




2011 REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN FRAGILE STATES

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN



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The 2011 monitoring survey was conducted prior to the independence of the Republic of South Sudan on 9 July 2011, when the territory was still referred to as Southern Sudan. Following independence, the OECD now refers to the Republic of South Sudan in line with the common usage of the international community.

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
FOREWORD

2011 HAS BEEN A MOMENTOUS YEAR FOR SOUTH SUDAN. It is the culmination of a long struggle for the freedom of the people of South Sudan following decades of conflict and marginalisation. Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, the Government of Southern Sudan has made a number of significant achievements, not least the maintenance of relative peace and security and the establishment of the essential institutions of government at the central, state and local government level. The conduct of a successful, transparent referendum on independence in January 2011 left no doubt as to our future as an independent nation, which was confirmed and celebrated on 9th July. However, the attainment of independence brings with it significant challenges and we must plan now to ensure a prosperous future.

In this vein, the government has recently approved the first comprehensive Plan for the new Republic of South Sudan, which sets out the medium-term priorities of the government and the actions necessary to achieve them. The South Sudan Development Plan will centre on building strong institutions needed to promote a transparent and accountable state, as well as the promotion of private sector-led economic growth and basic service delivery to reduce the incidence of poverty among the population.

Aid will play an important role in the implementation of the Plan; development assistance to South Sudan was the equivalent of 45% of the government budget in 2010. It is therefore crucial that the government and development partners work harder than ever to improve aid effectiveness across all sectors to secure maximum dividends for the population. The government has taken a number of steps to improve aid management in recent months, including the development of a revised Aid Strategy that sets out the principles for aid delivery in South Sudan. It is our sincere hope that the *2011 Survey for Monitoring Implementation of the Fragile States Principles* will provide further insight into how we can better address the need for greater ownership and accountability for aid.

The Government of South Sudan is grateful for the steadfast support it has received from our development partners to date and looks forward to continuing our partnership as we become a new independent republic.



Aggrey Tisa Sabuni
*Undersecretary of Economic Planning
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
Government of South Sudan*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

THIS COUNTRY CHAPTER summarises the findings of the 2011 Fragile States Principles Monitoring Survey and the 2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration in South Sudan, which are supported by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

This chapter was prepared by Gregory Wilson under the responsibility of the National Co-ordinator, Mr. Moses Mabior Deu (National Co-ordinator of the Survey, Director of the Aid Co-ordination Directorate, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning), with inputs from the International Focal Point for the Survey, Ms. Stefanie von Westarp (Joint Donor Office). The Country Chapter was independently peer reviewed by Ms. Fiona Davies and Ms. Jups Kluyskens. Additional comments were provided by the OECD (Mr. Asbjorn Wee and Ms. Bathylle Missika, under the supervision of Ms. Bathylle Missika, with support from Ms. Annabell Merklin and Mr. Nezar Tamine). The original process and its launch were managed by Ms. Juana de Catheu. The OECD also contributed to the data and statistical annex. Additional analysis was contributed by Mr. Nick Travis and Mr. Aklilu Kabiso. This chapter, originally drafted in English, was edited by Ms. Sally Hinchcliffe (consultant) under the guidance of Mr. James Eberlein and Mr. Nezar Tamine (OECD). The executive summary, which is also available in French, was translated by Ms. Juliette Lindsay (consultant). The layout was designed by Mr. James Eberlein.

This chapter draws on the multi-stakeholder consultation held on 7 April 2011 in Juba, which was facilitated by Mr. George Wachira and interviews and focus group discussions with over 150 participants conducted by Mr. Gregory Wilson. This chapter also incorporates the analysis of development partner questionnaires, and comments received on the first and second drafts. As such, it reflects the views of key stakeholders in South Sudan rather than those of the author or the OECD.

The Government of South Sudan and the OECD wish to thank all the national and international stakeholders who have contributed to the survey process. This report could not have been prepared without the leadership and valuable inputs and views contributed by government, the international community, civil society and other stakeholders in South Sudan.

It is hoped that the findings summarised in this report will help strengthen international engagement and aid effectiveness in South Sudan and could serve to strengthen existing dialogue or ongoing processes in-country over the next few month/years. Whilst this is the first time that South Sudan has participated in this survey, the second round of the Fragile States Principles Monitoring Survey (2011) measures progress of on the application of the FSP over time. The 2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration follows previous surveys conducted in 2006 and 2008, and is critical in determining whether the targets set for 2010 in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness have been met. The results of both surveys will be presented at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea, 30 November to 1 December 2011. ■

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AEC	Assessment and Evaluation Commission
AFDB	African Development Bank
AIMS	Aid Information Management System
BSF	Basic Services Fund
BSI	Budget Strengthening Initiative
BSWG	Budget Sector Working Group
CBTA	Capacity Building Trust Fund
CCA	Common Country Analysis (UN)
COM	Council of Ministers
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation & reintegration
DP	Development partner
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FMIS	Financial management information system
FSP	Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (“Fragile States Principle”)
GATC	Government Accountancy Training Centre
GBS	General budget support
GBV	Gender-based violence
GDP	Gross domestic product
GOSS	Government of South Sudan
IDCF	Inter-Donor Coordination Forum

IDPBSB	International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
IDP	Internally displaced person
IFP-EW	Initiative for Peacebuilding – Early Warning Analysis to Action
IMAC	Inter-Ministerial Appraisal Committee
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
JDO	Joint Donor Office
LRA	Lord’s Resistance Army
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MDGS	Millennium Development Goals
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MHADDM	Ministry for Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management
MHRD	Ministry of Human Resource Development
MOFEP	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MTCDS	Medium-Term Capacity Development Strategy
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NNGO	National non-governmental organisation
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official development assistance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute

OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCNA	Post Conflict Needs Assessment
PFM	Public financial management
PPIU	Parallel project implementation unit
SBS	Sector budget support
SGBV	Sexual and gender-based violence
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SRF	Sudan Recovery Fund
SSCCSE	South Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSDP	South Sudan Development Plan
SSPS	South Sudan Police Service
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WDR	World Development Report (World Bank)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE SOUTH SUDAN COUNTRY CHAPTER reflects the findings from dialogue among more than 150 stakeholders representing both national and international institutions, complemented by interviews and data collection through separate development partner¹ and government questionnaires. In 2008, the Accra Agenda for Action built on the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) to emphasise the importance of applying and adapting aid effectiveness principles to situations of fragility. It also committed development partners and developing countries to monitor the implementation of the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations on a voluntary basis and at the country level. Five years after their endorsement by members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee, this country chapter reviews progress in the implementation of the principles in South Sudan, and identifies priority areas to improve the collective impact of international engagement in country. This chapter also analyses and draws on the results of the 2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, bringing together evidence on progress and challenges in implementing international commitments on aid effectiveness in South Sudan.

South Sudan is to become an independent state on 9 July 2011. The declaration of independence marks the culmination of a long process starting with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, bringing to an end to Sudan's 22-year civil war. Insecurity remains however, and external and internal security remains the primary concern for the government and the people of South Sudan.

South Sudan did not participate in the 2009 Survey, but this country chapter provides a baseline for development effectiveness at the time of South Sudan's independence. Its main findings must be viewed against the backdrop of continued insecurity, lack of agreement over implementation of the key remaining provisions of the CPA, the imminent announcement of a new United Nations (UN) mission for South Sudan after independence, and the huge task confronting the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) in building an independent state.

MAIN FINDINGS: FRAGILE STATES PRINCIPLES

■ Principle 1: Take context as the starting point

Development partners have tried to take context into account but their work is significantly hampered by the lack of statistics and other basic planning data and their own limited capacity and experience. The situation is exacerbated by the complicated and changing dynamics of conflict. Development partners did not adequately take into account the capacity of GoSS, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other delivery partners to design and implement major projects, as demonstrated by their experience with the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) and general project implementation.

■ Principle 2: Do no harm

Continuing to bypass the government in the delivery of basic services will cause harm in the medium to longer term. Both South Sudanese and international actors are increasingly concerned about the pervasive and destructive impact of corruption, but there is little will to address it. Aid dependency is perceived as

¹ Throughout this report the term "development partners" refers to providers of development co-operation; the term "partner countries" refers to those countries managing the development co-operation provided to them by development partners.

a growing problem and there is increasing competition for staff between development partners and the government, which is expected to increase after independence.

■ **Principle 3: Focus on statebuilding as the central objective**

Since 2005, development partners have been hampered by having to simultaneously support unity, as a requirement of the CPA, and prepare for an independent state of South Sudan. The strong initial focus on the central executive has been at the expense of working with state and county governments. Although development partners claim to focus on the key requirements of statebuilding, they have overlooked some key dimensions including economic diversification, domestic resource mobilisation, and the specific need in the South Sudan situation to address nation-building. The lack of capacity in South Sudan has led development partners to establish a large number of parallel project implementation units (PPIUs) which GoSS feels will ultimately undermine state systems. However, GoSS has been slow to meet important deadlines for establishing the minimum legislative and administrative capacity for fiduciary management in time for independence, such as the Public Finance Management, Procurement and Internal Audit Acts.

■ **Principle 4: Prioritise prevention**

The threat of renewed conflict remains high both from the North and from internal threats caused by ethnic divides and perceived discrimination. These latter threats are perceived to be growing. In response, many agencies are involved in conflict prevention on a number of levels and there is wide support for establishing early warning systems, but co-ordination is problematic. The general view is that instability in South Sudan is multi-dimensional and could be triggered by a range of factors. The lack of a single GoSS peacebuilding strategy is regarded

as problematic. Such a strategy, though ambitious, would not just focus on the cessation of violence and implementation of government-led disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) but also include improved service delivery and development of the security and justice sectors.

■ **Principle 5: Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives**

Development partners (DPs) can no longer rely on the CPA framework to integrate political, security and development concerns and to drive the necessary prioritisation. The government and DPs will be faced with increasingly difficult choices and trade-offs between political, security and development objectives in the post-independence era. Whilst preventing conflict and building consensus is naturally high up on the agendas of international partners, the government's focus on maintaining and strengthening the armed forces cannot be supported at any cost.

■ **Principle 6: Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies**

Most DPs claim to have mechanisms in place to ensure the views of vulnerable and marginalised groups inform their programming. Many survey participants admit to feeling some unease over their levels of understanding the complicated nature of discrimination in South Sudanese society, for instance the issues around supporting the reintegration of returnees. The government is committed to addressing the issue of gender discrimination but it remains deeply embedded in South Sudanese society.

■ **Principle 7: Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts**

Both government and development partners experience problems prioritising and sequencing work. A number of line ministries have embarked

on “sector strategic planning” processes whilst also participating in the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) process, with timelines of the various processes overlapping but not clearly feeding into one another. There is currently neither any general nor any sector budget support provided to the GoSS. Only one DP has a strategy for gradually moving aid on-budget and through country systems. Most participants recognised that current financing mechanisms may need a strategic reorganisation and realignment to better support implementation of the SSDP. NGOs especially felt that the current short-term funding associated with most mechanisms does not serve South Sudan well.

■ **Principle 8: Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms**

Despite the existence of a formal donor co-ordination forum and Budget Sector Working Groups (BSWGs) to support budget planning, there is no effective formal donor co-ordination agreement in South Sudan. There are a wide range of informal, broad donor forums – including groups focused around specific sectors with *ad-hoc* participation by GoSS. Some donor and aid co-ordination is effective but generally it is weak. Paris Declaration (PD) indicators for joint analysis, technical co-operation and joint mission planning are all very low. The government’s revised Aid Strategy sets out the need to develop more formal co-operation mechanisms and represents a new opportunity to address some of the failings of the 2006 Strategy. NGOs need more clarity on their legal, management and co-ordination frameworks, as they are some of the government’s key implementation partners. In the spirit of mutual accountability there are measures that the GoSS could take, such as approving key processes and documents which are important for the international community.

■ **Principle 9: Act fast... but stay engaged**

There was a general view that international actors have the flexibility to respond quickly to humanitarian needs, though procedures can sometimes appear

complicated. Although most international actors appear to be committed to long-term engagement in South Sudan, this is not always well-reflected in forward budget planning and contractual commitments. This is due in part to the cyclical nature of programming, the current emphasis on short-term funding, the highly volatile political situation and poor predictability of bilateral aid in an uncertain global financial climate.

■ **Principle 10: Avoid pockets of exclusion**

Political exclusion continues to jeopardise the conclusion of a political agreement necessary to promote stability. Both the government and DPs recognise that there are states, sectors, and/or population groups in South Sudan that receive insufficient development assistance. Why this should be is less well-understood though partly linked to the conclusions under FSP 6. Unemployed, disaffected youth – particularly young men – have emerged as a significant threat to maintaining peace. Rapid urbanisation will lead to a complicated picture of increasingly marginalised and excluded urban poor.

MAIN FINDINGS: PARIS DECLARATION

■ **Ownership: Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption**

South Sudan has made a great deal of progress on its development strategy. However, due to its lack of institutional and organisational capacity, it has relied heavily on development partner support and high levels of technical co-operation – all of which operate outside of government systems. There are over 100 donor-established PPIUs, again due largely to lack of capacity. The initial needs assessment and development framework was negotiated and agreed largely between development partners. The first government-led strategic development plan is only now emerging in time for the declaration of independence. It is universally recognised that corruption is not adequately being tackled, but

GoSS has made significant progress in establishing most core government institutions.

■ **Alignment: Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local systems**

With 50% of ODA supporting government priorities, development partners have made positive efforts to increase alignment. However, there is virtually no use of government systems. Given the lack of necessary legislation for public financial management (PFM) and oversight institutions, weak capacity within both line ministries and oversight institutions, and lack of transparency mechanisms, virtually no development partners are using PFM systems including for procurement, audit and reporting. A significant effort will be required by all parties, including government, to realign behind the new SSDP and to increase the use of government systems.

■ **Harmonisation: Donor countries co-ordinate, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication**

Co-ordination between development partners is mainly informal, though information-sharing is regarded as ‘good’ at project level. South Sudan has the world’s only joint donor office, representing six countries, and five substantial pooled funding mechanisms which have led to improved co-ordination. However, there are few joint assessments, missions or planning exercises, and few examples of co-ordinated strategies, though sector-wide approaches are emerging in the health and education sectors. The presence of institutional mechanisms alone does not result in harmonisation. With all aid being off-budget, and over 80% of aid passing through bilateral mechanisms, the expected results from the attention being paid to harmonisation, alignment and integration have not yet emerged.

■ **Managing for results: Developing countries and development partners shift focus to development results and results get measured**

Development partners have struggled to improve aid effectiveness in the face of the complex peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda, and the significant constraints in the operating environment – especially limitations in information and capacity – which make managing for results extremely difficult. Development partners did not adequately take into account their own capacity to address the challenges nor that of GoSS to manage complex donor projects. The focus has been to make progress on the CPA, and to demonstrate unity of purpose and alignment. The achievement of results and managing risks in the wider development and statebuilding agenda have not been very successful. The new challenge will be to focus on the agreed expected results in the immediate post-independence era.

■ **Mutual accountability: Development partners and developing countries are accountable for development results**

There are few mechanisms in place in South Sudan to deter poor performance by any development partners or, indeed, government entities. Poor performance by GoSS in passing key legislation, acting against corruption, enforcing merit-based public service recruitment or dealing with procurement transgressions suggests a culture of impunity. Similarly, there are few systems or forums that oblige development partners to justify their decisions and actions. Use of the official project approval mechanism is by no means 100%. Low availability and use of information, too few mechanisms for monitoring performance, and the lack of adequate incentives for compliance are cited as contributing to the problem. It is hoped that the new SSDP will identify shared goals, an agreed results framework and improved division of labour that will improve the framework for mutual accountability. ■

TABLE 1. SUMMARY TABLE: FRAGILE STATES PRINCIPLES

PRINCIPLE	FINDINGS	SELECTED PRIORITIES
Take context as the starting point	While development partners do attempt to take context into account, their work is significantly hampered by the lack of statistics, other basic planning data, and the complicated and changing dynamics of conflict.	DPs should provide co-ordinated support to relevant GoSS institutions to develop the country's capacity to generate socio-economic statistics and strengthen the country's result-based M&E system.
Do no harm	Bypassing the government in the delivery of basic services, especially health services, will cause harm in the medium to longer term and there are growing concerns regarding the impact of corruption and aid dependency.	Government and DPs to work together on a holistic and long-term approach to capacity building, especially in support to the development of basic services provision.
Focus on statebuilding as the central objective	Development partners have been hampered by the challenge of simultaneously supporting unity, as a requirement of the CPA, whilst at the same time preparing for an independent state of South Sudan.	Government and DPs to review the work on developing core state functions at all levels of government, clarify the division of labour to support these core functions, make plans to jointly undertake priority assessments, review funding instruments and co-ordinate over long term capacity building.
Prioritise prevention	Threats to renewed conflict remain high both from Northern Sudan and internally. There is wide support for establishing early warning systems but co-ordination is problematic.	Government and DPs to prepare a long-term strategy for the analysis of conflict trends and the development of effective but flexible contingency strategies to ensure appropriate responses, matched by appropriate investments.
Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives	Relying on the CPA to integrate political, security and development concerns and to drive the necessary prioritisation is no longer the only answer.	Government and DPs to sustain and expand dialogue and improve co-ordination between diplomatic, development and security objectives in a principled way that leads via a clear path to locally defined political settlements.
Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies	Most DPs claim to have mechanisms in place to ensure the views of vulnerable and marginalised groups inform their programming though the complicated nature of discrimination in South Sudan society makes understanding it problematic.	Government and DPs to share the task of undertaking more systematic and comprehensive assessments, using existing research to develop a better picture of discrimination in South Sudan.
Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts	Both government and development partners experience problems in prioritising and sequencing. Development partners currently supply neither any general nor any sector budget support. Only one DP has professed to have a strategy for moving aid on budget and through country systems.	Government and DPs to pledge their commitment to the SSDP process and the new Aid Strategy and agree to a clear plan for involving GoSS in aid allocation mechanisms. Current financing mechanisms may need a strategic reorganisation and realignment to better support implementation of the SSDP.
Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms	Levels of joint analysis, technical co-operation and mission planning are all very low despite the fact that there are formal co-ordination agreements in place as well as informal donor forums and sector-focused groups .	Both the government and DPs to agree on establishment of a regular government-led international community co-ordination forum at a political level.
Act fast... but stay engaged	Development partners have the flexibility to respond as quickly to humanitarian needs as needed, though procedures can sometimes appear complicated. There is little evidence of long-term predictable commitments to aid.	Development partners need to provide clarity on future aid flows and volumes for at least three years and should ensure aid flows are reliably and transparently communicated to enable better government planning and budgeting.
Avoid pockets of exclusion	Political exclusion is an issue which continues to jeopardise concluding a political agreement necessary to promote stability.	Government and DPs need to understand exactly who is being excluded and why through independent research and take action to address exclusion at all levels, including political exclusion, substantially increasing the proportion of investment into areas outside Juba.

TABLE 2. SUMMARY TABLE: PARIS DECLARATION

DIMENSION	ACHIEVEMENTS OR CHALLENGES	LESSONS OR PRIORITY ACTIONS
Ownership	The government has made progress on owning its own development strategy and priorities from a very low base.	The new Strategic Development Plan and Aid Strategy is an opportunity to improve ownership.
Alignment	Development partners have made positive efforts to align themselves to government priorities, with 50% of aid supporting government priorities but there is virtually no use of government systems.	Significant effort will be required by all parties to reorient themselves behind the new SSDP and increase the use of government systems.
Harmonisation	Co-ordination between development partners is mainly informal and there are low levels of joint assessments and joint planning.	Harmonisation is more than just joint working and the use of pooled funding mechanisms, it requires commitment in word and deed by all development partners.
Managing for results	DPs have struggled to improve aid effectiveness in the face of the complex peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda, and the significant constraints in the operating environment.	The new challenge is to focus on the agreed expected results in the immediate post-independence era through an agreed results framework as part of the SSDP.
Mutual accountability	There are few mechanisms in place to deter poor performance by either development partners, or government entities.	The new SSDP will identify shared goals, and an agreed results framework, and improved division of labour that will provide a framework for improved mutual accountability.

FIGURE 1
Map of South Sudan*



Source: Based on UN map (no. 3707, rev. 10, April 2007).

* **Note:** The Republic of South Sudan became an independent country on 9 July 2011. South Sudan - Sudan boundary represents 1 January 1956 alignment; final alignment pending negotiations and demarcation. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the OECD, the United Nations or the Government of South Sudan.

INTRODUCTION

THIS COUNTRY CHAPTER was researched, discussed and drafted in the run up to the South Sudanese Declaration of Independence on 9 July 2011. The referendum on 9 January 2011 resoundingly decided the future status of South Sudan once and for all. Understandably, the focus of everybody's attention, including the development partners (DPs), is very much on this momentous event in the long history of Sudan.

The declaration of independence marks the culmination of a long process starting with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005. The CPA brought an end to Sudan's second civil war which had lasted 22 years. A number of the provisions of the CPA have been implemented. The Interim Constitution of South Sudan (2005) and the interim constitutions of the 10 states of South Sudan have been promulgated and are operational. On the basis of these constitutions, most core government institutions have been established and are functional. However, some of the most critical provisions of the CPA have not been implemented. These include the Abyei Protocol, the demarcation of the North/South border, and the conduct of the popular consultations in Blue Nile and South Kordofan States. Unless resolved, these outstanding issues will continue to cause tensions (GoSS, 2011a).

Insecurity remains, and in the last six months some parties have perceived a rise in the incidence of internal conflict. Indeed security remains the primary concern for the government and the people of South Sudan.¹ But the government and state capacity to deliver security and rule of law in terms of infrastructure, trained personnel, policy development and service delivery is limited. This is borne out by feedback from the 10 states during the consultation phase of the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP), where lack of capacity is evident throughout, both at state and lower levels of government.

GoSS continues to establish all the institutions required for administration of a new state supported by the necessary legal frameworks, including the development of permanent constitutions. It is working to meet the needs of a new administration at all levels to ensure that key institutions of the state can perform, including implementation and adherence to international treaties. At the same time as commencing work on constructing the essential institutions of the new state they are seeking to assume greater responsibility for providing, directing and co-ordinating the delivery of humanitarian and development aid. They have been assisted in this work by the international community, though there are concerns expressed by a broad spectrum of stakeholders that they underestimated the scale of the statebuilding and peacebuilding tasks over the last five years.

Building strong self-government will take many years and will require a robust road map to get there. In order to guide the extensive work required over the next three years, the government has committed to produce a medium-term development plan: the SSDP. It is expected that the plan will be completed by July 2011. The plan is an attempt to address the immediate, complex, inter-related challenges in conflict and security; the political transition; peacebuilding; and economic, human and social development. The plan will be complemented by a new Aid Strategy that will, it is hoped, provide a framework for the management of development assistance.

Most core government institutions have been established and are functional, [but] building strong self-government will take many years and will require a robust road map.

¹ Reaffirmed by all 10 states in the consultation exercise for the South Sudan Development Plan and the Planning Conference held on 19-20 May 2011.

South Sudan, from the signing of the CPA, has been a test case for the Paris Declaration and Fragile States Principles, including establishment of a six-country joint donor office, pooled funding mechanisms, and joint planning exercises. Despite this, and perhaps partly because of the degree of complexity associated with such efforts, international actors have struggled to improve aid effectiveness in the face of the complex peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda.


PURPOSE OF THE SURVEY

This Fragile States Principles (FSP) survey is unique in that it sets a baseline for development effectiveness at the time of South Sudan's independence. This is an opportunity no other country has had. The South Sudan chapter of the 2011 FSP survey has also been used to contribute to the on-going development planning process and the formulation of medium-term objec-

tives in-country. It will also be used to help finalise the Aid Strategy for South Sudan, to be applied after independence. The survey is therefore an opportunity to:

- examine the effectiveness of the current development financing modalities used in South Sudan to-date;
- improve the design and implementation of development assistance in the future;
- identify to what extent the fragile situation impacts aid effectiveness;
- raise the level of understanding by government and development partners of the Paris Declaration and Fragile State Principles in general, and of their respective degrees of implementation in particular; and to,

FIGURE 2
Sectoral composition of development partner assistance (2007-2011)



- identify the priority action required for both the development partners and government to improve development outcomes.

BACKGROUND DATA

The security situation in Sudan in 2005 constituted a threat to international peace and security. On 24 March 2005, the Security Council, passed resolution 1590 (2005), establishing the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). The current mission comprises a total of 10 456 uniformed personnel including 9 290 troops, 475 military observers and 691 police officers, supported by 966 international civilian personnel, 2 837 local civilian staff and 475 United Nations Volunteers.² A new UN mission for independent South Sudan is in the planning stages.

The gross domestic product (GDP) of South Sudan is unknown, and work on developing basic macroeconomic data continues. It has a population of 8.26 million, 50.6% of whom are classified as “consumption poor” according to the latest Household Survey (SSCCSE, 2010).

Total committed official development assistance (ODA) to South Sudan in 2010 was approximately USD 1 152 million, including reported humanitarian funds. Since 2005, ODA has averaged between approximately 30% and 40% of the approved government budget. Over the last five years, development partner support to social and humanitarian needs has been steadily rising. Figure 2 depicts the percentage of development partner assistance allocated to the various sectors.

The top five development partners to South Sudan are the United States, Netherlands, United Kingdom, the European Union and Norway (see Table 3). Key sectors for aid delivery are security, health and education. This is assessed by allocation, not actual expenditure.

TABLE 3
Top five development partners in South Sudan (2010)

	2010 funding allocation (USD)
United States	342 450 237
Netherlands	110 780 410
United Kingdom	103 666 819
European Union	97 014 766
Norway	78 010 805
Other development partners	420 275 885
TOTAL	1 152 198 922

Source: Government of South Sudan (2010).

² Source www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/facts.shtml accessed 28 April 2011.

1. TAKE CONTEXT AS THE STARTING POINT

PRINCIPLE 1: KEY FINDINGS

- Development partners do attempt to take context into account in the design and implementation of their programmes and projects but their work is significantly hampered by the lack of statistics and other basic planning data, and the fact that they failed to mobilise the right skills/people appropriate to the task at hand.
- It is suggested that the situation is one of “over-analysis and under-action”. The analysis itself is also questioned amid suggestions that the complicated and changing dynamics of conflict militate against full understanding.
- Development partners did not adequately take into account the capacity of GoSS and other implementing partners to manage donor projects when designing major projects, as demonstrated by experience with the MDTF.

DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS HAVE LIMITED CAPACITY IN CONTEXT ANALYSIS

All stakeholders recognise the importance of taking context as a starting point. Nearly all the DPs operating in South Sudan claim they have attempted to (i) identify and address causes and drivers of conflict and fragility, and identify and address factors that can strengthen peace and stability, and (ii) identify and address statebuilding challenges and priorities and regional dimensions of conflict and fragility in their respective country strategies.¹ However, only half of their country strategies identify and address global drivers of conflict and fragility in the country.

Many DPs are uneasy about their limited understanding of ongoing conflict and the political and social context of South Sudan. This can largely be explained by capacity constraints. Whilst often referring to extensive academic and policy analysis on the country, many DPs state they do not have adequate staff and/or skills in-country available to strengthen their analysis of the current context. Development partners not physically present in Juba feel particularly vulnerable. The dangers of “remote” development management are recognised by DPs who are now in the process of setting up new missions in South Sudan separate from their main Khartoum offices.

The “Multi-Donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in South Sudan 2005-10” concludes: “A sophisticated and nuanced analysis of power relations, causes of vulnerability, and drivers of conflict and resilience indicators was largely missing from the design and execution of many aid programmes ... donors have instead focused upon administrative delivery and implementation.” (Bennett *et al.*, 2010, p. xviii)

JOINT ANALYSIS AND UNDERSTANDING: A MIXED RECORD

The government, development partners, UN and the World Bank share a broad consensus on the security challenges and needs of South Sudan. There is also evidence of joint assessments, analysis and objectives

¹ From integrated questionnaire.

starting in 2004 with the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) (JAM, 2004), the 2006 Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) review, (UNDG/WB, 2006) the work to support the 2008 GoSS Expenditure Priorities Document² and the 2009 Juba Compact.³ However, the initial design of immediate interventions in South Sudan after 2005 stemmed from the analysis of the JAM, which was limited in its understanding as it was conducted before GoSS even came into being. Its analysis was approximate at best. One lesson identified by participants is that there should have been a provision for redesigning programmes, projects and financing instruments in the light of subsequent knowledge and field experience. The JAM and subsequent PCNA also underestimated the capacity of GoSS and that of NGOs and other contractors (see also constraints to MDTF performance mentioned under FSP 3).

Until now, the lack of an agreed national vision for South Sudan has acted as a critical constraint to a shared understanding of national priorities.

The UN system uses a Common Country Analysis (CCA) to inform and underpin the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). The current UNDAF, carried out in 2007, has informed the programming of UN agencies (UNCT Sudan, 2007). This is important as there are 21 individual UN agencies, all of which have conducted reviews – some jointly – to provide contextual and analytical information for planning and programming. However, this UNDAF covers all of Sudan.

Notwithstanding some shared analysis, including sector and social analysis, DPs acknowledge they need to share more information amongst themselves. The joint analysis work that has been undertaken has not necessarily translated into joint plans

² This document set out GoSS budgetary priorities for 2008-11, and identified the required volume and allocation of development partner funding in support of these priorities. Development partner support has been evaluated for its alignment to these priorities ever since, as per the pie chart shown under FSP 8.

³ The Juba Compact was endorsed in Juba, South Sudan, by the GoSS and its development partners on June 30, 2009. It was intended to represent a new higher level of co-operation and commitment to certain objectives. In particular, the Compact listed agreed measures to address the 2009 fiscal and economic situation and focused on important adjustment measures and reforms.

and priority setting. Joint analysis is most often undertaken for humanitarian needs assessments. By contrast, there is still a lack of shared analysis on security issues, despite this being acknowledged as a main priority for the country by all concerned.

There also seems to be a lack of consensus over the real capabilities of the government, which has caused a divergence of views on how fast to implement key economic and financial management initiatives. Some participants felt that more debate is needed with government on establishing the level and pace of support for development of systems, structures and approaches that are appropriate to the local context and government capacity. This has recently led to the drafting of a Medium-Term Capacity Development Strategy (MTCDS) for South Sudan, which it is hoped will provide a strategic framework for addressing the capacity development priorities essential to the implementation of the SSDP (MHRD, 2011). In addition, NGOs, recognising the lack of co-ordination at country level have recently come together to draft a strategy for “Governance Capacity Building At Country Level” (NGO Policy Forum, 2011a).

PREPARATION OF THE SSDP

Until now, the lack of an agreed national vision for South Sudan has acted as a critical constraint to a shared understanding of national priorities. In November 2010, the government started work on its first development plan, the SSDP. This will provide the first three-year planning document for the post-independence period and is extremely important for both the government and DPs. Development partners are positive and engaged in supporting its “four pillar approach” based around sector working groups. There is optimism that the SSDP and associated planning processes will help alignment significantly in the post-independence era.

The preparation of the new SSDP has encouraged more joint working between GoSS and a broad range of development partners. Drafting the plan has required DPs to closely support a government-led planning process and development partners have

made a number of public commitments to align with the SSDP (see FSP 7). The SSDP will address the central question of how to better focus both government and aid resources in a co-ordinated and planned way.

Development partner approaches are still likely to vary greatly in practice based partly upon their differences of understanding at a lower level of analysis, including for example, the speed of development of key state functions and approaches to capacity building in different sectors, an example of which is the progress on key public financial management (PFM) functions.

DEARTH OF STATISTICAL DATA

The lack of basic socio-economic statistics constitutes a major constraint. The South Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation (SSCCSE) was established in 2005 following the signing of the CPA and is the central authority for compiling national statistics. It has conducted two health surveys (2006 and 2010), a baseline household consumption survey (2009), a business survey (2010) and a number of other smaller surveys, and produced South Sudan's first Poverty Report (2010), and two annual statistical yearbooks for the years 2009 and 2010. The SSCCSE was also responsible for census data. While many consider it has performed well given limited resources and expertise, the data available remain inadequate. While data for some sectors, like education and health, are relatively more available, participants noted the discrepancies between these data and the SSCCSE household survey.

The ability of GoSS to undertake macroeconomic analysis and forecasting is also limited. The shortage of macroeconomic data is partly due to the fact that South Sudan has not had an independent monetary policy. Aggregated statistics are now urgently required, with the lack of reliable figures on balance of payments, GDP and Consumer Price Index acting as a constraint to resource mobilisation and investment planning. The SSCCSE has shared provisional estimates of GDP for 2007-10 with

other GoSS ministries and is working to produce official GDP statistics by the end of 2011.

The SSCCSE currently receives ongoing long-term support from Statistics Norway, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF and the UK's Overseas Development Unit (ODI), and support from other development partners such as the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Bank for individual surveys. There are no independent evaluations of its performance. A new National Strategy for the Development of Statistics is being written. All development partners now agree that the generation of official statistics should receive urgent attention.

The lack of baseline data hampers preparation of "results-oriented frameworks" and government wide monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems. DPs are working at project level with ministries and agencies to generate baseline data and impact indicators for their projects. The SSDP will be the first opportunity to consolidate these indicators, so that benchmarks and targets can be established.

WHOSE CONTEXT?

Development partners continue to use the limited pool of South Sudanese consultants for themselves, instead of working in a way that strengthens locally rooted research institutions, including universities or policy "think tanks" (see FSP 2). Even where local data and expertise exist, context analysis does not necessarily translate into relevant programme and project design, especially for development partners working from Khartoum or even Europe. Taking context as a starting point requires a sustained and constant dialogue between DPs and South Sudanese officials and others. Some participants asked whose context was being assessed and whether there were enough independent participatory assessments rather than ones that only reflect the views of selected experts, or development partners' predetermined positions.

Even where local data and expertise exist, context analysis does not necessarily translate into relevant programme and project design.

PRIORITY ACTIONS

- Development partners should provide co-ordinated support to relevant GoSS institutions to develop the country's capacity to generate socio-economic statistics and strengthen the country's result-based M&E system.
- DPs should also support relevant civil society and independent think tanks to end the government and donor monopoly on information.
- GoSS may need to consider the appointing statistical focal points in all ministries and at state level, or strengthening them where they exist. Evidence-based policy making and planning should be promoted in decision making at all levels in South Sudan.
- Development partners should use the opportunity of the SSDP and the new Aid Strategy (see FSP 8) to commit to greater co-ordination on analysis and data sharing and ensure it is translated into effective programmes and projects.

ILLUSTRATIVE INDICATORS

Indicator 1a. Are the international actors' country strategies based on sound political and social analysis (i.e. taking into account the situation in terms of national capacity, state-society relations and societal divisions?)

The individual country strategies are generally based on sound analysis of the available data but there are some concerns over the quality and quantity of analysis possible given data limitations.

Indicator 1b. Is there a process through which national and international actors conduct contextual analysis together when deciding priority actions, appropriate division of responsibilities, aid modalities etc.?

With a few notable exceptions there is little evidence that national and international actors work together on contextual analysis.

Indicator 1c. Have the development partners agreed on joint strategic objectives?

Only 50% of development partners felt their counterparts shared their strategic objectives.

2. DO NO HARM

PRINCIPLE 2: KEY FINDINGS

- Continued bypassing of the government in the delivery of basic services, especially health services, will cause harm in the medium to longer term.
- There is a growing concern amongst both South Sudanese and international actors about the pervasive and destructive impact of corruption but there seems to be little political will to tackle it, nor any national strategy to address it.
- Aid dependency, particularly in areas such as food aid and health service delivery, is perceived as a growing problem.
- There is increasing competition for staff between donors and the government which is expected to increase after independence.

“DO NO HARM” ESSENTIALLY MEANS that international actors’ intervention should not undermine statebuilding, peace, and development processes. While they do not deliberately aim to cause harm, international actors need to take on board several significant challenges. Approximately half of the DPs declared that they do not identify trade-offs between potentially different priorities/objectives within their own internal development, political and security objectives, nor that they have a process to manage them. Even those respondents who did, did not clearly articulate how such trade-offs were assessed and reached.

Since the signing of the CPA, South Sudan has been viewed as a test case for the Paris Declaration and Fragile States Principles, including establishment of a joint donor office, pooled funding mechanisms, and joint planning exercises. Given development partners’ limited understanding of the context in South Sudan, there is a danger that initiatives designed without sufficient attention to context, and without provision for revision in light of experience, could do more harm than good.

BYPASSING GOSS IN THE DELIVERY OF SERVICES

Concerns are being raised over the bypassing of GoSS in delivering services and the continued reliance on NGOs, as the government shows few signs of gradually taking over responsibility. There are significant risks associated with withdrawing support from key services. Some development partners have large commitments to ongoing support for basic services such as primary health care. If support is withdrawn, these services could collapse very quickly. There appears to be an almost tacit agreement to date that government focuses upon security and development partners support basic services. Further discussions as part of the implementation component of the SSDP may help clarify the future strategy for basic service provision bearing in mind the extended time scales required to develop government ownership (FSP 7) through greater use of government systems and reducing the number of external parallel project implementation units (PPIUs). Some participants felt that both the GoSS and development partners could have been more ambitious in terms of a more holistic and long-term approach to capacity building, especially in supporting the development of basic services.

Both the GoSS and development partners could have been more ambitious in terms of a more holistic and long-term approach to capacity building.

Most DPs claim to visibly promote the contributions of national counterparts. However, it is acknowledged that the current government communications systems are weak and many DPs step in to fill the void (for example MSI, 2009). Government partners have expressed a wish to develop strategic communication tools to assist with engaging in dialogue with the public, to gain their trust and foster mutual accountability.¹ In a separate and recent survey, almost all international NGOs (INGOs) claim they are already working closely with government (NGO Policy Forum, 2011b). Two-thirds of INGOs claim they are already supporting, or working through, national NGOs (NNGOs) and over one-third said they plan to increase such support in future. This suggests that further research is needed to better understand the perception that INGOs are not providing sufficient support to government or NNGOs. In any event, increased collaboration between NGOs and government is likely to increase transaction costs that have to be factored into the cost of development assistance.

Whilst most of the DPs claim they both monitor salary developments and co-operate on setting salary scales, the considered view is that co-operation across all the DPs is not systematic.

SALARIES AND GOVERNMENT TOP UPS

There were some concerns expressed over the higher salaries paid by the UN, some larger development partners and NGOs, which were seen as necessary to attract staff in a limited recruiting pool. Whilst most of the DPs claim they both monitor salary developments and co-operate on setting salary scales, the considered view is that co-operation across all the DPs is not systematic. The UN agencies use an “Operations Management Team”, supported by a human resource network comprised of senior UN

human resource personnel, to monitor and address remuneration issues through market surveys.

However, the wider situation is confused by the increasing presence of members of the diaspora and regionally recruited “experts” who anecdotally appear to have a greater value in the job market compared to “local” South Sudanese. The percentage of diaspora returnees in higher-level government posts is unknown and it is impossible to tell if some development partners favour the recruitment of returnees to complement the use of their own technical advisory teams. More research is required into the returning experts issue, including whether it is considered a problem by national stakeholders who are not returnees themselves. It was also noted that the GoSS was increasingly making payments as “incentives” to serving civil servants through the government budget via ad hoc payments in ministries.

AID DEPENDENCY

Many commentators have suggested that in South Sudan the dependency on food aid and a lack of self sufficiency has become a real problem and harming long-term development prospects. Many South Sudanese suggested that persistent support for food aid undermined enthusiasm to kick start local food production, and gave aid agencies disproportionate power in their relationships with government, though they acknowledged this was a complicated situation that has evolved over many years. The local private sector also expressed concern that its capabilities were not recognised and outsiders were preferred to local companies. GoSS is concerned about increasing its non-oil revenue, and has commissioned a study to make recommendations to expand revenue (Zeru Gebre Selassie, 2009). Nearly all survey participants noted that aid is used to provide services that the government could provide if it was not so reluctant to take over, possibly deepening dependency.

¹ Recognising this the UN Country Team is in the process of finalising a joint communications strategy which draws on national perceptions of UN visibility and programming. This strategy will be implemented by the UN Communications Working Group comprised of senior UN Communications personnel, led by the Resident Coordinators Support Office. It is intended that the communications strategy will support the 2011-12 programming and align with the South Sudan Development Plan goals and priorities at both central and state levels. Such a strategy could link to a new government policy on project branding and communications with citizens.

CAUSING HARM BY LACK OF ENGAGEMENT ON KEY ISSUES OR THROUGH PIVOTAL ACTORS

The issue of doing harm by “not engaging” was regarded as important by some participants and covered such areas as the need for increasing emphasis on anti-corruption, civil service reform, and support for a national process of reconciliation.

In the case of corruption, participants cited both the apparent lack of political will by the government to deal with it and the failings of the international community to adopt a joint stance and confront the government about it. There is a need to seriously tackle the issue, including the development of a national strategy (NORAD, 2011). Lack of action is perceived by some as providing political legitimacy to the way business is currently done. Arguably, indirect focus on strengthening public accountability may be a valid strategy but so far has failed to deliver results.

PRIORITY ACTIONS

- Government and DPs to work together, co-ordinated by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP) Aid Coordination Directorate on a holistic and long-term approach to capacity building, especially in support of the development of basic services provision.
- Increased co-operation amongst DPs to jointly commission regular monitoring of wages and recruitment of national staff, including from the diaspora, and benchmarking against an accurate assessment of the true level of wages and salaries in Government would begin to address the issue of suspected “brain drain”.
- Government and DPs to jointly review the extent to which “aid dependency”, and increasing aid volumes in the foreseeable future, can hinder nationally owned and driven reforms and development prospects, with issues of accountability and ownership receiving special emphasis.
- Government and DPs to examine ways in which the local private sector can be supported to have an increasingly material role to play in the reconstruction effort and eventually emerge as a key strategic partner.
- DPs to provide increased support to the Anti-Corruption Commission, Audit Chamber, Parliament, civil society and the media with the objective of promoting anti-corruption efforts.

ILLUSTRATIVE INDICATORS

Indicator 2a. Have the development partners performed previous assessments of the negative impacts their intervention could cause?

No. There has not been a systematic attempt to assess and monitor whether the interventions of development partners could impact negatively.

Indicator 2b. Do the development partners have an institutional mechanism for integrating lessons learned from past assessments into strategy and/or programming?

Approximately half of DPs reported that they have mechanisms in place for integrating lessons learned from past monitoring or assessments into strategy and/or programming.

Indicator 2c. Do the development partners individually or jointly monitor wages and recruitment of national staff, or have they set up any other actions to avoid a brain drain from the national public sector?

Nearly all the survey participants responded that they monitor salary developments. However, none of them co-ordinate salary levels and recruitment practices with other DPs and nearly 70% do not have a policy on recruiting staff from the government. This implies that there may be a harmful brain drain from the government towards donor agencies.

3. FOCUS ON STATEBUILDING AS THE CENTRAL OBJECTIVE

PRINCIPLE 3: KEY FINDINGS

- Since 2005, development partners have been hampered by the challenge of supporting unity, as required by the CPA, while at the same time preparing for an independent state of South Sudan.
- Some participants were of the view that the focus on statebuilding has come at the expense of addressing nation building.
- GoSS feels that perpetuating parallel systems of project implementation ultimately undermines state systems.
- Some participants felt strongly that development partners just want to deal with the government and are too focused on establishing a strong executive at the expense of working with state and county governments.
- Although development partners claim to focus on the key requirements of statebuilding, they have overlooked support to some key dimensions including domestic resource mobilisation.
- GoSS has been slow to meet key deadlines important for establishing the minimum legislative and administrative capacity in time for independence (The Public Finance Management Act, Procurement Act, Internal Audit Act).

STRENGTHENING POLITICAL PROCESSES

All DPs claim that their strategies take statebuilding as a central objective, with all development partners claiming that their country strategies include objectives for strengthening political processes and supporting or facilitating dialogue between state and non-state actors. However, since 2005 development partners have been hampered by the challenge of supporting unity, as required by the CPA, while at the same time supporting preparation for an independent state of South Sudan. Until 2010, little work had commenced on such areas as customs and immigration, and independent macroeconomic and monetary policy. Only following the referendum was it possible to commit to the “inevitable”. Development partners publicly express their support for reaching a successful conclusion of CPA implementation and the outstanding North-South issues, but it is not clear what support is currently given to mediate the ongoing disputes concerning North-South interests, other than supporting implementation of the Mbeki recommendations on peace, justice and reconciliation. The situation is still complicated by the need for continued support to mediation efforts on Darfur.

GoSS is aware that even as the country moves inexorably to statehood, it could still slip back into conflict, and so remains focused on security issues and peacebuilding initiatives, supported by development partners who are seeking to consolidate fragile development gains. Participants agreed that international actors have moved quickly to support GoSS in its efforts to maintain stability and have made substantial investments in supporting the establishment of basic services through the Basic Services Fund (BSF) and the Stabilisation Recovery Fund (SRF), establishing and then strengthening state institutions and building human capacity, through the Capacity Building Trust Fund (CBTF). However, there was some discomfort with the government’s lack of budgetary support for basic services and capacity building despite the frequent rhetoric about the need to develop these key areas.

PACE OF DEVELOPMENT

The very high levels of technical assistance required to support key government functions and other development objectives have led some participants to question whether a weak post-conflict state can stand up to the pace and complexity of reforms expected by DPs and their South Sudanese counterparts. The World Development Report 2011 (World Bank, 2011) identifies the need to find appropriate “best fit” solutions. The new SSDP will attempt to rectify this through more focused prioritisation. Many projects since 2005 have experienced less than optimum outcomes. On a more positive note, one GoSS senior official stated:

When GoSS started its work in 2005 we could see some schools being built, some water was being provided, and other local projects but we did not know who was behind these NGOs and why they were working where they were. Now in 2011 we mostly know why they are there, who is funding them and how they fit into our plans. However, we still do not have the capacity to account for all that donor money right now, so we will need to work hard to meet the requirements of the donors.

This clearly demonstrates that progress has been made on co-ordination, access to information and alignment, and that service delivery continues to improve, while recognising that there is much to do.

PROGRESS IN PUBLIC SECTOR REFORMS AND ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE QUALITY OF COUNTRY SYSTEMS

In late 2010 development partners and GoSS officials worked together on a “Costed Action Plan for Rapid Capacity Development” which is now feeding into the SSDP (GoSS, 2010a). This prioritised the core governance functions that need to be in place by independence on July 2011. The focus is on five areas: a) executive leadership, b) rule of law & law enforcement, c) fiduciary management, d) public administration and e) natural resource management. These priorities have drawn speedy and focused support from a number of key donors, the UN and the World Bank.

Work on the basic core functions of government is likely to go on for some years and preoccupy both development partners and the GoSS. There is still no agreed road map for improving public financial management though both government and DPs recognise the need. Indeed there is some disagreement on the pace of necessary reform.

One example is the speed of the development of the taxation system. Raising revenue is one of the main attributes of the state and a way to get out of aid dependency and generate mutual accountability between the state and its citizens. Thus the capacity of government to raise revenue and manage it in line with social expectations is often cited as a key state-building priority and it requires sound and transparent systems of public finance management. Yet there are currently very few experienced customs and tax revenue officials in South Sudan. The new customs function will need to take on greater responsibility in the South as most of the revenue (including that from excises and the new general sales tax) will come from collecting import duties. Because the creation of a Revenue Authority is a major multi-pronged reform effort, opinions differ on how quickly the government should establish one.

Some progress has been made on strengthening government procurement systems but it remains an outstanding issue. The Procurement Law is drafted but not yet enacted. The Government Accountancy Training Centre (GATC) provides training on procurement. Some development partners, including USAID, AfDB, and others support the development of procurement processes, but the experiences of the World Bank in 2005-7 demonstrate the risks associated with procurement policies that are not adapted to context and experience slow implementation. Local businessmen claim the government has no political will to implement procurement to international or even regionally accepted standards.

The GoSS receives support for public financial management (PFM) from development partners including the UK Department for International

Development (DFID), USAID, Norway and the World Bank. However, GoSS has been slow to meet key deadlines for establishing the minimum capacity for fiduciary management in time for independence. The Public Finance Management Act, Procurement Act and Internal Audit Act are not enacted and regulations have not yet been approved. The main development partners support the plan to undertake a “Common PFM Assessment” that will establish a new baseline after independence, diagnose the situation and set out a way forward with agreed indicators and benchmarks.

A cornerstone of the aid strategy is GOSS’s desire that development partners move towards more “system-aligned” aid modalities, i.e. that they make more use of GoSS systems. DPs feel that there is some way to go before tangible progress is possible, however GoSS is attempting to define what it views as the art of the possible through analysis under its “Budget Strengthening Initiative” (BSI).¹

PARALLEL PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION UNITS AND SYSTEMS

GoSS feels that parallel project implementation systems ultimately undermine its systems. Development partners admit to establishing more than 100 PPIUs, all of which operate outside of government. One of the OECD criteria defining parallel PIUs is whether the PIU is accountable to government and so, given the lack of procurement systems, the establishment of PPIUs in the immediate post-conflict period is not unexpected. Immediately after the CPA, South Sudan had to merge two civil services (outside and within government) and reconstruct basic infrastructure, with limited human resources. Even today, the government payroll is dominated by unclassified workers (cleaners, drivers), missing a middle layer of qualified technocrats. DPs and the government will need to work to transfer accountability to government to avoid the continuation of PPIUs in

the future. The MTDCS and the new aid strategy will provide a platform to address the issues of PPIUs and co-ordinate technical assistance.

THE NEED TO FOCUS ON PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY AND SUPPORT TO OTHER KEY INSTITUTIONS

All stakeholders noted that access to services needs to improve dramatically in order to meet citizen expectations. Service delivery in South Sudan is intimately linked to decentralisation. DPs will need to work closely with state governments as the GoSS refines and implements its decentralisation agenda. South Sudan is configured as a decentralised administration, however, County Commissioners claim that limited funds reach the county level despite GoSS assurances that funds will be transferred. This is clearly linked to the lack of financial accountability.

Secondly, some South Sudanese participants felt strongly that development partners have focused too much on establishing a strong executive. Development partners respond that without an immediate focus on GoSS after the signing of the CPA there would have been no state. Some note that Parliament was and is neglected and has received comparatively little development partner support. In a number of post-conflict countries, increased support to public accounts and legislation committees often acts as a counterbalance to a dominant executive. In the post-independence era DPs have alluded to the likelihood of increasing international pressure to develop a wide variety of other good governance functions such as action on corruption, transparency and accountability, and support for human rights.

Finally, some South Sudanese participants were of the view that the focus on statebuilding has come at the expense of nation building, the process of constructing or structuring a national South Sudan identity. There is currently some disagreement amongst South Sudan citizens on what a post-independence South Sudan will look like. The government, through frequent presidential

All stakeholders noted that access to services needs to improve dramatically in order to meet citizen expectations.

¹ The BSI is a technical assistance programme that provides support to strengthen budget policies, processes and systems.

speeches and preparation/promotion of the Vision 2040 document, clearly places great importance on creating citizen's ownership of the new "nation", by reducing ethnic and tribal rivalries and encouraging people to invest in the new state. However, survey participants drew attention to the lack of state presence in rural areas and the disconnect between farmers and the new state (see also FSP4).

Some of the DPs are reluctant to engage in or support nation building beyond efforts to support national dialogues, especially those with non-state actors. Some aspects of nation building are linked to an endogenous process of power relations and negotiations, and so are particularly hard to define and even harder to weave into the DPSS. However there is support for a more inclusive approach to development that would also see wider engagement with parliament, civil society and media.

PRIORITY ACTIONS

- Government, with the support of DPs, to facilitate a national dialogue on establishing more clearly the links between statebuilding and nation building and review what DPs can do in the context of nation-building activities to support the continued establishment of the state.
- Government and DPs to review the work on developing core functions at all government levels, clarify the division of labour to support these core functions, and make joint plans to undertake priority assessments, review funding instruments and co-ordinate capacity building.
- Government to instigate a more transparent dialogue with political groups and local non-state actors, particularly by using the media at the national, sub-national and global levels.
- Government and DPs to agree the detail of a medium- to long-term strategy for the gradual transfer of priority service delivery from NGOs to the government.

ILLUSTRATIVE INDICATORS

Indicator 3a. Percent of ODA disbursed focused on governance and security between 2005 and 2009

Most development partners do not support the security sector through ODA, leaving this mainly to government.

Indicator 3b. On the whole, has international engagement sufficiently strengthened strategic state functions?

Whilst the last 5 years have seen a good deal of focus on building the competency of state institutions, it has only been in the last 12 months that development partners have explicitly supported GoSS in strengthening strategic state functions tailored to independence.

Indicator 3c. On the whole, has international engagement contributed to strengthening political processes and supported dialogue between the state and society?

There is some evidence of support for strengthening political processes and dialogue, particularly support to local development committees and peace conferences, but generally support for political processes, systems and dialogue is weak.

4. PRIORITISE PREVENTION

PRINCIPLE 4: KEY FINDINGS

- Threats to renewed conflict with Northern Sudan remain high and internal threats are perceived to be escalating.
- Many agencies are involved in conflict prevention on a number of levels and there is wide support for establishing early warning systems but co-ordination is problematic.
- The general view is that instability in South Sudan is multi-dimensional and can be triggered by a range of factors. The lack of a single peacebuilding strategy is regarded as problematic. Such a strategy would not just focus on the cessation of violence and implementation of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) but also include improved service delivery and development of the security and justice sectors.

DEFINING POST-INDEPENDENCE SECURITY, CONFLICT PREVENTION, PEACEBUILDING AND NATION BUILDING PRIORITIES

Tribalism, the spread of arms, the threatening presence of militias, the presence of government corruption (see FSP 2), a confusing list of priorities, discipline lapses in the ranks of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), and the huge disparity between reality and the high expectations and ambitions of the South Sudanese people are all problems vividly present in South Sudan which make prevention all the more important in the post-independence era. In the first quarter of 2011, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported over 750 people had been killed and more than 80 000 displaced by conflict incidents, based upon reports by local authorities and/or assessment teams (OCHA, 2011, p.4).

However, key development partners suggest that there are reputational risks in continued support for security and conflict prevention by the armed forces after independence without safeguards in place. Preventing conflict is naturally high on the agenda of both the government and international partners but there is a sense that the latter cannot continue to support it “unconditionally”, particularly considering the high government expenditure on the uniformed forces as opposed to basic services. Currently there is a need for improved co-ordination between development partners and fresh dialogue with government on this issue. The international community will need to review and expand their commitment to justice and rule-of-law initiatives, some of which have experienced problems in implementation.

Currently GoSS still has no single agreed peacebuilding framework. None was prepared following signing of the CPA, and many regard this as a strategic error. In 2010, the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPBSB) highlighted the lack of a peacebuilding strategy as a key omission. This links to points made under FSP 3 about the confusing dual objectives of promoting unity yet building towards full separation and independence. The key discussion is now how to shift focus to strategies that give full responsibility for peacebuilding and statebuilding to the new post-independence government in a way that recognises the links that exist with the North and will continue after independence.

GoSS recognises that the peacebuilding process places great responsibility on the government, but supportive external involvement can be critical. Several development partners are contributing resources to support the Ministry of Peace and CPA implementation. However, it is questionable whether resolutions adopted from many years of peace meetings have been successfully followed up by GoSS and other government partners, despite international support for tracking resolutions and peace dialogues, provided through UNDP, UNMIS Civil Affairs and Pact Sudan, among others.

At the highest level strategic support has been given by the international community to implementing the CPA, through support to the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) for negotiations, security sector transformation, elections, census and the referendum. This support will be coming to a close as Independence Day approaches. As a result, the current focus from international partners is in a state of flux, as they consider how much attention should remain on supporting resolution of the outstanding CPA matters and how much should focus there should be on supporting resolution of internal conflict. Observers note recent bouts of violence have crippled some developmental activities. A number of militias remain active in the South, with inter-communal violence continuing, and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is active in Western Equatoria. The process of drafting the SSDP has identified the need for GoSS to prepare a new Security Strategy for South Sudan.¹

EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE SYSTEMS

A large number of external stakeholders now support emergency response, humanitarian assistance, food security, disaster relief and peacebuilding while the government's co-ordination responsibilities are increasing as it prepares to take full responsibility, posing a new challenge for the DPs.

Development partners such as DFID, Norway and Denmark are supporting NGOs such as PACT to work with government to develop early warning and early response systems. Other "early warning" type systems exist within the UN mission, other NGOs, and a number of GoSS agencies. The "Initiative for Peacebuilding"² is also working on an early warning case study on Sudan, the specific aim of which is to increase understanding of:

- the factors which catalyse violence and turn fragility into open, widespread violence
- the systemic blockages and policies which constrain institutions from acting fully and promptly on available analyses

The analysis will provide recommendations to the EU to help it better understand the institutional challenges and constraints on improving responses. The EU intends to link early warnings to more effective and timely responses to prevent conflict and build peace.

UNDP's Crisis Mapping & Risk Assessment project is working towards developing a concept and tool for early warning and response system with the Ministry for Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management (MHADM).

The Humanitarian Contingency Plan, involving more than 250 humanitarian partners, includes an annually updated emergency preparedness and response plan to deal with South Sudan's ongoing emergency needs. DPs reported that contingency planning was done to prepare for emergency scenarios during the elections and the referendum. This was followed by scenario-based post-referendum strategic and operational planning. The UN contingency planning exercises have been conducted in close collaboration with the government to ensure national goodwill, capacity-building and ownership of responsibilities. On the issue of food

¹ The current Security Strategy for South Sudan was approved by the Council of Ministers (CoM) in 2008. It recognises challenges to peacebuilding resulting from the failure to make progress on the CPA

² The Initiative for Peacebuilding – Early Warning Analysis to Action (IfP-EW) is a consortium led by International Alert and funded by the European Commission.

security, the GoSS Priority Core Government Functions framework includes the development of a GoSS-owned early warning, monitoring and surveillance information system (Priority Area 18), in order to build national leadership capacity for food security crisis prevention and management. A Food Security Council is in place but lacking clear impact, there is some information sharing for market information.

WOMEN AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

In South Sudan, there is little evidence to show development partner commitment towards the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions (SCRs) 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security. Development partners, through UNFPA, are supporting a five-year gender strategy development process, and there are several sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and women's empowerment activities, but these are limited in scope. There is international agreement on the need for high-level visibility and backing by champions at the highest levels of government and the need to ensure sufficient funds are allocated for the implementation of SCR 1325 and 1820. Women have an important role in protection, prevention, and relief and recovery. That these UN Resolutions were not mentioned at all during the national consultation and the interviews with key stakeholders including NGOs and civil society was surprising given the commitments made by many of the DPs in international forums on women, peace and security issues.

With so many initiatives underway, there is a risk of a situation of “over analysis and under co-ordination”. Greater co-ordination and a clear, integrated long-term strategy on prevention measures is needed between development partners, the government and relevant civil society actors. This includes a shared analysis of conflict trends and the development of joint effective contingency strategies to ensure appropriate responses. As the transition to independence kicks in, some participants suggested a that there needs to be a renewed focus on “conflict sensitive” programming; recognising this, the SSDP

government-led planning team have incorporated conflict-sensitive approaches to planning and project prioritisation.

PRIORITY ACTIONS

- Government and DPs to prepare a clear, integrated and flexible long-term strategy for analysis of conflict trends and the development of effective but flexible contingency strategies to ensure appropriate responses, matched by appropriate investments.
- Government and DPs to consider the scope for establishing and supporting a National Women, Peace and Security Taskforce with representatives from all relevant government departments and institutions responsible for implementation, reporting, and monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding and statebuilding initiatives. The Taskforce can invite other post-conflict African countries who have experience in the benefits of gendered policy development and service delivery to share their experiences with South Sudan, gathering examples of best practice and adapting them to their own context.

Greater co-ordination and a clear, integrated long-term strategy on prevention measures is needed between development partners, the government and relevant civil society actors.

ILLUSTRATIVE INDICATOR

Indicator 4a. Over the past 5 years, has the international community invested in preventing future conflict and fragility?

Many development partners have invested in studies of conflict and fragility at various levels but there is a disconnect between the production of studies, ongoing analysis and the application of findings to detailed programme and project design. There is evidence of information sharing but less evidence of joint assessments and joint donor approaches to addressing conflict prevention (see also FSP 1).

5. RECOGNISE THE LINKS BETWEEN POLITICAL, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

PRINCIPLE 5: KEY FINDINGS

- Relying on the CPA to integrate political, security and development concerns and to drive the necessary prioritisation is no longer the only answer.
- The government and DPs will be faced with increasingly hard choices and trade-offs between political, security and development objectives in the post-independence era.
- Preventing conflict and building consensus is naturally high on the agendas of international partners and thus support for the government's strong focus on maintaining and strengthening the armed forces, but not at any cost.

THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT

In the last five years the development partners have had the CPA to provide a clear framework against which to integrate political, security and development dimensions, define priorities, and measure progress. The CPA's objectives provided the co-ordinating framework for development partners and encouraged the different policy communities to converge on common goals, even if in practice results were variable and there were shocks along the way, such as renewed crises in Darfur and eastern Sudan. The intensely political nature of the CPA meant that development actors were a part of the political processes alongside diplomats. As the CPA comes to a close the situation will change markedly. This is a unique opportunity to capture lessons from the CPA implementation. One major lesson has been the difficulty of supporting a peace agreement where the signature parties did not realistically foresee a single united Sudan. This led to slow and unenthusiastic implementation of its key provisions. Implementing the CPA involved an attempt to solve many – some say too many – political, economic, and social problems in a very short period.

Development partners recognise this and are starting to look at new approaches that could encourage development and nurture the new state, but also support continued stability. Development partners have established a “Donor Stabilisation Work Group”. There is an emerging consensus amongst development partners on the overall approach as demonstrated by support to the SRF and renewed thinking about appropriate sustainable government-led DDR following unrealistic expectations associated with earlier attempts (Brethfeld, 2010). However there remains a lack of consensus on sequencing and prioritisation. This is the crux of the matter and can realistically only be resolved as the post-independence political landscape comes into focus.

There are, indeed, conflicting choices between security, development and political priorities. In post-conflict South Sudan, directing scarce resources towards the improvement of basic service delivery remains an urgent priority. However, much of the available government resources are being consumed by the security sector. Most stakeholders favour reducing security spending in favour of social spending, but reductions in military spending risk harmful security and political outcomes. One of the main drivers of military spending is the number of people paid by the military and the numbers are set to increase as the government continues to follow a policy of incorporating former militias into the military in the name of peacebuilding.

In post-conflict South Sudan, directing scarce resources towards the improvement of basic service delivery remains an urgent priority.

On the eve of independence, the state of South Sudan now needs to be able to manage and mitigate multiple, multi-dimensional threats.

Interviews with a number of key DPs reveal some concerns. With southern members of the former Joint Integrated Units being integrated along with any Southerners formerly fighting in the forces of the North, military spending seems certain to continue to consume a large portion of government expenditure into the future. The SPLA acts as a kind of “big tent” for the country and the presence of the former militias is in fact the cost of peace and not the cost of fulfilling the country’s military requirements. But if their incentives to remain within the SPLA are reduced there is every chance that combatants may return to the bush and may even resort to conflict. This would be devastating for the country, the region and the international community. Dealing with the humanitarian impacts of such a conflict could well cost even more than a well-planned and executed programme to professionalise and transform the security sector.

Many government participants from the states have given contradictory responses to this issue. On the one hand they question the current allocations of resources, citing the need to allocate more for social and human development and to care for returnees, suggesting that it was time to reconsider the “price of peace”. On the other hand they state that security cannot be compromised.

PROGRESS ON SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Taking the CPA as their framework, a number of development partners, principally the US and the UK, but also others including UNDP and Switzerland, have supported the security sector. The thesis behind this support has been the need to ensure that the security sector is appropriate to the current security context – of both citizens and state. A significant effort has been made to help the SPLA effect the transition from what might best be described as a guerrilla army to a professional fighting force under democratic, civilian oversight. From the vantage point of the CPA process, this was an entirely appropriate activity and clearly necessary in terms of reducing political and military threat to the internationally brokered peace agreement. However, with South Sudan now standing on

the verge of independence, it seems possible that the focus on the SPLA has come at the expense of similarly coherent and strategic investment in the wider, more people-facing security and justice service providers such as the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS). During the CPA period, South Sudan’s security management has focussed on the need to hold safe and successful elections and then the referendum. The country’s security systems have had to deal with one threat at a time. On the eve of independence, the state of South Sudan now needs to be able to manage and mitigate multiple, multi-dimensional threats. The fact that the SPLA remains the only security sector organisation with any significant capability raises the possibility that it will continue to be involved in the political and domestic security life of South Sudan for some time to come. With the benefit of hindsight, GoSS and development partners ought to have matched their investments in the SPLA with similar investments in the strategic and operational development of the SSPS and the wider justice and rule-of-law sector, recognising the latter started from an almost nonexistent base.

MAINTAINING COHERENCE AFTER INDEPENDENCE

This FSP also relates to the international community’s coherence across their various strategies of engagement in the country. The question remains for development partners as to what is the right balance between political accommodation of the needs of the North and South as they undergo a no doubt painful separation, against actively encouraging the government to meet the obligations of a new state. A further complication is added by separation of DP offices between North and South Sudan. Separating embassies and development agencies will raise the question of which office is responsible for what activities. It is possible that DPs may opt to address North-South peace issues out of Khartoum offices. The implications of this are unknown. The uncertainty is complicated by the fact that large donors and other development partners such as the UN have strategies and agreements that cover all of Sudan and in some cases are signed by the

Government of National Unity. Currently there is great deal of activity in the DPs to split their headquarters, develop strategies that address only South Sudan, rearrange human resources, and reprogram funds.

Will the development partners and the government be able to engage properly at the highest political level on these issues? Very few senior-level development partner representatives are present in the new capital, Juba, to have the necessary high-level political and policy dialogue with GoSS on issues such as the direction of national policies, including key issues such as political agreements, security and stabilisation, anti-corruption and human rights. The future level of international representation in Juba is currently unclear.

It is likely that there will need to be a period of settling down after independence but the evidence also points more than ever to the need for a whole-of-government approach to ensure successful priority setting and the consolidation of peace dividends.

PRIORITY ACTIONS

- The government and the DPs to sustain and expand dialogue and improve co-ordination between diplomatic, development and security objectives in a principled way that leads to locally defined political settlements.
- In light of the focus on the impact of state fragility and vulnerability on national and international security, DPs and government need to be much more explicit about specific actions that promote stability in South Sudan. This could be articulated in locally designed “stabilisation plans” or other similar initiatives.
- Develop a strategic level capacity at the centre of government to oversee the development and operation of the security and justice sector. Ensure that the security and justice needs and interests of the citizens are the primary concern of security and justice sector institutions.

ILLUSTRATIVE INDICATOR

Indicator 5a. Do the development partners have a whole-of-government (or, in the case of the EU and UN, whole-of-system) country strategy (i.e. one joint strategy for the partner country, including political, development, security and other objectives) or at least joint strategic objectives?

Most DPs claim to undertake a “joined up” or whole-of-government approach to their country strategy encompassing political, development, security and other objectives. In the case of the UN, the UNDAF currently covers all of Sudan and will now be reviewed to focus on the South only. The EU is currently working on a single strategy for all member states.

6. PROMOTE NON-DISCRIMINATION AS A BASIS FOR INCLUSIVE AND STABLE SOCIETIES

PRINCIPLE 6: KEY FINDINGS

- Most DPs claim to have mechanisms in place to ensure the views of vulnerable and marginalised groups inform their programming.
- Many survey participants felt some unease over their understanding of the endlessly complicated nature of discrimination in South Sudan society, an example being projects around supporting returnees.
- Gender discrimination is deeply embedded in South Sudan society but the government is committed to addressing the issue.

DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS WILL, when asked, generally state that they are ethnically and tribally blind when it comes to designing and implementing their projects. Yet most DPs have extensive systems in place to look at gender issues, youth, children, HIV/AIDS and most include “rights-based approaches” to programming and projects. DPs recognise the need for increased understanding of all forms and drivers of discrimination and how to address them.

On the question of whether their country strategies address non-discrimination successfully and whether mechanisms are in place to ensure the views of vulnerable and marginalised groups inform programming, the results were mixed. Most concrete discussion and analysis to avoid discrimination takes place informally at the project level. This suggests that some appropriate responses have been implemented in spite of a probably imperfect understanding of realities. That discrimination is one of the drivers of conflict is well known and has to be addressed. This was one area where donors and other development partners clearly felt the need to share the burden of analysis and improve sharing of data.

As discussed under FSP 1, many participants feel some unease over their understanding of the complicated nature of discrimination in South Sudan society. Some participants cautioned against using their limited understanding of the socio-ethnic-landscape in South Sudan (see FSP 1) as an excuse for poor programming. The targeting of assistance to a certain client group, such as returnees, or for a specific conflict area in a country that is strongly ethnically and tribally divided will inevitably raise objections by some that they are being discriminated against. South Sudan has a long history of marginalisation, exclusion and discrimination so sensitivities are acute.

Whilst most South Sudanese survey participants agreed that there is no intention to discriminate, the results can suggest otherwise. Too many projects in Juba, a focus on GoSS institutions over those of the states, too many projects close to other administrative centres, often as a result of real security concerns in rural areas, and inadequate selection criteria for training, resulting in a risk of inadvertent resource capture by dominant groups.

TOO NARROW A FOCUS ON SOCIAL PROTECTION – TIME TO TAKE RISKS?

Some participants suggested that in South Sudan there is too narrow a focus on social protection and it is time to broaden the range of possible responses to dealing with chronic poverty, food insecurity (linked

Conflicts have resulted in immense social, economic and political disruptions from which women have suffered disproportionately.

to food aid dependency) and other hazards. Some discussions have started over the need to experiment with innovative programmes including asset (cash) transfer, livelihood promotion and community mobilisation and empowerment. However, some also caution that South Sudan will have to carefully appraise any new policies. South Sudan is an uncertain environment and the risks associated with committing to approaches that may not work, dashing high expectations, can be substantial. There is a danger that harm could result from the temptation to treat South Sudan as a testing ground for global initiatives that, whilst they may have been successful elsewhere, do not have sufficient backing from a broad group of development partners and at the necessary levels of government to facilitate co-ordination and coherence.

SOCIETAL DIVISIONS, THE URBAN-RURAL DIVIDE

Participants raised concerns over the support being concentrated too heavily on building up the central institutions of government with a particular focus on Juba, which has also benefited disproportionately from infrastructure development (see FSP 10). The proposed remedies consist mainly of the DPs working closely with government to increase understanding based upon clear analysis such as the recent National Poverty Report and other surveys. Other remedies include a renewed focus on decentralisation and more transparent targeting of services and capital investments. This can be achieved through the development of transparent government policy that moves beyond purely security concerns.

GENDER DISCRIMINATION

Gender discrimination in South Sudan has no boundaries. It goes beyond gender based violence (GBV) and includes forced marriage, dowry or bride-price related violence, marital rape, sexual harassment, forced pregnancy and marriage. Discrimination is differently interpreted and perceived across different customs in the diversity of South Sudan. Two decades of conflict in Sudan

have left many women in precarious conditions. Conflicts have resulted in immense social, economic and political disruptions from which women have suffered disproportionately (Abusharaf, 2006). Women and girls make up the majority of the internally displaced person (IDP)/refugee populations. Ninety percent of South Sudanese women are poor and uneducated. Females are disadvantaged in relation to access to basic services (Salih, 2008).

The prevalence of gender discrimination cuts across social and economic situations and is deeply embedded in cultures around South Sudan – so much so that that thousands of women consider it as a way of life. Domestic violence, especially against women, is viewed as the only way to solve family conflict. Such cultural norms put women in subservient positions in relation to their husbands and other males. This inferior status makes women undervalued, disrespected and subject to violence from their male counterparts. Discriminatory norms, combined with economic and social inequalities, serve to keep women subservient and perpetuate violence by men against them.

Following the signing of the CPA, the GoSS, with the support of international community, has been committed to advancing women's empowerment and gender equality in South Sudan. Progress has been made in enforcing the quota of 25% representation for women in the South Legislative Assembly and the State Legislative Assembly as enshrined in the constitution. Out of 170 members elected to the South Sudan Legislative Assembly in the 2010 April elections, 51(31%) are women. In addition, 120 out of 480 members elected to the 10 state legislative assemblies were women. The creation of the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare at the national level and the State Ministry of Social Development and Religious Affairs and the appointment of a Gender Advisor in the Office of the President is a measure of the commitment by GoSS to enhancing and strengthening its institutional capacity to reduce discrimination. It is also expected that the SSDP, a pro-poor document, will have a meaningful impact on the poor and

the vulnerable especially the women and children. Other positive measures include the establishment of the South Sudan Special Protection Units across the ten States that aim to provide an environment that enables the protection of victims of GBV and promotes reporting of GBV cases. Lastly, support to increase recruitment of women into the South Sudan Police Service will help bring balance and establish a strong and professional police force as an effective tool for good governance and effective law enforcement.

South Sudanese participants noted that the government does not have true “ownership” of many issues to do with discrimination such as HIV/AIDS.

POSSIBLE PRIORITY ACTIONS

- Government and DPs to share the task of undertaking more systematic and comprehensive assessments, using existing research, to develop a better picture of discrimination in South Sudan.¹
- Government, with support from DPs, to sustain support to decentralisation to ensure benefits of statehood are felt by all.
- DPs to work with government to identify how it can take ownership of, and address key issues such as gender discrimination and HIV/AIDS.

ILLUSTRATIVE INDICATORS

Indicator 6a. Percentage of ODA earmarked for human rights over the period 2004-2009.

According to available data the percentage of ODA earmarked for support to promotion of human rights over the period 2004-2009 is not likely to exceed 1%.

Indicator 6b. Does the international community explicitly promote inclusion of women, youth, the poor, minority or marginalised groups, through dialogue, programmes and/or capacity strengthening?

Development partners do try to promote inclusion although the needs are so great that many parts of the country are not yet reached. The GoSS has no earmarked funds specifically to address discrimination against women and the impact of HIV/AIDS.

Positive measures include the establishment of the South Sudan Special Protection Units across the ten States that aim to provide an environment that enables the protection of victims of GBV and promotes reporting of GBV cases.

¹ For example, by research to gather direct empirical evidence for the prevalence of large disparities among racial and ethnic groups in various domains.

7. ALIGN WITH LOCAL PRIORITIES IN DIFFERENT WAYS IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS

PRINCIPLE 7: KEY FINDINGS

- Both government and development partners experience problems in prioritising and sequencing. A number of line ministries have embarked on “sector strategic planning” processes whilst also participating to the SSDP process, with timelines of the various processes overlapping but not clearly feeding one into another.
- There is currently neither any general budget support (GBS) nor any sector budget support (SBS) provided to GoSS. Only one DP professes to have a strategy for gradually moving aid on budget and through country systems.
- Most participants recognised that current financing mechanisms may need a strategic reorganisation and realignment to better support implementation of the SSDP. NGOs especially felt that the current short-term funding associated with most funding mechanisms does not serve the longer-term interests of South Sudan well.

BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AGREE that the Budget Sector Working Groups (BSWGs), formed in 2006 to help the budget planning process, offered a successful mechanism for the alignment of their priorities, at least in their initial years. Most development partners have also expressed the view that they wish to build on the BSWG process to develop sector approaches. The 2008 GoSS Expenditure Priorities document also directed development partners and Figure 3 below indicates that approximately 50% of development partner funds were aligned with expressed priorities in 2011.

One large development partner has noted “there are so many needs, so many priorities, that it is easy to align, the real problem is sequencing and harmonising our support”. The issue of prioritisation and sequencing has not been resolved and the SSDP process has experienced some difficulties with it. The difficulty that both government and development partners experience in prioritising and sequencing is further shown by the fact that a number of line ministries have embarked on “sector strategic planning” processes alongside the SSDP process, with timelines of the various processes overlapping but not clearly feeding into one another.

The DPs note that the government’s commitment to the SSDP is not yet clear and question whether it will lead to a change in allocations to reflect needs and priorities. It is critical that development partners as well as government balance their support across states and counties, with implications for peacebuilding and statebuilding. GoSS is also concerned that development partners should pay utmost attention to designing aid instruments that respect the mandates of the different levels of the state in South Sudan in the provision of services. This is a big challenge as specifying these mandates and making them operational is likely to be a “work-in-progress” for some years to come.

Most participants recognised that current aid financing mechanisms may need to be reorganised and realigned with the final SSDP to support its implementation and accompany the multi-faceted transition to full-fledged statehood that should occur during the SSDP implementation period. NGOs especially felt that the current short-term funding associated with most funding mechanisms did not serve South Sudan well.

One large development partner has noted “there are so many needs, so many priorities, that it is easy to align, the real problem is sequencing and harmonising our support”.

CURRENT USE OF COUNTRY SYSTEMS


Currently, neither any GBS nor any SBS is provided to GoSS. No aid is “on budget”. Only one DP claims to have a strategy for gradually moving aid on budget and through country systems, though there is little evidence of any progress in practice. Indeed the use of all aspects of country systems (e.g. public financial management, procurement and audit) has been nonexistent. GoSS is clear in its belief that aid not passing through government systems does not build government capacity.

In brief, aid modalities currently do not go further than being “on plan” and at best recorded in the budget book (thus partly “on budget”), with as

much of the performance of the development partner-funded activities as possible captured in government budget preparation documentation which includes a review of the previous year’s budget performance. Aid is not “on Treasury” or on any other dimension of the PFM cycle.

It has been suggested that development partners can begin to use the procurement systems when certain milestones set out in the Core Functions documentation and the Juba Compact are reached (Juba Compact, 2009). Development partners claim that they have little incentive to move to using country systems due in part to poor fiscal discipline. This arises in part from capacity constraints in the spending agencies, resulting in

FIGURE 3
Development partner funding on GoSS expenditure priorities (2001)



poor budget execution which in turn seriously weakens the credibility of the budget.

The government's revised Aid Strategy, key elements of which will be included in the SSDP, will reflect its aspirations to improve matters. GoSS would like to identify opportunities to strengthen country systems and increase their use by DPs. GoSS recognises the limits placed upon development partners by their respective headquarters and the weaknesses in its own systems but feels the time is right to define initial joint actionable recommendations and take some initial concrete steps towards making progress.

Opportunities for strengthening country systems include:

- Strengthening of PFM systems – including plans to introduce improvements to budget and cash management which will facilitate greater fiscal discipline, improve budget execution, and strengthen the credibility of the budget.
- Complete rollout of the Financial Management Information System, including at state level, which will facilitate accountability for expenditures and will allow States to send regular budget execution reports for consolidation at central level.
- Ongoing gradual reforms of the intergovernmental fiscal transfer system, with, from 2011, a much clearer focus on service delivery, and clearer accountability requirements.
- Undertake an Integrated Fiduciary Assessment which will assess the key PFM and procurement weaknesses and risks with a view to setting out recommendations and capacity-building initiatives.
- Pilot new aid modalities using some aspects of the GoSS PFM system.

POSSIBILITIES FOR IMPROVING AID “SYSTEM ALIGNMENT”

Government and development partners could identify SSDP priority sectors and/or ongoing programmes as candidates for new sectoral aid modalities in which aid would use more of the government planning, budgeting, budget execution and reporting systems. Developing the framework for this, including dialogue, conditionality, technical support, monitoring and evaluation may take some time, but it may be feasible to start a few pilots in 2012. Candidates include programmes/activities that could be financed through the state transfer systems.

Alternatively, if full system alignment is not feasible in the short term it may be possible to promote a system of “shadow alignment”.¹

ALIGNING SUPPORT FOR RETURN, REINSERTION AND EARLY REINTEGRATION

Since October 2010, approximately 300 000 Southerners have returned to South Sudan. The figure is expected to reach 1 million in the first years of statehood. Supporting this return is a major priority of the government. The issue is an extremely complicated one which is costly, unpredictable, and varies from state to state. DPs will need to support the government in different ways depending on the context, in accordance with basic guidelines that must be agreed with government. Supporting this return embodies consideration of many of the FSPs: align behind government priorities, act fast but stay engaged, provide substantial predictable funding and use government systems as far as possible. State reintegration plans have to be robust, based on accurate research and locally owned.

1 For a discussion on “shadow alignment” see [www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD\(2005\)3&docLanguage=En](http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD(2005)3&docLanguage=En) and www.ineesite.org/toolkit/INEEcms/uploads/1023/Aid_Instruments_in_Fragile_States.pdf

PRIORITY ACTIONS

- Government and DPs to pledge their commitment to the SSDP process and agree a clear plan for involving GoSS in aid-allocation mechanisms.
- Government to finalise the Aid Strategy and to agree with development partners on a work plan for its step-by-step implementation including greater harmonisation (see FSP8), alongside the implementation of the SSDP.
- Government and development partners to identify a few pilots for the development of innovative aid sector modalities in line with the Aid Strategy, early candidates may be health and/or education.
- Government and DPs to increase the amount of documentation available for current systems as they are not well documented, not well understood and poorly communicated to the states.

ILLUSTRATIVE INDICATORS

Indicator 7a. Percentage of aid flows to the government sector that is reported on partners' national budgets

Zero - at present all development partner funding is accounted for using parallel systems rather than government financial management information systems (FMIS).

Indicator 7c. If there are joint strategic objectives among international actors, are they also shared by the national government?

Most of the DPs are aligned behind government priorities through the work of the BSWGs and at sectoral level there are agreed lead agencies.

8. AGREE ON PRACTICAL CO-ORDINATION MECHANISMS

PRINCIPLE 8: KEY FINDINGS

- South Sudan has a formal DP co-ordination agreement and a wide array of donor forums and sector-focused groups with *ad hoc* participation by GoSS, many of which predate the CPA period when the South was at war.
- Some donor and aid co-ordination is effective but generally it is weak. PD indicators for joint analysis, technical co-operation and joint mission planning are all very low.
- The new SSDP and the government's revised Aid Strategy is an opportunity to move the 2006 Aid Strategy forward.
- Clarity on the legal, management and co-ordination issues for NGOs is highly desirable.

DONOR CO-ORDINATION AND DIVISION OF LABOUR

While the current formal aid architecture is set out in the 2006 GoSS Aid Strategy, most respondents agree that it functions rather more informally, though it is government led. The 2006 Aid Strategy was developed at a time when there were few development partners in Juba, very limited capacity in GoSS with almost no structures in place at state and county level, and very little knowledge of development partner activities. The 2006 strategy served GoSS well by establishing a formal structure, enabling government-wide and government-led aid co-ordination. In particular it facilitated information flow on development partner activities and engaged development partners in the government planning process. However, given the rapid evolution in South Sudan since 2006, new aid co-ordination priorities have emerged. The revised Aid Strategy needs to provide a mechanism for high-level political dialogue, more monitoring, inclusion of states and counties in the aid co-ordination process, formal divisions of labour and more explicit undertakings on the actions needed to bring more aid on budget

The BSWGs were also established in 2006 and are the main bodies for government-wide co-ordination and planning (including aid co-ordination). The BSWGs have been reasonably effective as a sector-based co-ordination mechanism and provide inputs into the national budgeting process. The groups currently meet annually in June and July, and consist of both government budget holders and DPs. In addition, the 2008 GoSS Expenditure Priorities document and the 2009 Juba Compact helped focus development partner attention on key priority investment areas and provided a focus for co-ordinating development partner support.

The Inter-Ministerial Appraisal Committee (IMAC) appraises and approves development partner-funded projects. It remains a key achievement of the 2006 Aid Strategy, though development partner support is uneven. The GoSS Donor Forum was established as a co-ordination and communication mechanism between the GoSS and its development partners. It provides an information-sharing mechanism although most survey participants feel it has failed to galvanise the political-level support required. It is criticised as formulaic and not allowing high-level political discussions to take place. The GoSS has no way of influencing macro-level aid allocation decisions. The IMAC and BSWGs operate after the fact.

Aid Strategy needs to provide a mechanism for dialogue, more monitoring, [inclusive] aid co-ordination process, formal divisions of labour and more explicit undertakings on the actions needed to bring more aid on budget.

A number of other semi-formal and informal co-ordination mechanisms have arisen or carried over from the pre-CPA period. Many participants observed that these forums facilitate information sharing, discussions on comparative advantages and the capacities of respective agencies to deliver. Co-ordination at project level is generally regarded as “good”. However, one development partner commented, “Most co-ordination mechanisms in place only serve for information exchange among international partners, not for dialogue and harmonisation with GoSS”. Strategic dialogue takes place at steering committees for each joint donor programme, with representatives from GoSS and the implementing partners, limiting improvements to the programme level. Another development partner commented “Donors are undermining or even preventing the GOSS from increasing their effectiveness in co-ordination; hence, there is only little ownership of the government in co-ordinating activities”. Other development partners noted that co-ordination at the state level was poor until most recently, although UN-supported Partner Forums, chaired either by the Governor or Deputy Governor have now been established in each of the ten states.

The Inter Donor Coordination Forum (IDCF), co-chaired by the UN and World Bank, brings together all development partners including OECD/DAC members and non-traditional partners. Its key focus has been galvanising support for the Core Functions initiative which aims to ensure that essential systems are in place at independence and to help build a common understanding of the macroeconomic situation.

The G6 grouping is an informal regular meeting of the six largest donor and international organisations.¹ Its main focus is the identification of key strategic issues that it needs to address with GoSS; other development partners may feel excluded by such a small donor grouping.

The Joint Donor Office (JDO), one of the few pilots of its kind, co-ordinates development partner positions for engaging with the GoSS among the six participating countries. It has supported the management of one of the pooled funds and has provided its members with shared analysis on issues of common interest. By and large this has been regarded as useful. However, with the increasing bilateral presence in Juba in the last year there is some confusion in GoSS as to the future role of the JDO. It is likely to focus on supporting GoSS institutional capacity building and spend less time establishing joint political positions.

The revised Aid Strategy (2012-18) is a concrete opportunity to address some of the failings of the 2006 Strategy. A key challenge that the SSDP will pose for development partners will be agreeing on a relatively robust division of labour while ensuring that this does not leave “orphan” sectors or areas.

DONOR MISSIONS AND CO-ORDINATION

The number of donor missions in South Sudan is already high and likely to increase after independence. In 2010, 155 external missions visited South Sudan and met with government officials. Of these, only eight (4%) were co-ordinated with other development partners. This does not include UN missions where incidence of joint missions is higher. The sheer number of missions and the time required from GoSS leaves little time, space and human resources for independent policy and decision making.

Despite the many bodies engaged in co-ordination, there are few protocols in place to prepare joint assessments, analysis, and planning. Arrangements are informal. Only 16% of analytic reports were jointly prepared and only 13% of technical co-operation is co-ordinated between development partners. The SSDP process has developed draft “planning guidelines” which has led to increased joint working.

¹ UN, USA, EC, UK, Norway, and the World Bank.

POOLED FUNDING MECHANISMS

A number of pooled funding mechanisms have been established, most of which are due to cease operations by the end of 2012.² Most are managed in Juba, with the exception of the Sudan-wide Common Humanitarian Fund which is managed in Khartoum. GoSS has a formal implementation role in the MDTF. Only the South Sudan Rehabilitation Fund is targeted at the state level. One States participant noted “All the ‘funds’ for development seem to be at the centre, we have no access to these funds and little incentive to engage with them”. More information about these funds is in Annex E.

Given the underdeveloped state of government systems, the funds rely on project modalities for implementation. As early as 2006, both DPs and government noted problems with the MDTF, frustrated by the lack of progress and results from early projects. With disbursements not meeting expectations, its stakeholders grew increasingly critical of it, citing poor understanding of context, and concerns about its lack of flexibility to address design flaws, and capacity constraints (see FSP 3).

In 2009 the government and some development partners agreed on a rough division of labour among several of the funds. These funds are managed in a variety of ways involving joint planning, government participation in steering and implementation, and seconded national staff operating donor financial management systems. Implementation, including the delivery of basic services, is mostly entrusted to various third parties, including INGOs. In some of the BSWGs, such as the health group, the activities of partners are mapped but in

many instances sector ministries only get to know what development partners have financed through the MoFEP-prepared annual “donor book” recording donor-financed activities.

REGULATING THE ROLE OF NGOS

Participants recognised that there is work to do on co-ordinating and managing NGOs, who are on the frontline of much existing service provision. The government and DPs recognise the importance of having an appropriate regulatory framework for the operations of both national and international NGOs. The former play a significant local civil society role in statebuilding. The lack of a uniform regulatory framework creates a difficult working environment for the non-state actors and makes it almost impossible for GoSS to gather and manage information on their activities. Currently INGO registration is split between four ministries and the MHADM. Improving regulation and co-ordination could contribute to developing an appropriate strategy for service delivery.

TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR NGO CO-ORDINATION, REGULATION AND SUPERVISION

GoSS needs to develop an “NGO Law” that will provide a workable clear and principled framework to facilitate the work of NGOs, starting with clear guidance on which ministry is the primary interlocutor. Any new regulations should be developed in consultation with NGOs, and there ought to be prior warning and an adequate transition period for both parties to adapt. Any administrative and financial regulation should be designed to facilitate, not discourage, the humanitarian and development work undertaken by NGOs.

The government and DPs recognise the importance of having an appropriate regulatory framework for the operations of both national and international NGOs.

² The four largest are the Multi-Donor Trust Fund-South Sudan (infrastructure investment, service delivery, core government systems, productive capacity) managed by the World Bank, the Basic Service Fund (basic service delivery) managed by a private sector consultancy, the South Sudan Rehabilitation Fund, AKA the SRF (community development, state level capacity and recovery) managed by the UN; and the Capacity Building Trust Fund (PFM, PSR) managed by the Joint Donor Team.

IMPROVED GOVERNMENT CO-ORDINATION

It is important to give GoSS credit for sharing its out-turn expenditure data with donors, and development partners for sharing their aid information, particularly projected funding and activities. GoSS should make undertakings on areas which are im-

portant to the international community, such as progress on its PFM legislative framework, and development partners need to start reporting on results. UN agencies have made some progress in the area of project support by getting the endorsement of work plans by relevant line ministries.

The lack of approval of key documents and processes creates uncertainty for some of the partners. One senior GoSS official noted candidly “unfortunately the government does not speak with one voice at any level”. This is because of poor co-ordination caused partly by overloaded key officials and problems with internal communications. GoSS recognises problems with communications at the centre and between GoSS and the States and intends to address the problem after independence.

PRIORITY ACTIONS

- MOFEP Department of Aid Coordination to complete the revised GoSS Aid Strategy and also prepare Aid Financing Strategies at the sector level which set out which development partners will provide what and the division of responsibilities between GoSS and development partners on specific actions.
- GoSS and DPs to agree on establishment of a regular government-led international community political co-ordination forum (a technical one already exists in the form of the Quarterly Donor Forum).
- GoSS and DPs to prepare proposals for monitoring aid effectiveness on the basis of mutual accountability.
- GoSS to roll out its newly acquired Aid Information Management System as soon as possible.
- GoSS to clarify co-ordination arrangements with NGOs and pass an NGO Law after appropriate consultation.

ILLUSTRATIVE INDICATORS

Indicator 8a. Is there an agreed division of labour?

The DPs make some effort to divide labour at the sector level but overall it is weak. Lead development partners are informally agreed through BSWG co-chairs although this needs formal approval.

Indicator 8b. Is there a pooled funding mechanism, and what percentage of ODA flows through it (fiscal year 2010)?

In 2010, approximately 18% of ODA passed through five pooled funding mechanisms.

Indicator 8c. Has practical co-ordination resulted in better analysis, greater agreement on strategic objectives and improved implementation of international programmes?

In some sectors, assessment, agreement on objectives and implementation have improved, especially in health and education. However, PD indicators for joint analysis, technical co-operation and joint mission planning are all very low.

Indicator 8d. Percentage of technical co-operation disbursed through co-ordinated programmes in line with country development strategies

Since the approval of the 2009 Juba Compact and the GoSS 2010 “Priority Core Government Functions” document, technical co-operation programmes and GoSS priorities have been increasingly aligned rather than mostly supply led – although many remain so.

9. ACT FAST... BUT STAY ENGAGED LONG ENOUGH TO GIVE SUCCESS A CHANCE

PRINCIPLE 9: KEY FINDINGS

- There is a general view that development partners can respond quickly to humanitarian needs where necessary, though procedures can sometimes appear complicated.
- Although most international actors appear to be committed to long-term engagement in South Sudan, this is not always well reflected in forward budget planning and contractual commitments. This is due to the cyclical nature of programming, the current emphasis on short-term funding, the highly volatile political situation and poor predictability of aid in an uncertain global financial climate.

ACTING FAST

All development partners who responded to the survey claimed they had rapid response mechanisms or financing modalities that can be used to address urgent humanitarian needs and bridge the transition between humanitarian and development assistance. The government and implementing partners agreed to this assessment but with two caveats: first, it has to be a “real” emergency, as judged by the development partner, and second, implementing partners have to be adept at understanding complicated donor systems. The government also feels that whilst development partners are full of good intentions, the historical focus on short-term flexibility means that longer-term interventions have missed out. The short-term nature of funding was confirmed by the NGO Policy Forum members who lamented that it militated against long-term planning.

South Sudan is an example of aid being divided into separate humanitarian and development boxes. To date, humanitarian funding has been included in the overall Sudan humanitarian work plan where a significant amount of projects are for all of Sudan, including Darfur, making it difficult to know how much of the funds received for the project have been used for the South only. There are problems sharing data on humanitarian expenditure allocations and the linking of such expenditure to that directed towards longer-term recovery. There are no collective detailed reports on humanitarian funding prepared specifically for South Sudan. This situation limits aid effectiveness.

The future design of transition financing needs to more explicitly relate to the priorities and objectives agreed by government, as expressed in the SSDP. In South Sudan the trade-offs between urgent humanitarian needs, service delivery and longer-term development objectives need to be better understood and managed. Many basic services may also be being provided through humanitarian funding, which is rarely recorded by government systems. This has caused some confusion in GoSS about the difference between delivering urgent “life saving” humanitarian aid and their role in facilitating service delivery through NGOs and others. Better definition of the role of the government in supervision and oversight of service delivery is set out in the SSDP.

In South Sudan the trade-offs between urgent humanitarian needs, service delivery and longer-term development objectives need to be better understood and managed.

TABLE 4. FUTURE COMMITMENTS OF DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS (IN USD)

	2010		MEDIUM-TERM PROJECTIONS		
	Commitments	Expenditure (Jan-Jul)	2011	2012	2013
Accountability	34,650,357	9,495,780	31,159,729	10,050,000	10,000,000
Economic Functions	9,888,053	5,038,000	14,225,243	3,641,163	3,647,976
Education	112,643,814	21,806,330	73,979,553	14,598,400	0
Health	192,486,955	50,687,814	124,460,174	77,533,461	50,986,668
Infrastructure	184,933,751	48,497,304	149,774,442	24,400,000	7,700,000
Natural Resources	136,791,327	42,806,397	49,169,110	23,792,302	15,500,000
Public Administration	51,935,090	19,497,311	39,872,536	14,550,000	12,500,000
Rule of Law	44,030,540	40,662,233	1,630,465	1,000,000	0
Security	63,202,043	29,156,305	34,177,289	0	0
Social & Humanitarian	321,636,992	99,896,392	278,592,246	9,270,908	2,733,718
TOTAL	1,152,198,922	367,543,866	797,040,787	178,836,234	103,068,362

Source: Government of South Sudan (2010).

STAYING ENGAGED FOR THE LONG TERM: CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

Government partners feel that in the past too much support has been given to uncoordinated short-term capacity building.

It has been suggested that much support to fragile and conflict-affected countries naturally tends to focus on quickly reducing “fragility” and preventing further conflict. However, GoSS is keen that donors and their implementing partners align themselves behind its long-term priorities, whilst retaining their flexibility to respond in potentially unpredictable circumstances. GoSS firmly believes the new SSDP will help this. Staying engaged for the long term also requires a significant investment in capacity building. Government partners feel that in the past too much support has been given to uncoordinated short-term capacity building. GoSS feel not enough attention is given to longer-term professional development, support for universities and technical schools. There is a recognition that despite much good work in the last five years, institutional conditions are fragile, individual capabilities are heterogeneous, delivery capacities remain extremely weak, and there is an acute need for a professional and accountable public service

to create confidence in government. The GoSS has responded by preparing the MTCDS for South Sudan, which provides a strategic framework for addressing the capacity development priorities essential to the implementation of the SSDP.

FORWARD BUDGET PLANNING

A number of development partners, especially the larger ones, have publicly stated their commitment to a long-term development focus on fragile states in general and support to an independent South Sudan in particular. They note that many sectors will require very long time frames for successful change to occur. However, these commitments to long-term engagement are not necessarily reflected in forward budget planning and contractual commitments. This is due in part to the short-term nature of a lot of funding as well as the cyclical nature of programming. In comments made to the SSDP Planning Conference, DPs also talked about the impact of the global financial crisis on future aid flows and the fact that development partners from many countries faced serious deficits requiring

closer scrutiny of their aid budgets and a growing emphasis on value for money and results. Future aid flows in a time of international economic crisis remain uncertain.

Table 4 demonstrates that commitments for 2012 and 2013 are well below levels of previous years.

The government finds getting data on aid statistics from development partners is not always easy, and is exacerbated by the fact that some of them have not yet disaggregated expenditure between North and South Sudan.¹ The main data collection takes place during the annual planning / BSWG process in June where MoFEP receives data on all sectors, including the humanitarian sector. At the end of 2010 all of this data was entered into the Aid Information Management System (AIMS). MoFEP are now asking development partners to update the information presented on the AIMS and report any new projects, it is therefore anticipated that the data will be up-to-date through the end of the first quarter 2011 by the end of May 2011.

In the latest South Sudan NGO Policy Forum survey almost half of INGOs in the survey were fully funded for 2011. However, more than two-thirds of INGOs in the survey had confirmed funding for less than 50% of their expected programmes in 2012, and almost two-thirds had no confirmed funding for 2013. This indicates that even in the near medium-term, funding mechanisms are not effective, which leaves NGOs without the sort of predictable, long-term funding that is necessary for undertaking sustainable recovery or development work.

In accordance with international practice, information on humanitarian funding is available online through the Financial Tracking System managed by OCHA globally. Information on the funding provided through the Common Humanitarian Fund, which during the CPA period

has been managed in Khartoum, is provided by UNDP which functions as the fund manager. Updates are provided as requested by MoFEP. Changes to the design and management of the CHF will no doubt be made in time for the post-independence period, so that information is readily available for South Sudan only and presented in agreed formats.

PRIORITY ACTION

- Development partners need to provide clarity on future aid flows and volumes for at least three years and should communicate information about aid flows reliably and transparently to enable better government planning and budgeting, especially with regard to implementation of the SSDP. Development partners specifically supporting local service delivery should commit to provide aid flows that are predictable over the short, medium and long term.

ILLUSTRATIVE INDICATORS

Indicator 9a. Are there rapid response mechanisms?

Yes. Most development partners declare that they can act fast if needed.

Indicator 9b. Amount of aid committed at a given time (February 2011) beyond a three-year timeframe

None. Aid flows remain so unpredictable that determining the a three-year time horizon is not possible.

Indicator 9c. Aid fluctuations to average GDP over 2005-2010

There are no figures available for GDP.

¹ This is confirmed by the initial findings of the World Bank-led PEFA Assessment (April, 2011) where it was found that less than 50% of expenditure is recorded

10. AVOID POCKETS OF EXCLUSION

PRINCIPLE 10: KEY FINDINGS

- Political exclusion continues to jeopardise the conclusion of a political agreement necessary to promote stability.
- Both the government and DPs recognise that there are states, sectors, and/or population groups in South Sudan that receive insufficient development assistance. The causes of this exclusion were less well understood.
- Unemployed disaffected youth, particularly young men, have emerged as a significant threat to maintaining peace.
- Rapid urbanisation will lead to a growing population of marginalised and excluded urban poor.

WHO IS EXCLUDED?

Some survey participants were firmly of the opinion that there is no systematic regional or sectoral bias in programming and resource allocations. Limits to access and action were imposed by logistical difficulties or the presence of conflict. However, not having a programming bias is not the same as not being able to reach all needs and survey participants felt that many elements of exclusion needed to be addressed. The costs of not addressing exclusion issues may mean the continuation of societal divisions and inequality, hence the need to strengthen contextual analysis, to understand and address the drivers of exclusion better (see FSP 1).

This is therefore an issue of fundamental importance for the new state. All development partners believe that there are states, sectors, and/or population groups in South Sudan that receive insufficient development assistance. On the other hand most development partners also claim that their monitoring and evaluation systems enable them to disaggregate resource flows and results (e.g. by geographic location, by gender, and across social groups). However, one senior GoSS noted “this is non-issue for us, needs are everywhere, some places have not yet been touched by anything, humanitarian or development projects. Where do you start? Where do you end? Our problem now is politics”. Another official noted “Our real problem is political exclusion – we have to bring in the excluded”. Recent presidential statements endorse the need to address those who currently are excluded from the new South Sudan.

Exclusion, or even discrimination, is perceived as inevitable by some South Sudanese, and tackling it is as much about ensuring all South Sudanese feel they are benefiting from the peace dividend as about the specific allocations of aid to Juba/Central Equatoria and the other nine state capitals and their rural hinterlands. Survey participants held the view that many rural areas are prone to conflict, and so there are too many projects in Juba and close to other state administrative centres. Given the country’s ethnic landscape across main regions, this was perceived as reinforcing social discrimination further (see FSP 6).¹ There is a sense that there has been little infrastructure development outside Juba. Each of the 10 states gets the same fixed budget allocation regardless of population size, development status and needs.

¹ See report on 2011 SSDP Planning Conference – Consultation Findings.

Evidently, this has introduced a serious inequity problem in public resource allocation across states and counties, exacerbated by very weak spending capacity at state level and this perpetuates the feeling that the government is buying peace at the expense of addressing real needs and may be causing harm in the process.

THE CHALLENGE OF DECENTRALISATION

Much debate surrounds the issue of decentralisation and the theme of bringing “towns to the people”. Much of the responsibility for the organisation and delivery of services already lies with the states but they don’t have the resources to manage at local level. There is much work to do to articulate an agreement with the states and counties on exactly what local government will look like in post-independence South Sudan. The challenge, which is also an opportunity, is for development partners to help GoSS develop strong but practical policies and systems for improved local government and more equitable funding allocations. There are also opportunities to support and promote decentralised service delivery frameworks managed by and with oversight from the centre. This would ensure GoSS is not cut out but also directly supports individual states or counties. This would enable development partners to channel financial aid for decentralised service delivery through a strengthened government transfer system.

The challenge, which is also an opportunity, is for development partners to help GoSS develop strong but practical policies and systems for improved local government and more equitable funding allocations.

YOUTH

One thing both DPs and all levels of government do agree on is the exclusion of youth and the growing danger this presents to South Sudan. The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State-building Monitoring Survey in South Sudan found that disillusioned young men in particular pose a significant risk to local security and the lack of employment opportunities has given rise to an increase in local crime and apparent breakdown of social cohesion. There is an implicit assumption that most youth unemployment will be solved by agricultural employment but no demonstrable evidence for this, nor action to suggest that this will occur.

WOMEN

Historically, gender disparities in education have meant women are under-represented in many areas of society including the public service. Equitable geographical representation in the public service is also essential and key to the fair distribution of the gains of development (see FSP 6). The long conflict has resulted in high levels of illiteracy among women, another barrier to inclusion. The GoSS budget does not include any allocations to directly address women’s needs. DPs can assist GoSS with support from gender-budgeting specialists.

LOCAL BUSINESS

Many businessmen and their representatives felt that the lack of focus on private-sector development and lack of support for local investors may ultimately derail, or at best significantly slow, any attempts to establish a functioning state. In criticism targeted at the government they noted the perception that foreign business benefitted most from the reconstruction of South Sudan.

IMPACT OF URBANISATION AND LACK OF SETTLEMENT POLICY

Juba and the other state capital towns are experiencing rapid population growth and as a result facing growing destitution. The urban poor are very vulnerable with regard to livelihoods, services and infrastructure, exposure to environmental hazards and protection threats. Problems associated with urbanisation – overcrowded living conditions in informal or slum settlements, homelessness, a growing number of street children, unemployment, insecure tenure, food insecurity, poor access to services, health risks associated with pollution and poor sanitation, the proliferation of small arms and high levels of crime and displacement – are all areas of growing concern. Policy making at different levels of government has not kept pace with the expansion of towns. International engagement with the many and varied problems of urbanisation has been ad hoc and limited.

PRIORITY ACTIONS

- Government and DPs need to understand exactly who is being excluded and why through appropriate independent research and take necessary action to address exclusion at all levels, including dealing with political exclusion.
- DPs and government should substantially increase the proportion of investment into areas outside Juba based upon an agreed “key settlement” policy setting out the approach to development of key basic services.
- Government, supported by DPs, needs to vigorously tackle youth unemployment at the local level.

ILLUSTRATIVE INDICATORS

Indicator 10a. Is the country under-aided with regard to its needs and the quality of its institutions and policies?

South Sudan has massive development needs as an emerging African nation. However, it is expected that, once independent, it will be a middle-income country because of high oil revenue flows and a relatively small population. South Sudan is predicted to have between USD 3-4 billion of oil revenue a year. Despite this anticipated income, disparities will remain, including very high levels of poverty that warrant continued support to the development of institutions and appropriate policies.

Indicator 10b. All things being equal, does international engagement have a positive or a negative impact on social divides?

On balance most survey participants believe aid has had a positive impact but aid alone cannot be the only answer given how much security and political issues have driven the current context in South Sudan.

Indicator 10c. What percentage of ODA is disbursed at country-level beyond the capital city in calendar year 2010?

Approximately 80% of funding is disbursed outside of Juba.

ANNEX A. THE PRINCIPLES FOR GOOD INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN FRAGILE STATES AND SITUATIONS

PREAMBLE

A durable exit from poverty and insecurity for the world's most fragile states will need to be driven by their own leadership and people. International actors can affect outcomes in fragile states in both positive and negative ways. International engagement will not by itself put an end to state fragility, but the adoption of the following shared Principles can help maximise the positive impact of engagement and minimise unintentional harm. The Principles are intended to help international actors foster constructive engagement between national and international stakeholders in countries with problems of weak governance and conflict, and during episodes of temporary fragility in the stronger performing countries. They are designed to support existing dialogue and coordination processes, not to generate new ones. In particular, they aim to complement the partnership commitments set out in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. As experience deepens, the Principles will be reviewed periodically and adjusted as necessary.

The long-term vision for international engagement in fragile states is to help national reformers to build effective, legitimate, and resilient state institutions, capable of engaging productively with their people to promote sustained development. Realisation of this objective requires taking account of, and acting according to, the following Principles:

1. TAKE CONTEXT AS THE STARTING POINT

It is essential for international actors to understand the specific context in each country, and develop a shared view of the strategic response that is required. It is particularly important to recognise the different constraints of capacity, political will and legitimacy, and the differences between: (i) post-conflict/crisis or political transition situations; (ii) deteriorating governance environments, (iii) gradual improvement, and; (iv) prolonged crisis or impasse. Sound political analysis is needed to adapt international responses to country and regional context, beyond quantitative indicators of conflict, governance or institutional strength. International actors should mix and sequence their aid instruments according to context, and avoid blue-print approaches.

2. DO NO HARM

International interventions can inadvertently create societal divisions and worsen corruption and abuse, if they are not based on strong conflict and governance analysis, and designed with appropriate safeguards. In each case, international decisions to suspend or continue aid-financed activities following serious cases of corruption or human rights violations must be carefully judged for their impact on domestic reform, conflict, poverty and insecurity. Harmonised and graduated responses should be agreed, taking into account overall governance trends and the potential to adjust aid modalities as well as levels of aid. Aid budget cuts in-year should only be considered as a last resort for the most serious situations. Donor countries also have specific responsibilities at home in addressing corruption, in areas such as asset recovery, anti-money laundering measures and banking transparency. Increased transparency concerning transactions between partner governments and companies, often based in OECD countries, in the extractive industries sector is a priority.

3. FOCUS ON STATEBUILDING AS THE CENTRAL OBJECTIVE

States are fragile when state¹ structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations. International engagement will need to be concerted, sustained, and focused on building the relationship between state and society, through engagement in two main areas. Firstly, supporting the legitimacy and accountability of states by addressing issues of democratic governance, human rights, civil society engagement and peacebuilding. Secondly, strengthening the capability of states to fulfil their core functions is essential in order to reduce poverty. Priority functions include: ensuring security and justice; mobilizing revenue; establishing an enabling environment for basic service delivery, strong economic performance and employment generation. Support to these areas will in turn strengthen citizens' confidence, trust and engagement with state institutions. Civil society has a key role both in demanding good governance and in service delivery.

4. PRIORITISE PREVENTION

Action today can reduce fragility, lower the risk of future conflict and other types of crises, and contribute to long-term global development and security. International actors must be prepared to take rapid action where the risk of conflict and instability is highest. A greater emphasis on prevention will also include sharing risk analyses; looking beyond quick-fix solutions to address the root causes of state fragility; strengthening indigenous capacities, especially those of women, to prevent and resolve conflicts; supporting the peacebuilding capabilities of regional organisations, and undertaking joint missions to consider measures to help avert crises.

5. RECOGNISE THE LINKS BETWEEN POLITICAL, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

The challenges faced by fragile states are multi-dimensional. The political, security, economic and social spheres are inter-dependent. Importantly, there may be tensions and trade-offs between objectives, particularly in the short-term, which must be addressed when reaching consensus on strategy and priorities. For example, international objectives in some fragile states may need to focus on peacebuilding in the short-term, to lay the foundations for progress against the MDGs in the longer-term. This underlines the need for international actors to set clear measures of progress in fragile states. Within donor governments, a "whole-of-government" approach is needed, involving those responsible for security, political and economic affairs, as well as those responsible for development aid and humanitarian assistance. This should aim for policy coherence and joined-up strategies where possible, while preserving the independence, neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian aid. Partner governments also need to ensure coherence between ministries in the priorities they convey to the international community.

6. PROMOTE NON-DISCRIMINATION AS A BASIS FOR INCLUSIVE AND STABLE SOCIETIES

Real or perceived discrimination is associated with fragility and conflict, and can lead to service delivery failures. International interventions in fragile states should consistently promote gender equity, social inclusion and human rights. These are important elements that underpin the relationship between state and citizen, and form part of long-term strategies to prevent fragility. Measures to promote the voice and participation of women, youth, minorities and other excluded groups should be included in state-building and service delivery strategies from the outset.

¹ The term "state" here refers to a broad definition of the concept which includes the executive branch of the central and local governments within a state but also the legislative and the judiciary arms of government.

7. ALIGN WITH LOCAL PRIORITIES IN DIFFERENT WAYS IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS

Where governments demonstrate political will to foster development, but lack capacity, international actors should seek to align assistance behind government strategies. Where capacity is limited, the use of alternative aid instruments —such as international compacts or multi-donor trust funds—can facilitate shared priorities and responsibility for execution between national and international institutions. Where alignment behind government-led strategies is not possible due to particularly weak governance or violent conflict, international actors should consult with a range of national stakeholders in the partner country, and seek opportunities for partial alignment at the sectoral or regional level. Where possible, international actors should seek to avoid activities which undermine national institution-building, such as developing parallel systems without thought to transition mechanisms and long term capacity development. It is important to identify functioning systems within existing local institutions, and work to strengthen these.

8. AGREE ON PRACTICAL CO-ORDINATION MECHANISMS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

This can happen even in the absence of strong government leadership. Where possible, it is important to work together on: upstream analysis; joint assessments; shared strategies; and coordination of political engagement. Practical initiatives can take the form of joint donor offices, an agreed division of labour among development partners, delegated co-operation arrangements, multi-donor trust funds and common reporting and financial requirements. Wherever possible, international actors should work jointly with national reformers in government and civil society to develop a shared analysis of challenges and priorities. In the case of countries in transition from conflict or international disengagement, the use of simple integrated planning tools, such as the transitional results matrix, can help set and monitor realistic priorities.

9. ACT FAST... BUT STAY ENGAGED LONG ENOUGH TO GIVE SUCCESS A CHANCE

Assistance to fragile states must be flexible enough to take advantage of windows of opportunity and respond to changing conditions on the ground. At the same time, given low capacity and the extent of the challenges facing fragile states, international engagement may need to be of longer-duration than in other low-income countries. Capacity development in core institutions will normally require an engagement of at least ten years. Since volatility of engagement (not only aid volumes, but also diplomatic engagement and field presence) is potentially destabilising for fragile states, international actors must improve aid predictability in these countries, and ensure mutual consultation and co-ordination prior to any significant changes to aid programming.

10. AVOID POCKETS OF EXCLUSION

International actors need to address the problem of “aid orphans” – states where there are no significant political barriers to engagement, but few international actors are engaged and aid volumes are low. This also applies to neglected geographical regions within a country, as well as neglected sectors and groups within societies. When international actors make resource allocation decisions about the partner countries and focus areas for their aid programs, they should seek to avoid unintentional exclusionary effects. In this respect, coordination of field presence, determination of aid flows in relation to absorptive capacity and mechanisms to respond to positive developments in these countries, is therefore essential. In some instances, delegated assistance strategies and leadership arrangements among development partners may help to address the problem of aid orphans.

ANNEX B.

SUMMARY TABLE OF FSP INDICATORS

TABLE B.1. INDICATORS FOR THE 2011 FRAGILE STATES PRINCIPLES SURVEY

PRINCIPLE 1. TAKE CONTEXT AS THE STARTING POINT	
1a. Are the international actors' country strategies based on sound political and social analysis (<i>i.e.</i> taking into account the situation in terms of national capacity, state-society relations and societal divisions?)	The individual country strategies are generally based on sound analysis of the available data but there are some concerns over the quality and quantity of analysis possible given data limitations.
1b. Is there a process through which national and international actors conduct contextual analysis together when deciding priority actions, appropriate division of responsibilities, aid modalities etc.?	With a few notable exceptions there is little evidence that national and international actors work together on contextual analysis.
1c. Have the development partners agreed on joint strategic objectives?	Only 50% of development partners felt their counterparts shared their strategic objectives.
PRINCIPLE 2. DO NO HARM	
2a. Have the development partners performed previous assessments of the negative impacts their intervention could cause?	No. There has not been a systematic attempt to assess and monitor whether the interventions of development partners could impact negatively.
2b. Do the development partners have an institutional mechanism for integrating lessons learned from past assessments into strategy and/or programming?	Approximately half of DPs reported that they have mechanisms in place for integrating lessons learned from past monitoring or assessments into strategy and/or programming.
2c. Do the development partners individually or jointly monitor wages and recruitment of national staff, or have they set up any other actions to avoid a brain drain from the national public sector?	Nearly all the survey participants responded that they monitor salary developments. However, none of them co-ordinate salary levels and recruitment practices with other DPs and nearly 70% do not have a policy on recruiting staff from the government. This implies that there may be a harmful brain drain from the government towards development partner agencies.
PRINCIPLE 3. FOCUS ON STATEBUILDING AS THE CENTRAL OBJECTIVE	
3a. Percent of ODA disbursed focused on governance and security between 2004 and 2009	Most development partners do not support the security sector through ODA, leaving this mainly to government.
3b. On the whole, has international engagement sufficiently strengthened strategic state functions?	Whilst the last 5 years has seen a good deal of focus on building the competency of state institutions, it has only been in the last 12 months that development partners have explicitly supported GoSS in strengthening strategic state functions tailored to independence.
3c. On the whole, has international engagement contributed to strengthening political processes and supported dialogue between the state and society?	There is some evidence of support for strengthening political processes and dialogue, particularly support to local development committees and peace conferences, but generally support for political processes, systems and dialogue is weak.
PRINCIPLE 4. PRIORITISE PREVENTION	
4a. Over the past 5 years, has the international community invested in preventing future conflict and fragility?	Many development partners have invested in studies of conflict and fragility at various levels but there is a disconnect between the production of studies, ongoing analysis and the application of findings to detailed programme and project design. There is evidence of information sharing but less evidence of joint assessments and joint development partner approaches to addressing conflict prevention (see also FSP1).

PRINCIPLE 5. RECOGNISE THE LINKS BETWEEN POLITICAL, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES	
5a. Do the development partners have a whole-of-government (or, in the case of the EU and UN, whole-of-system) country strategy (<i>i.e.</i> one joint strategy for the partner country, including political, development, security and other objectives) or at least joint strategic objectives?	Most DPs claim to undertake a “joined up” or whole-of-government approach to their country strategy encompassing political, development, security and other objectives. In the case of the UN, the UNDAF currently covers all of Sudan and will now be reviewed to focus on the South only. The EU is currently working on a single strategy for all member states.
PRINCIPLE 6. PROMOTE NON-DISCRIMINATION AS A BASIS FOR INCLUSIVE AND STABLE SOCIETIES	
6a. Percentage of ODA earmarked for human rights over the period 2004-2009.	According to available data the percentage of ODA earmarked for support to promotion of human rights over the period 2004-9 is not likely to exceed 1%.
6b. Does the international community explicitly promote inclusion of women, youth, the poor, minority or marginalized groups, through dialogue, programmes and/or capacity strengthening?	DPs do try to promote inclusion although the needs are so great that many parts of the country are not yet reached. The GoSS has no earmarked funds specifically to address discrimination against women and the impact of HIV/AIDS.
PRINCIPLE 7. ALIGN WITH LOCAL PRIORITIES IN DIFFERENT WAYS IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS	
7a. Percentage of aid flows to the government sector that is reported on partners’ national budgets	Zero - at present all development partner funding is accounted for using parallel systems rather than government FMIS.
7c. If there are joint strategic objectives among international actors, are they also shared by the national government?	Most of the DPs are aligned behind government priorities through the work of the BSWGs and at sector level there are agreed lead agencies.
PRINCIPLE 8. AGREE ON PRACTICAL COORDINATION MECHANISMS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL ACTORS	
8a. Is there an agreed division of labour?	The DPs make some effort to divide labour at the sector level but overall it is weak. Lead development partners are informally agreed through BSWG co-chairs although this needs formal approval.
8b. Is there a pooled funding mechanism, and what percentage of ODA flows through it (fiscal year 2010)?	In 2010, approximately 18% of ODA passed through the five pooled funding mechanisms.
8c. Has practical coordination resulted in better analysis, greater agreement on strategic objectives and improved implementation of international programmes?	In some sectors assessment, agreement on objectives and implementation have improved especially in health and education. However, PD indicators for joint analysis, technical co-operation and joint mission planning are all very low.
8d. Percentage of technical cooperation disbursed through coordinated programmes in line with country development strategies	Since the approval of the 2009 Juba Compact and the GoSS 2010 “Priority Core Government Functions” document, technical co-operation programmes and GoSS priorities have been increasingly aligned, rather than mostly supply led – although many remain so.
PRINCIPLE 9. ACT FAST... BUT STAY ENGAGED LONG ENOUGH TO GIVE SUCCESS A CHANCE	
9a. Are there rapid response mechanisms?	Yes. Most development partners declare that they can act fast if needed.
9b. Amount of aid committed at a given time (February 2011) beyond a three-year time frame	None. Aid flows remain so unpredictable that determining the a three-year time horizon is not possible.
9c. Aid fluctuations to average GDP over 2004-2009	There are no figures available for GDP.

PRINCIPLE 10. AVOID POCKETS OF EXCLUSION

10a. Is the country under-aided with regard to its needs and the quality of its institutions and policies?	South Sudan has massive development needs as an emerging African nation. However, it is expected that, once independent, it will be a middle-income country because of high oil revenue flows and a relatively small population. South Sudan is predicted to have between USD 3-4 billion of oil revenue a year. Despite this anticipated income, disparities will remain, including very high levels of poverty that warrant continued support to the development of institutions and appropriate policies.
10b. All things being equal, does international engagement have a positive or a negative impact on social divides?	On balance most survey participants believe aid has had a positive impact but aid alone cannot be the only answer given how much security and political issues have driven the current context in South Sudan.
10c. What percentage of ODA is disbursed at country-level beyond the capital city in calendar year 2010?	Approximately 80% of funding is disbursed outside of Juba.
11. Results-oriented frameworks?	Approximately half of development partners declare they have joint indicators for assessing statebuilding progress with other DPs and/or the government.

ANNEX C.

SUMMARY OF PARIS DECLARATION INDICATORS

TABLE C.1. ARE GOVERNMENT BUDGET ESTIMATES COMPREHENSIVE AND REALISTIC?

	Government's budget estimates of aid flows in 2010*	Aid disbursed by donors for government sector in 2010*	2005	2007	2010 **		Total aid disbursed through other donors*
	a	b	(for reference)	(for reference)	c = a/b	c = b/a	
African Development Bank	0	3	--	--	0%		2
Canada	0	22	--	--	0%		53
Denmark	0	0	--	--	--		11
European Commission	0	43	--	--	0%		11
France	0	0	--	--	--		2
Germany	0	7	--	--	0%		5
Italy	0	2	--	--	0%		3
Netherlands	0	9	--	--	0%		37
Norway	0	0	--	--	--		30
Sweden	0	4	--	--	0%		25
Switzerland	0	6	--	--	0%		0
United Kingdom	0	43	--	--	0%		31
United States	0	239	--	--	0%		0
World Bank	0	136	--	--	0%		60
Average donor ratio			--	--	0%		
TOTAL	0	513	--	--	0%		270

* In USD millions

** Ratio is $c = a/b$ except where government's budget estimates are greater than disbursements ($c = b/a$).

TABLE C.2. HOW MUCH TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION IS CO-ORDINATED WITH COUNTRY PROGRAMMES?

	Co-ordinated technical co-operation*	Total technical co-operation*	2005	2007	2010
	a	b	(for reference)	(for reference)	c = a/b
African Development Bank	0	2	--	--	0%
Canada	0	14	--	--	0%
Denmark	0	0	--	--	0%
European Commission	0	1	--	--	0%
France	2	2	--	--	83%
Germany	0	7	--	--	0%
Italy	0	1	--	--	0%
Netherlands	0	9	--	--	0%
Norway	0	20	--	--	0%
Sweden	0	0	--	--	--
Switzerland	0	1	--	--	0%
United Kingdom	0	6	--	--	0%
United States	0	121	--	--	0%
World Bank	27	30	--	--	90%
TOTAL	29	215	--	--	13%

* In USD millions

TABLE C.3. HOW MUCH AID FOR THE GOVERNMENT SECTOR USES COUNTRY SYSTEMS?

	Aid disbursed by donors for government sector*	Public financial management						Procurement			
		Budget execution	Financial reporting	Auditing	2005*	2007*	2010	Procurement systems	2005*	2007*	2010
	a	b	c	d			avg(b,c,d) / a	e			e / a
African Dev Bank	3	0	0	0	--	--	0%	0	--	--	0%
Canada	22	0	0	0	--	--	0%	0	--	--	0%
Denmark	0	0	0	0	--	--	--	0	--	--	--
European Commission	43	0	0	0	--	--	0%	0	--	--	0%
France	0	0	0	0	--	--	--	0	--	--	--
Germany	7	0	0	0	--	--	0%	0	--	--	0%
Italy	2	0	0	0	--	--	0%	0	--	--	0%
Netherlands	9	0	0	0	--	--	0%	0	--	--	0%
Norway	0	0	0	0	--	--	--	0	--	--	--
Sweden	4	0	0	0	--	--	0%	0	--	--	0%
Switzerland	6	0	0	0	--	--	0%	0	--	--	0%
United Kingdom	43	0	0	0	--	--	0%	0	--	--	0%
United States	239	0	0	0	--	--	0%	0	--	--	0%
World Bank	136	0	0	136	--	--	33%	0	--	--	0%
TOTAL	513	0	0	136	--	--	9%	0	--	--	0%

* In USD millions

TABLE C.4. HOW MANY PIUS ARE PARALLEL TO COUNTRY STRUCTURES?

	2005 (for reference)	2007 (for reference)	2010 (units)
African Dev. Bank	--	--	1
Canada	--	--	37
Denmark	--	--	6
European Commission	--	--	1
France	--	--	0
Germany	--	--	4
Italy	--	--	0
Netherlands	--	--	0
Norway	--	--	17
Sweden	--	--	0
Switzerland	--	--	0
United Kingdom	--	--	6
United States	--	--	37
World Bank	--	--	0
TOTAL	--	--	109

TABLE C.5. ARE DISBURSEMENTS ON SCHEDULE AND RECORDED BY GOVERNMENT?

	Disbursements recorded by government in 2010*	Aid scheduled by donors for disbursement in 2010*	2005	2007	2010 **		For reference: Aid disbursed by donors for government sector in 2010*	For reference: % of scheduled aid disbursements reported as disbursed by donors in 2010***	
					c = a / b	c = b / a		d	e = d / b
African Development Bank	0	0	--	--	--		3		0%
Canada	0	0	--	--	--		22		0%
Denmark	0	0	--	--	--		0	--	
European Commission	0	0	--	--	--		43		0%
France	0	0	--	--	--		0	--	
Germany	0	9	--	--	0%		7	78%	
Italy	0	0	--	--	--		2		0%
Netherlands	0	0	--	--	--		9		0%
Norway	0	18	--	--	0%		0	0%	
Sweden	0	0	--	--	--		4		0%
Switzerland	0	0	--	--	--		6		0%
United Kingdom	0	0	--	--	--		43		0%
United States	0	239	--	--	0%		239	100%	
World Bank	0	200	--	--	0%		136	68%	
Average donor ratio	0	0	--	--		0%			20%
TOTAL	0	467	--	--	0%		513		91%

* In USD millions

** Ratio is c=a/b except where disbursements recorded by government are greater than aid scheduled for disbursement (c=b/a)

*** Ratio is e=d/b except where disbursements recorded by donors are greater than aid scheduled for disbursement (e=b/d)

TABLE C.6. HOW MUCH BILATERAL AID IS UNTIED?

	Total bilateral aid as reported to the DAC in 2009	Untied aid	2005 (reference)	2007 (reference)	Share of untied aid
Australia	-11.4	-11.4	26%	100%	100%
Austria	0.0	0.0	0%	--	100%
Belgium	2.3	2.3	100%	100%	100%
Canada	0.0	0.0	89%	100%	--
Denmark	4.9	4.9	100%	--	100%
Finland	8.3	8.3	100%	100%	100%
France	28.7	27.9	34%	68%	97%
Germany	15.4	15.2	41%	100%	99%
Ireland	2.5	2.5	100%	100%	100%
Italy	0.8	0.1	32%	49%	8%
Japan	208.5	208.5	100%	100%	100%
Korea	36.1	11.7	--	1%	32%
Luxembourg	0.9	0.9	100%	100%	100%
Netherlands	0.0	0.0	84%	--	--
New Zealand	1.1	1.1	52%	100%	100%
Norway	2.4	2.4	100%	100%	100%
Portugal	0.0	0.0	--	--	--
Spain	9.6	8.9	94%	90%	93%
Sweden	19.2	19.2	100%	100%	100%
Switzerland	0.3	0.3	100%	100%	100%
United Kingdom	72.6	72.6	100%	100%	100%
United States	74.1	69.2	0%	79%	93%
TOTAL	476	445	85%	89%	93%

TABLE C.7. HOW MUCH AID IS PROGRAMME BASED?

	Programme-based approaches			Total aid disbursed d	2005 (reference)	2007 (reference)	2010 e = c / d
	Budget support	Other PBAs	Total				
	a	b	c = a+b				
African Development Bank	0	0	0	3	--	--	0%
Canada	0	0	0	22	--	--	0%
Denmark	0	0	0	13	--	--	0%
European Commission	0	0	0	43	--	--	0%
France	0	2	2	3	--	--	52%
Germany	0	0	0	7	--	--	0%
Italy	0	0	0	2	--	--	0%
Netherlands	0	0	0	13	--	--	0%
Norway	0	0	0	31	--	--	0%
Sweden	0	0	0	8	--	--	0%
Switzerland	0	0	0	6	--	--	0%
United Kingdom	0	0	0	43	--	--	0%
United States	0	0	0	239	--	--	0%
World Bank	0	0	0	136	--	--	0%
TOTAL	0	2	2	568	--	--	0%

TABLE C.8. HOW MANY DEVELOPMENT PARTNER MISSIONS ARE CO-ORDINATED?

	Co-ordinated development partner missions* (units) a	Total development partner missions (units) b	2005* (for reference)	2007* (for reference)	2010* c = a/b
African Dev. Bank	0	4	--	--	0%
Canada	0	17	--	--	0%
Denmark	0	3	--	--	0%
European Commission	0	4	--	--	0%
France	0	16	--	--	0%
Germany	0	5	--	--	0%
Italy	0	4	--	--	0%
Netherlands	1	4	--	--	25%
Norway	1	5	--	--	20%
Sweden	2	4	--	--	50%
Switzerland	1	9	--	--	11%
United Kingdom	0	5	--	--	0%
United States	0	25	--	--	0%
World Bank	3	25	--	--	12%
TOTAL	5	130	--	--	4%

* The total of co-ordinated missions has been adjusted to avoid double counting. A discount factor of 35% is applied.

TABLE C.9. HOW MUCH COUNTRY ANALYTIC WORK IS CO-ORDINATED?

	Co-ordinated development partner analytic work* (units)	Total development partner analytic work (units)	2005* (for reference)	2007* (for reference)	2010* c = a/b
	a	b			
African Dev. Bank	1	3	--	--	33%
Canada	1	2	--	--	50%
Denmark	0	2	--	--	0%
European Commission	0	0	--	--	--
France	0	1	--	--	0%
Germany	0	14	--	--	0%
Italy	1	2	--	--	50%
Netherlands	1	1	--	--	100%
Norway	0	1	--	--	0%
Sweden	1	1	--	--	100%
Switzerland	0	0	--	--	--
United Kingdom	1	5	--	--	20%
United States	1	11	--	--	9%
World Bank	3	3	--	--	100%
TOTAL	8	46	--	--	16%

* The total of co-ordinated missions has been adjusted to avoid double counting. A discount factor of 25% is applied.

TABLE C.10. SOUTH SUDAN BASELINES AND TARGETS FOR 2010

	Indicators	2005 (for reference)	2007 (for reference)	2010 Actual	2010 Target
1	Operational Development Strategies	--	--	0	B or A
2a	Reliable Public Financial Management (PFM) systems	--	--	0.0	No Target
2b	Reliable Procurement systems	Not available	Not available	Not available	No Target
3	Aid flows are aligned on national priorities	--	--	0%	85%
4	Strengthen capacity by co-ordinated support	--	--	13%	50%
5a	Use of country PFM systems	--	--	9%	No target
5b	Use of country procurement systems	--	--	0%	No Target
6	Strengthen capacity by avoiding Parallel PIUs	--	--	109	No Target
7	Aid is more predictable	--	--	0%	No Target
8	Aid is untied	85%	89%	93%	More than 85%
9	Use of common arrangements or procedures	--	--	0%	66%
10a	Joint missions	--	--	4%	40%
10b	Joint country analytic work	--	--	16%	66%
11	Results-oriented frameworks	--	--	0	B or A
12	Mutual accountability	Not available	Not available	Y	Y

TABLE C.11. WHICH DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS RESPONDED TO THE SURVEY?

	Top 15 development partners	2009 Core ODA* (USD millions)	Survey responses
1	Japan	128.48	
2	Asian Dev. Bank	86.98	
3	United States	70.25	✓
4	Global Fund	46.41	
5	World Bank	46.05	✓
6	Australia	45.37	
7	European Commission	41.34	✓
8	Germany	34.80	✓
9	United Kingdom	32.73	✓
10	France	29.85	✓
11	Spain	28.01	
12	United Nations	25.02	
13	Sweden	23.92	✓
14	Korea	16.93	
15	Denmark	16.45	✓
	All other development partners	62.88	
	TOTAL ODA	735.47	
	Estimated coverage of ODA		40%

* Core ODA is gross ODA less debt relief and humanitarian aid

ANNEX D. METHODOLOGY FOR THE FRAGILE STATES PRINCIPLES MONITORING SURVEY

APPROACH TO THE SURVEY AND PURPOSE

The general methodology is common to all participating countries/territories, although the very specific case of South Sudan has necessitated some changes. In particular, capacity issues in South Sudan are of some concern and the competent Government of South Sudan personnel tasked to address and participate in important international studies such as this are seriously constrained by time. In addition, the FSP Survey initial discussion took place three months before the new State of South Sudan was to be declared. The final version of the Country Chapter will be completed three weeks after the declaration of independence. Understandably the focus of key individuals is on a myriad of initiatives.

The consultant has therefore agreed with the government that the South Sudan FSP Survey will link to the existing exercise and dialogues on the preparation of the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP), the ongoing discussions on identifying and addressing core government functions and the current debate on the new Aid Strategy. Thus it is also intended that the survey findings will improve existing country planning and aid management processes. The development planning process involves central and local government, international actors, civil society and other stakeholders so it will be timely that key issues concerning development partner motives and behaviour are re-considered at this crucial time.

The survey will also seek to identify key areas where dialogue may not exist or where existing dialogue could be improved. Crucially, it also offers a lens through which to consider the new Development Plan and its implementation, fostering and strengthening consensus amongst development partners and other stakeholders around the vision, detailed plans and financing.

The ultimate objective of the survey is thus not simply the production of the Country Chapter as an input to the Global Report by OECD, but behaviour change and impact at country level. As such, the starting point for the survey in each country should be “How can the survey contribute to strategic objectives that we’ve already identified, or to certain ongoing processes?” The survey ultimately rests on a multi-stakeholder, multi-sector, mixed-methods approach (quantitative and qualitative data), building on data collection and a national consultation.

The survey consists of three phases and is a multi-stakeholder process. The three phases of the survey are:

1. Data collection (literature review; data search; interviews; focus group discussions; development partner questionnaire) before the national consultation meeting
2. A national consultation meeting
3. Validation of the Country Chapter.

Initial consultations have brought together multiple stakeholders:

- National actors including members of the government, Members of Parliament and civil society organisations

- International actors working in the fields of development, diplomacy, security

PHASE I. INITIAL DATA COLLECTION

This phase has now been completed. The data collection phase has drawn from the combined FSP-Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey development partner questionnaire, statistical data gathered by the consultant, stakeholder interviews, focus group discussions conducted by the consultant and direct observation.

The data collected informs the scoring of indicators. They aim at measuring progress towards good practices usually associated with each of the FSPs. The indicators are only a part of the survey and are contextualised by the other data collected. In other words, indicators are not meant as a perfect or comprehensive measure of how a given Principle is implemented. The indicators are common to all participating countries in order to assess existing trends in all countries. However, these indicators can be supplemented by country-specific indicators, which should be decided on by the Steering Committee before the national consultations are held.

PHASE II. THE NATIONAL CONSULTATION (APRIL 7 2011)

The consultation meeting began with a presentation of the initial findings from the consultant, in order to frame the discussion. The consultation allowed for a qualitative dialogue about whether international support accords with each Principle in the context of those issues of current concern to South Sudan, and with what impact. Examining each context with its specific features and dynamics will help explain why certain approaches and options have been preferred over others. The consultations are an opportunity to foster consensus on these issues, but in a number of cases diverging viewpoints remain, and these are reflected in the main text.

On the basis of discussion during the national consultation and during the follow up consolidation and consultative phase a list of “Priority Actions” was prepared. These priority actions should prove useful for both national and international actors and aim at improving the impact of international engagement through concrete, context-specific and measurable actions.

PHASE III. VALIDATION (APRIL - JULY 2011)

The data collected and the discussions at the national consultation are summarised in this Country Chapter, submitted to the different stakeholders by the National Co-ordinator for validation.

The Chapter has also been peer reviewed locally by an independent peer reviewer.

The data collected and the discussions at the national consultation are summarised in this Country Chapter, and have been submitted to a large group of national stakeholders for validation.

The Chapter has also been peer reviewed locally by an independent peer reviewer, Sally Healy.

ANNEX E. SOUTH SUDAN POOLED FUNDS: KEY INFORMATION (FEBRUARY 2011)

TABLE E.1. SUMMARY OF SOUTH SUDAN POOLED FUNDS

	MDTF	CBTF Phase II	SRF	BSF	CHF
Fund Type	Development	Development	Recovery	Recovery	Humanitarian
Administrator	World Bank	JDT & Mott MacDonald	UNDP	Mott MacDonald	OCHA
Start date	2005	2010	2008	2006	2005
End date	2011	2012	2011	2011	Unknown
Major development partners	GoSS, UK, EC, Norway, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, Germany, Spain, Denmark, Finland	UK, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, Spain	UK, Netherlands	UK, Netherlands, Norway, Canada	Multiple
Development partner funding (USD million)	545.1 (+ 178.6 GoSS)	28.2	91 (received) 115 (pledged)	≈ 132.4 (69.4 for 2006-07/2010, ≈63 to 12/2010)	180
Length of intervention	2-5 years	1-2 years	1.5-3 years	1.5 years	0.5-1 year
Average size of intervention (USD million)	10-150	0.3-2	2.5-15	2-3	0.2
Type of intervention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Large-scale infrastructure - Service delivery - Productive capacity - Core government systems - Cross-cutting (gender and environment) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Public service strengthening - Public financial management - Government training and systems development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Phase 1: Productive capacity and community development - Phase 2: small grants and capacity-building for the SSRDF - Phase 3: state-level capacity and recovery 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Service delivery (primary health, basic education, water & sanitation) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Emergency response - Service delivery (existing safety nets & essential pipelines)
GoSS sectors of intervention	- All except security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Accountability - Public administration - Public financial management 	Phase 1: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Natural resources - Social & humanitarian 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Health - Education - Infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Health, education - Natural resources - Infrastructure - Security - Social & humanitarian
Implementation modality	GoSS agency, private contractor, UN agency & NGO	Private contractor	UN agency & NGO	NGO	UN agency & NGO
Government Role	Oversight and implementer	Oversight	Oversight	Oversight	None
Capacity Building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Formal training; - On-the-job training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Formal training; - On-the-job systems training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Phase 1: limited - Phase 3: state-level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Short-term state-level training for service providers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Limited

	MDTF	CBTF Phase II	SRF	BSF	CHF
Government role in oversight and monitoring	Oversight (chair of steering committee) & implementer (line ministries with consultants)	Oversight (chair of steering committee) & implementer (with consultants)	Oversight (MoFEP is chair of steering committee)	Oversight: MoFEP chairs steering committee; line agencies chair sub-committees for allocation & project management in new phase	Limited
Frequency of steering committee meetings	Every two months (in theory). In practice, this has varied based on the year.	Every 2-3 months (in practice)	Every two months (in theory). In practice, this has varied based on the year.	Every two months (in practice)	2-3 times per year
States engagement	Indirect	Direct & indirect	Direct	Indirect	Indirect
Absorption capacity	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate but improvements since September 2010	High	High, but implementation impeded by lack of access (floods) some parts of the year. Usual carry-over of funds to allow for pre-positioning.

ANNEX F.

MDG STATUS IN SOUTH SUDAN AND FOOD INSECURITY

TABLE F.1. SUMMARY OF MDG STATUS IN SOUTH SUDAN

Goal	Indicator	2004 status	Current status	2015 target	Will the goal be reached?
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger					
Reduce by half the proportion of people living below the poverty line	Proportion of population living below the poverty line	>90% (2003)	50.6% (2009)	45%	Potentially
Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger	Proportion of the population below minimum level of dietary consumption	23% (2003)	47% (2009)	11%	Unlikely
Goal 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education					
Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling	Net enrolment rate in primary education	n/a	48%	100%	Unlikely
Goal 3: Promote Gender Equity and Empower Women					
Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education at all levels	Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education	n/a	.70, .48, .46 (2008)	1	Unlikely
Empower Women	Ratio of literate females to males among 15-24 year olds	n/a	0.67 (2008)	1	Potentially
Goal 4: Reduce Child Mortality					
Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five	Under 5 mortality rate	n/a	381 (2008)		Unlikely
	Infant mortality rate	n/a	131 (2008)		Unlikely
Goal 5: Improve Maternal Health					
Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio	Maternal mortality ratio	n/a	1,989 (2008)	1,680	Potentially
Goal 6: Combat HIV and AIDS, malaria and other diseases					
Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS	No data available	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other diseases	No data available	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability					
Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water	Proportion of the population with sustainable access to an improved water source	n/a	49.5% (2008)		Unlikely
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development					
No data available					

Source: MDG Data compiled by UNDP South Sudan

TABLE F.2. LEVEL OF FOOD INSECURITY BY STATE (2010)

State	Projected Population (2011)	Severely food insecure		Moderately food insecure		Food Secure	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
EES	986,000	143,000	14.5	337,000	34	506,000	51
Jonglei	1,478,000	219,000	14.8	351,000	24	908,000	61
Lakes	807,000	106,000	13.2	224,000	28	477,000	59
NBS	848,000	58,000	6.9	309,000	36	481,000	57
Upper Nile	1,037,000	73,000	7.0	319,000	31	645,000	62
Warrap	1,071,000	154,000	14.4	367,000	34	550,000	51
WBS	368,000	24,000	6.5	72,000	20	272,000	74
WES	676,000	18,000	2.7	123,000	18	535,000	79
CES	1,224,000	51,000	4.2	211,000	17	962,000	79
Unity	664,000	40,000	6.0	97,000	15	527,000	79
TOTAL	7,608,458	886,000	9.7	2,410,000	26.3	5,863,000	64

Source: Compiled from WFP (2011) "Annual Needs and Livelihood Analysis"

TABLE F.3. TRENDS IN FOOD INSECURITY

	2008	2009	2010
Severely food insecure	11%	21%	10%
Moderately food insecure	23%	32%	26%
Food secure	66%	47%	64%

Source: Compiled from WFP (2011) "Annual Needs and Livelihood Analysis"

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2011 Report on International Engagement in Fragile States

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN

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