Conflict and Fragility

Investing in Security

A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF ARMED VIOLENCE REDUCTION INITIATIVES

OECD

UN DP

GENEVA DECLARATION

Conflict and Fragility

Investing in Security

A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF ARMED VIOLENCE REDUCTION INITIATIVES

GENEVA DECLARATION

OECD

UNDP

This work is published on the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Organisation or of the governments of its member countries ; or those of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Acknowledgements

Table of contents

Figures

Tables

Boxes

Abbreviations

AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AVRP	Armed violence reduction and prevention
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CAVR	*Comisção Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconcil* (Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation)
CTDT	*Commission technique de désarmement des civils et de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères et de petit calibre* (Technical Commission for Civilian Disarmament and the Fight Against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
F-FDTL	*Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste* (Timor-Leste Defence Force)
GDP	Gross domestic product
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDP	Internally displaced person
INCAF	International Network on Conflict and Fragility
JSSR	Justice and security sector reform
LNP	Liberian National Police
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMC	One Man Can Campaign

PRONASCI	*Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania* (National Programme for Public Citizen Security)
PRSP	Poverty reduction strategy paper
SGBV	Sexual and gender-based violence
SSR	Security system reform
TRC	Truth and reconciliation commission
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIT	United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste
UNOB	United Nations Mission in Burundi
UNODC	United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime
UPP	*Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora* (Pacification Police Units)
WHO	World Health Organization

Executive summary

Conservative estimates indicate that at least 740 000 men, women, youth and children die each year as a result of armed violence, most of them in low- and medium-income settings (Krause, Muggah, Wenmann 2008). The majority of these deaths occur in situations other than war, though armed conflicts continue to generate a high incidence of casualties. Approaches to preventing and reducing these deaths and related suffering are becoming increasingly important on the international agenda. The United Nations (UN) Secretary General (2009) and UN General Assembly (2008) highlighted the relationships between armed violence and under-development and various high-level diplomatic processes are drawing more attention to promising solutions. In spite of the global preoccupation with the costs and consequences of armed violence, comparatively little evidence exists about how to stem its risks and effects. Virtually no information is available on armed violence reduction and prevention (AVRP) interventions, much less their effectiveness.

This report aims to fill this gap. It seeks to generate more understanding of what works and what does not when it comes to armed violence reduction and prevention (AVRP), to stimulate further evaluation and to contribute to more effective and efficient policies and programmes. The report is based on a large-scale mapping of AVRP activities around the world, focusing primarily on programming trends in six countries – Brazil, Burundi, Colombia, Liberia, South Africa and Timor-Leste. These countries represent the very different programming contexts – from high rates of urban criminal violence to protracted post-conflict insecurity – in which development practitioners are currently engaged. While offering new data and analysis, this assessment builds directly on the report *Armed Violence Reduction – Enabling Development* produced by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's International Network on Conflict and Fragility (OECD, 2009a).

An important evolution of AVRP programming in all six countries over the past decade was detected. Approximately two-thirds of all armed violence prevention and reduction activities reviewed in Brazil occurred between 2005 and 2010. Likewise, in Burundi, Colombia, Liberia, and Timor-Leste, nearly all initiatives began after 2005. Not only does the report highlight the importance

of internationally-mediated peace processes and security promotion efforts as important entry points for preventing and reducing violence, it highlights the significant investments made by national governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in more developmental approaches to AVRP over the past decade.

This report draws attention to the experimentation and innovation of AVRP initiatives. It finds that many actors are already actively engaged in "direct" and "indirect" AVRP activities, even if they label their initiatives by a different name. Many different practical approaches are used in AVRP activities to achieve the common objective of improving safety and security. Not only are the defence, police and justice sectors involved, but also specialists involved in urban planning, population health, tertiary and secondary education and youth programming. What many have in common is the experience of pursuing common comprehensive interventions to improve safety and security. Implementing agencies are similarly varied, ranging from multilateral and bilateral agencies to governments, NGOs and private organisations engaged in relief, development and social entrepreneurship. The most promising AVRP activities are forged on the basis of inter-sectoral partnerships and evidence-based approaches, and operate simultaneously at the local and national levels.

Key findings

The report offers a rich, empirical overview of the diversity and scope of armed violence reduction and prevention efforts. Specific observations include:

Considerable variation in the types of violence addressed by AVRP interventions: AVRP activities are not restricted to preventing and reducing violence associated with armed conflict or crime alone. Overall, the global mapping registered more than 20 separate categories of armed violence in which actors were involved, with some interventions focused on more types of violence than others. This reflects both the dynamic nature of armed violence in low- and medium-income countries, and also the diverse range of programming options on the ground.

The "armed violence" label is not always recognised nor uniformly applied by practitioners in low- and medium-income settings: "Direct" and "indirect" AVRP interventions range from public and citizen security and crime prevention to conflict prevention, peacebuilding, pacification and community policing. This linguistic and programmatic diversity is to be encouraged since it reflects local histories, cultures, and social realities. Multilateral and bilateral policy makers and practitioners must therefore be attentive to the semantics of armed violence when designing their interventions with local partners.

There is a considerable overlap between "direct" and "indirect" AVRP programming: Most organisations involved in AVRP claim to be pursuing predominantly "indirect" programming, focused on mitigating proximate and structural risk factors through education, employment and targeted development programming at "at-risk" groups. A smaller proportion claim to be addressing the instruments, actors or enabling institutions of armed violence "directly", via legislative initiatives to regulate and control firearms, working with gangs and collecting weapons from former combatants and civilians. Many organisations blend the two programming approaches.

A significant proportion of AVRP interventions seek to prevent and reduce collective and inter-personal violence, particularly violence against women: Both the assessment of large, development agency AVRP databases and the findings generated from the survey highlight the importance attached by programmes to reducing sexual and gender-based violence. Interventions address "at-risk" male youth and perpetrators through a combination of activities emphasising education, strengthening social and family networks, and employment. A comparatively smaller range of activities target female victims and survivors.

The global AVRP agenda is biased in favour of actions endorsed and supported by international agencies and national governments: A review of existing inventories of AVRP activities reinforces the incorrect perception that most activity is supported by international actors, public authorities, and non-governmental organisations, or takes place exclusively in upper-income settings. The persistent bias in the mainstream literature on armed violence prevention and reduction underlines a gap in the identification, analysis and evaluation of cross-border, sub-national, metropolitan, community-based and grass-roots activities, especially in lower- and medium-income contexts.

Multilateral and bilateral support for AVRP programmes appears to be most common in low-income, post-conflict contexts, while national, public authority-led and NGO efforts are more common in medium-income, crime-affected settings: The report detects more international and donor government agencies operating in post-conflict settings as compared to other non-war environments. Important exceptions are the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Both support integrated, citizen-security approaches in countries affected by high homicide and victimisation rates, but not necessarily armed conflict.

Recent, high-level policy engagement in armed violence is supported by two decades of relevant AVRP programming experience: There is nothing new about addressing AVRP as part of wider development aid programmes. Although not necessarily described as armed violence prevention or reduction per se, a vast array of interventions has emphasised conflict prevention, peacebuilding and wider security and safety priorities since the early 1990s.

Moving forward

The report sets out a baseline against which international and national development agencies can begin thinking through prospects for AVRP. For many organisations the language of armed violence may seem new and unfamiliar. For most practitioners, however, the importance of preventing and reducing armed violence to allow for investments to proceed is beyond question. The report sets out a number of practical suggestions to help the development sector move forward on this critical agenda. To this end, development agencies can:

Undertake AVRP "audits" or "inventory" initiatives: By taking stock of their portfolios, multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental agencies can determine where they have strengths and weaknesses. It would also allow organisations to begin assessing their own profile and direction with respect to AVRP more generally. OECD member countries could begin by inventorying their own activities in this regard.

Identify and reinforce the goals, indicators and promising AVRP practices: Rather than continuing to debate over definitions of armed violence, a key priority should be to ensure that stakeholders analyse their common problems and support comprehensive responses. To do this, development agencies will need to establish clear and achievable goals, methodologies for quantifying results and appropriate indicators, to design, implement and monitor interventions and their outcomes.

Adopt integrated and evidence-based approaches to preventing and reducing armed violence: The report demonstrates how the most effective "direct" and "indirect" interventions are multi-sector, operate at multiple levels, and rely on extensive partnerships among many actors. Such activities should promote both security and wider development outcomes, with the two being mutually reinforcing. For interventions to be sustainable and ultimately scaled-up, these kinds of integrated initiatives are imperative.

Document good or promising practice with reliable evaluations: Effective AVRP interventions are overwhelmingly based on high-quality evidence and routine baseline assessments. It is critical that development agencies document evidence of what works and what does not. While circumstances shape the form and function of AVRP interventions, development agencies need to assess the outputs and outcomes of such activities in both lower- and middle-income settings.

Link the AVRP agenda to the promotion of peacebuilding and statebuilding: Evidence has shown that promoting the capacity of public and civil society to document, prevent and reduce armed violence, strengthens state authority and legitimacy. Indeed, from a development practitioner perspective,

a more explicit focus on AVRP in existing peacebuilding and statebuilding strategies (OECD, 2010a) could produce significant benefits for local safety and security. The combination of "direct" and "indirect" AVRP interventions at various levels, focusing on the instruments and perpetrators of armed violence and positively manipulating the broader enabling environment could also generate important outcomes.

Introduction

There are literally thousands of armed violence reduction and prevention (AVRP) interventions underway around the world. Some regions – North America, Western Europe, South-Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean – seem to have more programming experience than others. Indeed, North and sub-Saharan Africa, South, South-East, and Central Asia and Central and Eastern Europe exhibit less activity (though not necessarily indicating low levels of actual programming experience).

As a social phenomenon, armed violence is multi-faceted and defies simple or ready-made solutions (Krause, Muggah and Wenmann, 2008). Any effort to make a meaningful dent must be backed up with a robust evidence base, strong inter-sector partnerships, and a comprehensive package of activities. The evidence presented in this report shows that AVRP is not only possible, it is already well underway (WHO, 2009). It singles out the innovative strategies and approaches undertaken by numerous public authorities, private sector entities and civil society organisations working on the frontlines, to contribute to safety and security and enable meaningful development opportunities to proceed.

The report underlines how targeted and appropriately-tailored interventions – including those that combine both "direct" and "indirect" measures to prevent and reduce armed violence – can lead to measurable improvements in security, whether recorded as declining homicides, violent assault, rape or domestic abuse or improved perceptions of security, mobility and wellbeing. However, the evidence base identifying what is going on, where, and supported by whom, remains comparatively thin, especially in low- and medium-income settings.

The development sector has an extremely important role to play in supporting AVRP activities, particularly in countries affected by or emerging from armed conflict or experiencing acute criminal violence. Most frontline aid agencies have already assumed this responsibility. Indeed, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are heavily involved in cutting-edge AVRP programming, and have been for almost two decades. As growing numbers of other multilateral, bilateral and national entities become more

involved in AVRP interventions, the underlying institutional architecture shaping these activities will need to be clearly defined and understood.

To accelerate the process, the Organisation for Economic Coordination and Development (OECD) and the UNDP – as part of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) – initiated a scoping effort to map out AVRP activities around the world (OECD, 2010a, 2010b). The intention was to develop preliminary evidence of the diverse policy and programming experiences, extract key trends and patterns, and ultimately identify promising AVRP interventions for comprehensive evaluation. To make the process manageable, the assessment focused on a selection of country case studies to highlight the different contexts in which AVRP activities are underway.

This report is nested in a wider debate on the issues of armed violence and development. It has been written in response to the language and recommendations of the United Nations Secretary General's Report (UNSG,

---

Box 0.1. **What is armed violence?**

Armed violence is difficult to define but easy to recognise. Most attempts to define violence tend to focus on settings, tools and outcomes. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) highlights the ways violence occurs in multiple environments, and includes a range of vectors and the causes of physical and psychological harm (WHO, 2002). Likewise, the OECD DAC (2009a) sets out some general parameters: "… armed violence is the intentional use of force (actual or threatened) with arms or explosives, against a person, group, community or state, that undermines people-centred security and/or sustainable development". This working definition covers armed violence perpetrated in both armed conflict and non-conflict settings.*

Key risk factors associated with armed violence can be divided into at least four categories. These include *i)* individual (*e.g.* youth, male, poor behaviour control, history of aggressive behaviour, low education achievement, substance abuse, exposure to violence); *ii)* relationship (*e.g.* poor family supervision, exposure to punishment, low family attachment, low socio-economic status, association with delinquents); *iii)* community (*e.g.* low social capital, high levels of unemployment, gangs, guns and narcotics, access to alcohol); and *iv)* societal (*e.g.* quality of governance, laws on social protection, income inequality, urban growth and cultures sanctioning violence).

* The definition of armed violence that is used for data collection from the various sources in this report does not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate uses of force. It also presumes that resorting to violence can be legitimate in some circumstances in accordance with relevant international and national law.

2009), UN General Assembly Resolutions (2008), the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development (2006) and the Oslo Commitments on Armed Violence (2010). The report has also utilised information from the UN-led Armed Violence Prevention Programme (AVPP), and, in particular, the extensive activities of the public health community on violence and injury prevention. Programmatically, the report builds on the ongoing efforts of the World Bank, IADB, UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), WHO and others.

Report structure

The report charts out a basic roadmap to guide prospective efforts to document and evaluate AVRP programmes worldwide. It targets development practitioners and policy makers in multilateral and bilateral agencies, international organisations and community-based associations. In featuring the findings of a review of global experience and laying out preliminary findings from mappings undertaken in six settings – Brazil, Burundi, Colombia, Liberia, South Africa, and Timor-Leste[1] – the report offers the first comparative inventory of AVRP ever undertaken. The findings are not exhaustive: only those programmes and projects that *i)* directly or indirectly targeted armed violence or *ii)* applied a "diagnosis-treatment-results" framework were selected.

The survey of the six countries provides new and original insights into the AVRP activities taking place in each of the countries. Following consultations with numerous agencies and individuals, a shortlist of 570 AVRP initiatives was entered into a database for statistical analysis.[2] Case information was collected through a combination of desk and field research (including key informant interviews, site visits and an on-line survey). While focused predominantly on six lower- and middle-income contexts, the mapping methodology illustrates the types of data that can be collected through a systematic, yet decentralised research effort.

The report is divided into four main sections. The first chapter sets out a conceptual framework and typology to assist development decision-makers and practitioners to acquire a better understanding of the different categories of AVRP programming. Chapter 2 offers a review of existing "global" inventories, designed to collect experiences associated with violence prevention. Chapter 3 synthesises the findings from the six selected case studies. The final section provides conclusions and recommendations and highlights some key trends.

Notes

1. These cases have been selected because they feature sufficient data and evidence of AVRP activities; offer promising future evaluations or political commitment to AVRP; are geographically representative; and cover different contexts in which AVR programming takes place.

2. These included 179 programmes in Brazil, 45 in Burundi, 219 in Colombia, 44 in Liberia, 58 in South Africa, and 25 in Timor-Leste.

Chapter 1

Conceptualising armed violence reduction and prevention

This chapter sets out a basic typology of different Armed violence reduction and prevention (AVRP) programmes and highlights emerging promising practices. It "sets the scene" for the empirical assessment featured in subsequent chapters. Armed violence reduction and prevention interventions can be direct, indirect or components of wider development schemes. Direct interventions aim to influence the instruments, actors and institutional environments that enable armed violence. Indirect interventions counter the proximate and structural risk factors that shape armed violence onset and intensity. Broader development schemes may not have armed violence reduction and prevention as their primary aim but can nonetheless contribute to reductions in insecurity over time.

It is essential for development practitioners to acquire a common and shared understanding of what is, and what is not, an armed violence reduction and prevention (AVRP) intervention. To support this goal, the report presents a preliminary AVRP typology – assembled on the basis of extensive surveys and expert interviews – to allow interventions from around the world to be tracked and compared. This chapter introduces a concise, conceptual framework for tracking AVRP programmes and concludes with a reflection on "best practice" AVRP cases.

Conceptual framework

Any conceptual framework should be guided by an overall classification scheme that allows for spatial, temporal, and programmatic comparison. This report draws explicitly from the Organisation for Economic Co-ordination and Development (OECD) armed violence "lens" that distinguishes interventions according to whether they are:

- **Direct programmes** that seek to address the instruments, actors and institutional environments enabling armed violence,

- **Indirect programmes** that address proximate and structural risk factors giving rise to armed violence;[1] and

- **Broader development programming** that, while not having prevention and reduction of armed violence as a key objective, can nevertheless produce additional benefits

Drawing from existing typologies (WHO, 2004; Marc, 2009; IADB, 2003; McLean and Blake Lobban, forthcoming) and new verifiable findings, the conceptual framework highlights a wide spectrum of possible programming entry points. It also considers a wide range of disciplinary perspectives, such as public health and epidemiology, crime prevention and justice, conflict prevention and peacebuilding. It also draws attention to distinct intervention types to assist development practitioners in their design, implementation, and monitoring efforts. It is important to stress that the focus of this report is not to evaluate good practice, but rather to document the range and types of current experiences.

Figure 1.1 provides an illustration of the ways in which "direct", "indirect", and broader development initiatives can be distinguished. These three categories are not necessarily pursued in isolation. Indeed, many cutting-edge AVRP programmes intentionally blur "direct" and "indirect" approaches – for example focusing simultaneously on reducing firearms availability and working with "at-risk" male youth, while seeking to mitigate the likelihood of misuse through targeted employment schemes, after-school education programmes, psychological support and even family planning activities. Large-scale development programmes can also positively address relevant proximate and structural risk factors associated with armed violence prevalence, enhancing the value of such investments beyond their primary developmental aims.

Figure 1.1. **Categorising AVRP activities**

As noted in the OECD report and repeatedly acknowledged by the practitioners surveyed as part of this report, any AVRP intervention should be premised on a solid evidence base and an understanding of the local and regional context (OECD, 2009a). This requires carefully administered conflict and political economy analysis, as well as survey and surveillance-based assessments to ensure that activities build on local perceptions and actual experiences, as well as relevant capacities and capabilities. In best-case scenarios, affected communities may also participate in the elaboration of assessments, design and implementation of interventions and monitoring and evaluation of activities.

There are many AVRP activities; however, no blueprint or simple template of an AVRP programme exists. Indeed, AVRP programmes are often referred to by practitioners as initiatives, schemes, or projects and may not easily conform to conventional programming logic that sets out a "diagnostic-treatment-results" model.[2] In order to capture the full range of AVRP efforts underway, a more flexible accounting approach should be developed.

Introducing the typology

Past efforts to establish clear categories for violence prevention and reduction have struggled to capture their heterogeneous and multi-dimensional characteristics (Bellis *et al.*, 2010). Any typology must therefore avoid being overly deterministic or prescriptive, while simultaneously allowing for sufficiently broad categories, so as to capture multi-phased interventions. In order to map out programme experiences in the six country contexts, Table 1.1 applies the conceptual framework and the OECD armed violence "lens", noted above, together with distinct programmatic approaches.[3] The typology then provides examples from the six review countries.

"Direct" AVRP programmes include those focused predominantly on the instruments, actors and institutions that enable armed violence. Activities are wide-ranging and include efforts to seize, collect, buy back, promote amnesties, and destroy small arms and light weapons, ammunition and bladed and blunt instruments. Other efforts focus on "at-risk" children and youth, male and female perpetrators, gangs and criminal groups and even non-state armed groups and terrorists. Interventions focused on institutions range from informal mediation and neighbourhood watch associations, to checkpoints and search and seizure activities, to the reform of law enforcement agencies.

Table 1.1. **AVRP programming typology**

Programme priorities	Examples from case studies	Programming approaches	Examples from case studies
Direct programming			
Instruments Small arms and light weapons	72	Weapons collection and destruction	47
Ammunition	43	Weapons seizures	26
Conventional military equipment	25	Voluntary gun-free zones	15
Explosive remnants of war and unexploded ordinance	31	Securing armouries and managing stocks	6
Perpetrators *Age profile*		Informal mediation and local dispute resolution	56
Children	122	Checkpoints and stop/searches	14
Youth	100	Neighbourhood watch activities	12
Adults	57	Local militias and home guards	6
Gender profile		Private security actors	7
Both male and female	128	Formal or track 1/1.5 negotiation	2
Male only	11		
Female only	4		

Table 1.1. **AVRP programming typology** *(continued)*

	Programme priorities	Examples from case studies	Programming approaches	Examples from case studies
Perpetrators *(cont.)*	**Perpetrator profile**			
	Active armed groups	57		
	Gangs and youth groups	55		
	Organised crime groups	47		
	Community groups	33		
	Armed forces and police	30		
	Former combatant groups	12		
	Individual delinquents	11		
	Vigilante groups	3		
	Militia or paramilitary groups	5		
Institutions	Local and municipal authorities	85	Investments in local/urban/ national governance	77
	Police and law enforcement	79	Training and monitoring of enforcement	67
	Military and paramilitary	25	Promotion of justice and security system reform	54
	Social welfare	24	Strategies to enhance community policing	46
	Public health	21	Investment in local or traditional courts and strategies to resolve disputes	33
	Justice and transitional justice	6	Large-scale public administration reform	17

Indirect programming

	Risk factors (selected)	Examples from case studies	Programming approaches	Examples from case studies
	Legacies of violence	295	Youth programming activities	233
	Marginalised youth	245	Media and civil awareness campaigns	207
	Gender-based discrimination	164	Skills development programmes	184
	Rising inequality	142	Targeted education interventions	180
	Presence of armed groups	130	Community empowerment	112
	Availability of weapons	90	After-school activities	110
	Psychological trauma	75	Home visits, care groups and social service delivery	107
	Economic deprivation	77	Targeted employment schemes	103
	Family problems	32	Interventions to prevent income inequality and social marginalisation	98

Table 1.1. **AVRP programming typology** *(continued)*

Risk factors (selected)	Examples from case studies	Programming approaches	Examples from case studies
Cross-border trafficking	31	Treatment and rehabilitation of individuals	95
Exposure to recent violent events	27	Job creation and employment	94
Exposure to violence representations	19	Group therapy and treatment	82
Forced recruitment	15	Public or private health interventions	69
Demand or supply of drugs	8	Community and individually-targeted DDR	68
		Environmental and urban design (including lighting)	64
		Urban/slum upgrading and renewal	41
		Better security monitoring and surveillance, including "hotspot mapping"	101
		Justice and penal reform, including increased penalties	42
		Reductions in the availability and selling of alcohol, particularly for minors	38
		Community prohibitions and ordinances	14

"Indirect" AVRP programmes address a wide variety of risk factors. The most frequently cited risk factors in the six case studies included the presence of armed groups, legacies of violence, marginalised youth, gender-based discrimination, and rising income inequality. Interventions range from voluntary to enforcement-based activities. Concurrently, the most common "indirect" programming approaches introduced to mitigate these risk factors included youth programming schemes, media and civil awareness campaigns (formal and informal), skills development programmes, targeted education interventions, and urban renewal/environmental design activities. In order to ensure a wider collection of "indirect" programmes, the report also included the option "other" on the online survey.

Promising AVRP initiatives

A number of challenges arise when documenting and tracking AVRP activities. First, it is difficult to distinguish between what can be classified as "direct" or "indirect" AVRP programming, or a combination of the two.

Second, it is difficult to know whether specific interventions actually work or can be considered effective in the absence of an evaluation.[4] This report does not determine the success of specific AVRP activities, however, several AVRP "promising practice" examples can be found in the selected country settings.[5]

Box 1.1. **Promising practice in Burundi**

Since 2007, the Mine Advisory Group (MAG) has been involved in managing leftover mines and weapons stockpiles in Burundi. Specifically, it has supported the weapons destruction workshop in Bujumbura where more than 8 000 weapons have been destroyed. MAG has partnered directly with the national armed forces in order to destroy 312 man-portable air defence systems. MAG also implements a comprehensive Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) project with the national police, to destroy unsecured small arms and light weapons stockpiles held at police stations following civilian disarmament campaigns. The agency also seeks to improve the security of police armouries and to provide armourers with training in safe storage and disposal.

The selected "promising practice" examples were drawn from the AVRP programming database established by the case study mapping teams. It should be noted that their selection was not made on the basis of a formal programme evaluation. Instead, selection was determined on the basis of a series of straightforward questions in the on-line survey undertaken by the authors of the report.[6] Future mapping and evaluation exercises undertaken by the OECD and its partners can refine these best practices by determining selection criteria from the outset.

Box 1.2. **Promising practice in Brazil**

Extensive efforts are underway in Brazil to reduce gang violence in urban areas. In 2003, the state government, state prosecutor's office and mayor's office formulated a programme entitled *Fica Vivo* (Stay Alive) to reduce the homicide rate of young people aged 15-19. The initiative aims to improve the quality of life in "at-risk" communities, to minimise the likelihood of young men resorting to armed violence. Alongside specific recreation and cultural activities, it features a systematic monitoring system to ensure that youth do not turn to gangs. The programme is administered by 27 community centres in metropolitan areas and, since its inception, has resulted in a 50% reduction in homicide in the targeted areas.

One way that development policy makers and practitioners distinguish between good and bad practice is by determining if interventions have been designed as programmes with clear results-based frameworks.[7] Of course many AVRP activities tend to be more project-oriented, and could benefit from adopting a more coherent and strategic framework. Another way of determining whether a given AVRP programme is a best practice case is whether a "theory of change" has been incorporated.[8] Theory of change categories are now included in monitoring and evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities and are featured in OECD guidance documents (OECD, 2009b).

Box 1.3. **Promising practice in South Africa**

South Africa has one of the highest rates of sexual violence in the world. The One Man Can Campaign (OMC) aims to transform the attitudes and behaviour of men. Specifically, it encourages men and boys to advocate for gender equality, to promote and sustain change in their personal lives, and to change the gender norms driving the rapid spread of HIV-AIDS. The OMC campaign is conducted in all of South Africa's provinces and in countries across Southern Africa and each year reaches between approximately 3 000 and 5 000 men and boys from all walks of life.

Successful AVRP interventions are not only those that have a results-based framework or clearly articulated theory of change. Relying exclusively on proof of "good practice" may unintentionally result in selection bias and the exclusion of a wide range of innovative, ongoing activities. It could result in only counting those interventions already supported by donors, who themselves structure assistance according to the presence of a theory of change or results-based framework.

Notes

1. Proximate risk factors include *inter alia* the presence of alcohol, narcotics and weapons or even gangs, while structural risk factors refer to economic crises, income inequality, marginalised youth, gender-based discrimination, and legacies of violence. There is no universally-agreed list of risk factors but the factors mentioned are widely recognised to account for the core armed violence risk factors (OECD, 2010a, 2010b).

2. Just focusing on a strictly defined AVRP programmes would significantly under-report the breadth and depth of activities currently pursued by states, non-governmental agencies and private sector actors around the world.

3. Some categories may overlap and can be defined in subsequent, more detailed evaluations of AVRP programmes.

4. Key questions include for example: how can outsiders know whether an intervention managed to successfully prevent or reduce armed violence? What are the benchmarks, methodologies for quantifying results and indicators of successful reduction or – often more challenging to demonstrate – prevention?

5. With more focused evaluation in specific programmatic interventions, the category of promising practice can be refined to identify true "best practice" models of intervention.

6. These questions include: has the programme been underway for more than 2 years? Does the programme feature a monitoring and evaluation system? Is the programme multi-sector and multidimensional in approach? Does the programme include elements of "direct" AVRP programming? Does the programme have any supportive information highlighting outcomes? Only respondents that were able to respond affirmatively to these five questions were included.

7. The defining feature of programming approaches is that they are embedded in a results-oriented process including four main components: *i)* a clearly articulated problem statement; *ii)* a diagnostics-treatment-results framework, including the definition of targets, success criteria, and measurement indicators; *iii)* the implementation and monitoring of the treatment of the problem; and *iv)* a pre/post-intervention analysis and impact review.

8. A "theory of change" defines the steps to be followed from an initial situation to the achievement of a specific goal. It clearly articulates the underlying assumptions shaping the current and future situations. It requires implementing partners to clarify long-term goals, identify measurable indicators of success, and formulate relevant actions to achieve these goals. It also forms the basis for strategic planning, on-going decision-making and evaluation (Act Knowledge, 2009).

Chapter 2

Mapping Armed violence reduction and prevention programming trends

This chapter considers the general characteristics of armed violence reduction and prevention (AVRP) activites in Brazil, Burundi, Colombia, Liberia, South Africa and Timor-Leste. It detects a surge in policies and programmes over the past five years and some innovative shifts in programming theory and practice. It features a comparative analysis of direct, indirect and broader AVRP activities in each setting, the types of armed violence specific interventions aim to redress, their gender dimensions, their timelines, approaches to monitoring and evaluation, and budgets.

Between March and November 2010, Six case studies were generated between March and November 2010 based on an intensive online survey and key informant interviews. The surveys were adminsitered in multiple languages (English, French, Portuguese and Spanish). A total of 570 armed violence reduction and prevention (AVRP) interventions were short-listed, including 179 initiatives in Brazil, 45 from Burundi, 219 in Colombia, 44 in Liberia, 58 in South Africa, and 25 from Timor-Leste.

The report revealed that there are more programmes targeting risks that give rise to armed violence ("indirect") than those tackling firearms, armed perpetrators or enabling institutions ("direct"). Figure 2.1 presents the relative distribution of programming types between 1990 and 2010. It shows how many implementing agencies are adopting integrated approaches – combining "direct" and "indirect" activities. Indeed, OECD members and partners would do well to acknowledge (and further support) the prominence of comprehensive approaches that sequence direct AVRP interventions with medium- and longer-term indirect components.

AVRP initiatives have been ongoing in Brazil, Burundi, Colombia, and South Africa since the early 1990s. Programmes were introduced to address the escalating rates of violence and widespread insecurity, especially in the rapidly urbanising cities of Bujumbura, Bogota, Cali, Medellin, Rio de Janeiro, São Paolo, Cape Town and Johannesburg. Many of these interventions combined enforcement with conflict prevention, peacebuilding, crime reduction, and citizen security priorities.

A significant increase in AVRP programming was detected in all six case studies since the mid-2000s, with roughly two-thirds occurring between 2006 and 2010 (Figure 2.2). More than three quarters of all AVRP activities in Brazil occurred during the past five years. Likewise, in Burundi, Colombia, Liberia, and Timor-Leste, almost all registered programmes were initiated after 2005. This recent surge in AVRP activity could have various explanations. For example, in Brazil, the national public and citizen security initiative (PRONASCI) and the upcoming World Cup (2014) and the Olympics (2016), could have influenced the increase.

The scope and scale of AVRP programming appears to be changing over time. In Brazil, for example, the first AVRP activities were initiated at the time of a military dictatorship and focused on ensuring national security through enforcement and repression (the national slogan since the 1960s has been "order and progress"). However, over the past few decades the domestic agenda has shifted from national to municipal public safety. By 2000, public security had become a central component of presidential campaigns and by the end of the decade, public safety policies emphasised participatory approaches and citizen or civic safety.

Figure 2.1. **"Direct" and "indirect" programming in six case studies, 1990-2010**

Brazil (n=179)

Burundi (n=45)

Colombia (n=219)

Liberia (n=44)

South Africa (n=58)

Timor-Leste (n=25)

In Colombia, pre-1990s programmes were heavily influenced by national security considerations, particularly in light of the ongoing war against guerrillas and paramilitaries. By the mid-1990s, interventions were influenced by the government-led decentralisation process as well as increases in armed violence across most of Colombia's major cities. Since 2003, however, activity has increased tremendously, partly resulting from the disarmament and demobilisation of paramilitaries and growing civil society engagement. This is mirrored somewhat in Liberia and Timor-Leste where a post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation focus has expanded to a wider consideration of security sector institutions.

The case studies revealed the relationship between donor investment and geographic location. AVRP interventions in Latin America (Brazil and Colombia) tend to feature more public sector involvement, particularly at the

Figure 2.2. **Evolution of programming in selected cases, 1990-2012**

municipal level with metropolitan authorities (including mayors and associated state-level policing authorities). Thus, bilateral donors and international development agencies appear to be comparatively smaller players in the region.[1] In Africa, however (Burundi, Liberia and South Africa), the key actors remain international and local non-governmental agencies**.**

In sub-Saharan Africa, many AVRP programmes are typically financed and administered by bilateral donors, international agencies, non-governmental and community-based agencies, or private organisations, with less engagement by national and municipal public sector counterparts. This partially reflects the role of the state in promoting public security and the relative capacities of governmental institutions.

The case studies noted several overlapping trends regarding the direction and objectives of AVRP programming. For example, the most common categories of armed violence addressed by all 570 interventions are youth, domestic, interpersonal, urban and sexual violence (Table 2.1). Armed violence occurring within or between communities or in the household is given high priority, whereas violence generated by security forces, insurgent groups or organised crime receives less attention.

Table 2.1. **Most common types of armed violence addressed across all cases**

Number of responses

Type of armed violence	Brazil	Burundi	Colombia	Liberia	South Africa	Timor-Leste	Total responses
Youth violence	113	29	58	27	38	14	279
Domestic violence	92	28	46	29	43	5	243
Interpersonal violence	72	34	48	23	42	13	232
Urban violence	99	11	77	6	27	2	222
Sexual violence	81	30	13	32	45	5	206
Gang violence	51	12	37	10	34	11	155
School violence	76	2	18	11	34	2	143
Physical and sexual violence against children and adolescents	77	8	8	1	43	4	141
Intra-state armed conflict	1	22	106	6	0	5	140
Violent organised crime	45	11	27	6	24	1	114

In all case studies, the AVRP programmes ran for three years, with a few extending beyond that (Figure 2.3). Annual budgets for AVRP programmes appear to fall into two general categories. In Brazil and Colombia, for example, budgets are between USD 100 000-500 000 per year. However, Burundi, Liberia, and South Africa have a significant number of large-scale AVRP programmes (more than USD 1 million) but also smaller scale programmes (less than USD 100 000) (Figure 2.4).

Figure 2.3. **Time horizons of AVRP programming**

Number of responses

Figure 2.4. **Budget ranges of AVRP programming**

Number of responses

The studies also revealed that direct AVRP interventions targeted a combination of instruments, perpetrators or associated institutions, though no clear trend emerged (Table 2.2).[2] For example, the most common efforts targeting instruments are firearms collection/destruction and weapons seizures, whilst the most common activities targeting perpetrators are those involving informal mediation and education, which focus on "at-risk" youth.[3] Meanwhile,

Table 2.2. **Direct AVRP interventions**

Number of responses

	Brazil	Burundi	Colombia	Liberia	South Africa	Timor-Leste	Total response
Interventions targeting instruments							
Weapons collection and destruction	18	13	9	1	3	3	47
Weapons seizure	12	11	0	0	3	0	26
Weapons amnesties and buyback programmes	7	7	3	1	3	0	21
Voluntary gun-free zones	4	0	6	3	2	0	15
Securing armouries	0	6	0	0	0	0	6
Armourer training	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Law enforcement	0	0	0	0	3	0	3
Interventions targeting perpetrators							
Informal mediation	10	13	17	11	4	1	56
Education	0	13	0	6	2	0	21
Checkpoints	6	0	5	1	0	2	14
Neighbourhood watch	0	0	5	2	1	4	12
Private security actors	3	0	3	0	0	1	7
Local militias or home guards units	5	0	0	0	0	1	6
Peer pressure	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Prosecution of perpetrators	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
Formal mediation	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Interventions targeting institutions							
Improved local/urban/national governance	24	16	24	7	1	5	77
Better law enforcement	27	12	10	8	5	5	67
Justice and security sector reform (JSSR)	31	10	0	5	5	3	54
Community policing	28	4	7	2	3	2	46
Local or traditional courts and dispute resolution mechanisms	5	8	10	6	3	1	33
Public administration reform	10	1	1	0	2	3	17
Education interventions	0	3	0	1	1	0	5
More professional military and police	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Community structures	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Crime prevention information	0	0	0	0	1	0	1

strategies designed to promote the rule of law and access to justice were commonly used with institutions.

"Direct" programming tended to be sensitive to gender-related issues (Figure 2.5), with the bulk of interventions showing no discrimination between the sexes. This is interesting in South Africa and Liberia, where one would expect a series of initiatives focusing on male perpetrators and female victims,

Figure 2.5. **Gender dimensions of all AVRP programmes**

Percentage of responses

Table 2.3. **Most frequently cited risk factors**

Number of responses

Type of proximate risk factor	Brazil	Burundi	Colombia	Liberia	South Africa	Timor-Leste	Total responses
Legacies of violence	101	40	96	18	27	13	295
Marginalised youth	108	19	47	25	35	11	245
Gender-based discrimination	74	22	0	28	35	5	164
Rising inequality	91	14	0	14	17	6	142
Presence of armed groups	45	5	62	5	11	2	130
Availability of weapons	40	12	17	6	14	1	90
Economic crises	36	6	0	17	10	8	77
Trauma	16	15	0	21	23	0	75
Family problems	0	0	26	0	6	0	32
Cross-border trafficking	19	0	0	11	1	0	31
Exposure to recent violent events	0	0	24	0	3	0	27
Forced recruitment	0	0	15	0	0	0	15

given the rates of sexual violence.[4] Meanwhile, in Brazil, many "direct" AVRP interventions focusing on males also register substantial female participation, suggesting a broadening of selection criteria.

Table 2.4. **"Indirect" AVRP programmes**

Number of responses

	Brazil	Burundi	Colombia	Liberia	South Africa	Timor-Leste	Total response
Informal/formal voluntary strategies							
Youth programming activities	108	13	64	16	26	6	233
Media and civil awareness campaigns	90	31	36	28	20	2	207
Skills development programmes	85	13	35	14	34	3	184
Education interventions	7	12	101	19	35	6	180
Community empowerment interventions	13	13	46	22	17	1	112
After-school activities	74	0	9	4	19	4	110
Home visits, care groups and social service delivery	78	2	13	9	5	0	107
Targeted employment schemes	65	7	14	7	7	3	103
Interventions designed to address income inequality and social marginalisation	61	12	11	7	6	1	98
Treatment and rehabilitation of individuals	19	11	35	10	19	1	95
Job creation and employment programmes	43	5	20	10	13	3	94
Group therapy and treatment	28	4	24	6	20	0	82
Public or private health interventions	39	4	7	7	11	1	69
Incentive-based DDR	31	9	23	3	0	2	68
Environmental or urban design	36	1	0	3	6	1	47
Urban/slum upgrading and renewal	30	1	4	1	5	0	41
Research	0	2	21	0	1	0	24
Informal/formal enforced interventions							
Better security monitoring	59	11	15	7	5	4	101
Justice and penal reform	5	11	3	7	10	6	42
Reducing the availability and consumption of alcohol	15	0	7	4	12	0	38
Community prohibitions and ordinances	3	2	2	4	2	1	14
Mine action	2	2	7	1	0	0	12
Strengthening formal institutions	0	8	0	0	2	0	10

In comparison, "indirect" AVRP programmes tended to be extremely diverse (Table 2.3). While all six countries focus on a wide range of proximate and structural risk factors, they additionally concentrate on legacies of armed violence, marginalised youth, gender-based discrimination, and rising inequality. Several important risk factors, such as family challenges, exposure to recent violent events, unemployment, and lack of education, are less well represented, however, this may be at least partly attributable to the design and translation of the survey.[5] Future surveys could also focus on risk factors at the individual, relational, communal, and societal levels.

The vast majority of "indirect" AVRP programmes under review also showed a tendency towards voluntary (rather than enforcement-based) approaches.[6] Table 2.4 illustrates a series of different types of interventions led by "at-risk" youth programming, media and civil awareness campaigns, skills and livelihood development programmes, and educational interventions. Strategies that drew on enforcement tactics emphasised enhanced crime and "hot spot" monitoring and reforms to the justice and penal sectors, including increasing penalties and incarceration periods.

The review also established that AVRP monitoring and evaluation is not consistent (Figure 2.6). This may be because many interventions are short-term while outcomes and impacts are long-term, making a systematic assessment within existing project-cycles difficult. Additionally, to determine programme effectiveness, routine monitoring requires good surveillance, analysis capacities and evidence, which may not be available in every intervention. Even in countries with robust public-surveillance capacities, such as Brazil and Colombia, 47% and 70% of respective responses indicated that AVRP activities claimed not to have had monitoring and evaluation capacities.

Figure 2.6. **AVRP monitoring and evaluation**

Percentage of responses

Notes

1. This stands in contrast to the "global review" earlier in the paper that highlighted the relatively significant role of the IADB and World Bank in financing AVRP activities across Latin America. These findings may reveal an underlying bias in reporting – most international financing is nevertheless channelled to public institutions (and not NGOs) suggesting that there may in fact have been a lagged effect of their investment.

2. This is in part due to a high non-response rate for this question.

3. A review of all programming contexts suggests that "direct" AVRP programmes principally target children and youth. It was not possible to identify clear trends in relation to how "direct" programmes addressed specific categories of "armed groups" because the perceptions of armed violence "types" and related "perpetrators" varied widely between the six cases.

4. It is possible that different trends may emerge if the caseload of respondents is expanded in future rounds of this mapping.

5. The options on the questionnaire were a choice of known risk factors, as well as an "other" option for additional categories. The risk factors included departed from the notion that, from the perspective of a state, there are external and internal risk factors. External risk factors include, *inter alia*, economic and environmental crises, cross-border trafficking, external interference; internal risk factors include rising economic inequality, marginalised youth, gender based discrimination, legacies of violence, presence of armed groups, availability of weapons, and trauma. (OECD DAC/INCAF, 2010b).

6. As with the review of direct AVRP programming approaches, responses to indirect AVRP efforts also yielded a high no-response rate.

Chapter 3

Case study summaries

This chapter considers the wide range of armed violence reduction and prevention (AVRP) activities in Brazil, Burundi, Colombia, Liberia, South Africa and Liberia. It reviews the historical and social factors giving rise to specific forms of AVRP, but also profiles the policies and activities in each context. In states affected by and emerging from armed conflict, approaches may be more direct and include controlling the tools of violence or demobilising and reintegrating combatants. In states experiencing acute rates of violent crime, interventions may be more indirect and emphasise recurring risks such as chronic youth unemployment and extreme inequality.

This chapter highlights the main findings from the six country mappings. Each of the cases reported below *i)* summarises the wider political, economic and historical dynamics of armed violence, *ii)* considers the basic characteristics of armed violence reduction and prevention (AVRP) interventions, and *iii)* highlights a number of relevant qualitative findings. To allow for comparison, each focuses on the key programming characteristics, including the relationships between "direct" and "indirect" programming, the structure of funding and donor support, intervention targets, programming types, key risk factors and monitoring and evaluation capabilities.

Brazil

Brazil has one of the highest homicide rates in the world and, although this has decreased in recent years, the national rate is still 25 per 100 000 (Waiselfisz, M. and J. Jacobo, 2010). Violence is concentrated among young people, especially young black males. Indeed, the juvenile homicide rate jumped from 30 per 100 000 in 1980 to 50.1 per 100 000 in 2007, while for black youths it reached 66 per 100 000 (Waiselfisz, M. and J. Jacobo, 2010). Homicide rates for other population groups declined from 21.2 to 19.6 per 100 000 over the same period.

At the same time, there are numerous public, private and non-governmental led efforts to prevent and reduce armed violence, commonly referred to as "public safety" or "public security" initiatives. Many of these developed in the wake of drug-related violence during the 1990s and the opening up of democratic space. Civil society supported emerging campaign agendas, which linked violence to social justice, police aggression, impunity, and even small arms availability and misuse.

Before the 1990s, unrest and delinquency was met almost exclusively with a heavy fist. Likewise, domestic civil society and faith-based groups tended to focus more on poverty alleviation and welfare promotion – an ethos that persists today. Over the past decade and a half, however, violence – including armed violence – became categorised as a social problem of the country. The public security agenda was also used as a means to justify all manner of investment across disparate sectors. Indeed, many public and private institutions, civic action groups, faith-based associations and community-based groups began capitalising on violence in order to raise funds, pass white papers and drum-up votes.

Brazilian political and public authorities have also initiated numerous activities to prevent and reduce armed violence in all its major cities and amongst specific "at-risk" groups. Launched in 2007, PRONASCI appears to have contributed to an increase in both stability and social welfare. Creative interventions focused on encouraging the public to report on crime are proving successful (Box 3.1). Meanwhile, the deployment of pacification police units (UPP) to the "hot" zones of selected cities, beginning with Rio de

Janeiro, is benefiting the security situation, though there are early indications that violence may be spreading to adjoining municipalities (Box 3.2).

To better understand the characteristics and dynamics of "direct" and "indirect" AVRP interventions, a Brazil-based mapping team interviewed more than 400 specialists in the police, justice, penal, crime prevention, social welfare and development and public health sectors. In the process, analysis was conducted for 179 programmes and projects by telephone, online and face-to-face interviews.

Overall, the study found that the expression "armed violence" is not widely applied in Brazil, even though many people are engaged in violence prevention and reduction. Preferred concepts include "public safety" and "citizen security", and to a lesser extent "public order" and "pacification". Nevertheless, historically, there has been considerable focus on combining security and development activities. Today, many public entities and non-governmental organisations opportunistically use concepts as a means to advance a wide range of projects.

Box 3.1. **Denouncing crime in Brazil**

In order to expand the surveillance and response to criminal violence in Brazil, the government launched Dial Denounce. Dial Denounce aims to increase reporting on crime and through the active involvement of community members as "advocates" and "denouncers". The project operates through a 24-hour call-centre that forwards denunciations to the police branch responsible for the investigation. As part of the country's National Programme to Combat Sexual Violence Against Children, the government also set up "Dial 100" to promote the denunciation of actual and would-be perpetrators. It has registered and responded to more than 130 000 separate claims.

Box 3.2. **Pacification police in Rio de Janeiro**

The Pacification Police Unit (UPP) intervention was launched in 2008 to transform the police model in Brazil. Beginning in the state of Rio de Janeiro, the UPP first reclaims territory, by force if necessary, focusing on shanty-town neighbourhoods formerly controlled by narco-traffickers and private militia. The UPP then deploys male and female community police to improve the services provided by the police and equally the public perception of the police. To date, some 18 favelas including more than 44 communities (240 000 people) have been "pacified", violent crime has dropped dramatically and property values have increased.

AVRP programming trends in Brazil

Most of Brazil's 179 AVRP activities are "indirect" (60%) as compared to "direct" (39%). The vast majority of support for these activities comes from national public authorities (25%) and local government/mayoral representatives (24%). The private sector also plays an important role (15%) followed by national NGOs and international NGOs. Bilateral donors provided support in just 3.3% of cases, multilateral donors in 7.3% and international NGOs in 8.5% (Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1. **Types of implementing agencies**

Aggregate responses

Forty-eight percent of "direct" AVRP interventions targeted domestic violence, with 31% targeting youth, gang and school violence. 16% of interventions focused on interpersonal violence, while 9% addressed sexual violence and 11% focused on "other" categories. Overall, more than one-third of all "direct" programmes focused on children and youth; almost one-fifth focused on youth and adults, while just over one-tenth focused exclusively on adults (Table 3.1).

Brazil has a wide range of "direct" and "indirect" intervention types (Table 3.2), though most are centred on voluntary "indirect" interventions, which promote youth programming, media and civil awareness campaigns and skills development. The majority of "direct" interventions relate to justice and security system reform, community policing and improved law enforcement.

Table 3.1. **What types of armed violence do your programmes address?**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid percent	Cumulative percent
Domestic violence	88	48.1	48.1	48.1
Interpersonal violence	16	8.7	8.7	56.8
Gang violence	1	0.5	0.5	57.4
School violence	7	3.8	3.8	61.2
Sexual violence	9	4.9	4.9	66.1
Urban violence	11	6.0	6.0	72.1
Youth violence	23	12.6	12.6	84.7
Other	20	10.9	10.9	95.6
No response	8	4.4	4.4	100.0
Total	183	100.0	100.0	

Table 3.2. **Most common "direct" and "indirect" AVRP interventions in Brazil**

Direct interventions	Responses	Indirect interventions	Responses
Instruments		*Informal/formal voluntary*	
Weapons collection and destruction	18	Youth programming activities	108
Weapons seizures	12	Media and civil awareness campaigns	90
Weapons amnesties and buyback campaigns	7	Skills development programmes	85
Voluntary gun-free zones	4	Home visits, care groups, and social services delivery	78
Perpetrators		After school activities	74
Informal mediation	10	Targeted employment schemes	65
Checkpoints	6	*Informal/formal enforced*	
Local militias and home guard units	5	Better security monitoring	59
Private security actors	3	Reducing availability and consumption of alcohol	15
Institutions		Justice and penal reform	5
JSSR	31	Community prohibition and ordinances	3
Community policing	28	Mine action	3
Enhanced law enforcement	27		
Improved local/urban/national governance	24		

There is generally widespread agreement that "unattached" youth in Brazil – young males and females who are disconnected from stable familial, societal, educational and welfare systems – are most susceptible to engaging in armed violence. Thus, the principal risk factor addressed through "indirect" programming was marginalised youth (20%). Other risk factors included legacies of violence (19%), inequality (17%) and gender-based discrimination (14%). Only 7% of respondents identified the availability of weapons as an important risk factor (Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2. **Most prominent risk factors addressed through "indirect" programming**

Percentage of responses

As Figure 3.2 illustrates, the majority of formal "indirect" AVRP interventions focused on youth programming (25%), with activities also focusing on after-school activities (17%), redressing income inequality (14%) and job creation schemes for "at-risk" youth (10%). More informal "indirect" programming ranged from civic awareness campaigns to promote violence awareness (21%) and targeted skills development (20%) to specialised care groups, enhanced social services delivery (19%), direct home visits (14%) and wide-ranging employment schemes (15%).

A major challenge in Brazil, as elsewhere, is determining what kinds of interventions work and which do not. There is a growing emphasis in the security and development sectors on the importance of monitoring and evaluating interventions.[1] Just over half (55%) of the programmes mapped had adopted some form of monitoring and evaluation capacity, which is surprising given the growing emphasis in Brazil on results- and evidence-based approaches.

Box 3.3. **Youth AVRP in Brazil**

Young males are the most common perpetrators and victims of armed violence in Brazil. Many interventions are designed to directly and indirectly promote armed violence prevention and reduction to minimise associated risks for youths. For example, Programme H aims to engage young men and their communities in discussions on gender relations and male-on-female violence. It supports educational activities, community campaigns, and an innovative evaluation module for assessing the programme's impact on attitudes. Meanwhile, Peace Squares SulAmerica focuses on preventing violence among adolescents and youth. As of 2010, five neighbourhood centres/ plazas had been renovated and given to the community. The aim is to alter the risk factors shaping armed violence by changing the urban environment through the provision of sports, leisure and cultural alternatives.

A large number of qualitative insights emerged from the Brazil case that might help shape emerging best practices on AVRP programming. For example, there is a general sense among programme implementers that prevention – focusing on early interventions to address key risk factors – is highly effective in mitigating armed violence. Virtually all respondents noted that activities that mobilise education and vocational alternatives (for both "at-risk" adolescents and youth), recreation and sporting activities, and cultural investments, play a key role in deterring youth from violent behaviour.

Most respondents also highlighted the fundamental importance of adopting comprehensive and integrated interventions. Virtually all respondents emphasised the need for wide-ranging and full-spectrum approaches – *i.e.* early prevention together with enforcement. Most activities made reference to the importance of not only engaging "at-risk" youth, but also promoting civilian protection, community policing and human rights advocacy, together with wider social programming.

Though only half the respondents claimed to apply strict monitoring and evaluation practices, most highlighted the need for evidence when amending or restructuring priorities and activities. Many stressed the importance of documenting key opportunities and constraints, as well as publicising successes. More practically, justice- and police-led activities appeared to privilege the critical role of data and evidence in shaping interventions, including mapping out trends in order to target and respond to crime "hot spots".

Burundi

The international aid sector – and to some extent Burundians themselves – have typically adopted peacebuilding and conflict-management strategies to reduce and prevent armed violence. Since the end of armed conflict in 2000, various direct AVRP activities have been implemented including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), civilian disarmament, security system reform, transitional justice for former perpetrators of armed violence, and the promotion of non-violent elections.

While the incidence and intensity of armed violence has tapered off in the past decade, armed violence still claims thousands of lives every year. As recently as 2008, Burundi reportedly suffered 1 049 violent deaths, 1 262 injuries, and a firearm homicide rate of 12.3 per 100 000 people – above the global average of 7.6 per 100 000.[2]

Opportunities for candid dialogue on difficult topics now exist, despite the post-conflict legacies of revenge and impunity prevailing since independence. The successful integration of Hutu and Tutsi former combatants into both the national police force and military, as well as the emergence of multiple, independent media outlets, were crucial to the success of the initial programmes addressing armed violence issues and laid the foundations for the 2005 elections.

A series of internationally-sanctioned and sponsored AVRP interventions has been credited with promoting Burundi's post-conflict security. For example, the Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration Project (PNDRR), was approved and funded in 2004 via the Multi-Donor Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (USD 41.8 million) and a grant (USD 36 million), with the World Bank and the Burundian Government as partners in the projects' implementation. By June 2006, 29 000 ex-*Gardiens de la Paix* and *combattants militants* were reinserted into civil society and received reintegration support. More than 23 000 adult ex-combatants and over 3 261 former child soldiers had been demobilised and had received (re)insertion support by April 2008.

However, reintegration fell behind as the overall development programming to support the demobilised failed to emerge.[3] In the meantime, the early stages of disarmament, including that launched by the Commission technique de désarmement des civils et de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères et de petit calibre (CTDT) had disappointing results. Indeed, from 2006 until the end of 2009, only 40 000 of the estimated 100 000 – 300 000 small arms in the country were handed over (Pezard, S. and S. de Tessières, 2009).

Notwithstanding the DDR and civilian disarmament efforts, armed violence remains a significant problem. The key insurgent, Palepehutu-FNL, continued fighting despite signing cease-fire agreements in 2006 and 2008.

In 2009 the group agreed to formally disarm and transition to a political party. However, armed violence remained a challenge as the population was still not secure. Targeted assassinations and the use of grenades and armed youth gangs to advance party interests became increasingly prevalent. Banditry and arms proliferation is also considered to be a serious concern (Human Rights Watch, 2009; Lemarchand, R., 2004; Uvin, P., 2009).

The current security situation is marked by revenge and a high level of impunity. Banditry is the largest source of armed violence around the country, followed by conflicts over land and access to property, domestic violence, sexual violence and political violence. There are also numerous violent deaths every month, with neither the cause nor the perpetrators being identified by police. There has therefore been considerable focus in Burundi on promoting peacebuilding through awareness building, dispute resolution, and enhanced policing.

AVRP programming trends in Burundi

The Burundi survey analysed 45 programmes across five provinces, including Ngozi, Kirundo, Ruyigi, Makamba, and Mwaro. Overall, the mapping confirms the general finding that "armed violence" is not a category or label widely used by national or local practitioners. Indeed, despite acknowledgement among respondents that the reduction and prevention of armed violence are clear aims, AVRP programming itself does not exist. Instead, the primary focus is on peacebuilding, conflict management and security system reform.

AVRP interventions are grouped into two financial categories. The largest category includes more than two-thirds of all cases, with budgets of more than USD 500 000. The second group receives funding of less then USD 25 000 – with local-level organisations being the primary recipients. In contrast to Brazil and Colombia, more than two-thirds of all reported funding comes from international donor organisations or NGOs.

Burundi has a comparatively high proportion of respondents reporting "indirect" AVRP activities – 64% said their activities were "direct" programming while 97% said their activities were also "indirect" programming. Table 3.3 details the most common programmatic "direct" and "indirect" AVRP interventions in Burundi. Responses are comparatively balanced between "direct" and "indirect" interventions, with most "direct" interventions focused on the instruments of violence – notably the control, collection and destruction of small arms.

These interventions also focus on the perpetrators – through informal mediation and education activities – and on key institutions, especially the military and policing sectors. Meanwhile "indirect" interventions focus primarily on media and civil awareness campaigns, though youth programming and skills development are common, especially among "at-risk" groups.

Table 3.3. **Most common "direct" and "indirect" AVRP interventions in Burundi**

Direct interventions	Responses	Indirect interventions	Responses
Instruments		*Informal/formal voluntary*	
Weapons collection and destruction	13	Media and civil awareness campaigns	31
Weapons seizure	11	Youth programming activities	13
Weapons amnesties and buyback	7	Skills development programmes	13
Securing armouries	6	Community empowerment interventions	13
Perpetrators		Education interventions	12
Informal mediation	13	Interventions against income inequality and social marginalisation	12
Education	13	*Informal/formal enforced*	
Peer pressure	3	Better security monitoring	11
Prosecution	2	Justice and penal reform	11
Institutions		Strengthening formal institutions	8
Improved local/urban/national governance	16	Mine action	2
Enhanced law enforcement	12	Community prohibition and ordinances	2
Justice and security system reform	10		
Local or traditional dispute resolution/courts	8		

Figure 3.3. **Types of armed actors targeted by "direct" programming**
Percentage of responses

It is worth noting that what might be categorised as "direct" AVRP programmes target the individual rather than the community.[4] **"Direct"** programming overwhelmingly targets adult and youth perpetrators, and many of the 29 interventions directly addressing armed violence focus on the military/police and former combatants (51% and 41% respectively). Moreover, 74.9% of all "direct" interventions also address the reform of the military and/or the police, including laws, directives and policies. Finally, the majority of respondents felt that DDR and SSR programming constituted "direct" armed violence reduction (Figure 3.3).

Many "indirect" AVRP programmes encourage sensitisation or awareness-building. The critical risk factors for armed violence in Burundi are legacies of violence (22%), gender-based discrimination (12%), marginalised youth (10%) and trauma (9%) (Figure 3.4). 45% of all respondents highlighted the importance of independent radio as an effective tool to prevent armed violence. This is no doubt a reflection of the role played by the media in encouraging ethnic violence in the 1980s and 1990s. Given low literacy rates in the country, radio broadcasts also seem more effective for sensitisation than print media.

Measuring outcomes is difficult in Burundi, given the poor standard of surveillance and information collection found in both the security sector and the conventional development community. Despite the requirements of multilateral and bilateral donor partners, few interventions report monitoring and evaluation capacities. Indeed, 77% of respondents had no monitoring and evaluation

Figure 3.4. **Main risk factors addressed by "indirect" programming**

Percentage of responses

mechanisms whatsoever. Where monitoring was reported, the outputs were quarterly or annual reports, documenting outputs and financial information.

From a more qualitative perspective, a large number of Burundian respondents emphasised the challenge of international, regional and domestic arms flows. Indeed, many actors felt powerless to engage with regional efforts to control arms trafficking. They highlighted the challenges of policing the country's porous borders and regular flow of handguns and automatic rifles from one Great Lakes country to another. Local actors are aware that investments have been made to enhance border controls and forensics, but argue that concrete steps beyond simply marking weapons must be adopted

Other respondents emphasised the importance of AVRP. Some suggested that the recent shift in donor perspective from peacebuilding to poverty reduction may be premature. Indeed, armed banditry is on the rise and, by all accounts, includes local police and administrators. The potential threat of routine criminal violence to wider national security is considered to be very real. However, most felt that if the formal economy improved, this would be beneficial for armed violence prevention and reduction.

Colombia

Colombia's ongoing, armed conflict is now accompanied with staggering levels of organised and petty crime organised crime. Thus the level of armed violence and insecurity remains well above the international average. Though the intensity and diversity of armed violence in Colombia[5] is difficult to explain, it obviously affects the development of the country.

Despite the reported declines during 2002-05, armed violence in Colombia is still very high and has been increasing since 2005. Non-lethal, inter-personal armed violence is also on the rise, although this is concentrated in cities. The political and instrumental use of violence, including targeted assassinations and intimidation of witnesses to ongong judicial cases, also appears to be increasing in certain areas.

There are complex relationships between armed groups and armed violence in Colombia. For example, homicidal violence directly attributable to the armed conflict is now relatively minor and is confined to rural areas. Relationships also exist between conflict and non-conflict violence. For example, growing criminal violence is increasingly being linked to former combatants and the availability of surplus military weaponry, despite the demobilisation of more than 30 000 paramilitaries since 2003.

Colombia has been relatively slow to undertake systematic strategies to reduce and prevent armed violence. "Direct" and "indirect" AVRP programmes have only formally appeared within the last three decades, with

interventions emerging between 1990 and 2005, and a consolidation and increase in AVRP initiatives occurring since 2006.[6]

AVRP programming trends in Colombia

Sixty-two organisations and institutions were involved in interventions to prevent and reduce armed violence among local and national governments, organisations of the civil society, international organisations, foundations and others. Overall, these organisations and institutions administered some 219 AVRP programme initiatives.

"Indirect" AVRP programmes are, as in other cases, more common than "direct" AVRP programmes in Colombia. More than half (54%) the interventions focused on mitigating the proximate risk factors of armed violence while 20% addressed armed violence directly by tackling the instruments, perpetrators and/ or institutions. Some 16% of the interventions are fully integrated, addressing armed violence both "directly" and "indirectly". One category of programming where "direct" and "indirect" interventions are often combined is in relation to youth (Box 3.4)

Public authorities and civil society are the primary actors administering AVRP interventions across Colombia. These range from periodic neighbourhood safety promotion initiatives, to structured, far-reaching, multi-sector programmes emphasising metropolitan or national security. Most reported activities (38%) are run by local governments, 21% by the national government[7] and 14% by NGOs.

AVRP interventions principally target conflict-related violence. However, they must also address the variety of violence types found in Colombia, such

---

Box 3.4. **Addressing youth violence before it happens in Colombia**

The *Golazo* project is being implemented in what are widely considered to be the most "at-risk" areas for armed violence. The project objective is to strengthen social development and reduce incentives to become involved in armed violence by promoting sports activities. Children and youth are encouraged to participate in a range of different after-school activities and parents are invited to support their children.

The *Jóvenes a lo Bien* initiative seeks to reduce juvenile and gang violence in major cities, predominantly through disarmament, mediation and business-sponsored vocational study schemes. Building on these and other activities, the national Programme for Inclusion, Violence Prevention and Youth Employment also seeks to reduce risk factors associated with violence by creating educational and professional opportunities. Both private and public sector companies have joined this latter initiative, providing jobs for approximately 200 youths, aged 18 to 29.

---

as protracted armed conflict, interpersonal crime, narco-trafficking, gangs and gender. Current AVRP efforts tend to be reactive and focus on reduction rather than prevention. They are only put into practise once the incidence of armed violence has been identified and emphasised as a problem by public figures and institutions.

Table 3.4 provides an overview of the "direct" and "indirect" AVRP interventions in Colombia. It notes the emphasis on "indirect" activities: educational interventions, youth programming, community empowerment, media and civil awareness campaigning, skills development and treatment and rehabilitation. It also reveals the transformation in the institutions shaping the onset of violence, including local governance and improved law enforcement and notes the importance of informal mediation among perpetrators, and the role of weapons collection and destruction.

Over half of the documented "direct" interventions in Colombia focused on controlling instruments, actors and institutions, targeting explosives, remnants of war and small arms and light weapons (Figure 3.5). The remaining 48% "direct" interventions targeted youth. Other interventions sought to reform the institutional environment shaping armed violence by enhancing law enforcement, reinforcing traditional courts and dispute mechanisms, and promoting community policing strategies (Figure 3.6).

Table 3.4. **Most common "direct" and "indirect" AVRP interventions in Colombia**

Direct interventions	Responses	Indirect interventions	Responses
Instruments		*Informal/formal voluntary*	
Weapons collection and destruction	9	Education interventions	101
Voluntary gun-free zones	6	Youth programming activities	64
Weapons amnesties and buyback	3	Community empowerment interventions	46
Perpetrators		Media and civil awareness campaigns	36
Informal mediation	17	Skills development programmes	35
Checkpoints	5	Treatment and rehabilitation of individuals	35
Neighbourhood watch	5	*Informal/formal enforced*	
Private security actors	3	Better security monitoring	15
Institutions		Mine action	7
Improved local/urban/national governance	24	Reducing availability and consumption of alcohol	7
Better law enforcement	10	Justice and penal reform	3
Local or traditional dispute resolution/courts	10	Community prohibition and ordinances	2
Community policing	7		

Colombian organisations addressing armed violence have to take account of a wide range of risk factors. The most frequently addressed risk factor relates to legacies of violence, followed by the presence of armed groups and marginalised youth (Figure 3.7). These findings are consistent with the historical patterns of armed conflict in the country, but also demonstrate that youth are the primary perpetrators and victims of armed violence.

Monitoring and evaluation of AVRP activities is, again, substandard with only 30% of respondents acknowledging that M&E took place. Of those responding, 13% tracked intentional murder rates at the local level, 10% monitored violent victimisation and 6% observed the rate of landmine and unexploded ordnance victims. In addition, 11% assessed local perceptions of security, another 11% monitored reported crime rates and 10% assessed other socio-economic indices.

Figure 3.5. **Specific instruments of armed violence**

Percentage of responses

Figure 3.6. **"Direct" intervention strategies in relation to institutions**

Percentage of responses

Figure 3.7. **Types of proximate risk factors**

Percentage of responses

The analysis of Colombia observes how both conflict and non-conflict forms of armed violence are being addressed. While political attention has been devoted to the DDR process, public, private and non-governmental actors have sought to simultaneously engage with escalating urban violence. Despite a massive expansion in AVRP activities, Colombian experts acknowledge that greater attention is needed to enhance the monitoring and evaluation of locally-organised interventions.

Liberia

Seven years after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement ended Liberia's 14-year civil war, the country is still unstable. Significant progress has been made towards post-conflict reconstruction, through programmatic efforts in Disarmament, Demobilisation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRR), SSR, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (Box 3.5). Nevertheless, violence continues to occur and, in some cases, is increasing.

Violent crime is increasing in many communities (Amnesty International, 2009) with minor disputes deteriorating into assault and fighting, especially during holiday periods when alcohol consumption increases. Armed robbery is fuelled by high unemployment, lack of policing, and a willingness to use violent means for economic ends – a mentality reinforced among many young Liberians

during the war (Gompert and Stearns, 2006). Most robberies occur in the home and increase during the rainy season.

Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), including rape and domestic violence, was widely used as a weapon of war and still remains a significant threat to women and girls (Republic of Liberia, 2008). Vigilantism, or so-called "mob justice", is highly publicised and is perceived to be a significant threat to individual and community security (Republic of Liberia, 2008). It is disconcerting to note that relatively small-scale incidents can quickly escalate into major, destabilising events.[8]

As a country emerging from conflict and still facing instability, armed violence reduction is a central component of the recovery and reconstruction process. Specifically, "peaceful" economic growth is incorporated into the Liberian Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), however two of four strategic pillars in the PRSP (*e.g.* economic viability and access to basic infrastructure and services) could prioritise AVRP. Most observers agree that a key area for enhancing armed violence prevention is employment, especially for un/under-employed youth (Box 3.6).

Box 3.5. **Ensuring adequate reintegration as part of DDRR**

The DDRR Agricultural Training Programme focuses on training, resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants and war-affected community members. The programme identifies ex-combatants and other "at-risk" households/groups, enrols them in a sustained, residential agricultural training curriculum, based on the self-identified needs of the participants, and reintegrates graduates into communities of their choice. A programme evaluation measures the programme's success according to the self-reported rates of economic and social reintegration among participants and among the members of the resettlement community.

Box 3.6. **Armed violence prevention through employment**

The Emergency Employment Programme was designed to reintegrate thousands of war-affected people by providing employment as an alternative to the existing war economy. While seeking to provide an income supplement and livelihood support for affected populations, the overall goal of the programme was to sustain the peace process in Liberia. A key criticism, however, is that short-term employment interventions need to be complemented by the creation and expansion of more sustained employment opportunities or they result in disillusionment.

Official, media, and popular perspectives differ substantially on the way armed violence is defined and perceived as a social problem. The official view is that much investment and energy is committed to reforming the security sector, primarily the national police and armed forces. However, the results of these efforts are more at the central municipal level, rather than in peri-urban and rural areas.

Media reporting on armed violence focuses on the problem of collective communal violence (often described as "mob" or "vigilante" justice). This may reflect the concern that sectoral reform and the strengthening of security and judicial processes at the community level are moving too slowly, and that dissatisfied local community groups may re-form as rival factions. Evidence has shown that armed violence consists predominantly of assault and armed robbery/ theft. This, in turn, seems to explain why many observers believe that economic difficulties are themselves frequently described as the cause of criminal activity.

AVRP programming trends in Liberia

Thirty-eight organisations were identified for the Liberian survey and 44 separate AVRP initiatives were analysed. The majority of these programmes are implemented with non-governmental partners, predominantly international and national NGOs. Eighty separate partners were featured in total. While most organisations did not describe their activities as specifically targeting AVRP, they endorsed the distinctions of "direct" and "indirect" interventions and the definition of armed violence noted in the introduction.

Both SSR and DDR are acknowledged in Liberia as constituting "direct" AVRP programming.[9] SSR appears to be more common. SSR has focused more on strengthening the Liberian National Police (LNP) and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), rather than security and justice capacity and function at the community level. More enforced programming seems relatively limited in the post-conflict Liberian context.

Table 3.5 highlights "direct" and "indirect" AVRP interventions in Liberia. While "direct" AVRP interventions tend to focus on perpetrators (mediation) and improved law enforcement, numerous "indirect" AVRP activities focus on media and civil awareness, community empowerment, education, and youth programming. While the list of interventions is not exhaustive, it does highlight the heavy focus on "indirect" efforts designed to minimise the risk of armed violence.

A considerable amount of "indirect" AVRP programming focuses on preventing sexual violence (SGBV) and also targets "at risk" youth (Figure 3.8). These are acknowledged priorities at the highest levels in Liberia and are relatively consistent with the demographic profile of violence in Liberia. However, there is less engagement with escalating banditry, theft, robbery and economically

motivated criminal violence. Some respondents noted the importance of enhancing the policing, judicial and penal capacity on the one hand, and supporting community-based work on reducing criminality on the other.

Table 3.5. **Most common "direct" and "indirect" AVRP interventions in Liberia**

Direct interventions	Responses	Indirect interventions	Responses
Instruments		*Informal/formal voluntary*	
Voluntary gun-free zones	3	Media and civil awareness campaigns	28
Weapons amnesties and buyback	1	Community empowerment interventions	22
Weapons collection and destruction	1	Education interventions	19
Perpetrators		Youth programming activities	16
Informal mediation	11	Skills development programmes	14
Education	6	Job creation and employment programmes	10
Neighbourhood watch	2	*Informal/formal enforced*	
Checkpoints	1	Better security monitoring	7
Institutions		Justice and penal reform	7
Better law enforcement	8	Reducing availability and consumption of alcohol	4
Improved local/urban/national governance	7	Community prohibition and ordinances	4
Local or traditional dispute resolution/courts	6	Mine action	1
Justice and Security Sector Reform (JSSR)	5		

Figure 3.8. **Types of risk factors targeted by "indirect" programmes**
Percentage of responses

The estimated budget reported for AVRP programming in Liberia is approximately USD 76 million, of which USD 13.5 million is allocated to the UNMIL component of AVRP. The average annual budget for AVRP programmes operated by other organisations is approximately USD 910 000 (Figure 3.9), with almost half having annual budgets of USD 250 000 or less. Most of the programmes are planned for 2006 to 2012.

Figure 3.9. **Liberia: Budgets for interventions**

Percentage of responses

Figure 3.10. **Types of funders**

Percentage of responses

As the surveillance and data analysis capacities are weak, so too is the monitoring and evaluation of the AVRP programmes. Given the high proportion of non-governmental agencies involved, the absence of dedicated assessments is alarming. Of the few AVRP programmes that claim to be analysing trends, the indicators focus on mortality/morbidity and incident-reporting data, but also use a number of qualitative and poorly-defined measurements.

Overall, programmes focusing on the problem of armed violence seem to be decreasing in Liberia. Notwithstanding the evidence generated from the mapping assessment, a number of respondents claim that there is a shortfall in longer-term programmatic support to ex-combatants and affected communities (*e.g.* sustainable approaches to employment generation and household income generating capacity). What is more, there appears to be a limited emphasis on using AVRP as an explicit objective of community level recovery and development project work. These reductions could be considered premature.

South Africa

High levels of violence – including armed violence – have been a prominent feature of South African society for almost two decades. While political violence captured public attention during the late 1980s and 1990s, following the end of apartheid and the historic 1994 elections, the public, the public became increasingly concerned about the high levels of violent crime, which are among the highest in the world. Thus numerous initiatives are now being implemented to address crime and criminal violence.

AVRP programming in South Africa can be divided into three categories. The first is increased Government investment in the criminal justice system (most notably the police) and improved legislation. Beyond increasing the numbers of criminal justice personnel this initiative has a rather weak strategic focus, though this may have been remedied slightly by a recent Criminal Justice Review.

The second category includes amending legislation to incorporate changes lobbied for by civil society. In addition to ensuring the new legislation is approved, civil society is also involved in the implementation of certain elements of the new laws. The third category comprises the implementation of numerous civil society initiatives, focusing on violence against women, firearm violence, violent organised crime or responses to violence. These initiatives are defined as social crime prevention, victim empowerment, restorative justice and population health.

One category that has not appeared in contemporary analyses of South African crime and violence over the past two decades is the investment in private security by middle-class civilians and the formal business sector. This may be because it is difficult to analyse in terms of programming, even though those involved understand how to address the problem of crime.

The work undertaken by neighbourhood watches and vigilante groups is also not classified as programming, although those governed by legislation and/or integrated into local-level crime prevention activities are more easily analysed.

AVRP programming trends in South Africa

The South African mapping process documented 58 programmes that qualified as addressing AVR. Of these, 43 were administered by NGOs (9 community-based and 34 with a broader focus) and 13 by government agencies at the national, provincial and local levels (including inter-governmental departments and criminal justice agencies).

Many South African programmes are preoccupied with crime or violent crime rather than armed violence per se. Activities that do address armed violence focus on violence against women (domestic violence, intimate partner violence or sexual violence) and the victimisation of children, particularly in schools.

Table 3.6. **Most common "direct" and "indirect" AVRP interventions in South Africa**

Direct interventions	Responses	Indirect interventions	Responses
Instruments		*Informal/formal voluntary*	
Weapons collection and destruction	3	Education interventions	35
Weapons seizure	3	Skills development programmes	34
Weapons amnesties and buyback	3	Youth programming activities	26
Law enforcement	3	Media and civil awareness campaigns	20
Perpetrators		Group therapy and treatment	20
Informal mediation	4	After school activities	19
Education	2	*Informal/formal enforced*	
Neighbourhood watch	1	Reducing availability and consumption of alcohol	12
Institutions		Justice and penal reform	10
Better law enforcement	5	Better security monitoring	5
Justice and Security Sector Reform (JSSR)	5	Community prohibition and ordinances	2
Community policing	3	Strengthening formal institutions	2
Local or traditional dispute resolution/courts	3		

Most AVRP programming in South Africa is "indirect". A few address armed violence directly, while five combine both "direct" and "indirect" programming. Several targeted small armed and light weapons, with one targeting knives and other bladed instruments. As illustrated in Table 3.6, most reported activities in South Africa include educational interventions, skills development, youth programming activities, media and civil awareness campaigns, and group therapy and treatment.

The incidence of sexual violence in South Africa is amongst the highest in the world. Likewise, particularly since the end of Apartheid, the country has been plagued by collective violence in major cities – especially street gangs. "Indirect" AVRP programming has therefore included gender-based discrimination, marginalised youth and other related issues. Many respondents are also involved in programmes addressing legacies of violence, trauma, rising income inequality and availability of weapons, which were also cited as key risk factors (Figure 3.11).

Figure 3.11. **South Africa: Main risk factors addressed through "indirect" programming**

Percentage of responses

Most AVRP interventions feature budgets of less than USD 250 000 per annum. Out of 53 respondents, 17% claimed an annual budget of less than USD 50 000. Meanwhile, 57% reported an annual budget range of between USD 50 000 and USD 250 000. Finally, a further 26% noted budgets ranging between USD 250 000 and USD 2 000 000 per year (Table 3.7).

Table 3.7. **South Africa: Annual budget range of programmes (USD)**

	Number of responses	Percent
USD 10 000–25 000	3	5%
USD 25 000–50 000	7	12%
USD 50 000–100 000	12	21%
USD 100 000–250 000	14	24%
USD 250 000–500 000	7	12%
USD 500 000–1 000 000	1	2%
USD 1 000 000–2 000 000	1	2%
> USD 2 000 000	8	14%
No response	5	9%
Total	58	100%

Many of the AVRP programmes receive funding from a variety of sources. On average, more than two different funding sources were recorded for each programme. Less than half (41%) are funded by international NGOs, bilateral donor agencies and multilateral donors agencies with 30% receiving support from public agencies in South Africa, at the national, provincial or local level. Finally, 37% also claimed investment from companies (predominantly South African).

In contrast to virtually all other cases, nearly all respondents conduct monitoring and evaluation activities. However, the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) conducted is not necessarily formal or of a high standard. Many specifically use indicators related to the number of incidents of violent victimisation (28%) or injury (17%).

Timor-Leste

Over the past years Timor-Leste has experienced two major outbreaks of violence: the struggle for independence (1975-99) and the internal armed clashes in the security forces in 2006. The Timorese society also faces the more chronic phenomena of violence, namely domestic violence against women and youth violence, which is often related to long-standing grievances among Timorese communities.[10]

The most severe episode of collective violence occurred during the struggle for Timorese independence. According to the final report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) between 1974 and 1999 almost one-quarter (102 800 to 183 000 people) of the Timorese population died as a result of armed violence.

The more recent outbreaks of violence in 2006, 2007 and 2008 are comparatively modest. In 2006, for example, a group of F-FDTL soldiers deserted and initiated a dispute within the security forces, including the police. During the course of the tensions, some 38 people died and many more were injured (United Nations, 2002). More significant was the number of internally displaced persons that reached 150 000, most of whom were clustered in the capital city, Dili.

Several categories of armed violence have been identified in Timor-Leste in the post-independence period. These are typically associated with gangs, martial arts groups, and domestic violence. While the former groups were forged and fostered during Indonesian occupation and played a role in the independence movement, gangs are a more recent phenomenon. Concern escalated during the 2006 outbreak of violence as some gangs appeared to have connections to and be manipulated by political elites.

It is important that youth gangs in Timor-Leste be studied separately. Some of these groups are classified as grass-roots social movements defending the interests of their communities, while others are more closely identified with criminal networks (Scambary, J., 2006; Scambary, J., 2009). Others, particularly martial arts groups, maintain closer relations with Timorese security forces, which is an obstacle to establishing a comprehensive strategy.

Most analysts in Timor-Leste claim that sexual and gender-based violence – especially domestic violence – is the main category of armed violence. A 2008 opinion poll by the Asia Foundation showed that 15% of Timorese families had experienced domestic violence during the previous two years, while only 7% were assaulted by unknown individuals.[11] Other analysts note that property disputes and the possibility of armed violence between rival groups and families over property and title issues, have become more common.

AVRP programming trends in Timor-Leste

The mapping process in Timor-Leste focused on a smaller selection of "direct" and "indirect" AVRP programmes. As in other cases, armed violence (and AVRP) is not a common concept in Timor-Leste. Moreover, interventions designed to address armed violence in Timor-Leste tend to focus on specific sectors or actors rather than on adopting integrated or comprehensive approaches.

"Direct" programming in Timor-Leste was comparatively limited. A few interventions focused on the instruments,[12] while others focused on actors and institutions. Legislative reform in the security sector, police training and improvements to law enforcement, and strengthening conflict resolution mechanisms among youth groups, gangs, and martial arts groups were most common.

Most AVRP interventions in Timor-Leste are "indirect" (84%) (Table 3.8). Approximately 20% claim to undertake a combination of both "direct" and "indirect" activities. Most "indirect" interventions target legacies of violence and marginalised youth, in addition to grievances arising from economic crises and inequality (Table 3.8).

Both "direct" and "indirect" AVRP interventions are predominantly funded, designed and implemented, by multilateral and bilateral donor agencies and their partners. This tends to be a common feature of post-conflict societies, particularly in developing countries. This is more evident in Timor-Leste because the United Nations accompanied the country through independence and its transitional administration. Several interviewees commented that the UN system needs Timor-Leste to be a success story and therefore commits a high amount of human and financial resources for the stabilisation and socio-economic development of this country.

Approximately 36% of AVRP activities in Timor-Leste underwent some kind of monitoring. Examples of indicators used include displacement and resettlement rates of IDPs and perception of security. Core indicators of

Table 3.8. **Most common "direct" and "indirect" interventions in Timor-Leste**

| Direct interventions	Responses	Indirect interventions	Responses
Against instruments		*Informal/formal voluntary*	
Weapons collection and destruction	3	Youth programming activities	6
Against perpetrators		Education interventions	6
Neighbourhood watch	4	After school activities	4
Checkpoints	2	Skills development programmes	3
Informal mediation	1	Targeted employment schemes	3
Private security actors	1	Incentive-based DDR	2
Against institutions		*Informal/formal enforced*	
Improved local/urban/national governance	5	Justice and penal reform	6
Better law enforcement	5	Better security monitoring	4
JSSR	3	Community prohibition and ordinances	1
Public administration reform	3		

armed violence, like the homicide rate, direct and indirect battle deaths and violent victimisation, are not necessarily monitored. This could be because most programmes are "indirect".[13]

Respondents noted that AVRP programming in Timor-Leste is undergoing a period of transition. Most of the operational initiatives were designed in direct response to the crisis in 2006/07. Having addressed the more imminent security threats created by this crisis, programmes then focused on the recovery of the society in Timor-Leste (*e.g.* the return of IDPs) (Box 3.7). Many of these programmes, including the interventions by United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) have nearly finished or need extending. The long-term planning of major actors, like United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), is gradually changing to more conventional development assistance.

Table 3.9. **Types of funders**

	Responses	
	N	Percent
Bilateral donor agency	14	41.2
Multilateral donor agency	13	38.2
National government	3	8.8
No response	4	11.8
Total	34	100.0

Figure 3.12. **Types of risk factors addressed by "indirect" programming**

Percentage of responses

> ### Box 3.7. **Addressing reintegration of IDPs for peace**
>
> The Strengthening Early Recovery for Comprehensive and Sustainable Reintegration of IDPs Project initially offered financial and food assistance, as well as transportation for the return of IDPs. So-called "social mobilisers" were trained to engage with community level councils in order to reach more inclusive and participatory planning, involving local stakeholders. Particular focus was placed on support for infrastructure projects to increase social and economic interaction and foster bonds between IDPs and receiving/host communities.

In the meantime, other international actors are starting their planned exit from Timor-Leste (*e.g.* the Norwegian Refugee Council), and local NGOs will be expected to fill these gaps. The multiplicity and diversity of the local NGOs is such that they are quite capable of doing so. Additionally, international actors have invested a lot of resources to strengthen human capacity in the local civil society for planning and implementing programmes.

However, the experience of 2006 demonstrates that an early withdrawal without sustainable reforms can result in the re-eruption of violence. The two most pressing issues, comprehensive SSR and land law reform, seem to be very difficult to implement in view of the lack of committed partners within the government. Innovative programming is needed which offers suitable incentives to governmental actors. This task can only be undertaken by international actors and their ability to deliver will affect the long-term stability and development of Timor-Leste.

Notes

1. In both Rio de Janeiro and São Paolo, local governments are tracking the relationships between armed violence and MDG achievement. One group, the Public Security Forum, is using the Survey of Living Conditions conducted by the Seade Foundation in 2006 to assess the attainment of MDG indicators related to income, employment, sanitation and housing conditions. This consists of a household survey of approximately 20 000 households, including 5 500 respondents in the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo. (Muggah and Restrepo, 2011).

2. Figures based on the Armed Violence Observatory of Burundi (Pézard and de Tessières, 2009).

3. For a review of the evidence of DDR interventions, see (Muggah [ed.] 2009)

4. In Burundi, AVRP interventions target individuals (35% of "direct" interventions) more than communities (14% of "direct" interventions).

5. For a review of trends and dynamics of armed violence in Colombia since the 1950s, see, for example, Small Arms Survey (2006).

6. The first period witnessed a shift of focus away from national security towards interventions targeting the prevention and reduction of urban violence. The second period saw a consolidation and increase in the number of AVRP programmes throughout the country, predominantly associated with the DDR process.

7. From a budgetary perspective, however, it is the national government that tends to be the principal funding body.

8. In February, at least four people were reportedly killed when Muslims and Christians clashed in the northern city of Voinjama. United Nations peacekeepers and local security forces were able to intervene, but there were fears that violent retributions could destabilise Monrovia (United Nations, 2009).

9. An emphasis in "direct" programming on small arms and light weapons does not seem in accord with the types of weapons recorded in most cases of (armed) violence.

10. For an examination of urban violence and household survey findings in Timor-Leste see Muggah (ed.), 2010.

11. The same opinion poll also showed that over the past five years the situation for women in Timor-Leste has deteriorated. In 2004, 19% of the interviewees responded that men have the right to hit their wives. But in 2008, 21% were of the same opinion. Meanwhile, in 2004, 75% of respondents rejected the right of husbands to beat their wives while in 2008 just 34% agreed with this statement. Some 44% argued that the right of the husband needed to be assessed on a case-by-case level.

12. Addressing the instruments of violence in the form of weapons collection was the focal point of only two initiatives run by the Timorese security forces, namely operation Halibur and operation Kilat.

13. There are two noteworthy exceptions (run by BELUN) that monitor violence more directly, but in these programmes monitoring is not used in order to assess the impact of the programmes, but is itself the goal of these initiatives.

Conclusion

This report represents a groundbreaking effort to map out armed violence reduction and prevention (AVRP) programmes around the world. It introduces an innovative conceptual framework and survey methodology, and new empirical material. It is not a "how to" guide to programming, but rather a descriptive overview of the state of AVRP programming. While not exhaustive – the focus was primarily on mapping six settings and 570 initiatives – it is substantial. The findings are illustrative of the many thousands of programmes being advanced to prevent armed violence in lower- and middle-income contexts.

First, the assessment revealed the enormous number of activities being undertaken with respect to the prevention and reduction of armed violence. Many of these are focused "directly" on controlling and reducing access to weapons, engaging perpetrators and reforming legislation and security practices. However, the majority of interventions are pursued "indirectly" – seeking to manipulate and diminish the proximate and structural risks of armed violence at their source. At the forefront of AVRP are those interventions combining both "direct" and "indirect" approaches – targeting both the risks and symptoms – many of which are pursued at the municipal level. Accordingly, development agencies should ensure their support focuses on comprehensive and community-focused interventions.

Second, despite the scale and scope of AVRP, the report finds that the descriptive label "armed violence" is not commonly applied in practice. For example, in South Africa the focus amongst public authorities and non-governmental organisations tends to be on preventing and reducing criminal, domestic and youth violence. In Colombia and Brazil (and indeed across Latin America and the Caribbean), citizen and community security are used as synonyms for armed violence prevention and reduction. OECD donors and international agencies will need to adapt their terminology to local contexts if they are to advance wider AVRP priorities in the future.

Third, the report highlights the fundamental role of development actors – from multilateral and bilateral donors to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civic action groups – in promoting AVRP. Across all cases, interventions highlighted the ways in which organisations could tighten their focus

on recurring development challenges (poverty and income inequality in high risk areas, youth unemployment and literacy, youth recreation and cultural activities, family planning and early childhood development, etc.,) to prevent and reduce armed violence. Equally, it is critical for investments to be made into strengthening the capacities of local partners and partnerships across sectors to monitor and measure performance.

While the wealth of small-scale and innovative programmes reflects the dynamism and social entrepreneurship that exists in this field, future successes will require in-depth evaluations, investments to scale-up activities and the development of long-term programming interventions. All six case studies have demonstrated the fundamental importance of evidence-generation and the key role of innovative partnerships – particularly between public authorities, local civil society actors and the private sector – with international agencies playing a facilitating and supportive role. Encouraging a partnership-driven approach can also enhance the legitimacy and capacity of actors in affected areas. Ultimately, while small, short-lived initiatives are often essential for catalysing action and generating demonstration effects, they are not a long-term solution.

Bibliography

Act Knowledge (2009), *Theory of Change; Theory of What? www. theoryofchange.org/background/basics.*

Amnesty International (2009), *Human Rights in Republic of Liberia, Human Rights Report*, Blattman and Jamison, *www.amnesty.org/en/region/liberia/ report-2009.*

Bellis, M.A., *et al.* (2010), *Preventing and Reducing Armed Violence: What Works?,* United Nations Development Programme and Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New York and Oslo, *www.preventviolence. info/showResourcespdf.aspx?id=18a25404-4a63-4353-8055-cbb3ceb116ff.*

Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development (2006), *www. genevadeclaration.org.*

Gompert, D.C. and B. Stearns (2006), "Comprehensive Security Sector Reform: making Liberia safe", *Africa Policy Journal*, Fall, Vol. 2, Harvard University, Boston.

GTZ (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit*) (2007), *Securing a Better Future: Martial Arts Groups and Their Potential to Become Part of a Peace Constituency in Timor-Leste*, GTZ, Dili.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2009), *Pursuit of Power: Political Violence and Repression in Burundi,* HRW, New York, *www.hrw.org/en/ reports/2009/06/03/pursuit-power.*

IADB (Inter-American Development Bank) (2003), *Guidelines for the Design of Violence Reduction Projects*, IADB, Washington, DC.

Krause, K., R. Muggah and A. Wenmann (2008), *Global Burden of Armed Violence*, Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Geneva.

Krause, K., R. Muggah and E. Gilgen (2011), *Global Burden of Armed Violence*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Lemarchand, R. (1997), "The Burundi Genocide", in S. Totten, W. Parsons and I. Charny (eds.), *Century of Genocide: Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views*, Garland Publishing, New York., pp. 317-333.

Marc, A. (2009), *Making Societies More Resilient to Violence: A Conceptual Framework for the Conflict, Crime, and Violence Agenda. Conflict, Crime and Violence Paper*, World Bank, Washington, DC.

McLean, A. and S. Blake Lobban, *Assessment of Community Security and Transformation Programmes in Jamaica,* forthcoming.

Muggah, R. (2005), "No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Weapons Reduction in Post-conflict Contexts", *The Round Table*, Vol. 94, Iss. 379, pp. 239-252.

Muggah, R. (ed.) (2009) *Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters After War*, Routledge, London

Muggah, R. (ed.) (2010), *Urban Violence in an Urban Village: Case Study of Dili,* Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Geneva.

Muggah, R. and Restrepo, J. (2011), "More Violence Less Development", in *Global Burden of Armed Violence*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

National Programme for Public Citizen Security (PRONASCI), http://*portal. mj.gov.br/pronasci/data/ Pages/MJF4F53AB1PTBRNN.htm*

OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2009a), *Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development*, OECD, Paris.

OECD (2009b), *Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peace-building Activities,* OECD, Paris.

OECD (2010a), *International Support to Statebuilding in Situations of Fragility and Conflict*, OECD, Paris.

OECD (2010b), *Accelerating Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals in Countries Affected by Conflict, Violence and Insecurity*, Document DCD/DAC/INCAF(2010)3, OECD, Paris.

Oslo Commitments on Armed Violence (2010), *www.osloconferencearmedviolence. no/.*

Pézard, S, and S. de Tessières (2009), *Insecurity is Also a War: An Assessment of Armed Violence in Burundi,* Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Geneva.

Public Security Forum (2010), *Anuário do Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública*. Brazilian Public Security Forum, São Paulo.

Republic of Liberia (2008), *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper*, IMF Country Report No. 08/219, *www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08219.pdf*.

Scambary, J. (2006), "A Survey on Gangs and Youth Groups in Dili, Timor-Leste", A Study for USAID, Dili, *www.etan.org/etanpdf/2006/Report_Youth_Gangs_in_Dili.pdf*.

Scambary, J. (2009), "Groups, gangs, and armed violence in Timor-Leste", *TLAVA Issue Brief, No. 2, http://www.timorlesteviolence.org/pdfs/Timor-Leste-Violence-IB2-ENGLISH.pdf*

Shapiro, I. (2005), *Theories of Change, www.beyondintractability.org/essay/theories_of_change*.

Small Arms Survey (2006), *Small Arms Survey 2006: Unfinished Business*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution (2008), *http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/472/17/PDF/N0847217.pdf?OpenElement*.

UN Armed Violence Prevention Programme (AVPP), *www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/activities/en/avpp_overview*.

UN (2006), *Report of the Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste*, United Nations, Geneva.

UN (2009), *Nineteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*, Report to the Security Council S/2009/411, United Nations, New York, p. 4.

Uvin, P. (2009), *Life After Violence: A People's Story of Burundi*, Tufts, Boston.

UNSG (United Nations Secretary-General) (2009), *Promoting Development through the Reduction and Prevention of Armed Violence*, Document A/64/228, United Nations, New York.

Waiselfisz, M. and J. Jacobo (2010), *Mapa da violência 2010: Uma Anatomia dos Municípios Brasileiros,* Instituto Sangari, São Paulo.

WHO (World Health Organization) (2002), *World Report on Violence* and Health, WHO, Geneva.

WHO (2004), *Handbook for the Documentation of Interpersonal Violence Prevention Programmes,* WHO, Geneva.

WHO (2009), *Violence Prevention: The Evidence – Overview*, WHO, Geneva.

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The OECD is a unique forum where governments work together to address the economic, social and environmental challenges of globalisation. The OECD is also at the forefront of efforts to understand and to help governments respond to new developments and concerns, such as corporate governance, the information economy and the challenges of an ageing population. The Organisation provides a setting where governments can compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and work to co-ordinate domestic and international policies.

The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The European Union takes part in the work of the OECD.

OECD Publishing disseminates widely the results of the Organisation's statistics gathering and research on economic, social and environmental issues, as well as the conventions, guidelines and standards agreed by its members.

THE GENEVA DECLARATION ON ARMED VIOLENCE AND DEVELOPMENT

The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, endorsed by more than 100 countries, commits signatories to supporting initiatives intended to measure the human, social, and economic costs of armed violence, to assess risks and vulnerabilities, to evaluate the effectiveness of armed violence reduction programmes, and to disseminate knowledge of best practices. The Declaration calls upon states to achieve measurable reductions in the global burden of armed violence and tangible improvements in human security by 2015. Core group members include Brazil, Colombia, Finland, Guatemala, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. Affiliated organizations include the Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO). For more information about the Geneva Declaration, related activities, and publications, please visit www.genevadeclaration.org.

THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP)

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the UN's global development network, advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help people build a better life.

Conflict and Fragility

Investing in Security
A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF ARMED VIOLENCE REDUCTION INITIATIVES

Contents

Chapter 1. Conceptualising armed violence reduction and prevention
- Conceptual framework
- Introducing the typology
- Promising AVRP initiatives

Chapter 2. Mapping armed violence reduction and prevention programming trends

Chapter 3. Case study summaries
- Brazil
- Burundi
- Colombia
- Liberia
- South Africa
- Timor-Leste