



THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BIODIVERSITY POLICY REFORM

The role of civil society engagement

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Overcoming barriers to reform

- Competitiveness impacts
- Distributional impacts
- Influence of vested interests and rent seeking
- Political and social acceptability of reform






FRANCE: THE TAX ON PESTICIDES AND PESTICIDE SAVINGS CERTIFICATES



Pesticide use rises despite ambitious targets for reduction

Evolution of pesticide use compared to objectives of the Ecophyto plans



Source: OECD (2016), *OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: France 2016*, OECD Publishing, Paris, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264252714-en>. OECD based on data from MAAF (2016), *Tendances du recours aux produits phytopharmaceutiques de 2009 à 2014*.

Note: Changes in agricultural "number of unit doses" (Nodu) compared to Ecophyto plan. 2015 is an estimate based on 2012-14 average.



Policy reforms

- Target to reduce pesticide use by 50% (“if possible”)
- Tax on pesticides since 1999
 - Low rates not sufficiently strong incentive to reduce; Resistance to increase rates
 - Expansion of tax base
- Pesticide savings certificates
 - Novel, complex instrument



Political economy lessons

- Public concern about risk of pesticide use an increasingly important driver of reform
 - Campaigns by NGOs, media attention
 - Public opinion expressed through market choices (demand for organic products)
 - Strong support at Ministerial level (ban of neonicotines)
- Broad stakeholder engagement advanced reforms
 - “Grenelle” model
 - Heterogeneity of agricultural sector




SWITZERLAND: REFORMING AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES



Reforming agricultural support in Switzerland

Structure of direct payments to farmers, 1986-2013




Source: Updated from OECD (2015), *Agricultural Policy Review: Switzerland* (based on data from OECD Agriculture statistics database).



Agricultural Policy 2014-17: Reforms

- The effectiveness and efficiency of direct payments system questioned
- Reforms to better target policy objectives, including for biodiversity

Distribution of direct payments by category, 2014





Political economy lessons


- Active lobbying by environmental NGOs helped to build an alliance of market-oriented and ecological interests
 - Coalition of trade liberalisation interests and environmental interests
- Seizing window of opportunity
 - Green Liberal Party's success in 2011 elections
- Broad stakeholder consultation
 - NGOs encouraged engagement of agricultural groups who would benefit from reform



EU PAYMENTS TO MAURITANIA AND GUINEA- BISSAU: SUSTAINABLE FINANCING FOR MARINE PROTECTED AREAS



Funding marine protected areas via a conservation trust fund



Source: Adapted from Binet et al., 2013. Note: "EEZ" = exclusive economic zone.



Political economy lessons

- Environmental NGOs concerted effort to build a shared understanding of benefits of marine conservation to fisheries
- Credible “broker” FIBA lobbied actively domestically, at the EU level and in the broader donor community
- Wavering political support threatens long-term stability of financing




ITQS AND RESOURCE RENT TAX IN ICELANDIC FISHERIES



Reform of fisheries to avert impending collapse

Discrepancy between recommended TAC for cod and landings, 1995-2015



Source: Based on data from Marine Research Institute (2016), <http://data.hafro.is/>.



Political economy lessons

- Limited initial stakeholder engagement
 - Mainly government and scientists
- Subsequent reforms to address distributional impacts
 - Winners and losers as a result of initial free allocation of quotas
 - Resource rent tax to more widely share the benefits of harvesting a common property resource with the general public



Thank you



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<http://www.oecd.org/environment/resources/mainstream-biodiversity/>