

Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools

Sudan

*Principal author,
Emery Brusset*



Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office



CABINET
OFFICE



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE



HM TREASURY

Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools

Bradford University, Channel Research Ltd, PARC

& Associated Consultants

Country/Regional Case Study 4

Sudan

Principal Author: Emery Brusset

March 2004

DISCLAIMER

The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author/s and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department for International Development nor of the other government departments who have assisted in managing this evaluation (Cabinet Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, HM Treasury).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE	iii
EVALUATION TEAM ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vii
LIST OF ACRONYMS	ix
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
1. BACKGROUND	6
2. BENCHMARKS FOR INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO VIOLENT CONFLICT IN SUDAN	9
3. ACPP IN SUDAN: OVERVIEW	10
4. EFFECT ON PREVENTING NEW CONFLICTS AND CONTAINING EXISTING ONES	16
5. EFFECT ON INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS	21
6. EFFECT ON INTER-DEPARTMENTAL PROCESSES	24
7. IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT	27
8. RECOMMENDATIONS	28
8.1 Future of the ACPP in Sudan	28
8.2 Suggestions On Indicators And Targets	30
ANNEX 1: SUDAN CONFLICT PREVENTION STRATEGY: REVIEW of 2002/3 AND FORWARD LOOK TO 2003/4	31
ANNEX 2: LIST OF KEY DOCUMENTS AND OTHER WRITTEN MATERIALS CONSULTED	36
ANNEX 3: LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED	39

PREFACE

P1. The Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) are a joint Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Department for International Development (DFID) mechanism for funding and managing the UK's contribution towards violent conflict prevention and reduction. The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) covers sub-Saharan Africa while the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) covers the rest of the world. The CPPs were established by Her Majesty's Government (HMG) in April 2001, following a government-wide review of UK conflict prevention work in 2000. The rationale behind the CPPs is that by bringing together the interests, resources and expertise of FCO, MOD and DFID, greater effectiveness can be achieved. To this end, the CPPs share a joint Public Service Agreement (PSA) target, expressed as follows:

Improved effectiveness of the UK contribution to conflict prevention and management as demonstrated by a reduction in the number of people whose lives are affected by violent conflict and a reduction in potential sources of future conflict, where the UK can make a significant contribution.

P2. HMG commissioned the first evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools to inform the Spending Review 2004 (SR04). DFID has managed this evaluation through Evaluation Department in collaboration with an Evaluation Management Committee (EMC) that also included the Cabinet Office Defence and Overseas Secretariat (Chair), the FCO's United Nations Department, MOD's Directorate of Policy and Planning, DFID's Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Department (CHAD) and DFID's Africa Conflict Team (now the Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit), situated in the Africa and Greater Horn Department (AGHD).

P3. The establishment of a cross-Whitehall Evaluation Management Committee was an innovative approach to managing an evaluation in DFID, and followed the ethos of the joint working of the CPPs. It allowed for extensive consultation between the various departments and conflict prevention teams. Many thanks are due to the various EMC members who contributed to the management of this evaluation. These include: Chris Chalmers, Benjamin Saoul and Anthea Dolman (Cabinet Office), Clare Barras and Stephen Evans (HMT), Joan Link, Euan Wallace and Karen Wolstenholme (FCO), Bernard Harborne and Malcolm Hood (AGHD), Tom Owen-Edmunds, Catherine Masterman and Ben le Roith (CHAD), Alicia Forsyth, Charlotte Brown, Campbell McCafferty (MOD).

P4. The study was managed by Mary Thompson, Iain Murray and Dale Poad (DFID Evaluation Department) in collaboration with the EMC. It was edited by Caryn Maclean.

P5. The evaluation was undertaken by Bradford University, Channel Research Ltd, the PARC & Associated Consultants. The Sudan Case study was carried out by Mr Emery Brusset of Channel Research Limited. Work was conducted in three phases. The first was London-based, and involved situating the ACPP activities in the context of UK approaches to conflict prevention and the overall policy framework of the ACPP. The second phase, the most intense, involved fieldwork in the Sudan and Kenya. The third phase involved consultations in London through October and November, with ACPP representatives, and specifically with the joint FCO-DFID Sudan Unit in London.

P6. The aim of the evaluation of the CPPs is to assess current government approaches to Conflict Prevention through the GCPP and the ACP, and to provide an overview of lessons learned and recommendations for the way forward. The purpose of evaluation generally is to examine the design, implementation and impact of selected programmes in order to learn lessons from them so that these can be applied to current and future work, and also to help strengthen HMG's accountability. It should be borne in mind that any programmes or projects examined are the product of their time, and that the policies they reflected and the procedures they followed have often changed in the light of HMG's developing knowledge.

P7. The Sudan Case Study is one of six studies undertaken within the framework of the evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools. In accordance with the Terms of Reference (ToRs) and the Inception Report, the Evaluation placed maximum emphasis on the macro level: the policy processes in Whitehall by which decisions on allocations are made and implemented by the CPPs. Considerable attention has also been placed on the meso level: the degree to which CPP policies and activities in a given conflict form part of a coherent package of direct interventions by the international community and local actors to the problems of particular large scale deadly conflicts or potential conflicts. The micro-level of analysis (review of specific projects) confines itself largely to the way in which projects impact on the meso and macro levels. The Evaluation has not analysed systematically whether specific projects funded by the CPPs have been well managed and whether they have achieved their specific project goals. Single projects have been analysed to the extent that they reflect on the macro and meso levels.

P8. The main findings of the evaluation, reflected in this Synthesis Report, are that the CPPs are doing significant work funding worthwhile activities that make positive contributions to effective conflict prevention, although it is far too early in the day to assess impact. The progress achieved through the CPP mechanisms is significant enough to justify their continuation. Overall, the consultants believe that worthwhile improvements could be achieved through:

- a. more consistent approaches to joint assessment and priority setting;
- b. more determined pursuit of coordinated international responses;
- c. and by allocation of more administrative resources and staff trained appropriately in the associated processes.

P9. The Sudan Case Study notes that the ACP activities in Sudan are part of a much wider international effort to resolve the principal conflicts in the country between the government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The ACP has funded in part four sets of activities in Sudan: the Joint Military Commission (JMC), in existence since February 2002; the Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT), in existence since April 2003; the Sudan Secretariat of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and seminars on peacekeeping.

P10. Overall the consultant's main findings are as follows:

- a. Measures funded by the ACP in Sudan have played a key role in underpinning the peace process, particularly in the case of the JMC, which the consultant recommends as a good model for replication. He notes that these measures do not concentrate extensively on structural issues, which he says are addressed in the peace talks.
- b. Improvements in international efforts could be further pursued, though the ACP has, through timely and flexible funding, supported efforts to galvanise international efforts in support of the peace process by giving others the precedent and the time to mobilise their own resources.
- c. The ACP has not been the driver of UK conflict prevention in Sudan but rather a subsidiary element of a broader strategy for UK engagement in Sudan. However, the joint FCO/DFID Sudan Unit, though separate from the inter-departmental dynamics of the CPPs, relies on the same personnel working jointly in both the ACP and the Sudan Unit and this unit has promoted better coordination of HMG policy in Sudan.
- d. The ACP has been a flexible reserve to support initiatives in Sudan resulting in good value for money through triggering other funding, through rapid deployment, and through targeting key aspects of the conflict.

P11. The evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools is comprised of the following reports which can be found on the corresponding web-site links:

Synthesis Report	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647synthesis.pdf
Security Sector Reform, Nicole Ball	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647ssr.pdf
United Nations, Pierre Robert & Andrew Mack	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647un.pdf
Sudan, Emery Brusset	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647sudan.pdf
Sierra Leone, Jeremy Ginifer & Kaye Oliver	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647sleone.pdf
Afghanistan, Jonathan Goodhand & Paul Bergne	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647afghanistan.pdf
Russia and the FSU, Greg Austin & Paul Bergne	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647russia.pdf
Portfolio Review, Greg Austin & Malcolm Chalmers	www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev647portfolio.pdf

Evaluation reports can be found at the DFID website:

<http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/>

Michael Hammond
Head of Evaluation Department
2 April 2004

EVALUATION TEAM ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The members of the Evaluation Team would like to acknowledge the support of the Evaluation Management Committee (EMC), especially Iain Murray, DFID Evaluation Department Programme Manager, who accompanied Mr Brusset on the field visit to Sudan. The Evaluation Team is strongly indebted to all of those officials and other interlocutors who gave freely of their time for the interviews. The team is especially grateful to personnel in the Embassy in Khartoum and the High Commission in Nairobi. We hope this material will be useful to the work at hand

The Evaluation Team has been supported effectively by Ms Janet Wilson, the Programme Officer at Bradford University's Centre for International Cooperation and Security. Research assistance has been provided by Mr Todd Krannock, Mr David Newton, Mr Rob Lawton, Mr Nick Robson and Mr Thom Oommen. Mr Ken Berry has provided review assistance for the synthesis report and some case study reports, as well as having drafted some background material.

Bradford University
Channel Research Ltd
PARC & Associated Consultants

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACOTA	African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program
ACPP	Africa Conflict Prevention Pool
AGHD	Africa Greater Horn Department
AU	Africa Union
BPST	British Peace Support Team
CHAD	Conflict and Humanitarian Aid Department
CoH	Cessation of Hostilities
CPMT	Civilian Protection Monitoring Team
CPP	Conflict Prevention Pool
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Resettlement and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development
DOMA	Department for Overseas Military Aid
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EMC	Evaluation Management Committee
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GCPP	Global Conflict Prevention Pool
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
JMC	Joint Monitoring Commission
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMPACT	Nuba Mountains Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation
OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan
OSCE	Organisations for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PSA	Public Service Agreement
SALW	Small Arms/Light Weapons

SDA	Service Delivery Agreement
SPDF	Sudan People's Democratic Front
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSUM	South Sudan Unity Movement
ToRs	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USAID	US Agency for International Development
VMT	Verification and Monitoring Team

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

S1. Sudan's 30 million people, living in a territory almost as large as that of India, have suffered the vagaries of civil strife and civil war for several decades. This has resulted in the deaths of close to two million people from violence or war-induced starvation and disease during the past two decades. Since October 2001, the conflict in the south of the country has moved in the direction of cease-fire and political resolution, but not without serious reversals. A partly unconnected conflict in the west, in Darfur, has continued to rage. At the same time, the death toll in the past three years has been low compared with previous years. In recent years, the war has not been fought as much through the actions of large armed groups directly engaging with each other as through attacks on civilian targets by small armed groups. The country is poor, seriously debilitated, and affected by social and military conflicts that are not all addressed by current cease-fire negotiations. That is because the current negotiations are to be seen as part of a process of creating an environment which will lead to a wider effort to settle conflicts in Sudan

S2. The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) has funded in part four sets of activities in Sudan: the Joint Military Commission (JMC)¹, in existence since February 2002; the Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT), in existence since April 2003²; the Sudan Secretariat of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and seminars on peacekeeping. Most of the ACPP spending (totalling £3.15 million in the period February 2002 to September 2003) has been directed to the JMC and VMT. These two international monitoring mechanisms address only selected locations of violence: the Nuba mountains in central Sudan (South Kordofan State) and southern Sudan. The British contribution has been the second most important source of funding for both mechanisms, complementing contributions from the USA, Norway, Holland, Switzerland, Germany, Italy and France. The UK followed the initiative of the USA, led by Senator Danforth in the Nuba Mountains, but has played a leading role in setting up the VMT on the model of the JMC but under IGAD direction. The UK effort has been inspired by the need to mobilise other international support apart from the USA, and to deliver operational teams on the ground.

¹ The JMC derives its mandate from the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement of 19 January 2002, signed between the SPLM, the Government of Sudan and the Government of the US. The Agreement stipulates that the members of the JMC must come from countries acceptable to the parties, but does not provide a list of what those should be. This document was supplemented by the Status of Mission Agreement of 2 April 2002, between the SPLM, the Government of Sudan, and the Government of Norway.

² The VMT derives its mandate from the 'Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Sudan and the SPLM/SPLA on Resumption of Negotiations on Peace in Sudan', signed between the Parties and the Special Envoy Lt Gen Lazaro Sumbeiywo on behalf of the IGAD Envoys. The Parties to the Memorandum call for the creation by the mediators of 'a channel of communications between them to facilitate implementation of the cessation of hostilities, assist with the verification of complaints, and exchange information on supply of non-combat items and rotation of troops'. An addendum was signed between the same in February 2003 to allow a Verification and Monitoring Team, 'which may include personnel and aircraft from an expanded CPMT, IGAD, AU, and Observer Nations, i.e. Italy, Norway, UK and US'.

Effect on Preventing New Conflicts and Containing Existing Ones

S3. The ACPP activities in Sudan are part of a much wider international effort to resolve the principal conflicts in the country between the government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). This resulted in July 2002 in the Machakos Protocol, which provided solutions to the two main issues confronting the peace negotiators. Their negotiations are ongoing in Kenya. The ACPP activities have been relevant to one of the main obstacles to peace in Sudan: lack of trust among the parties and their unwillingness to honour agreements, and lack of reliable evidence that the agreements are being implemented. All of the ACPP activities strengthen the flow of information, and this in itself can contribute to discipline in the chain of command of the forces of both parties. The focus on cessation of hostile acts for a defined period of time has been conducive to a lowering of the numbers of casualties, primarily military, but also non-combatant. Large-scale violence had stopped in the SPLM/Government conflict areas in Sudan before the ACPP activities in the country commenced, but the Pools funding has helped to maintain that situation.

S4. The objective of the JMC, as presented in the Danforth Report of April 2002, was to place the burden of proof of good faith in negotiations on the parties at war, by carrying out in an observable manner the phased implementation of a peace process. The number of complaints on cease-fire and cessation of hostility violations, as well as human rights violations, has dropped over the life of the Mission, showing that this key objective is being met. Compliance in that area has been much higher than for any of the other three Danforth tests (days of tranquillity for the delivery of assistance, prevention of intentional attacks against civilians, creation of an effective anti-slavery commission). So the ACPP funding contributes to an environment likely to make the current peace process more sustainable than previous, short-lived agreements.

S5. An addendum to the cessation of hostilities Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in February 2003, providing for advance notification of troop movements, the return of land taken since the signature, suspension of work on roads, propaganda, and launch of a Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT) to investigate complaints. The VMT has been much less efficient in global terms than the JMC due to its inability to implement rapidly activities (in this sense VMT includes the decision making mechanism governing it rather than the Mission personnel structure only which have established the structure efficiently). The VMT has to date carried out three investigative missions into Sudan, out of 82 requests presented. The main reason for this delayed implementation has been the absence of a green light on the part of the Special Envoy, Ret. Gen Lazaro Sumbeiywo, who is the peace-talks facilitator on behalf of IGAD and who has limited time to give to the issues pertaining to the VMT. There have also been delays in obtaining secondments to the mission, and visas for Eritrean staff.

S6. The evidence collected and presented in the report leads to the conclusion that the JMC and VMT have had a certain degree of impact on popular attitudes on the ground, by creating a sense of the possibility for change to the better. They have not affected the attitudes of political leaders among the parties to the conflict to consider use of force: should the peace process falter there will rapidly be a return to the status quo *ante*. Rather, their ability to use force has been circumscribed, and control by the political leadership on

both sides more clearly enforced. Generally available information shows a degree of continued mobilisation of forces, and an antagonistic discourse still present at all levels.

S7. Change in the attitudes of the parties was not the immediate objective of the Danforth tests or the ACPD activities but can remain an important objective of international efforts. Results achieved so far could be rapidly overturned. To avoid this calls for a process of structural change on the ground, allowing for a new dynamic for peace based on popular will. This would aim to support the demand by the population for peace, through public information and mechanisms of consultation. It could also facilitate decisions by socially responsible corporations to look at new investment in the extractive and agricultural industries. The sustainability of the ACPD efforts as they are currently conceived is limited. The main reason for this is that it is envisaged that both the JMC and VMT will be replaced by a UN monitoring mission once a peace agreement is concluded. So priority is being given to the signature of the peace agreement. A secondary reason is the difficulty of mobilising the necessary human resources to carry out an expansion of activities.

S8. The measures funded by the ACPD in Sudan have played a key role in underpinning the peace process, particularly in the case of the JMC. These measures do not address more structural issues, which are addressed exclusively in the talks.

Effect on International Arrangements

S9. The JMC and VMT have come to rely principally on shared operational culture, involving monitors from both parties, and a strong leadership for the effectiveness and impact of their activities in creating an enabling environment for the peace process. This has been a successful strategy, providing a strong ground presence for international efforts. The regulatory and legal basis of the missions is hazy in multilateral terms, their creation ad hoc³ however, and no political engagement has been enlisted from the UN or regional organisations, although the initiatives are wholly endorsed by UN resolutions and international law, as shown in the course of this evaluation by the Presidential Statement of the Security Council of 10 October 2003. The role of IGAD is limited to covering some expenditure and per diem, while there is no evidence of efforts to oblige the parties to accept the services of the African Union, the EU or the UN beyond a humanitarian function with the World Bank for the forthcoming reconstruction⁴.

S10. However, it must be recognised that the UK has been able, thanks to the funding made available by the ACPD in a flexible and timely manner, to galvanise the international efforts in support of the peace process by giving others the precedent and the time to mobilise their own resources. Few other donors, apart from the USA and UK (and now the EU⁵), have easy access to funding and personnel of this nature for political operations combining links to defence and humanitarian assistance.

³ In the sense that it was not institutionally planned, and in the same way that OLS is an ad hoc body.

⁴ We refer here to the information given to the team concerning the Humanitarian Plus Programme, and the rehabilitation as well as the human rights and democracy budget lines used by the EC Delegation in Khartoum.

⁵ Through the Rapid Reaction Mechanism of the EC DG Relex.

Effect on Inter-Departmental Cooperation

S11. The joint Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)/Department for International Development (DFID) Sudan Unit was created as part of an effort to reinvigorate Her Majesty's Government (HMG) policy in Sudan, and its establishment is separate from the inter-departmental dynamics of the Pools. The creation of a joint FCO/DFID Unit in Whitehall, supported by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) in-country has promoted better coordination of, and greater coherence in, HMG policy toward the conflicts.

S12. The ACPP has not been, in the Sudan case, the driver of UK conflict prevention policy. ACPP activities have instead been a subsidiary element of a broader strategy summarised well in November 2002 in an Outline Approach for UK Engagement in a Peaceful Sudan, prepared for a UN donors' meeting. The UK's policy toward Sudan relies largely for advice on the diplomatic posts and the joint Sudan Unit, which sits outside the ACPP steering group. This joint unit has given the UK interventions in Sudan a stronger inter-departmental underpinning than exists for many other countries in Africa. The lack of strong MOD involvement so far is explainable by the absence of a defence interest to date, although a UK military officer has been provided, under the ACPP funds, practically from the beginning. This highlights the usefulness of the ACPP as a "trilateral" mechanism to supplement the joint 'bilateral' processes of the Sudan Unit.

S13. The pooling of funds into an international Trust Fund has allowed for greater legitimacy, reduced risks, and lowered the cost of the missions to the UK. However long term partnerships, such as with the EC, other European countries, the UN, have not been brought to work in this case.

Implications for Financial Management

S14. The monitoring missions, within the framework of the Danforth Initiative, are an irreplaceable contribution, and hence represent high value for money. The joint Sudan Unit's structure, even though independent of the Pools, has given the interventions continuity and strengthened inter-Departmental coordination. The ACPP has been a flexible reserve to support initiatives that have emerged, in some cases, in a matter of days. The costs of the mission have remained modest when compared to humanitarian expenditure without them, or the cost of deploying an armed mission. The Commanding Officer of the JMC reports monthly costs of 500,000 US\$ plus staff salaries, and logistics, whose costs are not reported in the multi-donor Trust Fund). In summary, the measures financed have represented high value for money by triggering other funding, by being rapidly deployed, and by being targeted at key aspects of the conflict.

Recommendations

S15. The ACPP activities in Sudan have covered a fundamental but narrow spectrum of the possible responses to end the conflicts in Sudan. The objective of structural and attitudinal change has not been addressed, pending a firm peace agreement. Conflict in Sudan has become less probable as a result of the US/UK/international initiative: Evidence, such as that provided by the Conflict Prevention Indicator, shows a reduction of risk. However it is still latent, and active in at least one area, Darfur, which is not covered by the

ACPP-funded measures. *The link between the country strategy and the thematic priorities of the ACPP (the economic causes of war, the strengthening of African capacities for peace under UN mandate, and cooperating with the EU) should be made stronger (Recommendation #1).*

S16. *HMG should consider establishing a clearer framework of funding priorities to permit a deliberate choice such as either continuing the current level of funding, or extending activities to cover more structural aspects (Recommendation #2).* The existing informal process is sufficient to take advantage of political opportunities and to occupy the space generated by foreign initiatives, but is not based on a consistent analysis of conflict risk addressed in a long-range perspective. The latter approach would better achieve the impacts described in the ambitious public service agreements (PSA)/Service delivery agreements (SDAs) of addressing the sources of conflict and strengthening the local capacities for resolution, independently of the political negotiations for peace.

S17. *The ACPP should make available to the Sudan Unit and to the posts working on Sudan the necessary human resources to implement a long-range approach that is less dependent on external factors (Recommendation #3).* In particular this would include more capacity for assessments. Best practices identified in Sudan (the cost efficient support to peace processes through civil-military observer missions supporting a dynamic peace process) should be codified and studied for their possible relevance to other conflicts.

1. BACKGROUND

1. UK policy toward the violent conflicts in Sudan has developed in close relationship with those of the USA. The UK Special Representative spent a lot of effort personally in 1999–2000 lobbying for renewed US engagement in Sudan. On 6 September 2001, the US Government engaged in a renewed process of negotiations towards peace, naming as its special envoy, Senator John Danforth. His assessment was that the war was not winnable by either side, but that the parties could take concrete steps towards agreement, providing tests of their willingness to seek peace.⁶ The proposals outlined by Danforth would have to rely on outside support for US efforts and support a peace process facilitated by Kenya under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).⁷ The UK echoed this call after a visit by the then Secretary of State for International Development to Sudan in January 2002, which corresponded with its own assessment of the need for a balanced approach in the context of a long-standing engagement with Sudan.

2. Sudan had been both a site of humanitarian disaster and a temporary residence for Osama bin Laden until 1996. It began however a slow process of realignment from 1999, when the export of oil began. The new peace process developed outside the UN framework, whether through humanitarian means (Operation Lifeline Sudan or Resident Coordinator, UN Special Representative for Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretary General Tom Vraalsen) or political approaches (the Security Council). This has meant that the support to the initiative was based on a 'coalition of the willing', from which the support of others (Arab League, Russia, China, EU, etc) would be solicited on an ad hoc basis. IGAD, which had a historical mandate to bring the parties to the negotiating table, has provided the forum for the renewed efforts.

3. The civil war in Sudan had flared in 1983 over the semi-autonomous governance of the south, and over equal access to resources, in particular water, land, and oil. The fighting pitched the Government of Sudan, allied with fluctuating groups of ethnic militia, against the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM),⁸ and occasionally splintering factions. Other violent conflicts have erupted, as in the western region of Darfur, but with little international involvement. Issues of identity, religious and ethnic, underlie the fighting, which is loosely organised around a centre/periphery dichotomy, the centre being occupied by the Nile valley Arabs.⁹ This has been most pronounced as it overlaps with the predominantly Moslem north cleavage from the mostly non-Muslim south.

4. The effective fragmentation of political currents in such a vast country, which is almost the same size as India, has complicated all efforts to seek peace, and imposed a process

⁶ John C. Danforth, 'Report to the President of the United States on the Outlook for Peace in Sudan, 26 April 2002. See <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10258.pdf>.

⁷ IGAD comprises seven countries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. IGAD was first established in 1986 under the name Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) as a regional organisation for co-ordinating efforts to combat desertification. During a summit meeting in April 1995, it was decided that the organisation should be revitalised and its mandate enlarged to cover a broader range of political and economic issues in the region. IGAD was formally established the following year. The IGAD secretariat has its headquarters in Djibouti.

⁸ The SPLM is variously called the SPLM or the SPLA (Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army).

⁹ Described in the Whitehall Sudan Conflict Strategy as tension between the centre and the periphery, the centre being 'the riverain communities of the north that have tended to provide the political elite' (para 4).

built on alliances, and negotiation. There is a long history of negotiation and agreements reached and violated, as well as of changing tactical alliances. The level of distrust is extremely high, and rooted in historical antagonism going back centuries. The efforts to negotiate peace have been more or less continual in the nineties, mostly orchestrated by the UN, Nigeria, IGAD, the churches, or lone countries such as Norway (1996 with Secretary of State Jan Egeland¹⁰) or more recently Egypt and Libya, and IGAD/Kenya. The UK herself negotiated a localised ceasefire agreement in Bahr el Ghazal in 1998.

5. Until recent years the sole economic potential of the Sudan seemed to lie in the agricultural sector, which now holds diminishing promise in international trade. The commercial exploitation of oil began in 1999 from the central regions of Sudan, generating 5 per cent of GDP by 2001.¹¹ Serious economic reforms began to be implemented in the mid-1990s with privatisation and public expenditure slashed from 20 per cent of GDP to less than 10 per cent in 1998 to reduce fiscal imbalances. However, the structure of government spending has not been pro-poor, being weighted in favour of higher education, capital intensive irrigation, and urban infrastructure. Nevertheless, annual average percentage change in per capita income accelerated from 1.2 per cent during 1991–95 to 4 per cent in 1996–2000.

6. The past two decades of fighting led to the deaths of close to two million people either from violence or war-induced starvation and disease. Since October 2001, the country has moved in the direction of cease-fire and political resolution of the conflicts, but not without serious reversals. At the same time, the death toll in the past three years has been low compared with previous years. In recent years, the war has not been fought as much through the actions of large armed groups directly engaging with each other as through attacks on civilian targets by small armed groups. The country is poor, seriously debilitated, and affected by social and military conflicts that are not all addressed by current cease-fire negotiations.

7. Danforth had proposed that, instead of drawing up an optimal agreement between the parties, he proceed by securing agreement to a series of milestones which would prove to both sides the intent and willingness for progressive compromise. The lack of willingness had stymied all previous agreements. These milestones, since called the 'Danforth tests', have been:

- A cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains.
- The respect of certain days of tranquillity for the delivery of relief (mostly public health campaigns, admittedly the least successful implementation so far because of the lack of freedom of movement for the agencies).
- A cessation of acts of violence against non-combatants.
- The creation of a Commission and some monitoring to reduce the practice of slavery.

The first of these tests was the Nuba Mountains Cease-Fire Agreement signed in December 2001, monitored by a Joint Military Commission with strong international assets. This was followed by the signature of the Status of Mission Agreement in February 2002, signed between the warring parties and the Government of Norway, giving the mission a clear renewable mandate (valid for six month periods), legal immunity, and freedom of movement.

¹⁰ Cf. Evaluation of Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance to the Sudan, Ref 11/97, COWI.

¹¹ Based on current working documents by the IMF and World Bank.

8. The Joint Military Commission (JMC) is an ad hoc organisation based on the agreement of the parties, which operates through transparent investigation and reporting of any incident relating solely to the cease-fire. It is staffed by some 70 individuals equally representing both parties and international monitors, and is presided over by a Chairman's Group, made up of nine persons (3 from the JMC, 3 from the Government of Sudan, 3 from the SPLM). JMC's headquarters are in the Nuba Mountains, and it maintains five sector field offices, plus an office in Khartoum. Moreover, it is supported by an informal donor group called 'Friends of the Nuba Mountains' chaired by HM Ambassador William Patey, and a core group made up of the so-called Troika facilitating the peace process (UK, US, Norway).

9. All subsequent international efforts for peace since 2001 have been launched after the first step of establishing the JMC, each with a slightly different legal basis and implementing mechanism. It was marked by the creation of a Civilian Protection Monitoring Team, based on an Agreement to Protect Civilians from Military Attack, March 2002, implemented by a private contractor, and steered by the US Department of State. There were also activities carried out to investigate the issue of slavery and ensure respect for 'zones of tranquillity' for the delivery of humanitarian assistance—all of which have also been supported by DFID from the humanitarian aid budget.

10. In July 2002 the Machakos Protocol was signed between the SPLM and the Government. It defined successive periods for the peace, leading up to a referendum on the independence of the south. In these phases progress was perceived to depend on a general atmosphere of *détente* in the conflict. An MoU was signed in October 2002 to resume good faith negotiations through a period of military tranquillity. An addendum was signed in February 2003, which stipulated that there would be advance notification of troop movements, that the locations and identity of troops would be shared, that land taken since the signature of the MoU would be returned, that work on roads would be suspended, that propaganda would be frozen, and that a Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT) would investigate complaints.

11. The JMC and VMT, and the other Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) activities in Sudan, do not address the conflict in the west of Sudan, which in recent months has seen new violence and which has generated large flows of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The JMC is a model that can be replicated or extended for other regions, but has been kept to a narrow remit. USAID has reported the following information from non-governmental organisations (NGOs):

31,097 residents fled their villages and sought protection in Mukjar due to increased hostilities and armed militia activities between August 8 and 29. Ongoing insecurity in the area prevents the IDPs from returning to their homes and engaging in agricultural and commercial activities. On November 5, IRIN reported that approximately 70,000 conflict-affected Sudanese have fled from Darfur across the border into neighboring Chad. Despite the cease-fire and humanitarian access agreement, UNHCR reports no significant return movement among recent refugees.¹²

¹² USAID, 'Sudan—Complex Emergency Situation Report #1 (FY 2004)', 14 November 2003.

2. BENCHMARKS FOR INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO VIOLENT CONFLICT IN SUDAN

12. The UK response to conflict in Sudan through the ACPP and other mechanisms has acted in parallel with the US efforts in the transition from humanitarian assistance to wholesale engagement in the peace process. The US expenditure for humanitarian aid to Sudan in the past decade has been about three times that of the UK (600m versus 220m). On the diplomatic front, through the State Department, the USA has conducted a series of activities designed to support the peace process to: undermine support activities for terrorists, foster protection of civilians, promote access by humanitarian agencies, and monitor abuses of international humanitarian law. USAID's program to enhance conflict prevention, mainly in southern Sudan, includes:

- technical assistance and logistical support for people-to-people reconciliation;
- training for local civilian administrations;
- technical assistance and training for civil society-civil authority partnerships;
- training for judges and 'lay magistrates', promoting basic civic education, human rights and civil society organisations, and logistical support for rebuilding courthouses;
- technical assistance and materials to promote civic education;
- training teachers, rebuilding schools, and improving distance education; and
- training and logistical support to reintegrate demobilized child soldiers.¹³

13. In October 2003, the UN Security Council (UNSC) acknowledged the progress that had been made in Sudan and called on the UN agencies to prepare for support to a comprehensive peace settlement. The UNSC declaration was initiated by the UK to encourage UNSC support for UN peacekeeping operations in Sudan.

14. UN agencies are active in advocating the special concerns of women and children in Sudan's conflicts.¹⁴ The UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict is currently working with UNICEF and NGOs to ensure the inclusion of provisions ensuring the protection of children during the ongoing peace processes in the Sudan. There is a long history of child abductions, particularly by the *murahaleen* militia, the SPLM, and the former Sudan People's Democratic Front (SPDF). Since 2001, numbers of child soldiers have been demobilised in the south of the country, but thousands of boys remain within the ranks of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), many of whom have been re-recruited. Several thousand children are also serving in units created under the South Sudan Unity Movement (SSUM, which has now rejoined the SPLA). The SPLM has committed itself to releasing 2,000 children by the end of 2003, and the Government of the Sudan has created a task force on the demobilization of children. The Sudanese Women for Peace, a non-partisan, grass-roots organisation, has been set up to advocate on their own account and on behalf of children affected by the violent conflicts. Work relating to these 'unaccompanied minors' has been ongoing under the aegis of UNICEF and some NGOs since 1991, but the estimates of overall numbers are still unreliable, due to the importance of youth mobilisation in Sudan, and the accompanying lack of transparency.

¹³ See USAID website, <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2003/afr/sd/650-001.html>.

¹⁴ See UN General Assembly, *Children and armed conflict: Report of the Secretary-General*, 30 October 2003, A/58/546-S/2003/1053.

3. ACPP IN SUDAN: OVERVIEW

15. In January 2002, the UK's Secretary of State for International Development visited Sudan and declared it a priority country. This move was fully supported by the Foreign Office, whose Middle East Director accompanied Ms Short, and was followed by the appointment of the UK Special Representative for Sudan on 16 February. Close consultation began on mutually reinforcing activities, leading to the creation of a Joint FCO/DFID unit located in the FCO in April 2002.

16. This team did not begin from a blank slate. In June 2001 a Whitehall Sudan Conflict Strategy was elaborated, identifying the joint public service agreement (PSA) target of the ACPP as a resource to be used in support of conflict management. At this stage the new US administration was shifting from 'an anti-government pro SPLA strategy'¹⁵ to a State Department-led process of critical dialogue. Yet there was only talk about talks, based around the Declaration of Principles agreed under IGAD auspices in 1994 (principles recognising the need to respect rights, diversity, and to share natural resources).

17. The UK strategy was to encourage an agreement based on the Declaration of Principles, enlisting international pressure to overcome the 'interests of key players content with the status quo'. To do this a suite of seven projects of no more than £500,000 each was proposed: dealing with political facilitation (HMA, Ministerial visits, civil society work); support to the IGAD Secretariat; an exploratory study on elections in the north and the south; support to the Uganda/Sudan agreement regarding the relocation of the Lord's Resistance Army; actions against abductions; grass roots peace initiatives through the church network; dialogue between religious leaders.

18. The subsequent strategy¹⁶ recognised the degree to which this suite of activities had been overtaken by the Danforth initiative, described as a 'new window of opportunity', and the signature of the Machakos protocol. Continuous consultation had been achieved with the Government and SPLM.

19. The new strategy described the priorities for conflict pool work as made up of five elements:

1. Support to the diplomatic process (without financial incidence on the ACPP).
2. Preparation of a peace observation mission (estimating £1 million of assessed UN contributions).
3. Support to the JMC.
4. Contribution to the demobilisation and reintegration process and security sector reform.
5. Rehabilitation of the basic social services, security and public information and reconciliation (including land mine surveys for the ACPP in particular).

¹⁵ Whitehall Sudan Strategy, paragraph 15.

¹⁶ Sudan Conflict Prevention Strategy: Review of 2002/3 and Forward Look 2003/4, dated December 2002.

20. All these activities would lead to expenditure only after the signature of the agreement, except for the support to the JMC. The VMT had not been foreseen, and the support to the IGAD process was not mentioned but was in fact still funded from the ACPP. As can be seen from this relative disconnect between the strategies and spending on the ground, the written formulation followed the more dynamic policy making in the Sudan Unit and in posts.

21. Two main projects in Sudan have effectively received funding support from the ACPP in Sudan:

- the JMC, established in February 2002, and mandated by the parties to the conflict (the SPLM and the Government of Sudan) to monitor the implementation of the cease-fire agreement in the Nuba Mountains (part of South and West Kordofan States); and
- the VMT, established in February 2003, deployed to Nairobi since July 2003, and mandated to assist the IGAD-led peace process under a MoU binding the parties to maintaining channels of communication open and ceasing hostilities in the preparation for a cease-fire.¹⁷

22. The Pools provided £3.15 m for these activities from 2001 to 2003 (based on the British financial year), including £1.05 m for secondment of specialist advisory staff. Some smaller amounts of funding have been given to support the IGAD Secretariat expenses for the Sudan peace talks in Nairobi (£150,000). Similarly some assistance was provided to the two cease-fire workshops in Sudan in December 2002, as well as training provided out of Kenya by the British Peace Support Team (BPST), benefiting, amongst personnel from other countries, 85 SPLA and Sudanese Army personnel. Subsequently a team of facilitators (including the Sudan Unit and the BPST in Nairobi) conducted a three-day workshop in Khartoum for 40 senior government armed forces personnel, and provided a compressed seminar in southern Sudan for 37 SPLA Commanders. Both were aimed at teaching peacekeeping doctrine, and advising on cease-fire procedures to military authorities (see Annex 1 for a copy of 'The Sudan Conflict Prevention Strategy').

23. The first of the two ACPP UK interventions have been described to the evaluation as triggered by a request from the US, designed to galvanise other donors. The VMT was generated out of UK support to the IGAD process. The UK policy has been to provide resources in a complementary and responsive manner, and target them at important elements of the peace process. There was no discrete conflict prevention policy as such within the ACPP in Sudan, but there was certainly a broader political strategy with that goal.

24. The VMT is based in Nairobi (close to the IGAD Secretariat for Peace in Sudan) and has a liaison office in the UN logistics base of Lokichokio, 10 km from the Sudan border.

¹⁷ The JMC spends, according to its own estimates, US\$1 million per month. This represents US\$15m since its creation, of which US\$3m has been given by the UK in cash. VMT was scheduled to cost US\$0.5m per month and run originally for six months, and has received US\$1m, of which half has been British funding. The JMC figures include the use of 2 helicopters, 50 vehicles and 3 planes, all of which are in good operational order.

The VMT is made up of 25 people, of whom five are non-African personnel currently, and four of these five are British. Other observers have been provided by the SPLM (4), the Government of Sudan (4), Kenya (8), Uganda and Ethiopia (3 each) and Eritrea (2). The VMT has to date carried out three investigative missions into Sudan, out of 82 requests presented. The main reason for this limited implementation has been the absence of a green light on the part of the Special Envoy, who is the peace-talks facilitator on behalf of the IGAD Envoys, and who is the operational authority. This has mainly been due to the lack of time that the Special Envoy can dedicate to the VMT. There has also been no agreement on the Concept of Operations, the shape of the force, its relations to the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT), all bedevilled by personality clashes.¹⁸ In fact, according to a number of sources, progress so far can be attributed in great part to the commitment of UK personnel, including the Commanding Officer for the BPST, Col. RFC Andrew. Some delays also occurred because of the difficulties in obtaining visas for personnel seconded from some of the neighbouring countries.

25. The VMT reports to the MoU Channel of Communications Committee, part of the community of peace negotiators. It includes the representatives to the parties, the representatives of the neighbouring IGAD states (excluding Djibouti and Somalia), the Troika (USA, UK and Norway) and Italy. The VMT is currently (October 2003) short both of personnel (16 according to the draft Concept of Operations under review) and of funds (£120,000 in the accounts currently). However, it was promised additional secondments and funding at a donor consultation in September 2003. The VMT could assist in the formation of a UN peace support mechanism and peace accord monitoring system, should this come to pass. Additionally, the VMT is experiencing difficulty in applying the terms of reference drawn up in the preparatory phase.

26. In the UK's ACPP-funded response, it is striking to observe the limited scope of the funded activities in contrast with the breadth of issues underlying the conflict. The ACPP is concentrating most effort in Sudan on just two sharply defined missions. Some of the other activities funded by DFID in Sudan in the past have included a peace-building element, usually at community level.¹⁹ The bulk however remains committed to humanitarian assistance, which is of a palliative nature. As mentioned in the Strategy Review, most of the structural forms of assistance depend on the signing of the agreement, at an undefined point in time.

27. The ACPP funding in Sudan is part of a broader Whitehall strategy of resolving the conflict,²⁰ which extends beyond the PSA target of reducing the number of persons affected by conflict. In fact, it can be said that the high level of policy coherence in the region has

¹⁸ Information provided independently by four different interviewees, highlighting the delicate nature of many of these strategic measures.

¹⁹ Document reference: undated, unsourced, unnamed paper describing the Project number, the PRIO Main Category, the Direct Link to Peace-Building (described as either clear or possible), the Project Purpose, the start date and the Selected Amount. The projects are: SCF Reunification of Abducted Women, SCF Care for Retrieved Abducted Children, Sudan LRA Abductees (Embassy Project), ERM Study on the Impact of Oil on the Conflict, the Christian Aid 'People to People Reconciliation Programme', CARE Kordofan Water Project, and then a series of projects for £520,000 for rehabilitation and support for education initiatives. The total funded is £1,769,173, launched between 1996 and 2001.

²⁰ Whitehall Sudan Conflict Strategy.

been achieved at the expense of any discrete ACPP conflict 'strategy' of the sort that exists as a normal course of events in the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP). The assumption behind the creation of the ACPP was that it would facilitate the elaboration of joint objectives, as well as joint assessment and priority setting,²¹ and that it would overcome rigidities in financial allocations. However, the different levels of priority accorded to Africa by different Departments, and the legal restrictions on the use of resources under the Overseas Development Act, show that assessment has been done independently of the Pools. This case study shows usefulness of the Pool is really derived from its financial flexibility.

28. If the ACPP were to have a discrete conflict prevention strategy for Sudan, this might be able to dictate that actions be taken in a forward manner rather than act as reserve to provide a 'peace dividend' to reassure the parties of support in the case of peace. It could also reduce the potential level of violence generally by addressing the causes of conflict in a more systematic and comprehensive manner than the ACPP spending currently does. There are many other ways of impelling the country to peace even in the current phase, ways of a more structural nature, for example by supporting citizens' groups to apply pressure on government and rebel hierarchies, and by increasing transparency in the extractive industry. The revenue sharing negotiations have for example remained relatively general in their terms, and the corporate social responsibility efforts of potential investors (in oil, in gold, etc) have not been covered.

29. The evaluation has been requested to highlight possible options. Four broad orientations can be defined, which go beyond the recommendations of this report, and should be seen as options for consideration.

30. First, the ACPP activities could concentrate on the issue of the public support for peace. Whilst it is suggested that the war has been waged between two leadership groups quite isolated from the majority of the population, the current focus on political agreements has gone along with this inherent elitist bias. The three regions of Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile risk being marginalized unless treated carefully, even at the level of local leadership (for example Payam level in Southern Blue Nile). The level of reliable public information on the negotiating positions is minimal. In structural terms, the aid effort has grown increasingly fragmented with the increasing weakness of coordination functions of the Operation Lifeline Sudan humanitarian assistance framework. This has led to growth of developmentalist rehabilitation aims in the United Nations Development Plan (UNDP), outside the humanitarian aid framework, and expansion outside the limited areas covered by Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) for example the Talisman community development projects continuing near the Nuba Mountains. The aid effort has not tended to reinforce the engagement of communities with their leadership.²² The exceptions, such as the USAID Office for Transition Initiatives, are situated well outside the UK funding sphere, which is focusing on NMPACT and NGO programmes. Reconciliation efforts supported by DFID

²¹ ACPP: 'Cross-Cutting Review: Conflict Prevention in Sub-Saharan Africa: Section 3, on non-financial collective arrangements'.

²² This would relate to John Paul Lederach's concept of building 'vertical capacity', as discussed in his book *Building Peace*. A communication 'gap' exists in the peace-building process, which results in a 'lack of coordinated relationships' between the higher levels of leadership and community and grassroots leadership.

under the people-to-people label are about the reduction of communal tensions rather than building constituencies for peace concerned with constitutional issues.

31. Second, the role of the oil industry in promoting peace could also be the subject of ACPP activity. The ACPP has declared that targeting the economic causes of war would be a priority. A programme has been established in DFID under the Extractive Industries Initiative. There has been research on the connections between oil revenues and war. Oil has raised the stakes of the warfare in Sudan, even if it has not caused it. Oil could play an important role by becoming a source of community investment for peace building. The Canadian oil group Talisman is currently doing this, but has sold its investments to another company. One way of doing this kind of work would be to help to establish consultative mechanisms whereby community leaders could enter into negotiations with the investors, rather than through a centralised and not necessarily responsive political hierarchy (for example facilitating contacts between gold mining companies and community groups in Southern Blue Nile). According to NGO scrutiny, a new risk now exists that the more corporate-responsibility-minded western investors will leave the country, benefiting groups less interested in peace. This process has been observed in the diamond industry and the logging industry, where an official market has pushed a much less savoury black market out of view. This needs to be addressed in Sudan.

32. Third, the UN conflict management systems might be more effectively cultivated in Sudan. The one regional body involved, IGAD, has been given a Secretariat for Peace in Sudan based in Nairobi with only limited links to its peacekeeping personnel or its Ministerial Group. Even if the Special Envoy reports to IGAD, the involvement and capacity of IGAD to intervene operationally in a meaningful way in Sudan is practically non-existent at this stage. As observed elsewhere in the Conflict Prevention Pools the weak connection between the UK geographical policy and the thematic strategy in relation to the involvement of the UN in regional conflicts is particularly noticeable here.

33. Fourth, another GCPP thematic strategy, concerning small arms and light weapons (SALW) is similarly poorly connected. Sudan is 'awash with illicit small arms', many of which are not in the hands of organised forces who cannot be enticed to part from them for strategic reasons.²³ There is a direct relation between the availability of small arms and the level of violence, even down to intra-communal violence such as high levels of goatherd raiding. SALW funds have not been committed by the GCPP to Sudan. In contrast with Sierra Leone, there has been no monitoring of flows, reflecting the Whitehall strategy of a more contained and focused approach.

34. Nevertheless, respondents in the MOD argued that the ACPP projects do have structural impact. One of the benefits of the JMC and the VMT is to carry out training through their involvement of Sudanese and regional military personnel in observation missions and non-coercive peacekeeping operations. This training is not an objective of the missions but could represent an investment in the future. Personnel thus trained need to be brought into standing regional regimes respectful of international law and international humanitarian law, to avoid risks illustrated by a number of recent fiascos in military training, for example in the case of SADC. This point is also echoed in the Security Sector Reform

²³ Minutes of the Meeting Between Global Pool Small Arms Steering Group and Africa Pool, 5 August 2002.

(SSR) Thematic Case Study for the CPP Evaluation, pointing to the need for comprehensive strategies when engaging in security related interventions.

35. The evaluation is asked to assess the impact of the ACPP projects on women and children. The UK foreign policy priority of addressing the special needs or circumstances of women and children in armed conflict is not directly implemented in the case of the Sudan. The most direct stakeholders of the implementation process are men, i.e. political elites and armed forces but the conflict has had an impact on women and children. There has been a gradual erosion of the social mores and values that previously prevailed concerning for example marital responsibilities, sexual gender-based violence and killings, making these two groups in Sudan vulnerable. This process has been amply documented in anthropological work,²⁴ and indicates a grave loss of protection, calling for the intervention of international regulatory regimes.

36. By focusing on restraining violence, on limiting military deployments and visiting outlying communities, the ACPP actions will have an impact on the needs of women and children. There is, of course, also a need to tackle detrimental traditional practices such as female genital mutilation. However, Save the Children and other organisations are addressing these issues through the use of humanitarian aid funding. Beyond such programmes, studies have shown that because of the entitlement systems and the importance of complex modes of exchange in social organisation, child and gender-focused programming needs to be channelled through the communities. Limiting and possibly halting the spread of war into the communities must be seen as an important contribution to the cross cutting concern for women and children.

²⁴ By Sharon Hutchinson, for example, who has carried out some work for the CPMT in 2003.

4. EFFECT ON PREVENTING NEW CONFLICTS AND CONTAINING EXISTING ONES

37. According to the documentation Ministerial concerns make meeting the demands of humanitarian aid and future possible cease-fires a priority. This has framed the scope of the conflict prevention work in Sudan. This creates a certain disconnection with the two Service delivery agreements (SDAs) of the Conflict Pools that address the underlying causes and building capacity. The ACPD projects do not directly engage in capacity building in any form, although they could be seen as preparing the ground for subsequent UN mandates.²⁵ Nor do they address the economic underpinnings of the momentum to negotiate which are considered too sensitive for multilateral initiatives i.e. the assurance in the near future that considerable oil revenues will accrue to the Sudan, The scope for international intervention in this area has been reduced by the gradual divestment of western oil companies. Talisman, Lundin, OMV in particular have left or ceased extraction, thus reducing the influence which can be exercised to moderate human rights abuses in the concession areas.

38. The JMC and the VMT build on knowledge generated by many years of monitoring missions. A common culture permeates the two which in the presentations made to this evaluation are clearly linked to the British and Norwegian peace support doctrine. The mechanisms, verified in the course of interviews, are premised on the full consent of the parties, a non-coercive field presence, a strong commonality of views among an inner donor core and a wider donor base, a well equipped if expensive, logistical base sub-contracted by the Department of State to Pacific Architects and Engineers (this latter arrangement still needs to be enabled in the case of the VMT in October 2003), and continual transparent monitoring and reporting.

39. The JMC operates through a rigorous system of daily, weekly and monthly situation reports, and follows up on all complaints. It is estimated that some 250 complaints have been received since the beginning of the operation in March 2002, of which only a third have been classified by the JMC as cease-fire incidents. All these have been acknowledged as such by consensus in the JMC, and addressed.²⁶

40. The VMT has not been able to address complaints, but has carried out efforts to collect information on militia groups that could hinder the settlement, and on public information efforts.²⁷ It has moved away from its first, slightly off mandate intent to investigate violations of international humanitarian law. The VMT is concentrating now on opening a forward base inside Sudan, and facilitating humanitarian assistance, a role for which the JMC has been appreciated by the NGOs the evaluator met.

41. The JMC supports humanitarian operations, mainly through logistics, use of helicopters, planes and vehicles, and information. There has been a particular focus on support to the mine clearance organisations, with a critical medical evacuation function,

²⁵ The evaluation understands that a substantial grant has been made by Canada for capacity building, but was not able to collect evidence on the outcomes this has achieved.

²⁶ JMC reporting.

²⁷ Interviews in Nairobi at VMT and donor meetings.

and, in the early stages, a common access permit clearance. Without JMC de-mining would not have been possible.²⁸ JMC helps to identify needs, publicises the extent of secure international access, and facilitates movement. Limited medical and infrastructure assistance has been provided. The credibility of the operation would be reduced if the JMC were to constrain the delivery of assistance or not to be able to guarantee that some assistance arrives.²⁹

42. The evaluation was able to collect triangulated information concerning public attitudes in the Nuba from sources in Khartoum. The public perception on the ground is that the international presence is an assurance of assistance. This has led to unrealistic expectations, for example that the JMC will provide food and supplies for reintegration of the displaced, and some friction between the JMC and humanitarian agencies. Early on there were heated exchanges between the JMC and aid agencies, over speed of deployment and in some cases ambiguity of roles. The JMC appears to be providing humanitarian aid, and mention this even in some of its press releases. Also, the VMT is finding that relations with the humanitarian aid community require a high investment in public relations.³⁰ Currently there is no world-wide agreement defining the optimal relations between a politico-military mission with significant logistical capacity and humanitarian agencies, even where both communities aim to reduce the occurrence of military violence and crimes of war against non-combatants, on a basis of consent and persuasion, rather than denunciation or substitution.³¹

43. There have been some cost overruns in the initial phase of the JMC due to poor control systems and the absence of any previous model for the establishment of the operation.³² During the third mandate, the delay in the renewal of contributions caused disruptions in the management of the JMC. This was corrected after prompt pledges were received from the US, UK and Switzerland. Most donors have developed systems for the secondment of staff to international monitoring operations, but many still experience difficulties in supporting such operations financially. This places the UK at an advantage in terms of taking the initiative, as Her Majesty's Government (HMG) has access to qualified expertise and cash resources through the FCO secondments and the CPP. The VMT has not been able to deploy fully, and, consequently, not suffered from the resource shortfalls it is experiencing.

44. In all other terms the programme does serves the PSA and relevant SDAs of the CPP, in particular by containing the scale of the population affected by the conflict. It is establishing a rigorous confidence building model in a limited and strategically less sensitive area, and succeeds in galvanising international interest.

²⁸ Interviews with Danchurchaid in Khartoum, Nairobi and Copenhagen outside this evaluation.

²⁹ This assessment is based on interviews in Khartoum and the broader experience of the consultant in Sudan.

³⁰ Interviews in Nairobi.

³¹ For example one NGO staff member reported being surprised by being applauded by senior personnel of the JMC for thanking them for the hospitality of their accommodation. She was told that normally nobody from the humanitarian community said thank you.

³² Evidence is provided in the PWC audit report of the JMC.

45. The key element of the peace process is to ensure that preliminary agreements reached are honoured, both in view of encouraging the continued willingness of the parties to seek peace, and in reducing the baggage of distrust that threatens the subsequent sustainability of any peace agreement. The mechanisms supported by the ACPD serve to build confidence between the SPLM and the Government, while a comprehensive negotiated settlement is sought.

46. Two main principles have been followed by the JMC. The first involves incremental stabilisation at the level of an identifiable population group and its neighbours (Nuba and pastoral groups, command structures of the two parties in areas covered by the cessation of hostilities). This is then turned into support for the central leadership to maintain the integrity of command structures and attend to peace negotiations. Both present a relevant response to the situation.

47. The consensus view of many of those interviewed however is that the JMC and VMT did not have a significant impact on the fundamental attitude of the military leadership as shown at the level of the peace negotiations. This type of change was not the aim of the missions, but it points to the need for other actions to reinforce and render more sustainable the peace process. As mentioned by the Commanding Officer the improvement over time in the climate at the talks in Kenya led to an improvement in the 'lying and cheating' in evidence at the beginning of the JMC. The leaders maintain the Nuba cease-fire because it is a small but symbolically important part of the IGAD talks preceding the agreements, rather than the reverse, i.e. because of pressure generated from the JMC which acts as a source of conflict mitigation. The presence of the JMC is dependent on the momentum of the talks, and does not act as a structural prevention measure in itself. Should the talks take a different turn, the gains made could disappear. Sustainability is premised on commitments leading to political change, in other words, on factors outside the control of the Missions.

48. There have been no overlaps or contradiction between the different monitoring missions (CPMT, VMT, JMC), thanks to a combination of geographical (VMT/JMC) and thematic (CPMT/others) responsibilities. However, outside a small circle of well-informed personnel (Nairobi and Khartoum based), there is considerable lack of clarity about the differences between the missions.³³ The assumption outside this circle is that these missions contribute to the implementation of the peace agreements, and are as such a sign and an instrument of the talks. The differences of style of the VMT/ JMC and CPMT (less consent based and more attached to one country, the US) has not affected the UK supported missions because of the geographic delimitation of the operations of the groups. The civilian/military distinction intended in the statements of mandate have become much more blurred on the ground, as population control is one of the most important assets of this guerrilla war.

49. The operational vigour of the JMC has ensured that no sustained complaints have been formulated against it, and that there has been no break in the continuity of monitoring.

³³ 'The Troika (US, UK and Norway) was useful but perceived to be rather exclusive. We were looking at involving the Italians and French more, and also the EC said that in the longer term we needed to look towards having a UN mandate for peace support'. Memorandum on Ministerial meeting, 10 June 2003.

No complaint presented by either side of the parties has gone un-investigated. On the other hand the VMT has not been able, at the time of visit (September 2003) to achieve as much impact on the ground due to the limited number of missions carried out. Its presence in Nairobi is however a testimony to the progress in negotiations, including the joint composition with both parties represented, as well as the IGAD members.

50. One of the values of the JMC is as a model for other such operations, albeit on a small scale. Even by covering only part of the conflict, it has contributed to confidence-building and positive international involvement. This could potentially be reproduced for some of the other conflicts in Sudan, for example the Darfur instability. More importantly, it could also serve as the basis for a unification of the resources of the three missions under a UN mandate should the peace be signed and should the UN be called on to play a role.

51. The depth of changes provoked on the ground by the JMC has been tested by visitors in the area, through the indicator of population movement. NGO staff movement, and non-combatants movement has begun to be quite extensive, but took a long time to occur. Until mid-2003, NGOs ran separate programmes into the southern and northern controlled areas. Even though the local personnel can be only civilians, hence included under the freedom of movement clause in the cease-fire, there is considerable reluctance by the parties to see them cross front lines.

52. The management of aid operations remains completely divided under Nairobi and Khartoum spheres of influence in spite of considerable cross-line information flows by the JMC.³⁴ No account has been taken in aid programming (UN or other) of the grass roots peace-building activities carried out for some sectors of the Nuba Mountains by Talisman, as part of its oil consortium efforts to gain a 'social licence to operate'. Talisman's social projects are situated to the south of the mountains along the pipeline route, in the JMC sector. There is no consistent effort, outside of UNDP where the new Resident Representative/Resident Coordinator Dr Mukesh Kapila is rapidly establishing an integrated programme for emergency rehabilitation and governance, to resolve the 'two-country-two-systems' situation of the humanitarian and development effort, which had been encouraged by the parties to the conflict.

53. The evaluation was not able to ascertain the impact of the JMC on public attitudes, or on the attitudes of the military hierarchy on both sides. However, there was great consistency of opinions among the agencies present in Khartoum that the population was generally more at ease since the implementation of the cease-fire. The JMC and cease-fire have not claimed to remove the threat of war permanently but the JMC has helped materialise and clarify the talks concerning that region of Sudan. Some movement is taking place, particularly out of the Peace Villages, which comprise up to 100,000 persons.

54. The second indicator is the nature of the complaints presented to the JMC. The most serious allegations either preceded the JMC, or occurred at the beginning. The nature of the complaints is becoming more and more loosely related to the cease-fire.

³⁴ At a meeting with NGOs in Khartoum, and further meetings with ECHO and UN agency personnel in Nairobi, it was explained that programming is still done independently in each capital, and the logistical systems remain separate, with very few flights from the southern sector into Government controlled areas.

55. The VMT appears to have been partially effective in this area, by the fact that it exists in Nairobi and has carried out three investigations. In February 2003, 32 allegations were submitted (in March, 25; in April, 13; in May, 1; in June 7; in July and in August 0). The nature of the violations, as with those in the framework of the JMC, has veered from serious complaints of large-scale attack to attacks on population groups. Many of those occurring at the time of the evaluation can be attributed to militia operations.

56. Surprisingly, for observer missions operating in direct contact with the society, the linkages to civilian operations, in particular community confidence building and peacebuilding, have been very limited. Consequently, there is a constant temptation for the JMC and VMT to become more involved in the economic issues related to the cease-fire, and to strengthen the popular attitudes towards international mediation, in order to gain in credibility and respond to popular appeals.

57. However, as far as the evaluator could ascertain, both the JMC and the VMT have failed to affect attitudes towards the other side at the higher levels of the parties to the conflict. A return to the status quo ante is very possible. Weaknesses in the aid effort in the Nuba Mountains, and lack of control of fringe militia elements in the southern sector, have compounded the situation. This has not facilitated the launch of a process of irreversible transformation of the conflict to date.

5. EFFECT ON INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

58. The ACPP involvement in the JMC was premised at the outset on working with other donors. The ACPP activities were to support an internationally supported peace process, following the White House inspired Danforth Initiative. This has been followed up by close consultations between the USA, UK and Norway, with the backing of a broader group of nations (Switzerland, Germany, France, Italy, Holland and Denmark). The British funding is the second largest contribution to this and VMT operations after that of the US. It should be pointed out that the VMT MoU was mostly a UK initiative, coming in the wake of the revived peace process triggered by the visit of the US Special Envoy.

59. A good balance has been achieved in the two operations between mobilising a significant number of donor countries while preserving the streamlined effectiveness of the mechanism. However, this is more the case for the JMC than the VMT. In both operations the US and UK were the first to make contributions, joined by Switzerland and Norway in the case of the JMC. The ability to make financial decisions quickly for hybrid military/civilian programmes sets the UK apart, and gives it a leadership role, openly acknowledged by other donors. The possibility of accessing personnel for secondments through the FCO's Organisations for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) database has avoided recourse to Private Military Companies, which might have been the only alternative.

60. On the other hand, the US Department of State was able to tap into its own instruments. These instruments have been used to allocate money to Private Military Contractors and medical service contractors to carry out similar tasks to the UK and to provide the highly necessary logistical base. Pacific Architects and Engineers are under written contract to provide support services to both missions, although the one for VMT has not been called upon as of October 2003.

61. Recruited staff, especially those at the higher echelon, have had considerable experience in this field, and enjoy a shared military culture. The quality of international secondments is extremely varied, even within the same donor country. This has been counter-balanced by the use of accepted norms and practices to prevent loss of coherence in the approach to the population and to the authorities, and to maintain a focus on field presence, in particular in the case of the JMC. This latter element has won and preserved international respect for the JMC, as well as that of the Nuba Relief and Rehabilitation Organisation. This NGO was the only Sudanese group interviewed, as the views of the Government and the SPLM were not collected by the evaluation.

62. The link between the JMC and the peace negotiations is strong in that the JMC demonstrates that negotiated consensual arrangements can work for the benefit of all. Information flows directly from the JMC to all the peace process stakeholders. This ensures continued engagement. The potential link of the VMT to the peace process is even stronger, since the Chairman of the peace talks also chairs the MoU Committee. Nevertheless the inability to deploy fully, as discussed in the preceding sections, has prevented the VMT from becoming as operationally relevant as the JMC.

63. Two weaknesses can be detected in the links between the JMC/VMT and the international dynamics surrounding them. The first lies in the absence of any institutional

anchor and administrative authority, the second on the uncertain locus of control of the Missions.

64. On the first point, the JMC's contractual base is a Trust Fund Agreement between system using Swiss and Norwegian accounts. It is based on the application of JMC regulations, rules and directives, which have been only gradually elaborated and refined in accordance with a UN model. The Mission has been protected from irregularities by its shared culture and commitment, and possibly donor oversight, rather than any well defined financial regulation.³⁵ Similarly in the case of the VMT the strong involvement of the Chairman in contracting processes has provided oversight. However, this approach may have hamstrung the efficiency of the VMT, over and above the expected political blockages it experienced in obtaining clearances.

65. The system of secondments limits the autonomy of the Chief of Mission and the level of training that can be given to staff. This is a recurrent weakness in many multilateral operations, especially in the UN. More controlled operations such as the recent EU Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo can implement very precise specifications. One of General Wilhemsen's main responsibilities has been to ensure the performance of allocated tasks, in contrast the VMT has remained dependent on the goodwill of contributing nations to obtain a full contingent of personnel. Paradoxically, the parties to the conflict have from the outset provided all personnel required to both missions.

66. Political will and consent have been the basis of the success of the JMC on the ground, but may still continue to make the VMT only partly effective. The future of the JMC, and by implication its relations to other Missions, is not clear. Even though the JMC operates in conformity with international law (UN Charter Chapter VI and International Humanitarian Law), it does not enjoy legal authority and cannot rely on official sanction. Legitimacy derives from the pressure of a few foreign Governments. Furthermore, there is no link to regional institutions such as IGAD, and, consequently, an opportunity to build up long term regional conflict management has been missed. The limited multilateral integration of the JMC makes it vulnerable to policy shifts in key Troika states (even though these may not necessarily take place at the current stage), and limits its perceived independence.

67. The VMT is based on a restricted list of 'nations agreed to by the parties' (Addendum to the MoU on Cessation of Hostilities). This covers CPMT personnel and aircraft, IGAD (but not necessarily IGAD members), African Union Observers (who are not present), Italy, Norway, the UK and US. Others actors wishing to join the VMT must be agreed to by the parties. This gives the VMT, apart from its close relation to IGAD, a very different footing from the JMC. This is further increased by the fact that the policy base of both operations is situated in a completely different environment: one in the capital of Sudan, with an operational base in the Nuba Mountains, the other in a much more regionally-oriented Nairobi. Few countries are able to replicate the degree of diplomatic coherence achieved through the Sudan FCO/DFID Unit, spanning as it does all aspects of the Sudanese peace process.

³⁵ See the mention of cost overruns in the section on Strategy Implementation, and the Price Waterhouse Coopers, 'Joint Military Commission in Sudan: Financial Review'.

68. Despite numerous European Council Declarations on conflict prevention in Africa, and a gradual programming development in the European Commission, no links have been developed to the European Union as a basis of intervention into the Sudan peace process. The three most relevant instruments of the Commission (European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) for humanitarian aid, the Rapid Reaction Mechanism for political processes, and the rehabilitation budget lines for rapid interventions outside European Development Fund procedures) have not been called on to support the Missions or other conflict prevention activities to be funded out of the CPPs (e.g. ECHO funding international humanitarian law training via specialised organisations). The EC's focus remains on humanitarian aid issues, and in the north on 'humanitarian plus', i.e. broader emergency rehabilitation and civil society interventions.

69. The JMC and VMT have come to rely principally on a shared operational culture and strong leadership for their effectiveness. This evaluation recognised fully the positive impact of their activities in creating an enabling environment for the peace process. Only general support has been enlisted from the UN or regional organisations. One of the missions has been placed in direct but symbolic support to IGAD mediation in the negotiations. This means in effect that they rely on two key assumptions: the political influence of the Troïka, and the active approval of the parties to the conflict.

6. EFFECT ON INTER-DEPARTMENTAL PROCESSES

70. UK involvement in the two observer initiatives were identified as part of a diplomatic consultation in Khartoum by Her Majesty's Ambassador and the UK's Special Representative for Sudan presented to the joint FCO/DFID Sudan unit in London. MOD was invited to participate in the joint unit but declined to do so because of staff constraints, and a limited defence interest in Sudan. One staff member was seconded to the JMC, and one staff member performed Commanding Officer functions for the VMT. There has been close contact as appropriate between the MOD and the Sudan Unit, while on the other hand the involvement of the ACPP Steering Committee was quite limited. The ACPP bidding process was used to allocate additional funding for Sudan for the difficult and original work of support to peace negotiations. The planning documents drawn up were essentially forward looking, indicating the use of considerable funding (£5.5m) to expand upon existing activities once peace is reached.

71. The decision by the Sudan Unit to recommend the use of the ACPP to fund the UK involvement was based on the view that the ACPP was a good mechanism for rapid and flexible funding. Coherence and joined-up decision-making have emerged more from the operation of the Joint DFID/FCO Unit than from the conflict advisors working in support of the ACPP. Close working relationships between the two departments involved have been enormously facilitated by the fact that policy documents for each are prepared in a joint manner, making the ACPP steering process more of a formality.

72. The Sudan Unit, which was created in May 2002, includes personnel from the two Departments principally involved, the FCO (which is perceived by personnel from other Departments to be in the lead in its culture, physical location, and decision making procedures) and DFID. It has a staff of five, plus one attached to British High Commission in Nairobi, and includes the UK Special Representative for Sudan, whose status is comparable to a Director in the FCO. The MOD has deployed two active duty personnel for Sudan, and has monitored the programme out of the Defence section originally in the High Commission in Nairobi but now in Addis Ababa since the formation of the Defence Section there.

73. The ACPP programmes are monitored by the integrated Embassy team based in Khartoum (two persons, the first arriving in November 2002), and the Sudan Section in the British High Commission in Nairobi (two persons), supported by a joint FCO/DFID Unit in London. Technical advice is also provided from Conflict and Humanitarian Aid Department (CHAD) and the Governance Department in DFID, and other departments on an agreed percentage time basis for each one, based on volumes of funding. The technical advisers (especially governance, and latterly conflict) have had to share their workload between different countries. The small percentage allocated to Sudan (10 to 15 per cent of time) has not been conducive to in-depth work. For these reasons the centre of gravity has resided in the Joint Unit.

74. The Sudan Unit has been the main point of contact between the different Government Departments, ensuring a close connection between political priority assessments and spending decisions. It complements the role of the geographic unit in DFID (Africa Greater Horn Department (AGHD)), which has concentrated on humanitarian assistance, some of

which reinforces the peace dividend approach), and DOMA/Defence Policy Directorate at the MOD, which has intervened through the secondment of two uniformed staff for forward planning. This has led to a well-defined policy and implementation structure. The Unit became the sole geographic desk from December 2002.

75. The Embassy has as a result enjoyed rapid and flexible access to additional resources in what is a very novel and sensitive operation. The combination of civilian and military dimensions required good coordination, available through the integrated Embassy and the FCO/DFID Sudan Unit. Personnel were drawn from active duty services (DFID, FCO and MOD), as well as the so-called OSCE secondment database managed by the FCO. According to several sources, the UK personnel involved have consistently demonstrated a high level of expertise and commitment. The ability to have access to structural development funds is reported by Unit and Embassy personnel to be much more limited. This goes some way to explain the sharply focused nature of the work in the country, with little work on oil investment as a contributing factor of war, for example.

76. Spending decisions are initiated from the Sudan Unit, in close consultation with the Ambassador in Khartoum. The Unit enjoyed enhanced and confidential communications capabilities, thanks to its access to the FCO systems. The unit uses extensively the technical and financial resources of the three Departments and the ACPP.

77. The fact that the ACPP-funded initiatives did not depend on the existence of a discrete conflict strategy, as exists for some countries in the Global CPP, may point to a new approach, in which activities can drive CPP strategies. This approach may be able to achieve greater effectiveness and efficiency than would have been the case if the activities had been made to fit a pre-ordained policy framework. In the case of Sudan, the CPP mechanism provided the required elasticity in which, in this case, a highly joined up approach is able to support a dynamic international strategy. An elaborate UK conflict strategy may not have been as responsive to the opening presented by the US initiative.³⁶

78. Flexibility and access to resources were particularly important in the Sudan case to exploit the opportunity presented for three reasons:

- *Administrative expediency*: many donors were impeded in funding due to the absence of legally sanctioned funding sources for a military mission. Funding in large quantities outside the humanitarian assistance area for crisis responses is not widespread. Within DFID it is possible that other development aid sources may have been used, but with greater constraints.
- *The high importance of timely intervention in a symbolic area*: in the Nuba Mountains, the IGAD led process, is of symbolic importance and any slippage would have been disastrous; there was a need to trigger a good donor response at short notice.
- *The poor level of trust amongst the parties*: a poor level of information on events on the ground from the humanitarian aid community, and the absence early on of any operational structure, required implementation through non traditional partners.

³⁶ There are differing opinions among officials about the emphasis to be given the CPPs as a driver of policy and its accessibility as a simple funding mechanism, with policy being made outside the CPP system. These different aspects of the CPPs will be reviewed more extensively in the framework of the evaluation Synthesis Report.

79. In hindsight, efficiency gains might have been made, within the given resource context, if the contracting processes, criteria for acceptable costs and an operational concept had been clearer at the outset. However, the JMC was operational in the space of three months, followed by a lifting of nearly all obstruction by the parties, which in itself is indisputably a good achievement in Sudan. The management systems established appeared to be optimal considering that no previous model or capacity existed.

7. IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

80. The ACPSP spending patterns in Sudan, which show a large under-spend, suggest that additional money could still be made available for new activities in 2004. However, all these unspent monies in support of the peace process have been earmarked for the phase following a peace agreement: demobilisation and reintegration, governance, and local economic development (outside a possible UN peace observation mission). These are made conditional on the success of the peace talks. Hence, this approach obviates other possible structural courses of action to reduce violence before a durable peace agreement is reached.

81. The financial allocation to Sudan is the third, by order of magnitude, in the ACPSP (after Sierra Leone, which absorbed 70 per cent of resources, and the Great Lakes region). According to official sources, initial amounts were allocated to Sudan in early 2002 with the view that the first activities funded would be a prelude to a broader involvement after a peace agreement was signed in the country as indicated above. Sudan has had to compete for resources with other regional priorities, in particular Rwanda, where the Secretary of State was keen to fund a demobilisation programme. It appears from interviews and documents consulted that the financial allocation was agreed after the costing of the two Missions was given. The additional allocation for support to peace subsequent to the signature of the agreement was based on a negotiated agreement in relation to other countries under ACPSP.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS

82. The issues enumerated below relate to the issues identified for specific attention for each one of the evaluation case studies in the Inception Report of 12 August 2003. The section is structured into two sets of propositions: firm recommendations for the activities funded from the ACP, and a presentation of a range of options. This reflects the feedback received in the course of the evaluation, for both clear recommendations that can be reflected at the level of the work of the ACP and GCP, and for broad forward looking options for programme development.

8.1 Future of the ACP in Sudan

83. From the point of view of delivery against the PSA and SDAs pertaining to the ACP, *the link between the country strategy and the thematic priorities should be strengthened, by considering activities relevant to addressing the economic causes of war, or to the strengthening of African capacities for peace under the UN mandate* (Recommendation #1).

84. *HMG should consider establishing a clearer framework of funding priorities to permit a deliberate choice between the continuation of the existing level of funding, or the extension of the activities to cover more structural aspects* (Recommendation #2). The existing informal process is not based on a consistent analysis of conflict risk addressed over the long term.

85. *In order to make the success of the conflict prevention strategy less dependent on external factors, the ACP should be able to secure for the Sudan Unit and for the posts working on Sudan the necessary human resources to implement a long range structural approach* (Recommendation #3). This would include more capacity for assessments in particular. Best practices identified in Sudan (the cost efficient support to peace processes through civil-military observer missions supporting a dynamic peace process) should be codified and studied for their possible relevance to other conflicts.

86. Should the latter orientation be followed, two areas would seem very relevant to the further development of the ACP in line with the PSA. If HMG decides that a policy of conflict prevention should drive the programme, rather than a more limited support to the peace negotiations, these areas for attention would be:

- Community based confidence building, targeted at the areas where monitoring missions have a mandate and possibly linking the efforts of other agencies (UNDP, USAID, European Commission), and the programmes designed by economic actors, such as the ongoing Talisman legacy projects.
- Addressing the economic causes of the war, or its accelerating factors (Danforth described oil as 'reshaping Sudan's civil war'). This priority policy of the ACP could encourage corporate social responsibility for oil companies in community relations. It may not be possible to engage in enhancing the transparency of oil revenue sharing until a much more advanced stage is reached in the peace negotiations.

87. In the prioritisation of additional and subordinated ACP-driven optional activities³⁷ this evaluation could propose is the following:

- Develop targeted area based programming, probably in community rehabilitation and community mediation, in the vicinity of oil and mining concessions. The objective would be the development of forms of social organisation that would enable the communities to engage in a non-political way with the investors. This could ensure that that minimal justified claims are taken into account during the pre-investment period in the design of the installations, and that well-identified benefits will accrue to the neighbouring communities.
- Link up humanitarian and peace-building programmes to the existing community investment programmes developed by oil companies, for example, the currently ongoing Talisman projects which cover part of the Nuba sector. The objective would be to ensure synergies between the aid and the business groups on issues of common interest.
- Begin a dialogue between existing and potential investors (Total, BP, etc) and NGO and advocacy groups regarding the scope and nature of oil revenue redistribution in Sudan. This could make use of lessons learned in Angola and Myanmar.
- Begin discussions in Khartoum on the possible design of the community consultative regulatory environment with the relevant Ministries. The objective would be to prepare for an optimal climate if/when corporate social-responsibility-minded companies do decide to invest.
- Increase the level of public information on the negotiations by developing a contextualised coverage of the peace talks on radio stations received in Sudan, for example providing a description of those attending the talks, the structure of the talks, and the nature of the issues being discussed. The objective would be to increase the pressure on the parties to negotiate.
- Increase the demand for good governance by launching a programme for legal aid and access to justice units, developed in coordination with the USAID's Office for Transition Initiatives, Southern Sudan programme, channelled through UK based Christian Aid These could deal with issues relating to security sector activities and international humanitarian law in the area of the Nuba Mountains. The objective would be to complement the work of the monitors in reducing violations.
- Set the JMC and the VMT within a continent-wide policy of UK contributions to African peacekeeping, in terms of models to replicate, and networks of individuals who could be called on to participate in regional exercises (Recamp, ACOTA). Links should be made to current efforts to strengthen the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Africa Union (AU), as well of course as IGAD. The objective would be to place the resources provided in a long-term policy framework.

³⁷ An item requested by the Sudan Unit for the purpose of identification of possible courses of action.

88. Some of these above activities are already carried out from humanitarian assistance by the country programme, for example through funding for UNICEF and Save the Children UK, or the Christian Aid People to People Strengthening of the Peace Process in South Sudan. The evaluation suggests that these be more closely linked in terms of programme objectives, to the CPP strategy for the Sudan, and reinforced, depending on resources, by new activities funded out of the ACPP.

89. This proposal is based on the assumption that more funds are available for Sudan given the unspent allocation for this country to achieve a greater impact using ACPP funds in a single country. This evaluation does not make recommendations concerning the use of development money for Sudan.

8.2 Suggestions On Indicators And Targets

90. The PSA should be defined by intermediary objectives defining whether or not any clear limits should be placed between security and conflict prevention. The anti-terrorist activity of the BPST in Nairobi, and peacekeeping tasks, are currently clearly within the PSA. HMG could formulate this more clearly so that activity selection can be done more transparently so that more convergence of objectives is achieved between activities.

91. The indicators used by the JMC rely entirely on the reporting of security incidents, and their redress. It should be possible to develop indicators of impact: small scale surveys of changes in popular attitudes, based on closed questionnaires administered by mission staff or teams of experts; and mapping of revealing indirect patterns of change in public expectations, in particular population movements (transhumance, markets, cultivation) and the price of arms.

92. The evaluation has also used indicators of performance relating to capacity issues, that could be developed further, for example operational responsiveness of the JMC to certain tests, such as sudden changes in access or personnel changes. A final evaluation of the JMC could be undertaken to capture the lessons that have been developed in this operation for future application elsewhere.

ANNEX 1: SUDAN CONFLICT PREVENTION STRATEGY: REVIEW of 2002/3 AND FORWARD LOOK TO 2003/4

Summary

1. This draft paper reviews the UK conflict prevention strategy for Sudan during 2002/3 and sets out the priorities and budget required for 2003/4.

Context

2. In 2002 a new window of opportunity for peace in Sudan has opened. War-weariness and international pressure finally bought the Government of Sudan and the SPLM back to the negotiating table in June 2002. The peace talks are held under the auspices of the IGAD at Machakos in Kenya and have been revitalised under the leadership of Kenyan Special Envoy, Lt-Gen Sumbeiywo.

3. Good progress has been made towards a comprehensive peace agreement this year. The Machakos Protocol, signed at the end of the first session on 20 July, represents a significant breakthrough on two key issues—state and religion, and self-determination for southern Sudan, within a framework of national unity. A second session of talks, ending on 18 November, produced agreement on a cessation of hostilities until the end of March and a Memorandum of Understanding on aspects of power and wealth-sharing, as well as human rights.

4. The cessation of hostilities is currently holding. A committee has been set up to monitor alleged violations of the agreement, consisting of the parties and representatives of the IGAD envoys and International observers, chaired by Lt-Gen Sumbeiywo. It has received no major allegations thus far.

5. The talks are presently adjourned for the season's holidays. They are due to resume in mid-January 2003 to discuss three conflict areas outside southern Sudan (Southern Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains and Abyei), security and ceasefire issues and guarantees. Lt-Gen Sumbeiywo is aiming for a comprehensive agreement in the first half of next year. Pressure for peace is building on both sides. International support is firm.

Review and forward look

6. The UK is playing a full part in the **peace talks**. The UK is one of a team of international observers at the talks. UK Special Representative Alan Goulty and his team work in close co-ordination with the US and Norwegian observers and together with the Embassy are in continuous consultation with the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army to help ensure the best results. UK support for the peace talks will continue until a comprehensive peace agreement is reached.

7. Although negotiations for a comprehensive ceasefire are yet to come, important preparatory work has already been done. The UK has led series of **seminars on ceasefire**

and security issues for GoS and SPLA armed forces, in coordination with USA and Norway: first in January in the UK, at Machakos in November and then in Khartoum and Rumbek in December respectively. UNDPKO also participated. The UK provided several experts to present the main issues and facilitate the discussions. There may be a need for follow-up workshops prior to a ceasefire agreement. Should there be a comprehensive ceasefire in 2003, more extensive training will be required for both armed forces.

8. In order to enable IDPs/refugees to return safely and the agencies to operate effectively, early establishment of **security and peace observation** will be very important. It is still not known what kind of peace observation operation will be required if and when a comprehensive ceasefire agreement is reached. However, there are a few aspects that can be expected. It is likely the UN will be the overarching body co-ordinating the work: UNDPKO and UNDPA have attended part of Machakos talks and begun initial discussions with the parties and with donors. The operation is likely to be low-key, consisting of a few hundred monitors, rather than a larger peacekeeping operation consisting of serving troops. The EU has shown some interest in providing an EU monitoring mission to work as part of the UN operation.

9. The **Nuba Mountains ceasefire** can be counted as one of the success stories of 2002. Brokered in late January 2002, the ceasefire has held for 11 months, troops have been demobilised, basic policing is being established and life for the local populations is beginning to return to normality. However, a political settlement is still needed for the area, as with the rest of Sudan. An international mission called the **JMC** was established to monitor the ceasefire and deal with violations. It is headed by a Norwegian General with UK (serving officer) and US Colonel deputies. It also includes officers from GoS, SPLM and donor countries. The UK has committed \$2 million to JMC running costs in 2002/3. In addition, the UK has provided six civilian monitors and a police adviser for the JMC, who, by all accounts have added a lot of value to the work of the Mission. The parties have recently agreed to a third mandate for the JMC, lasting until 19 July 2003.

10. Regardless of a political settlement, and any wider ceasefire arrangements, it is very likely the **JMC operation will continue during 2003** because the area is something of a special case. The SPLM areas of the Nuba Mountains are totally surrounded by GoS areas: this requires the sort of intensive monitoring arrangements the JMC provides. It would be difficult to fold the operation into a wider (and more sparse) UN peacekeeping operation and quite likely that the GoS would not agree to it.

11. The war in Sudan has prevented many donors, including the UK, from carrying out a **development programme** in Sudan over the past decade. Over \$500 million of development funding will become available from the international community when there is peace: this is a huge incentive for the warring parties to reach a comprehensive agreement.

12. This year, the UK has committed around £12 million to support both humanitarian work and the peace process, including:

- £2.5 million for emergency health assistance through Medecins Sans Frontieres.

- £2.5 million for ICRC's humanitarian work in Southern Sudan.
- £2 million (approx) support to the Joint Monitoring Commission in running costs and personnel (**from the conflict pool**).
- £300,000 support to UNICEF for schools rehabilitation and teacher training the in Nuba Mountains.
- £500,000 to Save the Children for tracing and reunification of abducted women and children.
- £220,000 support for scholarships programmes, particularly for women.
- £135,000 support to the IGAD secretariat who chair the peace talks.
- £250,000 for towards NMPACT for coordination of humanitarian and development aid in Nuba Mountains .
- £225,000 People to People peacebuilding process in South Sudan.

Work in progress:

- £2 million for UNICEF for education work in the South and conflict affected areas of the North, in line with progress on peace.

13. **Until there is a peace agreement**, the UK will continue to support life-saving humanitarian work, education and peacebuilding activities, support for the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Secretariat and support for anti-slavery work.

14. **Following a peace agreement**, it is anticipated that **humanitarian support** would need to be stepped up as access is gained to new areas. Support for rehabilitation of basic services will also be important in order to make a tangible difference to people's lives and underpin the peace deal; alongside efforts to improve equitable access. Equally, people will be concerned to gain **information** on the peace process—media interventions may be appropriate; to contribute to the broader peace process—reconciliation work is key; and to have **security**—landmine survey and clearance will be a priority in some areas. There will be other massive needs such as return, reintegration and rehabilitation of **IDPs and refugees, Disarmament, Demobilisation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRR)**, and **security sector reform**. The UK is coordinating closely with other donor countries, the UN and the World Bank on all planning for peace matters.

UK objectives and priorities for conflict pool work, 2003/4

15. The following are objectives for conflict pool policy and funds for 2003/4:

- a) *Support a successful conclusion to the Sudanese peace talks.* This is unlikely to have financial implications for the pool, however, it will be important for pool partners to maintain a co-ordinated policy, particularly as plans for a peace observation mission take shape.

- b) *Support the UN peace observation mission following a comprehensive peace agreement. Estimate: £1m from peacekeeping side.* The financial contribution for this mission will be assessed and will therefore come from the peacekeeping side of the pool. Close coordination from pool partners will be required on the possibility of an EU monitoring team to support the operation.
- c) *Support the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire. Estimate: £1.5m from programme side, £0.5m from peacekeeping side.* As described above, the JMC of the Nuba Mountains is likely to continue its operation throughout 2003.
- d) *Contribute to successful DDRR and Security Sector Reform. Estimate: £2m from the programme side.* This will be a large area of work following a comprehensive peace agreement and will take some years. Activities might include training of the armed forces for ceasefire arrangements, pensions for and/or provision of livelihood opportunities for demobilised soldiers, establishment of police forces in the South etc. It will also be important to carry out an assessment of what constitutes the security sector to establish the baseline for future reform. Usually this work is a UNDP lead, but there may be scope for the UK to support to the process. Work on small arms and light weapons may also be a priority.
- e) *Underpin the peace agreement: Estimate £2million.* As described above, rehabilitation of basic services, security, provision of information about the peace process and reconciliation work will all help broaden an elite political settlement to a more widely held consensus for peace. The conflict pool could make a large contribution to this work through funding land mine survey and clearance and peacebuilding and reconciliation programmes, involving civil society in the broader peace process.

Activity	Prog Side (£m)	PK Side (£m)	Total (£m)
Support a successful conclusion to the Sudanese peace talks	0	0	0
Support the UN peace observation mission	0 (assess ^d)	1.0	1.0
Support the JMC of the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire	1.5	0.5	2.0
DDRR and SSR	2.0	0	2.0
Underpin the peace agreement	2.0	0	2.0
TOTAL	6.0	1.5	7.5

Risks

16. While IGAD talks are in progress:

- **Nuba Mountains ceasefire breaks down**—Low risk. Even if the peace talks break down, it is likely that the people of the Nuba Mountains would not want to return to a state of conflict and would work to preserve the ceasefire, provided there was continued support from the international community.
- **Cessation of Hostilities is not renewed after 31 March 2003**—Medium risk. If both parties continue the peace talks in good faith, the Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) is likely to be renewed. However, if either party perceives that the other does not have the will for peace, or if there are significant violations of the CoH, the agreement may not be renewed.

17. Following close of IGAD talks:

- **IGAD talks fail to produce a comprehensive agreement**—Medium risk. There are a large number of reasons why a comprehensive agreement may not be reached through the talks. The talks could stumble on just one issue resulting in the collapse of the rest of negotiations. Furthermore, it is possible that the negotiations may lose impetus if they drag on throughout 2003. The international community must keep pressure on the parties to move towards a comprehensive agreement in good time.
- **IGAD talks produce an agreement, which is not implemented**—Medium risk—if the negotiating teams fail to sell the comprehensive agreement to the rest of their parties, there is a danger it will not be implemented. The mediators and observers need to ensure that the negotiating teams reflect the broad views of their parties and keep lines of consultation open. Implementation will also depend on successful inclusion of other political parties in the implementation process, especially in the pre-interim period.
- **IGAD talks produce an agreement, which is implemented, but inadequate security arrangements mean the situation on the ground does not change.** High risk. The large number of militia factions involved in the war means that an insecure situation will remain on the ground until there are proper security arrangements in place. This may not result in the breakdown of the peace, but does mean that the Sudanese people will not see the benefits of peace. The new GoS and the international community need to focus on security arrangements as a priority following a peace agreement.

ANNEX 2: DOCUMENTS AND OTHER WRITTEN MATERIALS CONSULTED

ACPP: 'Cross-Cutting Review: Conflict Prevention in Sub-Saharan Africa

Africa Greater Horn and Coordination Dept, 'Policy and resources Plan 1999/00–2001/2', May 2001

Christian Aid, 'Strengthening the People to People Peace Process in Southern Sudan', Final Project Report (London, 2001)

Danchurchaid, 'Hiding Between the Streams: The War on Civilians in the Oil Regions of Southern Sudan', 1 March 2002

Danforth, John, 'Report to the President of the United States On the Outlook for Peace in Sudan', 26 April 2002

DFID, 'IGAD Partners Forum (Sudan and Somalia): Rome 19–20 October' (London, 26 October 1999)

DFID, 'Sudan: LRA abductees', date n/s

DFID, Private Secretary, Memorandum on Meeting with Secretary of State of 10 June 2003, to the Special Representative, 12 June 2003

DFID, Africa Great Lakes and Horn Department, Memorandum on Secretary of State's Meeting on Resources for Sudan, 7 June 2002

ERM, 'Oil Sudan ERM Study draft report', May 2001

FCO (UND), Conflict Prevention Fund 2000/01: Final Spend, March 2001

FCO (UND), Conflict Prevention Fund: FY 2000/01

FCO/DFID, 'Outline approach for UK engagement in a peaceful Sudan—prepared for the UN and Donor's meeting 25–26 Nov 02' (Geneva, London, November 2002)

FCO/DFID, 'Sudan Conflict Prevention Strategy: Review of 2002/3 and Forward Look to 2003/4', 2003

Friends of the Nuba Mountains Group, Trust Fund Agreement between the JMC and Donor Governments Regarding the Nuba Mountains Agreement, 1 October 2002

Government of Norway, Government of Sudan, Status of Mission Agreement on the JMC in the Nuba Mountains Area of Sudan, 19 January 2002

Government of Sudan, Sudan People's Liberation Army, MoU on the Resumption of Negotiations on Peace in Sudan, 1 October 2002

IGAD, 'Aide Memoire re Assumptions by IGAD Partners Concerning the Nairobi IGAD Secretariat Budget Proposal for the Period October–December 1999' (Rome, October 1999)

IGAD, 'IGAD Peace Fund: Terms of Reference for the Financing of the Secretariat of the IGAD Peace Process in Sudan' (Rome, 20 October 1999)

IGAD, 'Non-paper on the Peace Process in Sudan'

IGAD, Assessing the Capacities for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution in the IGAD Sub-region, www.igad.org, 31 January 2003

- IGAD, Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in Africa—Discussion Paper, Maputo, 29 June 2001
- IGAD, The Sudanese Peace Process, www.igad.org, 31 January 2003
- ICG, 'Capturing the Moment: Sudan's Peace Process in the Balance', report, 03 April 2002 (www.crisisweb.org)
- ICG, 'Dialogue or Destruction? Organising for Peace as the War in Sudan Escalates', report, 27 June 2002 (www.crisisweb.org)
- ICG, 'Ending Starvation as a Weapon of War in Sudan', report, 14 November 2002 (www.crisisweb.org)
- ICG, 'God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan', report, 28 January 2002 (www.crisisweb.org)
- ICG, 'Power and Wealth Sharing: Make or Break Time in Sudan's Peace Process', report, 18 December 2002 (www.crisisweb.org)
- ICG, 'Sudan Endgame', report, 07 July 2003 (www.crisisweb.org)
- ICG, 'Sudan's Best Chance for Peace: How Not to Lose It', report, 17 September 2002 (www.crisisweb.org)
- ICG, 'Sudan's Other Wars', briefing, 25 June 2003 (www.crisisweb.org)
- ICG, 'Sudan's Oilfields Burn Again: Brinkmanship Endangers The Peace Process', briefing, 10 February 2003 (www.crisisweb.org)
- ITGD, 'Women's Development Associations Sudan proposal to CSCF', November 2002
- Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding Survey, 'Sudan', date not supplied.
- Justice Africa, IGAD Resource Group Seminar on Outstanding Issues in the Sudanese Peace Process—Project Proposal, February 2001
- Lederach, John Paul, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997)
- Memorandum on Ministerial meeting, 10 June 2003.
- Minutes of the Meeting Between Global Pool Small Arms Steering Group and Africa Pool, 5 August 2002.
- NENAD, CP: SR2000 Bid—minute to UND, n/s, May 2000
- NMPACT Coordination Structure, NMPACT Internal Review, n/s, July 1, 2003
- Office of the UN Resident Coordinator, Nuba Mountains Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation (NMPACT) Six-Month Report, n/s, May 1, 2003
- Parties to the Conflict, 'The Nuba Mountains Cease-Fire Agreement', n/s, January 19, 2002
- Price Waterhouse Coopers, 'Joint Military Commission in Sudan: Financial Review', n/s, 31 December 2002
- Resident Coordinator and JMC, 'MoU between the UN and the JMM Nuba Mountains', n/s, 1 February 2002

Save the Children (UK), 'Internal Abductions Project—Activity and Strategy Update', n/s, December 2002

Save the Children (UK), 'Proposal for the Protection and Abduction Work in South Sudan' (London, 2 April 2001)

Sudan Conflict Prevention Strategy: Review of 2002/3 and Forward Look 2003/4, dated December 2002.

Sudan Unit, 'Outline Approach for UK Engagement in a Peaceful Sudan', Prepared for UN and Donors Meeting, Geneva, n/s, 25 November 2002

Sudan Unit, West Kordofan: 'Abduction Tribal Conflicts', n/s, May 2002

Tracing and Reunification of Internally Abducted Women and Children in Sudan—Project Description, Khartoum, June 2002

UN General Assembly, Children and armed conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, 30 October 2003, A/58/546-S/2003/1053

US Congress, Sudan Peace Act, US, 1 October 2002

USAID, 'Sudan—Complex Emergency Situation Report #1 (FY 2004)', 14 November 2003

'Whitehall Sudan Conflict Strategy', undated

World Bank, Africa Department 6, 'Country Re-engagement Note for the Sudan', 24 June 2003

World Bank, 'LICUS Strategy Concept Note', 1 January 2003

ANNEX 3: LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED

Ahmed, Mr Mustaque: CARE Assistant Country Director
Ali, Mr Mousa: Program Development Advisor, Save the Children Fund US
Andrews, Colonel Rob: Chief of Mission a.i., VMT
Awad, Mr: Programme Manager, NRRDO
Baugh, Matthew: First Secretary, Aid, UK Embassy, Khartoum
Baumann, Charley: Program Manager, CPMT
Bellemans, Marc: FAO Representative, Khartoum
Blake, Oliver: Governance Adviser for Sudan, DFID
Cloud, Leon 'Lee': Nairobi Liaison Officer, CPMT
Cole, Tim: FCO
Craddock, Tim, Head, Africa and Greater Horn Department, DFID
D'Amelio, Margarite: Community Development, Talisman/Touch & Technology
Eijkenaar, Jan: Southern Sudan Programme Technical Assistant, ECHO
Forber, Ian: Secretariat Overseas (S-S Africa and Asia-Pacific), MOD
Fox, John: FAO Natural Resource Management Consultant
Freijssen, Ivo: ECHO Technical Assistant (Khartoum)
Girdlestone, Ric: Deputy Head of Mission, UK Embassy
Goult, H.E. Alan: UK Special Representative for Sudan
Hamm, Jake: NMPACT Field Coordinator, UNDP
Harborne, Bernard: Senior Conflict Advisor on Africa, DFID
Hodnebo, Kjell: Counsellor, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Nairobi
Hood, Malcolm: Africa Conflict Officer
Isch, Emmanuel: Country Director, Fellowship for African Relief
Kuhle, Major Christoph: Chief of Staff, British Peace Support Team, Eastern Africa
Lazim, Mr: Deputy Executive Director, NRRDO
Lilly, Damian: Assistant Head of Mission, MSF Holland
Mawson, Dr Andrew: UNICEF, Chief, Rights, Protection and Peace-Building
McGarr, Colonel George: Chief of Staff, JMC
McGhie, Stuart: VMT
Mills, Emma: Policy Officer, Sudan Unit, FCO/DFID
Moir, Jo: Sudan Unit, FCO
Oldfield, Colonel Paul: Defence Diplomacy Directorate, MOD
Pantuliano, Sara: Coordinator, NMPACT
Patey, H.E. William: HM Ambassador, Khartoum
Polloni, Domenico: Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Italy
Porteous, Tom: former Conflict Adviser, FCO
Rahimi, Kabir: UNMAS Information Management Officer
Ramachandran, K.: UNICEF Senior Programme Officer, Khartoum
Raynor, Mike: JMC Monitor
Reichlin, Andrea: Chargé d'affaires, Embassy of Switzerland, Khartoum
Rhoad, David: USAID Senior Humanitarian Advisor, USAID Mission
Russell, Phillip: VMT
Scaramella, Cristiano: FAO Deputy Emergency Coordinator, Khartoum
Sisk, Rachel: 1st Secretary, British High Commission, Nairobi
Steele, Laurel: Political Officer, United States Embassy, Khartoum

Stegmann, Graham: Director Africa , DFID

Stillhart, Dominik: Head of Delegation, International Committee of the Red Cross

Trivedy, Roy: former Conflict Adviser, ACPP, DFID

Valent, Roberto: UNDP Deputy Resident Representative, Khartoum

van Oosten, Roland: Senior Programme Support Officer, UNDP Sudan Nairobi Sub-Office

Verkerk, Rutger: Head of Mission, MSF Holland

Widerhofer, Ingo : Consultant, World Bank Post Conflict Fund

Wilhelmsen, Brigadier General Jan Erik: Commanding Officer, JMC

DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Department for International Development (DFID) is the UK Government department responsible for promoting sustainable development and reducing poverty. The central focus of the Government's policy, based on the 1997 and 2000 White Papers on International Development, is a commitment to the internationally agreed Millennium Development Goals, to be achieved by 2015. These seek to:

- Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
- Achieve universal primary education
- Promote gender equality and empower women
- Reduce child mortality
- Improve maternal health
- Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
- Ensure environmental sustainability
- Develop a global partnership for development

DFID's assistance is concentrated in the poorest countries of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, but also contributes to poverty reduction and sustainable development in middle-income countries, including those in Latin America and Eastern Europe.

DFID works in partnership with governments committed to the Millennium Development Goals, with civil society, the private sector and the research community. It also works with multilateral institutions, including the World Bank, United Nations agencies, and the European Commission.

DFID has headquarters in London and East Kilbride, offices in many developing countries, and staff based in British embassies and high commissions around the world.

DFID's headquarters are located at:

1 Palace St
London SW1E 5HE
UK

and at:

DFID
Abercrombie House
Eaglesham Rd
East Kilbride
Glasgow G75 8EA
UK

Switchboard: 020 7023 0000 Fax: 020 7023 0016

Website: www.dfid.gov.uk

Email: enquiry@dfid.gov.uk

Public Enquiry Point: 0845 3004100

From overseas: +44 1355 84 3132

ISBN: 1 86192 618 9