened.

[8] Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) kits provides newly displaced persons with life-saving supplies for three to five days. They consist of ready-to-eat food, water, hygiene items, and a dignity kit designed to cover the most basic requirements to families who have nothing.
[9] UNICEF. "Post Distribution Monitoring Report. Rapid Response Mechanism". Iraq: UNICEF, July 2017.
[10] UNICEF. "Post Distribution Monitoring Report. Rapid Response Mechanism". Iraq: UNICEF, September 2017.
[11] On behalf of the UN Humanitarian Country Team in Iraq, UNOPS built and implements a national toll - free hotline that allows Iraqi citizens to access information on humanitarian services, provide feedback, and lodge complaints.

## Q6. Participation

# Do you feel your views are considered in decisions made about the support you receive?

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 = Not at all | |
| 2 = Not really | |
| 3 = Neutral | |
| 4 = Mostly yes | |
| 5 = Yes, very much | |
| Not sure | |
| Do not want to answer | |

**(values in %)**                                                            **Mean: 1.9**

| 37 | 20 | 10 | 4 | 21 | 8 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

**Over half of the respondents do not believe their opinions are considered in the decisionmaking process.**

Refugees and returned IDPs are even more sceptical than IDPs about whether their views are taken into account by aid providers.

| Affected population | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **IDP** | | | | | **2.1** |
| 36 | 16 | 13 | 7 | 19 | 9 |
| **Refugee** | | | | | **1.8** |
| 32 | 35 | 7 | 24 | | 1 |
| **Returned IDP** | | | | | **1.4** |
| 42 | 18 | 2 1 | 21 | 16 | |

The older the respondents, the more suspicious they feel.

| Age | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **18 – 30 years** | | | | | **2.2** |
| 23 | 23 | 12 | 4 | 24 | 13 |
| **31 – 40 years** | | | | | **1.9** |
| 38 | 23 | 10 | 4 | 19 | 6 |
| **41 – 81 years** | | | | | **1.7** |
| 47 | 15 | 8 | 4 | 18 | 6 |

Correlations across questions suggest that people who feel they receive sufficient aid to cover their main needs and information about services are more likely to consider that their views count.

## Q7. Safety

# Do you feel safe in your place of residence?

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 = Not at all | |
| 2 = Not really | |
| 3 = Neutral | |
| 4 = Mostly yes | |
| 5 = Yes, very much | |
| No opinion | |
| Do not want to answer | |

**(values in %)**                                                            **Mean: 4.2**

| 1 | 4 | 11 | 37 | 48 |
|---|---|---|---|---|

**A majority of respondents feel mostly safe in their place of residence.**

IDPs and refugees indicate a stronger sense of safety compared to returned IDPs.

| Affected population | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDP | | | | | **4.3** |
| 1 | 5 | 9 | 36 | 49 | |
| Refugee | | | | | **4.5** |
| 1 3 | 4 | 29 | 63 | | |
| Returned IDP | | | | | **3.9** |
| 1 3 | 24 | 49 | 24 | | |

Our findings reveal some variation across regions suggesting that people feel safer in some areas than others.

| Region | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anbar | | | | | **3.5** |
| 8 | 30 | 62 | | | |
| Babylon | | | | | **4.8** |
| 3 | 7 | 90 | | | |
| Baghdad | | | | | **4.3** |
| 7 | 53 | 40 | | | |
| Diyala | | | | | **3.4** |
| 2 6 | 46 | 39 | 7 | | |
| Dohuk | | | | | **4.6** |
| 3 | 34 | 62 | | | |
| Erbil | | | | | **4.4** |
| 1 2 | 4 | 44 | 49 | | |
| Kirkuk | | | | | **4.2** |
| 5 | 5 | 52 | 38 | | |
| Najaf | | | | | **3.9** |
| 16 | 29 | 3 | 52 | | |
| Ninewa | | | | | **4.4** |
| 0 4 | 5 | 41 | 50 | | |
| Salah Al-Din | | | | | **4.6** |
| 1 3 | 10 | 4 | 82 | | |
| Sulaymaniyah | | | | | **4.8** |
| 17 | 83 | | | | |

## Follow-up question to those who responded 1, 2, or 3 to Q7:

# Why not?

| | |
|---|---|
| Lack of security and stabilitiy | **66% (71)** |
| Issues in the camp | **19% (21)** |
| ISIS/terrorism | **18% (19)** |
| Discrimination | **5% (5)** |
| Miss home/family | **5% (5)** |
| Other* | **14% (15)** |

* "Other" includes remoteness, being forced to live in the camp, the large number of IDPs, expatriation, being accused of terrorism, and lighting issues.

A lack of stability and security in the area and in the camps, as well as fear of ISIS and terrorist attacks are the main reasons for safety concerns. Some are afraid of strangers in the camps and do not feel protected there. **Several respondents report cases of harassment and exploitation of women as safety issues in the camps.**

The chart shows the percentage and frequency of respondents indicating a certain answer to this open-ended question. Percentages do not total 100% because respondents had the option to provide multiple answers.

**Follow-up question to those who responded 4 or 5 to Q7:**

# Why?

| | |
|---|---|
| Security presence | 44% (312) |
| Secure area | 36% (253) |
| Police forces | 11% (81) |
| Means of living/needs provided for/services | 6% (39) |
| Kurdistan region safe | 4% (29) |
| Government | 4% (26) |
| Neighbours | 3% (21) |
| Family | 1% (5) |
| Other* | 4% (31) |

\* "Other" includes being able to live with family and relatives, welcomed by local community, expatriation, the government, having residency, and getting used to the area.

**People feel safe because their place of residence is perceived to be secure, protected by central security and police; and they receive support to meet their needs.**

The chart shows the percentage and frequency of respondents indicating a certain answer to this open-ended question. Percentages do not total 100% because respondents had the option to provide multiple answers.

## Q8. Empowerment

# Do you feel the support/services you receive prepares (empowers) you to live without aid in the future?

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 = Not at all | |
| 2 = Not really | |
| 3 = Neutral | |
| 4 = Mostly yes | |
| 5 = Yes, very much | |
| No opinion | |
| Do not want to answer | |

**(values in %)**                                                **Mean: 2.4**

| 22 | 32 | 4 | 12 | 22 | 9 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

**Respondents do not feel that the support they receive will enable them to live without aid in the future.**

The sense of empowerment is strongest among returned IDPs.

| Affected population | | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IDP | | | | | | **2.3** |
| 23 | 30 | 4 | 12 | 22 | 9 | |
| Refugee | | | | | | **2.0** |
| 20 | 38 | 4 | 3 | 28 | 6 | |
| Returned IDP | | | | | | **2.7** |
| 18 | 30 | 1 | 23 | 17 | 11 | |

Displaced people who live in private accommodation feel more empowered to become independent from aid compared to those living in camps.

| Accommodation | | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Camp | | | | | | **1.8** |
| 31 | 36 | 5 | 6 | 12 | 11 | |
| Private | | | | | | **2.9** |
| 11 | 27 | 3 | 19 | 34 | 7 | |

Older respondents are more optimistic they can achieve self-reliance in the future compared young people.

In another survey on Northern Iraq our findings indicated concerns for the youth in the camps who are suffering from the psychological stress of being unemployed and staying at home or in their tents all day.[12]

| Age | | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 18 – 30 years | | | | | | **1.9** |
| 21 | 36 | 2 | 3 | 28 | 10 | |
| 31 – 40 years | | | | | | **2.4** |
| 24 | 30 | 4 | 13 | 19 | 9 | |
| 41 – 81 years | | | | | | **2.8** |
| 19 | 30 | 5 | 19 | 20 | 7 | |

## Follow-up question to those who responded 1, 2, or 3 to Q8:

# Why not?

| | |
|---|---|
| Insufficient assistance/services | **74% (415)** |
| Need a job | **8% (43)** |
| The economic/political situation in Iraq | **6% (36)** |
| Need cash | **6% (33)** |
| Only receive short-term support | **5% (30)** |
| Do not receieve any aid/support or services | **5% (27)** |
| Need a home | **2% (9)** |
| Lost everything | **1% (8)** |
| Other* | **1% (5)** |

* "Other" includes: theft, limited support for IDPs and returnees, unfairness in provision of aid, Iraq being not as secure as Europe, and lack of service providers.

The chart shows the percentage and frequency of respondents indicating a certain answer to this open-ended question. Percentages do not total 100% because respondents had the option to provide multiple answers.

**Respondents do not see how current support can empower them because it is limited to specific goods and services, and is short on financial assistance.** Respondents report that the support they currently receive covers only emergency needs and is provided on a short-term basis giving little assurance for the future. As some respondents comment, current support does not rebuild a house, substitute lost property, provide a job or education.

IOM's ongoing assessments reveal that humanitarian response needs durable solutions to provide permanent shelter and basic household items for displaced people.[13] Another crucial issue is job opportunities. Unemployment is the main reason for returnees saying they may try to migrate again, according to the study conducted by REACH Initiative.[14]

Ground Truth's findings from the focus group discussions conducted with IDPs in Northern Iraq suggest a strong desire to work and be self-sufficient.[15]

## Follow-up question to those who responded 4 or 5 to Q8:

# Why?

**Some respondents feel empowered by aid because after losing everything aid is the vital source to cover their most important needs to survive in crisis and to reduce the hardships of life.** It gives people mental comfort and some feeling of security. However, they also mention the short-term nature of support which makes them worry about future stability.

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[12] Ground Truth Solutions. "Perceptions of Internally Displaced Persons in Northern Iraq." Iraq: MMP, October 2017.
[13] IOM. "IOM Funding Appeal (January – December 2017.)" Iraq: IOM.
[14] REACH. "Iraqi Migration To Europe In 2016: Profiles, Drivers And Return." Itaq: REACH, June 2017.
[15] Ground Truth Solutions. "Perceptions of Internally Displaced Persons in Northern Iraq." Iraq: MMP, October 2017.

## Q9. Progress

# Overall, is life improving for people in Iraq?

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 = Not at all | |
| 2 = Not really | |
| 3 = Neutral | |
| 4 = Mostly yes | |
| 5 = Yes, very much | |
| No opinion | |
| Do not want to answer | |

**(values in %)**                                           **Mean: 2.4**

| 26 | 23 | 17 | 17 | 9 | 8 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

**Most respondents do not share a sense that life is improving.**

Refugees are notably more optimistic about the outlook than IDPs and returned IDPs.

| Affected population | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **IDP** | | | | | **2.3** |
| 32 | 25 | 14 | 12 | 8 | 9 |
| **Refugee** | | | | | **3.6** |
| 1 | 16 | 20 | 36 | 16 | 11 |
| **Returned IDP** | | | | | **2.2** |
| 34 | 25 | 24 | 14 | 2 | 1 |

Scores are lowest among IDPs in Baghdad, Diyala, and Dohuk as well as IDPs and returnees in Salah Al Din, with the majority seeing little progress in people's lives.

| Region | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Anbar** | | | | | **2.8** |
| 9 | 16 | 62 | 12 | 1 | |
| **Babylon** | | | | | **4.7** |
| 33 | 67 | | | | |
| **Baghdad** | | | | | **1.1** |
| 93 | 4 | 4 | | | |
| **Diyala** | | | | | **1.6** |
| 49 | 44 | 7 | | | |
| **Dohuk** | | | | | **1.9** |
| 28 | 59 | 14 | | | |
| **Erbil** | | | | | **3.4** |
| 3 | 23 | 18 | 33 | 15 | 9 |
| **Kirkuk** | | | | | **2.5** |
| 10 | 18 | 24 | 6 | 2 | 39 |
| **Najaf** | | | | | **2.6** |
| 47 | 32 | 5 | 16 | | |
| **Ninewa** | | | | | **2.6** |
| 22 | 30 | 15 | 19 | 8 | 6 |
| **Salah Al-Din** | | | | | **1.0** |
| 100 | | | | | |
| **Sulaymaniyah** | | | | | **4.1** |
| 4 | 50 | 11 | 36 | | |

Older respondents hold more sceptical views about the progress in Iraq.

| Age | | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **18 – 30 years** | | | | | | **2.6** |
| 17 | 24 | 22 | 22 | 7 | 8 | |
| **31 – 40 years** | | | | | | **2.3** |
| 27 | 25 | 16 | 17 | 9 | 5 | |
| **41 – 81 years** | | | | | | **2.1** |
| 34 | 20 | 14 | 12 | 10 | 10 | |

# DEMOGRAPHICS

The graphs below depict the demographic breakdown of the 849 respondents. Each graph includes percentages, as well as the frequency in parentheses. For detailed information for each region see the Annex.

## Gender

46% (394)
**FEMALE**

54% (455)
**MALE**

## Age

| | |
|---|---|
| 18-30 years | **32% (270)** |
| 31-40 years | **33% (279)** |
| 41-81 years | **35% (299)** |

## Affected population

| | |
|---|---|
| IDP | **64% (541)** |
| Refugee | **19% (161)** |
| Returned IDP | **17% (147)** |

## Region

| | |
|---|---|
| Ninewa | **27% (230)** |
| Erbil | **22% (185)** |
| Anbar | **10% (85)** |
| Salah Al-Din | **9% (79)** |
| Diyala | **7% (61)** |
| Kirkuk | **6% (51)** |
| Dohuk | **4% (35)** |
| Najaf | **4% (33)** |
| Babylon | **4% (30)** |
| Baghdad | **4% (30)** |
| Sulaymaniyah | **4% (30)** |

## Type of accommodation

| | |
|---|---|
| Camp | **53% (446)** |
| Private | **47% (403)** |

## Service

| | |
|---|---|
| Food/nutrition | **60% (512)** |
| WASH | **51% (434)** |
| Healthcare | **33% (277)** |
| Education | **29% (250)** |
| None | **20% (167)** |
| Cash | **13% (107)** |
| Psychosocial support | **10% (84)** |
| Shelter | **7% (56)** |
| Information | **3% (28)** |

# SECTION 2 – FIELD STAFF SURVEY

## Reading This Section

This report uses bar charts for closed Likert scale questions. The charts show the distribution (in %) of answer options chosen for a particular question – with colours ranging from dark red for negative answers to dark green for positive ones. The mean or average score is also shown for each question on a scale from 1 to 5. For each question we indicate the main take-away or conclusion drawn from the data. For the open questions we use summary of responses and quotes of the original answers.

# SURVEY QUESTIONS

### Q1. Transparency

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 = Not at all | |
| 2 = Not very much | |
| 3 = Neutral | |
| 4 = Mostly yes | |
| 5 = Very much | |

## Do you feel aid funds go where they are most needed?

(values in %)                                                                 **Mean: 3.9**

| 1 | 9 | 10 | 54 | 26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|

**Humanitarian aid funds in Iraq appear to be used in accordance with the current needs and demands in the field.**

Respondents from local organisations share a more critical perspective on how the funds are allocated compared to international staff.

| Type of organisation | Mean |
|---|---|
| INGO | **4.0** |
| 2 / 7 / 8 / 53 / 31 | |
| Local responder | **3.5** |
| 6 / 24 / 12 / 29 / 29 | |
| UN agency | **3.9** |
| 9 / 13 / 58 / 20 | |

### Follow-up to those who responded 1, 2, or 3 to Q1:

## Please explain why you answered that way.

**Field staff indicate several problems with current aid distribution.** They mention assessment problems that result in aid failing to reach those most vulnerable, or covering the most urgent needs. They also talk about more focus on quantity than quality of aid and voice concerns about a lack of strategic projects (including social cohesion). Poor management and coordination seem to be an issue, which leads to duplication of effort and, in some instances, to corruption.

> "A lot of the response is spent fulfilling requests from national/regional offices which do not take into account the local context and situation on the ground and which appear to lack any strategic significance or relevance."

> "Too much emphasis on camps, but little is provided to off-camp settings. Too much in-kind assistance as well. Markets are now flooded with UNHCR, ICRC, and WFP branded goods."

> "Poor coordination by other protection and non-protection actors in the camp, delaying response to referred cases and timely follow up; Limited provision of humanitarian services (especially, healthcare, legal, SGBV *[Sexual and gender based violence]*); Heavy presence of armed actors in the camp causing serious protection issues and affecting protection work."

## Please give 1 or 2 examples of how this could be improved.

**Field staff call for: more consultations among local organisations and with the target community; investment in capacity building of local NGOs, better programme monitoring; and more flexibility in the use of funds.**

"Enhance communication channels with local organisations and direct dialogue with the target community and rationalise reliance on local governments and politically motivated actors."

"One is strengthening local capacities for sustainability and secondly large NGOs have high operational costs which could be minimised by introducing built-in accountability systems in the delivery. CASH distributions through Mobile Network operators, for example, cost less than SCOPE systems *[System for Cash Operations]*."

"Improve outreach or needs based assessment approach."

"There should be restrictions to international personnel costs absorbed by NGOs. More chances should be given to local NGOs. Even though they may not be able to write strong concept notes, the quality of deliveries is not much different, if not better, than the international NGOs. Also, UNHCR can consider more direct implementation compared to bulk delegation of projects to NGOs."

### Q2. Management of aid

# Do you feel that aid is managed well by the humanitarian community in Iraq?

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 = Not at all | |
| 2 = Not very much | |
| 3 = Neutral | |
| 4 = Mostly yes | |
| 5 = Very much | |
| Do not know | |

**(values in %)**                                                      **Mean: 3.8**

| 2 | 10 | 10 | 52 | 20 | 6 |
|---|----|----|----|----|---|

**Aid funds are regarded as well-managed by the humanitarian community in Iraq, although there is some difference of opinion among staff working for international and national organsiations.**

Participants from local organisations are less satisfied with the administration of aid than other field staff.

| Type of organisation | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **INGO** | | | | | **3.8** |
| 2 | 10 | 10 | 53 | 19 | 5 |
| **Local responder** | | | | | **3.4** |
| 5 | 20 | 10 | 25 | 20 | 20 |
| **UN agency** | | | | | **3.9** |
| 1 | 8 | 10 | 54 | 21 | 6 |

HQ staff are more concerned about how the aid is managed compared to other staff members.

| Role in the field | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Field staff team leader** | | | | | **3.8** |
| 2 | 9 | 12 | 58 | 17 | 2 |
| **Field staff team member** | | | | | **4.0** |
| 1 | 6 | 8 | 53 | 25 | 6 |
| **HQ staff** | | | | | **3.3** |
| 5 | 23 | 14 | 41 | 9 | 9 |
| **Others*** | | | | | **3.9** |
| 11 | 6 | 43 | 23 | 17 | |

* "Others" include consultants, specialists, assitants and other external support.

**Follow-up to those who responded 1, 2, or 3 to Q2:**

# Please explain why you answered that way.

**Aid managers point to a range of issues.** These relate to but are not limited to poor programme design that leads to waste and duplication of resources; gaps in the response caused by focusing on IDPs, refugees, and the Mosul area; lack of contextual knowledge among aid providers as well as the long-term impact of the aid. Some staff members complain about competition for funding instead of coordination among humanitarian responders; shortage in professional experienced staff and interference from the local government.

> "Humanitarian actors need to have a better understanding of the affected population's aspirations, needs, and trends."

> "Sometimes the project design doesn't reflect the exact situation on the ground, the lack of knowledge of the context and market mapping lead to waste in money in many cases."

> "There are many useless programmes and many useless non-food items. Additionally, the implementation method for some programmes are sometimes a waste of time, effort, and money."

# Please give 1 or 2 examples of how this could be improved.

**A better humanitarian response would include: coordinated harmonised service mapping and provision; timely assessment and monitoring (including third-party monitoring); more local staff involved in the programme design and implementation; and closer work with government to get access to all areas.**

> "Impact of projects should be vigorously assessed prior to continuation the following year; turnover of managers should be stabilised so that programs don't suffer delays or deviations."

> "Gaining the acceptance of the local community for the organisations, and to establish the co-operation and involvement of local governmental representatives. This is needed in the form of training organisations and raising their awareness in order to improve their attitudes, treatment and understanding of the scope of the people's need for aid."

> "Need to put real coordination system in place between agencies. Need of monitoring project implementation. Very strong leadership from HC but inaccessible. Weak staff who do not understand the mandate and work of the different agencies. Poor system within OCHA."

## Q3. Localisation

# Do you feel there is sufficient funding for local and national aid providers in Iraq?

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 = Not at all | |
| 2 = Not very much | |
| 3 = Neutral | |
| 4 = Mostly yes | |
| 5 = Very much | |
| Do not know | |
| Do not want to answer | |

**(values in %)**                                                                 **Mean: 3.7**

| 3 | 18 | 12 | 44 | 9 | 7 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

**Support for local and national responders is mostly sufficient according to staff interviewed. However, there is room for improvement.**

Staff from local organisations say they receive insufficient support and almost one-third of local staff chose not to answer the question.

| Type of organisation | Mean |
|---|---|
| INGO | 3.4 |

| 3 | 19 | 13 | 43 | 9 | 7 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

| | |
|---|---|
| Local responder | 2.9 |

| 25 | 25 | 10 | 5 | 5 | 30 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

| | |
|---|---|
| UN agency | 3.5 |

| 4 | 14 | 11 | 49 | 10 | 8 | 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

**Follow-up to those who responded 1, 2, or 3 to Q3:**

# Please explain why you answered that way.

**Localisation is complicated by limited resources, favouritism of INGOs over local organisations, government barriers, and corruption.** While local NGOs lack the capacity to get funding and implement projects, little has been done for capacity building and increasing their involvement in coordination structures.

> "It mostly goes to international organisations while NGOs bear more risk."

> "Local agencies, though capable, need capacity building and more ownership of the response."

> "The response is still quite International and NGO centric. Given the massive sensitivities and ethnic divisions as well as political loyalties, it is not always feasible for national actors to provide assistance in a neutral, impartial way and avoid pressures."

> "Projects are often awarded for one fiscal year's duration only, with high expectations and no strategic approach and sustainability (including capacity building and how those national partners fit or contribute to the overall picture in the medium- to long-term). Insistence on formal requirements (e.g. completed registration of the national/local partners) disregards the realities on the ground like lack of capacity or political will on the side of the government to allow certain NGOs to get registered (be it because of their perceived political affiliations or the specific ethnic composition of staff)."

# Please give 1 or 2 examples of how this could be improved.

**Suggested solutions to the problem of localisation include investment in human rights training, IHL, technical capacity, Humanitarian Principles, and SPHERE standards.** A special fund for local NGOs; increased cooperation and long-term partnership between INGOs and local responders as well as joint implementation of projects are seen as necessary steps on the way to localisation of response.

> "Partnering international NGOs with national NGOs in order to build capacity - providing information on partner performance to cluster to see where the gaps are in service delivery - at the moment, especially with WASH - I see that UN donors are not providing accurate information on performance."

> "Support the local NGOs to implement the projects because many have experience working directly with the beneficiaries and good relations with the local authorities who really want to facilitate the process in order to deliver the best service to the IDPs."

> "National actors should be given more chances to express themselves through office visits and introduction sessions instead of judging only by profiles. Also, more investment should be made to build capacity. The UN system seems to lack the patience for doing this."

> "More coordinated funding to solve root causes of problems in Iraq and according to HRP *[Humanitarian Response Plan]* strategy."

## Q4. Feedback

# Do you feel that field staff like you have enough information about the way refugees see aid programmes?

| 1 = Not at all |
| 2 = Not very much |
| 3 = Neutral |
| 4 = Mostly yes |
| 5 = Very much |
| Do not know |

(values in %)                                                                                   **Mean: 3.9**

| 2 | 9 | 8 | 46 | 26 | 10 |
|---|---|---|----|----|----|

**Staff interviewed feel well informed on the feedback of affected people and their opinion on the provided aid.**

Respondents from local organisations are less convinced that field staff is informed about people's feedback than others.

| Type of organisation | | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **INGO** | | | | | | **4.0** |
| 1 | 9 | 7 | 45 | 29 | 10 | |
| **Local responder** | | | | | | **3.5** |
| 5 | 19 | 10 | 19 | 24 | 24 | |
| **UN agency** | | | | | | **3.9** |
| 3 | 8 | 9 | 51 | 22 | 7 | |

### Follow-up to those who responded 1, 2, or 3 to Q4:

## Please explain why you answered that way.

**Lack of information among staff is due to insufficient evaluation efforts and feedback mechanisms, scarcity of experienced staff with local knowledge, poor community involvement in the programme design, a top-down approach, and lack of coordination among humanitarian partners.**

"Communications with communities is always an afterthought in a response."

"Most of the feedback I see refers to what affected people need and want, rather than what they think about aid programmes."

"Despite efforts to the contrary, there is a gap between UNHCR and POCs *[Protection of Civilians]*. Daily contact to intimately get to know the entire community happens only for the implementing partners."

## Please give 1 or 2 examples of how this could be improved.

**Gaps in the feedback loop could be closed by conducting continuous surveys which reflect beneficiary perceptions and by sharing the results throughout the relevant clusters and with other partners. Including communities in programme design and monitoring activities; working directly with them in the field; hiring and training competent staff are all seen as ways to improve feedback mechanisms.**

"Donors allowing budgets for MEAL and CwC *[Communications with Communities]* or having dedicated CwC actors/trainers."

"Instead of having a long study that won't be read I would suggest increasing funding and project timelines to put in place community groups and community-based projects, driven by the community of affected people."

"Donors force INGOs to comply with the CHS *[Core Humanitarian Standard]*."

### Q5. Participation

## Do refugees have enough say in the way aid programmes are designed and implemented?

| 1 = Not at all |
|---|
| 2 = Not very much |
| 3 = Neutral |
| 4 = Mostly yes |
| 5 = Very much |
| Do not know |

**(values in %)**                **Mean: 3.4**

| 7 | 18 | 11 | 40 | 11 | 14 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

**Staff interviewed feel that affected people are to some extent able to influence programme design.** However, every fourth respondent does not believe they can.

Nearly half of the respondents from local organisations do not believe affected people have a say in how the programmes are run.

| Type of organisation | | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **INGO** | | | | | | **3.3** |
| 7 | 20 | 10 | 39 | 11 | 12 | |
| **Local responder** | | | | | | **2.7** |
| 17 | 28 | 17 | 6 | 17 | 17 | |
| **UN agency** | | | | | | **3.5** |
| 5 | 15 | 12 | 45 | 10 | 14 | |

Field staff team members feel more optimistic about the involvement of affected people in programme design than other staff.

| Role in the field | | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Field staff team leader** | | | | | | **3.3** |
| 8 | 23 | 12 | 38 | 12 | 8 | |
| **Field staff team member** | | | | | | **3.6** |
| 5 | 12 | 9 | 44 | 11 | 18 | |
| **HQ staff** | | | | | | **3.1** |
| 9 | 23 | 12 | 40 | 5 | 12 | |
| **Others*** | | | | | | **3.2** |
| 9 | 18 | 15 | 24 | 12 | 21 | |

\* "Others" include consultants, specialists, assitants and other external support.

**Follow-up to those who responded 1, 2, or 3 to Q5:**

# Please explain why you answered that way.

**Voices of affected people are not considered because of a prevailing top-down approach and pre-designed programming; donor-led funding; the lack of clear feedback channels to collect community perceptions (MEAL systems); no time for community consultations in the project timeline; power relations within the community; a lack of awareness and knowledge about the aid programmes among the population; and a perceived ignorance of community members.**

"Funding allocation is often donor-led with larger UN or government sector organisations leading on sectoral strategy that does not always reflect needs."

"Usually household-level surveys are pre-structured to identify vulnerability not designing and implementation."

"It takes a long time before projects are given a green light and before this happens it is difficult to consult the concerned population because there is worry about raising expectations. Once a project gets approved, it is usually approved late and there is pressure to implement it quickly with little opportunity to involve the community and incorporate their opinions into the planning and implementation."

# Please give 1 or 2 examples of how this could be improved.

**Humanitarian actors should base programme design and HRP processes on needs assessments, consultations and coordination with community, local partner organisations, and local authorities.** Some respondents call for more community driven projects, third-party evaluations and integrated dialogue channels from the start of the project cycle. Focus group discussions and field visits are suggested as CwC mechanisms. Available perceptual data should be better cycled among the organisations. Regarding the donors, there is a request for advanced notice of proposals and more flexible funding for new areas of work. To raise awareness among the affected population, they should be informed about the goals of the programme and the selection criteria for different services. This has to be explained both to those who receive and do not receive the aid by sharing brochures, for example.

"Conduct more frequent, specific outreach to underrepresented groups (such as women and youth) to ensure that programming meets their needs – and not just the needs of 'community representatives' such as Mukhtars [a village or mahalle (neighbourhood)]."

"More activities that increase community participation, and ownership in WASH projects. This should be from the start of the project cycle."

"Challenging but integrated surveys (MICS [Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys]) are most important and shall be done on periodic basis to provide better information on needs and responses. Each proposal shall be communicated and approved by the authority who is doing assessments and see how well the response is designed."

## Q6. Cash

# Do you feel that cash programmes contribute to better outcomes than other kinds of aid?

| 1 = Not at all |
| 2 = Not very much |
| 3 = Neutral |
| 4 = Mostly yes |
| 5 = Very much |
| Do not know |

(values in %)                                                             **Mean: 3.9**

| 2 | 6 | 8 | 33 | 41 | 9 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

**Most respondents feel that cash programmes are a more effective practice which leads to better outcomes.**

The majority of respondents from local organisations favour cash support over other kinds of aid.

| Type of organisation | Mean |
|---|---|
| INGO | **4.2** |
| 2 | 7 | 7 | 29 | 46 | 10 | |
| Local responder | **4.5** |
| 11 | 16 | 68 | 5 | |
| UN agency | **4.0** |
| 3 | 6 | 10 | 40 | 32 | 9 | |

## Follow-up to those who responded 1, 2, or 3 to Q6:

# Please explain why you answered that way.

**Some staff see no advantage in cash programming as it is mostly a short-term fix without sustainable solutions.** Cash does not suit all purposes and needs to complement other sectors such as protection, education, and WASH. Besides that, it is prone to corruption and requires good management.

"It depends; unconditional cash can be a negative incentive to work or make other efforts. Cash for work in emergency settings is a much better alternative as it accomplishes many things like increased social cohesion, access to safe working environment and income, and it contributes to clean up, maintenance, rehabilitation."

"There are better ways to help peoples' sustainable livelihoods, and to boost the community's economy in general such as rebuilding factories and mobilizing human resources in sustainable jobs."

"This is a very broad question. In terms of shelter or food distributions – then sometimes yes. But it depends on the context. However, for health, education, or protection programming, cash is not a replacement. Furthermore, while cash gives the individual the ability to decide what he/she is most in need of, it is not possible to ensure the cash assistance is going towards that particular need."

## Please give 1 or 2 examples of how this could be improved.

**Staff believe that cash programmes could be more effective if they included infrastructure investment, market, and business structures; were adjusted to different sectors and needs; and came with an exit strategy.** Some respondents suggest implementing a pilot project before rolling out the final programme. The aid should only strengthen the basic needs of the local community without creating dependency.

> "Need to assess, orient, and keep monitoring."

> "If it's meant for people in camps with restricted movement, then it's not effective. Also, when cash is given during the development stage without identifying specific problems, it might be used by the families for other priorities apart from the ones planned by the aid programme."

> "There should be specific cash programming for whatever sectors are being replaced by it – for example cash for shelter or cash for food. By tying it to some sort of basic need, humanitarian partners can ensure that this cash assistance is going towards a real need that we normally would have provided anyway to meet basic needs."

### Q7. Flexibility

## Do humanitarian organisations have the flexibility to adjust their projects and programmes when things change?

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 = Not at all | |
| 2 = Not very much | |
| 3 = Neutral | |
| 4 = Mostly yes | |
| 5 = Very much | |
| Do not know | |

**(values in %)**          **Mean: 3.7**

| 2 | 12 | 14 | 46 | 19 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

**Staff interviewed believe they can adjust the programming to the changing needs in the field.**

Respondents from international organisations feel more flexible compared to staff from local NGOs.

| Type of organisation | Mean |
|---|---|
| INGO | **3.7** |

| 2 | 13 | 13 | 42 | 20 | 9 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

| Local responder | **3.2** |
|---|---|

| 11 | 21 | 26 | 16 | 21 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

| UN agency | **3.8** |
|---|---|

| 1 | 10 | 12 | 54 | 18 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

### Follow-up to those who responded 1, 2, or 3 to Q7:

## Please explain why you answered that way.

**Staff mention obstacles to flexibility including donor restrictions; purposeful funds; overcomplicated and time consuming re-alignment processes; mandates and programmes which predefine the services; and the failure to accept mistakes and learn from them.**

> "Adjust – yes. Overhaul a dysfunctional programme? No. Often this is also a matter of staff who are reluctant to assume responsibility for a failing project. Achievements are exaggerated and problematic issues are glossed over."

> "Projects and programmes planned and approved by high-level decisionmakers through log frames, sometimes six months prior to implementation, so no one can change anything."

## Please give 1 or 2 examples of how this could be improved.

**More flexibility could be achieved if flexibility and adjustments to the dynamic situation on the ground were included in contracts; and/or if funds could be moved between areas, sectors, and clusters.** The re-alignment process also needs to be faster and less complicated. Emergency plans with unconditional funds and long-term funding plans would help the field staff to adjust the programmes to the changing needs.

> "Donor targets for particular communities/locations, based on domestic pressures. Unpredictable and shorter-term funding (a year or less) with tight spending deadlines - can result in a lot of wasteful expenditure as agencies attempt to increase their 'burn rates.' "

> "Create a culture of better needs based response on changing needs in the donor and cluster community."

### Q8. Reporting time

## Do you feel the amount of time you spend on reporting is appropriate?

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 = Not at all | |
| 2 = Not very much | |
| 3 = Neutral | |
| 4 = Mostly yes | |
| 5 = Very much | |
| Do not know | |

**(values in %)**            **Mean: 3.9**

| 2 | 10 | 7 | 50 | 26 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

**The amount of time spent on reporting is seen as mostly appropriate.**

HQ staff are the least satisfied with the reporting time among the staff interviewed.

| Role in the field | Mean |
|---|---|
| Field staff team leader | **3.9** |

| 2 | 11 | 8 | 55 | 23 | 2 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

| | |
|---|---|
| Field staff team member | **4.0** |

| 1 | 8 | 7 | 46 | 29 | 8 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

| | |
|---|---|
| HQ staff | **3.7** |

| 2 | 19 | 9 | 40 | 26 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

| | |
|---|---|
| Others* | **4.1** |

| 3 | 3 | 6 | 54 | 26 | 9 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

\* "Others" include consultants, specialists, assitants and other external support.

### Follow-up to those who responded 1, 2, or 3 to Q8:

## Please explain why you answered that way.

**Some field staff feel burdened by the amount of reporting required because there is a lack of standardisation between the donors and some information is required multiple times.** Meanwhile, field staff receive no response or follow up on the reports and issues they raise in the reports. Short-term grants put additional pressure on completing and reporting processes while failing to cover "real" indicators of the effectiveness and relevance of humanitarian response.

> "Donors often use complex and different reporting formats that require detailed input and breakdowns that cannot always be generated (either at all or reliably) within the given short deadlines (this is especially true for UN agencies)."

> "Reporting time would be appropriate if people actually read the reports, followed up with comments, and acted on the reports. My email is filled with queries about issues that I have reported on many times before."

## Please give 1 or 2 examples of how this could be improved.

**In line with the Grand Bargain, the staff interviewed suggest harmonizing reporting requirements, formats, and timelines across donors.** Creating an effective cluster indicator that clearly links to the response activities and switching to a one centralized web-based platform for reporting to all donors could also streamline the reporting process. More office, staff, and training support is needed to deal with reporting and there should be more time between spending and reporting.

> "Monthly reports with sufficient time to collect data from the preceding month and draft a narrative."

> "Having daily, weekly and monthly reports give you the same information."

### Q9. Cooperation

# Do humanitarian and development actors work together effectively in Iraq?

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 = Not at all | |
| 2 = Not very much | |
| 3 = Neutral | |
| 4 = Mostly yes | |
| 5 = Very much | |
| Do not know | |
| Do not want to answer | |

**(values in %)**                                           **Mean: 3.6**

| 6 | 11 | 12 | 38 | 17 | 11 | 5 |
|---|----|----|----|----|----|---|

**Most respondents see effective cooperation among humanitarian and development actors, although there are some who do not.**

Respondents from local organisations are poorly informed about cooperation among the humanitarian and development actors.

| Type of organisation | Mean |
|---|---|
| INGO | **3.6** |

| 6 | 10 | 14 | 37 | 17 | 14 | 3 |
|---|----|----|----|----|----|---|

| Local responder | **3.3** |
|---|---|

| 14 | 5 | 10 | 10 | 19 | 29 | 14 |
|----|---|----|----|----|----|----|

| UN agency | **3.6** |
|---|---|

| 4 | 12 | 10 | 43 | 17 | 7 | 6 |
|---|----|----|----|----|---|---|

Field staff team members interviewed are more convinced that the two actors work together effectively compared to other respondents.

| Role in the field | Mean |
|---|---|
| Field staff team leader | **3.4** |

| 8 | 14 | 14 | 41 | 14 | 6 | 3 |
|---|----|----|----|----|---|---|

| Field staff team member | **3.8** |
|---|---|

| 2 | 9 | 11 | 34 | 22 | 13 | 8 |
|---|---|----|----|----|----|---|

| HQ staff | **3.4** |
|---|---|

| 11 | 7 | 16 | 36 | 11 | 18 |
|----|---|----|----|----|----|

| Others* | **3.5** |
|---|---|

| 6 | 11 | 11 | 40 | 11 | 17 | 3 |
|---|----|----|----|----|----|---|

\* "Others" include consultants, specialists, assitants and other external support.

Staff working in the camps are mostly convinced the two parties work well together.

| Area | | | | | | | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Camp** | | | | | | | **3.9** |
| 3 | 8 | 8 | 43 | 24 | 10 | 4 | |
| **Other** | | | | | | | **3.3** |
| 9 | 10 | 17 | 38 | 9 | 12 | 6 | |
| **Urban settings** | | | | | | | **3.5** |
| 6 | 15 | 14 | 32 | 17 | 12 | 5 | |

## Follow-up to those who responded 1, 2, or 3 to Q9:

# Please explain why you answered that way.

**Negative perceptions are explained by poor coordination of field-level initiatives, the lack of development projects, and the absence of clear transition plans from emergency to reconstruction.** Staff interviewed see prioritisation of one's own work and a competition for funds among the humanitarian and developmental organisations instead of cooperation. The overlapping of projects and the duplication of work and services in the same area or camp were given as examples of poor cooperation between the actors.

> "Sometimes you find different missions to the same camp without coordination. Second, not all basic needs reach the people in time, for example, some IDPs pay the money they receive for food to buy medicines."

> "High staff turnover and lack of institutional memory adds to the problem. Lack of accountability (especially in the event of short-term coverage; and at all levels)."

> "There isn't real coordination in the cluster meetings, nor coordination between organizations. INGOs start programs without proper assessments or surveys to see if other INGOs or NGOs are providing the same services. Also, some organizations use money as incentive to coordinate with the government or get participants to attend, which promote negative behaviour."

# Please give 1 or 2 examples of how this could be improved.

**Cooperation could be improved by joint implementation of programmes and through long-term strategies targeting root causes of the problems.** Initiatives should be pushed down to the governorate/regional level, and led by competent staff with longer field presence. Staff interviewed call for better service mapping and assessment of local capacities as well as more external communication and coordination mechanisms based on the cluster system.

> "Design and implementation of stabilization program should be more integrated with Humanitarian Response."

> "Need to have the clusters linked in with a national strategy on phasing into recovery and development in each governorate."

> "Should be two levels of coordination, one with UN agencies and donors and the second for the implementing NGOs. This will improve the distribution tasks, and promote better implementation and effective communication."

# DEMOGRAPHICS

The graphs below depict the demographic breakdown of the 382 respondents. Each graph includes percentages, as well as the frequency in parentheses.

## Gender

30% (114) **FEMALE**

70% (269) **MALE**

## Work with displaced people**

| | |
|---|---|
| IDP | 88% (341) |
| Returnee | 46% (179) |
| Refugee | 40% (156) |

## Area of work

| | |
|---|---|
| Camp | 37% (138) |
| Urban setting | 35% (132) |
| Other* | 28% (107) |

* Those who selected "other" responded that they work in both areas, as well as in communications, non-camp settings, community centres, country offices, youth centres and in a supportive capacity with NGOs and beneficiaries.

## Location of work**

| | |
|---|---|
| Psychological Support | 22% (87) |
| Cash | 21% (83) |
| WASH | 20% (79) |
| Food / Nutrition | 18% (68) |
| Information | 14% (56) |
| Shelter Support | 14% (54) |
| Education | 13% (50) |
| Healthcare | 9% (36) |

## Age

| | |
|---|---|
| 22-28 years | 33% (121) |
| 29-37 years | 34% (124) |
| 38-65 years | 33% (118) |

## Role in the field

| | |
|---|---|
| Field staff team member | 43% (164) |
| Field staff team leader | 36% (140) |
| HQ Staff | 12% (45) |
| Other* | 9% (35) |

* "Other" includes consultants, specialists, assitants and other external support.

## Type of organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| INGO | 52% (197) |
| UN Agency | 43% (163) |
| Local Responders | 6% (22) |

## Location of work**

| | |
|---|---|
| Ninewa | 37% (142) |
| Erbil | 30% (115) |
| Sulaymaniyah | 27% (105) |
| Dahuk | 24% (94) |
| Kirkuk | 20% (79) |
| Diyala | 18% (68) |
| Baghdad | 17% (66) |
| Salan al-Din | 17% (65) |
| Anbar | 13% (49) |
| Najaf | 8% (30) |
| Babylon | 5% (19) |

**Respondents could choose multiple answer options, therefore percentages do not total 100%.

# RECOMMENDATIONS AND NEXT STEPS

The following next steps are suggested for consideration by humanitarian agencies in Iraq:

**a) Dialogue**. Discuss the main findings with your own staff and partners to verify and deepen the analysis. These "sense-making" dialogues should focus on themes where the data suggests that further attention or course correction may be necessary.

**b) Advocacy**. Consider sharing the feedback with other agencies working in Iraq to see how, together, the humanitarian community can address concerns or bridge gaps.

**c) Closing the loop.** Encourage frontline staff to close the feedback loop by communicating changes or informing affected people about how services are being adapted to take their feedback into account.

Ground Truth Solutions' staff would be happy to discuss the findings with agencies in Iraq and offer advice on follow-up activities.

# NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

## Survey development

Ground Truth developed two survey instruments – the affected people survey and the frontline staff survey – to measure the implementation and the effects of the Grand Bargain commitments. The goal of the first survey is to gather feedback from affected people on the provision of humanitarian aid and track how perceptions evolve over time. The second survey collects feedback from frontline staff on the implementation of Grand Bargain themes and provides a baseline to track progress on implementation and impact of the commitments. Closed questions use a 1-5 Likert scale to quantify answers.

## Sample size

**Affected people survey**

Interviews were conducted with 849 individuals across eleven governorates in Iraq targeting Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), returned IDPs, and refugees.

**Field staff survey**

Online surveys were conducted with 382 field staff team members, team leaders, and M&E, programme and technical specialists from different organisations, namely INGOs, UN Agencies, and local responders. Thirty percent of respondents are female and 70% male.

## Sampling methodology

**Affected people survey**

The affected population was sampled pseudo-randomly. The objective was to have representative samples in each of ten governorates in Iraq, for each of the three groups of displaced people, and a 50-50 male-female split. Participants were randomly selected and interviewed in their place of residence, in public places, on the street, in social gatherings, and in the camps.

**Field staff survey**

Twenty-two organisations were approached and asked to participate in the survey and distribute the online survey using a convenience sample of their staff. Organisations participating were: UN agencies and international organisations (UNHCR; UNICEF; WFP; OCHA; UNWOMEN;

UNFPA; IOM; UNDP); INGOs (DRC; Save the Children; Mercy Corps; Oxfam; Mission East; Muslim Aid; Action Contre La Faim; ZOA; GSP/Taqadum; Islamic Relief Worldwide) and the local and national responders (Civil Development Organisation; Al Rakeezeh Foundation for Relief & Development; Al-Khanjar Foundation; Ministry of Displacement and Migration in Iraq).

## Data disaggregation

**Affected people survey**

Data is disaggregated by region, type of displacement, type of accommodation, gender, age, and services received.

**Field staff survey**

Data is disaggregated by type of organisation, role in the field, and area of field work. The analysis in the report includes any significant difference in the perceptions of different demographic groups. It does not, however, show the full breakdown of responses according to these categories.

## Language of the survey

**Affected people survey**

This survey was conducted in Kurdish and Arabic.

**Field staff survey**

This survey was conducted in Arabic, Kurdish, and English.

## Data collection

**Affected people survey**

Data was collected between 9 July and 21 September 2017 by SREO, an independent data collection company contracted by Ground Truth.

**Field staff survey**

Data was collected between 1 August and 7 September 2017 using an online survey tool.

**For more information about Ground Truth surveys in Iraq, please contact:**

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# ANNEX – DETAILED DEMOGRAPHICS

## Affected population per region

| Legend |
| --- |
| IDP |
| Refugee |
| Returned IDP |

| Region | IDP | Returned IDP |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Anbar | 39% (33) | 61% (52) |
| Babylon | 100% (30) | |
| Baghdad | 100% (30) | |
| Diyala | 49% (30) | 51% (31) |
| Dohuk | 100% (35) | |
| Erbil | 29% (54) | 71% (131) |
| Kirkuk | 100% (51) | |
| Najaf | 100% (33) | |
| Ninewa | 87% (200) | 13% (30) |
| Salah Al Din | 57% (45) | 43% (34) |
| Sulaymaniyah | 100% (30) | |

## Accommodation per region

| Legend |
| --- |
| Camp |
| Private accommodation |

| Region | Camp | Private accommodation |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Anbar | 36% (31) | 64% (54) |
| Babylon | 63% (19) | 37% (11) |
| Baghdad | 60% (18) | 40% (12) |
| Diyala | 49% (30) | 51% (31) |
| Dohuk | 11% (4) | 89% (31) |
| Erbil | 43% (80) | 57% (105) |
| Kirkuk | | 100% (51) |
| Najaf | 100% (33) | |
| Ninewa | 85% (196) | 15% (34) |
| Salah Al Din | 25% (20) | 75% (59) |
| Sulaymaniyah | 50% (15) | 50% (15) |

## Affected population per accommodation

| Legend |
| --- |
| IDP |
| Refugee |
| Returned IDP |

| Accommodation | IDP | Refugee | Returned IDP |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Camp | 73% (324) | 21% (94) | 6% (28) |
| Private | 54% (217) | 17% (67) | 30% (119) |